Russian Military Watcher Identifies Problems With the Russian VDV and Parachute Assaults

Combat Vehicle of the Airborne BMD-4M.

Combat Vehicle of the Airborne BMD-4M.


“These issues have led to the fact that, as after every war in the past, the future of the Airborne Troops is now being called into question.  We will also call it into question, but at the same time it is necessary “not to throw out the baby with the bathwater” and assess what of the existing potential of the Airborne Troops still needs and should be preserved…”


The accompanying excerpted article from aRussian military enthusiast website, Voyennoye Obozreniye (notably still allowed to remain active), features a Russian military watcher’s assessment of issues concerning, and possible reforms of, the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV). As some of his chief concerns, the author highlights insufficient armor, artillery, air defenses, and airlift capabilities for the VDV. He also posits that the requirement of air supremacy for parachute landings and the hazards of the proliferation of air defense systems make parachute landings unfeasible. Although the author questions current VDV equipment and doctrine, he seems confident the overall VDV concept is sound and may just need to be updated.


Source:

Alexander Timokhin, “Реформа ВДВ в свете опыта боёв на Украине и предшествующих войн (Reform of the Airborne Troops: In light of the experience of fighting in Ukraine and previous wars),” Voyennoye Obozreniye (Russian military enthusiast website that has been allowed to remain active), 13 September 2022. https://topwar.ru/201636-reforma-vdv-v-svete-opyta-boev-na-ukraine-i-predshestvujuschih-vojn.html

…Let us briefly list the problems that arose in connection with the large-scale use of the Airborne Troops in military operations.

1. The seeming senselessness of using these [VDV] formations as paratroopers in a war against an enemy with a conventional army, air defenses and aviation.  It is worth recalling that part of the forces that were planned to be dropped near Kyiv from the air (presumably also near Gostomel) were preparing specifically for a parachute landing…Today, knowing the situation there and then, we can only be glad that this landing did not happen.  Military transport aircraft loaded with parachute platforms with airborne equipment, prepared for a parachute landing on the Gostomel airfield. The parachute landing was later cancelled.

2. Low survivability of airborne armored vehicles at a huge price. It is known that the BMD-4 [Combat Vehicle of the Airborne] costs approximately the same amount as a T-90M tank.  However, it (BMD-4) can be destroyed by small arms fire. Despite the very light weight, the BMD uses a very advanced fire control system by Russian standards and uses powerful weapons — 100mm and 30mm guns.  The BMD’s thin aluminum armor provides little protection, but there is no alternative, as it must be [lite enough to be] dropped by parachute.  The BMD-4 has performed well in Ukraine (aside from survivability issues), but only two can be air dropped from an airplane [presumably the Il-76] as opposed to three. [of older versions of the BMD]

3. The parachute squad [3-4 dismounts] is too small and lightly armed to fight on foot, the Airborne Troops have few heavy weapons, tanks, large-caliber artillery, however, now it is being attached to units or the artillery is being upsized from D-30 122mm howitzers to Msta-B 152mm howitzers or other howitzers of the same caliber.  At the same time, the Airborne Troops have weak strike capabilities compared to motorized rifle troops and are relatively expensive.

4. During Soviet times, the Airborne Troops could parachute not only their light armored vehicles and artillery, but also vehicles (GAZ-66 cars), and even multiple launch rocket systems. Now the Airborne Troops has vehicles that cannot be dropped by parachute, such as tanks, and the vehicles that can be dropped by parachute are lightly armored.

5. Insufficient number of military transport aircraft.  It is currently not possible to parachute drop a VDV division.

6. The lack of a clear concept of the use of the troops in combat, which require [for a parachute drop] complete air supremacy over the areas of flight and landing, with the subsequent retention of such air supremacy over the combat area, parachute drops are almost impossible against an enemy with at least some kind of air defense.

7. The need to keep in the Airborne Troops very large number of selected personnel who are much better trained and more expensive than those in the Ground Forces, whose potential cannot be fully realized due to the afore mentioned shortcomings.

