Tag Archives: Global Operational Environment

Central Asian Forces Boosting UAV Capabilities

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TAI Anka at Teknofest 2019.

TAI Anka at Teknofest 2019.

“Maintenance and repairs of the UAV will be carried out at a joint venture in Kazakhstan.”

In March 2022, Kyrgyzstan’s Border Guards carried out an exercise with their recently acquired Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  Shortly after that, Tajikistan’s defense minister visited Turkey and met with representatives from Baykar, the makers of the Bayraktar TB2 being used in Ukraine with much fanfare.  The meeting triggered speculation that Tajikistan is planning to acquire the Bayraktar TB2, but Tajik officials did not confirm this.  The accompanying excerpted articles report on drone-related developments in Central Asia and provide insight into the role they could play in the region over the next several years.

The excerpted article from independent Tajik news website Asia Plus reports on the establishment of an enterprise in Tajikistan for the production of Iranian Ababil-2 UAVs.  The article provides no additional details about the production capacity of the facility, but notes that the Ababil is used mostly for reconnaissance and that it can be equipped as a loitering munition.  The article also quotes U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan as recently saying that the United States “would provide Puma reconnaissance UAVs to the Tajik border guards.”

The excerpted article from independent news website Fergana Agency reports that a new joint Turkish-Kazakh enterprise will produce Turkish Aerospace Industries’ ANKA UAVs in Kazakhstan.  The article notes how Kazakhstan “will become the first foreign country to establish the production of ANKA attack drones” and that the Kazakh government bought three of the UAVs last year.  The early variants of the ANKA were only for reconnaissance, but recent variants can be equipped with a munition and it appears Kazakhstan will use one of these systems.

Neither article states whether Tajikistan or Kazakhstan will put their jointly produced UAVs into service with their respective ministries or another security force.  The governments of Central Asia have always put a high priority on border security forces and if Kyrgyzstan serves as an example, the border guards of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan could be the recipients of the new UAVs.  Regardless, the announcements of two new UAV production facilities shows how much of a priority governments in the region are putting on UAV capabilities.

Source:

“В Таджикистане открылось предприятие по производству иранских беспилотников (An enterprise for the production of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles opened in Tajikistan),” Asia Plus (an independent news website in Tajikistan), 17 May 2022. https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20220517/v-tadzhikistane-otkrilos-iranskoe-predpriyatie-po-proizvodstvu-bespilotnikov

…an enterprise for the production of Iranian Ababil-2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has opened in Tajikistan. Tajik Defense Minister Sherali Mirzo and Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Mohammad Bokiri attended the opening…

IRNA reports that the enterprise was built “in order to strengthen and expand joint defense and military cooperation between the two countries thanks to the efforts and assistance of specialists from the Ministry of Defense and support of the Iranian Armed Forces.”…Details about the production capacity of the facility were not reported…

The Ababil is designed primarily for reconnaissance missions… The system can also be equipped with up to 40 kg of explosives, turning it into a loitering munition…

Previously, the U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan, John Mark Pommersheim, stated at a press conference that the U.S. would provide Puma reconnaissance UAVs to the Tajik border guards…

Source: “В Казахстане наладят производство турецких беспилотников ANKA (Production of the Turkish unmanned aerial vehicle ANKA is being set up in Kazakhstan),” Fergana Agency (an independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 11 May 2022. https://fergana.agency/news/126095/

The Turkish ANKA unmanned aerial vehicle will be produced in Kazakhstan. This was reported by Andolu Agency, referring to the producer of the drones – Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ)…

Maintenance and repairs of the UAV will be carried out at a joint venture in Kazakhstan. Thus, it will become the first foreign country to establish the production of ANKA attack drones…

Last year, a contract was signed with the Kazakh side for the supply of ANKA UAVs to the republic. It was reported that Turkey, under this agreement, sold three systems to Kazakhstan…

Image Information:

Image: TAI Anka at Teknofest 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TAI_Anka_Teknofest2019_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC BY YA 4.0

Turkish Military Operation in Syria Risks Clash with Iran

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Turkish Soldiers in Syria.

Turkish Soldiers in Syria.

“Driven apart by clashing regional interests, Turkey and Iran appear headed for a face-off in Syria, with Tehran explicitly opposing Ankara’s plan for a fresh military operation against Kurdish-held areas, wary of risks to its own posture in the region.”

