Erdoğan Relying on Russia To Bolster Support Ahead of Turkish Elections

Putin with Erdoğan.

Putin with Erdoğan.


“…Putin is making “gesture after gesture” to…President Erdoğan… No Turkish administration in the past has received such political support from a world power… Putin is behaving like a provincial AKP leader, to get [Erdoğan] reelected…” 


As he prepares for elections in June 2023, Turkish President Erdoğan will face a more united and determined domestic opposition than ever. Polls show that the most important issue for the Turkish electorate is the economy. Given the high inflation and economic crisis in the country, polls also show that if elections were held today, Erdoğan’s victory is not guaranteed. It is in this context that a series of recent moves made by Russian President Vladimir Putin in support of Erdoğan, are significant. As the first accompanying passage taken from respected Turkish journalist Murat Yetkin’s YouTube channel details, Russian President Vladimir Putin is making “gesture after gesture” to secure Erdoğan’s victory in 2023 elections by helping him claim that he is improving Turkey’s economy.  

In the second accompanying passage from independent news and analysis platform Medyascope, former Turkish diplomat Sinan Ülgen points out that the current pronouncements about making Turkey the largest natural gas center for Europe is a significant change in Russia’s stance on the issue.  He begs the question: “Why now?” and suggests that Putin prefers Erdoğan to win. Ülgen also notes that Russia’s state-run Rosatom, which is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, wired around $15 billion to its Turkish subsidiary recently, helping relieve a shortage in Turkey’s foreign currency reserves, a notable benefit for Turkey in an election year.  In the third excerpted passage, also from Medyascope, expert Ömer Taşpınar claims the transfer of funds represents Putin’s “investment in Erdoğan’s election victory.” Shortly after the transfer, Erdoğan criticized the West’s sanctions on Russia, while voicing support for Putin’s decision to block natural gas sales to Europe. Taşpınar says this was Erdoğan thanking Putin for the transfer.  In addition to Turkey’s economic woes, Erdoğan also faces resentment from the Turkish public regarding the approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees that it currently hosts. From the fourth excerpted passage, also from Medyascope, expert Gönül Tol predicts that Putin may help Erdoğan with this challenge too, by allowing Erdoğan to conduct an operation into northeastern Syria before the elections, something Putin has objected to in the past. This would enable Erdoğan to claim that such an operation would allow for the creation of a safe zone where Syrian refugees could be resettled back in Syria. Turkish observers would seemingly not be surprised if Putin gave the green light to Turkey to conduct at least a limited operation in the coming months.


Sources:

Murat Yetkin, “Erdoğan Putin’le aylık olağan görüşmede: Rusya yeniden seçilsin istiyor (Erdoğan in his monthly regular meeting with Putin: Russia wants [him] to get reelected),” Murat Yetkin via YouTube (veteran journalist Murat Yetkin’s own YouTube channel providing neutral analysis on Turkish developments), 12 October 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tzz1YSqsOUc&t=2s

Russian President Putin is making “gesture after gesture” to Turkey, specifically to President Erdoğan… Back to back statements coming from Moscow about natural gas are surprising even for Ankara.  No Turkish administration in the past has received such political support from a world power… Our journalist friend Nevsin Mengu says that Putin is behaving like a provincial AKP leader, to get [Erdoğan] reelected… 

Sinan Ülgen, “Putin’in Türkiye’deki “seçim yatırımları” ve tüm yönleriyle gaz merkezi (Putin’s “election investments” in Turkey and the gas hub [debate] from all angles),” Medyascope.tv (independent Turkish news and analysis platform), 15 October 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UOPh5Hrd53o&t=16s

Russia’s capital investments into the Turkish banking system for the Akkuyu nuclear plant, certain statements, other ways that Russia has provided financial help to Turkey such as sending the money for the Akkuyu nuclear plant in advance, suggest that Putin prefers that Erdoğan stay in power, since he knows how to work with Erdoğan and has a working relationship with him, one that has produced results for Putin.  Because it does seem like sending the money for Akkuyu in advance has no benefit for Russia, but a notable direct benefit for Turkey.   The natural gas issue is a bit different.  On this issue, Russia has a benefit, but… if Russia is really proposing to make Turkey a gas hub, as opposed to a transit country, this points to a huge policy change for Russia, …which begs the question, “Why now?”… given that Turkey has wanted this for 25 years.  So it does seem that Putin is taking steps to help Erdoğan in the upcoming elections. 

“Transatlantik: Ankara-Atina hattında gerilim: Savaş kapıda mı? Enerji krizi | Biden-Trump çekişmesi (Transatlantic: Tension in the Ankara-Athens route: Is war knocking on the door?  The Energy crisis | Biden-Trump Competition),” Medyaskope.tv (independent Turkish news and analysis platform),7 September 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szU-hgn-6_w&t=2270s

The billions of dollars that came from Russia, I’m not sure how that’s coming, but… it seems that Putin is making an election investment for Erdoğan.  He wants Erdoğan to win elections… and he gave this money for him to win.  And in return, we see that Erdoğan is protecting Russia in his statements.  Erdoğan’s comments [criticizing Europe’s sanctions and voicing support for Russia’s decision to cut natural gas to Europe] are pro-Russia…and his position is one that is closer to Russia on the issue of energy… He is criticizing the EU for the sanctions and saying that Russia is a strong country when he should be saying that Russia should not weaponize gas…

“Transatlantik: Kılıçdaroğlu’nun ABD ziyareti | ABD’den F-16 kararı | Erdoğan-Putin görüşmesi (Transatlantic: Kılıçdaroğlu’s USA visit | The USA’s F-16 decision | Erdoğan-Putin meeting),” Medyaskope.tv via YouTube, 13 October 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oG3YglxALwAErdoğan has been a lifeline for an isolated Russian economy…  Putin is also a lifeline for Erdoğan [domestically]…  In this context, Putin’s injection of money into the Turkish economy … is important for Erdoğan… I think Putin can provide important help for Erdoğan in Syria… Before the elections, I think an operation into Syria would be beneficial to Erdoğan because he could use the narrative that “I know you are resentful about the refugees but I can fix this problem.  I will conduct an operation into Syria to establish a zone [for the refugees to be resettled].  Until now, Putin had not given a green light to Turkey on this, but today, given how much Putin depends on Erdoğan, he might give a green light for this, which would be a huge favor to Erdoğan.


