Tag Archives: Russia

Russian Import-Substitution Impacts Armored Vehicle Production

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Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities.

“Currently, measures are being taken to engage specialized enterprises and organizations in the development and manufacturing of domestic components necessary for the production of protected military vehicles. Solving these issues is now considered by military leadership as one of the priority directions for enhancing combat readiness and reducing combat losses of the troops.”

Recent articles in Russian military publications regarding Typhoon [i] armored vehicle production  highlight the advantages – and tradeoffs – of import-substitution measures across Russia’s defense industry. Moscow’s inability to import critical components has forced Russian manufacturers to simplify designs and shift component production to domestic manufacturers. According to the Russian military journal Material’no-tehnicheskoe obespechenie Vooruzhennyh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, initial development of the Typhoon series of 4×4 and 6×6 armored vehicles in the 2010s was in response to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) order to create vehicles capable of protecting crews on par with foreign offerings through 2020. The Typhoon-Kand Typhoon-Y capable of carrying a variety of armaments depending on mission requirements were Russia’s answer to the American-made Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle. Despite their official adoption by the Russian MoD, the number of components of foreign origin prevented mass production of initial models.

The journal further details how the military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 underscored the urgent need for armored transport. While domestic production has been a Russian military focus prior to the Ukrainian conflict, the war has accelerated import-substitution measures. Using existing multi-purpose vehicle chassis and domestic components, Russian military manufacturers began rapidly producing armored vehicles to meet pressing battlefield needs. However, current Typhoons suffer from reduced payload capacity, mobility, and less protection than initial test models using foreign produced parts. Some variants, such as the Typhoon-VDV, remain in limited production due to continued reliance on foreign parts.

The second excerpted article from the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik noted the extent of these changes in manufacturing and capability to the current Ground Forces model BMM,[ii] the ZCA-T “Linza,” a Typhoon-K variant. The “simplified chassis” version of the Linza features transmission, transfer block, bridge, power steering, and armor made by domestic manufacturers—primarily KamAZ but lacks a multi-functional command and control terminal. The case of the Typhoon demonstrates the impacts of import-substitution measures on the Russian defense industry and the rapid tradeoffs being made to maintain the current manufacturing tempo.

Sources:

Source: Evgeniy I. Kotyga, Vasily A. Novikov, Ksenia N. Moskalyuk, “Броня На Колесах (Armor on Wheels),” Logistics of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation (Monthly Russian military periodical), No. 4, April 2024. https://on-demand.eastview.com/browse/publication/144326

Pg. 75-76: “Following the tests, the protected vehicles OKR “Typhoon-K” and “Typhoon-U” were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. However, due to the high complexity of the design and the large number of imported components, they were not mass-produced.

With the beginning of a special military operation, the issue of equipping the forces with protected vehicles became acute. To meet the urgent operational needs of the troops, the production of protected vehicles was organized based on the chassis and components of existing domestic multi-purpose vehicles (similar to unrealized projects with codes “Vodnik,” “Medved,” “Karatel,” etc.).

Pg. 78: “To address technical issues related to “import substitution” in protected vehicles of the “Typhoon-K” 4×4 wheeled formula and “Typhoon-VDV” families, a series of measures have been taken and is currently being implemented in the following main directions:

  • Utilization of domestic armored steels, titanium alloys, and composite ceramic panels instead of foreign-produced armor materials like Armox and Plasan.
  • Full localization of Cummins engines and ZF transmissions by domestic enterprises.
  • Import substitution of automotive components in suspension systems, steering control, electrical equipment, and other vehicle systems and assemblies with domestic counterparts.”

Pg. 80: “The effectiveness of the introduced changes in the design of protected vehicles has been positively evaluated based on the results of the conducted tests. Samples of modernized protected vehicles were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the beginning of 2023. Thus, summing up the creation of new and modernization of existing protected vehicles, it should be noted the effectiveness of measures for ‘import substitution,’ simplification of sample designs, and the use of domestic materials, components, and assemblies, which meets the high demand of the troops for this type of equipment.

Source: R. Pokutny, R. Kurmaev, V. Stolbunov, “Красный Крест На Броне (A Red Cross on Armor),” Army Digest (Monthly Military journal), No. 4 (128-129), April 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 129: However, during the operation of the BMM (Armored Medical Vehicle), a number of shortcomings related to the excessive complexity of the design were identified. Taking into account the changes made (Table 1), on the basis of the ZSA-T “Linza” was created with a simplified design. The goals of creating this modification are to eliminate unnecessary complexity, reduce cost and time indicators at the production and operation stage, and replace imported components with domestic ones. The main changes to the ZSA-T “Linza” of a simplified design include the use of a single-volume body layout formula with a simultaneous increase in the protection class of the medical department, the provision of a spare wheel, and the installation of a “Tucha” smoke screen system, while BIUS (multifunction command and control system) and ABS (most likely the acronym for “anti-brake system”) are excluded.”

Notes:

[i] The Typhoon armored vehicle is produced by ROSOBORONEXPORT, a subsidiary of Rostec State Corporation and manufacturer of military equipment across the Russian Ground, Air, Naval, and Air Defense Forces. Products range from the T-90 tank to the Orlan family of UAVs.

[ii] “BMM” is the overarching term in the Russian Ground Forces for armored medical vehicles.

Image Information:

Image: Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities. 
Source: ROSOBORONEXPORT, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Air-droppably_special-purpose_protected_vehicle_%28ZASN-D%29_during_the_%22Armiya_2021%22_exhibition.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED

Russia Evaluates Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Combat Missions

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“One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs.”

The accompanying excerpted article in a monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the modern battlefield. Russia believes that current UAV usage is not just a feature of the current conflict, but also indicative of the changing character of war. Therefore, Russia is now considering how UAV usage will be employed for all types of combat actions (offense, defense, raid, meeting battle) and when on the march.[i] Although not explicitly stated, the article suggests that UAVs will no longer be concentrated in a single unit as they were before 2022.[ii] Russia’s understanding of the situation suggests that individual units will likely each have their own UAVs and counter-UAV technologies. In the Russian view, success on the modern battlefield requires that all types of units, not just electronic warfare and air defense personnel, need some degree of UAV and counter-UAV technologies to accomplish their respective missions.