The Turkish Government’s plan to launch a fifth military operation into Syria is back on the table.  The stated goal is to create a 20-mile “safe zone” along Turkey’s border with Syria by targeting areas held by the mostly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).  A Turkish operation into this region and its related repercussions might jeopardize the security of U.S. troops remaining in the region to support and advise the SDF fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  Turkish President Erdoğan announced he intends to start the operation in Tel Rifaat and Manbij and gradually extend to other areas, some of which include Kurdish groups, Iranian-backed militias, Syrian regime forces, and Russian control of the airspace.  The accompanying articles analyze the complexity and risks for Turkey, including that of a face-off with Iran. 

According to the first excerpted article from pro-government Turkish daily Hürriyet, the critical issue for Turkey is access to Syrian airspace, so it will need permission from Russia and the Syrian regime.  Moreover, especially in Manbij, Russia and Syrian regime forces currently control the areas north of the M-4 highway, while Kurdish groups control the area south of the highway.  In any ground operation against Kurdish groups, Turkey would find itself facing Russian and Syrian regime forces first in this area.  Since Turkey is unlikely to risk fighting Russia, it will seek Russian consent first.

The other critical issue is Iranian opposition and the presence of Iran-backed Shia militias in the area.  The second excerpted article from security focused al-Monitor states that Iran will resist Turkey’s operation both militarily and politically, and an operation might lead to a clash between them.  Iran perceives the Turkish military presence in Syria as a threat to its interests and has taken several steps to dissuade Turkey from launching a military operation.  First, Iranian high-level officials publicly warned Turkey not to launch the military operation.  Second, Iran is bolstering its posture by deploying militias to areas with Shiite settlements, including Zahra and Nubl.  Third, Iran and the Syrian regime are mobilizing support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units that Turkey vowed to clear from the area.  Fourth, Iran-backed Shiite militias tried to deploy Grad missiles to Turkey’s potential area of operations, but Russia stopped them for now.  Iran’s increased presence because of a potential Turkish operation may also impact U.S. forces in the region.

Source:

Sedat Ergin, “Tel Rifat ve Münbiç’te Rusya ve İran faktörleri ne? (What are the Russian and Iranian factors in Tel Rifat and Manbij?),” Hürriyet (a pro-government Turkish daily),3 June 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/tel-rifat-ve-munbicte-rusya-ve-iran-faktorleri-ne-olacak-42076420

“We are entering a new phase of our decision to create a 30-kilometer-deep safe zone along our southern borders,” [President Erdoğan] said, adding: “We are clearing Tel Rifat and Manbij from terrorists. Then we will gradually do the same in other regions.”

…if the operation area is to be limited to Tel Rifat and Manbij, we must take into account that Turkey’s primary interlocutor on the ground will be Russia…

But there are other players as well. The importance of Tel Rifaat is that it is a multi-actor geography in which Russia, Iran, the Assad regime, and the YPG/PYD… have military presence…

A very critical issue to consider in a possible operation is that Russia controls Syria’s airspace west of the Euphrates. Its airspace east of the Euphrates is under the control of the USA. If [a Turkish Armed Forces operation] happens, the airspace will have to be kept open so that the radars of the Russian/Syrian air defense systems do not lock onto Turkish warplanes and unmanned aerial vehicles during the operation of the TAF [Turkish Armed Forces]…

Tel Rifaat is also a region where Shiite militia groups, which are directly under the control of Iran, also exist. This means that Turkey should also take into account the Iranian factor in any operation to be carried out in Tel Rifaat.

Source: Fehim Taştekin,“Iran, Turkey brace for face-off in Syria,” al-Monitor (globally read security news site with regionally based reporting), 10 June 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/iran-turkey-brace-face-syria

Driven apart by clashing regional interests, Turkey and Iran appear headed for a face-off in Syria, with Tehran explicitly opposing Ankara’s plan for a fresh military operation against Kurdish-held areas, wary of risks to its own posture in the region.

Turkey has failed to get a green light from the United States to press ahead with the plan, while Russia appears to be stalling. The Iranians, meanwhile, have sent militia reinforcements to two Shiite settlements northwest of Aleppo, not far from a key area in Ankara’s crosshairs, while trying to talk Turkey out from making the move — apparently with little success thus far…

The notion of rivalry has become an understatement in defining Turkish-Iranian ties. The rifts between the two neighbors have deepened amid an array of issues concerning Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, coupled with frictions over the sharing of transboundary waters and a seemingly uncontrolled stream of Afghan refugees to Turkey from Iran…

…the Iranian Foreign Ministry slammed Turkey’s intervention plan, warning that it would only exacerbate tensions and humanitarian suffering in Syria.