Image Information:

Image: Putin with Erdoğan.
Source: Kremlin.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin_with_Erdo%C4%9Fan.jpeg
Attribution: CC BY 3.0

Saudi Arabia Continues Buying Missiles and UAVs From China as Part of Broader Foreign Policy Rebalancing

A Chinese DF-21A transporter erector vehicle on display at the "Our troops towards the sky" exhibition at the Beijing Military Museum.

A Chinese DF-21A transporter erector vehicle on display at the “Our troops towards the sky” exhibition at the Beijing Military Museum.


“Saudi foreign policy has adapted to international multipolarity…”


Saudi Arabia’s continued unwillingness to act against Russia in global energy markets should understood in the context of a broader Saudi foreign policy recalibration, formulated prior to the Ukraine conflict and in response to a perceived geostrategic transformation in which it views China playing a key role. Early in the Ukraine conflict, Saudi leadership countered U.S. pressure to undermine Russian interests in global energy markets with demands that the U.S. bolster security assistance for the kingdom. Looming behind these demands was the prospect of turning to China as a complementary, if not alternative, security partner. As detailed in the first excerpted article, a columnist in the influential Saudi daily al-Riyadh recently noted: “Saudi foreign policy has adapted to international multipolarity,” leading the kingdom to strengthen political, economic and military relations with several countries, including China. Chinese-Saudi military cooperation, which is likely to come under increased scrutiny in coming months, primarily involves weapons and technology transfers, most notably involving ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

At the core, Chinese-Saudi defense cooperation is rooted in missiles, and has been a relationship shrouded in secrecy from the start. Such cooperation began with a 1986 deal for around 50 medium-range DF-3 (Dongfeng 3) missiles, conducted surreptitiously and before the establishment of official bilateral relations in 1990.[i] In 2007, following a landmark visit to China by King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia purchased the upgraded DF-21 ballistic missile system; however, neither country publicly admitted to the deal, which was reported on several years later. Today, the secret China-Saudi missile development program appears to continue evolving, with recent media reports and analyses claiming that Saudi Arabia, with Chinese assistance, has begun producing missiles domestically.

In contrast to the clandestine missile program, Saudi-Chinese cooperation on UAVs and counter-UAV systems is mostly in the open. In the past decade, Saudi Arabia has purchased the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group’s Wing Loong II and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s Rainbow CH-4 UCAVs, employing them in the Yemen conflict and signing cooperation agreements for CH-4s to be coproduced in Saudi territory. Saudi military industry has also contracted with the China Electronics Technology Group to jointly develop drones and counter-drone systems.[ii]  Last February, during the first edition of the Saudi World Defense Show, the Saudi government signed a deal with China’s Poly Technologies to purchase an anti-UAV laser system called “Silent Hunter”[iii] amid Saudi accusations that the United States was an unreliable security partner. As a prominent journalist wrote at the time in the regionally influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat: “When Houthi terrorism targets Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles and Iranian drones, Washington rushes to Vienna to complete the nuclear agreement,” in reference to negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear deal. A few weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the defense ministers of China and Saudi Arabia met virtually and, per the accompanying tweet by the Saudi Defense Minister, “explored ways to strengthen our military and defense cooperation.”  Similar discussions took place in June 2022, on the sidelines of the 2022 Shangri-La Asian Security Dialogue. There was much expectation that Chinese President Xi Jinping would visit Saudi Arabia last summer, but the visit never materialized. If such a visit takes place, defense and security cooperation will very likely be on the agenda.


Sources:

المملكة وسياسة الرصانة.. تنويع التحالفات وتعزيز التوازن الدولي

Fahim al-Hamed. “The Kingdom and its Sober Policy… Diversifying Alliances and Strengthening International Balance,” al-Riyadh (influential Saudi daily), 15 October 2022. https://www.alriyadh.com/1977312


The kingdom is governed by mutual strategic interests, but has always set limits to its flexibility and to being pressured. At this stage, the kingdom maintains its interests in light of a changing international system and major international conflicts, to ensure its leading role in the global scene. Saudi foreign policy has adapted to international multipolarity; thus, the kingdom has strengthened its political, economic and military relations with China, Russia and India, and has recently been restoring the relationship with Turkey.

حان وقت العقلانية السياسية

Tariq al-Hamid. “It is time for political rationality,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (regionally influential Saudi daily), 23 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4663yaye


It is unreasonable for the price of oil to rise, so Britain and the United States rush to contact Saudi Arabia, and when Houthi terrorism targets Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles and Iranian drones, Washington rushes to Vienna to complete the nuclear agreement…
Is there a serious stance from the US administration, which is now talking about “partnership” and “alliance” with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states? Where is the serious American position on the security of the Gulf, as the Americans demand the Saudis and the Gulf states now to reduce oil prices and support international stability?

@kbsalsaud (Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Minister of Defense), Twitter, 26 January 2022. https://twitter.com/kbsalsaud/status/1486308204455804932

Upon the direction of HRH the Crown Prince, I met with the Minister of National Defense in the people’s republic of China General Wei Fenghe. We reviewed the historic ties between our two countries and explored ways to strengthen our military and defense cooperation.

@defensearabia (Defense Arabia, Arabic-language military news and analysis website), Twitter, 11 June 2022. https://twitter.com/defensearabia/status/1535634061141725184Saudi Assistant Defense Minister meets Chinese Defense Minister in Singapore, to discuss defense and military cooperation relations.