Sources:

Source: V. Dyatchin and I. Starodubtsev, “Влияние беспилотных летательных аппаратов на способы действий общевойсковых подразделений (The influence of unmanned aerial vehicles on the methods of action of combined arms units),” Armeisky Sbornik (monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense), May 2024.  https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/573847/

One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs. [i] Without UAVs, it is impossible to imagine the actions of assault detachments and groups, the destruction of the enemy by tube artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, including the use of high-tech weapons, the conduct of actions by reconnaissance elements, the fight against special detachments of foreign states and illegal armed groups, and other armed sabotage and terrorist formations. This also applies to the work of the command staff of combined arms formations in assessing the current situation and organizing combat actions.

Combined arms units participating in military conflicts use various forms and methods of action in the defense; on the offense; conducting combat, route, and direct security; enforcing martial law; during administrative movements; maneuvering on the battlefield, when locating targets.

The method of action means the sequence of use of all available forces and means, chosen by the unit commander and approved by the higher-level commander. When combined arms units are saturated with UAVs, unit commanders make changes to all methods of action, thereby achieving high efficiency when performing combat missions.

In the defense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

  • conduct reconnaissance of enemy targets in front of the forward edge of the defense and in the immediate depths of their combat formations, transmit enemy target coordinates to artillery, combat vehicles, and air defense systems in real time;
  • support air, missile, artillery and combat vehicle (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles) fires in order to increase their accuracy, increase damage and reduce the combat potential of attacking enemy units;
  • inflict effective defeat on the opposing group of troops with fires from the defending combined arms formations;
  • help unit commanders study the terrain in combat areas and assess the nature of the actions of advancing enemy units;
  • monitor the nature of the actions of the enemy’s second echelons and reserves, and changes in the combat area;
  • control the actions of enemy units, their sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist groups in the gaps between defensive strongpoints and on the flanks of units;
  • provide assistance to combat, route, and direct security elements in carrying out their tasks;
  • intensify electronic warfare against enemy electronic zones in order to disrupt the work of troops and weapons control centers;
  • perform other tasks in the interests of achieving defensive tasks by combined arms units.

In the offense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

Laying fires, correcting air and artillery fires, increasing the accuracy of the destruction of targets by determining their coordinates in real time, reducing ammunition consumption, and assisting in creating the required superiority [of forces and means] over the defending enemy. They also help carry out the tasks of assault, raid and encircling detachments to destroy strongpoints, fortified areas (objects) and command posts of the opposing group.  Thanks to UAVs, which perform tasks to identify strongpoints, artillery and mortar firing positions, and the nature of the defending enemy’s actions, the losses of friendly personnel and equipment in an offensive are significantly reduced.When combined arms units are on the march, UAVs are used to strengthen route security and inflict preemptive fires on enemy formations that attempt to impede the movement of the column, as well as when encountering an enemy group and conducting meeting combat. When units occupy rest areas, UAVs take an active part in protecting them and repelling surprise enemy attacks…

Notes:

[i] For additional recent analysis on Russian drone development and operations, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-details-plan-to-overcome-military-drone-deficiencies/; and Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] Typically, a UAV company for a maneuver brigade or division.

Russia To Reintroduce Military Training Into High Schools

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Personnel receiving instruction.

“The course of basic military training (NVP) will again appear in schools from next year.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the official Russian Government daily newspaper, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, discusses Russian plans to reintroduce a “basic military training” course into high schoolers’ educational curricu- lum. In Soviet times, rudimentary military skills (small arms familiarization, first aid, close order drill, etc.) were taught to all students, with differing training regimens for male and female students. These courses were supplemented by the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF), a paramilitary organization that sponsors after-school activities involving militarily useful skills associated with sports, weapons, automobiles, and aviation.1 Although military training was removed from the high school curriculum in the 1990s, DOSAAF has remained in continuous operation. Undoubtedly, the reintroduction of military training into high school curriculums is directly related to ongoing events in Ukraine, continuing the trend of the growing militarization of Russian civil society.

Sources:

Maria Agranovich, “Курс начальной военной подготовки вернется в школьную программу в 2023 году (The course of basic military training will return to school curriculums in 2023),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official Russian Government daily newspaper), 9 November 2022. https://rg.ru/2022/11/10/klass-na-marshe.html

The course of basic military training (NVP) will again appear in schools from next year.2

This was announced by the Minister of Education of Russia Sergey Kravtsov. “We will prepare such a course before January 1, 2023, then it will be tested, and schools will be able to use it from the next academic year,” Kravtsov said.

Recall that the “basic military training” course was removed from school curriculums in the 1990s, and discussion of its return started this spring. Now the Ministry of Education plans to integrate this knowledge into the Federal Basic Educational Program for students in 10-11 grade, the draft of which is posted on the Internet for public discussion. This training will not be taught as a separate subject, but as modules within the course “Fundamentals of Life Safety” (OBZh).

In the draft educational program for high school students in the course “OBZh” there are two options for program, one of which is basic and contains the usual sections about safety at home, in transport, in society and in natural conditions, as well as basic knowledge of state security, defense and the basics of military service.
In the second version there is a separate module “Elements of initial military training.” In this version there is training on close order drill, military greetings, and small arms. Pupils in grades 10-11 will learn how to provide first aid and get acquainted with personal protective equipment…

Notes:

[1] Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF) [Добровольное общество содействия армии, авиации и флоту (ДОСААФ)].

[2] Basic military training (NVP) [начальной военной подготовки (НВП)].

Image Information:

Image: Personnel receiving instruction.
Source: https://tinyurl.com/33maf4kc
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Turkey Conducts Counterterrorism Operations Against the Islamic State

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Turkish Army vehicles in south-eastern Turkey. In light of recent regional attacks by the Islamic State, Turkey is ramping up counterterror measures in the country, especially targeting Tajiks.