…Iranian media outlets have described Turkey’s presence as an “invasion” and referred to the Syrian National Army (SNA), Turkey’s rebel allies, as “Turkish-backed terrorists.” They have accused Turkey of pushing demographic changes to the detriment of the Kurds, expanding the space of “terrorists” under the guise of safe zones, seeking gains to use against Damascus in future talks or laying the ground for annexing Syrian territory.

…“The Syrian regime and its Iranian militias have mobilized and [are] sending reinforcement to the YPG” — a reference to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, which Ankara has vowed to oust from Tel Rifaat.

Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency, meanwhile, reported that Iranian-backed Shiite militia attempted to deploy Grad missiles to the area May 30, but were stopped by Russian forces…

Could Iran go even further now at the risk of a showdown with Turkey? According to the Iranian journalist, Turkey is “well aware” that Iran will defend Zahra and Nubl, even though Iran has avoided directly confronting Turkey in Syria thus far, except for Iranian participation in a 2020 offensive in Idlib that resulted in Damascus recapturing the crucial M5 highway.

Though Ankara has not mentioned Zahra and Nubl as targets, they would fall within Turkey’s range should it take control of Tel Rifaat. The two settlements and Tel Rifaat are seen as a barrier shielding Aleppo…

Today, Kurdish and government control in Tel Rifaat and its environs prevents rebels in Idlib from crossing to the Turkish-controlled Euphrates Shield pocket and accessing Aleppo. The importance of the area feeds suspicions that Ankara’s aims may go beyond weakening the Kurds. 

According to various sources, local groups trained and equipped by Hezbollah, Iranian-sponsored Shiite groups such as Fatemiyoun, Hashemiyoon and Zainabiyoun and the Syrian government’s militia the National Defense Forces are all present in Zahra and Nubl. They are reportedly coordinated by the IRGC, which has a headquarters in the area.

Image Information:

Image: Turkish Soldiers in Syria.
Source: Voice of America, via Wikimedia,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:T%C3%BCrk_Askeri_Suriye%27de.jpg
Attribution: CC-PD-Mark | PD VOA

Sanctions Likely To Weaken Russian Arms Flow to Africa

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Ethiopian soldier holding an AK-47.

Ethiopian soldier holding an AK-47.

“The wide-ranging sanctions could have serious implications for Africa. Importantly, they could affect the continent’s ability to procure and maintain military hardware from Russia.”

Economic sanctions on Russia will likely jeopardize African countries’s ability to purchase new weapons and maintain existing stockpiles, according to the excerpted article from South African news source The Conversation Africa.  As the article points out, African countries import 49 percent of its military hardware from Russia, everything from battleships and fighter jets to handguns and rifles. 

The article notes five ways the sanctions on Russia are likely to impact African defense contractors and/or militaries.  First, Russia cannot deliver military hardware that is already on order.  Second, African militaries will struggle to maintain their vast inventories of Russian weapons because the supply of spare parts is now in jeopardy.  Third, various contractual obligations between Russian arms suppliers and African nations will not be met, possibly leaving some difficult issues for courts to decide.  Fourth, arms merchants from numerous countries will try to fill the void created by Russia’s absence.  However, since so much of Africa’s weaponry is Russian made, it will not be easy for many African countries to replace their Russian weapons with Western armaments.  Fifth and finally, the already present black market in arms transfers is likely to grow as Russia and possibly some African nations look to skirt the sanctions.

The absence of Russian weapons could also prove to be an incentive for African defense industries to increase the quantity of their output as well as try to manufacture larger and more complex weapons platforms.  As the article points out, Russia might even transfer some of its defense contracts to countries such as Nigeria and South Africa, which already have a enough industrial capacity to manufacture arms.

Source:

Moses B. Khanyile, “Sanctions against Russia will affect arms sales to Africa: the risks and opportunities,” The Conversation Africa (South African independent news source), 27 March 2022. https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038

 The wide-ranging sanctions could have serious implications for Africa. Importantly, they could affect the continent’s ability to procure and maintain military hardware from Russia.

The biggest buyers of armaments from Russia – and most long-standing importers – are Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco and Uganda.

In the past Russia has been astute in filling the void left by western countries. It did this in 2013 when the US cut off military aid and arms to Egypt after the military staged a coup. Suppliers such as Russia and France were happy to fill the gap.

The comprehensive sanctions imposed on Russia are likely to last beyond the current conflict. This implies that what may be regarded as ‘interim measures’ to fill a temporary void may end up being a long-lasting solution to Africa’s desire to produce its own military hardware for its own use, and also to reduce reliance on external suppliers.