Notes:

[i] The DF-3 missiles were expensive and inaccurate, to the point of allegedly making them unusable during the first Gulf War. Yet, according to the memoirs of former deputy defense minister Khalid bin Sultan—the key Saudi official involved—the deal marked a turning point in Saudi military development and in its relations with China.

[ii] See: Lucas Winter, “UAV Technologies Proliferating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia,” OE Watch, Issue 7, 2022.

[iii] See: Lucas Winter, “Saudi Arabia Turns to China for Low-Altitude Air Defense,” OE Watch, Issue 4, 2022.


Image Information:

Image: A Chinese DF-21A transporter erector vehicle on display at the “Our troops towards the sky” exhibition at the Beijing Military Museum.
Source: Max Smith, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:DF-21A_TEL_-_Chinese_Military_Museum_Beijing.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Ecuador Seeks New Relationship With China After Debt Deal

Chinese President Xi Jinping and former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa sign 11 cooperative agreements during a state visit in 2017.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa sign 11 cooperative agreements during a state visit in 2017.


“The idea is that part of the oil is released, and it is allowed to be sold at market price, which is an additional benefit for Ecuador.  And with those resources, the president can further strengthen social investment.”


Ecuador is performing a balancing act as it undertakes a strategic review of its with China while making overtures to Washington. Under President Rafael Correa (2007-2017), Ecuador racked up billions in debt, with China as the country’s largest lender. Since Correa’s departure, Ecuador has struggled to repay China, making repeated requests to restructure debt deals. In contrast, current President Guillermo Lasso recently announced the renegotiation of Ecuador’s debt, reports center-right daily El Universo. According to the article, the agreement will free Ecuador’s oil production, previously tethered to the repayment of the Chinese debt, to be sold on the spot market. The newspaper notes that this should provide additional revenues for the government, which it badly needs to invest in both social programs and to combat rising insecurity and criminality. The debt renegotiation is part of a broader repositioning of the Ecuador-China relationship, notes another El Universo article.  One large source of debt is the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam project, which has generated controversy throughout the country. The project is mired in cost overruns, environmental degradation, and questions over the structural integrity of the infrastructure (it has thousands of cracks and is unstable). As a result, a review commission within Ecuador’s government recommended a rejection of the project, with a threat to withhold repayment of the loan that financed it if China does not fix the structural deficiencies.


Sources:

“Presidente Guillermo Lasso anuncia renegociación de deuda con China en Nueva York (President Guillermo Lasso announces debt renegotiation with China in New York),” El Universo (one of Ecuador’s largest dailies, generally seen as center-right), 19 September 2022. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/economia/presidente-guillermo-lasso-anuncia-renegociacion-de-deuda-con-china-en-nueva-york-nota/  

The government… said that, in general, these agreements represent a relief of $1.4 billion in debt service for Ecuador until 2025, since amortizations to the China Development Bank will be reduced by more than $745 million over the next three years and amortizations to Eximbank will be reduced by about $680 million over the next four years… The idea is that part of the oil is released and it is allowed to be sold at market price, which is an additional benefit for Ecuador.  And with those resources, the president can further strengthen social investment.

“Informe de Fiscalización recomienda no recibir central Coca Codo y revisar designación del Ministro de Energía por conflicto de intereses (Audit report recommends not receiving Coca Codo Sinclair Dam and reviewing the appointment of the Minister of Energy due to conflict of interest),” El Universo (one of the country’s largest dailies, generally considered center-right), 9 September 2022. https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/economia/informe-de-fiscalizacion-recomienda-no-recibir-central-coca-codo-y-revisar-designacion-del-ministro-de-energia-por-conflicto-de-intereses-nota/  

At least 121 conclusions and 13 recommendations, which include asking the President of the Republic, Guillermo Lasso, that his government reject the work of the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant (due to its multiple structural problems) and that it review the appointment of the current Minister of Energy, Xavier Vera Grunauer, for allegedly having a conflict of interest, came out of a final report of the investigation carried out by the Supervisory Commission of the National Assembly, on the contract and construction of the largest hydroelectric power plant, the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam.


Image Information:

Image: Chinese President Xi Jinping and former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa sign 11 cooperative agreements during a state visit in 2017.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecuador_y_China_firman_11_convenios_de_cooperaci%C3%B3n_(30958228411).jpg
Attribution: CCA BY 2.0

“Chronic Instability” Atop Algerian Military’s Foreign Intelligence and Security Directorate

President of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria Abdelmadjid Tebboune (2021).

President of the Democratic People’s Republic of Algeria Abdelmadjid Tebboune (2021).


…a politico-military regime… which cuts off heads instead of questioning the structural reasons for its inadequacy.


The Algerian military seems plagued by internal rifts that negatively affect leadership and cohesion.  Some evidence of this can be found in what the widely read Moroccan news website Le360 characterizes as”chronic instability” atop Algeria’s foreign intelligence and security agency, the General Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DGDSE).  The Le360 article considers the instability atop DGDSE leadership as proof of a political-military regime that “cuts off heads instead of questioning the structural reasons for its inadequacy,” in ways that “destabilize both the officers and the troops.” 

In early September 2022, Major General M’henna Djebbar was appointed as director of the DGDSE, making him the fifth person to hold the position since current President Abdelmadjid Tebboune assumed office in December 2019.  The volatility is noteworthy, given that for approximately 25 years, from 1990 until 2015, Algerian intelligence services were controlled by a single man: Mohamed Mediene, also known as “Toufik.”  Since then, factional struggles within the military and between the military and intelligence services have led to sudden falls from grace within the DGDSE, as one-time powerbrokers have been dismissed, indicted, or imprisoned for being on the losing side of a factional battle.  Djebbar, who is a longtime associate of Mohamed Mediene, was briefly jailed in 2019-2020, during the purge led by then-chief of staff Ahmed Gaid Saleh, following the ouster of longtime president Abdelaziz Bouteflika.  According to the accompanying excerpt from the France-based online news and analysis website Maghreb Intelligence, Djebbar has become a close ally to President Tebboune but is distrusted by Said Chengriha, the army’s current chief of staff. 

