Members of Collective Security Treaty Organization Show Less Support for Russia-Led Body

Flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.


The question of the participation of the troops of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the war between Russia and Ukraine is not on the agenda.”


Despite various disputes and conflicts, member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have until recently appeared to put aside their differences to continue working jointly within the Eurasian intergovernmental military alliance. However, as the accompanying excerpted articles illustrate, these internal frictions may be taking a toll. The first article excerpted article from semi-independent Russian daily newspaper Kommersant reports on Armenia’s refusal to participate in a CSTO exercise that took place in Kazakhstan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had requested that the CSTO provide military assistance following the mid-September 2022 clashes with Azerbaijan, but member states “insisted on the need to resolve the conflict situation through diplomacy.” This marked the second time that the CSTO refused military assistance to Armenia in its clashes with Azerbaijan. The second article, from independent news website Fergana, reports on Kyrgyzstan’s refusal to take part in a CSTO exercise in Tajikistan because of ongoing clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. The article also notes that the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan cancelled a separate CSTO exercise in Kyrgyzstan a week prior. The CSTO exercises in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were part of an annual series that focuses on preparing CSTO joint operational forces for a variety of scenarios. The third article, from Kazakhstan’s independent news website Vlast, reports on a comment from an official from Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry that CSTO forces will not get involved in the war in Ukraine, noting Kazakhstan’s respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. While Kazakh officials have previously mentioned their position on this, the statement comes at a time when other member states are showing less overall support for the organization.


Sources:

Andrey Sapozhnikov, “Армения не будет участвовать в учениях ОДКБ (Armenia will not participate in the CSTO exercises),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 26 September 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5581954

The exercises of the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which will be held from September 26 to October 8 in Kazakhstan, will be held without the participation of Armenia. The reason for the country’s refusal to participate in military activities was the border conflict with Azerbaijan…

On September 13, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated…Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan requested military assistance from the organization. The CSTO member countries, however, insisted on the need to resolve the conflict situation through diplomacy.

“Кыргызстан отказался от участия в учениях ОДКБ в Таджикистане из-за «неостывшей крови» (Kyrgyzstan refused to participate in the CSTO exercise in Tajikistan because of “bad blood”),” Fergana Agency (an independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 11 October 2022. https://fergana.agency/news/128011/

The military contingent of Kyrgyzstan will not take part in the exercises of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) “Frontier – 2022” in Tajikistan due to the military conflict between the two countries. This was stated by Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan Edil Baisalov…

…on October 9, the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan announced the cancellation of the CSTO exercises “Indestructible Brotherhood – 2022”, which were to be held from October 10 to 14 at the Edelweiss training center in Balykchy. The reasons for the cancellation were not reported.

Tamara Vaal, “Войска ОДКБ не будут принимать участие в войне между Россией и Украиной – МИД (The Forces of the CSTO will not take part in the war between Russia and Ukraine – Ministry of Foreign Affairs),” Vlast (independent news website in Kazakhstan),” 3 October 2022.

https://vlast.kz/novosti/51937-vojska-odkb-ne-budut-prinimat-ucastie-v-vojne-mezdu-rossiej-i-ukrainoj-mid.html

The question of the participation of the troops of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the war between Russia and Ukraine is not on the agenda, Aibek Smadiyarov, the agency’s official representative, said at a briefing at the Foreign Ministry on Monday… 

He also stressed that Kazakhstan proceeds from the principles of the territorial integrity of states, their sovereign equality and peaceful coexistence in accordance with international law and the UN Charter.


Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Collective_Security_Treaty_Organization.svg
Attribution: Public domain

Erdoğan Relying on Russia To Bolster Support Ahead of Turkish Elections

Putin with Erdoğan.

Putin with Erdoğan.


“…Putin is making “gesture after gesture” to…President Erdoğan… No Turkish administration in the past has received such political support from a world power… Putin is behaving like a provincial AKP leader, to get [Erdoğan] reelected…” 


As he prepares for elections in June 2023, Turkish President Erdoğan will face a more united and determined domestic opposition than ever. Polls show that the most important issue for the Turkish electorate is the economy. Given the high inflation and economic crisis in the country, polls also show that if elections were held today, Erdoğan’s victory is not guaranteed. It is in this context that a series of recent moves made by Russian President Vladimir Putin in support of Erdoğan, are significant. As the first accompanying passage taken from respected Turkish journalist Murat Yetkin’s YouTube channel details, Russian President Vladimir Putin is making “gesture after gesture” to secure Erdoğan’s victory in 2023 elections by helping him claim that he is improving Turkey’s economy.  