African countries should therefore make a concerted effort to look towards defence companies on the continent for support. The African Union and South Africa, in particular, given its BRICS link, should play a central role in driving such a campaign.

Image Information:

Image: Ethiopian soldier holding an AK-47.
Source: U.S. government via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afrimil-ethiopiansoldier.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Turkey Tries To Mitigate Economic Impact of Sanctions on Russia

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Erdoğan and Putin at the Kremlin, 23 September 2015.

Erdoğan and Putin at the Kremlin, 23 September 2015.

“Us three countries, Russia, China and Turkey can trade among ourselves with our national currencies; with the ruble, yuan, the Turkish lira and gold.”                                                                                                                                                -Turkish President Erdoğan

The sanctions on Russia will cost the Turkish economy at least $30-35 billion, according to Turkish economists quoted in the pro-government newspaper Yenicag.com.  There will be a significant hit to Turkey’s tourism industry, an increase in energy prices and agricultural products, as well as further decline in the Turkish lira.  In an effort to mitigate this impact, Turkey appears to be trying to position itself as a safe haven from Russian sanctions.

As the accompanying passage from pro-government newspaper Hürriyet reports, in early March, Turkish President Erdoğan suggested to Putin, “Us three countries, Russia, China and Turkey can trade among ourselves with our national currencies; with the ruble, yuan, the Turkish lira and gold.”  Pro-government outlets interpreted Erdoğan’s offer as a “historic hand [being extended] to Russia, whose ties with the international system are being cut and who is being isolated.”  Others criticized this as ridiculous, claiming that the world would not accept Turkey’s effort to turn the Russian sanctions into an advantage while it endures the costs.  Regardless of the reactions to the idea, business leaders said Turkey should actively work to develop a mechanism to facilitate trade with Russia in rubles, as the passage from pro-government Daily Sabah reports. 

Economically, Russia is an important trading partner to Turkey, with over 3000 Turkish companies operating in Russia and a trading volume of over $32.5 billion annually.  Russia provides 34% of Turkey’s natural gas, is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, and sends the greatest number of tourists to Turkey.  Russia and its banks’ exclusion from the international payment system will create challenges in Russia making its payments to Turkish contractors in Russia and to Turkish travel agents that organize tours for Russian tourists to visit Turkey. 

Politically, Turkey is a neighboring country to both Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea and has good relations with both, including a developing partnership with Ukraine, whereby Turkey sells it armed drones.  As such, Turkey has been trying to play a balancing act between Ukraine and Russia regarding Russia’s invasion.  On the one hand, Turkey acted with its NATO allies and strongly condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine, openly calls Russia’s invasion a “war,” and voted to condemn Russia in the United Nations.  President Erdoğan said that Turkey would continue to sell armed drones to Ukraine.  On the other hand, Turkey abstained from a vote to suspend Russia’s membership rights within the European Council, and announced it was not planning to impose sanctions on Russia.

Source:

“Atilla Yeşilada Türk ekonomisine düşen bombayı duyurdu (Atilla Yeşilada explains the bomb that is about to explode on the Turkish economy),” Yenicag.com.tr (pro-government newspaper), 25 February 2022. https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/atilla-yesilada-rusyaukrayna-savasi-sonrasi-turk-ekonomisine-dusen-bombayi-acikladi-514360h.htm         

Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association Chief Economist Gizem Öztok Altınsaç says that the geopolitical tension can have an initial cost to Turkey of about $30-35 billion.

Source: Abdülkadir Selvi, “Erdoğan, Putin’e ne önerdi? (What did Erdoğan suggest to Putin?),” Hurriyet.com (pro-government newspaper), 8 March 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/abdulkadir-selvi/erdogan-putine-ne-onerdi-42017962

At the AK Party Central Executive Council, President Erdoğan made important statements about the meeting he had with Putin.  He said he suggested to Putin, that “Us three countries, Russia, China and Turkey can trade among ourselves with our national currencies; with the ruble, yuan, the Turkish lira and gold.” 

…With this suggestion, Erdoğan is extending a historic hand to Russia, whose ties with the international system are being cut and who is being isolated. At the same time, he is taking steps to turn the crisis into an opportunity for Turkey.  Would Russia, who is being isolated in the world, consider the Turkey and China option?  Why not? 