Major security challenges, including Libya’s civil war, Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara, and lawlessness in the Sahel are also likely to affect Algeria’s military performance.  Indeed, some recent DGDSE directors seem to have been appointed expressly to deal with the various crises of the moment.  The first head of the DGDSE in the Tebboune era, Major General Mohamed Bouzit, was a Libya specialist appointed in April 2020 at a time of growing Turkish influence in Libya.  After nine months on the job, he was dismissed and subsequently arrested on espionage charges. A report published at the time in the Africa-focused political weekly magazine Jeune Afrique argued that failure to curb Turkish influence in Libya was behind his fall.  His replacement, nicknamed “Polisario” due to his strong ties with leaders in the Western Sahara independence movement, was likely appointed to deal with Algerian concerns over growing international support for Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara. Domestically, the military-controlled Algerian government seems to be in a position of relative strength, having largely neutralized the protest movement that overthrew Bouteflika in 2019.  Algeria’s natural gas reserves and relatively stable relations with both Russia and Europe have yielded newfound geopolitical leverage in the shadow of war in Ukraine.  The Algerian military is strong on paper, thanks to substantial purchases of advanced Russian and Chinese weaponry in the past decade. Still, the chronic instability atop the DGDSE may be symptomatic of internal leadership and cohesion issues which, while not visible on the surface, should be considered when assessing Algeria’s military capabilities.


Sources:

Mohammed Ould Boah. “Les non-dits des nouveaux changements  à la tête des services du renseignement algérien (What goes unsaid about new changes in the leadership of Algerian intelligence services),” Le360 (widely read Moroccan news website), 16 July 2022. https://fr.le360.ma/politique/les-non-dits-des-nouveaux-changements-a-la-tete-des-services-du-renseignement-algerien-263715

This chronic instability at the head of Algerian foreign intelligence is indicative of the improvisation, mistakes, even casting errors, of a politico-military regime visibly incapable of scoring points and which cuts off heads instead of questioning the structural reasons for its inadequacy. At this rate of purges, the Algerian army has become leaderless – in the sense of lacking a head. Decapitated, this army capsizes according to the news and thinks of reassuring the chain of command by changing commander each time. This destabilizes both the officers and the troops.

Ilyes Aribi. “Algérie: la cruelle désillusion des partisans du général M’henna Djebbar (Algeria: the cruel disillusion of General M’henna Djebbar’s supporters),” Maghreb Intelligence (French-based online news and analysis website), 20 July 2022. https://www.maghreb-intelligence.com/algerie-la-cruelle-desillusion-des-partisans-du-general-mhenna-djebbar/

In 2021, M’henna Djebbar convinces Tebboune to include him in his inner circle to consolidate his faltering presidential power… But since June 2022, M’henna Djebbar’s plans have been troubled by the strong comeback of his number one opponent: Said Chengriha, the head of the Algerian military institution, who has worked to slow down the rehabilitation of former generals from the 1990s, fearing their stranglehold on Algerian power.

“Algeria: Is the Russia-Turkey rivalry at the heart of the Bouzit affair?” Jeune Afrique (Africa-focused political weekly magazine), 24 September 2021. https://www.theafricareport.com/130371/algeria-is-the-russia-turkey-rivalry-at-the-heart-of-the-bouzit-affair/

Major General Mohamed Bouzit (aka Youcef ), the former head of Algerian foreign intelligence, was appointed in April 2020 and replaced in January 2021. He was placed in detention in the Blida military prison, 60km south of Algiers, following his arrest on 7 September 2021…

Bouzit… is accused of having left the field open for Turkey to extend its field of intervention in Libya by installing several military bases, among other things… [and] is suspected of having misled Algerian diplomacy and favouring Ankara’s Libyan interests…

Therefore, the Bouzit affair is just another episode in the clan struggle that dominates the Algerian political-military seraglio. This muted war is taking place between President Tebboune’s close advisors, Chengriha’s entourage and even generals from Ahmed Gaïd Salah’s former team, who are all prepared to ally themselves with one or another of the factions to avoid joining their comrades in prison.


Image Information:

Image:  President of the Democratic People’s Republic of Algeria Abdelmadjid Tebboune (2021)
Source: https://www.quirinale.it/elementi/60784 
Attribution: Quirinale.it

The Appeal of “Duginism” in the Middle East

Aleksandr Dugin, at the Civilizations of the Eurasian Area meeting on February 26, 2018 at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.

Aleksandr Dugin, at the Civilizations of the Eurasian Area meeting on February 26, 2018 at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.


A special role in the project is given to Sufism, not only in Turkey but also in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa.


Whatever one thinks of Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin’s esoteric cultural-geopolitical theories, his influence in Arabic-speaking countries is worthy of attention. Dugin, a Russian political philosopher who rose to prominence among Russian military and foreign policy elites with the 1997 publication of his book “Foundations of Geopolitics,” has long called for Russia to annex Ukraine to counter “Atlanticist” encroachment. Several of Dugin’s books are available in Arabic translation, most recently a tome published last July by prominent Qatari think tank The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Two elements of Dugin’s ruminations on culture and geopolitics are finding receptive audiences in the Middle East: one, his opposition to U.S. regional involvement; and two, his appeals to cultural conservatism and civilizational identity.

Dugin’s strident critique of U.S. presence in the Middle East has been attractive to members of the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis,” which includes Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon and opposes the “West,” Israel, and Saudi Arabia.  Following the assassination of Dugin’s daughter Daria in August 2022 in Russia, allegedly by the Ukrainian government, a top Lebanese Hezbollah official issued a condolence statement that praised Dugin’s support for “the Palestinian cause and the legitimate struggle against American hegemony, Zionist occupation and takfiri terrorism.” Indeed, Dugin’s strong critiques of Israel seemingly appeal to a broad spectrum of the Arab public, including leftists and liberals who may otherwise disagree with many of his far-right-leaning ideas.

