Russian Views on Finland and Sweden Joining NATO

NATO Secretary General meets with Ministers of Defense for Finland and Sweden, March 2022.

NATO Secretary General meets with Ministers of Defense for Finland and Sweden, March 2022.


Of course, this means the deterioration of our strategic position….” 


Russian reactions to the recent decision by Finland and Sweden to join NATO have ranged from mild concern to grave trepidation.  According to the excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin news outlet RIA Novosti, President Putin does not foresee any serious problems with this decision, provided that no “military infrastructure of the alliance is deployed in Finland and Sweden.”  If this were to occur, Putin stated that “Russia will be forced to respond in a similar way.”  Putin also asserted that there was no merit to “the thesis that Russia’s goal to push NATO forces away from its borders, preventing Ukraine from joining the alliance, led to the opposite, only from Sweden and Finland.”  Putin explained his rationale by claiming that “unlike Ukraine, Sweden and Finland do not persecute people who feel they are part of Russian culture.”

Other knowledgeable Russians have expressed greater concern over the further enlargement of NATO.  In an interview in the popular daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets, “Ruslan Pukhov, the Director of the Moscow Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), spoke about the military significance of NATO expansion in the northwest.”  According to Pukhov, this expansion “means the deterioration of our strategic position.”  He asserts that Russia will now “have to spend more on defense than before February this year [which will mean] that less money will be spent on infrastructure projects, healthcare, and education.”  Pukhov reviews Russia’s long history with these two countries, stating “both the Swedes and the Finns have already experienced the power of Russian weapons,” which resulted in “bad memories for them.”  He concludes that becoming members of NATO might tempt them to try to settle old scores, and that therefore Russia “can’t be weak.”


Source:

“Путин: Россия ответит в случае размещения баз НАТО в Швеции и Финляндии (Putin: Russia will respond in case of deployment of NATO bases in Sweden and Finland),” RIA Novosti (pro-Kremlin news outlet) 30 June 2022. http://RIA/Ru/20220629/Putin-1799133978.html

In Russia’s relations with Sweden and Finland, there are no such problems as with Ukraine, if they want to join NATO, let them join, but if the military infrastructure of the alliance is deployed in Finland and Sweden, Russia will be forced to respond in a similar way, Russian President Vladimir Putin said…

…He also called false and ‘having nothing to do with reality’ the thesis that Russia ‘s goal to push NATO forces away from its borders, preventing Ukraine from joining the alliance, led to the opposite, only from Sweden and Finland.  “For us, the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO is not at all the same as the membership of Ukraine, these are completely different things.  They understand this very well.  No.  This is a completely different thing,” the Russian leader emphasized.  He noted that, unlike Ukraine, Sweden and Finland do not persecute people who feel they are part of Russian culture.

Source: Olga Bozheva, “Вступление Финляндии и Швеции в НАТО принесло России серьезные риски (The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO brought Russia serious risks),” Moskovskiy Komsomolets (popular, pro-Kremlin news organization), 5 July 2022. https://www.mk.ru/politics/2022/07/05/vstuplenie-finlyandii-i-shvecii-v-nato-prineslo-rossii-sereznye-riski.html

The process of accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO was continued.  On July 4, negotiations between these countries and the Alliance were completed in Brussels.  On July 5, the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland signed the accession protocol at NATO Headquarters.  Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), spoke about the military significance of NATO expansion in the northwest.

Now there are rather contradictory statements about the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO.  A number of political scientists say that this does not pose a serious danger to us.  Someone thinks that we need to strengthen the borders, up to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons there.  What do you think their entry into the alliance means for us?

Of course, this means the deterioration of our strategic position.  And not because these countries suddenly became anti-Russian overnight – even before that they loved us like a dog with a stick.  However, they were not at least formally integrated into NATO structures, and accordingly, they behaved cautiously and correctly towards us.

…In any case, such a move by Stockholm and Helsinki does not lead to anything good.  And the one who says that their entry into NATO means practically nothing to us, he, I think, is disingenuous.

…This will force us to invest more financially in the arms race.  We’ve already gotten into it.  And now it doesn’t matter at all whether we did it ourselves or were dragged into it.  The score is on the scoreboard.  We will have to spend more on defense than before February this year.  This means that less money will be spent on infrastructure projects, healthcare, and education. There are no illusions here.

…Both the Swedes and the Finns have already experienced the power of Russian weapons… bad memories for them.  They still remember very well how they got hit in the teeth from us.  And if you suddenly forgot, so we can remind you….  So we can’t be weak.


Image Information:

Image: NATO Secretary General meets with Ministers of Defense for Finland and Sweden, March 2022
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/nato/51942155994
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Russia and China Look To Corner Bolivia’s Lithium Industry

“China controls 80 to 90 percent of global capacity.  This is an extremely dominant position for a country at a time when everyone is trying to expand.”