“Turkish security services have carried out continuous campaigns against the [terrorist] cells and members of the organization, which resulted in the arrest of thousands, in addition to the deportation of nearly 3,000.”

Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Division continues its offensive against the Islamic State (IS) and other groups as the government attempts to restrict Tajik nationals access after a string of international attacks. Turkey is actively attempting to disrupt the remaining cells of the IS in the country after several deadly terrorist attacks linked to the group have occurred throughout the globe. Over a week period in January 2024, IS conducted bombings in Kerman, Iran, conducted a shooting at the Santa Maria Catholic Church in Istanbul, Turkey, and finally, the group killed over 130 people during an attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, Russia. According to the first excerpted article from the Saudi-owned international newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, in April 2024, the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Division personnel arrested 48 IS members in Istanbul. Thirty of those arrested were said to be connected to the Santa Maria Catholic church attack. 18 additional members were arrested in Ankara, many of whom are Tajik. The article also notes that at least two of the perpetrators of the Crocus attack in Moscow spent time in Istanbul immediately before the attack. IS fighters traveling through Turkey or using the country as a temporary place to stay is not a new phenomenon, as thousands of fighters and recruits have passed through Turkish borders since 2013. IS fighters and supporters have consistently used Turkey as a hub, despite counter-terrorism efforts. Many IS-affiliated individuals will cross the border from Syria, and Ankara’s primary countermeasure has been deportation to the country of origin with over 9,000 deported to date.[i] According to the second excerpted article from the Turkish-based news outlet TürkRus, Tajik nationals now face deportation and rescinded visa exemptions as a result of the Tajik connection to the recent terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, the Santa Maria Catholic church attack, and a planned attack in Istanbul. Tajiks in Turkey were given a deadline of 20 April 2024 to leave or be under the threat of being forcibly expelled. Although Tajikistan is a small former Soviet republic just north of Afghanistan, approximately half of IS fighters are recruited there. A combination of poverty, lack of religious freedom, and an oppressive dictatorial regime give citizens few options, which IS has capitalized on. Through primarily online recruitment methods, IS appears to have been able to appeal to many Tajik’s grievances with Russia and the West. As for Turkey, the effects of its most recent countermeasures for Tajik nationals are yet to be seen.

OE Insight Summary:

TUR’s Anti-Terrorism Division continues its offensive against the Islamic State and other groups as the government attempts to restrict access to Tajik nationals after a string of international attacks.

Sources:

Saeed Abdul Razik, “طاجيكستان دون تأشيرة تركيا توقف العشرات من «داعش» وتلغي دخول مواطني (Turkey arrests dozens of ISIS members and cancels visa-free entry of Tajik citizens),” Asharq Al-Awsat (Saudi news site), 6 April 2024. https://aawsat.com/شؤون-إقليمية/4952726-تركيا-توقف-العشرات-من-داعش-وتلغي-دخول-مواطني-طاجيكستان-دون-تأشيرة

Counter-terrorism forces in Turkey arrested 48 members of the terrorist organization ISIS, including 30 members linked to the perpetrator of the attack on the Santa Maria Catholic Church in Istanbul on January 28. 18 members of the terrorist organization were also arrested in the Turkish capital, Ankara.

Last February, a Turkish court decided to imprison 25 defendants and conditionally release 9 others who were involved in the armed attack on the Santa Maria Church in the Sariyer district of Istanbul, which was carried out by two ISIS members: the Tajikist Amerjon Khalikov and the Russian David Tandev, who were charged. They were charged with: “belonging to a terrorist organization” and “premeditated murder.” They were among 60 Russian and Tajik suspects who were arrested in connection with the attack, and 26 of them were referred to deportation centers outside the country.

The Turkish security forces arrested 147 ISIS members as part of the investigations, and 17 members of what is known as the “Khorasan Province” affiliated with ISIS were arrested after their identities were identified by Turkish intelligence and the Anti-Terrorism Division in the Istanbul Security Directorate. Confirming their connection to the armed attack on the church and planning to establish an entity to train and deploy ISIS militants in Middle Eastern countries. ISIS, which Turkey has classified as a terrorist organization since 2013 and which was responsible for or attributed to the killing of more than 300 people in attacks in Turkey between 2015 and 2017.

Turkish security services have carried out continuous campaigns against the cells and members of the organization, which resulted in the arrest of thousands of them, in addition to the deportation of nearly 3,000, and preventing the entry of more than 5,000 into the country.

“Turkey 20 Nisan’dan itibaren Tacikistanlıları deport edecek (Turkey will deport Tajikistan citizens as of April 20),” TurkRus (Turkish news site), April 7, 2024. https://www.turkrus.com/3167873-turkiye-20-nisandan-itibaren-tacikistanlilari-deport-edecek-xh.aspx

After the terrorist attack in Moscow, it was revealed that the terrorists were Tajik nationals. Turkey also recently announced that it has lifted visa liberalization for Tajikistan. Turkey announced that it had lifted visa liberalization with Tajikistan. Speaking to Sputnik, Turkish diplomatic sources stated that Turkish officials informed the Tajikistan authorities that Tajik nationals who did not leave the country as of April 20 would be deported from the country.

It is noteworthy that the decision was taken after it was announced that some of the defendants, who were Tajik citizens, who were announced to have carried out the terrorist attack in Crocus City in Moscow, had traveled to and from Turkey before this action, and after many news about this issue appeared in the Russian press.It was noted that Tajikistan is considering the issue of imposing a visa requirement for Turkish citizens in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.

Notes:

[i] The International Crisis Group provides a detailed analysis of the overall challenge Türkiye faces with ISIS-linked foreigners in Türkiye. For more information, see:

“An Enduring Challenge: ISIS-Linked Foreigners in Turkiye,” International Crisis Group, 28 February 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkiye/267-enduring-challenge-isis-linked-foreigners

Image: Turkish Army vehicles in south-eastern Turkey. In light of recent regional attacks by the Islamic State, Turkey is ramping up counterterror measures in the country, especially targeting Tajiks.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Turkish_Army_vehicles_in_south-eastern_Turkey.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Iranian Warships Conduct Joint Naval Drills With China and Russia

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“Shahid Sayyad Shirazi (FS313-03),” Khabar Online (Iranian news website affiliated with reformist political faction), 21 January 2024.