Source: “Uslu: İnsanlar ayçiçek yağı ile güçlü lider arasında tercih yapabilir (Uslu: People can decide between sunflower oil and a strong leader),” Karar.com.tr (independent Turkish newspaper), 8 March 2022. https://www.karar.com/karar-tv/bikarar-ver-bugun-karar-tvde-12-1655020

Political communications expert İbrahim Uslu [said about Erdoğan’s offer to Putin]: “This is unbelievable, even if you convince Putin, once the world feels that you are intensely piercing their sanctions, they will sanction us…  As the world imposes sanctions and endures significant economic costs, they will not look favorably upon Turkey’s attempt to turn this into an opportunity, attempt to feed the entire Russian market by itself and comfortably make money from this.  Such suggestions can seem appealing trade-wise, but they should be reconsidered in light of political international relations and the alliances that Turkey belongs to.” 

Source: “Turkish businesses expect progress on using rubles in trade with Russia,” Daily Sabah (pro-government newspaper), 11 March 2022. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkish-businesses-expect-progress-on-using-rubles-in-trade-with-russia

Since the currency dispute with shipping companies is causing problems in the delivery of goods passing through customs, Turkey should actively work to develop a mechanism to facilitate trade with Russia in rubles, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) head Şekib Avdagiç said Friday.

Avdagiç stated that the companies working with Russia see the withdrawal of Western countries from Moscow as a new opportunity and emphasized that it is important to enable the use of the national currency of Russia.

Image Information:

Image: Erdoğan and Putin at the Kremlin, 23 September 2015.
Source: Kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Erdo%C4%9Fan_and_Putin.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Syrian Kurds Balancing Great Powers To Secure a Future in Syria

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Fighters of the YPJ.

Fighters of the YPJ.

“We have good relations with Russia. For the past two years, we have cooperated on the ground within the framework of the [Sochi] agreement. This problem cannot be solved without Russia.” Mazlum Kobane

The accompanying excerpts provide perspectives of Syrian Kurdish leaders about their discussions with the United States and Russia regarding their place in the future of Syria.  The passages also highlight the circumstances they face on the ground, particularly in light of Turkish threats of another operation and demands by the Syrian regime to relinquish their quest for autonomy.  As the final passage summarizes, the Syrian Kurds are “trying to achieve a status for themselves in the future of Syria…by following a remarkable policy of balance between Washington and Moscow.”

The first excerpted article, an interview with Mazlum Kobane, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), featured in security news site Al-Monitor, covers a range of issues impacting Syrian Kurdish territory.  The first issue is Turkey’s threats to launch another operation into Syria.  Kobane states that without consent from Russia or the United States, Turkey is unlikely to carry out such an operation because both countries have given the Kurds assurances.  Regardless, he takes Turkish threats seriously and prepares his forces accordingly.  Another topic is worsening economic conditions and increasing unemployment in Kurdish-controlled territory.  He claims this diminishes the authority of their de facto administration and that ISIS takes advantage of this to regain ground there.  Therefore, he says, an effective counterterrorism strategy requires addressing the economic situation of the region.  As such, he wants the United States to exempt the Kurdish region from Caesar sanctions to alleviate the declining economy. 

With respect to the negotiations with the Syrian regime, Kobane says that no serious negotiations have taken place so far, although they have engaged in some initial talks.  Kobane expects that Russia will be more proactive in its negotiations with the Syrian regime and play a determinative role.  Kobane notes the SDF’s good relations with Russia and ongoing cooperation on the ground within the framework of the Sochi agreement. He expects Russia will play a critical role in Syrian Kurdish negotiations with the Syrian regime.  To that end, on 23 November 2021, after receiving an official invitation from Russian officials, a Kurdish delegation met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow.  According to the second excerpt, a press release by the Syrian Democratic Council, Russian officials reiterated their support and encouragement for Kurdish dialogue with the Syrian regime and discussed possible political solutions to end the Syrian conflict. 

The third article from pro-government Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, analyzes the aforementioned Kurdish delegation’s visit to Moscow.  The article highlights that the statement from Russian officials referenced the territorial integrity of Syria and the protection of the rights of all ethnic and sectarian groups.  The article also points out that Lavrov personally welcomed the Kurdish delegation to highlight to the international community Russia’s attempt to broker a solution between the Syrian regime and the Kurds.  The author of the article claims this role will likely push the Kurds towards Russia even though Kurdish officials have been trying to strike a balance in their relations with the United States and Russia as they try to maintain their current autonomous status and advance their rights within Syria.

Source:

Amberin Zaman,“Syrian Kurdish commander says Russia opposes further Turkish land grabs” al-Monitor (a globally read security news site with regionally based reporting),09 November 2021. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/syria-kurdish-commander-assured-washington-turkey-wont-invade-again

Al-Monitor: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is making fresh threats to launch another military operation against the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria, and daily there is speculation in the media as to where and when yet another Turkish invasion might occur. Do you believe that Erdogan will follow on his threats? He’s certainly always done so in the past.