Bolivia has some of the largest deposits of lithium in the world, a mineral with civilian and military applications.  As reported by the UK-based news outlet BBC Spanish, Russia, which possesses deep experience in mining strategic minerals, is one of the major contenders to win a globally strategic contract to extract much of Bolivia’s lithium. China is another contender. According to U.S. Government international broadcaster Voz de America, China already controls 80 to 90 percent of global lithium mining capacity.  Voz de America reports that there is international concern that China will consolidate its position as the most important lithium mining power, given China’s past use of economic interdependence as a weapon.  Russian or Chinese dominance over the lithium industry risks producing another raw material dependence on authoritarian competitors.


Source:

“La carrera por los codiciados ‘minerales del future’ que pueden crear gigantescas fortunas e influir en la seguridad nacional de los países (The race for the coveted ‘minerals of the future’ that can create gigantic fortunes and influence the national security of countries),” BBC Spanish (Spanish-language version of the popular British news outlet), 21 April 2022.  https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-61144362

Russia, one of the major exporters of gas and oil, demonstrated that due to the dependence of many countries on its exports, especially European ones, fuels are a weapon of war amid the harsh economic pressures that the U.S. and its allies have pursued in order to get the Kremlin to end the invasion of Ukraine… However, in the race for the metals that will play a crucial role in future economic development, Russia has its advantages: it is the world’s second largest exporter of cobalt, the second of platinum, and the third of nickel.

Source:  “Fuerte competencia por el litio de Latinoamérica para reducir dependencia de China (Strong competition for lithium from Latin America to reduce dependence on China),” Voz de America (U.S.-based, state-owned international broadcaster), 24 June 2022. https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/fuerte-competencia-por-el-litio-de-latinoamerica-para-reducir-dependencia-de-china/6628644.html 

The race for lithium has led manufacturers of electric vehicles to enter into contracts directly with mining companies to ensure the supply of lithium… China not only exploits lithium but also exercises a dominant position in the entire supply chain for the manufacture of electric car batteries.  Most of the battery manufacturing is in China.  China controls 80 to 90 percent of global capacity.  This is an extremely dominant position for a country at a time when everyone is trying to expand.

Kremlin Easing Russian Citizenship for All Ukrainians

President Vladimir Putin …signed a decree giving the right to all residents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner….


Six months before Russia reinvaded Ukraine, President Putin published a long historical article where he asserted that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people, a single whole.” (See: “Studying Putin’s History of Ukraine,” OE Watch, Sept 2021.)  Attempts to prove this assertion using force have thus far met with considerable Ukrainian resistance.  However, the Kremlin is also employing its administrative and economic prowess to make it easier for Ukrainians to become Russian citizens.  As the first excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant points out, the Kremlin has recently enacted legislation “giving the right to allresidents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner.”  The article goes on to stress that this new streamlined procedure does “not require them to renounce Ukrainian or other citizenship.”  The article concludes by quoting a high-level Kremlin official, who claims that “from 2016 to 2020, about 978,000 citizens of Ukraine received Russian citizenship.”

The second excerpt from the popular, pro-Kremlin site Versiya describes how Russian authorities have set up “bus passport tours” to transport those Ukrainians who want to obtain Russian citizenship.  The buses pick up Ukrainians in regions not taken by Russia and transport them to those occupied by Russian forces.  According to the author, Russian “passportization of the Black Sea region is gaining momentum [where, for instance], “the number of residents of Odessa who have received Russian passports goes into the thousands.”  Many pensioners participate in these tours, since once they gain Russian citizenship, they “will be able to apply for Russian pensions (before recalculation – 10,000 rubles [$185] a month.”  The article asserts that there are many other categories eligible to receive monthly payments: “war veterans and children, the disabled…fathers and single mothers…pregnant women,” and that the Russian benefits far exceed those provided by the Ukrainian government.  The article concludes by pointing out that because of the conflict in and around “the Mykolaiv and Zaporozhye regions…, up to 85 percent of local residents lost their jobs… [and] there is only one hope – for Russia.”


Source:

Elena Rozhkova, Ksenia Veretennikova, “Гражданам Украины вышло упрощение (Citizens of Ukraine received a simplification),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 11 July 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5458512

President Vladimir Putin on Monday signed a decree giving the right to all residents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner…. The expert believes that the updated decree will be relevant given the dynamically changing situation with the transition of Ukrainian territories under the control of Russian troops, as well as for Ukrainian emigrants living in Russia.

According to the new amendments, the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship in a simplified manner now applies to all residents of Ukraine, and not only to the population of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) and regions of Ukraine controlled by the Russian armed forces. The document also notes that the presence of citizens in military service cannot serve as a basis for rejecting their applications for admission to Russian citizenship….

…The deputy [Mr. Zatulin] also clarified that residents of the DPR, LPR and Ukraine who receive Russian citizenship are not required to renounce their first citizenship and can have two passports…. 