In the second accompanying passage from independent news and analysis platform Medyascope, former Turkish diplomat Sinan Ülgen points out that the current pronouncements about making Turkey the largest natural gas center for Europe is a significant change in Russia’s stance on the issue.  He begs the question: “Why now?” and suggests that Putin prefers Erdoğan to win. Ülgen also notes that Russia’s state-run Rosatom, which is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, wired around $15 billion to its Turkish subsidiary recently, helping relieve a shortage in Turkey’s foreign currency reserves, a notable benefit for Turkey in an election year.  In the third excerpted passage, also from Medyascope, expert Ömer Taşpınar claims the transfer of funds represents Putin’s “investment in Erdoğan’s election victory.” Shortly after the transfer, Erdoğan criticized the West’s sanctions on Russia, while voicing support for Putin’s decision to block natural gas sales to Europe. Taşpınar says this was Erdoğan thanking Putin for the transfer.  In addition to Turkey’s economic woes, Erdoğan also faces resentment from the Turkish public regarding the approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees that it currently hosts. From the fourth excerpted passage, also from Medyascope, expert Gönül Tol predicts that Putin may help Erdoğan with this challenge too, by allowing Erdoğan to conduct an operation into northeastern Syria before the elections, something Putin has objected to in the past. This would enable Erdoğan to claim that such an operation would allow for the creation of a safe zone where Syrian refugees could be resettled back in Syria. Turkish observers would seemingly not be surprised if Putin gave the green light to Turkey to conduct at least a limited operation in the coming months.


Sources:

Murat Yetkin, “Erdoğan Putin’le aylık olağan görüşmede: Rusya yeniden seçilsin istiyor (Erdoğan in his monthly regular meeting with Putin: Russia wants [him] to get reelected),” Murat Yetkin via YouTube (veteran journalist Murat Yetkin’s own YouTube channel providing neutral analysis on Turkish developments), 12 October 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tzz1YSqsOUc&t=2s

Russian President Putin is making “gesture after gesture” to Turkey, specifically to President Erdoğan… Back to back statements coming from Moscow about natural gas are surprising even for Ankara.  No Turkish administration in the past has received such political support from a world power… Our journalist friend Nevsin Mengu says that Putin is behaving like a provincial AKP leader, to get [Erdoğan] reelected… 

Sinan Ülgen, “Putin’in Türkiye’deki “seçim yatırımları” ve tüm yönleriyle gaz merkezi (Putin’s “election investments” in Turkey and the gas hub [debate] from all angles),” Medyascope.tv (independent Turkish news and analysis platform), 15 October 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UOPh5Hrd53o&t=16s

Russia’s capital investments into the Turkish banking system for the Akkuyu nuclear plant, certain statements, other ways that Russia has provided financial help to Turkey such as sending the money for the Akkuyu nuclear plant in advance, suggest that Putin prefers that Erdoğan stay in power, since he knows how to work with Erdoğan and has a working relationship with him, one that has produced results for Putin.  Because it does seem like sending the money for Akkuyu in advance has no benefit for Russia, but a notable direct benefit for Turkey.   The natural gas issue is a bit different.  On this issue, Russia has a benefit, but… if Russia is really proposing to make Turkey a gas hub, as opposed to a transit country, this points to a huge policy change for Russia, …which begs the question, “Why now?”… given that Turkey has wanted this for 25 years.  So it does seem that Putin is taking steps to help Erdoğan in the upcoming elections. 

“Transatlantik: Ankara-Atina hattında gerilim: Savaş kapıda mı? Enerji krizi | Biden-Trump çekişmesi (Transatlantic: Tension in the Ankara-Athens route: Is war knocking on the door?  The Energy crisis | Biden-Trump Competition),” Medyaskope.tv (independent Turkish news and analysis platform),7 September 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szU-hgn-6_w&t=2270s

The billions of dollars that came from Russia, I’m not sure how that’s coming, but… it seems that Putin is making an election investment for Erdoğan.  He wants Erdoğan to win elections… and he gave this money for him to win.  And in return, we see that Erdoğan is protecting Russia in his statements.  Erdoğan’s comments [criticizing Europe’s sanctions and voicing support for Russia’s decision to cut natural gas to Europe] are pro-Russia…and his position is one that is closer to Russia on the issue of energy… He is criticizing the EU for the sanctions and saying that Russia is a strong country when he should be saying that Russia should not weaponize gas…

“Transatlantik: Kılıçdaroğlu’nun ABD ziyareti | ABD’den F-16 kararı | Erdoğan-Putin görüşmesi (Transatlantic: Kılıçdaroğlu’s USA visit | The USA’s F-16 decision | Erdoğan-Putin meeting),” Medyaskope.tv via YouTube, 13 October 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oG3YglxALwAErdoğan has been a lifeline for an isolated Russian economy…  Putin is also a lifeline for Erdoğan [domestically]…  In this context, Putin’s injection of money into the Turkish economy … is important for Erdoğan… I think Putin can provide important help for Erdoğan in Syria… Before the elections, I think an operation into Syria would be beneficial to Erdoğan because he could use the narrative that “I know you are resentful about the refugees but I can fix this problem.  I will conduct an operation into Syria to establish a zone [for the refugees to be resettled].  Until now, Putin had not given a green light to Turkey on this, but today, given how much Putin depends on Erdoğan, he might give a green light for this, which would be a huge favor to Erdoğan.


Image Information:

Image: Putin with Erdoğan.
Source: Kremlin.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin_with_Erdo%C4%9Fan.jpeg
Attribution: CC BY 3.0

Russia Demands Mandatory History Lessons for College Students

Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky on Red Square, 4 November 2020.

Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky on Red Square, 4 November 2020.


“The focus of the course on the formation of Russian patriotism is ensured by priority attention to the heroic pages of Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence against foreign invaders, for ensuring national interests and security.”