8. The lack of VDV air defense capabilities, despite the fact that the VDV must act in isolation from the main forces.

In addition to these issues, there is a deficit of infantry in the Russian Armed Forces for the conduct of operations in the mountains and other such inaccessible terrain, as well as during assaults on cities.  Also, the Russian Armed Forces lack airborne assault units and formations trained to operate in conjunction with helicopters and parachute from them.  These issues have led to the fact that, as after every war in the past, the future of the Airborne Troops is now being called into question.  We will also call it into question, but at the same time it is necessary “not to throw out the baby with the bathwater” and assess what of the existing potential of the Airborne Troops still needs and should be preserved…


Image Information:

Image: Combat Vehicle of the Airborne BMD-4M
Source: https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/Moscow-Victory-Parade-Vehicles-9-May-2019/i-LvCkZHZ
Attribution: CCA-4.0

Russia Conducts Submarine Sea Trials and Amphibious Landing Exercise in Arctic

“Two of Russia’s newest nuclear-powered submarines have completed a 5,500 nm voyage under the Arctic ice cap.


Historically, the Russian Far East has not been a high priority on the Kremlin’s military spending list, but that is changing. According to independent Norwegian news site The Barents Observer, Russia has added two new nuclear-powered submarines to its Pacific Fleet. The Pacific Fleet now has three of the latest long-range nuclear-powered strategic Borei-class submarines, while the Northern Fleet has two. The second excerpted article from The Barents Observer reports that the Northern Fleet’s annual summer/autumn exercise continues as scheduled with amphibious assault landings, but no riverine exercise up the Yenisei River to the riverport of Dudinka and then overland to Norilsk. Riverine exercises are complicated, and according to the excerpted article, elements of the Arctic brigades have fought in Ukraine and many of the current soldiers and sailors of the brigades are new. Amphibious assault landings are a good starting point before attempting a riverine exercise in the Arctic.


Sources:

Thomas Nielsen, “Nuclear subs made trans-Arctic under-ice transfer from Barents to Pacific,”The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 28 September 2022.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/09/nuclear-subs-made-trans-arctic-under-ice-transfer-barents-pacific

Two of Russia’s newest nuclear-powered submarines have completed a 5,500 nm voyage under the Arctic ice cap. Built at Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk and tested in the White- and Barents Seas, the two submarines “Novosibirsk” and “Knyaz Oleg” are now ready for combat patrols.

The inter-fleet transit from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet contributes a substantial strength to the submarine forces in the Russian Far East. “Knyaz Oleg” of the Borei-class carries 16 ballistic nuclear missiles, while the “Novosibirsk” is armed with some of the navy’s most modern long-range cruise missiles, torpedoes and mines.

Both submarines participated in the Umka-2022 naval exercise taking place in the Chucki Sea in September before sailing into Vilyuchinsk naval base near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy according to the Defense Ministry.

There are now three Borei-class ballistic missile submarines in active service with the Pacific Fleet. The “Novosibirsk” is the first 4th generation Yasen-class multi-purpose sub to be deployed in the Pacific. 

Thomas Nilsen, “Russia shows off Arctic Military Power”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 22 September 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/09/russia-shows-arctic-military-drill-amid-ukraine-war

The official press statement says nothing about how the mock enemy managed to get to Cape Chelyuskin. The cape is the northernmost tip of the Taymyr Peninsula, also known to be the northernmost coastline of the Eurasian mainland.

Here, between icebergs and frozen tundra, the soldiers of Russia’s Northern Fleet countered an imagined illegal armed sabotage reconnaissance group. The drill this week included landing amphibious assault forces supported by choppers and artillery fire from the destroyer “Admiral Levchenko” – the lead warship on the Arctic voyage.

September expeditions with exercises along the Northern Sea Route have been an annual highlight for the Russian navy over the last decade. This year, the voyage is supervised by Vice Admiral Oleg Golubev, Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet.

Armored personnel carriers were brought to shore by “Aleksandr Otrakovsky”, the landing ship that last year sailed side-by-side in the Black Sea with the cruiser “Moskva”. That warship sank after being hit in Putin’s war off the coast of Ukraine earlier this year.

Troops now training for Arctic warfare on the top of the world come from the same infantry brigades that have lost hundreds of soldiers on the battlefields in Ukraine since Putin ordered them to invade on February 24th.

Thousands of kilometers from the violent fighting in Ukraine, the soldiers practiced tactical actions to capture the beach and made a five-kilometer march on the permafrost of the peninsula.

The navy ships set out from the Kola Bay on August 10 and have conducted navy drills at Franz Josef Land, near the offshore oil rig Priazlomnaya in the eastern Barents Sea and in the Kara Sea on their way to Severnaya Zemlya and the Laptev Sea where a drill took place at the Kotelny Island last week. 

Turkish Lessons Learned From the War in Ukraine

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with Minister of National Defense Minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar, Kyiv, Ukraine.

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with Minister of National Defense Minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar, Kyiv, Ukraine.