“The new ships added to the IRGC Navy are participating in this joint exercise for the first time and are conducting operations.”

In March, China, Iran, and Russia held joint naval drills in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, known as the 2024 Maritime Security Belt.[i] As part of the fourth group exercise since 2019, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy (IRGC-N) deployed two new warships, the Shahid Hassan Bagheri [R1] and Shahid (Ali) Sayyad Shirazi. As noted in the excerpted article from the Iran-based Mehr News Agency, both warships are heavily armed, guided-missile catamarans of the Shahid Soleimani class launched in 2022.[ii] Shahid Soleimani class warships are believed to be the most advanced IRGC-N ships to date and have an operational reach of 5,600 miles.[iii]

According to the second excerpted article from IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, both ships are named after martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War. The article also provides tech-specs noting, that the warships are powered by four engines, are 67 meters long, travel 45 knots, and carry an array of defense and offensive missiles, and an armed combat helicopter. According to Tasmin, the warships are reportedly capable of traveling 5,500 nautical miles—a slight discrepancy to the 5,600-mile range reported for Shahid Soleimani class ships by Mehr News Agency. In January 2024, another Shahid Soleimani class warship was revealed: the Shahid Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis The ship is named after the commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella group of Shia militias, whose commander was assassinated along with Soleimani in Iraq. While the Shahid Soleimani class warships are no match for U.S. capabilities, they should not be underestimated. The new additions are part of Iran’s plans to expand its presence in the Persian Gulf and extend its reach from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.

OE Insight Summary:

IRN recently added three warships to its navy and deployed two of them during military drills with CHN and RUS in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.

Sources:

“حضور ناوهای جدید سپاه در رزمایش مشترک با چین و روسیه دراقیانوس هند (The presence of new IRGC ships in the joint exercise with China and Russia in the Indian Ocean),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news agency owned by Iranian government’s Islamic Development Organization), 13 March 2024. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6054031/%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%DA%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%DA%86%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B3

According to Mehr News, the 2024 (Maritime) Security Belt exercise was conducted with the participation of the countries China, Russia, and Iran with shooting at the designated surface targets.

In this exercise, the Shahid Mahmoudi, Shahid Haj Qasem Soleimani, Shahid Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis warships, Tondar-class Shahid Tavassoli frigate, as well as IRGC maritime helicopters and the heroic soldiers of the Islamic Republic are present.

The new ships added to the IRGC Navy are participating in this joint exercise for the first time and are conducting operations.

“الحاق ۲ ناو رزمی شهید صیاد شیرازی و شهید حسن باقری به نیروی دریایی سپاه (Addition of two warships Shahid (Ali) Sayyad Shirazi and Shahid Hassan Bagheri to the IRGC Navy),” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC-affiliated outlet), 21 January 2024. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/11/30/3041554/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%82-2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%88-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B5%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B4%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87

According to Tasnim News Agency’s defense correspondent, this morning in Bandar Abbas (a port city), the combat patrol vessels the Shahid (Ali) Sayyad Shirazi and Shahid Hassan Bagheri were joined by the IRGC Naval Combat Organization in the presence of chief of staff of the armed forces Major General Mohammad Bagheri.

These two stealth vessels are of the Shahid (Qasem) Soleimani class, and recently the Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis vessel of this class was unveiled and joined the IRGC-Navy. These ocean-going vessels are catamaran-type with a speed of 45 knots and many offensive and defensive missiles.

These vessels are equipped with a Navab vertical launch missile defense system and a Sayyad cruise missile with a range of 700 kilometers. They are capable of carrying three light missile launchers and an armed combat helicopter. These two IRGC naval vessels are 67 meters long, 20 meters wide, weigh 600 tons, and have four engines. Shahid Bagheri’s vessel was built at the IRGC-N’s specialized vessel center in Bushehr. The Shahid (Ali) Sayyad Shirazi vessel is equipped with Sayyad long-range defense missiles and Navab defense missiles. These vessels are capable of sailing 5,500 nautical miles.

Notes:

[i] According to Iranian Rear Adm. Amrollah Nozari, the exercises cover 6,500 square miles of sea “in an area of strategic importance to the whole world.” See: Brad Lendon, “China, Russia and Iran put on show of force with Mideast naval drills,” CNN, 14 March 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/13/middleeast/china-russia-iran-navy-drills-intl-hnk/index.html

[ii] The Shahid Soleimani class warships are named in honor of assassinated Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, who was killed via a U.S. drone strike in Iraq in 2020. For a review of the U.S. strike on Soleimani, See: Michael Crowley, Falih Hassan and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander of Iranian Forces,” The New York Times, 2 January 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html

[iii] Eric Wertheim, “Iran’s first VLS missile catamaran,” U.S. Naval Institute, December 2023. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/december/irans-first-vls-missile-catamaran; Farzin Nadimi, “New Iranian Warship Signals Longer Maritime Reach, More Aggressive Strategy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 16 September 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-iranian-warship-signals-longer-maritime-reach-more-aggressive-strategy

Image Information:

Image: “Shahid Sayyad Shirazi (FS313-03),” Khabar Online (Iranian news website affiliated with reformist political faction), 21 January 2024.
Source: https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1874777/%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B3-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Belarussian Military Undertakes Mass Training Mobilization

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103rd Mobile Brigade of Belarus, BTR-ZD [R1] tank with an installed ZU-23-2[R2] . Belarus has recently mobilized parts of its military along Lithuanian and Polish borders.

“A situation has been created where there is not yet a war today, but the enemy prepares for one. Our actions demonstrate our determination to protect our country. We are prepared to protect our homeland.”

