Tag Archives: Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso Reels From Continued Terrorist Attacks

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Burkinabe soldiers respond to an ambush during training at Exercise Flintlock near Po, Burkina Faso.

“Burkina Faso – like its neighbors Mali and Niger – have been hit for almost ten years by attacks by jihadist groups which have left more than 20,000 dead and two million displaced.”

Summary: Despite the Burkinabe government spending nearly 30% of the state budget on military equipment, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin has continued to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against targets throughout the country.

Even with exceptional monetary investment in military equipment by Burkina Faso, the al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist group Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) continues to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against government targets. According to the first excerpted article from French language news agency specializing in African economics, Agence Ecofin, a speech by the Minister of the Economy, Aboubakar Nacanabo, revealed Burkina Faso had spent more than $1 billion to acquire military equipment in the fight against terrorism.[i] While this amount might not be notable for many nations, these purchases totaled 30% of the entire state budget in 2023 and contributed to the government’s 6.7% budget deficit. To help with funding, Burkina Faso implemented a voluntary Patriotic Support Fund and, later, compulsory taxes on telecommunications systems and land to assist with funding defense purchases. Minister Nacanabo indicated that the government planned a similar financial allocation for defense equipment purchases in 2024, totaling 29.49% of the state budget.

Despite its considerable spending, Burkina Faso continues to struggle with organized and frequent terrorist attacks by armed jihadist groups such as JNIM. JNIM, originally based in Mali, has spread through many parts of Africa, including Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Togo, and Cote d’Ivoire.[ii] According to the second excerpted article from French-language public service news channel TV5 Monde, JNIM conducted a deadly attack on 11 June 2024, at the military installation in Mansila, near the border with Niger. The attack targeted homes and businesses in the town as well as the local military detachment. The government is yet to release an official report on the number of killed or wounded. The 11 June attack is just one in a long history of terrorist attacks affecting the country, with the article noting that over 20,000 have been killed by jihadist groups and over 2,000,000 have been displaced in Burkina Faso alone.

Nearly one third of the Burkinabe state budget is being spent on defense equipment purchases, and the ongoing armed conflict throughout the country raises questions about the efficacy of these purchases. Much of the military equipment purchased by the new regime is likely originating from Russia, as Burkina Faso and other Sahelian countries have moved away from Western aid.[iii] Though the country’s deteriorating security situation is currently a regional issue, Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism strategy and effective combat operations against groups like JNIM have broader U.S. policy implications. Transnational terrorist organizations have had a resurgence in conducting international attacks, which brings to the forefront the importance of stopping the spread of JNIM and the Islamic State from expanding to other neighboring African nations.

Sources:

“Burkina Faso: 1 milliard $ investis dans du matériel militaire en 2023 (Burkina Faso: $1 billion invested in military equipment in 2023),” Agence Ecofin (French language Geneve-based news agency), 7 June 2024. https://www.agenceecofin.com/economie/0706-119330-lien-burkina-faso-1-milliard-investis-dans-des-materiels-militaires-en-2023

Burkina Faso has been facing a security and humanitarian crisis for many years due to terrorist attacks, putting strong pressure on public finances. In 2023, the country’s budget deficit reached 6.7% due to security-related spending. Burkina Faso spent around $1 billion (more than 600 billion CFA francs), or 30% of the state budget, for the acquisition of military equipment in 2023. This information was revealed by Aboubakar Nacanabo (photo), minister of the Economy, during the program “Tribune of Accountability” broadcast on Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina.

According to the minister, this investment aims to strengthen the operational capabilities of the national armed forces in the fight against terrorism. Burkina Faso has, in fact, been facing a security and humanitarian crisis due to terrorist attacks for many years, putting strong pressure on public finances. In 2023, the country’s budget deficit reached 6.7% due to security-related spending, according to the government. However, Minister Nacanabo reassured the public by affirming that after these acquisitions, the government will gradually increase spending in other sectors. A move that could underline the administration’s commitment to ensuring balanced national development, despite pressing security challenges.

Note that Captain Ibrahim Traoré, president of the transition, has placed the fight against terrorism and the reconquest of the territory at the heart of his priorities; what is considered “essential” before the organization of national elections. As a result, several reforms have been put in place to respond more effectively to the crisis, notably the creation of the Patriotic Support Fund (FSP) in January 2023. Initially funded by voluntary contributions, the government introduced compulsory contributions on certain products and services to support the Fund. For the 2024 budget year, the Burkinabe government plans to allocate 29.49% of its budget to security-related expenses.

“Burkina Faso: quel bilan dans l’attaque djihadiste meurtrière à Mansila (Burkina Faso: what results in the deadly jihadist attack in Mansila),” TV5 Monde (Multi-nationally funded French language news outlet), 15 June 2024.  https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/burkina-faso-quel-bilan-dans-lattaque-djihadiste-meurtriere-mansila-2726176

The town of Mansila located in the northeast of Burkina Faso near Niger, was the target of a deadly jihadist attack on June 11, according to local and security sources. The authorities have not communicated on the attack claimed by the GSIM, affiliated with Al Qaeda.

A deadly jihadist attack, the exact toll of which is unknown, targeted the town of Mansila on Tuesday, in the north-east of Burkina Faso, near Niger, we learned on Sunday from local and security sources. On June 11, “ill-intentioned individuals stormed the detachment (military, editor’s note), our homes, our businesses and all other representations of the country”, indicates the association of pupils and students of Mansila, in a published press release on Facebook.

“At present, while we have not finished mourning our dead, many of our fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters are missing,” continues this association, which calls on the authorities to “restore peace.”  A security source confirmed the attack to AFP. “It is difficult to give a precise assessment, but there were losses in Mansila. Many elements are missing,” said this source.