Furthermore, Dugin’s cultural conservatism seemingly endears him to a spectrum of Middle Eastern religious movements and organizations, both Sunni and Shi’ite.  Perhaps most interesting in this regard are Dugin’s appeals to Sufism, a diverse and varied Sunni school of thought and practice.  Broadly speaking, Sufism is associated with a mystical, esoteric approach to Islam, in contrast to the strict textualism of fundamentalist Salafi or Wahhabi groups.  The accompanying excerpt from the leftist, pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, translates a 2020 piece written by Daria Dugin on Russia’s approach to the Middle East.  In it, she argues for establishing a Russian alliance with the “Islamic Civilization” via Iran and Turkey, with special emphasis on Turkey due to its historical links with Sufism. Dugin’s appeal among Arab intellectuals and pundits has its limits, however.  Arab liberals, in particular, are likely to be skeptical of Dugin’s “anti-imperialism” and distrust his appeals to cultural conservatism.  As a recent piece in the independent Lebanese news website al-Modon argues, Dugin supports the idea of self-determination yet also “theorizes conquests, profit-sharing, and access to the warm waters of oceans and seas,” and as such is little more than an ideologue seeking to justify Russia’s imperial ambitions.


Sources:

Source: The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (prominent Qatari think tank), July 2022. https://bookstore.dohainstitute.org/p-2276.aspx

As part of its “translation series,” The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies has published a book titled “Geopolitics of Postmodernity: The Age of New Empires, General Outlines of Political Geography in the Twenty-First Century,” by Alexander Dugin.

Source:

“الموسوي: جريمة اغتيال داريا دوغينا تشكل عملاً ارهابياً قذرا

(Al-Moussawi: The assasination of Daria Dugin is a dirty act of terrorism),” al-Manar (Lebanese Hezbollah media outlet), 24 August 2022. https://almanar.com.lb/9887506

Hezbollah’s official in charge of Arab and international relations, Ammar al-Moussawi, issued the following statement:

On the occasion of the tragic incident that claimed the life of Mrs. Daria Dugin, the daughter of the Russian thinker and philosopher Alexander Dugin, I would like to express my condemnation of this crime, which constitutes a filthy terrorist act. I also take this occasion to express my great appreciation for Mr. Dugin’s position and courageous stances in defense of his country and people, as well as of just and righteous causes, including the Palestinian cause and the legitimate struggle against American hegemony, Zionist occupation and takfiri terrorism.

Source:

“روسيا والشرق الأوسط: استراتيجيات آفاق وتوقعات

(Russia and the Middle East: Strategies, Prospects and Expectations),” al-Akhbar (leftist, pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 22 August 2022. https://al-akhbar.com/World/343506

A special role in the project is given to Sufism, not only in Turkey but also in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, with the exception of countries where Wahhabism, Salafism and Takfirism predominate (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar)… Reviving the traditions of Rumi, Bektashi, and Yunus Emre may also change the role of Ankara, which has a chance to become a true leader of the Sunni world. Sufism, while remaining outside Middle Eastern operations, is at least as mobilizing as Salafism, and could play a role in uniting the Muslim world against Atlanticism and the Wahhabism it supports…

Thus, Moscow, Ankara and Tehran will return to their traditional roots and become centers of three spiritual civilizations (Orthodox, Sunni and Shiite). Together, they will oppose the West. It is interesting to note that these three nations, with imperial traditions, may have fought each other in the past, but today they have learned to overcome historical contradictions and realize the geopolitical inevitability of this tripartite partnership. 

Source:

“الدوغينيون العرب

(The Arab Dugins),” al-Modon (independent liberal Lebanese news website), 25 August 2022.

https://tinyurl.com/2p978ntr

Indeed, in some of his books, Dugin theorizes conquests, profit-sharing, and access to the warm waters of oceans and seas. In short, the Russian Dugin is nothing but the other side of the American ideologues who have exposed us to creative chaos and what resulted from creative chaos, and democracy and what resulted from democracy…


Image Information:

Image: Aleksandr Dugin, at the Civilizations of the Eurasian Area meeting on February 26, 2018 at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.
Source: https://www.farsnews.ir/photo/13981126000814/نشست-تمدن-های-حوزه-اوراسیا
Attribution: CCA 4.0 INT

Turkish Lessons Learned From the War in Ukraine

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with Minister of National Defense Minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar, Kyiv, Ukraine.

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with Minister of National Defense Minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar, Kyiv, Ukraine.


An armed force with a high degree of maneuver capability and a high communication capability can conduct very effective maneuvers regardless of how much bigger its enemy force may be.


Various Turkish news programs consider Turkey’s observations from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The accompanying excerpts from one such televised debate summarize Turkey’s military, technical, and geopolitical takeaways from the war. The excerpts are from a program which aired on Nokta TV24, a Turkish independent news and analysis channel, featuring a discussion between former Turkish Ambassador Fatih Ceylan, the Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO from 2013 to 2018, and one of Turkey’s top defense and security experts, Arda Mevlütoğlu. The show was posted on YouTube.

To begin, Mevlütoğlu notes the most important lesson from a military and technological standpoint has been that an armed force (Ukraine) can conduct very effective maneuvers against a much larger enemy force (Russia). He points to the importance of Ukraine’s capable strike systems, maneuver forces, and particularly communication systems. Citing reports of Russia having to resort to commercial GPS systems because of its Glonass GPS system being jammed, he concludes that attention to electronic and cyberwarfare are also extremely important. Mevlütoğlu also points to the importance of the psychological dimensions of the war, noting that Ukraine’s successful and effective psychological campaign has enabled it to maintain the support of the European public, which has been critical for ensuring those countries’ continued support. As such, he claims that diplomatic, cultural, and psychological factors are just as important as military defense technologies, which can even be a tool of foreign policy. He points to the success of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones in Ukraine, and how the successes of these drones have increased Turkey’s profile there [1]. Geopolitically, Mevlütoğlu assesses that Russia will end up deeply weakened in terms of potential and capability. He argues that such a Russia will have an asymmetric relationship with China, where China will have the upper hand in their trade relationship, especially in energy. In this sense, he sees China coming out as one of the beneficiaries of this war. On the other hand, he claims that the United States has consolidated its political-military influence in Eastern Europe, which he says will likely limit China’s influence in Europe and access to the Atlantic.


Sources:

“İnsansız Kara – Hava ve Deniz Aracı Üretiminde Neredeyiz? | S-400’lerin İkinci Partisi Gelir Mi? Fatih Ceylan Arda Mevlütoğlu ile (Where are we in the Production of Unmanned Land – Air and Sea Vehicles? | Would a Second Batch of S-400’s Come?  Fatih Ceylan speaks with Arda Mevlütoğlu),” Nokta TV24 via YouTube (a Turkish independent news and analysis channel), 1 September 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZT3eIYmT84Q&list=WL&index=63

Q: As you know, there’s been a huge inflection point in the global security environment in February 2022 with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine… We’ve left behind six months of this war.  In these six months, what lessons should we learn as far as military operations and deterrence based on how the war is going?  What strategies, visions, concepts, and doctrines do we need to develop for the future? 

A: Six months of the Russia-Ukraine war has given us the opportunity to make some very important political, military, and strategic and observations.  From the Turkish point of view, both from a military and technological standpoint, some of the most important ones are [as follows]:  An armed force with a high degree of maneuver capability and a high communication capability can conduct very effective maneuvers regardless of how much bigger its enemy force may be.  A well-educated, well-equipped force with units with good communication systems and highly [capable] strike systems can be very effective.  Communication technology is the most important here…  There is open-source information that says that the Starlink communication system provided by Elon Musk has been instrumental for Ukraine in the battlefield… We have reports that there have been important GPS jamming attempts in the region, especially against Russia’s Glonass system.   And in fact, there are reports that Russia has had to resort to commercial GPS systems as a result.  So we can conclude that there is huge competition in electronic and cyber war.  We can’t see this directly, we can only observe the outcomes of this.  The war has shown us that electronic and cyberwars, as well as strike and maneuver forces are extremely important. 

There is also the psychological dimension.  Morale and psychological support is very important.  Ukraine has been conducting a very successful, very effective psychological war.   It has not only consolidated its public support in the West, but increased it.  It has obtained moral superiority and retained this.  So, however right you may be in your war, if you can’t defend your thesis in the international arena or find international support, it is that difficult to continue your fight…  Of course in this case there can be no explanation for attacking a sovereign country. 

So [the war has shown us that] it’s not just military fighting [that matters]; the fight in the diplomatic, cultural, psychological dimensions are also very important.  In fact, military defense is not just a military or industrial thing, its also an element of foreign policy.  We don’t need to repeat the success that Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s have had for Ukraine, they are even conducting crowdfunding activities to buy more. 

Q: There’s a new reality now… When we look at the military strategies of the U.S., China and Russia and the related doctrines they are developing, we see a serious global strategic competition that is here to stay for many years.  How will the balance of powers play out? 

A:  This is an open-ended process.  In this competition between the U.S., China and Russia, my view is that, regardless of how this war ends, Russia will end up deeply weaked.  It will continue to be a superpower and a big power, but it will be seriously damaged and tarnished in terms of potential and capability.  Such a Russia will have an asymmetric relationship with China such that China will have an advantage, particularly in terms of energy imports and advanced technologies and systems.  …  So I think China may come out benefiting from this [war].  I don’t know if it will result in a conflict with Taiwan- I think it’s very difficult and I hope not.   Taiwan’s TSMC company is very important for global microchip production, so a war in that region could lead to a serious global crisis… But it will be tense.  In fact we see that the U.S. has focused its interest in that area.  China’s relations with the U.S. and the West may be both competitive and cooperative at the same time…  Finally, the U.S. has consolidated its military-political influence in Eastern Europe.  So China’s influence in Europe and access to the Atlantic may become more limited.


Notes:

[1] See also Karen Kaya, “Turkish-Made Bayraktar TB2 Drones Play Important Role in Ukraine,” OE Watch, Issue 6, 2022.


Image Information:

Image: President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with Minister of National Defense Minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar, Kyiv, Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Volodymyr_Zelensky_and_Hulusi_Akar.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Colombia’s New Government Quickly Reestablishes Relations With Maduro’s Venezuela

The Colombia-Venezuela border, which has witnessed millions of migrants in recent years.

The Colombia-Venezuela border, which has witnessed millions of migrants in recent years.


The first and most important step in this new phase of bilateral relations is to restore diplomacy between the two countries.


Mere weeks after taking office in August 2022, Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro, has reestablished relations with Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela. This is noteworthy as relations between the two countries ruptured in 2019, when Columbia’s then-president Iván Duque recognized Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president, thus prompting Maduro to end formal diplomatic ties. Under president Duque, Colombia was a staunch opponent of Maduro, seeking to isolate him on the international stage, while itself seeking to play a lead role in Latin America.

Presidents Petro and Maduro celebrated the resumption of relations with the exchange of ambassadors, CNN en Español reports. The article notes that the exchange of ambassadors, the reopening of their shared border, the resumption of trade, and eventually, a meeting between Petro and Maduro, signals a changing strategic environment in Latin America toward Venezuela’s dictatorship.  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also changed the region’s appetite for isolating Venezuela and demanding domestic changes. In an interview with Colombia’s leading weekly magazine Semana, Colombia’s new ambassador to Venezuela, Armando Benedetti, announced Colombia’s intention to buy Venezuelan oil and gas, previously sanctioned to press Maduro over links to organized crime and gross human rights abuses.  Ambassador Benedetti also spoke of a proposal to establish special economic zones along the Colombia-Venezuela border, which immediately generated concern about the potential for drug trafficking organizations and Colombian guerrillas using these zones to launder money. Collectively these moves give the Maduro regime more space to maneuver.