Over the past two decades, and especially since February 2022, the Kremlin leadership has used its extensive media resources to promulgate its version of Russian history. Key components of this narrative revolve around the continuity of the Russian state and how the West has always presented an existential threat. As the first excerpt from Russian government news source Rossiyskaya Gazeta points out, college students will now receive a mandatory “144 hours for the study of the history of Russia… in all universities without exception.” Students will not be permitted to review the materials on their own, but as the excerpt emphasizes, “educational institutions will have to spend 80 percent of this time on the so-called contact work, that is, not online.”

The second excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes one of the concepts prepared by the Russian Historical Society (RHS), which might be selected to write the curriculum. Rather than allowing individual universities to develop their own courses of instruction, the draft concept developed by the RHS urges the “unity of historical education at the country’s universities and is aimed at the formation of a common civic identity of Russian society.” Not surprisingly, this draft concept mimics the Kremlin’s view of history, where to the focus is on “the heroic pages of Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence against foreign invaders, for ensuring national interests and security.” The Kremlin’s perspective on current events is given special emphasis. For instance, describing the situation in Ukraine, “whose leadership turned it into ‘anti-Russia’ and, with the help of NATO, was preparing for the ‘return of Crimea and Donbass,’ led to the inevitability of a special military operation by Russia in 2022.” The article cites a Russian historian who refers to the official description of the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as propaganda. It also raises the “question of how modern students will relate to the words of the teacher in the presence of many sources of information.”  Nevertheless, the article concludes by stating that “RHS representatives promised that the document would undergo a wide public discussion” prior to being finalized. However, this discussion may not be very candid given the current political climate in Russia today.


Sources:

Elena Novoselova, “Во всех неисторических вузах вводится 114 часов истории России (All non-historical universities introduce 114 hours of Russian history),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Official government source), 7 October 2022. https://rg.ru/2022/10/07/vo-vseh-neistoricheskih-vuzah-vvoditsia-114-chasov-istorii-rossii.html

It was decided to allocate 144 hours for the study of the history of Russia in non-historical specialties in all universities without exception. Educational institutions will have to spend 80 percent of this time on the so-called contact work, that is, not online.

Anna Vasilyeva, “От Руси до спецоперации (From Russia to special operation),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 10 October 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5606420

The Russian Historical Society has prepared a draft concept for a university course in the history of Russia for all students, regardless of their specialization. It covers the period from Ancient Russia to modern Russia and ends with the expansion of NATO, the entry of Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine and the announcement of Western sanctions. As conceived by the authors, such a concept should form in students the ideas of citizenship, patriotism and all-Russian unity. Teachers are advised to “avoid negative bias and slander” when talking about the problems and contradictions of Russian history.

A team of experts from the Russian Historical Society (RIO), led by Yuri Petrov, director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has developed a draft unified concept of teaching Russian history for non-historical faculties…. Now universities have the right to determine the content of the subject, its chronological and geographical scope, as well as methodological aspects. As a result, “conflict persists and even deepens in approaches to the selection of content, in interpretations and concepts in relation to both the history of Russia as a whole and many topical problems of the past,” the concept says.

According to the authors’ plans, it should ensure the unity of “historical education at the country’s universities” and is aimed “at the formation of a common civic identity of Russian society.” … “The focus of the course on the formation of Russian patriotism is ensured by priority attention to the heroic pages of Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence against foreign invaders, for ensuring national interests and security.”…

…The “anti-constitutional coup in Kyiv” in 2014 and the circumstances of the annexation of the Crimean peninsula are also mentioned. The relevant appeals of President Vladimir Putin are almost directly quoted here: “The situation in Ukraine, whose leadership turned it into “anti-Russia” and, with the help of NATO, was preparing for the “return of Crimea and Donbass,” led to the inevitability of a special military operation by Russia in 2022,” the concept says….

…Candidate of Historical Sciences, teacher at Tyumen State University Alexander Fokin directly calls ‘propaganda’ that part of the concept that describes the latest events: “It is clear that they need to show that we have developed, and here we are faced with villains that hinder development. But it is difficult to evaluate the present from the point of view of a historical view…. It seems to them that if a teacher at a university begins to bend a certain line, then students will believe it as the truth. But the big question is how modern students will relate to the words of the teacher in the presence of many sources of information.”…So far, the concept has been sent to the Ministry of Education and Science and presented on Friday at the forum of history teachers in Tobolsk. There, RHS representatives promised that the document would undergo a wide public discussion.


Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky on Red Square, 4 November 2020.  
Source: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64332/photos
Attribution: CCA-4.0

Lack of PTSD Treatment for Russian Soldiers

President Putin meets with injured Russian soldiers, 25 May 2022.

President Putin meets with injured Russian soldiers, 25 May 2022.


“…[W]ork[ing] to preserve the psychological health of military personnel in the SMO zone should now be a priority.”


The accompanying excerpt from the semi-independent Russian news site Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye looks at the question of repairing military morale, arguing that Russia “lacks comprehensive measures to preserve the mental state of people who are in the zone of the SMO [special military operation].” The article begins by pointing out that Russian medical personnel have experience with dealing with “stress, trauma, [and] post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).” It describes how during operations in Chechnya (1994-1996), Ministry of Defense doctors developed a multi-step process to identify “servicemen with adaptation disorders caused by severe psycho-emotional stress” and then provided treatment based on the degree of trauma. The article also discusses research and methods recently demonstrated at the Army-2022 exercise designed “to increase the efficiency of the professional activities of servicemen and extend their professional longevity.” However, Russia has not yet fielded the new diagnostic equipment required even though, as the article points out, “such complexes are now in great demand among the troops.” The article further asserts that “work to preserve the psychological health of military personnel in the SMO zone should now be a priority.” The article concludes by warning that “due to psycho-traumatism, we expect an increase in cardiovascular and nervous diseases, alcoholism, disability, and mortality among various categories of citizens.” 