The military detachments deployed in the various localities of Burkina generally comprise around 150 elements. No official report has been released, and the authorities have not communicated about this attack, which was claimed by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Friday, the head of the military regime in power in Burkina Faso appeared on national television news, donating blood in the capital Ouagadougou, after two days of uncertainty following the fall of a shell in the courtyard of public television located near the presidency.

On Sunday, the presidency of Faso posted a message wishing a happy Eid to the country’s Muslims, accompanied by a photo of Captain Traoré praying. Burkina Faso – like its neighbors Mali and Niger – has been hit for almost ten years by attacks by jihadist groups which have left more than 20,000 dead and two million displaced. The authorities regularly claim to obtain victories over the jihadists, but the attacks continue, and part of the territory remains beyond the control of the army

Notes:

[i] Aboubakar Nacanabo’s speech took place in June 2024 during the “Tribune de la redevabilité (Tribune of Accountability)” broadcast on Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina.

[ii] The Office of the Director of National Intelligence published a foreign terrorist profile on JNIM, located here: “Jama’at Nursrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” Office of the Director of National Intelligence Counter Terrorism Guide, Updated October 2022. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/jnim_fto.html

[iii] The M-DIME Research Project details Russia’s total Military DIME influence in Burkina Faso, including arms transfers. Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham, “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office, January 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-russia-m-dime-report/

OE Insight Summary:

Despite the Burkinabe government spending nearly 30% of the state budget on military equipment, JNIM has continued to conduct deadly and coordinated attacks against targets throughout the country.

Image Information:

Image: Burkinabe soldiers respond to an ambush during training at Exercise Flintlock near Po, Burkina Faso.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Burkinabe_soldiers_respond_to_an_ambush_during_training_at_Exercise_Flintlock_2019_near_Po,_Burkina_Faso,_Feb._26,_2019.jpg Attribution: Public Domain

Revisiting Russian “Africa Corps’” Organizational Structure

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Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.

“The Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.”

Following the death of Russian Wagner Group founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov.[i] However, in Africa, the mercenary company’s operation is rebranding as “Africa Corps” whereas the company’s operations elsewhere in the world seem to be retaining the Wagner brand. This new branding may help the company avoid the stigma of its Wagner predecessors for war crimes and smuggling and reduce international pressure against the company in Africa.

The excerpted French-language article in the Chadian publication, alwihdainfo.com, is an African perspective of the differences between Russia’s Africa Corps[ii] and its predecessor Wagner Group. The article acknowledges that Africa Corps is the successor to Wagner Group with important differences. First, it notes that Africa Corps is intended to legitimize the Russian military influence on the African continent while competing with the diminishing presence of the U.S. and European powers. Second, Africa Corps may have a smaller footprint than Wagner in Africa. For example, the article mentions it operates only in Libya, inheriting Wagner’s main bases and most of Wagner’s fighters; Burkina Faso; Mali; Central African Republic and Niger. According to the article, Libya’s position on the Mediterranean Sea facilitates military supply lines and the movement of Africa Corps personnel into Africa. The previous iteration of Wagner had also operated extensively in Sudan and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in Eastern Africa, including Mozambique and Madagascar.[iii]

Another difference highlighted in the article relates to the way that Africa Corps will operate. Africa Corps is now focusing on providing military support to African countries through instructors, weapons, and developing counter-terrorism strategies with host nations in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. In contrast, Wagner soldiers directly participated in missions against terrorist or insurgent groups and functioned separate from, albeit in support of, the Russian government. The article indicates that the new Africa Corps will be more sustainable than the previous Wagner Group because of Africa Corps’ formal integration with the Russian state, and the ministry of defense. Further the ministry’s commitment to Africa Corps indicates that Russia is serious about its geopolitical ambitions in West Africa and Africa Corps’ impact on the region will not be fleeting. At a time when Western influence and partnerships with West African states are waning, Africa Corps is becoming the entity through which Russia will reassert itself.

Sources:

Source: “De ‘Wagner’ à ‘Africa Corps’: la Russie toujours présente au Sahel (From ‘Wagner’ to ‘Africa Corps’: Russia always is present in the Sahel),” alwihdainfo.com (French-language Chadian publication with a reputation for independent reporting and being critical of the government), 3 May 2024. https://www.alwihdainfo.com/De-Wagner-a-Africa-Corps-la-Russie-toujours-presente-au-Sahel_a132053.html

Recently, many people have been curious about the difference between the Russian paramilitary group “Wagner” and the “Africa Corps”, which newly appeared on the African scene and which was also founded in Russia to be deployed in African countries. In this analysis, we will seek to explain the difference between the two organizations, how and where they operate, and what their ambitions are in Africa.

Africa Corps is a Russian military company that was created in early 2024 as a replacement for the Wagner Group. This organization reflects Russia’s desire to extend its military influence on the African continent and to provide legitimacy to its official and public presence in the face of the European and American presence. Africa Corps is deployed in 5 countries: Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Central African Republic and Niger. Libya represents the core of the corps due to the previous activity of Wagner elements in the city of Tripoli…. Another factor in the choice of Libya as the headquarters of this corps is its strategic geographical location due to its connection with the Mediterranean coast, which ensures military supply lines and movement of corps members to other countries The Africa Corps’ modus operandi is entirely dependent on providing military support to African countries such as instructors and weapons. The company also is concerns with the development of strategies in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, such as is the case in Mali and Niger… In short, the Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.

Notes:

[ii] Since the death of Russian Wagner Group founder and CEO, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov. For a profile of Evkurov, which argues that he “has the full backing of Russia’s military establishment and will not have to beg for ammunition or restrict himself to the use of contractors and mercenaries,” see: Andrew McGregor, “Yunus-Bek Yevkurov: A Profile of Russia’s New Ingush African Corps Leader,” Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume: 15 Issue: 3, 18 April 2024. (URL?) The article notes that under Yevkurov “the Africa Corps will have greater access to resources, but will be expected to be self-sufficient in many ways. This means Wagner-style associations with business interests will likely continue, although disentangling these interests from the Wagner network will be challenging.” In addition, it asserts that “Improving battlefield performance will be a priority for Yevkurov. Thus far, Russian fighters have not proven any more effective in eliminating Sahelian terrorist formations than their French predecessors.”