Sources:

Source: “Colombia y Venezuela restablecen relaciones bilaterales con la llegada de embajadores a Bogotá y Caracas (Colombia and Venezuela reestablish bilateral relations with the arrival of ambassadors to Bogotá and Caracas),” CNN en Español (the Spanish-language version of the popular American outlet), 29 August 2022.

https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2022/08/29/armando-benedetti-embajador-de-colombia-en-venezuela-llega-a-caracas-orix/

Benedetti told journalists in Caracas that the first and most important step in this new phase of bilateral relations is to restore diplomacy between the two countries.  That includes both the diplomatic issue and trade relations, one of the priorities of the two governments.  “We are going to reestablish relations with Venezuela, we are going to reestablish trade from which more than 8 million Colombians live, we are going to look for an economic zone, tax exemptions and legislation that allows the Colombian government to invest in works that have an impact on the development of the region,” said Benedetti…Upon his arrival in Caracas, Benedetti told reporters that “there are several ideas” to restore trade relations…among them, creating a special economic zone on both sides.  “And in my country legislation would have to be passed so that it can invest in hospitals, in bridges, in works, infrastructure, that really have an impact on development.”

Source: “‘Es necesario que Colombia le compre gas a Venezuela:’ Armando Benedetti (‘It is necessary for Colombia to buy gas from Venezuela:’ Armando Benedetti),” Semana (Colombia’s leading weekly magazine), 9 September 2022. https://www.semana.com/politica/articulo/es-necesario-que-colombia-le-compre-gas-a-venezuela-armando-benedetti/202247/

The purchase of gas from Colombia to Venezuela “is necessary because our country will run out of gas in the next seven years.  They already have the gas pipeline that comes out of the Gulf of Maracaibo itself.  They already have the exploitation, a gas pipeline, it would only be necessary to look for about 30, 40 kilometers so that they can begin to commercialize from Colombia.”


Image Information:

Image: The Colombia-Venezuela border, which has witnessed millions of migrants in recent years.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/cidh/49534798383
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Algerian Media Dismissive of Morocco-Israel Security Cooperation

IAI Harop UAV at Paris Air Show 2013.

IAI Harop UAV at Paris Air Show 2013.


“China controls 80 to 90 percent of global capacity. This is an extremely dominant position for a country at a time when everyone is trying to expand.”


Security cooperation between Morocco and Israel has expanded rapidly since the two countries formalized relations as part of the 2020 Abraham Accords.  As reported in the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, the two militaries will institutionalize regular joint training and education programs.  In addition, Morocco has agreed to purchase Israeli weapons systems, including the BARAK MX Integrated Air & Missile Defense System, Heron unmanned aerial vehicles, and Harop loitering munitions[RG1] .  Seeking to bolster its domestic defense industry with Israeli know-how, Morocco is set to eventually manufacture Harop munitions domestically. 

Against this backdrop, Algerian media outlets have been dismissive of the extent to which deepening Israeli-Moroccan security links will shift the balance of military power in North Africa.  A recent opinion article in the Algerian daily El Chorouk interprets Moroccan outreach to Israel as a sign of desperation and insecurity within Morocco’s ruling elite, due to both regional strategic challenges and uncertainty over royal succession.  In this view, Israel is the only party willing to “rescue Morocco from Algeria’s military power,” something that in the author’s view it will not accomplish.  Algerian pundits may be dismissive of Morocco’s growing power, but Algerian military leaders are undoubtedly paying attention to the challenge of the Israel-Morocco security partnership. 


Source:

“كيف يستفيد المغرب من التجربة الإسرائيلية؟ 

(How does Morocco benefit from the Israeli experience?),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 22 July 2022. https://tinyurl.com/n5ntt67x

Kochavi’s visit to Morocco resulted in a series of technical and strategic agreements between the two armies and the two governments. At the core of them is cooperation in various security fields, as well as an active and persistent exchange of experiences, including study exchanges and joint training of combat units throughout the year… Morocco also agreed to buy a set of [Harop kamikaze drones] and to start manufacturing them domestically…

Source:

“الصهاينة لنجدة المخزن ضدّ قوة الجزائر العسكرية

(Zionism to rescue the Makhzen from Algeria’s military force),” El Chorouk (Algerian daily), 9 August 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4k6ew5zb

As for its dispute with Algeria, it led Morocco to an accelerating arms race in which it was difficult to keep pace with its eastern neighbor, leaving it far behind due to the strength of the latter’s resources, in contrast to the scarcity of Moroccan resources… [Morocco] has found no refuge except in the Zionist entity, which cannot provide what Rabat is looking for.


Image Information:

Image: IAI Harop UAV at Paris Air Show 2013
Source: Julian Herzog, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IAI_Harop_PAS_2013_02.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine War Demonstrate Reliance on, Antipathy Toward West

 “The West wants its African partners to share its condemnation of Russia. African states meanwhile cling to their monopoly on victimhood and historical resentment of Western domination in world affairs.”


Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, official reactions from African nations have varied.  For instance, the March 2022 UN vote to condemn Russian aggression showed that 27 African states voted for the resolution, one state (Eritrea) voted against, 17 abstained, and nine more were absent for the vote.  As commentary from the respected Pan-African Institute for Security Studies lays out, the range of African reactions to the war is guided by logics not always appreciated from the outside.