Belarus has mobilized 5,000 reserve troops to conduct extensive military training along two NATO borders, according to the first excerpted article from the state-run news agency Belarus Today. The first site is located along the border of Lithuania, seven miles from the Lithuanian capital city Vilnius, near the Belarussian village Grodzie. The second training site sits along the Polish-Belarussian border in Brest. Additionally, the Belarussian Ministry of Defense reports that its 19th Mechanized Brigade and the 120th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade are fully combat-ready. Belarus Today also reports that Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin stressed that Belarus cannot react calmly to the growing threats and militant rhetoric of its neighbors and that Belarus must learn from its history and apply the lessons learned to the modern day. The minister further emphasized that although Belarus is monitoring the situation, the defense ministry will not hesitate to act in defense of its homeland. The Belarus Today article reports that Defense Minister Khrenin noted that the function of these combat readiness checks is to “train military personnel, improve issues of combat and mobilization preparedness, and to improve skills operating on unfamiliar terrain.”[i] Among the delivered supplies, the Belarussian Ministry of Defense showcased T-72B [R1] tanks and BMP-2 [R2] armored vehicles.

The second excerpted article from the prominent Polish public news service Polskie Radio 24 describes these training movements as “disturbing” with soldiers simulating realistic combat situations with large quantities of heavy military equipment being stationed on the frontier with NATO. The exercises were noted to be in response to NATO exercises in nearby nations, according to Deputy Minister of Defense General Viktor Gulevich. Belarus’s recent military activities suggest the nation may be actively preparing for a wartime footing to engage in armed conflict by training and improving military readiness, or that the nation is utilizing its military to posture, understanding the close watch the NATO border states of Lithuania and Poland maintain. While the exact intentions of these exercises are unclear, in either scenario, these movements bear monitoring.

OE Summary Insight:

BLR mobilizes an extensive network of military personnel and equipment to complete combat readiness checks and training along the borders of LTU and POL.

Sources:

“Хренини: Вооруженные Силы Беларуси повышают уровень проверок боеготовности (Khrenin: The Armed Forced of Belarus increase the level of combat readiness checks),” Belarus Today (Belarussian state-run media outlet), 26 March 2024.  https://www.sb.by/articles/khrenin-vooruzhennye-sily-belarusi-povyshayut-uroven-proverok-boegotovnosti.html 

There are increasing challenges and threats, and we are increasing the level of checks. According to the scale carried out, this check is one of the largest. The 19th Mechanized Brigade and the 120th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade are on full combat readiness. Nearly 5,000 reserve soldiers are taking part in these events (combat readiness checks).

“Today we are seeing many challenges and threats growing. It is the militant rhetoric which is heard from our neighbors. We cannot, of course, treat this calmly because we have learned our lessons from the history of our time,” stressed Viktor Khrenin.

Concerning combat readiness checks, (they are being) held in order to train military personnel, improve issues of combat and mobilization preparedness, and to improve skills operating on unfamiliar terrain. 

“Therefore, units did not go to the training ground, but to real places, real routes, and real borders. The tasks (these places) fulfill are educational. For them a situation has been created where there is not yet a war today, but the enemy prepares for one. Our actions demonstrate our determination to protect our country. We are prepared to protect our homeland,” stressed the minister (Viktor Khrenin). 

“We must watch and track the situation. If needed, (we are) determined to act. We will not stand on ceremony if we experience provocation. This is our main task,” added Viktor Khrenin. 

“Niepokojące ruchy białoruskich wojsk. Ćwichzenia tuż przy granicy z Polską (Disturbing movements of Belarusian troops. Exercises right next to the border with Poland),” Polskie Radio 24 (Polish national public-service radio broadcasting network), 21 March 2024. https://polskieradio24.pl/artykul/3353184,niepokojace-ruchy-bialoruskich-wojsk-cwiczenia-tuz-przy-granicy-z-polska 

The squadron of the 115th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment of the Belarussian Army is conducting tactical exercises at the “Brest ” training ground, informed the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. The “Brest” training ground is located near the border with Poland. 

Soldiers shoot at training targets, operating in a situation as close to combat conditions as possible. The Ministry of Defense emphasized that the units take into account the experience of the Russian army in the war in Ukraine.

The exercises are part of the control of the combat readiness of the Belarusian armed forces, which has been carried out for 10 days, mainly in the western part of the country. Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff, General Viktor Gulevich, stated at the beginning of this operation that it was being carried out as a reaction to military exercises of NATO countries near the borders of Belarus. 

…Railway transports carrying elements of the 19th mechanized Brigade of the Belarusian Armed Forces arrived in Ashmyany in the Grodno Oblast, Belarus. A total of 50 wagons with soldiers and military equipment. 

The amount of equipment delivered corresponds to an incomplete mechanized Battalion reinforced by a tank company. These are four passenger cars with staff, three covered wagons with equipment and ammunition and 39 platform wagons…Ashmyany is located just over 50 km from the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius. The arrival of the transport at the station there was confirmed by the Belarussian Ministry of defense. The resort even published photos, among others T-72B tanks and BMP-2 to armored vehicles. After unloading, the equipment will go to the position scheduled for inspection. The field camp where the Belarusian soldiers with equipment will stay is to be located near the village of Grodzie, 12 kilometers from the border with Lithuania.

Notes:

[i] Belarussian opposition website Belarusian Hajun Project, which reports on the movements of the Belarussian military within Belarus, noted 50 rail cars-worth of soldiers and equipment arrived at the Lithuanian-Belarussian border for inspection and combat readiness checks. For more, see: “Large-scale combat readiness inspection, drills with the territorial defense, and rearmament of the army: review of the main military events in Belarus in March,” Belarusian Hajun Project, 14 April 2024. https://hajun.info/analytics/large-scale-combat-readiness-inspection-drills-with-the-territorial-defense-and-rearmament-of-the-army-review-of-the-main-military-events-in-belarus-in-march/

Image Information:

Image: 103rd Mobile Brigade of Belarus, BTR-ZD [R1] tank with an installed ZU-23-2[R2] . Belarus has recently mobilized parts of its military along Lithuanian and Polish borders.
Author: Serge Serebro
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_Belarus#/media/File:Btr-d_Belarus.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Russian-Finnish Tensions Rise Amidst Border Closures and “Hybrid” Tactics

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Russian border crossing at Paljakka, Kuusamo, Finland. In light of rising tensions, Finland shut down its border with Russia.