[iii] See, for example, Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies, CSIS, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/

Image Information:

Image: Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.
Source:kremlin.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deputy_Defence_Minister_Yunus-Bek_Yevkurov_and_Wagner_leader_Andrei_Troshev.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0

Russia’s “Africa Corps” Set To Replace Wagner in Niger

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Russian mercenaries provide security for convoy with president of the Central African Republic

“The future Russian Army “Africa corps” is presented by certain Telegram channels as intended to replace Wagner.”

Russia’s Wagner Group became heavily involved in Africa in the years before the death of its founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in an airplane crash in August 2023. The mercenary fighter company deployed its troops primarily to West African countries where France was the security guarantor but had become ostracized by military juntas and authoritarian regimes, such as in Mali, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, and Sudan.[i] Wagner, in turn, became a key means for Russia to exert influence on the leadership of those countries, which often resulted in Russia being granted special concessions, such as access to resources. However, the Wagner brand name has fallen out of favor with the Kremlin for African operations following Prigozhin’s rebellion against Russian leadership. Yet, the benefit for Russia of having mercenary military formations in Africa still exists. As a result, Russia may replace Wagner with a new, but similarly purposed, “Africa Corps.”

The excerpted French-language article on the website of Radio France Internationale highlighted the visit in December 2023 of Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Evkourov (often spelled Yevkurov) to Niger, where the two countries agreed to strengthen military cooperation.[ii] The was significant because it was the first time a Russian delegation visited Niger since the 2023 coup and demonstrated Russia’s endorsement of Niger’s new military junta, whereas Western countries criticized the coup. Additionally, only one month after the coup, the new junta in Niger requested from Russia Wagner’s protection of the junta from internal and external threats, including a potential military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (See Jason Warner, “West African States Split On Potential Intervention In Niger,” OE Watch, Issue # 08, 2023, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/).  Evkourov’s visit solidifies the new partnership between Russia and Niger, with Wagner—or the new “Africa Corps”— as the vehicle for Russian influence. The article noted that, based on an analysis of Telegram social media channels, “Africa Corps,” like Wagner, would welcome mercenaries. Indeed, the offer of a relatively high salary, health insurance with free medical care, and life insurance, all under the supervision of Evkourov, would motivate mercenaries to join. Such inducements attract, in particular, Russian Army veterans whose professional skill set and sense of adventure is otherwise not compatible with civilian life. Further, the article indicates Russian military intelligence and businessmen close to Vladimir Putin support “Africa Corps.” The similarities between Wagner and “Africa Corps” strongly suggest the latter is a continuation of the former under different branding.

Sources:

“Russie: Moscou prépare un «corps militaire africain» pour prendre la suite de Wagner (Russia: Moscow is preparing an “African military corps” to replace Wagner),” Radio France Internationale, (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 5 December 2023. rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231205-russie-moscou-prépare-un-corps-militaire-africain-pour-prendre-la-suite-de-wagner

A Russian delegation led by the Deputy Minister of Defense is in Niamey. This is the first official visit by a member of the Russian government to this country since the July 26 coup which broke diplomatic relations between Niger and its international partners. The delegation led by the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Younous-bek Bamatguireevich Evkourov, was received by the head of the Nigerien military regime, General Abdourahamane Tiani. At the end of the meeting, the parties continued “to sign documents to strengthen military cooperation between the Republic of Niger and the Russian FederationThe future Russian Army “African corps” is presented by certain Telegram channels as intended to replace Wagner. Former mercenaries would be welcome. The conditions include a high salary of nearly 3,000 euros, free medical care, and life and health insurance, all under the supervision of Deputy Defense Minister Yunous-bek Bamatguireevich Evkourov. Other sources suggest that the unit receives direct patronage from Russian military intelligence, under the leadership of a businessman close to the president… This last scenario would be very similar to that applied to Wagner

Notes:

[i] In the final week of December 2023, the last remaining 1,500 French troops withdrew from Niger. In addition, Niger previously vowed to stop selling minerals to France and removed diplomatic immunity from the French Ambassador to Niger, who departed the country in August. With the closure of the French Embassy in Niamey on 31 December 2023, the 127 years of a French diplomatic presence in Niger came to an end. This followed a similar French withdrawal from Burkina Faso earlier in 2023 and from Mali in 2022. For additional details, see Morgane Le Cam, “France completes troop withdrawal from Niger, closes embassy,” lemonde.fr, 22 December 2023. lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/22/france-completes-troop-withdrawal-from-niger-closes-embassy_6367061_124.html

[ii] Evkourov is an interesting choice to lead Africa Corps because he was close to Yevgeny Prigozhin but remained loyal to the Russian Defense Ministry during Prigozhin’s mutiny. Evkourov played a mediating role during the mutiny. When Prigozhin’s Wagner forces entered Rostov and seized the city center, Evkourov received Prigozhin hospitably and defused tensions. However, after Prigozhin’s death, Evkourov led a delegation to Syria, Libya, Central African Republic, and other countries where Wagner operated and told Wagner forces that the Defense Ministry would take over the leadership of Wagner.

Image Information:

Image: Russian mercenaries provide security for convoy with president of the Central African Republic
Source: Clément Di Roma/VOA, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RussiansecurityBangui.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Military Junta Led Sahelian States Create New Collective Security Organization

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The leader of junta currently ruling Mali, COL Assimi Goita, recently tweeted an announcement about the new mutual defense pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

“The military regimes led by Assimi Goïta in Mali, Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso and Abdourahamane Tiani in Niger signed a charter on Saturday establishing a defensive alliance.”