Mazlum Kobane: Erdogan has always sought the support of international actors before embarking on a military intervention here. He’s made threats and continues to make threats. He insists he will intervene and will continue to insist. In doing so he is looking to prepare the ground for an operation. However, the existing situation in northeast Syria is different now. The balances have shifted. In the past instances, there were no binding agreements between Turkey and the international powers…But now there are two agreements in place… In my view, unless Turkey gets the approval of either Russia or the United States, Erdogan cannot take such a step. And as far as I am aware there is no such approval.

Al-Monitor: Have Russia and the United States provided you with such guarantees?

Mazlum Kobane: Yes. The United States has given us such assurances. They were relayed to us officially. The United States said they were opposed to, and would not accept, any attack by Turkey against us. The US officials we spoke to… informed us that during the last meeting between Erdogan and President Joe Biden [on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Rome] that Erdogan was told that the United States would not accept any attack against us. The Russians also told us that they had not made any deals with Turkey…

…Like I said, a Turkish attack does not seem likely in the current circumstances. Besides, the Russians told us that they had told the Turks that they would not accept an attack against us. However, they are unable to determine what Turkish-backed forces might do. They said they would not accept an attack by them either. But it remains to be seen what will happen in practice, on the ground.

Al-Monitor: Are you saying they are not standing as firmly against Turkey as the Americans are?

Mazlum Kobane: No not at all. This is a very critical point and requires proper clarification. The Russians said there was no question of them allowing Turkey to attack but that Turkish-supported rebel groups might attack us without Turkey’s authorization…

Al-Monitor: Economic conditions in Rojava are getting harder by the day. On the one hand, there are the embargos imposed by Turkey and sanctions imposed by the United States on the Assad regime. On the other hand, there is the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the most severe droughts in decades and Turkey’s continued suppression of water along with its threats of an attack. Can these factors give the Islamic State a new lease of life?

Mazlum Kobane: DAESH [the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State] is active all across Syria. And these unfavorable economic conditions are impacting our struggle against DAESH. Its ability to regain ground is increasingly linked to economic conditions in Syria. There are way too many unemployed people. There is widespread poverty. All such factors diminish the authority of our administration. DAESH takes advantage of this. Therefore, the international coalition forces and all powers fighting against terrorism must take immediate steps to address the economic situation here. Bolstering the economy has become one of the pillars of combatting terrorism. We as the Syrian Democratic Forces say this openly. If we are to fight DAESH effectively we need to prioritize the economy.

…Our demand is that the whole of North and East Syria be exempted from the United States’ Caesar sanctions…

Mazlum Kobane: So far nobody has gone to Damascus for any kind of negotiations. And so far there have been no serious negotiations with Damascus. There have been some contacts but none of those meetings evolved into negotiations.

Al-Monitor: Why not?

Mazlum Kobane: Damascus is not ready for this. However much they claim that there will be no return to the pre-2011 era their mentality remains unchanged. They need to be pressured. Plus, there’s an issue of trust, particularly for Damascus.

Al-Monitor: Are they telling you to sever your ties with the United States?

Mazlum Kobane: Not exactly. They are telling us, “We do not want a state within a state. We do not want an army within an army.”… Our project is autonomy and we are implementing it at this time. However, they want guarantees from us with regard to the aforementioned concerns. Severing our ties with the Americans is not their precondition…

Al-Monitor: Are the Russians sincere in their mediations efforts? Or do they simply want you to capitulate so they can get the lion’s share of the oil pie from the regime as some claim?

Mazlum Kobane: We have good relations with Russia. For the past two years, we have cooperated on the ground within the framework of the [Sochi] agreement. This problem cannot be solved without Russia. I believe Russia could be more proactive and apply more pressure on the regime.

Source: “At an official invitation, “SDC” in Moscow to discuss the Syrian issue and bilateral relations,” m-syria-d.com, (Syrian Democratic Council Official website),23 November 2021. https://m-syria-d.com/en/?p=3302

The meeting was positive, as the two sides discussed the Syrian situation in general and methods to find a comprehensive settlement…

The meeting focused on many common points, the most important of which are the Syrian-Syrian Kurdish dialogue and Moscow’s support and encouragement for dialogue between the “SDC” and the authority in Damascus.

The two sides also talked about the need to work seriously for the participation of “SDC” in the political process and to represent it in a balanced manner in the international paths as a main and active party in the Syrian scene.

