Tag Archives: China

Chinese Observations on the Role and Impact of Social Media in Cognitive Warfare

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“Cognitive warfare through social media can directly interfere with relevant government decisions and influence the direction of the war.”

Drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, Chinese military strategists see social media as a highly effective tool in both warfare and politics.  The accompanying excerpted article published in the nationalistic-leaning Chinese daily Huanqui Shibao notes that cognitive warfare is playing a historic role in shaping the war, which is the first time combatants have incorporated it into a large-scale physical conflict.  The author notes that cognitive warfare tactics such as “deepfakes” and “accelerationism” over social media deliberately manipulated the world’s emotions and collective consciousness to sway public opinion and exacerbate polarization.  He notes that social media has elevated the role and effectiveness of cognitive warfare to new heights.  It has interfered with government decisions and influenced the direction of the war.

According to the author, cognitive warfare extends beyond propaganda and psychological warfare.  It can be carried out in conjunction with both the physical and information domains.  It can be used in wartime or peacetime and on a daily basis.  It can be waged through public diplomacy, academic exchanges, culture and art, or simply hidden in seemingly innocuous areas such as social media.  The author also describes how cognitive warfare has evolved through technological advances.  The digital technology available during the 1991 Gulf War allowed round-the-clock, real-time televised coverage of wartime events as they unfolded.  This play-by-play coverage had a psychological impact on the entire world, which helped to shape the narrative, but not the outcome, of the war.  Three decades later social media is seen as a weapon in the Ukraine conflict.

Source:

Sun Jiashan, “俄乌冲突中认知战对我们的启示 (What Cognitive Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Teaches Us),” Global Times (daily newspaper known for its nationalistic take on world affairs), 10 March 2022. https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/477wrRCvjHx. 

The role and effectiveness of cognitive warfare based on social media in the Russia-Ukraine war has reached new historical heights since the 1991 Gulf War.

More than 30 years have passed since the 1991 Gulf War, but we still have a clear visual image of it because, for the first time in history, television media had followed it every step. The information technology that allowed round the clock digital broadcasting of modern warfare by the American television media had a great psychological impact on the entire world.

The 1991 Gulf War, despite near-live digital broadcasting of the war, (however), only offered a narrative of the war and had no direct impact on the war itself. The biggest difference between the role and effectiveness of the 1991 Gulf War and the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that the advent of social media has affected the media and directly impacting the war. Whether it was the so-called “Ghost of Kyiv,” in which it was eventually revealed that footage had been taken from an air combat simulation game at the beginning of the conflict… or the spreading of rumors such as the Nuclear leak of the Zaporozhye nuclear plant… “deepfake,” “accelerationism,” and other cognitive warfare tactics, which can impact cognition through social media, are now being applied in large-scale situations over the course of the war.

…cognitive warfare can no longer be simply seen as propaganda warfare and psychological warfare (as it was previously)…. Cognitive warfare through social media can directly interfere with relevant government decisions and influence the direction of the war. This has been a historical wake-up call for us by the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

New Development in PLA Close Air Support

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The J-10 multirole fighter can mount laser-guided bombs, anti-ship missiles and land attack missiles.

The J-10 multirole fighter can mount laser-guided bombs, anti-ship missiles and land attack missiles.

“In view of the issue of air combat support, they organized special training for command, reconnaissance and special operations officers and soldiers of the services and arms, compiled training materials, arranged specialized forces such as flight instructors and aviation engineers to give lectures, carried out inspection and training based on tactical live fire, and improved the joint quality of officers and soldiers in one move.”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force recognizes strikes close to maneuver units are difficult and is taking steps to improve their efficacy. The accompanying excerpt from a recent PLA Daily article discusses a new development to improve PLA combat effectiveness by training Army officers from reconnaissance units to provide guidance for air-to-ground strikes.  The PLA Air Force defines “close air fire support” as air strikes in support of the Army or Navy against enemy forward and shallow targets, usually according to a predetermined plan.  Strike targets are those that directly affect the maneuver unit.  Key enemy targets for air strikes include tactical missiles, artillery, armor groupings, landing ships, fire support ships, command posts, communications facilities, and ammunition and oil depots.  Target guidance groups identify the target, time, and other requirements, coordinating with Army maneuver and fire support units in the area.  The target guidance group designates the target via radio communication using landmarks, smoke, and other means.

The PLA Air Force has sent these target guidance groups from bomber and air assault units to the Army and Navy to coordinate and guide air strikes against surface targets.  The team leader is usually flight personnel with staff that includes combat pilot and communications personnel.  They guide the aircraft to the target, providing parameters such as time and distance, as well as observe the strike effect and correct for subsequent strikes.

However, the PLA Air Force has too few target guidance groups to provide to the Army or Navy and is working to remedy this problem.  The article describes a base in the Western Theater Command Air Force that is training Army officers from reconnaissance units to provide guidance for air-to-ground strikes.  Reportedly hundreds of guidance personnel from different military branches including command, reconnaissance, and special operations officers and troops have been trained.  In one training event, a guide designated a camouflaged enemy command post that an aircraft struck with precision munitions.  At the same time, the article states that problems remained between the services in the integration of data standards, terminology, and tactical understanding.  An example was a failed training event where aircraft could not strike the intended target due to poor communications signals and a misunderstanding in terminology despite advanced planning.  Training of Army personnel to provide target guidance removes the burden from the Air Force and likely will increase the ability of ground maneuver units to call in close air support against targets that artillery cannot address.  The article also states that this development will increase jointness across the PLA.

