Tag Archives: China

Taiwan Considers “Porcupine Strategy” Against Chinese Invasion

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“Taiwan’s asymmetrical warfare strategy is commonly referred to as the ‘the porcupine strategy.’ A porcupine braces itself by hardening its many quills when faced with a huge predator.”

In recent years, Taiwan has felt an increasing sense of urgency to develop a strong system of defense because mounting cross-Strait tensions, China’s growing military might, and gray-zone activities that are one step short of the use of force. Since 2017, some Taiwanese commentators have advocated for the development of a “porcupine strategy” to ward off a potential Chinese invasion.[i] A porcupine strategy, viewed as asymmetric warfare, is used by a weaker opponent to counter an attack from a more powerful one. In Taiwan’s case, this would mean hardening its defenses and inflicting many small, but significant and early, losses for China using many weapons spread throughout the island. As described in the first excerpt, published in Taiwan’s English-language publication Taipei Times, “the pain of stepping on (a porcupine’s) quills become the main deterrent to crushing it.” The second excerpted article, published by the newly established English-language news and opinion site, Japan Forward, also discusses the porcupine strategy. The article attributes retired Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, who served as chief of Taiwan’s General Staff from 2017 to 2019, with being the architect of Taiwan’s overall defense strategy, at which a porcupine approach was the core. Lee argues that the best option is to deter the enemy from attacking. This article also describes a scenario in which People’s Liberation Army forces gather around Taiwan to conduct standard military exercises prior to the unexpected attack. While larger Taiwanese targets, such as fighter jets and large naval vessels, would be easier to see and therefore destroy if taken by surprise by China, smaller mobile weapon systems that are well dispersed throughout the island and its environs—such as small missile-equipped boats, multiple rocket launchers, and mobile missiles—would be less vulnerable. However, according to the article, while Taiwanese leadership understands the importance of asymmetric weapons, the Taiwanese armed forces have not yet fully embraced the “porcupine strategy.”

Sources: 

“Editorial: ‘Porcupine Strategy’ the Right Move,” Taipei Times (Taiwan’s English-language sister publication of Liberty Times), 29 April 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
editorials/archives/2022/04/29/2003777394

Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept is based on a strategy of asymmetric warfare. Instead of acquiring expensive jets and submarines, the strategy focuses on deployments of mobile and concealable defensive weapons across Taiwan, especially missiles for use against ships and planes. This is the “porcupine strategy” — the pain of stepping on the animal’s quills becomes the main deterrent to crushing it.

Yoshiaki Nishimi, “Taiwan Military Expert: ‘Porcupine Strategy’ Could Deter Chinese Invasion,” Japan Forward (a new English-language news and opinion website), 27 January 2023. https://japan-forward.com/taiwan-military-expert-porcupine-strategy-could-deter-chinese-invasion/

…retired admiral Lee Hsi-ming, who served as chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from 2017 to 2019. He spoke to a group of reporters, including a Sankei Shimbun correspondent, in Taipei in November of last year. During his time in office, as the military power gap with China rapidly widened, [retired admiral Lee Hsi-ming, who served as chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China… from 2017 to 2019] sought ways to defend Taiwan through “asymmetric operations.” In fact, Taiwan’s “Overall Defense Concept,” which has this strategy at its core, is his brainchild.

Taiwan’s asymmetrical warfare strategy is commonly referred to as the “porcupine strategy.” A porcupine braces itself by hardening its many quills when faced with a huge predator. Similarly, this strategy is designed to prevent occupation by an invading Chinese force by inflicting severe pain (damage) with smaller weapons widely dispersed throughout the island. 

“Taiwan needs an asymmetric strategy to deter China,” Lee emphasizes. “That means having a large number of small weapons that are less susceptible to long-range attacks, more mobile, and capable of conducting precision strikes.”

“Taiwan does not have the strength to go toe-to-toe against China in a traditional ‘symmetrical war’ involving aircraft carriers against aircraft carriers, warplanes against warplanes, and tanks against tanks. After all, there is a disparity of more than twenty times between their defense budgets.”

Taiwan’s asymmetrical warfare strategy is commonly referred to as the “porcupine strategy.” A porcupine braces itself by hardening its many quills when faced with a huge predator. Similarly, this strategy is designed to prevent occupation by an invading Chinese force by inflicting severe pain (damage) with smaller weapons widely dispersed throughout the island.

“The best course of action is to deter the enemy and keep him from making a move,” explains Lee. “To that end, Taiwan must prepare itself as quickly as possible. We must demonstrate that we have the capacity to prevent a successful Chinese invasion.”Lee argues that the only option for Taiwan is “deterrence by denial.” In other words, a defense capable of physically blocking an attack by the other side. What scenario does Lee offer in which Taiwan would be able to repel the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)?

Notes:

[i] The concept of a porcupine strategy gained popularity following the 2008 release of a study published in the Naval War College Review. At the time, Taiwan was intent on building up its weapons systems to try to match those of the People’s Liberation Army. Countering Taiwan’s belief that like weapons would help to deter China from attacking, the study instead described using alternative asymmetric warfare to counter China’s short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and manned tactical aircraft. For more information, please see: William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 61, No. 3, Article 3, 2008. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1814&context=nwc-review

China Issues Concept Paper on Its Role in Global Security

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China Issues “The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper” at the 21 February 2023 Lanting Forum.

China Issues “The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper” at the 21 February 2023 Lanting Forum.

“The legitimate and reasonable security concerns of all countries should be taken seriously and addressed properly, not persistently ignored or systemically challenged. Any country, while pursuing its own security, should take into account the reasonable security concerns of others.”