“There are hundreds and possibly thousands of people close to Finland’s border on the Russian side that could be instrumentalized against Finland.”

In December 2023, Finland closed its 800-mile border with Russia, which included three maritime crossings for smaller boats, in the wake of Finland formally joining NATO. These closures have heightened tensions between Russia and Finland.

According to the first article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the closure includes three maritime border crossings for smaller boats, which will impact leisure boating in the Barents Sea.  As per a second article, also from The Barents Observer, Finland had been overwhelmed with over a thousand migrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East and Africa. According to the article, Moscow has orchestrated the influx of migrants in a deliberate “hybrid” tactic by the Russian government – so-called “instrumentalized immigration” – to overwhelm the country and its border police as a punishment for closing the border to Russians. Authorities in Moscow have organized flows of asylum seekers on Finland’s eastern border since last fall, the Finish prime minister has argued. A representative for the Finnish border guard said that the maritime border was important to close because reaching Finland by sea is “life threatening,” given the Baltic Sea’s much harsher conditions than the Mediterranean.[i]

In response, the European Union has voiced its support for Finland. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, paid a visit to the Finnish-Russian border in April to say that “Europe stands by your side” as it seeks to secure its border against such “hybrid attacks.”[ii] With the weather warming up, officials there expect an even larger influx of migrants and asylum seekers in the weeks and months ahead. For the latter half of the 20th century, following a war between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939, relations between the two neighbors were relatively peaceful. The recent rise in tensions and border closures have drawn concerns that Russia, beyond staging hybrid operations like “instrumentalized immigration,” could stage a false-flag border intervention to test NATO resolve and its Article Five protections.

OE Insight Summary:

As the RUS-FIN border remains indefinitely closed, RUS has employed hybrid tactics and ‘instrumentalized immigration’ to protest FIN joining NATO.

Sources:

“Finland’s eastern border to remain shut indefinitely (Восточная граница Финляндии останется закрытой на неопределенный срок),” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 8 April 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/ru/granicy/2024/04/vostochnaya-granica-finlyandii-ostanetsya-zakrytoy-na-neopredelennyy-srok

In the past, the closure has been reconsidered every couple of months, but this time the decision is open-ended…

With warmer weather on the way, this time the decision also covers border crossing points at three small-boat harbours: Haapasaari, an island off the southeastern city of Kotka, Santio, an island in Virolahti, Finland’s southeasternmost municipality, and Nuijamaa lake harbour in Lappeenranta on the Russian border. They will be closed to pleasure boat traffic from mid-April. “By closing border crossing points for maritime traffic to leisure boating, the Government is preparing for the possibility that instrumentalised migration could expand to maritime traffic as spring progresses,” the Interior Ministry said in a statement.

“This would be dangerous to people seeking to enter Finland and would burden maritime search and rescue,” it went on to say.

The frontier has been closed since December, when Finnish authorities accused Russia of orchestrating the flow of third-country asylum seekers across the border as a means of hybrid influence.

Nearly two months ago, the government led by Prime Minister Petteri Orpo (NCP) extended the closure until 14 April. Another extension was widely expected, with officials predicting that favourable spring weather conditions would spur more arrivals across the border.

The cabinet also plans to ask Parliament soon to approve a more stringent border law that would allow migrants deemed to have no grounds for seeking asylum to be immediately sent back to Russia. That bill, which was still being finalised on Thursday, has come under criticism for violating international border treaties.

Atle Staalesen, “As Helsinki prepares new measures against Russian hybrid operations, President Stubb makes visit to the border,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 27 March 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/borders/2024/03/helsinki-prepares-new-measures-against-russian-hybrid-operations-president-stubb

Together with his wife, President Alexander Stubb on Wednesday arrived at Niirala checkpoint where he met with representatives of the Finnish Border Guard. Captain of the border guard station Mikko Sorasalmi gave the president an introduction to equipment applied by the border patrols. On site were also representatives of the EU border agency Frontex and the discussion took place in Finnish, English and German, Yle reports.

The Niirala border-crossing point used to be site buzzing with travellers, but since mid-December the border between Finland and Russia has been closed and travellers forced to use checkpoints in the Baltic states or northern Norway. The closure came after several thousands of migrants flocked from Russia and into the Schengen zone through the Finnish border-crossing points. Finnish authorities are confident that the migrant flows were orchestrated by Moscow as part of a hybrid influence operation. 

This week’s visit of Alexander Stubb comes as Finland is preparing new measures to counter Russian hybrid influence on the country. Last week, the government completed a draft law that is aimed at preventing asylum seekers from entering the country. The bill aims at preventing asylum seekers from entering the country. The acceptance of asylum applications would be significantly limited. The bill is balancing between national security concerns and international human rights consideration, representatives of the government admit … It is aimed at influencing Finland’s national security and public order, the government leader underlines. “We have to prepare for the fact that the situation may get more difficult when spring arrives,” he said in last Friday’s press conference. “The authorities need tools to manage the terrain border.”

Notes:

[i] Mariia Yemets, “Finland closes sea checkpoints near border with Russia until mid-April,” Ukrainska Pravda, 5 April 2024. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/5/7449951/

[ii] Doug Cunningham, “Ursula von der Leyen visits border to stand by Finland against Russian ‘hybrid attacks’,” UPI, 19 April 2024. https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/04/19/Finland-EU-Russian-hybrid-attacks/1921713541719/

Image Information:

Image: Russian border crossing at Paljakka, Kuusamo, Finland. In light of rising tensions, Finland shut down its border with Russia.
Source: Fanny Schertzer, (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Finland-Russia_border#/media/File:Finnish-Russian_border,_Paljakka-2.jpg)
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Sanctions Drive Russia’s Shift to Domestic Weapons Production

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Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.

“The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors… but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences [necessity] for local production.”