…In June 2022, TASS, citing the press center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reported that since April 2019, on the basis of this decree, more than 800 thousand people have acquired Russian citizenship. A year ago, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Dmitry Kozak… stated that not only residents of Donbass, but also residents of the “rest of Ukraine” apply for Russian citizenship. According to him, from 2016 to 2020, about 978 thousand citizens of Ukraine received Russian citizenship…

Source: Alexander Artishchenko, “Туры за паспортами (Tours for passports),” Versia (popular, pro-Kremlin site), 3 August 2022. https://versia.ru/zhiteli-nikolaeva-i-odessy-ezdyat-oformlyat-rossijskoe-grazhdanstvo-v-xersonskuyu-oblast

Passportization of the Black Sea region is gaining momentum – Russian citizenship is issued in Kherson, Skadovsk, Genichesk, Nova Kakhovka, Oleshki, Belozerka and Gola Prystan. Despite the fact that it is rather difficult to leave the settlements controlled by Ukraine, besides, they mostly let pensioners through and, less often, women, the number of residents of Odessa who have received Russian passports goes into the thousands….

…Bus passport tours are organized from Zaporozhye and Nikolaev to Kherson – the final destinations of the trip are usually not advertised, but these buses are still allowed through at checkpoints without any problems. As explained by the deputy head of the military-civilian administration of the Kherson region Ekaterina Gubareva, any citizen of Ukraine, regardless of place of residence, even from Lviv, can apply for a Russian passport. … Together with Russian citizenship, pensioners will be able to apply for Russian pensions (before recalculation – 10,000 rubles a month, but in the fall they promise to recalculate and increase pensions, and accrue “from above” what they don’t receive in the summer). Moreover, war veterans and children, the disabled and some categories of beneficiaries are entitled to an allowance of 5,000 rubles per month. The allowance can be issued in the same place as passports. Gubareva separately noted, that monthly social payments are due to fathers and single mothers – at the rate of 10,000 rubles for each child. And payments to a full family for the maintenance of a minor child will amount to 4,000 rubles. Also, pregnant women can apply for social assistance (10,000 rubles – a one-time payment for pregnancy, and another 20,000 – at the birth of a child).

Russia’s social support is especially important, since Kyiv has actually curtailed the payment of pensions and social benefits in the Mykolaiv and Zaporozhye regions. As of early August, up to 85 percent of local residents lost their jobs – able-bodied families do not have the full opportunity to support their elderly and children. In the Odessa region, 70 percent of the inhabitants have lost their jobs (although pensions are still paid there). So there was only one hope – for Russia.

Russia’s Newest Nuclear Submarine Joins Northern Fleet

“The ‘Belgorod’ special purpose submarine, carrier of the so-called doomsday Poseidon drones, will be in experimental operation with the Northern Fleet before later to serve in the Pacific Fleet.”


According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia recently announced that its newest nuclear-capable research submarine, the Belgorod, will begin “experimental operation” with the Northern Fleet in Arctic waters.  Many of Russia’s research submarines begin their work with the Arctic portion of the Russian Navy’s specialized submarine and surface fleet designed for espionage, deep-sea rescue, and special operations.  However, according to the article, the Belgorod’s real mission is to carry up to six Poseidon autonomous nuclear-powered underwater attack drones.  The Belgorod is likely to join the Pacific Fleet as part of Russia’s nuclear triad when the Poseidon drone system is deployable.


Source:

Thomas Nilsen, “World’s longest nuclear submarine handed over to the ‘Russian Navy’,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian internet news service in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 8 July 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/climate-crisis/2021/06/looming-arctic-collapse-more-40-north-russian-buildings-are-starting-crumble

An official press release posted by the Sevmash submarine yard on 8 July says the “Belgorod” (K-239) is a “research submarine”.  In fact, the vessel is built to carry one of the craziest weapons of mass destruction mankind ever has seen:  The Poseidon is an autonomous, nuclear-powered underwater drone that can deliver its nuclear payloads from deep under water after crossing distances like the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean.

Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Nikolai Evmenov, stated: “… this is a significant day for us” as … advanced achievements of science and the latest construction technologies were applied….  “The submarine “Belgorod” opens up new opportunities for Russia in conducting various studies, allows conducting diverse scientific expeditions and rescue operations in the most remote areas of the World Ocean.”  … The statement also adds that the submarine can conduct search and rescue operations in deep waters as it carries autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles. There is no mention of the Poseidon drone weapon armament.

With the U.S. developing an anti-ballistic missile defense system, Russia started to develop a deep-diving response capability.  The Poseidon is a 24-meter-long torpedo-shaped vehicle with an estimated range of 10,000 km and can travel at speeds of 100 knots down to a maximum depth of 1,000 meters.  Powered by a small nuclear reactor, it could be armed with a megaton nuclear warhead.