An armed force with a high degree of maneuver capability and a high communication capability can conduct very effective maneuvers regardless of how much bigger its enemy force may be.


Various Turkish news programs consider Turkey’s observations from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The accompanying excerpts from one such televised debate summarize Turkey’s military, technical, and geopolitical takeaways from the war. The excerpts are from a program which aired on Nokta TV24, a Turkish independent news and analysis channel, featuring a discussion between former Turkish Ambassador Fatih Ceylan, the Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO from 2013 to 2018, and one of Turkey’s top defense and security experts, Arda Mevlütoğlu. The show was posted on YouTube.

To begin, Mevlütoğlu notes the most important lesson from a military and technological standpoint has been that an armed force (Ukraine) can conduct very effective maneuvers against a much larger enemy force (Russia). He points to the importance of Ukraine’s capable strike systems, maneuver forces, and particularly communication systems. Citing reports of Russia having to resort to commercial GPS systems because of its Glonass GPS system being jammed, he concludes that attention to electronic and cyberwarfare are also extremely important. Mevlütoğlu also points to the importance of the psychological dimensions of the war, noting that Ukraine’s successful and effective psychological campaign has enabled it to maintain the support of the European public, which has been critical for ensuring those countries’ continued support. As such, he claims that diplomatic, cultural, and psychological factors are just as important as military defense technologies, which can even be a tool of foreign policy. He points to the success of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones in Ukraine, and how the successes of these drones have increased Turkey’s profile there [1]. Geopolitically, Mevlütoğlu assesses that Russia will end up deeply weakened in terms of potential and capability. He argues that such a Russia will have an asymmetric relationship with China, where China will have the upper hand in their trade relationship, especially in energy. In this sense, he sees China coming out as one of the beneficiaries of this war. On the other hand, he claims that the United States has consolidated its political-military influence in Eastern Europe, which he says will likely limit China’s influence in Europe and access to the Atlantic.


Sources:

“İnsansız Kara – Hava ve Deniz Aracı Üretiminde Neredeyiz? | S-400’lerin İkinci Partisi Gelir Mi? Fatih Ceylan Arda Mevlütoğlu ile (Where are we in the Production of Unmanned Land – Air and Sea Vehicles? | Would a Second Batch of S-400’s Come?  Fatih Ceylan speaks with Arda Mevlütoğlu),” Nokta TV24 via YouTube (a Turkish independent news and analysis channel), 1 September 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZT3eIYmT84Q&list=WL&index=63

Q: As you know, there’s been a huge inflection point in the global security environment in February 2022 with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine… We’ve left behind six months of this war.  In these six months, what lessons should we learn as far as military operations and deterrence based on how the war is going?  What strategies, visions, concepts, and doctrines do we need to develop for the future? 

A: Six months of the Russia-Ukraine war has given us the opportunity to make some very important political, military, and strategic and observations.  From the Turkish point of view, both from a military and technological standpoint, some of the most important ones are [as follows]:  An armed force with a high degree of maneuver capability and a high communication capability can conduct very effective maneuvers regardless of how much bigger its enemy force may be.  A well-educated, well-equipped force with units with good communication systems and highly [capable] strike systems can be very effective.  Communication technology is the most important here…  There is open-source information that says that the Starlink communication system provided by Elon Musk has been instrumental for Ukraine in the battlefield… We have reports that there have been important GPS jamming attempts in the region, especially against Russia’s Glonass system.   And in fact, there are reports that Russia has had to resort to commercial GPS systems as a result.  So we can conclude that there is huge competition in electronic and cyber war.  We can’t see this directly, we can only observe the outcomes of this.  The war has shown us that electronic and cyberwars, as well as strike and maneuver forces are extremely important. 

There is also the psychological dimension.  Morale and psychological support is very important.  Ukraine has been conducting a very successful, very effective psychological war.   It has not only consolidated its public support in the West, but increased it.  It has obtained moral superiority and retained this.  So, however right you may be in your war, if you can’t defend your thesis in the international arena or find international support, it is that difficult to continue your fight…  Of course in this case there can be no explanation for attacking a sovereign country. 

So [the war has shown us that] it’s not just military fighting [that matters]; the fight in the diplomatic, cultural, psychological dimensions are also very important.  In fact, military defense is not just a military or industrial thing, its also an element of foreign policy.  We don’t need to repeat the success that Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s have had for Ukraine, they are even conducting crowdfunding activities to buy more. 