In February 2023, China released The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper, a document that describes China’s perception of its role in international security governance. According to Beijing, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) is meant to address the “deficits in peace, development, security, and governance” with “Chinese solutions and wisdom.”[i] Most of the GSI’s underlying principles—the “six commitments”—are the pillars of China’s foreign policy as codified in the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.”[ii] The GSI document also refers to a Chinese Communist Party treatise on China’s Peaceful Development[iii] and Xi Jinping’s New Asian Security Concept[iv]speech,citing claims about China’s historical love for peace and commitment to common, cooperative, comprehensive, and sustainable security. However, the fourth of the “six commitments”—“taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously”—has only in recent years achieved prominence in Chinese foreign policy rhetoric. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization endorses the underlying concept of indivisible security.[v] More recently, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia signed a “no limits” partnership agreement evoking the spirit of indivisible security to oppose NATO expansion.[vi] Following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, China’s foreign influence apparatus has actively sought to frame Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as induced by NATO expansion.[vii] It has also sought to undermine U.S. efforts to hold Russia accountable by accusing the United States of “Cold War mentality, unilateralism, bloc confrontation, and hegemonism.” The GSI thus provides Beijing with a normative tool for advancing China’s expanding national security interests, motives, policies, and conduct when it comes to international security. It legitimizes any aggressive motives, policies, and conduct on Beijing’s part as defensive, while simultaneously enabling Beijing to denounce the United States, its allies, and partners as the aggressors.

Source:

“The Global Security Initiative,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 21 February 2023. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html

Stay committed to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously. Humanity is an indivisible security community. Security of one country should not come at the expense of that of others. We believe all countries are equal in terms of security interests. The legitimate and reasonable security concerns of all countries should be taken seriously and addressed properly, not persistently ignored or systemically challenged. Any country, while pursuing its own security, should take into account the reasonable security concerns of others. We uphold the principle of indivisible security, advocating the indivisibility between individual security and common security, between traditional security and non-traditional security, between security rights and security obligations, and between security and development. There should be a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture, so as to realize universal security and common security.

Engage in wide-ranging discussions and communication on peace and security at the General Assembly, relevant UN Committees, the Security Council, relevant institutions, and other international and regional organizations based on their respective mandates, and put forward common initiatives and propositions to forge consensus in the international community to address security challenges.

Leverage the roles of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS cooperation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the “China + Central Asia” mechanism, and relevant mechanisms of East Asia cooperation, and carry out security cooperation incrementally to achieve similar or same goals. Promote the establishment of a multilateral dialogue platform in the Gulf region and give play to the role of coordinating and cooperative mechanisms such as the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan and the China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference to promote regional and global peace and stability.Support the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, the Middle East Security Forum, the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum (Lianyungang) and other international dialogue platforms in contributing to deepening exchange and cooperation on security. Promote the establishment of more global security forums to provide new platforms for governments, international organizations, think tanks and social organizations to leverage their advantages and participate in global security governance.

Notes:

[i] For more on so-called “Chinese solutions and wisdom” on global issues, see: Wang Yi, “Acting on the Global Security Initiative to Safeguard World Peace and Tranquility,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 24 April 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/kjgzbdfyyq/202205/t20220505_10681820.html

[ii] The Five Principles are mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and, peaceful coexistence. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence make up the basic normative framework for modern China’s foreign policy and are codified in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.

[iii] For a detailed reading of China’s efforts to promote its “peaceful development” narrative, see: “China’s Peaceful Development,” State Council Information Office, 6 September 2011. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm

[iv] For Xi Jinping’s speech on the New Asian Security Concept, see: “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 21 May 2014. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201405/t20140527_678163.html#:~:text=Common%20security%20means,regional%20security%20issues

[v] China is the founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and has endorsed indivisible security through SCO. For more on the SCO, see: Rashid Alimov, “The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Counteracting Threats to Peace and Security,” United Nations, October 2017. https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/role-shanghai-cooperation-organization-counteracting-threats-peace-and-security#:~:text=By%20reinforcing%20mutually,its%20respective%20regions

[vi] Indivisible security is the principle that the pursuit of one’s security should not be at the expense of another’s security. Indivisible security as a guiding principle is difficult to incorporate in practice, as defining “at the expense of another’s security” is highly subjective. For more on Chinese normative conceptions of security, see: Jerker Hellström, “Security/安全,” Decoding China. https://decodingchina.eu/security/

[vii] For more on China’s accusations that NATO expansion undermined Russia’s security interests, see: “People’s Republic of China Efforts to Amplify Kremlin’s Voice on Ukraine,” U.S. Department of State, 2 May 2022. https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/prc-efforts-to-amplify-the-kremlins-voice-on-ukraine/#:~:text=PRC%20and%20CCP%20media%20and%20officials%20have,the%20West%2C%20NATO%2C%20and%20the%20United%20States and “China’s Position on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 4 February 2023. https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-position-russias-invasion-ukraine#:~:text=%5BStatement%5D%20Chinese%20Foreign%20Minister%20Wang%20Yi%20stated,Putin%20during%20his%20December%202021%20annual%20news%20conference

Image Information:

Image: China Issues “The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper” at the 21 February 2023 Lanting Forum.
Source: Chinese Government, https://twitter.com/WangLutongMFA/status/1628010620846227456
Attribution: Public Domain

Chinese Military Exercises Highlight Improvements in Joint Operations

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Chinese J-10B.

Chinese J-10B.

Since the end of last year, the brigade selected target drone operators to study at PLAAF academies and training institutions, and also invited PLAAF pilots to explain flight modes and attack methods of various aircraft types to the air defenders to help them improve their combat skills.

China continues to improve the realism of its training through extensive use of Opposition Force (OPFOR) training.[i] The following excerpted articles describe the recent integration of PLA Airforce (PLAAF) opposition forces into PLA Army (PLAA) brigade training. In the first excerpt from the Chinese military news outlet PLA Daily, PLAAF advisers helped a PLA ground forces brigade improve its air defense training. The unnamed brigade leader notes that, for over a year, his unit has dispatched air defense personnel to PLAAF academies and technical schools to better absorb tactics and skills. In the full article, the reporter also noted the presence of PLAAF pilots and electronic countermeasures teams from an unnamed unit. This appears to be occurring across multiple theater commands. The second excerpted PLA Daily article describes joint training between other PLAAF and PLAA units in the Southern Theater Command that occurred in January 2023. More broadly, the PLA has also embraced OPFOR training as a means to rapidly improve home station training at lower levels. A separate report in PLA Daily from March 2020, for example, indicated that at least some brigades in the Eastern Theater command were establishing dedicated OPFOR platoons in each battalion to enhance realism in training as well as the tempo with which they could conduct training.[ii]

Sources:

Tong Zujing (童祖静), Sheng Yangdi (盛洋迪), Jiangwu Jingwen (江吴靖文吴靖文); “陆军演兵场迎来空中 ‘联合蓝军’ (PLAA Exercise Area Welcomes ‘Joint OPFOR’),” PLA Daily [解放军报] (Official Newspaper of the Chinese military), 9 February 2023. https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2023/02-09/9950203.shtml

A brigade of the 72nd Group Army and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) cooperated to innovate, adopting a new approach to confrontation training, improve joint interoperability training and preparation for war…The brigade leader explained that since the end of last year, they selected target drone operators to study at PLAAF academies and training institutions, and also invited PLAAF pilots to explain flight modes and attack methods of various aircraft types to the air defenders to help them improve their combat skills.