The submarine likely carries six Poseidon drones.  The submarine also serves as a mother vessel for a deep-diving midget nuclear-powered submarine, like the infamous Losharik, a mini-submarine that got the world’s attention in July 2019 when its batteries caught fire and all 14 officers on board died. 

The “Belgorod” has an elongated hull of what was originally meant to be an Oscar-II class multi-purpose submarine, a sister vessel to the ill-fated “Kursk” submarine that sank in the Barents Sea during a naval exercise in August 2000.   The hull of the submarine was laid down in 1992, but only twenty years later, in 2012, the Defense Ministry decided to use the hull to construct this giant special purpose vessel.  With a hull elongated by 29 meters to 184-meters, the one-of-a-kind vessel is longer than the world’s largest submarine, the Soviet-built Typhoon-class. 

The “Belgorod” launched in April 2019, the “Belgorod” started sea trials in the White Sea last summer.  The Russian Navy has not announced where the “Belgorod” will be based for the period it will be in experimental operation with the Northern Fleet.  It could be Severodvinsk where the Poseidon drone development will be conducted or at Olenya Bay on the Kola Peninsula where the other special-purpose submarines of GUGI, Russia’s Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research, are based.  Indications are that the long-term assignment of the Belgorod will be with the Pacific Fleet.

Russia To Provide Belarus a Potential Nuclear Delivery Capability

Russian Air Force Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft.

Russian Air Force Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft.


Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with 9M723K5 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and Transloader of the Iskander-M.

Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with 9M723K5 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and Transloader of the Iskander-M.


“Lukashenko has asked Putin to help convert Belarusian military aircraft to carry nuclear warheads.”


“The strengthening of the “missile fist” of the Union State can deter the deployment of critical, but vulnerable stationary objects of NATO military infrastructure near the borders of both Belarus and Russia.”


The accompanying excerpted article from pro-Kremlin daily Izvestiya describes Russian plans to provide Belarus with the Iskander missile system.  Russia exports the Iskander-E limited capability export variant to Armenia and Algeria.  However, according to Izvestiya, due to changing “geopolitical realities,” Russia will provide Belarus with the same version of the Iskander that the Russian Armed Forces field.  In a related development, Russian government news service Interfax describes President Putin’s proposal to modernize Belarus’s aging fleet of Su-25 ground attack aircraft and President Lukashenko’s request to modify Belarussian aircraft so they may employ nuclear weapons.  In February, Belarus removed verbiage from the constitution regarding its status as a “nuclear-free zone.”  This prompted speculation that Russia may be planning to deploy nuclear weapons on Belarussian territory.  There have been no announcements from Moscow or Minsk on what, if any, arrangements they have made for such a contingency, but the announcement about the Iskander, which is capable of nuclear delivery, and Lukashenko’s request for nuclear delivery capable aircraft is notable.


Source:

Anton Lavrov, “Идите под ‘зонтик’ (Go Under the ‘Umbrella’),” Izvestiya (large circulation pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 28 June 2022.  https://iz.ru/1356221/anton-lavrov/idite-pod-zontik

On June 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Iskander [missile systems] would be transferred to our closest.  According to him, Belarus will receive a variant with both ballistic and cruise missiles.

This means that we are talking about transferring to a partner in the Union State not a limited and simplified export version of the Iskander, but a full-fledged formidable system that is not inferior in capabilities to those that are in service with our country and are now being successfully used in a special operation in Ukraine.

Due to international agreements, the export Iskander-E is limited to a range of 280 km.  The deployment of such in Belarus would not bring a serious increase in NATO territory controlled by them compared to the Iskanders already in the Kaliningrad region…

Such a radical discrepancy in the capabilities of the export and “home” version has long encouraged the leadership of Belarus to strive to obtain the Russian version.  But the issue of its acquisition, as well as price, for various reasons, remained the subject of bargaining between Minsk and Moscow for years.  Dramatically changed geopolitical realities, it seems, will allow Alexander Lukashenko to get a variant in the “top configuration”.  It is clear that in the event of a real conflict, it will be possible to use it jointly with the Russian Federation and according to a single plan.

The strengthening of the “missile fist” of the Union State can deter the deployment of critical, but vulnerable stationary objects of NATO military infrastructure near the borders of both Belarus and Russia.  The Alliance will have to reckon with the prospect of receiving a highly accurate and irresistible retaliatory strike against them in the event of a military confrontation…

Iskander missiles have already been deployed in the Russian Kaliningrad region.  But their additional deployment in Belarus will give a significant increase in the reach zone, it will shift another 300 km to the south.