With the string of coups d’état that have engulfed the African continent over the past three years, a steady drumbeat of alliances has been growing among military juntas.[i] As per the article from leading Africa-focused French language publication Jeune Afrique, the increasing amity between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has coalesced into a formalized mutual security cooperation organization. Called the “Alliance of Sahelian States,” the grouping is a defensive alliance that commits each country to respond to the aid of the others in the event of any “attack on the sovereignty or integrity of the territory” of one of its members. Additionally, the Alliance of Sahelian States also includes economic dimensions (likely to help each of the regimes, all of which have faced threats of economic sanctions for unconstitutional transfers of power) and counterterrorism dimensions (as the three collectively constitute the epicenter of jihadist violence undertaken by Al-Qaeda and Islamic State-linked groups).[ii] While Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have been getting closer since 2022 – often with support from Russia[iii] – the real impetus for the formalization of the Alliance of Sahelian States was Niger’s July 2023 coup. In the aftermath, West Africa’s primary regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), threatened to launch a military intervention to restore power to the democratically elected president. This proposal starkly divided West African states, with Nigeria, Benin, and Senegal falling on one side, and Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Algeria, on the other. Mali and Burkina Faso intuitively aligned behind Niger given the vulnerabilities that other military juntas would face if ECOWAS made good on its word. Whether or not the Alliance of Sahelian States is more than a paper tiger remains to be seen. However, the spate of military coups overtaking the region is having serious implications for patterns of alliances and rivalries.

Sources:

“Le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger scellent ‘l’Alliance des États du Sahel’ (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger seal ‘The Alliance of Sahelian States’),” Jeune Afrique (centrist pan-African news outlet), 16 September 2023. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1483586/politique/le-mali-le-burkina-et-le-niger-scellent-lalliance-des-etats-du-sahel/   

The military regimes led by Assimi Goïta in Mali, Ibrahim Traoré in Burkina Faso and Abdourahamane Tiani in Niger signed a charter on Saturday establishing a defensive alliance.This “Charter of Liptako-Gourma” creates “the Alliance of Sahel States” (AES), wrote on X (former Twitter), the head of the junta in Mali, Assimi Goïta. Its goal is “to establish an architecture of collective defense and mutual assistance,” he stressed. The charter provides (art. 6) that “any attack on the sovereignty and integrity of the territory of one or more contracting parties will be considered as an aggression against the other parties and will engage a duty of assistance and relief of all parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed force to restore and ensure security within the area covered by the Alliance.Since the July 26 coup in Niger, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has maintained a consistent position: the military authorities must “restore constitutional order immediately” by releasing deposed President Mohamed. Bazoum and reinstalling him in his functions. The West African organization has repeatedly threatened armed intervention and imposed heavy economic sanctions on Niger.“This alliance will be a combination of military and economic efforts between the three countries,” Malian Defense Minister Abdoulaye Diop told journalists. “Our priority is the fight against terrorism in the three countries,” he added.

Notes:

[i] For more on the growing ties between these three countries, see: Jason Warner, “’Axis’ of Military Regimes Strengthens In West Africa, With Support From Russia,” OE Watch,09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/axis-of-military-regimes-strengthens-in-west-africa-with-support-from-russia/; Jason Warner, “West African States Split On Potential Intervention In Niger,” OE Watch, 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/; Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled By Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-ruled-by-military-leaders-seek-to-circumvent-future-sanctions/; Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Leaders In Mali, Burkina Faso, And Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/

[ii] For more on the differing approaches that West African states have taken in dealing with these groups, see: Jason Warner, “As Sahelian Jihadists Expand South, Côte d’Ivoire Stands As Model Of Success,” OE Watch,09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/as-sahelian-jihadists-expand-south-cote-divoire-stands-as-model-of-success/;  Jason Warner, “Sahelian Countries Divided On Negotiating With Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Militants,” OE Watch,07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/sahelian-countries-divided-on-negotiating-with-al-qaeda-islamic-state-militants/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Claims Disguised Jihadists, Not Military, Responsible For Civilian Killings,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-claims-disguised-jihadists-not-military-responsible-for-civilian-killings/; Jason Warner, “Vast Majority Of Malians Express Confidence In Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch,06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/

[iii] For more on Russia’s role with these three countries, see: Jason Warner, “’Axis’ of Military Regimes Strengthens In West Africa, With Support From Russia,” OE Watch,09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/axis-of-military-regimes-strengthens-in-west-africa-with-support-from-russia/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Claims Disguised Jihadists, Not Military, Responsible For Civilian Killings,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-claims-disguised-jihadists-not-military-responsible-for-civilian-killings/; Jason Warner, “Vast Majority Of Malians Express Confidence in Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/; Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Leaders In Mali, Burkina Faso, And Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/

Image Information:

Image: The leader of junta currently ruling Mali, COL Assimi Goita, recently tweeted an announcement about the new mutual defense pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
Source: https://t.co/IjT43NHrKs
Attribution: BY-SA 4.0

“Axis” of Military Regimes Strengthens in West Africa With Support From Russia

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“Niger junta leader General Abdourahamane Tchiani announced that his country will allow the military governments of Mali and Burkina Faso to send their soldiers into Niger to defend against an attack.”