The addition of a “Joint OPFOR” to the training area introduced essential elements of Air Force penetration and assault operations into the brigade’s target drone flight training. The new training included different regions, mission profiles, and opponents using optimized flight routes and altitudes, along with operations in new domains and jamming helped force the brigades’ air defense units to improve their tactics.

Nie Dongfang, the acting squad leader of the brigade’s target support squad, together with several Air Force pilots, focused on conducting flight effectiveness tests and demonstrations on the operational use of target drones in different scenarios and under different target conditions. The reporter also learned that they have carried out strenuous flight training[i] many times in complex conditions such as the Gobi Desert, jungle covered mountain areas, etc…The brigade’s leader said that they will coordinate and absorb more joint elements into training, planning and design, and explore the creation of a regular confrontation drill mechanism. This will improve military training help shift attitudes toward training against a powerful opponent.

Chen Dianhong (陈典宏), Ye Xingguo (叶星国), Feng Dengya (冯邓亚); “陆空对抗锤炼实战本领 (Land-Air confrontation tempers actual combat skills China Military Online),” China Military Online/PLA Daily (PRC official military media outlets), 28 January 2023. http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0128/c1011-32613112.html

In the middle of the night, the air defense sirens sounded suddenly, and an unnamed Air Force unit playing the role of the “Blue Army” (OPFOR) took advantage of the night to launch a surprise attack on the brigade’s air defense position. In the command vehicle, battalion commander Li Chuan [李川] responded calmly and quickly deployed his force. Personnel immediately rushed to positions to build an emergency communications and command network, sending commands through the integrated command platform in real time. The surface-to-air missile group, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) group, and MANPAD group quickly formed up and waited for the “enemy” aircraft.

“A knife doesn’t sharpen quickly, a soldier doesn’t practice well alone, and an opponent is the best whetstone” Li Chuan told reporters, pointing at the radar screen. We should continue carrying out exchanges, setting up difficult tasks for each other to sharpen skills, make up for gaps in each other’s abilities and establishing set up growth strategies for each other’s difficulties, accelerate the transformation and upgrading of military training, and improve the level of actual combat training.

The radar screen showed that multiple groups of “enemy” planes were rapidly approaching, attempting to attack important targets of the “Red force.” Xin Chengcheng, a radar technician, calmly operated the system, firmly locking onto the target. Suddenly, the simulated enemy aircraft disappeared from the screen. Analyzing the situation on the battlefield, Li Chuan judged that the “enemy” aircraft was penetrating at an ultra-low altitude, and then ordered adjustments to the systems’ search range.

Soon, the close-air blind-filling radar identified the low-flying target, leaving only five seconds to engage. Li Chuan decisively gave the command to shoot. Seconds later the point on the screen disappeared with the targets successfully destroyed.

“Get ready for the ‘Blue Army’ to attack again!” called Li Chuan as he issued a new order. He told reporters that in recent years, the amount and intensity of real combat training for troops has increased, including during poor weather conditions. Extended training under extreme conditions and through the night are now carried out on a regular basis.

….After several hours the land-air confrontation exercise, came to an end as dawn’s light crept up from the east. There was no time to rest, and the red and blue teams conducted an after action review of problems revealed by the drill.

Notes:

[i] In PLA parlance, the Red Team represents Chinese forces while the Blue Team is the opposing force.

[ii] “Setting up ‘OPFOR’ platoons in each combined arms battalion to enhance confrontation exercises (在各合成营组建“蓝军”排，增强演练对抗性),” PLA Daily, 9 March 2020. http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2020-03/09/content_9763188.htm

[i] The term used here, 极限飞行训练, which might also be translated as “flight training testing limits,” appears to refer to extended training covering long periods or multiple days, including day and night operations and during poor weather conditions.

Image Information:

Image: Chinese J-10B
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/19.08.21_J10B_1200_7.jpg
Attribution: Mil.ru, CC BY 4.0

Cultivating Joint Talent: PLA Education and Training Reforms (Kevin McCauley)(February 2023)

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(Click image to download brief.)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Cultivating joint command talent and promoting realistic and complex joint training at
    the campaign and tactical levels is critical to the successful implementation of integrated
    joint operations, transformation efforts, and enhancing the People’s Liberation Army’s
    [PLA] overall combat capabilities. The PLA is implementing a “Triad” military education
    program to address problems with joint talent and training.

  • The implications for the PLA of successful implementation of joint talent cultivation and
    improving joint training are significant for reaching its goal of an advanced military. While
    the PLA’s transformation will likely be a lengthy process, the PLA can still present a lethal
    opponent with its precision long-range strike and information warfare capabilities.

  • The PLA’s modernization effort faces the complex task of integrating mechanized warfare,
    informationized warfare, and intelligent warfare systems and operational methods into the
    force concurrently. Reported difficulties educating officers and staff for informationized
    warfare raise questions about the PLA’s ability to integrate fully intelligent warfare
    technologies and operational methods into the force.

Chinese-Arab Summit Signals Growing Saudi-Chinese Defense Alignment

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Flag of Saudi Arabia.

Flag of Saudi Arabia.

“… Saudi Arabia spent $1.4 billion (5.1 billion riyals) in incentives to boost its local military sector over the last two years …”

Much of the Saudi reporting and commentary on Xi Jinping’s December 2022 visit to Riyadh highlighted the visit as a turning point in the birth of a new, multipolar world order. Commentators in Saudi media consider the kingdom a key player in this new world order, one that can maintain good relations and effectively balance between competing poles of global power to safeguard its own national interests. In this view, as articulated in the first accompanying excerpt from the influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, expressions of deepening Saudi-Chinese relations do not by definition threaten the Saudi-U.S. security partnership, but rather are signals of engagement “based on common interests.” 

Statements and agreements from the Saudi-organized Chinese-Arab summit revealed a growing alignment of Saudi and Chinese defense priorities that could put pressure on a key pillar of the Saudi-U.S. strategic partnership—arms sales. For now, China seems in no position to surpass the United States as a Saudi weapons supplier: between 2000-2019, the United States accounted for 60 percent of Saudi arms imports by value, while Chinese arms constituted less than 1 percent.[i] The fact that no weapons deals were signed or even publicly discussed during Xi’s visit to Riyadh indicates that arms trade is not yet a priority in the Saudi-Chinese relationship, although this may also be because the two sides had reportedly signed a blockbuster arms deal at the Zuhai Air Show only one month before the summit.[ii]

From the Saudi perspective, reducing its arms imports has become a key priority. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has begun shifting its defense priorities to better align with the kingdom’s “Vision 2030,” which includes localizing weapons manufacturing and developing an indigenous, high-tech national defense industrial base.[iii] As noted in the second accompanying excerpt, from the Saudi news channel al-Arabiya, the director of the Saudi military industry’s regulatory body explained that the kingdom has in the past two years channeled $1.4 billion toward “incentives to boost its local military sector.” Speaking at the Saudi 2023 Budget Forum last December, he added that more than half of that money has gone into research and development, mostly in Saudi Arabia’s priority defense production sectors, which include “unmanned systems, radars and cybersecurity.” Thus, it seems likely that licensing agreements and technology sharing, rather than weapons sales, will emerge as a centerpiece in future Saudi Arabian defense partnerships.

Many of the deals signed at the Chinese-Arab summit were memorandums of understanding and other documents of intent expressing a shared vision and approach, rather than contractual agreements. Notable domains where a bilateral shared vision and intent to deepen cooperation were expressed include space, information technology, telecommunications, and artificial intelligence. The two countries also signed a wide-ranging “digital economic partnership,” which covers a vast array of new technologies, detailed in the third accompanying excerpt, from the official Saudi news agency’s press release on the agreement. These various agreements and statements of intent, although not essentially military in nature, will likely bolster a growing partnership in high-tech weaponry such as unmanned systems, and are likely to feed into the kingdom’s broader defense and security efforts over the next decade.

Sources:

“العلاقات السعودية ـ الصينية وحسابات المصالح

Hoda al-Husseini. (Saudi-Chinese relations and the calculation of interests),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 8 December 2022. https://tinyurl.com/k342vwkd

… Saudi Arabia does not seek to replace the U.S.’s role in the Middle East and stop considering it the main guarantor of regional security; rather, it seeks to find a balance through which it safeguards its own interests. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States is deeper and greater than a crisis with a transient American administration. At the summit, Prince Mohammed bin Salman will prove to the Chinese president that the Kingdom cannot be infiltrated by benefiting from tensions, but rather must be engaged through equal interaction based on common interests.

“Saudi Arabia spent $1.4 bln in incentives to boost local military sector in 2021-22,” al-Arabiya English (influential Saudi news media channel), 12 December 2022. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2022/12/12/Saudi-Arabia-spent-1-4-bln-in-incentives-to-boost-local-military-sector-in-2021-22

Saudi Arabia spent $1.4 billion (5.1 billion riyals) in incentives to boost its local military sector over the last two years, the governor of the sector’s general authority Ahmed al-Ohali said on Monday…

SAMI’s chief executive officer Walid Abukhaled said the company will focus on unmanned systems, radars and cybersecurity in coming years. Both were speaking at a forum in Riyadh on Monday, in the wake of Saudi Arabia’s 2023 budget announcements.

“Saudi Arabia and China Strengthen Strategic Partnership in Digital Economy,” SPA – Saudi Press Agency (official Saudi news agency), 9 December 2022. https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2407961

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has signed a strategic partnership for cooperation in the fields of digital economy with the People’s Republic of China, as part of the framework of the current official visit of President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China to the Kingdom…The partnership develops a framework for cooperation between the two friendly countries, covering the fields of digital economy, communications and information technology, and promoting research and innovation in the field of emerging technologies, in addition to improving aspects of communications infrastructure, and enabling the growth of digital entrepreneurship through emerging business models such as financial technology and e-commerce. It also covers cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence, advanced computing and quantum information technology, in addition to robots and smart equipment, and work to develop their technologies and applications for industrial and commercial purposes. Moreover, this partnership memorandum aims at enhancing the two friendly countries’ cooperation in the fields of the modern generation of mobile communications technology and emerging technologies. Within the framework of this partnership, the two sides will also cooperate in the field of digital technology applications and radio frequency spectrum management, in addition to their cooperation in developing and building local capabilities in communication and data centers, developing digital platforms and cloud computing services, and expanding submarine cable projects.

Notes:

[i] “Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy,” U.S. Congressional Research Service, Updated 23 November 2020, p. 23.https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf

[ii] Several media outlets reported that Saudi Arabia and China signed a stack of weapons sales agreements worth around $4 billion at the November 2022 Zhuhai Air Show in China, a few weeks before the Saudi-organized Arab-Chinese summit. The deal reportedly included TB001 UAVs, YJ-21 anti-ship missiles, carrier-based hypersonic missile systems, and an anti-drone laser system known as the “Silent Hunter.” A Chinese military analyst cited by the English-language South China Morning Post is bullish on the prospects of growing Saudi-Chinese arms trade.  He considers Saudi Arabia to be potentially interested in several Chinese land systems, including tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery—to include long-range rocket artillery.  See: “Why is Saudi Arabia looking to China to buy weapons after years of arms deals with the US?” South China Morning Post, 8 December 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3202245/why-saudi-arabia-looking-china-buy-weapons-after-years-arms-deals-us;For more on the “Silent Hunter,” see: Lucas Winter, “Saudi Arabia Turns to China for Low-Altitude Air Defense,” OE Watch, Issue 4, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/415161

[iii] For background on Vision 2030’s impact on Saudi military industry and Saudi-Chinese defense industry relations, see: Lucas Winter “Saudi Arabia and the UAE Streamline Military Industry,” OE Watch, January 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/353022; “Radars and UAVs: Saudi Arabia Taking Steps to Localize Military Industries,” OE Watch, November 2020. https://community.apan.org/search?q=Radars and UAVs%3A Saudi Arabia Taking Steps to Localize Military Industries; “Continued Growth and Development in Domestic High-Tech Military Industries of Saudi Arabia and the UAE,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/382665;  “Will Saudi Arabia’s Domestic UAV Program Slow Get Off the Ground?,” OE Watch, Issue 1, 2022 https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/405136; “UAV Technologies Proliferating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia,” OE Watch, Issue 7, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/420430; and “Saudi Arabia Continues Buying Missiles and UAVs From China as Part of Broader Foreign Policy Rebalancing,” OE Watch, Issue 11, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429585

Image Information:

Image:  Flag of Saudi Arabia
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia_%28type_1%29.svg      
Attribution: Public Domain

Tajikistan and China Deepen Security Cooperation

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Gorno-Badakhshan map

Gorno-Badakhshan map.

“A temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises.”

The government of Tajikistan has, in recent years, only rarely released information about its security cooperation activities with China.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from Tajikistan’s independent news website Asia Plus reports on a recent agreement signed by the governments of Tajikistan and China to carry out a series of joint biennial exercises focusing on counterterrorism. While the Tajik government again provided few details about the agreement, there is enough information to gauge how it fits within broader expectations of Tajik-Chinese security cooperation going forward. The article reports that the agreement calls for joint counterterrorism exercises between Tajikistan and China to take place “at least once every two years” and that their purpose is “to strengthen and develop a comprehensive strategic partnership.” The article also mentions that both sides are looking to increase coordination between special forces units as well as tactical skills for counterterrorism. Special purpose units from Tajikistan and China have carried out a handful of joint exercises over the past seven years, all focusing on a counterterrorism scenario, though none of them had been part of a series of exercises.[ii] 

The article goes on to note that a “temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises” and that both sides will “not disclose details about the timing, location, scale, and leadership of the exercises before the start of the exercise.” It is likely that each side will release some information about future exercises after they take place, but this aspect of the agreement demonstrates how Tajikistan continues to develop a deeper partnership with China. Lastly, the article provides a reminder that China provided 55 million Chinese yuan (around $8 million) last year for a facility for Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. This new facility appears to be for Tajikistan and is not another Chinese base. Ultimately, Tajikistan’s agreement with China to carry out joint counterterrorism exercises may not appear as significant as Tajikistan’s partnership with Russia, but it does signal a more consistent effort from both sides to develop the partnership.

Source:

Mazhab Juma, “Не реже одного раза в два года. Таджикистан и Китай договариваются, как проводить антитеррористические учения (‘No fewer than one time every two years’. Tajikistan and China agreed to carry out counterterrorism exercises),” Asia-Plus (independent news website in Tajikistan), 21 November 2022. 

https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20221121/ne-rezhe-odnogo-raza-v-dva-goda-tadzhikistan-i-kitai-dogovarivayutsya-kak-provodit-antiterroristicheskie-ucheniya

Tajikistan intends to carry out counterterrorism exercises with China at least once every two years. The text of the agreement between the governments of Tajikistan and China, published on the information and legal portal of the (Tajik) Ministry of Justice), states that the purpose of the exercise is to strengthen and develop a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Another goal is to increase the level of coordination between the special counterterrorism units, the level of interaction between the units, and the training and tactical skills of the two countries…

… It is also noted that a temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises… the parties will take strict secrecy measures and will not disclose details about the timing, location, scale, and leadership of the exercises before the start of the exercise.

…in October last year, the Parliament of Tajikistan approved an agreement in which China is building a special base in the Wakhan Gorge of the Gorno Badakhsahn Autonomous Oblast… The base will be built in accordance with an agreement between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan and the Ministry of Public Security of China. “As part of the cooperation agreement between the two countries, China will provide grant assistance for the construction of the base for the rapid response team of the Organized Crime Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan…

The cost of building the base is 55 million Chinese yuan (approximately 100 million somoni)…

Notes:

[i] For instance, the 2019 revelation that China had established a base in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakshan region near the Tajik-Afghan border only came out after a Western journalist had traveled to the remote region.

[ii] For more information on joint Tajik-China exercises, see: Matthew Stein, “Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity,” 20 January 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/360801

Image Information:

Image: Gorno-Badakhshan map
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gorno_badakhshan_map.png
Attribution: Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication

Hong Kong Firm To Develop Satellite and Rocket Launch Site in Djibouti

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Signing of the Republic of Djibouti – HKATG MoU. President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh (center) with HKATG Vice President Allen Fung (center left).

Signing of the Republic of Djibouti – HKATG MoU. President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh (center) with HKATG Vice President Allen Fung (center left).

“The MOU signed this time not only involves the construction of 7 satellite launch pads and 3 rocket testing pads, but also covers supporting projects such as power stations, water plants, aerospace ports, roads, and ports.”

On 9 January 2023, Djibouti signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group (HKATG)[i] and Touchroad International Holdings[ii] to develop a $1 billion satellite and rocket launch site in Djibouti. The project includes seven launch pads and three rocket test pads in addition to power stations, water plants, spaceports, roads, and maritime ports in Djibouti’s northern Obock region. The MOU stipulates that the government of Djibouti will provide the necessary land (a minimum of 10 square kilometers) with a co-managed lease that runs for a minimum of 35 years. The government of Djibouti will take over the lease after 30 years of co-management.

According to the state-affiliated China Daily, the project would alleviate high demand for commercial satellite launching facilities in China, which are largely dependent on the Wenchang Space Launch Site and Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center for commercial launches. China currently maintains four official space launch centers, all state-owned and operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). A 2021 State Council Information Office white paper identified the country’s demand for “commercial launch pads and launch sites to meet different commercial needs” as a priority for China’s space capabilities through 2026.[iii]

For its part, Africa’s expanding space industry relies heavily on international partners, including private firms, universities, and national space programs. Several countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, and Tunisia, have already ventured into the space domain relying on Beijing’s capabilities. In 2007, China launched Nigeria’s first communications satellite. Moreover, Beijing launched Algeria’s first communication satellite, and in 2019 it launched Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s first satellites. In 2020, China’s launch of a second satellite for Ethiopia from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center was aired live on Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation.

The announcement represents a major expansion of China’s involvement in Djibouti, where it has hosted its first official overseas military base since 2017. It remains to be seen what launch capabilities the site will support or to what extent Chinese firms will use the facility upon its projected completion in 2028. However, the involvement of HKATG and Touchroad, with their close ties to state-owned corporations, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects—coupled with a permanent PLA presence and other strategic investments—may allow China to be looked to as African states’ space partner of preference.[iv]

Sources:

“与吉布提政府合作建太空港 助力商业航天突破限制 (Partnership with Djibouti Government to Build Spaceport Aids Commercial Aerospace Breakthroughs),” China Daily (PRC state-affiliated media), 12 January 2023. https://tech.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202301/12/WS63bfb3d4a3102ada8b22ae3e.html

The construction of the spaceport in the Republic of Djibouti is expected to take at least five years, that said, from a commercial point of view, the project is still of great benefit to the business of HKATG.

At present, most commercial satellites are launched in the new mode of “carpooling” of shared rockets, that is, “one rocket with multiple satellites” at the Wenchang Space Launch Site and China’s Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center. Facing the high demand for commercial satellite launches in China in recent years, the demand for launch pads has been far outstripping supply, the development of Djibouti’s Spaceport will break the restrictions of the existing business model and have a positive impact on HKATG’s business development.

It is noteworthy that the parties will work together to establish research centers, universities and provide aerospace technologies, products, services and programs in addition to infrastructure development.

“驻吉布提大使胡斌会见香港航天科技集团有限公司 (Ambassador to Djibouti Hu Bin Meets with Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group Co., Ltd. Vice-President),” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 5 January 2023. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/jghd_673046/202301/t20230106_11002946.shtml

Ambassador Hu Bin expressed his affirmation of the cooperation between Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group Co., Ltd. and encouraged the enterprise to strengthen feasible research, to establish a firm sense of compliance, to balance corporate interests and social responsibilities, to promote the diversified economic development of Djibouti, and to contribute to Sino-Djiboutian cooperation. The embassy will actively provide the necessary support and assurances.

He Liehui, vice president of the Chinese African People’s Friendship Association, attended the meeting.

Notes:

[i] HKATG (香港航天科技集团有限公司) maintains close ties with Chinese state-owned and affiliated giants Huawei Technologies (华为) and China Aerospace Technology Corporations (中国航天科技集团公司), both of which are main players in China’s military-civil fusion research and development programs. HKATG’s board members maintain strong ties to the CCP and its united front system. Vice Chairman and Executive Director Claire Ku previously served as the founding CEO of the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), a documented CCP united front organization. Vice President of Business Development, Allen Fung, is a member of the CCP’s All-China Youth Federation and a Standing Committee Member of the Guangdong Youth Federation.

[ii] Touchroad International Holdings is owned by Africa-focused Chinese investor He Liehui, who is the current Vice President of the Chinese African People’s Friendship Association, another known united front organization with development projects across the African continent.

[iii] For more on China’s space ambitions, see “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” State Council Information Office, 28 January 2022, http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465645/n6465648/c6813088/content.html

[iv] Other strategic BRI investments include China Merchant Ports Holdings’ operation and ownership stake in the Port of Doraleh’s Terminal Container and a high-capacity standard gauge railway that terminates at the Port of Doraleh.

Image Information:

Image:  Signing of the Republic of Djibouti – HKATG MoU. President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh (center) with HKATG Vice President Allen Fung (center left).
Source: Djiboutian Government https://twitter.com/IsmailOguelleh/status/1612488089603309568
Attribution:  Public Domain

China Addresses Challenges to Critical Mineral Supply

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PRC Minister of Natural Resources, Wang Guanghua.

PRC Minister of Natural Resources, Wang Guanghua.

“International geopolitics has become an important factor affecting China’s resource supply.” – Wang Yunmin

In an interview with Chinese party-owned media outlet People’s Daily this January, Chinese Minister of Natural Resources Wang Guanghua explains that Beijing will launch a new round of domestic strategic mineral mining operations to offset dependence on foreign suppliers of critical energy resources. Recent external shocks, including a global pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and a growing trend toward “resource nationalism,” threaten to disrupt Beijing’s access to the strategic minerals necessary to power its economy and military technologies.[i] The new Chinese initiative includes policies to stimulate domestic exploration, prospecting, and processing of raw strategic minerals, with particular emphasis on oil- and gas-bearing basins and key metallogenic belts.[ii] According to the director of the State Key Laboratory of Safety and Health for Metal Mines, Wang Yunmin, around two-thirds of China’s strategic mineral production and supply for minerals like iron, chrome, manganese, cobalt, nickel, copper and oil is highly dependent on foreign sources.

One of Beijing’s greatest concerns over strategic minerals lies in its ability to transition energy supply from fossil fuels like oil, gas, and coal to cleaner alternatives. China is the world’s single largest consumer of lithium-ion batteries, relying on them to not only power its electric car and renewable energy industries, but also military weaponry, including drones and submarines.[iii] Three core ingredients for the lithium-ion battery traditional recipe include cobalt, lithium, and nickel.

China’s critical mineral supply faces challenges from resource rich countries where local governments have announced restrictions on mining and exports of cobalt, lithium, and nickel. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Zimbabwe are among China’s top lithium supplier states while the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Indonesia are among its largest cobalt and nickel suppliers respectively. Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, collectively known as the ‘lithium triangle’ for their prospected vast lithium reserves, are reportedly discussing a possible OPEC-like agreement for lithium.[iv] In December 2022, Indonesia and Zimbabwe announced export restrictions requiring firms to processing raw materials in-country.[v] While Chinese lithium-ion battery production firms like CATL and SVOLT have recently reported production of lithium-ion batteries that rely on little or no nickel or cobalt, China is still far off from integrating these technologies across its military-economic structure.[vi]

Sources:

Shi Yimin (施毅敏), “工程院院士：中国战略性矿产对外依存度高地缘政治影响资源供给 (Chinese Academy of Engineering Scholar: High Degree of Chinese Foreign Dependence on Strategic Mineral Production, Geopolitics Influencing Resource Supply),” Caixin News (Beijing-based Chinese non-state media organization), 24 December 2022. https://companies.caixin.com/m/2022-12-24/101981473.html

Wang Yunmin introduced, Chinese foreign dependence on 10 types of minerals exceeds 50%. Among these, iron ore at 82%, chrome ore at 98%, manganese ore at 96%, cobalt ore at 95%, nickel ore at 90%, and both copper ore and oil at 78%. Wang said, “This determines the external environment’s strong influence over China’s resource supply and production.”

“优化要素保障 建设美丽中国 (Optimizing Factors to Ensure Construction of a Beautiful China),” People’s Daily (official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), 5 January 2023. http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0105/c1001-32599955.html

China has a high degree of foreign dependence on some important mineral resources, and once the international situation changes, it will certainly affect economic security or even national security.

A new round of domestic prospecting for strategic minerals will be launched in an all-round way. The focus will be on strategic minerals, particularly important oil and gas-bearing basins and key metallogenic belts. New policies will be implemented to promote exploration, prospecting and processing.

Notes:

[i] Resource nationalism (资源民族主义) refers to the tendency of people and governments to assert control over natural resources located within their territories.

[ii] In 2021, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology published its plan to facilitate the development of the country’s raw materials industry during the 14th Five-Year Period (2021-2025).

[iii] For more on China’s use of lithium-ion batteries in military weaponry, see: Stephen Chen, “China’s submarine fleet may soon be powered by lithium batteries,” 29 October 2022, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3197670/chinas-submarine-fleet-may-soon-be-powered-lithium-batteries; Zhang Tong, “Chinese scientists’ new gel filling could triple lifespan of lithium batteries for EVs, drones,” 4 November 2022, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3198333/chinese-scientists-new-gel-filling-could-triple-lifespan-lithium-batteries-evs-drones

[iv] Connor Mycroft, “China’s lithium hold won’t be undercut by Opec-style cartel as Argentina, Chile, Bolivia consider alliance,” 5 November 2022, South China Morning Post,  https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3198440/chinas-lithium-hold-wont-be-undercut-opec-style-cartel-argentina-chile-bolivia-consider-alliance

[v] For more on recent Indonesia and Zimbabwe’s export restrictions, see: Fransiska Nangoy and Bernadette Christina, “Indonesia confirms bauxite export ban to proceed as scheduled,” 21 December 2022, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/indonesia-announce-ban-exports-commodity-without-saying-which-2022-12-21/ and “Zimbabwe bans raw lithium exports to curb artisanal mining,” 21 December 2022, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zimbabwe-bans-raw-lithium-exports-curb-artisanal-mining-2022-12-21/

[vi] Keith Bradsher and Michael Forsythe, “Why a Chinese Company Dominates Electric Car Batteries,”” 22 December 2021, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/22/business/china-catl-electric-car-batteries.html and “Completely Cobalt-Free Battery Cells from SVOLT Available for Order Now,” 2 February 2021, SVOLT, https://svolt-eu.com/en/completely-cobalt-free-battery-cells-from-svolt-available-for-order-now/

Image Information:

Image: PRC Minister of Natural Resources, Wang Guanghua
Source: Chinese Government, https://baike.baidu.com/item/王广华/69366
Attribution: Public Domain

A Chinese Perspective on the Pitfalls of Military Intelligentization

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“The growing use of intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis.”

Chinese military strategists are increasingly focused on developing practices of military “intelligentization,” the next generation of warfare expected to improve the military’s combat efficiency.[i] Intelligentization, also referred to as intelligent warfare, is the Chinese concept of applying machine speed and processing power of artificial intelligence (AI) to military planning, operational command, and decision support.[ii] The rate of developing intelligent weapons and systems is progressing at such a rapid pace, however, that it comes with potential risks, according to the following article published in the People’s Liberation Army’s official newspaper PLA Daily. According to the article, the anti-jamming ability of current intelligent systems is too weak, making intelligent systems more vulnerable. For example, drone command and control relies on communication links that connect the drones to rear personnel. If the communication link is jammed, the operator will lose control of the drone. Therefore, improved anti-jamming capability is necessary to ensure communications links are not disrupted. The article also explains that the reliability of today’s AI technology is questionable. While the AI systems’ level of intelligence is superior to that of a human, there is not yet a reliable test to ensure they will not fail in a complex combat scenario.

The article also warns that using intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis. For example, military operations that rely on intelligent weapons and equipment could surpass the speed of political decision making. This could weaken the decision-maker’s ability to control the situation. The article further warns that the use of intelligent weapons and equipment in large-scale combat could increase tension between countries as well as lead to changing the psychology of combatants, potentially causing them to become more desensitized to killing because of their greater distance from the battlefield and gradually reducing caution in decision-making.

The article notes that countries are increasingly pouring money into AI technology to gain military advantage, and this struggle for predominance could lead to a dangerous arms race. With current AI technology, for example, the algorithms used to distinguish civilians from combatants are not yet reliable, thereby potentially putting the lives of civilians at risk. Based on the article, there is still a long way to go before China has perfected the software to not only drive AI weapons and equipment, but also to test them to ensure they are ready to meet all the demands of the battlefield.

Source:

Luo Zhaocheng, “关注智能化武器装备运用风险 (Pay Attention to Risks in Using Intelligentized Weapons and Equipment),” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 5 January 2023. http://www.81.cn/ll/2023-01/05/content_10209877.htm

… Currently, the world’s major countries are vigorously pursuing the development of military intelligentization of weapons and equipment across the different operational domains. While the new technology greatly enhances combat capabilities, it also could pose some great risks.

…the anti-jamming capability of intelligent weapons and equipment is weak. This could cause a loss of operational control over systems. The intelligent weapons and equipment currently used by various countries often require command and control to be conducted by rear area personnel who rely on communications links. As these links are jammed, it will be difficult to return them to operational effectiveness… Iran’s successful capturing of U.S. drones through jamming technology is a typical example…

Artificial intelligence technology in certain fields is shown to far exceed human intelligence. However, its reliability and interpretability are questionable… Presently, countries have conducted repeated simulation tests and even actual combat using intelligent weapons and equipment. However, there is still no reliable testing method to ensure its dependability should it run into a complex battlefield environment.

Wide-scale application of intelligent operations could trigger an arms race, leading to the risk of disposition for unsafe AI systems…

The use of intelligent weapons and equipment can impact the international strategic balance and increase the risk of war breaking out. The use of smart weapons and equipment increases the risk of “firing the first shot.”

The growing use of intelligent weapons and equipment increases the risk of losing control in a crisis…

…Intelligent weapons and equipment put participating personnel further away from the battlefield. Participants’ apathy will grow as distance increases…

Notes:

[i] For other Chinese insights on intelligentization, see Cindy Hurst, “China: ‘New Concepts’ in Unmanned Combat,” OE Watch, October 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376077 and Peter Wood, “A Chinese Perspective on Intelligent Warfare and Future Urban Operations,” OE Watch, November 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376999

[ii] For an example of intelligent warfare, see Cindy Hurst, “The ‘Blade of Victory’: A Chinese Perspective on Drone Swarms,” OE Watch, March 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/358341

New Domain Forces and Combat Capabilities in Chinese Military Thinking

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“Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”.

“Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”.

“With the support of intelligent network information systems, the new domain forces with new combat capabilities can make full use of intelligent [AI-enabled] technology based on the autonomous and intelligent real-time command and control of the battlefield.”

In 2021 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) adopted “Multidomain Precision Warfare” as its core operational concept. While few sources address this topic in much detail, a related concept has remained prominent in Chinese media. In October 2022, in his speech at the 20th Party Congress, President Xi Jinping declared that China must “increase the proportion of new-domain forces with new combat capabilities.[i] New-domain forces with new combat capabilities are also a focus area for Chinese military force development for the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). While these concepts are abstract and rarely include more than vague descriptions of what they entail, Chinese media emphasize them as essential to the PLA’s evolution from informatization toward intelligent warfare. The following excerpt from Chinese party-owned media outlet PLA Daily provides some insights into what is meant by these ideas and how they may take shape in coming years.

The excerpt, a commentary, acknowledges that clarity about the “newness” of some of the domains covered in this effort is important. The author provides an overview of the characteristics of these new domain forces and capabilities, which include flexible architectures, dynamic reorganization, and mutation of operational concepts in response to new technologies.

Terms[ii]Characteristics and Examples
New Domain ForcesFlexible architecturesReliant on intelligent systems (integrated command platform, etc.)Dynamic reorganizationMutability in response to technological developmentsCross-domain strikesFocus on achieving strategic paralysis of the enemy
New Combat Capabilities[iii]Uncrewed systems (air, sea, and ground-based)PLA Strategic Support Force[iv]PLA Ground Force long-range rocket artillery (MLRS)[v]

Fundamentally, these concepts demonstrate a recognition that the most effective use of combat capabilities will not be the single-domain clash between similar forces and that the PLA must instead be able to flexibly deploy forces across domains against enemy weaknesses to maximize their effects. Of course, Chinese military thinking does not develop in a vacuum. Multi-domain precision operations appear to have many of the same core assumptions about the future of war as in other countries’ concepts, such as “Multidomain Operations” (MDO).[vi]  However, despite the rhetorical similarities to U.S. concepts, at a more basic level, Chinese warfighting is likely to unfold differently due to core differences resulting from the direction and structure of PLA, which has Chinese Communist Party committees and political officers throughout as an essential part. The PLA’s development of an integrated command platform and other informatized tools, such as those referenced in the article, appear intended to not only make its forces more survivable in modern informatized or intelligentized war but also to be “designed to” the PLA’s structure itself and improve the speed of decision making that its structure might otherwise impede.[vii] While China’s focus on achieving multidomain effects is noteworthy, in the interim much of these concepts may remain aspirational for the PLA, a military that has, for much of its recent history by its own admission, struggled to effectively train to the standard of being able to carry out combined arms operations, much less joint operations.

Source:

Liu Haijiang (刘海江), “新域新质作战力量 ‘新’在哪里 (Explaining the ‘new’ in new-domain forces with new combat capabilities),” PLA Daily (Official newspaper of China’s armed forces), 29 November 2022. hxxp://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2022-11/29/content_328869.htm

With the expansion of the scope of human activities and the development of national interests, where military struggle takes place has moved beyond traditional domains such as land, sea, and air and continues to expand into the deep sea, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and other domains. As required by the times, forces and types of combat power to be fielded in these domains have emerged.

Driven by advanced technology, new domain and new quality combat forces have broken through traditional spaces such as land, sea, air, and space, and the scope of activities has become more three-dimensional and diverse. Deep sea, space, underground, and polar regions have all become new territories where new domains and new quality combat forces compete.

New-domain forces with new combat capabilities involve dynamic reconfiguration and cross-domain integration of combat elements. With the support of intelligent network information systems, the new domain forces with new combat capabilities can make full use of intelligent [AI-enabled] technology based on the autonomous and intelligent real-time command and control of the battlefield.

Notes:

[i] “New combat capabilities” is the more anodyne translation used in the official version of Xi’s remarks, but the Chinese here means something closer to “enabled by new capabilities.” For consistency, “new combat capabilities” is used throughout.

[ii] This table is partially constructed from other articles in PLA Daily that were either too short or did not have enough details and explanation to warrant translation.

[iii] The delineation between “new combat capabilities” and “New Type Combat Forces” [新型作战力量], another buzzword of PLA modernization, is unclear.

[iv] China’s 2019 Defense White Paper describes the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). The PLASSF is a new type of combat force for safeguarding national security and an important driver for the growth of new combat capabilities. China’s National Defense in the New Era [新时代的中国国防] State Council Information Office [国务院新闻办公室] 24 July 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-07/24/c_1124792450.htm

[v] One article in August 2022 described new long-range rockets launched by PLA ground force units belonging to the Eastern Theater Command toward the vicinity of Taiwan in response to then-U.S. Speaker of the House’s visit using the same language. “Our ground forces’ development of new combat capabilities continues to advance long-range rocket forces represent a new era of precision firepower” [我陆军新质作战力量建设持续推进 远程火箭炮兵成为新一代火力精兵], PLA Daily, 29 October 2022. http://www.81.cn/xue-xi/2022-08/29/content_10180334.htm

[vi] In his article, Liu Haijiang also highlights the U.S. Army’s fielding of the AI decision-making assistant FIRES Synchronization to Optimize Responses in Multi-Domain Operations (FIRESTORM) as indicative of the future direction of intelligent warfare.

[vii] Peter Wood, “PLA Fields New Integrated Command Platforms, Improving Combined Arms Operations,” OE Watch, December 2021.

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/400756

Image Information:

Image: “Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department Patch”
Source: Peter Wood
Attribution: Author-created