…the Kaliningrad bridgehead has serious shortcomings.  Its limited territory is completely visible from all sides by means of NATO reconnaissance, and the Iskander has limited maneuverability there. Issues of ammunition storage and protection are also not easy.  Belarus is much better protected from outside surveillance.  The complexes on its territory will have better survivability not only due to the air defense “umbrella”, but also due to their ability to maneuver around the country and even beyond its borders.  It is much more difficult to hunt for ground launchers in the wide open area of Belarus than the small area of Kaliningrad.  The experience of the special operation has shown that mobile long-range weapons systems are still a very difficult target to counter…

“Президент РФ предложил дооборудовать Су-25 для Белоруссии на российских заводах (President of the Russian Federation proposed to retrofit Belarussian Su-25s at Russian factories),” Interfax (Russian government news service), 25 June 2022.  https://www.interfax.ru/russia/847889

President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin proposed to retrofit the Su-25 aircraft in service with the Belarusian army in Russia.

“The Belarusian army is armed with a fairly large group of Su-25 aircraft.  They could be appropriately equipped and training of flight personnel could be started accordingly,” Putin said during Russian-Belarusian summit talks on Saturday.  “This modernization should be carried out at aircraft factories in Russia.  We will agree on how to do this,” he stressed.Meanwhile, Lukashenko has asked Putin to help convert Belarusian military aircraft to carry nuclear warheads.  He acknowledged that he was “very concerned about the training flights of US and NATO aircraft, which are preparing to carry nuclear warheads and nuclear charges.”… “It’s very stressful for us,” he said.


Image Information:

Image: Russian Air Force Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/MAKS-2007/i-kphcXRn/0/e220a607/X2/maks-2007-003-X2.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with 9M723K5 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and Transloader of the Iskander-M
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/ARMY-2016-Demonstration/i-bSmJnCF/0/ac0d8313/X2/Army2016demo-076-X2.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

“The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare” by Matthew Stein (July 2022)

(Click image to download brief.)


KEY TAKEAWAYS

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War stood out as a significant chapter in the history of the conflict in the region. Not only did Azerbaijan take control over a large amount of territory, the Russian government deployed peacekeepers as part of the cease-fire agreement between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This marked the first time a peacekeeping force became involved in the conflict over the region and stood as another example of how Russia utilized a peacekeeping operation as a response to a conflict in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS is made up of states of the former Soviet Union and is an area where the Russian government has special relationships and a sphere of influence. While the United States has arguably pulled back from peacekeeping operations in recent years and, as a result, the U.S. military has deemphasized them, Russia views peacekeeping operations as a key part of modern warfare. Like other military operations, Russians consider that peacekeeping operations can be utilized to achieve strategic objectives beyond conflict resolution. This article examines how Russia views peacekeeping operations as a part of warfare, including in its military doctrine and based on past conflicts in the CIS. It also examines how this applies to the most recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the peacekeeping operation as a response to civil unrest in Kazakhstan. Insights from this may also inform potential outcomes of the current war in Ukraine.


Algeria Inches Closer to Russia Amid Frosty Relations with Morocco and Spain

Ville de Tindouf مدينة تندوف.

Ville de Tindouf مدينة تندوف.


“…Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that relations between Russia and Algeria are reaching a new level…”


In need of allies and with deteriorating relations with neighbors, Algeria’s relations with Russia are firm and potentially deepening following multiple military-diplomatic visits from Russia.  Russia-Algeria links “are reaching a new level,” according to statements Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently made to the Russian media outlet RT Arabic.  A new strategic cooperation document is being drafted to replace the 2001 agreement that currently guides bilateral relations.  According to the excerpted article from influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, Algeria plans to hold joint military exercises with Russia in November.  In early June, the new director of Algeria’s Advanced Warfighting School led a group of officers on a tour of General Staff colleges in Russia.  Deepening Russian-Algerian relations may reflect an emerging strategic alignment that could turn the western Mediterranean into a new flashpoint in the brewing conflict between Russia and NATO.

This is all against the backdrop of Algeria’s perceived threats from Morocco and Spain.  Both Algeria and Morocco have taken steps to reinforce military presence along their shared border in recent months.  Earlier this year, the Moroccan military established a new “eastern military zone” along its border with Algeria.  More recently, as reported in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadid, the Algerian military conducted nighttime joint maneuvers and set up a new base near the oasis town of Tindouf, where the borders of Algeria, Morocco and the disputed Western Sahara converge.  Tindouf is home to the largest concentration of Western Saharan (Sahrawi) refugees, and a key center of gravity for the Polisario Front, Western Sahara’s pro-independence movement. 

In early June, Algeria downgraded its political relations with Spain in response to Spanish recognition of Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara earlier this year.  The Algerian government is threatening a near-total trade embargo with Spain, from which only natural gas exports would be excepted.  It has also threatened to shut off the remaining pipeline that carries Algerian gas to Spain.  Stopping the flow of Algerian gas to Spain would leave Italy as the only European country with pipelines bringing in Algerian natural gas.  Algeria’s diplomatic rupture with Spain also includes suspending cooperation on migration.  Given the Ukraine-related pressures on the EU’s eastern borders, increased immigration and decreased gas flows along Europe’s southern borders would undoubtedly put substantial strain on the European Union’s social and political order.