Despite Western efforts to dismantle or limit its defense industry, Russia continues to find ways to produce the weapons it needs to fight its war in Ukraine.[i] As discussed in the excerpted article from the Azeri based Caliber news outlet, on 16 April, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video unveiling an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan [R1] self-propelled multiple rocket launcher (MRL), supported by a new BAZ-69092 [R2] three axle chassis, at work in Ukraine.[ii] According to the Caliber article, the modifications are a reflection of not only the need to modernize Russia’s rocket and artillery systems, but also “align with Russian strategic [necessity] for local production.” The article notes that Russia has lost at least 83 BM-27 systems in Ukraine since it invaded in Feb 2022. Replacement of these and other systems is critical to Russia’s war effort. The article points out the original Uragan chassis were built in other parts of the former Soviet empire, including Ukraine.[iii] The new BAZ-96092 is a multi-platform chassis wholly built in Russia. Russia continues to rearm its military despite sanctions and restrictions imposed by the West to reduce Russia’s ability to fight the war in Ukraine.

OE Watch Insight:

Updated RUS Uragan MRLS appears on UKR battlefield demonstrating RUS ability to replenish its military systems despite western sanctions and restrictions intended to hold back military industrial establishment.

Sources:

“Russian Army deploys new version of BM-27 Uragan MLRS Rocket Launcher in Ukraine,” Caliber (Azeri based news source with good regional coverage from neighboring perspective), 18 April 2024. https://caliber.az/en/post/234544/

On April 16, 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video showing a night-time operation involving the BM-27 Uragan 220mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near the Belgorod region. Notably, the video unveiled an updated version of the BM-27 Uragan launcher mounted on a new platform, identified as the BAZ-69092 three-axle chassis, marking a significant departure from its traditional ZIL-135LM 8×8 truck chassis.

The transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis is part of an ongoing modernization effort within the Russian Army to upgrade existing military equipment and improve its artillery capabilities. This strategy includes plans to replace the aging BM-27 Uragan MLRS with the more advanced Tornado-S [R1] system….

…

The Russian transition to the BAZ-69092 chassis seems to be motivated by several factors. Firstly, the Russian Army lost at least 83 units in Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict. As of 2023, the Russian Army had only 150 of these vehicles in service, indicating a critical need for the modernization and replacement of this valuable system. Secondly, Russian engineers could face difficulties in modernizing older vehicles such as the ZIL-135LM, whose production ceased in 1995. Thirdly, these difficulties need to be compared with the advantages offered by new platforms for improving combat efficiency. The adoption of the newer BAZ-69092 6×6 chassis offers several advantages, including its capacity to accommodate weapons systems weighing up to 13 tons, but also aligns with Russian strategic preferences for local production.

…It is interesting to note that the BAZ-69092 chassis was specifically developed to standardize and facilitate the use of various military and special vehicles within the Russian army. This initiative began in the early 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which affected the supply of special chassis as key manufacturers were outside Russia (for instance MKZT in Belarus and KrAZ in Ukraine). The Bryansk Automobile Plant (BAZ) was tasked with developing the BAZ-69092 under the project code “Voshchina-1” to substitute for foreign-made chassis. The model is part of a family of vehicles designed for diverse functions, including combat and support roles, tailored to meet specific requirements of the military.

Notes:

[i] For recent media reporting on Russia’s resurgent domestic arms industry, see: “Russia ramps up weapons production, using mass quantity to outgun Ukraine,” The Washington Post, 19 April 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/19/russia-weapons-production-ukraine-war/; Russia has also received Chinese and Iranian weapons assistance. For recent news coverage regarding Chinese assistance, see: “China Has Helped Russia Boost Arms Production, U.S. Says,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 April 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-russia-arms-production-help-c098c08b and “US intelligence finding shows China surging equipment sales to Russia to help war effort in Ukraine,” The Associated Press, 19 April 2024. https://apnews.com/article/united-states-china-russia-ukraine-war-265df843be030b7183c95b6f3afca8ec

[ii] Fielding of the new and improved Russian BM-27 had been anticipated for months. See: Російські БМ-27 “Ураган” отримали нове шасі БАЗ-69092 (Russia Modernizes BM-27 Uragan Rocket Launchers with BAZ-69092 Chassis Upgrade),” Militarnyi (Ukraine media outlet focused on the military and defense industry), 22 December 2023. https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/rosijski-bm-27-uragan-otrymaly-nove-shasi-baz-69092/

[iii] The above sourced Caliber article noted that Ukraine is also “modernizing its BM-27 MLRS, fitting the Uragan launcher on a Tatra Т815-7Т3RC1 chassis, resulting in the creation of the Bureviy system. Revealed in 2020 and developed by the Shepetiv Repair Plant, the Bureviy successfully completed fire tests in November 2020. Ukraine also developed the Bastion-03, which combines a KrAZ-6322 chassis with a 9K57 Uragan MLRS launcher. This latter project is part of a Ukrainian initiative to standardize rocket artillery chassis using the KrAZ platform, following the earlier Bastion-01 and Bastion-02 models.”

Image Information:

Image: Still-frame from video of BM-27 Uragan MLRS supposedly moving into position to fire on Ukrainian targets near Belgorod, 16 April 2024.
Source: Russian Ministry of Defence, https://t.me/mod_russia/37664
Attribution: Public Domain

The 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, Robotics, and the Future of Russian Artillery Modernization (Bartles and Grau) (June 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Given Russia’s strong interest in artillery and robotics, it is no surprise that it has integrated robotic technology into its newest premier artillery platform—the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV—by way of an auto-loading, uncrewed turret and remote-controlled external weapons module.
  • This article, based primarily on information published in Russian defence journals before the current combat in Ukraine, outlines the purported capabilities of the 2S35, the current structure of Russian artillery units, and how the Russian artillery community envisages future structural changes to these units to best employ the 2S35 and robotics.
  • Capabilities Of The Koalitsiya-SV Armament. Perhaps the 2S35’s most impressive feature is the uncrewed turret. Russia has already had much experience with autoloaders in tanks, starting with the T-64 (also produced by UralVagonZavod), but this will be the first Russian artillery system with an autoloader and a completely uncrewed turret.
  • This provides several advantages, namely faster rates of fire, the capability to store more ammunition, and reduced weight. The 2S35 can reportedly fire up to 16 projectiles per minute and store up to 70 projectiles internally. This is a significant capability improvement from the latest modification of the similarly sized 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzer. The 2S19M2 has a maximum rate of fire of 10 projectiles per minute and can store up to 50 projectiles.
  • The Russian artillery community is particularly interested in how robotics can be integrated into artillery systems.
  • Robots and robotics can reduce force size and save human lives while increasing the intensity and effectiveness of combat, but the force structure, training, logistics and maintenance must be changed to effectively in corporate this developing technology into the force and support it.