Source:

“A Base of the Western Theater Air Force Improves the Terminal Execution Capability of the Joint Operations System of Systems – Army Guides are Active at the Air Force Drill Grounds (西部战区空军某基地提升联合作战体系末端执行力 — 陆军引导员活跃在空军演兵场)” People’s Liberation Army Daily, May 20, 2021, February 10, 2020. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-02/10/content_309058.htm

Taking combat training and jointness as a guideline, we must implement the concept of joint training to all levels of strategy, campaign and tactics, and solve the problems existing in the training field to a certain extent, such as joint immobility, joint incompatibility and joint disjointedness and other problems. In particular, we should solve the chronic disease of “form and spirit are not connected” at the end of combat effectiveness, so as to lay a good foundation and gather strength for the gradual development of higher-stage joint training. A base of the air force in the Western Theater has promoted the front-line officers and soldiers of the services and arms to improve their joint literacy and joint combat skills, which is worthy of recognition.

Image Information:

Image: The J-10 multirole fighter can mount laser-guided bombs, anti-ship missiles and land attack missiles
Source: https://tinyurl.com/yc3p7atc
Attribution: Wiki Commons

China and Taiwan Explain Key Differences Between Cross-Strait Relations and Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

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“We have seen that some people emphasize the principle of sovereignty on the Ukraine issue, but continue to undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the Taiwan question. This is a naked double standard.”

-Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sparked widespread concern that China could similarly invade Taiwan, although not everyone agrees with this analogy.  The accompanying passages from Chinese and Taiwanese sources consider the key differences between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China-Taiwan relations.

Two days before Russian forces invaded Ukraine, China’s Central News Agency released an article in which a high-level Taiwan national security official describes Taiwan as strategically located within the first island chain in East Asia, providing an important line of defense to keep communist forces “from crossing the first island chain and threatening the U.S. mainland.”  The article also argues that unlike Ukraine, which shares a common border with Russia, the Taiwan Strait offers a natural barrier between China and Taiwan, making it harder for communist forces to attack across the sea.  Finally, the article argues that Taiwan is critical to the development of automobiles, smart phones, wind power, and military equipment, which makes it more important than Ukraine to the international supply chain.  The article also states that China sought to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), arguing that “triggering boycott or sanctions by the CPTPP member states, which are mostly in the Indo-Pacific region, will not be something that China wants to see.”  The CPTPP is a free trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam.

Four days after the invasion began, Taiwan’s only English-language newspaper, Taipei Times, published an article describing further differences between the Ukraine and Taiwan issues.  First, Taiwan “has the advantage of being a mountainous smattering of islands that have been building up defenses for decades.”  Next, the article opines that sanctions against China would likely have “a far more acute sting” due to the country’s economy heavy integration with the rest of the world.  Finally, like the first article, the author talks about the importance of Taiwan to the global supply chain.  According to this article, “The world relies on Taiwan for semiconductors, meaning that a Chinese invasion would at best disrupt supply and at worst rewrite the technological and geopolitical world order.”  In comparing the two leaders, the article describes Russian President Vladimir Putin as a tyrant in charge, who fears his time is running out, and Chinese President Xi Jinping as more calculating and prudent and who believes he only has to wait.  Despite these arguments, the second article warns, “no one can predict the calculations happening in the halls of power, and as the Ukraine crisis has shown, anything is possible.”  The article ends on a note for the people of Taiwan to be prepared. 

Chinese sources, such as the third article, published by China’s official English-language news outlet, China Daily, explain that the situation in Ukraine involves a dispute between two sovereign countries, whereas the question of Taiwan is a domestic matter.  However, the article also warns that while Beijing will try to unify Taiwan with the mainland peacefully, the central government will never exclude taking military action as an option.

Source:

Wen Kui-hsiang, “國安高層：台海與俄烏情勢三大不同 嚴防中國認知戰 (High-Level National Security Official: Three Major Differences Between Taiwan Strait Situation and the Russia-Ukraine Situation; Guarding Against China’s Cognitive Warfare),” Taipei Chung-yang T’ung-hsun-she (The Republic of China’s central news agency), 22 February 2022. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202202220333.aspx

 First, in terms of geostrategy, Taiwan is in the first island chain in East Asia, which is extremely important for the United States to containing the expansion of China’s communist forces and for maintaining the military, commercial and shipping security of the Indo-Pacific region. It is an important defense line to prevent the communist forces from crossing the first island chain and threatening the U.S. mainland.

 Second, the geographical environment is very different, and the U.S. commitment to cross-Strait security is clear and firm. The senior national security officials said that unlike Ukraine, which is close to Russia, the natural barrier formed by the Taiwan Strait makes it far more difficult for the Communist forces to cross the sea and attack Taiwan than it is for Russia to invade Ukraine. Moreover, the United States is more interested in the Indo-Pacific region, having U.S. military deployed there, whereas the Russia-Ukraine conflict has a limited impact on U.S. military deployment.

 Third, the importance to the international supply chain is very different. Taiwan holds a key position in the international supply chain for post-pandemic recovery. According to a senior national security official, Taiwan’s economic strength and high-tech industries…are crucial to the development of global industries, such as automobiles, smartphones, wind power generation, and armaments. Even China cannot escape Taiwan’s industrial impact.