Source: Sedat Ergin,“Rusya Suriye’de YPG/PYD üzerinden özerkliğe kapıyı aralıyor (Russia opens the door to autonomy in Syria through YPG/PYD,” Hürriyet (a pro-government Turkish newspaper),26 November 2021. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/rusya-suriyede-ypg-pyd-uzerinden-ozerklige-kapiyi-araliyor-41947615

As it can be seen, the Syrian Kurds are trying to achieve a status for themselves in the future of Syria, where they aim to have advanced rights, by following a remarkable policy of balance between Washington and Moscow, keeping the doors of negotiations with both sides open.

Image Information:

Image: Fighters of the YPJ.
Source: Jakob Reimann, via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fighters_of_the_YPJ_stand_atop_a_hill_with_their_flag.jpg, Flickr images reviewed by FlickreviewR 2 | Flickr images missing SDC source of file | Flickr images missing SDC creator |
Attribution: CC-BY-2.0

Saudi Arabia’s Domestic UAV Program Slow To Get Off the Ground

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Personnel from the 378th Air Expeditionary Wing trained with Royal Saudi Air Force Police Wing members in a joint counter unmanned aerial system exercise Jan. 27, 2021 at Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Personnel from the 378th Air Expeditionary Wing trained with Royal Saudi Air Force Police Wing members in a joint counter unmanned aerial system exercise Jan. 27, 2021 at Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

“…Saudi Arabia has been very late in using unmanned weapons technologies and has relied on American weapons. The price of this delay has been Iran’s expansion in the region…”

Saudi Arabia’s domestic UAV program continues to develop at what some consider a snail’s pace.  While Houthi-led forces in Yemen have relied extensively on domestically assembled drones, using Iranian technology and foreign-sourced components, Saudi forces have yet to employ any of their domestic UAV technology on the Yemeni battlefield.  Saudi companies have contracted with Chinese and Turkish UAV manufacturers to assemble CH-4 and Karayel drones in Saudi territory, but there is an inherent expectation of a more robust Saudi domestic UAV industry, given the Houthis’ success in employing drones and the importance that Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” development program gives to localizing military industry.  According to the director of the Yemeni think tank Abaad for Studies and Research, Saudi delays in employing UAVs and its reliance on U.S. weaponry has been a critical element in allowing “Iran’s expansion in the region.”

The Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) recently announced that it would begin mass production of the “Sky Guard” UAV, a domestically developed platform that was initially scheduled for production in 2018.  As noted in the accompanying excerpt from the military news website Defense News, Sky Guard is a tactical UAV intended for surveillance and electronic warfare, though it can also carry small munitions.  Sky Guard joins another prominent Saudi domestic UAV project, the Saqr platform, which was first announced nearly a decade ago and went into production in 2017.  Still, there is no indication that Saqr drones have been employed in Yemen or elsewhere.

Source:

Abdulsalam Mohammed (@salamyemen2), Twitter, 1 November 2021. https://twitter.com/salamyemen2/status/1455138763110330369   

Riyadh intends to develop a homemade drone called Sky Guard. Will its effectiveness be tested in the Yemen war? Or is it too early for it to enter military operations?

Saudi Arabia has been very late in using unmanned weapons technologies and has relied on American weapons. The price of this delay has been Iran’s expansion in the region.

Source:  “Two Saudi firms to co-produce Sky Guard drone for operational use,” Defense News (military news website), 20 August 2021. https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2021/08/20/two-saudi-firms-to-co-produce-sky-guard-drone-for-operational-use/

The drone was developed in 2015 and displayed in 2017 at Bahrain’s BIDEC event and the Emirati conference IDEX, with an original expected date of mass production in 2018, according to Jean-Marc Rickli, head of global and emerging risks at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy… “The payload is light, 50 kilograms; range relatively short, 150 kilometers; and endurance of 8 hours,” Rickli told Defense News. Sky Guard can also fly at a maximum altitude of 18,000 feet, and be equipped with high-resolution cameras as well as electronic warfare systems. “So this is a tactical UAV mainly used for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes. I don’t know if it has combat experience such as in Yemen,” he said, but if Saudi Arabia wants to export it, proven combat experience would help. Asked whether the system can carry guided munitions, Rickli said: “I don’t know specifically about this drone, but a payload of 50 kilograms — it is enough for transporting bombs.” “As its description mentions: It was designed to be highly adaptable with several subsystem configurations. Thus one cannot exclude that it can be weaponized.”