First, and most important, the authors underscore that the continent’s 54 states are in no way a monolithic bloc and would not share a singular, unified viewpoint of the war given their varying goals, positions in international society, and international alliances.  Second, the authors note that African states are not affected by the war in the same ways.  While extreme food shortages were felt in certain states throughout the continent as a result of Russian blockades of grain and fertilizer, for many African countries, these issues “[don’t] compare with the Western aid that enables African countries to function.”  Third, the authors note that the war has been a litmus test bringing to light variations in African states’ interpretations of the international system.  Certain African states seek to maintain the Western “rules-based” order, and thus find more sympathy with Ukraine.  Conversely, other African states, with lingering antipathy to a global order in which they view themselves to be marginalized, are thus more sympathetic with revisionist, non-rule-abiding states like Russia. The authors sum up their assessments, saying: “Western surprise at most African countries’ limited emotion towards Russia’s invasion, and Africa’s neutral stance, point to a self-centeredness on both sides.  The West wants its African partners to share its condemnation of Russia.  African states meanwhile cling to their monopoly on victimhood and historical resentment of Western domination in world affairs.” 


Source:

Paul-Simon Handy and Félicité Djilo, “Unpacking Africa’s Divided Stance on the Ukraine War,” Institute for Security Studies (pan-African think tank), 12 August 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/unpacking-africas-divided-stance-on-the-ukraine-war  

“African votes in the United Nations (UN) on the war revealed sharp divisions between countries… The high number of abstentions was widely interpreted as a sign of Russian influence or evidence of the growing anti-Westernism of African governments and citizens.  This view wrongly assumes that Africa is a political monolith.  It also suggests an underlying expectation by the West that states on the continent should align with them because of the West’s pre-eminence in development and humanitarian aid, and their shared historical past. 

Western surprise at most African countries’ limited emotion towards Russia’s invasion, and Africa’s neutral stance, point to a self-centredness on both sides.  The West wants its African partners to share its condemnation of Russia. African states meanwhile cling to their monopoly on victimhood and historical resentment of Western domination in world affairs. 

How do African states benefit from proclaiming non-alignment?  Although the conflict reveals the extent of the continent’s dependence on grain and fertiliser from Ukraine and Russia, it doesn’t compare with the Western aid that enables African countries to function.  The increasing price of hydrocarbons is affecting Africa’s most fragile states.  While European countries imposed sanctions against Russia despite the costs to their energy supplies, many African countries feel less able to adopt a principled and values-based foreign policy. 

The divide, however, runs deeper – extending to perceptions about the international order itself.  Western states defend a rules-based system in which they are pre-eminent.  African states have a more cynical view of a global order whose rules seem to be determined by the West.  This difference in outlook may explain Africa’s leniency towards Russia, even though the latter has violated a cardinal AU principle on territorial integrity. 

African states’ position is not without contradictions – which isn’t surprising given the many norms and values on a continent of 54 states.  They aspire to an international order based on rules, not force, while at the same time sympathizing with Russia and China, which challenge this order for different reasons.”  

Venezuela Plays Host to China, Russia, and Iran in International Military Games

Venezuelan tanks during a military parade.

Venezuelan tanks during a military parade.


 “This week, Venezuela will become the first country in the Americas to host military competitions organized by Russia, known as the Army Games.” 


For the first time, the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela played host to Russia’s International Army Games.  The event, held in the city of Barquisimeto in Lara state, was a kind of “Olympics” of war games, according to an article in U.S. government-operated Spanish- language Voz de América.  While the Venezuelan armed forces have participated six times in Russia’s International Army Games, the list of participating countries coupled with the location in the Western Hemisphere presents a direct challenge to the United States, according to the article.  Furthermore, an article in left-leaning Argentine daily Clarín notes that the International Army Games began just one day after annual military exercises sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command.  The newspaper highlights Russia’s traditional role as a security provider to Venezuela, as well as its desire to show strength in the Western Hemisphere.  The International Army Games demonstrate Venezuela’s continuing desire to be considered a serious power and U.S. adversary in the Western Hemisphere.  They also demonstrate Russia’s enduring interest in projecting power in Latin America and the Caribbean and to blunt diplomatic isolation on the world stage.  Lastly, these military exercises are likely to further the interoperability of participating militaries with principal adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran.  


Source:

“Olimpíadas de la Guerra’ en Venezuela pueden  generar ‘celo y vigilancia’ en la region (War Olympics’ in Venezuela can generate ‘zeal and vigilance’ in the region),” Voz de América (the Spanish-language version of the state-owned media outlet), 9 August 2022.  https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/olimpiadas-guerra-venezuela-celo-vigilancia-region/6694410.html   

This week, Venezuela will become the first country in the Americas to host military competitions organized by Russia, known as the Army Games… The Russian Ministry of Defense… has organized these military sports annually since August 2015.  They usually last a couple of weeks and spokesmen close to the Kremlin refer them as the “Olympics of War”…The Army Games 2022 are being held in a context of worldwide condemnation of the Vladimir Putin government for its armed attack on Ukraine. 

Source“Rusia, China e Irán lanzan sus ‘juegos de guerra’ para desafiar a Estados Unidos en Venezuela (Russia, China and Iran launch their ‘war games’ to challenge the United States in Venezuela),” Clarín (left leaning daily in Argentina), 10 August 2022. https://www.clarin.com/mundo/rusia-china-iran-lanzan-juegos-guerra-desafiar-unidos-venezuela_0_HyifirkIYK.html  

The war and hunger games come together in Venezuela.  Live and direct military competitions with Russia, China, and Iran will be held from August 13 to 27 to challenge the United States in the city of Barquisimeto, Lara state, in the northwest of the country, while the streets have been heating up with the protests of the teachers affected by “starvation wages”…Vladimir Putin, whose armed invasion of Ukraine is in its sixth month, aims to demonstrate Russia’s military strength in the Latin America and Caribbean area.  


Image Information:

Image caption:  Venezuelan tanks during a military parade 
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BTR-80A[RG1] _VEN.jpg 
Attribution: CCA-SA 2.0