Source:

“لافروف: علاقاتنا مع الجزائر تصل إلى مستوى جديد

(Lavrov: Our relations with Algeria have reached a new level),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language news site), 26 May 2022. https://tinyurl.com/228xnr4b

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that relations between Russia and Algeria are reaching a new level. He also emphasized the need to formalize them in a new document, the preparation of which is underway.

Source:

“الجيش الجزائري ينفذ مناورات تحاكي قتالاً ليلياً قرب الحدود مع المغرب

(The Algerian army carries out maneuvers simulating night combat near the border with Morocc”),” al-Araby al-Jadid (Qatari-aligned daily), 7 June 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2cukk683

The Algerian army conduct nighttime military maneuvers with live ammunition. The exercises included various units and weapons, and the intensive use of missiles, rocket launchers and aircraft. They took place in the Tindouf region, which lies directly on the border with Morocco, not far from the disputed Sahara region between Rabat and t“e “Polisario Fro”t,” and coincided with the opening of a military base in the area.

Source:

“مسؤول روسي رفيع يبحث بالجزائر التعاون العسكري

(High-level Russian official discusses military cooperation in Algeri”),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 17 May 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2s3jt5ms

A senior official in the Russian Federation Council held discussion with Algerian officials yesterday regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine, the development of military cooperation between the two countries, and the previously announced joint military exercises, scheduled for next November in the Algerian desert.

Source:“”Students of Algerian Armed Forces Advanced Warfighting School visit Defence Universi”y,” Republic of Serbia Ministry of Defense, 6 June 2022. https://www.mod.gov.rs/eng/18878/poseta-polaznika-visoke-ratne-skole-oruzanih-snaga-alzira-univerzitetu-odbrane-18878

Students attending the Algerian Peo’le’s National Armed Forces Advanced Warfighting School have visited the Defence University in Belgrade today, thus starting their study tour of the Republic of Serbia which will last for several days.


Image Information:

Image:  Ville de Tindouf مدينة تندوف
Source: Photo by Habib kaki via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tindouf_تندوف.jpg
Attribution: CC 1.0., https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/deed.en

Azerbaijan Balances Security Cooperation Between Turkey and Russia

Unmanned combat aerial vehicle Akıncı of Bayraktar at Teknofest 2019.

Unmanned combat aerial vehicle Akıncı of Bayraktar at Teknofest 2019.


“Within its framework, it is planned to sign a number of agreements, and also announced the intention to establish the production of Bayraktar-Akinchy heavy drones in Azerbaijan.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the independent Russian-language website Kavkazskiy Uzel provides a regional analysis of how Azerbaijan balances its security cooperation with Turkey and Russia.  It also discusses Azerbaijan’s recent purchase of the Turkish-made Akinci drone.  The article reports on Teknofest being hosted in Azerbaijan, noting that this was the first time the festival took place outside of Turkey.  It points out that Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a number of agreements there.  It also notes the delivery of the Bayraktar Akinci drone to Azerbaijan and that Turkey “will transfer production technologies” to Azerbaijan.  The Akinci has better capabilities than the Bayraktar TB2, which Azerbaijan currently has in its inventory. 

The comments from analysts in the region provide more context for what Azerbaijan is looking for from Russia versus Turkey.  Regional security analyst Shair Ramaldanov notes that security cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia is mostly for the “repair of military equipment of Soviet and Russian production” and that “spare parts for this are supplied from Russia.”  Political scientist Ilgar Velizade points out one key difference in Azerbaijan’s security cooperation with Turkey and Russia, specifically “in relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan aims at the joint production of new weapons; [whereas] in relations with Russia, Baku buys arms in the Russian Federation.”  Political scientist Arastun Orujlu noted another difference between Turkey and Russia: that “Turkey does not yet produce tanks and military aircraft, so Baku will purchase this equipment from the Russian Federation.  But in the field of high-tech, missile, helicopter weapons, Turkey is ahead of the Russian Federation.” 

Overall, the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan have had various systems serviced by Russia in the past, even if relations between the two had been strained.  While the article does not mention this, the war in Ukraine is having an impact on logistics for the Russian defense industry.  Azerbaijan’s acquisition of the Bayraktar Akinci shows what it continues to look for in its security partnership with Turkey, which gave the country a specific capability that Russia could not.


Source:

“Аналитики сравнили военно-техническое сотрудничество Баку с Анкарой и Москвой (Analysts compared military-technical cooperation of Baku with Ankara and Moscow),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent Russian-language website with news from the Caucasus), 28 May 2022. https://kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/377597/

Azerbaijan is hosting the Teknofest aviation, cosmonautics and technology festival, which is held outside of Turkey for the first time. Within its framework, it is planned to sign a number of agreements, and also announced the intention to establish the production of Bayraktar-Akinchi heavy drones in Azerbaijan. Military cooperation between Baku and Ankara is unlikely to interfere with cooperation with Moscow, since it is about the supply of various types of weapons, analysts interviewed by the “Kavkazskiy Uzel” noted…

The organizers of the festival are the Turkish Technology Team Foundation (T3), the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Industry and Technology of Turkey…Within the framework of the festival, Turkey and Azerbaijan are planning to sign a number of agreements, Turkish Minister of Industry and Technology Mustafa Varank told the Anadolu Agency.

The most significant achievement of the festival in Baku is the flight of the new Turkish heavy strike-reconnaissance U“V “Bayraktar-Akin”hi” from Turkey through the airspace of Georgia to Baku without an intermediate landing. The UAV covered 3200 km. This aircraft is much larger, better armed, flies longer and higher, and is capable of carrying more weapons than its predecessor, Bayraktar-TB2, which Azerbaijan used in the 2020 Autumn War…Ankara will transfer production technologies to the Azerbaijani side.

…On February 22, 2022, the Declaration on Allied Cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation was signed in Moscow. The document says that the parties are developing bilateral military-political cooperation that meets national interests and is not directed against third countries…They cooperate on issues of equipping with modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest…Military expert Shair Ramaldanov told t“e “Caucasian K”ot” correspondent that the military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation did not stop. It consists, according to him, primarily in the repair of military equipment of Soviet and Russian production and the restoration of weapons damaged during the hostilities. Spare parts for this are supplied from Russia…

…Political scientist Ilgar Velizade told t“e “Caucasian K”ot” correspondent that the Azerbaijani-Turkish and Azerbaijani-Russian military-technical cooperation differs in at least one fundamental poin“. “If in relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan aims at the joint production of new weapons, then in relations with Russia, Baku buys arms in the Russian Federati”n,” he said.

…Political scientist Arastun Orujlu compared the expected arms supplies to Azerbaijan from Turkey and Russi“. “Turkey does not yet produce tanks and military aircraft, so Baku will purchase this equipment from the Russian Federation. But in the field of high-tech, missile, helicopter weapons, Turkey is ahead of the Russian Federation, he told t“e “Caucasian K”ot” correspondent…


Image Information:

Image: Unmanned combat aerial vehicle Akıncı of Bayraktar at Teknofest 2019.
Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BayraktarAk%C4%B1nc%C4%B1_Teknofest2019_(3).jpg
Attribution: CC BY YA 4.0

Russia Revising Marine Doctrine To Use Civilian Ships for Military Purposes

“The country’s revised Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.”


According to an article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is revising its marine doctrine to easily integrate civilian ships for military tasks when necessary.  Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov noted that the revisions are necessary in the current “geopolitical and military-strategical world situation.”  Borisov blames the “hybrid war of the Collective West” for unprecedented actions against Russia and considers the Russian navy and an update to the marine doctrine as essential for Russia’s survival.

According to the revisions, the navy will include civilian ships and crews and provide functionality of maritime infrastructure in times of war.  As the article points out, the use of civilian ships during war is not unusual or unique to Russia, although Russia has a long history of calling civilian ships into military service when necessary.  The current revisions will make it easier for Russia’s navy to appropriate Russia’s civilian nuclear powered icebreakers, likely giving the Russian navy an advantage in Arctic waters.


Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Russia outlines militarization of fishing fleet and icebreakers,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian internet news service in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia, 24 May 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/05/russia-militarizes-its-fishing-fleet-and-icebreakers

The country’s revised Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.  “The revisions of the Marine Doctrine take into account changes in the geopolitical and military-strategical world situation,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov underlined in a meeting in the government Marine Board late May.  The update of the strategic planning document comes in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine and its unprecedented isolation in international affairs.

According to Borisov, the Navy is now becoming even more important for Russia.  “Considering the total hybrid war of the Collective West against our country, the unprecedented sanctions and the special operation in Ukraine, the strengthening of national security is relevant as never before,” the Deputy Prime Minister stated as he opened the meeting.  The body includes top government officials from several ministries and federal agencies, as well as military representatives.

According to the high-ranking government official with special responsibilities for the military-industrial complex, the new and updated document “to the full extent meets current challenges and threats.  It is aimed not on confrontation, but on enhanced national security in the area of maritime operations [and] a significantly reduced dependency on external influence and markets in all fields of maritime activities.”  Among the revisions highlighted in the updated doctrine is a higher level of engagement of civilian ships in military activities.  According to the government, several “principally new aspects of the doctrine concerns mobilization preparations and preparedness.  This will allow for the inclusion in the Navy of civilian ships and crews and provide functionality of maritime infrastructure in times of war.”