A new pro-Russia geopolitical bloc is gaining steam in West Africa. Composed of francophone military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the new bloc is showing itself to be a cohesive and problematic new alliance in regional military, security, and political affairs with assistance from Russia and the Wagner Group. The first excerpted article, from the French state-sponsored RFI reposted on the pan-African news aggregator AllAfrica.com,includes the first known reference to a so-called “Mali-Russia-Niger Axis.”. To that “Axis,” one should also add Burkina Faso, a close ally of Mali, the Nigerien junta, and Russia. Mali and Russia formed the basis of this “Axis” after its two coups in 2020 and 2021, and Burkina Faso’s own 2022 coup led it to quickly fall in with the other two states.[i] Niger’s own military-led overthrow led its new government to  the newest member of the “Axis.” The four countries increasingly support one another. According to the RFI article, Russia recently vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have kept UN observers in Mali. This veto was both a boon for Mali, which had demanded the end of the UN’s peacekeeping mission, and for Russia, which the UN had, in veiled language, accused of widespread human rights abuses in Mali. The second article from AllAfrica.com states that the Nigerien junta recently signed a pact with Mali and Burkina Faso to allow their troops to enter Niger to defend it against an external attack. This pact was made in reference to discussions of a potential Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention into Niger to oust that country’s leader, General Abdourahamane Tchiani.[ii] Regarding Russian involvement, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger all have varying degrees of engagement with the Wagner Group.[iii] Moreover, in all three countries, Russian misinformation and disinformation campaigns, particularly decrying French presence, have been rampant. In return, Mali has been a supporter of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Increasingly, West Africa is being split into two camps. On one side is the described pro-Russia axis, while on the other side are the France-friendly countries like Senegal,[iv] Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, and Nigeria, the latter of which chairs ECOWAS.

Sources:

Melissa Chemam, “West Africa: Niger’s Junta Finds Support in Mali and Russia, But France Stands Firm,” AllAfrica.com (pan-African news aggregator), 11 September 2023. https://allafrica.com/stories/202309120079.html

The leaders of Russia and Mali have agreed the political crisis in Niger should be resolved using diplomacy and not force. Meanwhile, France has rejected accusations by Niger’s coup leaders that it’s planning a military intervention.

The Kremlin said President Vladimir Putin and interim Malian leader Assimi Goita had talked by telephone at Bamako’s request.

The comment came a day after Niger’s military rulers accused former colonial power France of assembling troops, war materials and equipment in several neighboring West African countries with a view to “military intervention” in the Sahel state.

A Mali-Russia-Niger axis

During his telephone exchange with Putin, Goita thanked Russia for vetoing an attempt by the UN Security Council to keep a team of UN experts in Mali.

The experts had accused “foreign forces”, a veiled reference to the Russian mercenary group Wagner, of involvement in widespread abuses in Mali.

Mali shares a long border with Niger, and, immediately after the coup, its junta voiced support for Niger’s new military rulers.

It has on several occasions stated its opposition to a military intervention there.

Mali has shifted sharply to Russia since back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021, becoming one of the few nations to back Moscow at the United Nations over its invasion of Ukraine.

The Kremlin added that Putin and Goita also discussed cooperation between Russia and Mail on economic and commercial issues, and on “anti-terror” operations.

Ecowas leaders have threatened to intervene militarily in Niger, the fourth West African nation since 2020 to suffer a coup after Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea.

“Niger: Junta Leader Signs Order to Allow Help from Burkina Faso, Mali Military,” AllAfrica.com (pan-African news aggregator), 25 August 2023. https://allafrica.com/stories/202308250228.html

Niger junta leader General Abdourahamane Tchiani announced that his country will allow the military governments of Mali and Burkina Faso to send their soldiers into Niger to defend against an attack.

Tchiani had been in a meeting with the foreign ministers of Burkina Faso, Olivia Rouamba, and Mali, Abdoulaye Diop, visited Gen Tchiani in Niamey before signing the order.West African regional bloc Ecowas was threatening to use force if President Mohamed Bassoum is not reinstated, but the regional West African bloc is focusing on diplomacy for now.

Notes:

[i] For more reading on the relationships between these four countries, see: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Claims Disguised Jihadists, Not Military, Responsible for Civilian Killings,” OE Watch 06-2023.https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-claims-disguised-jihadists-not-military-responsible-for-civilian-killings/; Jason Warner, “Vast Majority of Malians Express Confidence in Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/; Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled by Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-ruled-by-military-leaders-seek-to-circumvent-future-sanctions/

[ii] For more on the perspectives of the potential ECOWAS intervention, see: Jason Warner, “West African States Split on Potential ECOWAS Intervention in Niger,” OE Watch 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-split-on-potential-intervention-in-niger/

[iii] Mali has a substantial Wagner presence in the country. In Burkina Faso, the government has denied the official presence of Wagner, though many observers, including Ghana’s president, have claimed that the private military company does indeed operate there. In the case of Niger, reports have emerged that the Tichani has requested Wagner’s presence, though it is yet unconfirmed if this call has been answered. For more on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Wagner and Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/burkina-faso-fights-terrorism-with-recruits-and-russia/

[iv] Even within Senegal, members of the political commentariat have decried Senegal’s potential participation in a theoretical ECOWAS intervention into Niger. For instance, an op-ed signed by more than one hundred Senegalese in the news outlet Sud Quotidien called participation in such an intervention “a neocolonial military adventure.”  See: “Afrique de l’Ouest: L’aventure militarie neocoloniale du President Macky Sall (West Africa: The neocolonial military adventure of President Macky Sall),” Sud Quotidien (Senegal-based news outlet), 6 September 2023. https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/202309070398.html

As Sahelian Jihadists Expand South, Côte d’Ivoire Stands as Model of Success

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While much of the rest of the Sahel has become engulfed in jihadist violence, Côte d’Ivoire, highlighted here, has had surprising success at avoiding the same violence.

“The goal is to reverse perceptions among border communities that the state has abandoned them. Doing so will reduce the risk that they are exploited by insurgents.”

For the past several years, a primary concern in the Sahelian region of West Africa has been the ability of groups associated with the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda to push southward as they march to the littoral of the Bight of Benin.[i] While Mali and Burkina Faso continue to be the epicenters of jihadist activity, even historically immune countries like Togo, Benin, and Ghana have seen their northern regions, which border Mali and Burkina Faso, experience violence from these groups.[ii] However, as the accompanying article from the pan-African think tank The Institute for Security Studies articulates, Cote d’Ivoire, which would reasonably experience similar threats, seems to have figured out how to protect itself from this southern push. According to the authors, the country’s success is due to its commitment to strategies of security and development. On the security side, the article notes that its “military and security interventions played a notable role in achieving the prevailing calm.” These included several standard practices: the creation of a nationwide counterterrorism strategy; the addition of new weapons and armored vehicles; and the creation of a new counterterrorism center. Yet from the authors’ perspectives, the real success story has been Côte d’Ivoire’s citizen-centric development efforts, targeting populations living in its rural north, who are most susceptible to violence and radicalization. To discourage their joining the insurgents, the government’s social program seeks to “improve civilians’ living conditions” to “reverse the perception among border communities that the state has abandoned them” so as to “reduce the risk that they are exploited by insurgents.” The development program has focused on improving infrastructure, health, youth employment, and social safety allowances. A recent report by the global think tank International Crisis Group draws similar conclusions,[iii] further underscoring the broader perception of Côte d’Ivoire’s efficacy on this front. As the United States and partner countries seek to stem the tide of jihadist violence, Côte d’Ivoire’s approach might bear attention as a model that could be replicated elsewhere in the region.

Sources:

William Assanvo, “Has Côte d’Ivoire found the solution to violent extremism?,” Institute for Security Studies (centrist pan-African security studies think tank), 25 July 2023. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/has-cote-divoire-found-the-solution-to-violent-extremism

No significant terror attacks have been reported in northern Côte d’Ivoire over the past two years, suggesting that its approach to addressing the problem has been effective. With many other states in West Africa still facing a growing threat, what is the country doing right?

Côte d’Ivoire’s border area with Burkina Faso was under substantial pressure from violent extremist groups between 2020 and 2021. Almost 20 attacks and incidents attributed to these groups were recorded in that period. These included attacks against positions and convoys of the defence and security forces, incursions into Ivorian territory, propaganda sermons, threats and intimidation of civilians.

In response, the government focused first on military and security operations, and then supplemented these with a social programme…

Following the Grand-Bassam attack, efforts to strengthen the security apparatus continued, including developing a national counter-terrorism strategy in 2018.

From 2019, the growing presence of extremists in Burkina Faso’s forests along the border with Côte d’Ivoire led to increased vigilance and a stronger military presence in the north. In May 2020, a joint military operation was conducted with Burkina Faso.

This saw the creation in July 2020 of an operational zone in the north, the set-up of military camps in some border localities, and significant investments in increasing the defence and security forces’ functional capacity. This included human resources, air assets, armoured transport vehicles and surveillance equipment.

A counter-terrorism intelligence centre, Centre de renseignement opérationnel antiterroriste, was created in August 2021 to improve intelligence gathering. Better regional cooperation between countries, particularly within the framework of the Accra Initiative in which Côte d’Ivoire participates, was another important part of the response.

The military and security interventions played a notable role in achieving the prevailing calm. Land, air and intelligence operations have contributed to reducing armed groups’ ability to carry out incursions, move around, and operate within Ivorian territory. And reinforcing the presence of soldiers along the border has reassured civilians. It is also possible that the lull is due to the extremists withdrawing across the border to continue their violence there or adopt a low profile.

While this period of calm prevailed, the social component of the Ivorian response to the terror threat was started. It is being implemented under the framework of the government’s second social programme (PS Gouv 2), which runs from 2022 to 2024. The programme’s first strategic axis includes addressing the fragility in the northern border areas.

The programme was announced in November 2021 and officially launched in January 2022. It aims to improve civilians’ living conditions by enhancing infrastructure and access to basic social services. The goal is to reverse perceptions among border communities that the state has abandoned them. Doing so will reduce the risk that they are exploited by insurgents. The programme focuses on education, health, access to electricity and drinking water, road maintenance, professional integration and youth employment, and providing social safety allowances.The Ivorian approach of combining a military, security and social response isn’t in itself innovative or fundamentally different from that used by neighbouring countries facing terrorism. Notable examples are in central Mali, the Burkina Faso region of the Sahel, and northern Togo. The difference in Côte d’Ivoire could lie in its implementation of these strategies.

Notes:

[i] For more on the push of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State militants towards the West African coast, see: Jason Warner, “UN Warns About Islamic State Surging in Africa and Afghanistan,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/un-warns-about-islamic-state-surging-in-africa-and-afghanistan/; Jason Warner, “Coastal West African States Brace for Wave of Terrorism From the Sahel,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428040

[ii] West African states have taken various approaches to dealing with jihadist insurgents, especially on the topic of negotiations. For more, see: Jason Warner, “Sahelian Countries Divided on Negotiating With Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Militants,” OE Watch 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/sahelian-countries-divided-on-negotiating-with-al-qaeda-islamic-state-militants/ 

[iii] The International Crisis Group report largely agrees that the dual security and development approach of Côte d’Ivoire has been important, but also notes that the country’s broader focus on economic development; the northern region’s importance as a base of power for the ruling party; religious tolerance; and an ethnically and regionally balanced military also played their own roles. To read the International Crisis Group study on the topic, see: International Crisis Group, “Keeping Jihadists Out of Northern Cote d’Ivoire,” International Crisis Group, 23 August 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/b192-keeping-jihadists-out-northern-cote-divoire

Image Information:

Image: While much of the rest of the Sahel has become engulfed in jihadist violence, Côte d’Ivoire, highlighted here, has had surprising success at avoiding the same violence.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b2/Cote_d_Ivoire_in_Africa_%28-mini_map_-rivers%29.svg
Attribution: TUBS, CC BY-SA 3.0

West African States Split on Potential Intervention in Niger

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Mohamed Bazoum, the former president of Niger, was deposed by a military junta in July 2023.

“Senegal, Benin, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire have said they are ready to send troops, but face internal criticism and hesitation from other West African countries.”

The overthrow of the civilian government in Niger has prompted talk of military intervention by the standby force of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to restore deposed president Mohamed Bazoum to power. Those threats by the leader of ECOWAS, Nigerian President Bola, have led to ruptures in the African international order.

On one side are those West African states that showed some support for the proposed intervention. These tended to be the region’s more democratic and pro-Western states. Nigeria, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin have all said at one time or another that they would commit troops, according to the first article from AfricaNews. The article also notes that Niger recalled its ambassador from Abidjan in protest in the aftermath of Côte d’Ivoire’s announcement of its intent to contribute forces.

On the other side are those West African states which, because of their own domestic makeup, have sided with the military junta in Niger and refused to participate in any ECOWAS intervention. As per the second article from AllAfrica.com, the most prominent among these are Burkina Faso and Mali, both of which are ruled by military juntas that came into power under-girded by anti-French, pro-Russian[i] discourse. Flatly rejecting intervention, they expressed that they would instead send a joint delegation to Niger “in solidarity” with the Nigerien junta. The article also underscores that non-ECOWAS members Chad and Algeria, both of which share borders with Niger, assured Niger that they would not participate. Thus, of the seven countries that border Niger, four have said that they would not support intervention (Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Algeria), two stated that they would (Nigeria and Benin), with the seventh, Libya, not having made a clear statement so far of its stance on intervention. Despite the different positions on possible ECOWAS intervention, some broad threads do run through the region. All current, non-suspended ECOWAS members (which excludes Mali and Burkina Faso) have condemned the overthrow and encouraged mediation, even if they do not support military intervention. Broad agreement exists outside of ECOWAS too: such a military intervention poses great risks to the security of the broader West African region, with a significant risk of leading to a region-wide war.

Sources:

“Les militaires rappellent l’ambassadeur du Niger en Côte d’Ivoire, (Military junta recalls Nigerien Ambassador from Ivory Coast), AfricaNews.com. 15 August 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/08/15/les-militaires-rappellent-lambassadeur-du-niger-en-cote-divoire/

The coup leaders recalled the Nigerien envoy in Abidjan on Monday (Aug. 14) after remarks by Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara.

On his return from a summit of the ECOWAS August 10, Ouattara said the heads of state had agreed a military operation should “start as soon as possible”…

“Far from being the expression of the will of the brotherly Ivorian people, whose friendship with the people of Niger is unequivocal, this unusual declaration by President Ouattara and his eagerness to carry out an aggression against Niger which is in every way illegal and senseless, reflects in reality an order addressed to him and certain of his peers in the ECOWAS by other external powers, with the aim of preserving interests that no longer match those of today’s Niger.”…

Senegal, Benin, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire have said they are ready to send troops, but face internal criticism and hesitation from other West African countries.

Mimi Mefo Takambou, “Burkina Faso: Mali and Burkina Faso Send Joint Delegation to Niamey ‘In Solidarity’ With Niger,” AllAfrica.com, 11 August 2023.https://allafrica.com/stories/202308070483.html 

Mali and Burkina Faso will send a joint official delegation to coup-hit Niger on Monday in a show of “solidarity” between the nations – all of whom are ruled by juntas. Meanwhile a source close to regional bloc Ecowas said an immediate military intervention to restore Niger’s toppled president was not on the cards.

The delegation, announced by the Malian army, is expected to arrive in Niger on Monday, according to Niger’s foreign ministry.

The country’s coup leaders defied a Sunday deadline from the West African bloc Ecowas to reinstate democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum or face possible military action.Algeria and Chad, which are not part of Ecowas but share borders with Niger, have both stated they will not participate in any military operation.”

Notes:

[i] For more on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Wagner and Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Mohamed Bazoum, the former president of Niger, was deposed by a military junta in July 2023.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/Bazoum_mhamed.jpg
Attribution: BY-SA 4.0

Anti-French Sentiment Undergirds Overthrow of Nigerien Government

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Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa and was a prominent discourse in the recent Nigerian military takeover.

“Events of an extreme gravity are unfolding in Niger as a result of the behavior of the French forces and their accomplices.”

France, and the West more generally, appear to have lost one of their last, and most consistent, West African counterterrorism allies with the ouster of Nigerien President Mohammad Bazoum on 26 July by Abdourahamane Tiani, the former leader of Niger’s presidential guard. Like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, all of which have been taken over by military juntas over the past several years,[i] Niger’s new military government has thus far painted France, and its lackluster counterterrorism and development efforts, as to blame for Niger’s woes.

As per the accompanying article from the pan-African news aggregator Africanews.fr, the military junta spokesman, COL Amadou Abdramane, has claimed France was orchestrating a concerted effort to undermine the new leadership by releasing 16 terrorists and violating Nigerien airspace. According to junta statements, “Events of an extreme gravity are unfolding in Niger as a result of the behavior of the French forces and their accomplices,” and “we are witnessing a real plan of destabilization of our country, orchestrated by French forces.” France has denied the claims. These sentiments echo previous assertions by senior officials in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, all claiming that France was funding or supporting terrorists.[ii] [iii]

These more specific claims are in line with a broader ethos of anti-French sentiment that marked the overthrow in Niger. In the immediate aftermath of the takeover, thousands of protestors attacked the French Embassy in Niamey. As in Mali and Burkina Faso, protestors displayed signs depicting anti-French (“France kills in Niger”) and pro-Russian (“Down with France, vive Russia!”) sentiments. Translating this French antipathy into policy, on 4 August, the junta declared that it had formally annulled its security cooperation activities with France that were foundational to fighting Islamist insurgencies tied to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Simultaneously, it ceased the dissemination of French-funded broadcasters France 24 and RFI, following similar moves by Burkina Faso and Mali. Unless former president Bazoum is reinstalled, the takeover in Niger portends a loss of not only French but U.S. influence, especially in the counterterrorism space. If Mali and Burkina Faso provide any guide, it is reasonable to expect Niger’s new government to pursue a similarly populist, anti-French, pro-Russian—and likely pro-Wagner[iv]—path in coordination with other African military regimes.