Image Information:

Image:  Personnel from the 378th Air Expeditionary Wing trained with Royal Saudi Air Force Police Wing members in a joint counter unmanned aerial system exercise Jan. 27, 2021 at Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Source: Senior Airman Leala Marquez, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6513425/joint-force-rsaf-perform-counter-uas-exercise  
Attribution: Public Domain

Ethiopia Acquiring Emirati and Chinese Drones

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Wing Loong Baiweiflight.

Wing Loong Baiweiflight.

“The Ethiopian government has increased a large-scale recruitment drive in the army in the hopes that a string of purchases of an arsenal of drones and other weapons will be productive.”

On 25 November, the largely neutral Arab-language news service khabar25.com featured an article focused on the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in supplying unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to Ethiopia.  According to the article, Ethiopia’s interest in UAS from the UAE accelerated after the war began in November 2020 and the Ethiopian army faced greater resistance from the Tigrayan rebels than expected.  The article suggests that supplying the Ethiopian army has become more difficult for the UAE since the Tigrayan rebels captured two bases in Aksum and Samara in the northern Tigray region, leaving the military base in Harar, south of Addis Ababa, as another option to supply the Ethiopian army.

However, the article emphasizes that several other countries are providing UAS to Ethiopia in addition to the UAE.  For example, the article reports that China’s Wing Loong UAS was seen at the Harar military base.  Additionally, the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation on 8 October featured an Amharic-language interview of Ethiopian General Yilma Merdassa, who was seated near a model of the Wing Loong.  General Merdassa acknowledged that Ethiopia had received the UAS from China. The article also reports that Turkish drones are among the UAE’s purchases,UAS are a key part of the Ethiopian government’s last ditch efforts to ward off the Tigrayan rebels before they rebels approach the country’s capital, Addis Ababa.

Source:

“الجسر الجوي الإماراتي يقدم دعما عسكريا للحكومة الإثيوبية (The UAE air bridge provides military support to the Ethiopian government),” khabar25.com (Arabic-language news outlet focusing on current military and technology affairs from a neutral perspective), 25 November 2021. https://www.khabar25.com

Satellite images show that the UAE is providing significant support to the Ethiopian army in the fight against the Tigrayan forces.The UAE opened an air bridge to provide military support to the Ethiopian government in its war against forces in the northern Tigray region.Between September and November, there were more than 90 flights between the UAE and Ethiopia, many of which deliberately concealed where they took off and where they landed.

Flight maps and satellite images show aircraft recently arriving from the Sweihan base in Abu Dhabi, UAE, to the Harar Meda base, south of the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. The footage shows a Chinese-made Wing Loong drone, the first such aircraft ever to be documented at Ethiopian military bases.

The images also reveal that bases in Samara and Aksum were run over following clashes with Tigray forces, who said this week that they are about 200 kilometers from Addis Ababa. In recent weeks, the Ethiopian government has increased a large-scale recruitment drive in the army in the hopes that a string of purchases of an arsenal of drones and other weapons will be productive. The Ethiopian government signed a military cooperation agreement with Turkey in August, amid reports that it wanted to deploy drones to the war.

Source:  “የመሻገሪያ ዘመን -ሜ/ጀነራል ይልማ መርዳሳ የኢፌዲሪ አየር ኃይል ዋና አዛዥ(Maj. Gen. Yilma Merdasa, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force ),” Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (an Ethiopian government-owned public service broadcaster), 8 September 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOc1kBbEkvo

Image Information:

Image: Wing Loong Baiweiflight.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wing_Loong.jpg
Attribution: CC x 3.0

“Virtual War: The Qatar-UAE Battle of Narratives” by Lucas Winter (2020-05-28)

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(Click image to download brief.)

Over the past decade, strategic competition between Qatar and the UAE has evolved into low-level information warfare. What began as disagreements on foreign policy in the wake of the Arab Spring has escalated into a conflict to shape and control information flows in cyberspace. Although not always visible, Qatari-Emirati competition has become a persistent feature of the regional Operational Environment (OE). Their competition in the cyber-information sphere is part of a broader competition for influence involving Turkey, Qatar and their allies, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and their allies, on the other.1 One of Qatar’s main contributions to the Turkish-led axis is the employment of Arabic-language media outlets to influence local and foreign perceptions of the OE. The adversarial Qatar-UAE relationship has more recently morphed into a nascent cyber conflict to control not only the narrative but also digital data and information. Hoping to become hubs of the new digital economy, both countries are investing in cybersecurity and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in ways that will enhance their capabilities to shaper perceptions of the OE.2 Their conflict will continue to be a dynamic factor shaping the regional OE, and its evolution highlights the changing character of information war.