 …China is also seeking to join the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership). At this time, unilaterally triggering disputes, boycotts, or sanctions by the CPTPP member states, which are mostly located in the Indo-Pacific region, is not be something that China wants to see.

 Source: “Taiwan is Different from Ukraine,” Taipei Times (Taiwan’s only English-language newspaper and which aims to give Taiwan’s perspective to the international community), 28 February 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/03/01/2003773950

 First and most evident, Ukraine shares a long land border with its bellicose neighbor, while Taiwan has the advantage of being a mountainous smattering of islands that have been building up defenses for decades. Ukraine was caught off-guard when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and has been playing catch-up ever since. Most experts are confident that invading Taiwan would be immensely lengthy and costly for China, with no guarantee of success — especially with US involvement.

Sanctions against China would also likely have a far more acute sting, given its massive economy’s integration with the rest of the world. Beijing will certainly be watching closely to see how far countries are willing to go in sanctioning Russia, and adjust its risk calculation accordingly.

Perhaps most importantly, Taiwan is of critical economic interest to the countries poised to take action in its defense. The world relies on Taiwan for semiconductors, meaning that a Chinese invasion would at best disrupt supply and at worst rewrite the technological and geopolitical world order.

As unfathomable as it might seem to ignore these immense risks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown the world that when a tyrant is in charge, the war room is always open. Yet Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is not the same as Putin, and neither are their countries.

 Source: “Tsai Ing-wen’s Empathy For Ukraine Ridiculous,” China Daily (China’s official English-language news), 24 February 2022. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202202/24/WS62177fafa310cdd39bc88c12.html

What is happening between Ukraine and Russia is a dispute between two sovereign countries. The question of Taiwan is an internal affair of China…

The mainland will try whatever it can to seek the peaceful reunification of the island, which it believes is in the interest of the Chinese people across the Strait. But military action is always an option the central government will never exclude.

Chinese Brigade Makes Improvements to Command Information System

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“The battlefield situation changes constantly.  …The difference between victory or defeat can occur within a millisecond.”

A brigade in China’s 71st Group Army reportedly has upgraded and perfected its command information system, improving speed and accuracy in firepower response time.  The accompanying article, published in the official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army, Jiefangjun Bao, explains that the command-and-control software originally issued to the brigade was limited and inadequate.  There were delays in coordination between detachments, which affected the firepower response time.  According to the article, to improve the overall function of the command information system, leaders within the brigade assembled a team of key personnel with technical specialties.  Experts from factories and scientific communities also participated.  The new upgraded command information system allows real-time data sharing and precise air defense and targeting.  If the report is accurate, the effort demonstrates the effectiveness of President Xi Jinping’s push to foster an environment of independent innovation at all levels.  There is no mention in the article about whether the PLA will distribute the improved system to other brigades.  However, according to a brigade commander mentioned in the article, they will continue to strengthen the development of information systems, explore and innovate combat methods and training methods, and further strengthen the troops’ expert capabilities in winning modern wars.

Source:

Liu Renhao and Gao Junfeng, “数据共享提升体系作战能力第七十一集团军某旅升级完善指挥信息系统 (Brigade in 71st Group Army Upgrades, Perfects Command Information System, Data Sharing Boots ‘Systems of Systems’ Operations Capability,” Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the PLA), 14 February 2022. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-02/14/content_309298.htm

…By upgrading and improving the command information system, this brigade shortened the firepower response time, effectively enhancing the unit’s combat power.

Previously, a command and control software was provided to the brigade. However, after several combat-realistic drills, troops found that, due to the limited capabilities of the command information system, delays appeared during information transmission, easily leading to situations where coordination between detachments was lacking and delays occurred with respect to firepower response.

“The battlefield situation changes constantly. In the blink of an eye, and the difference between victory or defeat can occur within a millisecond.”

“Real-time data sharing provides technical support for ‘system of systems’ operations and joint operations.” The brigade’s commander explained that in the next step, they will continue to strengthen the development of information systems, explore and innovate combat methods and training methods, and further temper the troops’ expert capabilities in winning modern wars.

Saudi Arabia Turns to China for Low-Altitude Air Defense

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Автономный боевой модуль 9А331МК-1 ЗРК 9К331МКМ Тор-М2КМ (9A331MK-1 Tor-M2KM).

Автономный боевой модуль 9А331МК-1 ЗРК 9К331МКМ Тор-М2КМ (9A331MK-1 Tor-M2KM).

“…With its technological development, China has been able to surpass Russia, which has unsuccessfully tried to market its equipment to Saudi Arabia since 2007…”

Chinese weapons manufacturers were among the key winners at the World Defense Show 2022 (WDS 2022), Saudi Arabia’s new and much-vaunted annual international weapons fair.  The Saudi government meant for the show to serve as a catalyst for its Vision 2030 development plan, which aims to localize half of all defense spending by 2030.  Riyadh also meant for the show to help fulfill Saudi Arabia’s immediate military needs, which are currently dictated by the war in Yemen and are primarily focused on low-altitude air defense.  In that regard, the Saudi Arabian government inked a deal with China’s Poly Technologies to procure a laser air defense system, known as the “Silent Hunter.”  As described in the accompanying excerpt from the Arabic-language military news site and chat forum defense-arabic.com, the system uses lasers to target low-altitude UAVs of the type used by the Houthi-controlled military in Yemen.  The report notes that China has now succeeded in penetrating the Saudi air defense market, something that Russian companies have unsuccessfully tried to do since 2007.  Russian air defense offerings at WDS 2022 included the Tor-M2KM, a self-contained module version of the Tor short-range air defense platform.  In a further sign that Chinese companies are making inroads where their Russian counterparts have failed, the other accompanying excerpt from defense-arabic.com highlights Saudi interest in obtaining the Chinese HQ-17AE system, which is based on the Russian Tor platform.

Source:

“السعودية توقع عقد استحواذ على منظومات دفاع جوي صينية

 (Saudi Arabia signs contract to acquire Chinese air defense systems),” defense-arabic.com (Arabic-language military news site and chat forum), 10 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yc77ktna

The Saudi version of the Silent Hunter system is different from other versions offered by Poly Technologies. The kingdom has been using Chinese weapons for a long time, so the purchase itself is not novel. What is novel is to include them in one of the Kingdom’s most sensitive sectors, which is air defense. With its technological development, China has been able to surpass Russia, which has unsuccessfully tried to market its equipment to Saudi Arabia since 2007. Silent Hunter is an anti-drone laser weapon developed in China by Poly Technologies. It is an improved version of the 30 kW low-altitude defensive laser system, and is available in both fixed and mobile versions.

Source:

“السعودية تسعى للحصول على منظومة الدفاع الجوي HQ-17AE الصينية الصنع

(Saudi Arabia seeks to obtain Chinese HQ-17AE air defense system),” defense-arabic.com (Arabic-language military news site and chat forum), 16 January 2022. https://tinyurl.com/mrxrec6c

After acquiring the Chinese 3D TWA radar system, the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces are seeking to acquire HQ-17AE air defense systems, according to press sources. China had announced that the HQ-17AE air defense missile system, dubbed the “Low-Altitude Aircraft Hunter,” is available for export.

Image Information:

Image:  Автономный боевой модуль 9А331МК-1 ЗРК 9К331МКМ Тор-М2КМ (9A331MK-1 Tor-M2KM).
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2021-Static-part-1/i-4ZccFz9/A
Attribution: CC 4.0

China Deepens Information Security Cooperation with Central Asian Neighbors

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Shanghai Cooperation Organization logo.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization logo.

“… in the future, information security cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation organization should proceed from a strategic and long-term perspective, improve its position, strengthen its capabilities, expand its horizons, and promote the development of regional and global network governance in a more benign and orderly direction.”

2021 marked the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  The SCO, a multilateral association of China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with four additional observer states, was created to ensure security and maintain stability across Eurasia.

While its focus was initially on traditional counterterror military and police operations, there has been a steady expansion of emphasis on cyber and information security cooperation.  The excerpted article published on the website of the China Institute of International Studies, CIIS.org, provides an outline of the development of this cooperation and China’s future plans.  Written before the outbreak of political violence in Kazakhstan in January 2022, the article provides a snapshot of how China regards its international cooperation efforts in security spheres, and more generally, influence on its neighbors.  SCO members have signed joint documents on information security likening the potential disruptive capabilities of information technologies to weapons of mass destruction.  As such, they emphasize the need to better grasp these technologies to adequately address what the SCO refers to as the “three forces”—terrorists, separatists, and extremists. 

The full article also highlights the role of cyber exercises in China’s engagement with the SCO over the past decade.  Were it not for the pandemic, the fourth iteration of biennial cyberterrorism exercises would have been held in Xiamen, Fujian Province in December.  The first exercise was held in 2015, with subsequent exercises in 2017 and 2019.  These exercises involved capture the flag, cyber forensic investigations and collaborative intelligence collection exercises, identifying terror organizations’ methods of recruiting members, identifying affiliated individuals, and carrying out coordinated arrests.

Taken together, China appears to be equipping its neighbors with the tools to carry out both traditional counterterrorism operations using modern technologies, and improving their ability to counter dissent or any threat to social stability.  The 2018 SCO Qingdao Summit announced the desire to expand SCO far beyond its original size and remit.  As repeated in official readouts at the time, the meeting “marked a new start as the SCO began to transform from an organization of mainly landlocked Central Asian countries to one of regional cooperation between coastal and hinterland countries.”  Cybersecurity and information cooperation—especially with an emphasis on public security, counterterrorism and internal control—will continue to be a springboard for deepening and expanding the impact of the organization.  As Central Asian countries react to the fallout from recent political upheaval in Kazakhstan, China is likely to double down on the promotion of these tools.

Source:

Deng Hao [邓浩], Li Tianyi [李天毅], “上合组织信息安全合作：进展、挑战与未来路径(SCO Information Security Cooperation: Progress, Challenges, and Future Path),” CIIS.org (Website of the China Institute of International Studies, a directly-affiliated research institute or think tank for the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 24 September 2021.

https://www.ciis.org.cn/yjcg/sspl/202109/t20210924_8175.html

OR

https://web.archive.org/web/20211217134841/https://www.ciis.org.cn/yjcg/sspl/202109/t20210924_8175.html

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (hereinafter referred to as the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization”). Security cooperation has always been the top priority of the SCO cooperation and is the biggest highlight of the SCO’s two decades of development. In the past 20 years, Central Asia, the core area of ​​the SCO, has not been rendered chaotic (lit. “Middle Easternized” [被中东化]) and has always maintained a stable overall situation. The effective security cooperation of the SCO has contributed greatly to this. Over the past 20 years, the economy of the SCO has generally improved. The economic aggregates and per capita GDP growth of its member countries have both been higher than the world average. The security provided by the SCO has contributed a lot. Information security cooperation is the “rising star” of the SCO’s security cooperation and a new force for the SCO’s security cooperation. It plays an increasingly important role in maintaining regional security and stability. The SCO is standing at a new starting point in the history of the third decade, and maintaining information security faces new challenges and pressures. In the future, the SCO information security cooperation should further strengthen the sense of a community of shared future, continuously enhance the ability to respond to information security threats, increase international cooperation, and strive to build a peaceful, safe, fair and open information space.

The SCO information security cooperation started in 2005. Over the past 16 years, the SCO’s information security cooperation has continued to expand from consensus to action and has made positive progress, showing great potential and good prospects…

In the Declaration of the Fifth Astana Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2005, the heads of member states proposed for the first time the prevention of information terrorism. This is the first time that the SCO has raised the issue of information security in an official cooperation document. This opened the prelude to the SCO’s information security cooperation. The SCO’s security cooperation has begun to expand from the traditional field to cyberspace.

On June 15, 2006, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the SCO, the heads of the SCO member states held the sixth summit, which further clarified the need to maintain information security and jointly deal with the military, political, criminal, and terrorism they are facing… It was also at this summit that the heads of member states signed the first special document on information security cooperation-the “Statement of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on International Information Security.” The statement expressed concern about the use of information and communication technology to damage personal, social, and national security, and believed that information security threats would bring serious political, socio-economic consequences to countries and regions and the world, and trigger the instability of societies in various countries, which may cause It is a worldwide disaster equivalent to the use of weapons of mass destruction…

On September 13, 2013, the SCO held the 13th Bishkek Summit of Heads of State. The declaration adopted at the meeting clearly stated that it is necessary to build a peaceful, safe, fair and open information space based on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and advocate the formulation of a unified information space national code of conduct. This is a new understanding of member states on national information security cooperation. The Dushanbe Declaration of the 14th SCO Heads of State Summit in 2014 further stated that member states support the right of all countries to manage the Internet on an equal basis and support and guarantee their respective sovereign rights to Internet security. This has further improved the SCO’s position on international information security issues.

On June 9, 2017, the heads of state of the member states signed the “Statement of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Joint Fighting against International Terrorism” at the 15th SCO Summit in Astana. They believed that comprehensive measures should be taken to combat terrorism, particularly the spread of ideology and extremism, through the prevention of the use of the Internet and other propaganda to incite terrorism and extremism, and conduct recruitment activities.

On October 11, 2020, at the 20th Moscow Summit, the heads of the member states signed the “Statement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Heads of State Council on Ensuring Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security” and the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization… The Statement on Combating the Spread of Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism… calling on the international community to work closely in the information field to jointly build a community with a shared future in cyberspace…

In order to effectively carry out information security cooperation, the SCO has gradually established and continuously improved corresponding cooperation mechanisms and systems in the course of practice, which has provided the necessary means and legal guarantees for the SCO’s information security cooperation.

In terms of mechanism construction, regional anti-terrorist agencies are the primary support of the SCO’s information security cooperation. This institution is one of the two permanent institutions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Since its establishment in 2004, it has been committed to promoting coordination and cooperation among member states in combating the “three forces” (terrorists, separatists, and extremists)…

At the 20th SCO Moscow Summit in 2020, President Xi Jinping emphasized..in the future, cooperation within the SCO should proceed from a strategic and long-term perspective, improve its position, strengthen its capabilities, expand its horizons, and promote the development of regional and global network governance in a more benign and orderly direction.

Image Information:

Image: Shanghai Cooperation Organization logo.
Source: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation_(logo).svg
Attribution: Fair Use

China-Russia Pledges of Deeper Cooperation Show Tangible Results

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Chinese and Russian Flags.

Chinese and Russian Flags.

“…We continue to expand local currency settlements and establish mechanisms to counteract the negative effects of unilateral sanctions. The Agreement between the Russian Government and the Chinese Government on Settlement and Payment signed in 2019 became an important milestone in this work.”

“The two sides reiterated that they firmly support each other’s core interests, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and oppose external interference in the internal affairs of the two countries.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing in early February, and Russia and China took the opportunity to cement their increasingly close relationship further.  The accompanying excerpts from Putin’s public letter and a joint statement, both published by Chinese state media outlet Xinhua, give some sense of the future direction of this relationship.  Central to both the letter and the joint statement is the expressed desire to expand cooperation across a wide range of areas, including space exploration, development of the Arctic, transportation, science, and technological development.

The two countries have successively upgraded relations from a constructive partnership (1994), to strategic partnership of coordination for the 21st century (1996), to a comprehensive strategic coordinated partnership (2011), to a new-era Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic coordinated Partnership (2019) (See “China Upgrades Relations with Russia,” OE Watch, July 2019).  These titles have been accompanied by real improvements in the two countries’ levels of cooperation.  In particular, Putin’s letter highlighting the importance of joint efforts to improve each side’s ability to use local currencies in payments has helped Russia mitigate the effects of international sanctions.

Cooperation in the energy sector has further benefited both sides as China looks to transition its energy grid to use more natural gas as a cleaner and more efficient alternative to coal while Russia is diversifying and expanding its sales of oil and gas.  The two sides have steadily opened new transportation links to improve cross-border trade, including a bridge connecting Heihe and Blagoveschensk along the Amur River, which forms part of China’s northeast border with Russia (See “New Bridge to Connect Russia’s Far East with China’s Northeast,” OE Watch, February 2020).  In Putin’s letter, these links and improving trade have taken on additional importance as both countries look to expand trade after the negative effects of the global pandemic.

The joint statement expands upon the pledges of economic cooperation mentioned in Putin’s letter, promising increasing connectivity across Eurasia and cooperation in developing the Arctic.  The statement also systematically touches upon issues of concern to each side, ranging from core interests such as the “One China” Principle and the status of Taiwan, to the historical account of Russia’s role in World War Two.  It devotes significant time to defending their respective interpretations of democracy and positioning Russia and China as defenders of the post-World War Two international system and global security.  While both sides likely harbor some doubts about the long-term value of cooperation due to the massive inequalities in the size of their respective economies and populations, improving trade and scientific cooperation as well as backing each other diplomatically could pay significant dividends in expanding both countries’ national power in the near term.

Source:

“普京通过新华社发表署名文章《俄罗斯和中国：着眼于未来的战略伙伴》(Putin published a signed article through Xinhua News Agency ‘Russia and China: Strategic Partners for the Future’),” Xinhua (PRC State News agency), 3 February 2022.

http://www.news.cn/2022-02/03/c_1128325398.htm

OR

https://web.archive.org/web/20220203015000/http://www.news.cn/2022-02/03/c_1128325398.htm

….We continue to expand local currency settlements and establish mechanisms to counteract the negative effects of unilateral sanctions. The Agreement between the Russian Government and the Chinese Government on Settlement and Payment signed in 2019 became an important milestone in this work.

A mutually beneficial energy alliance is being formed between our two countries. In addition to the long-term delivery of oil and gas to China, we also plan to implement a series of large-scale joint projects. One of the projects is the construction of four new generating units at China’s nuclear power plant from last year, with the participation of the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation. All of this greatly enhances the energy security of China and the entire Asian region.

We believe that the two countries have extensive opportunities to develop partnerships in the information and communications industry, medicine, and space exploration, including the application of national navigation systems and the implementation of the International Lunar Research Station project. The “Year of Science and Technology Innovation” held  2020-2021 and hosted by both countries has injected a huge impetus into strengthening bilateral relations.

Accelerating the socio-economic development of Siberia and the Far East is one of Russia’s strategic tasks. These regions are the regions closest to China. We plan to actively develop local cooperation, attract Chinese investment and technology, and expand global transportation and trade routes. For example, modernization and upgrading of the Baikal-Amur and Trans-Siberian railways have already begun. Its capacity will be doubled and a half by 2024 by increasing the volume of transit freight and shortening transit times. In addition, the port infrastructure in the Russian Far East has also been developed. All of these will further enhance the complementarity of the Russian and Chinese economies.… We have the same position on international trade issues. We advocate maintaining an open, transparent and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system based on the rules of the World Trade Organization, and agree to restart the global supply chain. As early as March 2020, Russia proposed an initiative to build a “green corridor” for trade without any sanctions, political and administrative barriers. The implementation of this initiative will help overcome the economic impact of the pandemic….

Source: “中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于新时代国际关系和全球可持续发展的联合声明 (Joint Statement of People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on International Relations in the New Era and Global Sustainable Development),” Xinhua (PRC State News agency), 4 February 2022. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-02/04/content_5672025.htm

… The two sides will actively promote the cooperation between the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” and the Eurasian Economic Union, and deepen the practical cooperation between China and the Eurasian Economic Union in various fields. Improve the level of connectivity in the Asia-Pacific and Eurasian regions. The two sides are willing to continue to promote the parallel and coordinated development of the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” and the “Greater Eurasian Partnership”, promote the development of regional organizations and the process of bilateral and multilateral economic integration, and benefit the people of all countries in the Eurasian continent.

The two sides agreed to further deepen pragmatic cooperation in Arctic sustainable development…

The two sides expressed deep concern over the severe challenges facing the international security situation, and believed that the people of all countries share a common destiny, and no country can and should not achieve its own security by breaking away from world security and at the expense of the security of other countries. The international community should actively participate in global security governance to achieve common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.

The two sides reiterated that they firmly support each other’s core interests, national sovereignty and territorial integrity and oppose external interference in the internal affairs of the two countries.

The Russian side reiterated that it abides by the one-China principle, recognizes that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and opposes any form of “Taiwanese independence.”

China and Russia oppose external forces undermining the security and stability of the two countries’ common surrounding areas, oppose external forces interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign countries under any pretext, and oppose “color revolutions”, and will strengthen cooperation in the areas mentioned above.

… The two sides believe that individual countries, military-political alliances or alliances seek direct or indirect unilateral military superiority, harm the security of other countries through unfair competition and other means, intensify geopolitical competition, exaggerate rivalry and confrontation, seriously undermine the international security order, and undermine global strategic stability. . The two sides oppose the continued expansion of NATO, and call on NATO to abandon the ideology of the Cold War, respect the sovereignty, security, interests, and diversity of civilizations, history and culture of other countries, and view the peaceful development of other countries in an objective and fair manner. The two sides oppose the establishment of a closed alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region and the creation of confronting camps, and are highly vigilant of the negative impact of the “Indo-Pacific strategy” promoted by the United States on the peace and stability of the region. China and Russia have always been committed to building a security system in the Asia-Pacific region that is equal, open, inclusive, and not targeting third countries, and maintains peace, stability, and prosperity.

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Image: Chinese and Russian Flags.
Attribution: Image by Author. Permission to use image granted by author

Chinese AI Researchers Claim Success in Teaching Drones To Win Dogfights

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“A main focus of the Chinese military AI program is to develop new algorithms that can get high performance out of a slow computer.”

The accompanying excerpt from the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) references a report published in the Chinese peer-review journal, Acta Aeronautica et Astronautica Sinica, that researchers have developed an artificial intelligence (AI) system capable of teaching Chinese combat drones how “to win dogfights thousands of times faster than comparable American technology.”  According to the researchers, the ability to learn at a higher speed could help drones to identify a human pilot’s “cheating maneuvers” and outperform them in complex, large-scale air combat.  They put the system to the test by simulating combat between a drone and a test fighter.  The researchers claim that after conducting 800,000 simulations, the drone was able to win most of its encounters.  They compared the results to a “similar dogfight competition conducted in the United States in 2020,” which they say took more than 4 billion rounds of training to achieve the same result.  The test took place in Jianyang, Sichuan Province, at the Aerodynamics Research and Development Center, the largest research and testing institute of aerodynamics in China. The SCMP article notes the growing role of drones in defense, explaining that most military drones are designed for surveillance, early warning, communications, or attack.  They normally cannot handle the sophisticated, fast-paced action needed in a dogfight, which requires more calculation and swifter movement since their computer chips are slower and possess more conservative technology.  The AI program’s focus is to develop new algorithms that increase performance rate.

Source:

Stephen Chen, “Chinese AI Team Claims Big Win in Battle to Teach Dogfights to Drones,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong’s most prominent online English-language daily), 30 January 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3165330/chinese-ai-team-claims-big-win-battle-teach-dogfights-drones.

Researchers in southwest China say they developed an artificial intelligence system that can teach Chinese combat drones to win dogfights thousands of times faster than comparable American technology.

The (US) Heron system defeated the pilots in all five dogfights, taking more than 4 billion rounds of “training” to achieve the result.

The researchers in Sichuan said their system took just 800,000 simulations to win most of its encounters.

Huang said that their new AI system was selective, choosing only the best data for the next round.

Most military drones have been designed for surveillance, early warning, communications or to attack ground targets. These systems cannot handle fast-paced, sophisticated actions such as dogfights because an enormous amount of calculation must be done quickly, according to some military researchers.A main focus of the Chinese military AI program is to develop new algorithms that can get high performance out of a slow computer.

China Issues Fifth Mobilization Order To Kick Off Annual Military Training

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“Chairman Xi Jinping issued a mobilization order to the entire armed forces to begin training in the new year, clearly requiring that “[troops] comprehensively advance the transformation and upgrade of military training, resulting in elite forces capable of fighting and winning.”

The accompanying article published by the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) official newspaper Jiefangjun Bao is a possible indication of a heightened level of urgency and war preparedness in China.  The article discusses a training competition that the 82nd Group Army held in early 2022, with higher requirements and more rigorous standards.  This marks the fifth year in a row that President Xi Jinping, Chairman of the CMC, has issued a mobilization order to kick off military training.  These exercises have become more refined and high tech, adding cutting-edge technologies such as big data, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and artificial intelligence on the frontline of training.  They have introduced advanced simulators, including bio-simulation and virtual reality technologies, which simulate various types of combat injuries, creating a more realistic combat scenario. 

According to Jiefangjun Bao, participants broke 16 training records during the competition.  The article attributes some of the records to new processes, technologies, and equipment, such as new command-and-control equipment that has been in service for just over a year.  A system of rewards and punishment, meant to increase the soldiers’ level of confidence and motivation, is also in place.  While the article focuses on the specific exercise of only one group army, it describes the training activities as “a microcosm of troops from the entire armed forces obeying Chairman Xi’s orders and focusing on military training.”

Source:

Geng Tao and Zhou Yuan, “第82集团军某旅群众性练兵比武拉开新年度训练序幕——奖牌之争折射训练之变 (Mass Training and Competition Held by 82nd Group Army Brigade Kicks off the New Year of Training),” Jiefangjun Bao (People’s Liberation Army Daily. The official newspaper of the Central Military Commission), 20 January 2022. https://www.81.cn/sydbt/2022-01/20/content_10124683.htm

At the beginning of the new year, Chairman Xi issued a mobilization order to the entire armed forces to begin training in the new year, clearly requiring that “[troops] comprehensively advance the transformation and upgrade of military training, resulting in elite forces capable of fighting and winning.” This was the fifth year in a row that Chairman Xi has issued a mobilization order to kick off training, sounding a contemporary bugle call for troop training and war preparedness, and undoubtedly advancing the military training of our armed forces toward a new stage of all-round transformation and overall improvement. The gratifying scene that took place on the competition ground of a certain brigade of the 82nd Group Army was a microcosm of troops from the entire armed forces obeying Chairman Xi’s orders and focusing on military training. At a new starting point in the new year, units throughout the armed forces must use higher requirements and more rigorous standards to continue to set in motion a wave of enthusiasm for combat-realistic military training, and greet the opening of the 19th Party Congress with high spirits and first-rate training results.