Source:

Yuri Avdeev, “Психологические травмы войны излечимы (The psychological trauma of war is curable),” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (semi-independent site), 22 September 2022. https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2022-09-22/7_1207_medicine.html

…For more than six months, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been conducting a special military operation (SMO) to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. At the same time, in many ways, there is a lack of comprehensive measures to preserve the mental state of people who are in the zone of the SMO, in the territory controlled by the RF Armed Forces….

Combat operations are accompanied by social stress, which arises in the event of an extreme threat to the survival of the individual personality. Or the survival of entire social groups to which it belongs…. However, practicing physicians and psychologists have their own view of psychological trauma. They consider them treatable and distinguish between concepts such as stress, trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

…During the operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya in 1994–1996, doctors from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and other interested departments searched for the most informative psycho-diagnostic and effective psycho-corrective methods used at various stages of medical care. The result of the work done was the formation of a three-stage (three-stage) system for the provision of psychological and psychiatric assistance, which has been actively used since the beginning of the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region in 1999.

The first stage was carried out by specialists (psychologists and psycho-neurologists) directly in units and subunits using express diagnostic and express correction techniques. Active identification of servicemen with adaptation disorders caused by severe psycho-emotional stress, when the human psyche is not able to adapt to the changes in life, was carried out. The second stage is the provision of medical and psychological assistance to military personnel with a treatment period of up to seven days…. The third stage is specialized medical care for military personnel with treatment periods of up to 30 days. 

In January 2021, the Military Medical Academy. Kirov, under the leadership of the Main Military Medical Directorate on the basis of the ERA Military Innovation Technopolis, created a laboratory where a project is being implemented to study and implement technologies of the platform for medical and psychological monitoring of the professional reliability of military personnel based on the principles of personalized medicine. The main goal of scientific research was to increase the efficiency of the professional activities of servicemen and extend their professional longevity….

Active work is underway to develop specialized psychophysiological equipment. One of its samples was demonstrated at the international forum “Army-2022″…. Made in the interests of the main military medical department of the Ministry of Defense, it is compact and allows in the field using various sensory sensors placed on a soldier to determine his psychophysiological state in a few minutes. 

…Representatives of the department could not give any intelligible explanations about the possibilities of finalizing the system in the interests of the Ministry of Defense. It is also unclear why there are no developed mobile models of complexes for psychological relief rooms. Meanwhile, such complexes are now in great demand among the troops.While in the profile of psychologists, work to preserve the psychological health of military personnel in the SMO zone should now be a priority. And also, if necessary, the fastest restoration of their combat capability and ability to work. …Those who do not think about distant difficulties are sure to face close troubles. Therefore, today the primary task of Russian health care is the creation and effective operation of a system of medical and social support aimed at restoring the mental and somatic health of citizens who were on the territory of the SMO. Otherwise, due to psycho-traumatism, we expect an increase in cardiovascular and nervous diseases, alcoholism, disability, and mortality among various categories of citizens. 


Image Information:

Image: President Putin meets with injured Russian soldiers, 25 May 2022
Source: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68479
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russian Airborne Troops Get First Material-Technical Support Brigade

KAMAZ-4386 Typhoon-VDV rigged for air drop.

KAMAZ-4386 Typhoon-VDV rigged for air drop.


The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has made a fundamental decision to form a material-technical support (MTO) [logistics] brigade for the Airborne Troops.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin daily newspaper Izvestiya discusses Russian plans to establish the Russian Airborne Troops’ (VDV) first material-technical support (MTO) brigade. Currently, MTO brigades are only found in the Russian Ground Forces’ Combined Arms Armies and one Tank Army. According to the Izvestiya article, VDV operations in Syria, Kazakhstan, and presumably in Ukraine, have shown that the VDV requires a dedicated logistics formation (soyedineniye) to support the VDV’s unique needs for not only long-term combat operations and/or deployment abroad, but also peacekeeping operations.


Sources:

Roman Kretsul and Alexey Ramm, “Снаряд вне очереди: в ВДВ появится собственное тыловое соединение: В Воздушно-десантных войсках сформируют отдельную бригаду материально-технического обеспечения (Projectile out of turn: the Airborne Troops will have their own logistic formation: A separate logistics brigade will be formed in the Airborne Troops),” Izvestiya  (Pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 12 October 2022.  https://iz.ru/1408667/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/snariad-vne-ocheredi-v-vdv-poiavitsia-sobstvennoe-tylovoe-soedinenie

…The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has made a fundamental decision to form a material-technical support (MTO) [logistics] brigade for the Airborne Troops. The organizational and staffing structure, composition and tasks of the formation are still being worked out, sources in the military department told Izvestia. The brigade will report directly to the Airborne Troops command, working in the interests of the paratroopers. Almost all the equipment of the formation will be able to land by airborne means, and some by parachute.