Q: There’s a new reality now… When we look at the military strategies of the U.S., China and Russia and the related doctrines they are developing, we see a serious global strategic competition that is here to stay for many years.  How will the balance of powers play out? 

A:  This is an open-ended process.  In this competition between the U.S., China and Russia, my view is that, regardless of how this war ends, Russia will end up deeply weaked.  It will continue to be a superpower and a big power, but it will be seriously damaged and tarnished in terms of potential and capability.  Such a Russia will have an asymmetric relationship with China such that China will have an advantage, particularly in terms of energy imports and advanced technologies and systems.  …  So I think China may come out benefiting from this [war].  I don’t know if it will result in a conflict with Taiwan- I think it’s very difficult and I hope not.   Taiwan’s TSMC company is very important for global microchip production, so a war in that region could lead to a serious global crisis… But it will be tense.  In fact we see that the U.S. has focused its interest in that area.  China’s relations with the U.S. and the West may be both competitive and cooperative at the same time…  Finally, the U.S. has consolidated its military-political influence in Eastern Europe.  So China’s influence in Europe and access to the Atlantic may become more limited.


Notes:

[1] See also Karen Kaya, “Turkish-Made Bayraktar TB2 Drones Play Important Role in Ukraine,” OE Watch, Issue 6, 2022.


Image Information:

Image: President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy meets with Minister of National Defense Minister of Turkey Hulusi Akar, Kyiv, Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Volodymyr_Zelensky_and_Hulusi_Akar.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases

President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.


The export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.


When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, international sanctions forced the Russian defense industry to consider purchasing military equipment from defense companies in Kazakhstan as a workaround to meet requirements for the Russian Armed Forces. In 2014, no significant Russian acquisitions from Kazakh companies ultimately took place. However, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a new round of international sanctions against Moscow have reportedly caused Russia to look again at Kazakhstan’s defense industry. However, as the accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports, the Kazakh government’s announcement on 27 August that it is suspending all defense exports for one year. The ban includes “the export of weapons, military equipment and military products,” and it appears to have the greatest impact on Russia. The move is viewed as a direct effort by Kazakhstan to avoid violating sanctions levied against Russia, which it has stated multiple times that it seeks not to violate. The article notes that Russia had been planning to make a $46 million defense purchase from a Kazakh company, including acquiring shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, and even armored personnel carriers. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development denied this. The article notes that the pro-Russian Rybar Telegram channel tried to refute the Kazakh government by publishing documents for the purchase, but they could not be verified. Regardless of whether the Kazakh government agreed to the purchase, the one-year suspension of defense exports ultimately deprives Russia of a supplier of weapons and equipment that closely matches its own armed forces.


Sources:

“Казахстан на год приостановит экспорт вооружений (Kazakhstan is suspending defense exports for one year),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 29 August 2022.

https://fergana.agency/news/127503/

Kazakhstan will suspend the export of military products for a year. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of the country came up with such an initiative, and it was supported by the Commission on Defense Industry, the website of the Prime Minister reports…the export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.

In the middle of this month, Russian Telegram channels reported on an allegedly planned deal for the sale of Soviet and Russian-made ammunition by the Kazakh company Technoexport…They said that the contract in the amount of $46 million was concluded on July 16, 2022. The reports also provided a list of weapons – shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, armored personnel carriers and so on. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of Kazakhstan denied this information a few days later.

In response, the Rybar Telegram channel published documents (without specifying their origin) that cast doubt on the refutation of the Kazakh authorities.

On August 19, a meeting was held in Sochi between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. As the Kremlin reported, the agenda of the talks included the development of Russian-Kazakh relations, strategic partnership and cooperation.


Image Information:

Image: President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin-Tokayev_(2022-08-19).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russian Navy Weaponizes Shipping Containers

Shipping Containers.

Shipping Containers.


For the defense of Russian combat and auxiliary ships, an electronic warfare (EW) system is being developed. The EW system will be placed in ordinary 40-foot shipping containers.


The accompanying excerpted article from pro-Kremlin daily newspaper Izvestiya describes Russian efforts to place electronic warfare systems in standard 40-foot shipping containers.  The Russian Navy is also experimenting with other shipping container-based weapon systems involving air defense, anti-ship, and surface and underwater unmanned reconnaissance capabilities.  These shipping container-based weapon systems are not only intended to augment the capabilities of the Russian Navy’s ships, but also auxiliary ships (tugboats, transports, fuelers, etc.) that support the Russian Navy, and commercial ships if necessary.  Shipping container-based weapon systems are likely to become more important to the Russian Navy as it transitions from larger ships, such as cruisers and destroyers, which have many capabilities to smaller ships, such as frigates and corvettes, with fewer capabilities.  These shipping container-based weapon systems will permit these small vessels to expediently and cheaply add capabilities as required.


Source:

Roman Kretsul, “Шумящий патруль: российские корабли защитят

системы радиоэлектронной борьбы (The ‘noisy’ patrol: Russian ships will be protected by electronic warfare systems),” Izvestiya (pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 8 September 2022.  https://iz.ru/1392104/roman-kretcul/shumiashchii-patrul-rossiiskie-korabli-zashchitiat-sistemy-radioelektronnoi-borby

For the defense of Russian combat and auxiliary ships, an electronic warfare (EW) system is being developed. The EW system will be placed in ordinary 40-foot shipping containers. Thanks to this, the system can be easily installed on the decks of ships and vessels. Such protective “boxes” should reliably protect ships and vessels from enemy missiles and drones by way of electromagnetic interference. According to experts, as a result, this decision will significantly strengthen the protection of the country’s coastal regions.

The Project 22160 ‘Vasily Bykov’ patrol ships will be the first to receive this electronic warfare systems. In the future, auxiliary vessels of the Russian fleet – tugboats, transports and others – could also acquire it…Initially, a weaker electronic warfare system was installed on Project 22160 ships, military historian Dmitry Boltenkov told Izvestia.“Apparently, they created a more powerful solution, of operational or strategic designation. Containers allow you to put the system on different ships,” the expert explained. “If necessary, it will be possible to build up the electronic warfare system of ship groups. They will be able to enter a given area and, in fact, completely “turn it off”. First, they will suppress drone control channels and communication systems. It will no longer be necessary to drive an electronic warfare vehicle onto a landing ship, instead they will simply put a container.

The Navy is also actively testing new container modules — with weapons and with various auxiliary equipment —including the Redut and Pantsir-M air defense systems, container modules with anti-submarine equipment, and container modules with cruise missiles. In particular, the Kalibr-NK cruise missiles. But the main possibility is that they can be adapted for the employment of underwater and surface unmanned vehicles of all types. This provides a reconnaissance capability over hundreds of kilometers…


Image Information:

Image: Shipping Containers
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Container_%E3%80%90_2205_%E3%80%91_SAKC_000411(0)—No,1_%E3%80%90_Container_pictures_taken_in_Japan_%E3%80%91.jpg
Attribution: Gazouya-japan

Russia Conducts Arctic Naval Maneuver and Propaganda Tour Along Northern Sea Route

Locals were welcomed onboard to see the exhibitions of weaponry and told stories about how soldiers with the Northern Fleet are heroically fighting for the fatherland in Ukraine.


In August, Russia’s navy kicked off an exercise and a propaganda tour in the Arctic. As the first accompanying excerpted article from the independent Norwegian news site The Barents Observer describes, the Russian Northern Fleet concentrated in the Barents-Arctic region where there are western approaches to the Arctic Sea Route. The exercise included warships and submarines, but also support from air force and coastal air defense units with the aim of deterring an enemy attack from the Barents Sea against strategically important islands. These massive Arctic islands include Franz Joseph Land and Novaya Zemlya, with their nuclear, second-strike capabilities.

The second excerpted article from the Barents Observer reports that the Ivan Gren, one of the Northern Fleet’s newest large amphibious landing ships, was dispatched on an extended propaganda voyage to promote support for the “special military operation” in Ukraine. Loaded with military displays and an orchestra and choral group, the ship made several port calls along the Northern Sea Route over the course of two months. At a time when the Russian armed forces are consumed with the war in Ukraine, it is noteworthy that their attention to the Arctic is not diminished.


Sources:

Source: Thomas Nielsen, “Northern Fleet kicks off large Barents-Arctic naval exercise,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia),18 August 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/08/northern-fleet-kicks-large-barents-arctic-naval-exercise

More than 10 warships and submarines are at sea, including “Pyotr Velikye”, the Northern Fleet’s large nuclear-powered battle cruiser….The naval vessels are supported by the air force and coastal air defense units.  The exercise scenario, according to the Russian navy headquarters, is deterring an enemy attack on Russia from the Barents Sea, as well as repelling attacks on the country’s Arctic islands. 

Last week, a group of warships set out for the annual Arctic voyage. Those ships, including the destroyer “Admiral Levchenko” and the amphibious assault vessel “Aleksandr Otrakovsky” are currently far north in the Barents Sea, close to the shores of Franz Josef Land. Russia has, over the last decade, rearmed its Arctic archipelagos with new runways for heavy military planes and fighter jets and established missile defense systems aimed at ensuring access and control over the Northern Sea Route. Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya are both strategically important for protection of the bastion defense of the Barents Sea region, including the nuclear arsenal and second-strike capabilities…

            Source:  Thomas Nilsen, “Loaded with military propaganda, warship setting sail on Arctic voyage”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia),23 August 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/08/blessings-anti-fascist-congress-large-landing-ship-embarks-arctic-military

In his opening speech at the so-called first International Anti-Fascist Congress in the Patriot Park in Moscow on 20 August, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that “Ivan Gren” would embark on the agitation-propaganda cruise entitled “The Power is in Truth.”  Shoigu said the tour will be a first-of-its-kind.“Within its framework, the “Ivan Gren” large landing ship will make a voyage along the Northern Sea Route and enter remote cities and garrisons.”  Sergei Shoigu continued by calling on the international community to unite efforts in the fight against Nazism.

Up North in Severomorsk, where the voyage started, Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet, Rear Admiral Igor Kurochkin, stated:“The main thing that we want to say with this move is that we warmly and sincerely support our servicemen who courageously and heroically solve the tasks of the special military operation.”

On board the “Ivan Gren” in Severomorsk, were schoolchildren from the Murmansk Nakhimov Naval School and teenagers with Yunarmiya, the military-patriotic movement associated with, and financed by Russia’s Defense Ministry. First port call for the agitation-propaganda sailing was Kandalaksha on the southern shores of the Kola Peninsula.  Locals were welcomed onboard to see the exhibitions of weaponry and told stories about how soldiers with the Northern Fleet are heroically fighting for the fatherland in Ukraine.

On display in the hangars and rooms that normally carry tanks and attack helicopters are models of nuclear submarines, aircraft, warships and other military gear.  The Northern Fleet’s naval orchestra will perform patriotic compositions and the “Ivan Gren” even bring a song and dance ensemble from Severomorsk.

Second stop on the route was Arkhangelsk, from August 28 to September 1.  Thereafter, the ship sails north across the Barents Sea to Belushaya Guba, the largest military settlement on Novaya Zemlya where Russia in the course of the last few years has modernized the airfield to accommodate fighter jets and anti-aircraft missile systems.   The second stage of the voyage starts on September 19 and will take place in the western part of the Northern Sea Route with Dikson as first stop and Dudinka by the Yenisei River as next port call.

Russia Claims Victory in Vostok 2022 Exercise

President Putin and Chief of General Staff Gerasimov, Vostok 2022, 6 September 2022.

President Putin and Chief of General Staff Gerasimov, Vostok 2022, 6 September 2022.


One of Russia’s large-scale, annual military exercises, Vostok-2022, took place from 1-7 September.  As with such exercises, it was widely covered in the Russian media, and as the brief excerpt from the Ministry of Defense’s TV Zvezda news network indicates, Russian forces again proved victorious. The article also stresses that Russia has not been isolated by its aggression against Ukraine, pointing out that 10 countries participated: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, India, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and Tajikistan. The article says that President Putin arrived at the Sergeevsky training ground to watch the final part of the exercises from a specially equipped command post.  He watched his soldiers taking lines, liberating settlements, and forcing enemy retreats.


Sources:

Maxim Petrenko, Sergey Lebedev, “Враг уничтожен: как прошли учения Восток-2022»на полигоне Сергеевский (The enemy is destroyed: how did the exercises Vostok-2022 at the Sergeevsky training ground),” TV Zvezda (Ministry of Defense news network), 6 September 2022. https://tvzvezda.ru/news/2022961429-48GVw.html

Vladimir Putin watched the maneuvers from a specially equipped command post. From there, he fully assessed the operational situation. Real-time data came even from the distant borders of the huge test site. All thanks to cameras installed in the fields with 32x magnification.

At the same time, the Chief of the General Staff had a connection with all the commanders-in-chief. The most up-to-date information was received from the training ground to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the technical characteristics of the weapons used were shown on the screen.

According to the legend of the exercises, the mock enemy “Vostochnye” attacked the “Northern” and their allies, wedging 200 kilometers into the depth of defense. The enemy was stopped, suffered losses, but retained reserves. From this point, the action begins to unfold – a grouping of troops, supported by artillery and tactical landing forces, hitting the enemy, taking lines and liberating settlements. Massed strikes by rocket troops and artillery, breaking the enemy’s reserves as well, are forcing the enemy to retreat.

A special feature of Vostok this year is the creation ofa coalition grouping of the armed forces of ten countries – Russia, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, India, Kyrgyzstan, China, Mongolia, Tajikistan. Operational groups of the defense departments of Kazakhstan, Laos, Nicaragua and Syria were also involved….…The participants of the maneuvers noted that all the goals of the exercises were fulfilled. The issues of ensuring military security in the Eastern Region have been worked out. 


Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Chief of General Staff Gerasimov, Vostok 2022, 6 September 2022.
Source:  http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69288
Attribution: CCA CA 4.0 Intl

Russia Builds New Armor Repair Facilities To Replenish Losses in Ukraine

Russian T-72 Tank.

Russian T-72 Tank.


The Russian Defense Ministry will create two armored plants. 


While Russian information regarding the extent of damaged armor from their invasion of Ukraine is masked by the state, the accompanying excerpt from the Russian pro-business source Kommersant nevertheless suggests that such damages are considerable enough for Russia to need to establish new facilities. According to the article, Russia recently mandated the creation of two plants for the “repair of armored weapons and equipment, automotive equipment in the interests of defense.”  The article also points out that based on special legislation passed in July 2022, these repair facilities will be able to “work outside the established hours of work, at night, on weekends and non-working holidays.” Currently, the main Russian armor repair facilities are in the Sverdlosk Region, on the eastern side of the Ural Mountains.  The new plants will be built near Moscow and Rostov, much closer to Ukraine and Western Europe.


Source:

Anastasia Larina, “Мишустин поручил создать два бронетанковых завода для ремонта военной техники (Mishustin instructed to create two armored plants for the repair of military equipment),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 5 September 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5547483

The Russian Defense Ministry will create two new armored plants.  The corresponding order was signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.  The document is posted on the portal of legal information.  The main goal of the enterprises is “the repair of armored weapons and equipment, automotive equipment in the interests of defense.”

“To create a federal state institution “71 armored repair plant” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and a federal state institution “72 armored repair plant” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,” the order says.  They will be built in the city of Ramenskoye in the Moscow region and in the city of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky in the Rostov region.

In July, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on special measures in the economy during a military operation.  It allows the government to establish “the procedure and conditions for engaging in work outside the established hours of work, at night, on weekends and non-working holidays.”  In August, several Rostec enterprises switched to work in several shifts without summer holidays to fulfill the state defense order.


Image Information:

Image: Russian T-72 Tank
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2-72#/media/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:ParkPatriot2015part2-19.jpg
http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/635

Attribution: Vitaly Kuzmin, CC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Rebuilding Military Airfields in the Arctic 

“As part of a major upgrade of Northern Fleet airstrips in the European Arctic, the Severomorsk-2 that was shut down in 1998 will now be reconstructed and reopened.” 


According to the independent Norwegian news service The Barents Observer, Russia is reconstructing airfields in the Arctic despite other defense spending needs, suggesting the Kremlin considers the Severomorsk airfields a high priority.Severomorsk-2 is adjacent to the main airfield, Severomorsk-1, and is close to the city of Murmansk.  This is an indication that it is not an emergency field but is within the existing air defense umbrella of the Northern Fleet.  Renovation work on Severomorsk-1 was completed in 2018, allowing it to accept all aircraft, including the heaviest transports.  Emperor Nicholas II International Airport supports commercial aviation in the Murmansk region.  


Source:

Thomas Nielsen, “Abandoned military airport on Kola will be reconstructed”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian internet news service in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 13 June 2022. 

https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/06/abandoned-military-airport-kola-will-reconstructed

As part of a major upgrade of Northern Fleet airstrips in the European Arctic, the Severomorsk-2 airfield that was shut down in 1998 will now be reconstructed and reopened.  Comprehensive investments are needed.  After being abandoned 25 years ago, most of the airfield facilities and gear on taxiways were looted.  The 1,800-meter runway is still intact, but in bad shape with severe cracks even visible from satellite images like Google Earth. 

In recent years, the runway has been used for smaller UAVs operated by Russia’s Northern Fleet whose Headquarters is located in the city of Severomorsk, seven kilometers to the northeast of the former air base.  Severomorsk-2 is 11 kilometers northeast of Murmansk. 

Northern Fleet Commander, Admiral Aleksandr Moiseev, included Severomorsk-2 among Russian Arctic military airfields to be reconstructed or newly-built by 2030.  “The development and construction of airstrip network in the Arctic area continues. The development plan for the network until 2030 includes construction of two [airstrips] in Nagurskoye and Temp, as well as reconstruction of seven airstrips in Severomorsk-1, Severomorsk-2, Severomorsk-3, Rogachevo, Talagi and Kipleovo,” The former seaplane facility at Safonovo, south of Severomorsk in the Kola Bay, will also be re-established.  

No details were provided as to which aircraft would be based at the reconstructed Severomorsk-2.  Upgrade of the airstrip could be a preparation for more advanced UAVs that Russia has said will play an important role in future military plans.  Today, the Northern Fleet has two major air bases on the Kola Peninsula, Severomorsk-1 and Severomorsk-3. 

Located on the outskirts of Severomorsk city, Severomorsk-1 air base has a 3,500-meter-long runway and is home to maritime surveillance aircraft (Il-38), and anti-submarine helicopters (Ka-27). 

Severomorsk-3 is the air base for the Northern Fleet’s fighter jets and is located 28 kilometers east of Murmansk. There are two other military air bases on the Kola Peninsula as well, the Olenya near Olenogorsk which is home to long-range Tu-22 bombers and the Monchegorsk with fighter jets.

Armenia Questions Russian Peacekeeping After Nagorno-Karabakh Incident

2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict map.

2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict map.


“The Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan announced the operation “Retribution” in Nagorno-Karabakh in response to the killing of a service member.” 


There have been several clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh since the ceasefire agreement of November 2020 took effect.  While the Russian Ministry of Defense investigated violations of the ceasefire, Russian peacekeeping forces did not take action in response to any of them.  On 3 August, Azerbaijani forces not only carried out strikes on Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh but seized territory near the Lachin corridor, which serves as the only route connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports, this incident sparked criticism from Armenia regarding the Russian peacekeeping mission in the region. 

The article reports on the aftermath of the incident and includes comments from Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, who stated that Russia “is acting in accordance with the trilateral ceasefire agreement and expects compliance from Armenia and Azerbaijan.”  Peskov’s comments came as a response to Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan’s proposal to discuss the function of the Russian peacekeeping force.  The article mentions a few details of the incident, including that the “Russian Ministry of Defense blamed Azerbaijan for violating the ceasefire.”  In addition, the article notes that “Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused the Russian Defense Ministry of not fulfilling a promise to ensure the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Karabakh” as part of the ceasefire.  The article includes President Pashinyan’s criticism of the Russian peacekeepers, including that Armenia expects “that any attempt to cross the line of contact will be prevented by the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation.”  While the aftermath of this incident continues to unfold, Azerbaijan’s seizure of territory marks a significant difference from previous clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh since the 2020 ceasefire agreement.  As Russia continues to carry out its war in Ukraine, its response to this incident could be an important measurement for how the Russian peacekeeping force responds to any further incidents.  


Source:

“Кремль отреагировал на слова Пашиняна о функциях миротворцев (The Kremlin reacted to Pashinyan’s words on the function of the peacekeepers),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 5 August 2022. https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/379832/  

The Russian side is acting in accordance with the trilateral ceasefire agreement and expects compliance from Armenia and Azerbaijan, Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said in response to Nikol Pashinyan’s proposal to discuss the function of the Russian peacekeepers… 

…on 3 August, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan announced the operation “Retribution” in Nagorno-Karabakh in response to the killing of a service member.  The ministry also reported that it took strategic heights.  Baku demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Armenian military from Nagorno-Karabakh and threatened “even more destructive countermeasures” in the event of provocations on the line of contact.  Authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh reported two were killed and 19 were wounded as a result of the incident.  The Russian Ministry of Defense blamed Azerbaijan for violating the ceasefire. 

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused the Russian Defense Ministry of not fulfilling a promise to ensure the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Karabakh in accordance with the agreements of 10 November 2020.  On 19 July, the Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan said that Armenian troops will be withdrawn from Nagorno-Karabakh by September… 

…Nikol Pashinyan stated the need to specify the functions of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh.  “A number of events taking place today and earlier have revealed problems of a systemic nature….   Continued violations of the ceasefire regime along the length of the line of contact… in the presence of peacekeepers are unacceptable,” he said. 

Pashinyan stressed that the line of contact “is called the zone of responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh.”  “And we expect that any attempt to cross the line of contact will be prevented by the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation…” Novosti-Armenia quoted him as saying… 


Image Information:

Image: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict map 
Source: File: Nagorno-Karabakh war map (2020).svg – Wikimedia Commons  
Attribution: CCA 4.0