On the competition ground, while operating a new command and control equipment that had been in service for only a little over a year, Staff Sergeant Xie Kun was the first to complete the subject [of competition] and set a new record. Faced with multiple obstacles, heavy equipment transport vehicle driver Zhao Pengcheng drove the vehicle with speed and broke the training record that had been maintained at the brigade for many years…  At the beginning of the new year, a certain brigade of the 82nd Group Army held a mass training and skills competition, unfurling the curtain on the new year’s training. One after another, officers and soldiers broke 16 training records of the brigade.

… The combat-realistic level of the units’ training has been constantly rising. Many gratifying changes were taking place on the training ground.

… Last year, the brigade introduced bio-simulation and virtual reality technologies to simulate various types of combat injuries, making battlefield rescue training more closely adhere to actual combat.

… the brigade took the initiative to apply cutting-edge technologies such as big data, UAVs, and artificial intelligence on the frontlines of training. It upgraded and rebuilt eight new-type training fields, set up terminals for military vocational education and study, and established multiple types of high-tech training facilities that adhere closely to [the requirements of] actual combat. Multiple training courses on dangerous and difficult subjects can be carried out in all weather conditions and in high efficiency.

… This brigade focused on training and combat readiness to establish a reward and punishment mechanism. More than 90 percent of the meritorious service indicators were used for military training, allowing training elites to be commended and to receive rewards. This [mechanism] motivated officers and soldiers to actively exert efforts to fight and win on the battlefield. Since its establishment, the brigade has participated in various types of military skills competitions organized by the higher-ups and won 38 first place awards.

PLA Experimenting with Formations To Optimize Combat Effectiveness

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PLA soldier participates in a tactical shooting competition.

PLA soldier participates in a tactical shooting competition.

“Precise deployment of forces is an important part of winning future ‘informationized’ wars. Only by continuously improving the accuracy of the allocation of forces and use of firepower can we better unlock the full combat effectiveness of the troops, achieve functional integration and complement each other’s advantages.”

A brigade in northeastern China appears to be experimenting with new combat formations.  In the accompanying excerpt from the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) newspaper PLA Daily, the unnamed brigade, which is under the 78th Group Army based in northeastern China, reallocated units down to the squad level to better suit mission requirements and terrain.  Units under the 78th Group Army appear to have long been at the forefront of the PLA’s experimentation with, and transition to, combined arms battalions (See “New Type” PLA Units Emphasize Mobility, Joint Operations,” OE Watch, October 2018).  In this exercise, the brigade testing the new formation was representing the blue team, or “enemy” force.  This gave the red PLA force the chance to test itself against an unusual and more effective fighting force while experimenting with new ways of allocating forces.  The “mixing and matching” method proved successful in both defensive and offensive scenarios during the exercise.

In the article, the blue team brigade leader notes that allocation of forces will be essential to prevail in “informationized” warfare characterized by high tempos and deep integration of sensors, communications, and precision fires.  Modularity and organizational flexibility will be essential to bringing the maximum amount of combat power to bear while allowing quick responses to new threats.  Currently, the PLA is quickly adopting new command systems and testing new formations and equipment to improve its proficiency in combined arms operations.  (See “PLA Fields New Integrated Command Platforms, Improving Combined Arms Operations,” OE Watch, December 2021).  While new equipment is arguably equally important, finding new ways to use existing or new formations, and adopting a mindset that would allow such innovation, may prove key in future conflicts.

Source:

Zhang Guangxuan [张光轩], “第78集团军某旅 ‘按需混编’ 精准释放战斗效能(Brigade under the 78th Group Army ‘Mixes’ Units Correctly to Release Full Combat Efficiency),” PLA Daily (official newspaper of the PLA), 11 February 2022. 

http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2022-02/11/content_4904656.htm

On the eve of the Spring Festival, a brigade of the 78th Group Army and a related unit conducted a realistic confrontation exercise. Acting as the opposing force, the brigade used an “on-demand mixing” method to organize its troops and firepower for combat operations instead of the static, pre-allocated method used before, which allowed the unit to optimize combat formations and improve the effectiveness of combat command.

“Precise deployment of forces is an important part of winning future ‘informationized’ wars. Only by continuously improving the accuracy of the allocation of forces and use of firepower can we better unlock the full combat effectiveness of the troops, achieve functional integration and complement each other’s advantages.” According to the brigade’s leader, in this exercise, the opposing force broke up existing units and instead reallocated each squad to a new ad hoc mixed unit to better suit the mission requirements and terrain. Each combat unit has a designated commander and deputy. Compared with the previous grouping method, this “on-demand mixing” mode enables more precise use of force and firepower and more efficient and efficient combat command.

At the exercise area, Zhang Peng, the commander of the opposing force, organized the force into 18 operational units after leading the battalion, company, and platoon commanders to conduct repeated surveys of the defensive positions before the battle. After the battle started, Zhang Peng directly ordered each operational unit to enter the fight in response to the attacking forces. Their reaction speed and the efficiency of the deployment of troops and firepower were significantly improved.

“The opponent’s reaction is too fast!” admitted the commander of the attacking team at the end of the exercise. “The main reason for the failure of our attack is that the opposing team was able to respond quickly, and the coordination of forces and fires is more effective.” In the following iteration of the exercise, the opposing force switched from defense to attack and again ‘mixed’ forces to suit the terrain and mission. The result of the new tactics was clear—another decisive win. 

Image Information:

Image: PLA soldier participates in a tactical shooting competition.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/PLA-TACSHOOTER2021.png
Attribution: CC BY 4.0