“In general, it is difficult to organize a system of interaction with the regular structures of logistic support, subordinate to the Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics,” said Colonel Alexander Perendzhiev, Associate Professor at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. – As they say, “the convoys are late.” And the Airborne Troops move very quickly, and so it is necessary that the “wagons” keep up with them. I think that this is shown from not only the experience of Syria, but also CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] operations at the beginning of the year in Kazakhstan, where paratroopers formed the basis of Russian forces. “the usual logistic services do not act quickly enough, because they are not paratroopers,” said Alexander Perendzhiev. – They can supply motorized rifle and tank units. But the Airborne Troops are special, rapid reaction forces. Today the winner is the one who builds a more effective system of combat and logistics support. Much depends on the delivery of shells, cartridges, grenades, and the ability to quickly repair damaged equipment…

In January of this year, at the request of the government of Kazakhstan, peacekeeping forces of the CSTO countries arrived in the unrest-ridden republic. The Russian contingent was represented by the Airborne Forces. All units, together with equipment, were transferred to the airfield near Alma-Ata within one or two days by Il-76 military transport aircraft. After the situation stabilized, units of Russia and other countries participating in the treaty left this state just as quickly. This was the first experience in history of the real use of the CSTO forces.

The operational transfer of troops to one direction or another and the organization of their supply are also being actively worked out during the exercises of the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. So, last year, near Orenburg, in the rear of a mock enemy, helicopter landings were landed, which cut off the path to retreat. During the maneuvers, the “militants” were squeezed out of the border…


Image Information:

Image: KAMAZ-4386 Typhoon-VDV rigged for air drop
Source: https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2021-Static-part-2/i-Px9gHXf/A
Attribution: CCA-4.0

Russian Military Watcher Identifies Problems With the Russian VDV and Parachute Assaults

Combat Vehicle of the Airborne BMD-4M.

Combat Vehicle of the Airborne BMD-4M.


“These issues have led to the fact that, as after every war in the past, the future of the Airborne Troops is now being called into question.  We will also call it into question, but at the same time it is necessary “not to throw out the baby with the bathwater” and assess what of the existing potential of the Airborne Troops still needs and should be preserved…”


The accompanying excerpted article from aRussian military enthusiast website, Voyennoye Obozreniye (notably still allowed to remain active), features a Russian military watcher’s assessment of issues concerning, and possible reforms of, the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV). As some of his chief concerns, the author highlights insufficient armor, artillery, air defenses, and airlift capabilities for the VDV. He also posits that the requirement of air supremacy for parachute landings and the hazards of the proliferation of air defense systems make parachute landings unfeasible. Although the author questions current VDV equipment and doctrine, he seems confident the overall VDV concept is sound and may just need to be updated.


Source:

Alexander Timokhin, “Реформа ВДВ в свете опыта боёв на Украине и предшествующих войн (Reform of the Airborne Troops: In light of the experience of fighting in Ukraine and previous wars),” Voyennoye Obozreniye (Russian military enthusiast website that has been allowed to remain active), 13 September 2022. https://topwar.ru/201636-reforma-vdv-v-svete-opyta-boev-na-ukraine-i-predshestvujuschih-vojn.html

…Let us briefly list the problems that arose in connection with the large-scale use of the Airborne Troops in military operations.

1. The seeming senselessness of using these [VDV] formations as paratroopers in a war against an enemy with a conventional army, air defenses and aviation.  It is worth recalling that part of the forces that were planned to be dropped near Kyiv from the air (presumably also near Gostomel) were preparing specifically for a parachute landing…Today, knowing the situation there and then, we can only be glad that this landing did not happen.  Military transport aircraft loaded with parachute platforms with airborne equipment, prepared for a parachute landing on the Gostomel airfield. The parachute landing was later cancelled.

2. Low survivability of airborne armored vehicles at a huge price. It is known that the BMD-4 [Combat Vehicle of the Airborne] costs approximately the same amount as a T-90M tank.  However, it (BMD-4) can be destroyed by small arms fire. Despite the very light weight, the BMD uses a very advanced fire control system by Russian standards and uses powerful weapons — 100mm and 30mm guns.  The BMD’s thin aluminum armor provides little protection, but there is no alternative, as it must be [lite enough to be] dropped by parachute.  The BMD-4 has performed well in Ukraine (aside from survivability issues), but only two can be air dropped from an airplane [presumably the Il-76] as opposed to three. [of older versions of the BMD]

3. The parachute squad [3-4 dismounts] is too small and lightly armed to fight on foot, the Airborne Troops have few heavy weapons, tanks, large-caliber artillery, however, now it is being attached to units or the artillery is being upsized from D-30 122mm howitzers to Msta-B 152mm howitzers or other howitzers of the same caliber.  At the same time, the Airborne Troops have weak strike capabilities compared to motorized rifle troops and are relatively expensive.

4. During Soviet times, the Airborne Troops could parachute not only their light armored vehicles and artillery, but also vehicles (GAZ-66 cars), and even multiple launch rocket systems. Now the Airborne Troops has vehicles that cannot be dropped by parachute, such as tanks, and the vehicles that can be dropped by parachute are lightly armored.

5. Insufficient number of military transport aircraft.  It is currently not possible to parachute drop a VDV division.

6. The lack of a clear concept of the use of the troops in combat, which require [for a parachute drop] complete air supremacy over the areas of flight and landing, with the subsequent retention of such air supremacy over the combat area, parachute drops are almost impossible against an enemy with at least some kind of air defense.