Details Emerge on the Russian Medical System in Ukraine

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A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.

“The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.”

Since the beginning of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, there has been little, if any, information released from Russian sources about the workings of the Russian military medical system in general, and Russian casualty rates in particular.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal, is the first publicly released information about the inner workings of the Russian military medical system during the special military operation. Although this detailed 17-page account does not mention specific casualty numbers, some idea of the magnitude of Russian casualties can be postulated by the information it provides about the increases in various types of Russian military medical facilities, including long-term rehabilitation, palliative, and prosthetic care. The article also lays out the four stages of Russian military medical treatment consisting of forward treatment, treatment at Military District facilities, treatment at centralized MoD military medical facilities, and rehabilitation centers. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable effort in placing medical treatment as close to the line of contact as possible to increase positive outcomes. This is being accomplished not only by placing medical units further forward, but also by placing various medical capabilities/personnel at lower echelons than have historically occurred. In sum, the article does not provide Russian casualty figures but does support the premise that Russia has suffered large numbers of casualties in the operation and is adapting in response. The article highlights what the U.S. military medical community may expect if the U.S. engages in Large Scale Combat Operations on the modern battlefield.

Sources:

D.V. Trishkin, “Итоги деятельности медицинской службы Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации в 2023 году и задачи на 2024 год (Results of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2023 and goals for 2024.),” Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zhurnal (official medical journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense) January 2024. https://voenmed.ric.mil.ru/upload/site229/3JSanq38G6.pdf

The results of an analysis of the medical service activities of the Armed Forces in 2023 in its main areas are presented. Particular attention is paid to the organization of medical care and treatment of the wounded during a special military operation. The multi-level system of staged medical care has proven its effectiveness.  The following results were achieved: the time for providing first aid was reduced by 3 times (to 10 minutes), providing medical care to a serviceman from the moment of injury – by 2 times (to 1 hour); 98% of military personnel were discharged upon recovery after treatment for wounds and injuries; mortality at the stages of

medical care was 0.43%, disability – 2.1%. First aid training for personnel resulted in a potentially preventable mortality rate of 5.2%. The main task facing the medical service in 2024 will be the timely and high-quality provision of medical care to the wounded and sick when performing tasks in a special military operation…

The main efforts of military medicine were aimed at organizing medical support for the special military operation.  The enemy’s use of modern types of weapons and ammunition during military operations determined the prevalence of combined, combined lesions and shrapnel wounds. Taking into account these factors, it was formed a medical care system in which there are 4 main stages for the provision of medical care and treatment to special military operation participants:

— the stage of providing qualified medical care, which is represented by mobile medical units;

— the stage of providing specialized medical care, consisting of stationary military hospitals of military district subordination;

— the stage of providing high-tech medical care, at central military medical facilities;

— the stage of medical rehabilitation at rehabilitation centers and military sanatoriums…

One of the most important aspects in the system medical treatment and evacuation support is the stage of providing qualified medical teams and medical battalions directly in area of the special military operation …medical units are put as close as possible to the line of contact. At the same time, the medical detachments and battalions have been strengthened with surgeons and traumatologists from central hospitals that are capable of performing surgical procedures that were previously not typically conducted at this stage…

The next stage of treatment involves the wounded being treated at military district hospitals…The tactics of “damage control” [«контроля повреждений»] are widely used to providing specialized medical care with the goal of minimizing the volume of surgical interventions in the seriously wounded and performing definitive surgical treatment after stabilization of their condition.

In central hospitals, the basis for the provision of high-tech medical assistance is based on a multidisciplinary approach to the treatment of patients by specialists with different specialties within one military hospital. Multidisciplinary teams include resuscitators, vascular surgeons, traumatologists, general surgeons and extracorporeal detoxification specialists….

[T]he medical system evacuation, includes mass casualty aviation evacuation to district and central military hospitals, and medical evacuation by ambulance, sea, and rail transport…

[T]he quality of medical care provided remains sufficiently high level. The high professionalism of military doctors allowed them to reduce disabilities of military personnel, but most importantly, to reduce their hospital mortality rates, the lowest in history military medicine.

At the same time, in order to prevent a decline in the quality of medical care, the leadership of the medical service of the RF Armed Forces has taken a number of measures aimed at increasing the number of military and hospital medical specialists and units to prevent staffing and medical unit shortages in the special military operation, including:

— forming separate medical battalions, medical companies and medical posts for formations [объединение], large units [соединение], and units [часть];

— 4 additional medical billets in the staffs of the combined arms armies;

— Branch Clinic No. 4 was added to the 1602nd Military Clinical Hospital (Lugansk) with 300 beds;

— construction of military hospitals is underway in Ryazan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Makhachkala, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Mirny, Vladikavkaz, Kursk, Sevastopol, new 100-bed medical buildings are in Samara, Pskov, Krasnoznamensk, Kostroma, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo;

— major and ongoing repairs of military hospital facilities are underway in Rostov-on-the-Don, Chita, Polyarny, Volgograd, Novosibirsk, Stavropol, Khabarovsk, Selyatino;— a medical detachment (reserve) has been formed and successfully performs its tasks with citizen volunteers that have medical training (currently a decision is being made to form a second detachment from among the volunteers).

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Russian medic applying first aid. While Russia has released very little information about its casualty rate, a newly-released report offers some initial insights.
Source:
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl