Tag Archives: PLA

China’s Southern Theater Command Strained by Growing Operational Requirements

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Map of China’s five Theater Commands. The Southern Theater Command has responsibility for the borders all countries and coastline touched by its jurisdiction.

“With instability on the Myanmar border and rising tensions in the South China Sea, the PLA Southern Theatre Command is stretched to the limit.”

Multiple press reports emanating from Southeast Asia suggest China’s Southern Theater Command is being stretched to its operational limits.[i] According to the excerpted article from India media aggregator First Post, instability on the China-Myanmar border due to the on-going internal conflict in Myanmar between government and insurgent forces, and continued tension in the South China Sea, could push the command to the brink of its operational capabilities. The First Post article was published on the heels of China’s announcement that it would conduct three days of live fire drills and patrols on the border with Myanmar beginning on 27 August and ending 29 August. The military exercises took place across a small portion of China’s roughly 1,240-mile-long border with Myanmar and are the latest military operations by the PLA on the Myanmar border. According to the First Post article, the military exercises were conducted to “maintain the safety and stability of the border areas.”  According to the second excerpted article from Singapore-based Central News Asia (CNA), China justified the frontier training exercises and patrols in the wake of recent battles between Myanmar’s military and non-government forces spilling over onto Chinese territory and the conflict generally threatening Chinese infrastructure projects on its frontier.

To the east, the PLA Navy’s Southern Fleet and accompanying air assets, operating under the Southern Theater Command, is tasked with carrying out China’s many interests in the South China Sea as China battles a variety of counterclaims on the features of the area.[ii]

The third excerpted article from Xinhau and published on Chinese military-focused news aggregator Chinamilitary.com noted that in addition to border security and continued operations in the South China Sea, the Southern Theater Command is frequently tasked to help with natural disasters such as the participation of 700 PLA Army personal to assist in the response to flooding in central China’s Hunan Province in July. None of the excerpted articles suggest the operational tempo of the Southern Theater Command would threaten the viability of the command itself, nor that China would be unable to reinforce the command from the other four theater commands if necessary. Still, the articles highlight a myriad of flashpoints within the jurisdiction of the Southern Theater Command that show no sign of abating as natural disasters, the conflict in Myanmar, and challenges to Chinese claims in the South China Sea are sure to continue.

Sources:

“Myanmar crisis to South China Sea tensions: Is PLA’s Southern Theatre Command stretched?”, First Post (India-based news service covering the region), 26 August 2024. https://www.firstpost.com/world/myanmar-instability-to-south-china-sea-tensions-is-plas-southern-theatre-command-stretched-13808289.html – goog_rewarded

With instability on the Myanmar border and rising tensions in the South China Sea, the PLA Southern Theatre Command is stretched to the limit.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Southern Theatre Command is facing an unprecedented strain as it prepares for a three-day live-fire drill on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border. This drill, set to commence on Tuesday, is a critical test of the command’s capabilities as it grapples with the increasing instability in Myanmar, which poses a significant threat to China’s border security and strategic interests.

The Yunnan provincial government announced that the drill would take place in several key locations including Ruili city near the townships of Huyi and Wanting, Zhenkang county near Mengdui township and the autonomous county of Gengma Dai and Wa near Mengding town. These areas are close to the nearly 2,000-kilometre border that Yunnan shares with Myanmar making them particularly vulnerable to the spillover effects of the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.

The Southern Theatre Command of the People’s Liberation Army is unique in that it must manage operations across multiple domains simultaneously. This includes land-based operations along the Myanmar border, maritime security in the South China Sea and air operations that support both naval and land operations.

The PLA Navy’s Southern Fleet, operating under the Southern Theatre Command, is tasked with a wide array of missions from routine patrols to potential conflict scenarios with foreign navies. The fleet must also be prepared to enforce China’s maritime claims often involving standoffs with vessels from other nations including the United States. The PLA Air Force units under the Southern Theatre Command are similarly stretched. They must conduct regular reconnaissance missions enforce airspace control over contested areas and provide rapid response capabilities in case of escalation…

This includes protecting Chinese investments in Myanmar, ensuring the security of critical infrastructure projects and supporting China’s strategic ambitions in the region.

China’s investments in Myanmar, particularly those related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are of strategic importance. The Southern Theatre Command is tasked with ensuring the security of these projects, which include pipelines, roads and ports that are critical to China’s access to the Indian Ocean. Protecting these assets from potential threats, whether from internal conflict in Myanmar or external interference, adds another layer of responsibility to the command’s already heavy workload.

“China’s military to conduct armed patrols, live-fire exercises near Myanmar border,” Channel News Asia (Singapore-based media service), 26 August 2024. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/chinas-military-conduct-armed-patrols-live-fire-exercises-near-myanmar-border-4567376

China’s military said on Monday (26 Aug) it had organised army units and joint air-ground police patrols near its border with Myanmar to maintain security and stability as fighting between Myanmar’s ruling junta and rebel forces escalates.

The patrols will focus on areas around Ruili, Zhenkang and other frontline sections in China, the military said in a statement.

Major fighting has occurred in northern Kachin and Shan states in Myanmar, with artillery shells injuring people and damaging property on the Chinese side, and also threatening infrastructure projects in China.

The Southern Theatre of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is organising army units to test troops’ ability to “quickly move, block and control, and strike together, and maintain security and stability in the border areas”, the military said.

A unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is also scheduled to organise live-fire exercises on the Chinese side of the China-Myanmar border from Aug 27-29, according to a separate statement from China’s military.

Exercises will be held in areas located south of Ruili, and in other areas around Zhenkang county and Gengma Dai and Va autonomous county in west Yunnan province, the military said.

China said the conflict was having a negative effect on stability and social order on the China-Myanmar border.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also said recently that China would continue “its commitment to restore peace and stability in Myanmar”.

“Over 700 officers, soldiers of PLA Southern Theater Command head for flood-hit region,” 7 July. Chinamilitary.com (Chinese military-focused news aggregator) http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/ARMEDFORCES/SouthernTheaterCommand/News_209144/16322315.html

More than 700 officers and soldiers from the airforce of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command departed for Yueyang, central China’s Hunan Province, on Sunday to undertake flood relief and rescue operations.

Carrying 46 vehicles, they are scheduled to arrive at designated areas before midnight on Sunday, with the tasks of inspecting dikes, reinforcing embankments and assisting in the restoration of local production and daily life.Heavy and prolonged rainfall has resulted in flooding in various regions of China, notably causing a breach in the dike of Dongting Lake, the country’s second-largest freshwater lake, located in a county administered by the city of Yueyang.

Notes:

[i] China’s Theater Commands can be likened to the U.S. Combatant Commands but rather than a global focus, their areas of responsibility (AOR) are officially within China itself and the international borders respective to the individual command. China’s Southern Theater Command’s AOR borders Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam (Mainland Southeast Asia) and the South China Sea, and as such the Southern Theater Command has responsibility for this long frontier. It is also anticipated that the Southern Theater Command would support the Eastern Theater Command in any major amphibious operation against Taiwan.

[ii] The Southern Military Command’s air assets also engage in air interdiction missions. See: PLA Southern Theater Command drives away Philippine aircraft illegally intruding into China’s Huangyan Dao, China Military Online, 10 August 2024. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16330462.html

OE Watch Insight:

The high operational mission tempo on CHN’s Southern Theater Command has observers assessing that the command is being stretched to its operational limits.

Image Information:

Image: Map of China’s five Theater Commands. The Southern Theater Command has responsibility for the borders all countries and coastline touched by its jurisdiction.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theater_command_(China) – /media/File:Map_of_Theatres_of_PLA_en.svg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

China Concludes Its Largest Military Drills Near Taiwan

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China’s Eastern Theater Command released posters for ‘Joint Sword-2024A’, showcasing weapons aimed to ‘kill’ Taiwan independence.

“The distance is getting closer and closer, only one step away from the main island of Taiwan, or even a finger away.”

Summary: China concluded its Joint Sword-2024A military drills, the largest and closest-ever drills held near Taiwan. China states these drills test its ability to seize power in Taiwan, reinforcing concerns that future exercises may serve as a pretext for an actual invasion.

On 23-24 May, China conducted its latest large-scale military exercise, Joint Sword-2024A, around Taiwan, including the surrounding Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin islands. These drills were the largest and closest-ever held to Taiwan and signal an increasingly aggressive Chinese stance.

According to the first excerpted article published by the Central Military Commission via its website www.81.cn, the purpose of Joint Sword-2024A was to punish separatist activities of Taiwan’s independence forces and to issue a serious warning against interference from external forces.[i] Joint Sword-2024A was conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command to enhance its combat capabilities through multi-domain coordination. The exercise involved ships and aircraft conducting joint training near Taiwan’s periphery, including the Taiwan Strait and its northern, southern, and eastern regions.[ii] Activities encompassed rapid deployment of destroyer and frigate formations, integration of intelligence data for sea and air scenarios, target acquisition, and joint strikes. South of Taiwan networks of destroyer, frigate, and anti-submarine formations were established, deploying assets for comprehensive submarine detection. The Air Force deployed fighter jets for combat patrols around Taiwan, engaging in joint intelligence sharing and coordination with surface fleets for target strikes. Meanwhile, the Army and Rocket Force assumed predesignated launch positions, initiating preparation for joint strikes in coordination with naval and air assets.[iii] In the second excerpt, published by the People’s Republic of China newspaper Da Wan News, Major General Meng Xiangqi, a PLA professor from the National Defense University, outlines several significances of the Joint Sword-2024A exercise.[iv] Firstly, conducting battle group exercises from multiple directions very close to Taiwan’s periphery is intended to tightly confine Taiwan’s military defense space. Major General Meng stated the exercise demonstrates that the closer Taiwan independence forces move towards external support, the tighter the squeeze around Taiwan will become. He strongly indicates that PLA forces will inch closer to Taiwan’s periphery with each successive exercise.[v] Secondly, Major General Meng emphasized the significance of the exercise’s focus on the southern and eastern parts of Taiwan. In particular, he highlighted the strategic importance of eastern Taiwan, which has traditionally been considered a refuge and a place to preserve combat power by Taiwan’s military. He dismisses this notion, emphasizing that Joint Sword-2024A demonstrates the PLA’s ability to create a powerful firepower network through the close cooperation of its four major services—land, sea, air, and rocket forces—capable of delivering strikes anywhere, anytime on targets, including eastern Taiwan. Major General Meng also pointed out that if external forces were to intervene, they would likely approach from the east. However, the PLA’s ability to control and block access from the east means that Taiwan independence forces would be unable to escape or receive foreign aid. Thirdly, Major General Meng emphasized the significance of implementing a comprehensive blockade around the island. Such a blockade would halt Taiwan’s energy imports, disrupt domestic exports, and sever aid from the U.S. and its allies, effectively crippling the island.[vi] Ultimately, Joint Sword-2024A demonstrates that military drills are becoming routine to signal displeasure and punish Taiwan. Additionally, it underscores China’s increasing capability to convert these exercises around Taiwan into actual military operations at any time.[vii]

Sources:

Guo Yanfei, “东部战区位台岛周边开展“联合利剑-2024A”演习 (Eastern Theater Command conducts the ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ exercise around Taiwan island), www.81.cn (China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest national defense organization in the PRC), 24 May 2024. http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16310888.html

From May 23 to 24, the Eastern Theater Command of the PLA organized the army, navy, air force, rocket force, and other units to conduct the ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ exercise around Taiwan. The exercise focused on joint sea and air combat readiness patrols, the joint seizure of battlefield comprehensive control, joint precision attacks on key targets, and other objectives. Li Xi, spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command, stated that this exercise was a powerful punishment for Taiwan separatist forces seeking independence and a serious warning to external forces.

Starting at 0734, the exercise and training began in the Taiwan Strait, as well as in the northern, southern, and eastern parts of Taiwan, including areas around Kinmen, Matsu, Wuqiu, and Dongyin island. After the mobilization order was given, multiple formations of destroyers and frigates moved at high speed to surround Taiwan. Upon reaching their designated areas, the ships deployed their main and secondary guns, missiles, and other weapon systems, ready to strike. The fleet integrated intelligence information from both the air and sea, captured and locked onto targets, and executed multi-type, multi-dimensional saturation simulated strikes. Additionally, ships and aircraft coordinated anti-submarine operations by using towed sonar and buoys and carried out simulated attacks against underwater targets.

The Eastern Theater Air Force also dispatched dozens of fighters to systematically conduct combat patrols around Taiwan and its outer islands. These fighter jets, relying on joint intelligence support and various tactical maneuvers, approached the periphery of Taiwan for combat patrols. The air force formed multi-type formations with live ammunition and flew to designated airspace to establish strike positions. They coordinated with destroyers, frigates, and missile boats to simulate strikes against high-value targets. Simultaneously, the army and rocket force moved into their designated areas, quickly occupying their launch positions to coordinate with sea and air assault forces for joint strikes.

With the support of the Eastern Theater Command’s joint combat system, the theater command’s troops conducted training in sea assault, land strike, air defense, and anti-submarine operations around Taiwan. This exercise further tested their actual combat capabilities in multi-domain coordination and joint strike operations.

“联合利剑—2024A”演习距台岛很近有何深意？专家解析：这次解放军以压倒性实力反切香肠 (What is the significance of ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ being so close to Taiwan? Experts analyze: this time the PLA is countering incremental steps of Taiwan independence with overwhelming strength),” Xinan Evening News (PRC newspaper created by the Propaganda Department of the Anhui Provincial Committee of the CCP), 25 May 2024. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1799986237998926830&wfr=spider&for=pc

On May 23, the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army conducted the ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ exercise around Taiwan, involving sea-air coordination, sea assault, land strikes, and other training activities. The exercise aimed to test multi-domain coordination and organize joint strikes, demonstrating the combat capabilities of the Eastern Theater Command troops. With strong determination, firm will, and robust capabilities, they are poised to resolutely crush the arrogance of Taiwan independence forces. There are three significant aspects of this exercise to note: 1) The proximity of the exercise close to Taiwan. 2) The joint efforts to seize battlefield control and execute precision attacks. 3) The deployment of troops to the eastern part of Taiwan and its strategic implications.

Regarding the proximity of the exercise to Taiwan, Major General Meng Xiangqing, a professor and special commentator at the National Defense University, highlights two key points. First, he notes that the approaching ships and aircraft are increasingly nearing Taiwan, being just a step away from the main island, or even as close as a finger’s reach. Second, he emphasizes that the exercise clearly showcases the PLA’s multi-domain control capabilities, with the depth of this ‘squeeze’ being greater and more unprecedented than before. It can be inferred that the closer Taiwan independence forces move towards external support, the tighter the chain around Taiwan will become.

Regarding joint efforts to seize battlefield control and execute precision attacks, Major General Meng Xiangqing highlighted the 3D animations released by the Eastern Theater Command which demonstrated the focus on striking critical Taiwan independence targets. This involves leveraging strategic advantages by targeting coastal areas and dominating sea, air, and information domains from multiple directions. Additionally, the deployment of naval and air assets across vast areas creates a robust firepower network capable of striking any location harboring Taiwan independence.  Regarding the strategic implication of troop deployments to the eastern part of Taiwan, Major General Meng Xiangqing emphasizes it as a significant shift in perspective. Historically, the Taiwan military underestimated the PLA’s capability to effectively project combat power to the eastern part of the island, considering it a haven to preserve their own combat strength. However, recent demonstrations by the PLA, including simulated multi-directional strikes, have highlighted their ability to swiftly deploy troops to the region and assert control over key routes. Should external forces attempt intervention, they would likely approach from the east. However, the Eastern Theater Command’s capacity to deploy joint formations of naval, air, and land forces indicates that Taiwan independence elements would find it difficult to escape, foreign aid would be effectively blocked, and there would be no vulnerable points in their defense.

Notes:

[i] To watch the PRC’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) official response for conducting Joint Sword-2024A, see the MOD’s video post, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 24 May 2024. http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/xwfyr/fyrthhdjzw/16310980.html

[ii] For a comprehensive breakdown of PLA activities during Joint Sword-2024A, including composition of PLA forces on each day, see Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense daily report of PLA activities, Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C.  https://www.mnd.gov.tw/PublishTable.aspx?Types=即時軍事動態&title=國防消息&Page=2

[iii] Considering information released by the PLA and public sources, Joint Sword-2024A is recognized by observers as China’s largest and closest military exercise ever conducted near Taiwan. See: Josephine Ma, “Mainland China’s military wraps up Joint Sword-2024A drills near Taiwan,” South China Morning Post, 25 May 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3264093/mainland-chinas-military-wraps-joint-sword-2024a-drills-near-taiwan

[iv] To view a broadcast featuring Major General Meng Xiangqing from the National Defense University and Senior Colonel Tong Zhen from the Academy of Military Sciences discussing the ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ exercise, see the exclusive Xinhuanet video post, Xinhuanet (the official state news agency of the PRC known for propaganda and disinformation), 24 May 2024. https://live.baidu.com/m/media/pclive/pchome/live.html?room_id=9254336688&source=h5pre

[v] A visual released by CNA that compares the 2022 PLA military drills around Taiwan to ‘Joint Sword-2024A’, Central News Agency (Taiwan state-owned news agency), 25 May 2024. https://imgcdn.cna.com.tw/www/WebPhotos/1024/20240524/2000x2000_wmkn_02594021293743_0.jpg

[vi] To watch a clip of Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, Deputy Director at the National Defense University, briefly describing the effects of sieging Taiwan, see China Net Culture video post, China Net Culture (a state-run web portal of the State Council Information Office, part of the CCP Central Propaganda Department), 24 May 2024. https://haokan.baidu.com/v?pd=wisenatural&vid=6554376293806421436

[vii] Nectar Gan, Eric Cheung, Brad Lendon, “China says military drills encircling Taiwan designed to test its ability to ‘seize power,’ CNN, 24 May 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/23/asia/china-military-drills-taiwan-second-day-intl-hnk/index.html

OE Watch Insight:

CHN concluded its ‘Joint Sword-2024A’ military drills, the largest and closest ever held near TWN. CHN states these drills test its ability to seize power, reinforcing concerns that future exercises may serve as a pretext for an actual invasion.

Image Information:

Image: China’s Eastern Theater Command released posters for ‘Joint Sword-2024A’, showcasing weapons aimed to ‘kill’ Taiwan independence.
Source: http://www.81.cn/zq_208553/16310798.html
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

China Rehearsing Possible Taiwan Decapitation Operation

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Taipei Taiwan Presidential Office Building

“In the past, the PLA had created a Presidential Office Building replica in another location. However, he said this mockup covered much of the Bo’ai Special Zone and appears to be an aerial bombing and gunnery training range.”

China is expanding its capability to train for a decapitation operation against Taiwan. On 26 March, Joseph Wen, a Taiwanese defense analyst, posted satellite images of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) training ground in southwest Inner Mongolia. The images appear to show a mockup of the Bo’ai Special Zone, a restricted area that houses key government buildings, including the Presidential Office Building in Taipei. The first excerpted article, taken from the popular Taiwan English news source Taiwan News, highlights some of the concerns and speculation resulting from the images. For example, it explains that while this is not the first time the PLA has created a replica of Taiwan’s Presidential Office Building, this mockup is different in that it “covered much of the Bo’ai Special Zone and appears to be an aerial bombing and gunnery training range,” which indicates where China is likely to be focused. Lu Te-yun, a satellite imagery expert, explains that “visually speaking, the degree of realism in comparison with the actual location is quite high.” However, some experts, such as a former Kuomintang legislator cited in the article, believe the PLA would be unable to swiftly launch a decapitation strike. Instead, he believes, the exercise is more likely part of psychological and cognitive warfare effort to pressure Taiwan into believing that it must negotiate.[i] As seen in the second excerpted article, taken from an editorial published in Taiwan’s English-language newspaper Taipei Times, the PLA has repeatedly held other military exercises at its Zhurihe Training Base,[ii] also located in Inner Mongolia, during which they used a scale replica of the Presidential Office Building to simulate a decapitation strike. Published one month after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the article explains that the media had been predicting a potential “decapitation strike” from Moscow. The author, Yao Chung-yuan, former deputy director of the Taiwan Ministry of National defense strategic planning department goes on to stress the importance of Taiwan preparing for such an event. Today, as the Russia-Ukraine conflict drags on with no victory in sight for Moscow, China could be placing more urgency into honing its own capabilities to prevent a protracted conflict should it one day invade Taiwan.

Sources:

Keoni Everington, “China Creates Taipei Mockup to Train for Invasion,” Taiwan News (popular online English-language news source in Taiwan), 28 March 2024. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5131830

Joseph Wen …posted satellite images of a mockup of the Bo’ai Special Zone (博愛特區), which is a restricted zone in Taipei’s Zhongzheng District where the Presidential Office Building and other key government buildings are situated. The training ground is located in the Alxa Left Banner administrative division of Alxa League in the southwest of China’s Inner Mongolia.

Wen said in the past, the PLA had created a Presidential Office Building replica in another location. However, he said this mockup covered much of the Bo’ai Special Zone and appears to be an aerial bombing and gunnery training range.

Lu Te-yun (盧德允), a satellite imagery expert who once served as an inspector for the Ministry of National Defense (MND) told UDN that the proportions of the training grounds need to be measured. However, Lu said that “visually speaking, the degree of realism in comparison with the actual location is quite high.”

On the TVBS program “Situation Room” on Wednesday, former Kuomintang (KMT) Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方) said that given Taiwan’s extensive air defenses, it is unlikely that the PLA could swiftly launch a decapitation strike on Taipei. Lin said, “This is psychological and cognitive warfare. China will not relax and will continue to put pressure on Taiwan, telling Taiwan that it can negotiate or fight, simultaneously employing a dual strategy of negotiation and confrontation.”

Yao Chung-yuan, “Prepare for ‘Decapitation’ Attempts,” Taipei Times (Taiwan’s English-language daily newspaper), 28 March 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/03/28/2003775565

At the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the media predicted a potential “decapitation strike” from Moscow. An in-depth discussion of the issue seems necessary in Taiwan.

There are many ways of launching a decapitation strike, which seeks to assassinate a national leader. ….

Despite Russia’s failure to kill Zelenskiy, Ukraine must remain extremely vigilant.

“Decapitation” is a military term for the use of ballistic and precision-guided missiles to assassinate a national leader or destroy a presidential office, to demoralize and severely weaken an enemy.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has repeatedly held military exercises at its Zhurihe Training Base in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, during which it used a scale replica of the Presidential Office Building in Taipei to simulate a decapitation strike…

The purpose of Russia’s supposed decapitation attempts was to hijack Zelenskiy, not assassinate him, but as tension mounts during a continued war, whether Russia attempts other decapitation methods is a possibility. In Taiwan’s 2020 Han Kuang exercises, the military simulated strikes against PLA and Chinese secret agents targeting the Presidential Office Building and other central government agencies in Taipei’s Boai Special Zone (博愛特區), while training for countermeasures against the CCP’s hijacking of the Taiwanese president. From the situation in the Russia-Ukraine war, the scenario set in the Han Kuang military drill is not impossible.

Notes:

[i] For more on this, see: Cindy Hurst, “Chinese Cognitive Operations Might Impact Taiwan’s Will to Resist,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-cognitive-operations-might-impact-taiwans-will-to-resist/

[ii] Zhurihe is the PLA’s largest military training base. For more information, see: Chen Zhuo, “8 Things to Know About China’s Biggest Army Training Base,” South China Morning Post and reposted to China Military, 13 May 2019. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/Features_209191/9501757.html

Image Information:

Image: Taipei Taiwan Presidential Office Building
Source: CEphoto, Uwe Aranas, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Taipei_Taiwan_Presidential-Office-Building-01a.jpg
Attribution:

Chinese Strategists Consider Weaponizing “Complexity Science”

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“The network information system … can be damaged or controlled by destroying key nodes in the network information system, creating a destruction ‘multiplier’ effect of ‘100-1=0.’”

The complexity of warfare increases as new capabilities, such as unmanned aircraft, loitering munitions, cyber warfare, and others, are introduced. As complexity increases, so do the risks, prompting Chinese military thinkers to explore the possibilities of using “complexity science,” the study of complex systems, to their advantage. The first excerpted article, published by the People’s Liberation Army’s official newspaper, PLA Daily, and reposted to the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China’s website, underscores the importance of understanding basic science versus the concept of “complexity science.”  A traditional, cause-and-effect system assumes a linear outcome, which is predictable. However, as the article points out, in a complex system, the topic of study of “complexity science,” one slight change could have a huge impact on the course or outcome of the war.[i]

Complexity science is important in both defensive and offensive operations. For example, offensively, the article explains that destroying a key node of an opponent’s network information system, the glue that holds together the joint operations system, can serve as a force multiplier. In defensive operations, to protect their own systems, PLA commanders need to completely understand the emerging nature of complex war systems so that they can predict or anticipate where the adversary might attempt to degrade their systems. In offensive operations, on the other hand, they should use their insight to shape the war and create winning opportunities for themselves. The article explains that coming up with countermeasures and improving the ability to predict emerging technology can be facilitated through modeling and simulation. It also suggests taking advantage of the unpredictable and “fighting opportunities” in combat “to catch the opponent off guard with thunderous momentum.” The second article, published by China’s top military decision-making command body, the Central Military Commission’s authorized news source, China Military Online, details “complexity” in command-and-control (C2) systems. It explains that complexity science offers a new way to understand, guide, and practice war. It also recommends using complexity, around C2, as a weapon to complicate the opponent’s decision-making capacity, while also facilitating one’s own abilities. The key to accomplishing this is by breaking the traditional decision-making methods and reshaping those of the opponent. Humans, becoming increasingly intertwined with machines in the decision-making process at all levels, will create “unprecedentedly prominent battlefield management issues,” the article argues. As variables become more complex it is easier to reshape the opponent’s decision-making process by limiting the adversary’s intelligence capabilities, impairing their reflexes, creating confusion at the intersection, and pushing the opponent to their breaking point.

Sources:

Liu Haiye et al, “认真研究并加以把握运用，战争复杂系统的涌现性 (Carefully Study and Understand the Emergence of Complex War Systems),” PLA Daily (official news source of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 17 November 2023. http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16267413.html.

Informatization and intelligentization in the network information system is the “glue” and “catalyst” of the joint operations system. However, it does not always guarantee the network’s effectiveness in driving the entire joint combat system. The network information system not only can serve as a “multiplier” of “1+1>2”in aggregating combat forces that are widely distributed and have heterogeneous functional role, it can be damaged or controlled by destroying key nodes in the network information system, creating a destruction “multiplier” effect of “100-1=0”.

Make good use of the emergent nature of complex war systems: …In recent years, the continued advances in modeling and simulation, artificial intelligence, big data and other technologies, has provided new support for commanders to grasp the emergent nature of complex war systems. If commanders can fully grasp the emergent nature of complex war systems, they might be able to perceive, foresee, utilize or even create “points” where war emerges before their opponents do, thereby becoming more proactive in shaping the war situation and creating winning opportunities.

Gain insights in advance and implement changes before the enemy. Once the emergence of complex war systems occurs, it could cause major global or local changes in the entire battlefield. “Forewarned is forearmed, without prejudging the waste”. Only by sensing and anticipating the possible emergence of key nodes in the war system and key turning points in the combat process before the opponent does, can we implement changes before the enemy and disrupt their operations…(we should) implement various countermeasures for war preparations, and improve the pertinence and predictability of military training and preparations…Methods such as modeling and simulation, which can provide insights into the emergence of complex war systems, should be actively applied to build, restore, and simulate real combat environments and operations in virtual war spaces.

Hu Xiaofeng, “从复杂性科学看指挥控制领域变革趋势 (A Look at Changing Trends in Command and Control From the Perspective of Complexity Science),” China Military Online (news source authorized by the Central Military Commission and sponsored by the People’s Liberation Army), 2 January 2024. http://www.81.cn/ll_208543/16277640.html

Complexity science has provided new possibilities for understanding war and guiding war practice. In the field of command and control, complexity can be used as a weapon to make the opponent’s decision-making more complicated, while oneself can easily deal with it. The key to achieving this effect is to break the original traditional decision-making method and reshape the opponent’s decision-making process.

How to create complexity

In future wars, as the combat system becomes larger and larger, humans and machines become more intertwined in decision-making at all levels, especially the widespread use of intelligent combat platforms, resulting in unprecedentedly prominent battlefield management issues.

Traditional decision-making only changes the decision-making parameters, not the decision-making process, so the decision-making complexity is constant… If complexity methods are introduced, the opponent’s decision-making process can be reshaped, forcing the opponent to introduce new parameters, leading to an increase in decision-making complexity. For example, if one’s own camouflage effect exceeds the opponent’s existing reconnaissance capabilities, it forces it to find new reconnaissance and positioning methods, thereby prompting it to change its decision-making process and make decision-making more complex. So, how to create complexity? It is generally believed that there are mainly the following four methods.

Limit intelligence capabilities. By creating uncertainty to enhance complexity and reduce the adversary’s situational awareness, the adversary can only act with the support of limited information…

Impaired reflexes. Create complexity by leveraging adaptive characteristics to weaken adversaries’ operational responsiveness…

Create confusion at the intersection. Creating chaos and complexity by crossing boundaries to create new emergent effects… Facilitate tipping point transitions. Push your opponent to the breaking point and create complexity, resulting in non-linear transitions…

Notes:

[i] The first article uses an old the British proverb as an example. “For want of a nail, the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe, the horse was lost. For want of a horse, the rider was lost. For want of a rider, the battle was lost. For want of a battle, the kingdom was lost. And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.” This analogy underscores the importance of each node, down to the most basic one (the nail). For more on this proverb, see “A Little Neglect May Breed Great Mischief,” Citadel website, accessed 20 January 2024. https://web.citadel.edu/root/images/commandant/assistant-commandant-leadership/for-the-want-of-a-nail.pdf

China Celebrates New Turbofan Engine Design as Giving It a Strategic Advantage

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China’s WZ-7 (“Soaring Dragon”) is a high-altitude, long-endurance drone, shown here
on display during the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow.

“With its inherent advantages of having a world-leading industrial system and strong production capacity, China already has an absolute advantage in the Sino-US arms race around UAVs, loitering munitions, and cruise missiles.”

China claims its new turbofan could give it an edge during a high-intensity war. According to the first article posted on the publicly owned Chinese Internet platform Tencent, the Institute of Engineering Thermophysics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences has developed a new-generation, low-cost, easy-to-manufacture turbofan engine, which can be used in high-speed, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and missiles. A turbofan engine, first conceptualized in the 1930s is also known as a fanjet, is a modern variant of the gas turbine engine.

What makes the recent Chinese version unique is that it has a significantly reduced number of parts. According to the second article, published by leading Chinese Internet and gaming provider NetEase, there are only two stages, a fan stage and a high-pressure compressor stage. In contrast, according to the article, the U.S. Global Hawk’s turbofan engine has 13 additional stages. This less complex structure makes it 20 to 30 percent lighter and less expensive to manufacture than other turbofans. The first article argues that these simpler turbofan engines will allow China to produce them faster and increase “the operational efficiency of frontline combat forces.” For example, the People’s Liberation Army will be able to turn to private enterprise with lower technical capabilities than specialized military industrial complex to manufacture the new variant. Noting lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict, the article argues that “the side able to dominate the battlefield is often not the Ukrainian military with its advanced NATO equipment, but the Russian military, which can steadily supply less advanced equipment to the frontlines.” The article also notes that by leveraging its cost and production capacity to provide a continuous supply of units to power its weapons, China can ensure that “when a conflict does break out between [it] and the United States,” the U.S. military will not be able to “engage in a high-intensity war of attrition.”

Sources:

Jiang Fuwei, “中美无人机军备竞赛,中国抢先立于不败之地,可以让美军更清醒 (In Sino-U.S. UAV Arms Race, China’s Advanced, Invincible Position Can Make the U.S. Military Sober Up),” Tencent (a major Chinese platform company that connects users, businesses, and industries with technology and innovation, 1 November 2023. https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20231101A03WF100

“Zhu Junqiang, director of the Institute of Engineering Thermophysics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, said that they have developed a new-generation low-cost turbofan engine, and this new engine has been used in a certain type of high-speed, long-endurance UAV.

This type of turbofan engine reportedly adopts a very unusual single-shaft high-pressure direct-drive configuration, which integrates the compressor and fan that must be arranged separately in conventional twin-shaft engines, reducing the number of engine parts by more than 60 percent. This reduces the overall weight and size of this type of engine by 20 to 30 percent compared to conventional twin-shaft configuration engines with the same thrust, and it also reduces fuel consumption by 10 percent.

In other words, the emergence of this type of engine not only signifies that the performance of domestic UAVs, loitering munitions, and even cruise missiles using turbofan engines will be significantly improved, but also that the manufacturing costs of these types of equipment will be further reduced to what can be called a “formidable” level. With its inherent advantages of having a world-leading industrial system and strong production capacity, China already has an absolute advantage in the Sino-US arms race around UAVs, loitering munitions, and cruise missiles…

Once China can produce a new turbofan engine, which costs only 20 percent of that of the existing turbofan engine, even if [the engine] currently can only be used in weapons such as UAVs and cruise missiles, significantly reducing the overall cost can increase the output and equipment quantity of these weapons systems, thereby increasing the operational efficiency of frontline combat forces…

Due to the significant reduction in the number of parts, the degree of difficulty in producing this type of engine is greatly reduced…

Looking at the experience of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the side able to dominate the battlefield is often not the Ukrainian military with its advanced NATO equipment, but the Russian military, which can steadily supply less advanced equipment to the frontlines.

At this point, once the PLA can leverage these advantages in cost and production capacity, it can establish strong anti-loss capabilities and continuous supply capabilities for weapons such as UAVs and cruise missiles.

So, when a conflict does break out between China and the United States, the US military in the Western Pacific will not have the ability to engage in a high-intensity war of attrition with the PLA….

Jianduan Fangu, “我国研制成功高空低油耗涡扇发动机,战略无人机将傲视全球 (My Country Has Developed a Successful High-Altitude, Low-Fuel-Consumption Turbofan Engine and Will Dominate the World of Strategic Drones),” NetEase, (A leading Chinese Internet and gaming provider centered around premium content.), 26 October 2023. https://www.163.com/dy/article/IHVD86H205565PRU.html

The Institute of Engineering Thermophysics of the Chinese Academy of Science developed a high-performance, high-altitude, low-fuel-consumption turbofan engine, with greatly improved technology… First, the Institute of Engineering Thermophysics’ high-altitude, low-fuel-consumption turbofan engine has greatly simplified the engine structure. There is only one stage for the fan and one stage for the high-pressure compressor. The first stage uses a diagonal flow compressor, and the second stage uses a centrifugal compressor. The pressure ratio of each stage is very high, which significantly reduces the number of compressor stages. Comparing it to the Global Hawk’s engine, there are 13 fewer stages, which greatly reduces the number of parts. This reduces the complexity of the engine, which reduces fuel consumption and makes it cheaper.

Image Information:

Image: China’s WZ-7 [R1] (“Soaring Dragon”) is a high-altitude, long-endurance drone, shown here on display during the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WZ-7_at_Airshow_China_Zhuhai_2022.jpg
Attribution: CCA-Share Alike 4.0 Int

People’s Liberation Army Ground Force Fields First Armed Reconnaissance Drone

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A China Caihong-4 drone at Airshow China Zhuhai in 2022.

“65 helicopters and drones, nearly 50 sets of flight simulators and special vehicle equipment and other large exhibits were on display.”

According to the first excerpted article from the Chinese government news outlet Tianjin Daily, on 14 September, the 6th China Helicopter Exposition displayed 65 helicopters and drones to over 350 firms at the Industry Base of the AVIC Helicopter in Tianjin.1 On 18 September 2023, according to the second article from China Daily, a Chinese government newspaper, officials confirmed that the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) had unveiled their first armed reconnaissance drone, the KVD-002.2 The KVD-002 was displayed at the 6th China Helicopter Exposition.2 The CH-4 [RG1] , a predecessor to the KVD-002, is China’s best-selling unmanned combat aircraft. Prior to the KVD-002 release, the PLAGF did not have the capability for unmanned combat air reconnaissance. The KVD-002’s ability to provide up to 30 hours of air surveillance along with an air-to-ground strike package, adds additional capabilities to support China’s overseas expansion interests. The KVD-002 provides the PLAGF with battlefield and intelligence support to helicopter units, and guides attack helicopters to their target, increasing the PLAGF’s operational capability.2 Additionally, the KVD-002 could be utilized to support airborne early warning, control aircraft, and provide Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities to ground forces.

Sources:

“第六届中国天津国际直升机博览会开幕 (The 6th China Tianjin International Helicopter Expo opens),” Tianjin Daily (Tianjin Municipal People’s Government news outlet), 15 September 2023. https://www.tj.gov.cn/sy/tjxw/202309/t20230915_6406971.html

“On September 14, the 6th China Tianjin International Helicopter Expo opened in Tianjin Airport Economic Zone. Municipal Party Committee Secretary Chen Min’er met with Hao Zhaoping, Deputy Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and General Manager of Aviation Industry Corporation of China, who came to Tianjin to attend the conference, and Lieutenant General Deng Zhiping of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and witnessed the cooperation between the Tianjin Municipal People’s Government and Aviation Industry Corporation of China. Signed a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement.”

More than 350 companies from more than 20 countries and regions participated in the exhibition… 65 helicopters and drones, nearly 50 sets of flight simulators and special vehicle equipment and other large exhibits were on display. The audience is expected to exceed 60,000. During this period, more than 150 business negotiations and business activities will be held to build a platform for aviation companies to connect on-site and expand cooperation. “陆军推出战斗无人机 (Ground Force unveils combat drone),” China Daily (English language Chinese Communist Party newspaper), 18 September 2023. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202309/18/WS6507b43da310d2dce4bb644f.html

The People’s Liberation Army Ground Force has unveiled its first combat drone, a move observers said will strengthen the service’s operational capability. “The drone can cooperate with helicopters in combat operations. It can provide battlefield intelligence and fire support for the helicopter units, and can guide attack helicopters to their targets,” the introduction said, adding that the model can make short takeoffs and landings on a plateau.” The Ground Force did not disclose the KVD002’s developer. However, observers said that judged on its configuration and the AR-1 missile, the drone must have been designed based on the Caihong-4, or CH-4, China’s bestselling unmanned combat aircraft on the international market. The CH-4 is built by the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics in Beijing, a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp.

Image Information:

Image: A China Caihong-4 drone at Airshow China Zhuhai in 2022.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CASC_Rainbow#/media/File:CH-4_at_Airshow_China_Zhuhai_2022.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

The People’s Liberation Army’s Evolving Close Air Support Capability (Kevin McCauley) (January 2024)

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(Click image to download brief.)

This monograph examines PLA close air firepower support based on authoritative PLA sources including internal publications, as well as PRC aviation industry research. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Army Aviation, and unmanned aerial vehicle close air firepower support, command and control, and the firepower support process are examined.

Chinese Cognitive Operations Might Impact Taiwan’s Will To Resist

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President of TAIWAN Tsai Ing-wen reviews a Marine Corps battalion in Kaohsiung in July 2020

“[The will to fight] depends on our (Taiwan’s) internal conditions. There are differences just on whether to resist China.”

Taiwan might not be prepared to resist a Chinese invasion, according to Shen Po-yang, an associate professor at the Institute of Criminology at Taipei University. The following article excerpt from Taiwan cable TV network Sanlih E-Television News highlights some of Shen’s remarks, which he gave during a meeting held by the World Taiwanese Association and the European Taiwan Association in Vilnius, Lithuania. Shen, who researches Chinese cognitive operations against Taiwan, attributes his conclusion to China’s growing technological capability in disinformation operations and Taiwan’s internal division. He explains that Chinese information operations against Taiwan primarily targets the 20 percent who consider themselves neutral, including those who are undecided on whether Taiwan should commit to war or surrender should the mainland invade. According to the article, a survey of Taiwan’s vulnerability to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) cognitive warfare shows how divided the country is in its beliefs. For example, according to the survey, less than 20 percent of people in Taiwan believe the disinformation comes from external forces; 30 percent believe it comes from China; 20 percent believe it comes from the United States; and 20 percent believe it comes from Japan. According to Shen, “The reality is very far away (from what people believe).” Complementing the technical aspects of Chinese cognitive operations, Shen sees Xi Jinping’s continued emphasis on the “China Dream” as an ideology to win over the people when the economy is bad and he concludes that Taiwan’s will to resist will depend on their internal conditions. A study in the Oxford Journal of Global Security Studies,[i] explains that China’s vast cognitive operations against Taiwan are conducted through various governmental departments and party agencies that deal with Taiwan affairs including the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, the United Front Work Department, the PLA, and Propaganda Department. The CCP’s primary goal is to promote unification and to increase Taiwan’s internal conflict and anti-independence views. The study describes four ways in which China conducts cognitive operations. First, China uses military intimidation as a kind of psychological manipulation to prevent Taiwan from seeking independence. Second, China uses economic and sociocultural factors to increase its influence by promoting bilateral exchange across the Taiwan Strait. Third, China uses Mazuism, a popular folk religion that originated in China but is practiced by 70 percent of Taiwan’s population, to strengthen its connection with Taiwan culturally. Finally, China uses disinformation and content farms on the internet to sway public opinion.[ii]

Sources:

“「台灣抵抗意志不如烏克蘭」學者:恐不及因應資訊戰 (Taiwan’s Will to Resist is Not as Good as Ukraine’s’; Scholar: It May Not Be Able to Cope With Information Warfare),” Sanlih E-Television News (Taiwan cable TV network), 11 September 2023. https://www.setn.com/News.aspx?NewsID=1351592&utm_campaign=viewallnews

Shen Boyang, a scholar who specializes in the CCP’s cognitive operations against Taiwan, said that he is worried that Taiwan does not have enough time to prepare for information warfare, because China’s technology is becoming more and more sophisticated, and Taiwan’s internal divisions have made The lack of will to resist China is different from the situation faced by countries such as Lithuania and Ukraine when facing Russia.

Shen Boyang pointed out at the forum that the main targets of China’s information manipulation on Taiwan are those who consider themselves neutral, neither blue nor green, including those who have not yet made up their minds on whether to commit war or surrender when facing the CCP’s invasion of Taiwan. This group of about 20% of Taiwanese people are gradually being China controls and locks in through cross-strait exchanges or the collection of personal information on the Internet.

His survey showed Taiwan’s vulnerability to the Chinese Communist Party’s cognitive warfare. For example, less than 20% of Taiwanese believe that fake news mainly comes from external forces, of which more than 30% point to China, but 20% each point to the United States or Japan. “With The reality is very far away.”

… there is the emotional aspect. After Xi Jinping came to power, he has continuously emphasized the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” internally, which may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because in the past, the CCP could rely on the economy to stabilize its internal affairs. “When the economy is good, there is no need to talk about great rejuvenation, but when the economy is bad, it must use ideology.”What worries him most is the will of the Taiwanese people to resist. “This depends on our internal conditions. There are differences just on whether to resist China.” …

Notes:

[i] Tzu-Chieh Hung and Tzu-Wei Hung, “How China’s Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwan’s Anti-Disinformation Wars,” Journal of Global Security studies, Volume 7, Issue 4, December 2022 https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/7/4/ogac016/6647447

[ii] Social media has an important role in China’s cognitive warfare tactics. Social media can be used to spread “deepfakes” and “accelerationism” to deliberately manipulate emotions and collective consciousness to sway public opinion and exacerbate polarization. For more information, see Cindy Hurst, “Chinese Observations on the Role and Impact of Social Media in Cognitive Warfare,” OE Watch, 05-2022 https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/chinese-observations-on-the-role-and-impact-of-social-media-in-cognitive-warfare/; and Cindy Hurst, “China Wages Cognitive Warfare To Shape Taiwanese Public Opinion,” OE Watch, 02-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/china-wages-cognitive-warfare-to-shape-taiwanese-public-opinion/

Image Information:

Image: President of TAIWAN Tsai Ing-wen reviews a Marine Corps battalion in Kaohsiung in July 2020
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_Marine_Corps – /media/File:President_of_TAIWAN_Tsai_Ing-wen_reviews_a_Marine_Corps_battalion_in_Kaohsiung_in_July_2020_臺灣總統蔡英文校閱海軍陸戰隊九九旅步二營.jpg
Attribution: CC By 2.0

People’s Liberation Army Promoting Battlefield Commander’s Initiative

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Diagram outlining PLA Command and Control Network

Diagram outlining PLA Command and Control Network

“Mission command advocates fully leveraging the initiative of frontline commanders in a battlefield full of uncertainty and chaos to gain decision-making advantages.”

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) battlefield commanders have historically been constrained by the PLA’s preference for centralized over decentralized command authority.[i] However, a recent article from the PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the PLA, addresses the need to move from centralized to mission command to allow for greater initiative by operational and tactical commanders. Doing so would provide the PLA with greater flexibility and adaptability to address rapidly changing battlefield situations and opportunities. The articles argues that the PLA must “learn from the relevant concepts of mission command, optimize and improve the original command mode, and build a command mode suitable for future information-based and intelligent warfare.”

The article describes that mission command—a concept employed by the U.S. military—leverages frontline commanders’ initiative on uncertain and chaotic battlefields due to their more realistic awareness of on-the-ground realities.[ii] Mission command preserves the superior commander’s operational intent, guidance, tasks, and resources while allowing flexibility to the frontline commander to accomplish the mission. As it notes, “it is necessary to create an open architecture to enhance the system’s ability to flexibly assemble and adapt to changes.” Advancements in command-and-control systems and intelligent decision-making technologies will improve the ability of frontline commanders to make informed decisions. Allowing subordinate commanders to Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) will not only facilitate rapid decision-making but provide for more resilient command if communications with the superior headquarters are disrupted. The author states that mission command provides for greater decentralization of decision-making creating a stronger and more ubiquitous command-and-control system.

Sources:

Fie Paiguo, “从集中式指挥转向任务式指挥——美空军大力推动任务式指挥透视 (From Centralized Command to Mission Command – The U.S. Air Force Vigorously Promotes the Mission Command Perspective),” PLA Daily (official newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 24 August 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-08-24&paperNumber=07&articleid=913630

Learn from relevant operational concepts to optimize and improve the command-and-control organizational model. Under the conditions of modern warfare, it is not easy to organize large-scale, long-term, and high-intensity air operations. If the combat command ability cannot be improved, everything is out of the question. Judging from the development practice of foreign militaries, the contradiction of being constrained by two aspects has become increasingly obvious. First, the operational command and control process is not perfect enough, and the hierarchical command mode is not perfect enough. The second is that the control-based command and control method cannot adapt to modern high-intensity air confrontation. So, facing future wars, how to optimize and improve the command-and-control mode? The effective way is to fully consider the confrontation environments of different intensities, learn from the relevant concepts of mission command, optimize and improve the original command mode, and build a command mode suitable for future information-based and intelligent warfare.Build an open system architecture to lay a solid foundation for the flexible restructuring of the command-and-control system. To achieve mission command, it is necessary to upgrade the command-and-control capabilities of the entire system. On the one hand, it is necessary to create an open architecture to enhance the system’s ability to flexibly assemble and adapt to changes. On the other hand, it is necessary to promote node element transformation and promote the reorganization of digital space combat resources. Realizing the node element of operational entities is to digitize, network, serve, and standardize them, making them easier and more convenient to be called by other platforms.”

Notes:

[i] For further information on PLA modernization efforts see: Kevin McCauley, “PLA Army Efforts Integrate New Technology and Equipment Into Units,” OE Watch, 08-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/421895

[ii] Authoritative PLA publications indicate the need to promote more initiative by commanders, particularly at the tactical level. PLA authors believe this is necessary due to the dynamic and fast pace of modern combat operations as well as the need to take advantage of fleeting, unforeseen battlefield opportunities.

Image Information:

Image: Diagram outlining PLA Command and Control Network.
Source: Liu Xiaoming et al, Battlefield Information Management (战场信息管理), (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2012), 36
Attribution:

People’s Liberation Army Discusses Low-Altitude Air Control

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Soldier from Ukrainian 25th Air Assault Brigade employing Small bomb carrying UAV.

“Low altitude is the “junction” connecting airspace and land. With the rapid development and large-scale application of low-altitude combat equipment such as helicopters, small and medium-sized unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles, the low-altitude battlefield has become increasingly important, and low-altitude control has become one of the comprehensive dominances that must be seized in future land warfare.”

A recent PLA Daily article discusses the importance of low-altitude air control for ground operations and its difference from traditional concepts of air dominance.[i] The article appears to be influenced by recent conflicts such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Seizing low-altitude air control requires an integrated air defense and distributed, networked, system of systems integrating ground and low-altitude air systems with modular, mobile, multi-domain capabilities.  The importance of seizing low-altitude air control[ii] is based on the large-scale use of small and medium unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, and cruise missiles. Traditional air dominance[iii] cannot guarantee low-altitude air control due to the sundry of small arms and short-range systems that threaten low flying airframes. The author argues that traditional air dominance operations are generally more centralized, while low-altitude air control is an ongoing, independent, and decentralized tactical operation that seizes control in a certain location for a limited time. Decentralized low-altitude air defense operations to seize control require accurate intelligence with the capability to distinguish between friend and foe, coordinated communications, and timely warning of air threats.

Achieving the capability to control the low-altitude air space even for short periods will threaten an adversary’s ability to employ UAVs and fixed and rotary winged aviation. The author urges the PLA to accelerate the development of intelligent air control UAVs with swarming capabilities, loitering munitions, detection systems to identify low, slow, micro-targets, and innovative tactics to seize low-altitude air control in the critical place and time to influence ground combat. . The capability to control the low-altitude air space would give the PLA a significant advantage protecting its forces and critical infrastructure.

Source:

夺取未来陆战低空制权 (Seize the low-altitude dominance of future land warfare),” PLA Daily (official PRC military newspaper), 23 May 2023. http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2023-05-23&paperNumber=07&articleid=906414

“Low-altitude control is a relatively independent and decentralized tactical-level space control. Low altitude control cannot be achieved and controlled through a single operation or a stage of centralized air control operations. Seizing low altitude control power will run through the entire process of combat, displaying a “distributed, discrete” form with strong tactical, regional, mobile, and full process characteristics. Even without the guarantee of traditional air supremacy, through active actions, it is possible to seize low-altitude supremacy in a certain area and within a certain time limit, forming a low-altitude combat advantage.

To seize low altitude dominance, we should focus on the characteristics of the struggle for low altitude control, establish the concept of “relying on ground control, dynamic control, precise control, and flexible use of air”, and follow the basic principle of “whoever uses it seizes it, seizes it as needed, and manages it as needed”. By seizing it in combat, maneuvering, and using it, we can respectively seize low-altitude control power in the task area through relatively independent and dispersed low-altitude combat and low-altitude air defense operations. At the same time, it is necessary to dynamically implement low altitude airspace monitoring and management, establish a low altitude multi-means and multi-mode monitoring system, fully grasp low altitude situations, strengthen collaborative communication, accurately distinguish between enemy and friendly platforms, timely warning, quickly strike and destroy enemy air combat equipment and air control equipment, accurately handle our air conflicts, and ensure effective control of low altitude and ultra-low altitude airspace.

The low-altitude power struggle in future intelligent warfare will become more intense. The Army’s field air defense system should continuously improve the comprehensive combat effectiveness of the low-altitude airspace, attach great importance to the construction of a distributed low-altitude operational system of systems based on the network, and rely on the network to build air-ground integration, the combination of detection, attack and defense, and mobility, modular low-altitude operational system of systems. Focus on strengthening the research and development of low-altitude detection and monitoring platforms to achieve rapid network deployment and low-altitude ultra-low-altitude high-sensitivity dynamic monitoring, and improve the ability to detect “low, slow and small” aircraft; accelerate the development of intelligent air-controlling UAVs, loitering missiles, and “swarms” to enrich the air-to-ground and multi-mode guidance, multi-mechanism killing, and multi-domain attack capabilities; Continue to improve the ability to detect and attack low-altitude small and micro targets, accelerate the development of new mechanism combat equipment, and form a low-altitude combat capability that covers multiple levels of campaigns, tactics, and operational units.

Notes:

[i] For additional information and perspective, see: Thomas Shrimpton, “Chinese Perspective on Manned-Unmanned Coordinated Operations on the Modern Battlefield,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-perspective-on-manned-unmanned-coordinated-operations-on-the-modern-battlefield/

[ii] The ability to neutralize enemy air defenses and other weapons systems that could attack low flying aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, and cruise missiles would appear difficult to achieve since these weapons would include small arms and short-range gun and missiles systems.

[iii] The PLA defines air dominance or “command of the air” as the Air Force and other services controlling the battlespace for a period of time. Presumably this encompasses offensive and defensive operations, including electronic and information warfare, to neutralize the enemy’s air defense capabilities. The reference to “a period of time” likely indicates the difficulty of sustaining command of the air.

Image Information:

Image: Soldier from Ukrainian 25th Air Assault Brigade employing Small bomb carrying UAV.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UA_25th_DShV_Bde_Mavic_3_bomber_01.jpg
Attribution: CC By 4.0