7. The need to keep in the Airborne Troops very large number of selected personnel who are much better trained and more expensive than those in the Ground Forces, whose potential cannot be fully realized due to the afore mentioned shortcomings.

8. The lack of VDV air defense capabilities, despite the fact that the VDV must act in isolation from the main forces.

In addition to these issues, there is a deficit of infantry in the Russian Armed Forces for the conduct of operations in the mountains and other such inaccessible terrain, as well as during assaults on cities.  Also, the Russian Armed Forces lack airborne assault units and formations trained to operate in conjunction with helicopters and parachute from them.  These issues have led to the fact that, as after every war in the past, the future of the Airborne Troops is now being called into question.  We will also call it into question, but at the same time it is necessary “not to throw out the baby with the bathwater” and assess what of the existing potential of the Airborne Troops still needs and should be preserved…


Image Information:

Image: Combat Vehicle of the Airborne BMD-4M
Source: https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/Moscow-Victory-Parade-Vehicles-9-May-2019/i-LvCkZHZ
Attribution: CCA-4.0

Burkina Faso: A Bellwether on Russian and French Presence

Memorial of the Martyrs in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Memorial of the Martyrs in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.


“Russia delivers the equipment to us and shows us how to use it and that’s it. What it is given in return, if it is indecent exploitation, there is no problem. France has exploited us for a long time without it bothering anyone.”


The September 2022 military takeover in Burkina Faso appears to be an indication of the continuing shifts in geopolitical affinities among Burkinabe away from France and towards Russia. In the accompanying article from the Burkina Faso-based daily L’Observateur Paalga, a journalist interviews Alouna Traoré, a survivor of the 1987 Burkina Faso coup d’état, a seminal event in Burkinabe history.[i] In the interview, Traoré articulates why he supports what is perceived to be Russian influence in the September 2022 military takeover which saw Interim President Paul-Henri Sandago Damiba ousted by Army Captain Ibrahim Traoré (no known relation) due to the former’s inability to control the spiraling jihadist insurgencies plaguing the country. In the aftermath, international media reported the presence of numerous Russian flags carried by civil society members supporting the change of power. While Russia’s role in Burkina Faso remains murky, next door in Mali, Russian Wagner mercenaries have been in the country assisting the ruling military junta there to try to stem the tide of its own fight against jihadists associated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Meanwhile, even despite years of Sahelian counterterrorism assistance via Operation Barkhane, a strong anti-French sentiment persists throughout the Sahel.[ii]

As the interview details, Traoré, a longtime supporter of Russia, views Russian support positively and pragmatically. Given the dire situation that the country faces, Traoré believes Russia to be the country’s only option, especially for weapons, as neither France nor the United States offers what he views to be acceptable assistance. Importantly, he also articulates that simply because he advocates for engaging with Russia, he views this not as Burkina Faso being co-opted, as many intellectuals in his country interpret, but rather, as a pragmatic and necessary move. As he notes: “We are drowning and clinging to everything. But just because we’re attached to [Russia] doesn’t mean you become our owner.”[iii]


Source:

“Lutte contre le terrorism: ‘Ceux qui ont des problèmes avec Wagner n’ont qu’à rester là’ (Alouna Traoré, le rescapé du 15 Octobre 87) (Fight against terrorism: ‘those with problems with Wagner can just stay there’(Alouna Traoré, survivor of 15 October 87),” L’Observateur Paalga (daily newspaper from Burkina Faso), 12 October 2022.https://rb.gy/o4uxn

You are known to be a defender of the Russian cause. Can you give us an explanation for this Russophilia?

When you say defender of the Russian cause, that’s a bit of an exaggeration. The people of Burkina Faso find themselves shipwrecked. And when you’re in that situation, you cling to anything to get yourself out of trouble. The main thing is not to die. However, we are on the way to extinction with regard to what is happening to us. I cannot slander those who attack us because they are sending us a message….

To come back to your question, I have the feeling that Burkinabe intellectuals are a bit dangerous. They act exactly like France and the United States. We perish, we die, we lose parts of the territory and we find that normal. France does not speak, it has the ammunition and the techniques, but it does nothing. France’s mentor, the United States, says nothing either…

We have to make allowances: Russia delivers the equipment to us and shows us how to use it and that’s it. What it is given in return, if it is indecent exploitation, there is no problem. France has exploited us for a long time without it bothering anyone. Russia gives us weapons that we did not have with France in a short time and that is a problem. It is an insult to our intelligence. The African intellectual makes me ashamed. People who don’t know what they want in a situation of extreme peril is dangerous.

Some believe that those who support Russia, in particular Wagner, are financed. Is this your case?

At my age, am I incapable of knowing what is good for me? Do I need someone to show me the path that suits me? How are they [the Russians] going to come and arm me and instrumentalize me? Russia manufactures weapons like the Kalashnikov which has shown its effectiveness around the world. We are asking for Kalashnikovs in quantity to arm our people…

We are drowning and clinging to everything. But just because we’re attached to [Russa] doesn’t mean you become our owner. One does not leave slavery to go to another slavery. We want the emancipation of the African man because Westerners have never considered us as humans. When are we going to understand it?

Do you think the Russians can make us happy?