It is hardly a new phenomenon that civilian ships have a role in national security preparedness, as well as military conflicts, and Russia has a long experience in applying non-military ships for military purposes.  But the new federal document clearly prepares the ground for a more systematic approach.  Potentially, Russia can choose to apply a large number of trawlers and fishing vessels for military purposes.  Many of them are active in international waters, including along the Norwegian coast.  Russia can also choose to militarize its powerful nuclear-powered icebreakers, the vessels that autonomously are capably of breaking through the thickest sea-ice of the Arctic.  Ultimately, it could also designate a stronger military role to its research vessels. That could include also the brand new “Severny Polyus[RG1] ,” the ship that is designed for autonomous drifting in Arctic sea-ice for up to two years.

Russia’s current Marine Doctrine was adopted in 2017 and covers the period until 2030. The document highlights the need for a technological modernization of Russian ships and development of transport corridors like the Northern Sea Route.  According to Yuri Borisov, the Russian Navy will in the course of 2022 get a total of 20 new military ships, as well as five motorboats and 21 support vessels.


Russia Building Literal and Figurative Bridges to China

…The first road bridge was opened between Russia and China….”


Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western censure, the pro-Kremlin media has reassured its audience that Russia could not be isolated, and that the country would find other trading partners.  China is often cited as an example of an alternate, trustworthy trading partner with which Russia can expand commerce.  The first excerpt from the pro-business source Kommersant describes the recent construction of two bridges in the Far East that will link China and Russia and facilitate trade. 

According to the article this was “the first road bridge opened between Russia and China,” linking Blagoveshchensk (Russia) to Heihe (China) across the Amur River.  Construction began in 2016, and although it was completed two years ago, “the opening had to be postponed due to the pandemic.”  The article also points that back in April, “the first cross-border railway bridge across the Amur River from the Russian village of Nizhneleninskoye to China’s Tongjiang was opened.”  Citing a logistics’ expert, the article also reinforces the notion “that we [Russia] are experiencing a global drop in foreign trade volumes with the European Union, [so] we need any options for the delivery of goods from the Middle Kingdom in order to somehow compensate for the drop in import flows.”

The second article from the pro-Kremlin source National News Service describes additional economic measures intended to further strengthen Russia-China trade.  It cites a Russian economist who asserts that “China can increase the volume of trade and investment cooperation.  Secondly, it is necessary to develop cross-border cooperationelectronic commercescientific and technical cooperation.”  To increase trade opportunities, the expert recommends that it is necessary to move away from dollars in relations with China in the interbank sphere – to the ruble-yuan regime.”  The article concludes by quoting the Chinese Ambassador to Russia who recently said, “that the world is now at an important turning point, promising that the Russian-Chinese relationship will only get stronger regardless of changes in the international situation.”


Source:

Sabina Adleiba, “Россия и Китай навели мосты (Russia and China build bridges),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 10 June 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5405772

…The first road bridge was opened between Russia and China…. Russia and China signed an agreement on the construction of the bridge back in 2015, work on it began in 2016. For three years, it was erected in parallel from two banks. The facility was ready two and a half years ago, but the opening had to be postponed due to the pandemic.

…The new bridge is two-lane, its length is about a kilometer, plus access roads – 6 km in China, twice as much in Russia. It is expected that more than 600 trucks, about 160 buses and about 70 cars will be able to pass on the new road every day.

In addition, at the end of April, the first cross-border railway bridge from the village of Nizhneleninskoye to China’s Tongjiang was opened. It also passes over the Amur River.  The new route can significantly change this situation, Georgy Vlastopulo, director of Optimal Logistics, believes…. “Taking into account the fact that we are experiencing a global drop in foreign trade volumes with the European Union, we need any options for the delivery of goods from the Middle Kingdom in order to somehow compensate for the drop in import flows.”

Source: Evgenia Zheludkova, “Военные маневры и уход от доллара: Как Китай поддержит Россию в обход санкций (Military maneuvers and the withdrawal from the dollar: How China will support Russia bypassing sanctions),” National News Service (pro-Kremlin site), 3 June 2022. https://nsn.fm/policy/voennye-manevry-i-uhod-ot-dollara-kak-kitai-podderzhit-rossiu-v-obhod-sanktsii

…China will significantly help Russia in economic terms if it decides to switch to rubles and yuan, said Andrey Ostrovsky, head of the Center for Economic and Social Research of China at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences…

“It will be more difficult to provide proper economic support, but there are a number of areas in which cooperation can be further developed,” he added…. “Here, firstly, China can increase the volume of trade and investment cooperation. Secondly, it is necessary to develop cross-border cooperationelectronic commercescientific and technical cooperation, there are many points here…”

“The most important problem today is that it is necessary to move away from dollars in relations with China in the interbank sphere – to the ruble-yuan regime….”

…The day before, Chinese Ambassador to Moscow Zhang Hanhui said that “the world is now at an important turning point, promising that the Russian-Chinese relationship will only get stronger regardless of changes in the international situation.”