I saw something with the Russians I want. Do we manufacture weapons in Burkina Faso? We go to countries that manufacture weapons. Russia is looking out for its interests, I agree. I agree that the Russians are after the money, but in return I have the weapons to defend myself… Burkina Faso is looking for weapons and Russia has them. And better quality. What Russia will take in return cannot finish our wealth. That’s what it’s all about.


Notes:

[i] In that episode, then Captain Blaise Compaoré orchestrated a coup d’état, killing Burkina Faso’s far-left President Thomas Sankara. Among other reasons, Compaoré had justified the act by noting that Sankara’s left-leaning rhetoric had created problems with former colonial France; resultantly, the coup is a symbol for varying perspectives on Burkina Faso’s alignment, or not, with France.

[ii] For more on the phenomenon of anti-French “fake news” in the Sahel, see: Matthew Kirwin, Lassane Ouedraogo, and Jason Warner, “Fake News in the Sahel: ‘Afrancaux News,’ French Counterterrorism, and the Logics of User-Generated Media.” African Studies Review. July 2022.

[iii] For more on African stances on the Russia-Ukraine war, see: Jason Warner, “African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine War Demonstrate Reliance on, Antipathy Toward West,” OE Watch Issue 9, 2022.


Image Information:

Image: Memorial of the Martyrs in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Memorial_of_the_Martyrs-Ouagadougou-4.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Russia Conducts Submarine Sea Trials and Amphibious Landing Exercise in Arctic

“Two of Russia’s newest nuclear-powered submarines have completed a 5,500 nm voyage under the Arctic ice cap.


Historically, the Russian Far East has not been a high priority on the Kremlin’s military spending list, but that is changing. According to independent Norwegian news site The Barents Observer, Russia has added two new nuclear-powered submarines to its Pacific Fleet. The Pacific Fleet now has three of the latest long-range nuclear-powered strategic Borei-class submarines, while the Northern Fleet has two. The second excerpted article from The Barents Observer reports that the Northern Fleet’s annual summer/autumn exercise continues as scheduled with amphibious assault landings, but no riverine exercise up the Yenisei River to the riverport of Dudinka and then overland to Norilsk. Riverine exercises are complicated, and according to the excerpted article, elements of the Arctic brigades have fought in Ukraine and many of the current soldiers and sailors of the brigades are new. Amphibious assault landings are a good starting point before attempting a riverine exercise in the Arctic.


Sources:

Thomas Nielsen, “Nuclear subs made trans-Arctic under-ice transfer from Barents to Pacific,”The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 28 September 2022.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/09/nuclear-subs-made-trans-arctic-under-ice-transfer-barents-pacific

Two of Russia’s newest nuclear-powered submarines have completed a 5,500 nm voyage under the Arctic ice cap. Built at Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk and tested in the White- and Barents Seas, the two submarines “Novosibirsk” and “Knyaz Oleg” are now ready for combat patrols.

The inter-fleet transit from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet contributes a substantial strength to the submarine forces in the Russian Far East. “Knyaz Oleg” of the Borei-class carries 16 ballistic nuclear missiles, while the “Novosibirsk” is armed with some of the navy’s most modern long-range cruise missiles, torpedoes and mines.

Both submarines participated in the Umka-2022 naval exercise taking place in the Chucki Sea in September before sailing into Vilyuchinsk naval base near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy according to the Defense Ministry.

There are now three Borei-class ballistic missile submarines in active service with the Pacific Fleet. The “Novosibirsk” is the first 4th generation Yasen-class multi-purpose sub to be deployed in the Pacific. 

Thomas Nilsen, “Russia shows off Arctic Military Power”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 22 September 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/09/russia-shows-arctic-military-drill-amid-ukraine-war

The official press statement says nothing about how the mock enemy managed to get to Cape Chelyuskin. The cape is the northernmost tip of the Taymyr Peninsula, also known to be the northernmost coastline of the Eurasian mainland.

Here, between icebergs and frozen tundra, the soldiers of Russia’s Northern Fleet countered an imagined illegal armed sabotage reconnaissance group. The drill this week included landing amphibious assault forces supported by choppers and artillery fire from the destroyer “Admiral Levchenko” – the lead warship on the Arctic voyage.

September expeditions with exercises along the Northern Sea Route have been an annual highlight for the Russian navy over the last decade. This year, the voyage is supervised by Vice Admiral Oleg Golubev, Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet.

Armored personnel carriers were brought to shore by “Aleksandr Otrakovsky”, the landing ship that last year sailed side-by-side in the Black Sea with the cruiser “Moskva”. That warship sank after being hit in Putin’s war off the coast of Ukraine earlier this year.

Troops now training for Arctic warfare on the top of the world come from the same infantry brigades that have lost hundreds of soldiers on the battlefields in Ukraine since Putin ordered them to invade on February 24th.

Thousands of kilometers from the violent fighting in Ukraine, the soldiers practiced tactical actions to capture the beach and made a five-kilometer march on the permafrost of the peninsula.

The navy ships set out from the Kola Bay on August 10 and have conducted navy drills at Franz Josef Land, near the offshore oil rig Priazlomnaya in the eastern Barents Sea and in the Kara Sea on their way to Severnaya Zemlya and the Laptev Sea where a drill took place at the Kotelny Island last week. 

Iran Wants Sukhoi-35 Fighters From Russia

Russian Sukhoi-35 at the 2015 MAKS Airshow.

Russian Sukhoi-35 at the 2015 MAKS Airshow.


We hope to get these fourth-generation fighters in the future.


Recent reporting suggests that Iran is working to modernize its air force, which is widely considered the most deficient branch of its military. The deficiency in Iran’s air force rests largely on its outdated and increasingly obsolete jet fighters. Iran continues to fly F-14s sold to the Shah before the Iranian Revolution, and Iran is the only country that continues to fly the U.S.-made F-4 Phantom II, last produced more than 40 years ago. Iran also flies the Sukhoi SU-24, whose manufacture Russia ended 30 years ago; 40-year old MiG-29s; and a few Chengdu J-7s, a Chinese license-built version of the MiG-21. Iran claims its air force possesses more than 100 fighter jets, which is likely an exaggeration that does not take into account the end of production runs, natural attrition and aircraft losses, and cannibalization of some planes for spare parts.

In a bid to rectify these deficiencies, the excerpted article from the Borna News Agency, an outlet affiliated with Iran’s youth and sports ministry, suggests that the Iran is in the market to upgrade and overhaul its fleet. It quotes the commander of the Iran’s Army Air Force as saying that the Iranian military is considering the purchase of Russian Sukhoi-35s, an upgraded version of the Sukhoi-27 that it currently possesses. The article describes the Sukhoi-35 as “one of the most powerful 4th generation fighters in the world,” claiming it can engage up to eight air-to-air targets simultaneously. While in recent years Iran has concentrated its acquisitions and developments on drones and precision missiles, it now appears that a potential Iranian shopping spree—enabled by high oil prices and potential sanctions relief—will also aim to revitalize its air force. Such a purchase would also cement a long-term training relationship with Russia.


Source:

“Kharid-e Jangandeh Sukhoi-35 as Rusiya dar Dastor-e Kar-e Artesh-e Iran (The Purchase of Sukhoi-35 fighters from Russia is on the agenda of the Iranian army),” Borna (media outlet affiliated with the Islamic Republic’s youth and sports ministry), 4 September 2022. https://www.borna.news/بخش-سیاسی-3/1372678-خرید-جنگنده-سوخو-از-روسیه-در-دستور-کار-ارتش-ایران

Army Brigadier General Hamid Vahidi, commander of the Islamic Republic’s Army Air Force, told the security and defense Correspondent of the Borna News Agency about the purchase of fighter jets for the Army Air Force, saying that the purchase of Russian Sukhoi-35 fighters is on the agenda. He stated that the purchase of Sukhoi-30 is not in the plan but currently the purchase of Sukhoi-35 from Russia is under consideration and added: “This issue is on the agenda and we hope to get these fourth generation fighters in the future.” The commander of the Air Force also emphasized that the final decision on the purchase of Sukhoi-35 fighter jets from Russia rests with the Army Command and the Armed Forces General Staff.


Image Information:

Image: Russian Sukhoi-35 at the 2015 MAKS Airshow
Source: Dmitry Terekhov, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9d/MAKS_Airshow_2015_%2820615630784%29.jpg?20150929070701
Attribution: CCA – SA 2.0

Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases

President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.


The export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.


When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, international sanctions forced the Russian defense industry to consider purchasing military equipment from defense companies in Kazakhstan as a workaround to meet requirements for the Russian Armed Forces. In 2014, no significant Russian acquisitions from Kazakh companies ultimately took place. However, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a new round of international sanctions against Moscow have reportedly caused Russia to look again at Kazakhstan’s defense industry. However, as the accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports, the Kazakh government’s announcement on 27 August that it is suspending all defense exports for one year. The ban includes “the export of weapons, military equipment and military products,” and it appears to have the greatest impact on Russia. The move is viewed as a direct effort by Kazakhstan to avoid violating sanctions levied against Russia, which it has stated multiple times that it seeks not to violate. The article notes that Russia had been planning to make a $46 million defense purchase from a Kazakh company, including acquiring shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, and even armored personnel carriers. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development denied this. The article notes that the pro-Russian Rybar Telegram channel tried to refute the Kazakh government by publishing documents for the purchase, but they could not be verified. Regardless of whether the Kazakh government agreed to the purchase, the one-year suspension of defense exports ultimately deprives Russia of a supplier of weapons and equipment that closely matches its own armed forces.


Sources:

“Казахстан на год приостановит экспорт вооружений (Kazakhstan is suspending defense exports for one year),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 29 August 2022.

https://fergana.agency/news/127503/

Kazakhstan will suspend the export of military products for a year. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of the country came up with such an initiative, and it was supported by the Commission on Defense Industry, the website of the Prime Minister reports…the export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.

In the middle of this month, Russian Telegram channels reported on an allegedly planned deal for the sale of Soviet and Russian-made ammunition by the Kazakh company Technoexport…They said that the contract in the amount of $46 million was concluded on July 16, 2022. The reports also provided a list of weapons – shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, armored personnel carriers and so on. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of Kazakhstan denied this information a few days later.

In response, the Rybar Telegram channel published documents (without specifying their origin) that cast doubt on the refutation of the Kazakh authorities.

On August 19, a meeting was held in Sochi between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. As the Kremlin reported, the agenda of the talks included the development of Russian-Kazakh relations, strategic partnership and cooperation.


Image Information:

Image: President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin-Tokayev_(2022-08-19).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0