Source:

“Niger: la junte accuse la France d’avoir “libéré des terroristes (Niger: junta accuses France of having liberated terrorists),” Africanews.fr (pan-African news aggregator), 8 August 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/08/09/niger-la-junte-accuse-la-france-davoir-libere-des-terroristes/

Niger’s new military rulers on Wednesday accused France, the country’s traditional ally, of having “unilaterally freed captured terrorists,” a term used for jihadists, and of breaching a ban on the country’s air space.

They claimed that France released a number of jihadists, who then gathered to plan an attack on “military positions in the tri-border area,” a hotspot region where the frontiers of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali converge.

“Events of an extreme gravity are unfolding in Niger as a result of the behaviour of the French forces and their accomplices,” according to the statement issued by the new regime, called the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP).

The statement reported that a unit of the armed forces had come under attack on Wednesday, although it did not directly link this with France’s alleged release of the jihadists.

A position held by the National Guard in a locality called Bourkou Bourkou, 30 kilometres (18 miles) from a gold mine at Samira in western Niger, came under attack at 6:30 am (0530 GMT), it said.

“At present, the toll is not yet known.”

The statement called on the security forces to “raise their alert level across the country” and on the public “to remain mobilised and vigilant.”

The regime also accused France of having allowed a “military plane” to take off Wednesday from neighbouring Chad, which then crossed into Niger, defying a ban imposed on Sunday.

The aircraft “deliberately cut off all contact with air traffic control on entering our air space,” from 6:39-11:15 am (0539-1015 GMT), it said in a statement read on national TV.

France has around 1,500 troops in Niger, supporting the country in its fight against jihadists who swept in from Mali in 2015.

But relations broke down after French ally President Mohamed Bazoum was toppled by members of his guard on July 26.

The regime’s accusations come on the eve of a summit by the West African regional bloc ECOWAS on how to tackle the Niger crisis.ECOWAS — the Economic Community of West African States — had given the coup leaders until Sunday to reinstate Bazoum or face the risk of military intervention.

Notes:

[i] For more on the relationship between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled By Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-ruled-by-military-leaders-seek-to-circumvent-future-sanctions/

[ii] For more information on claims that France is funding African terrorists, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171; Jason Warner, “CAR Joins Mali in Accusing France of Funding Terrorists,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/car-joins-mali-in-accusing-france-of-funding-terrorists/

[iii] For more information on the anti-French sentiments in the security sphere in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “French Researchers Respond to Wave of Anti-French Sentiment in Africa,” OE Watch,07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/french-researchers-respond-to-wave-of-anti-french-sentiment-in-africa/; Jason Warner, Lassane Ouedraogo, and Matthew Kirwin, “The Fake News Phenomenon in the Sahel: ‘Afrancaux News’ and the Postcolonial Logics of Polemical Information,” African Studies Review, 65 (4): December 2022, 911 – 938.

[iv] For more on how post-coup African states have begun to cooperate with the Wagner Group, see: Jason Warner, “Vast Majority of Malians Express Confidence in Russian Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch,06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/; Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa and was a prominent discourse in the recent Nigerian military takeover.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Flag_(5089610330).jpg
Attribution: CC By 2.0

Sahelian Countries Divided on Negotiating With Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Militants

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Niger and Burkina Faso, both afflicted with jihadist violence, demonstrate divergent views on negotiating with jihadists from the Islamic State (flag pictured below) and Al-Qaeda

“Niger’s approach [to addressing jihadists threats]… starkly contrasts with the regional trend.”

The countries of the Sahel are undertaking divergent paths when it comes to the question of negotiating with terror groups as the African region cements itself as the new epicenter of global jihadist terrorism.[i] Most countries in the Sahel, and wider West Africa, have shown a reluctance to negotiate with terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda (AQ)[ii] or the Islamic State (IS),[iii] as well as with secular separatist insurgencies. Burkina Faso’s prime minister, Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela, was emphatic that his country, which has seen one of the most significant spikes of jihadist violence of any in the world, would “never negotiate” with the militants in his country, according to the pan-African news aggregator allafrica.com,. He articulated, “The only negotiations that matter with these armed bandits are those taking place on the battlefield.” Burkina Faso looks to rely heavily on its armed self-defense force, The Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, or VDP (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie). The VDP is an auxiliary unit working alongside the armed forces of Burkina Faso, which has been criticized for providing civilians arms and authority for violence with as little as two weeks of training.[iv] Burkina Faso is also presumed to be receiving some assistance from the Wagner Group to facilitate this kinetic response, which it has officially denied.[v] Niger has taken a different approach, combining negotiations with AQ and IS elements with kinetic counterterror efforts. Niger’s counterterrorism strategy is seen as being much more effective than the zero-tolerance negotiation policy of other Sahelian states, according to a second article from the centrist pan-African think tank The Institute for Security Studies.. Niger’s approach is modeled after the successes of two other regional states, Algeria and Mauritania, to their own insurgencies, and it derived from its own successful history of addressing Tuareg rebellions that plagued the country for years. The military-first approach to counterterrorism in the Sahel has shown its limits over the past decade. The authors of the second article give advise: “Niger’s neighbors in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that are affected by violent extremism should take inspiration from the country’s strategy as they tackle the insecurity afflicting their populations.”

Sources:

“Burkina Faso: Prime Minister Rules Out Any Deal With Jihadists, Boosts Civil Militias,” Allafrica.com (pan-African news aggregator), 31 May 2023. https://allafrica.com/stories/202305310419.html  

Burkina Faso’s prime minister on Tuesday ruled out any negotiations with jihadist insurgents that have taken control of swathes of the West African country since 2015. 

“We will never negotiate, either over Burkina Faso’s territorial integrity or its sovereignty,” Apollinaire Kyelem de Tambela told parliament, adding that the government aimed to double the number of volunteers for the VDP civil defence militia to 100,000. 

“The only negotiations that matter with these armed bandits are those taking place on the battlefield,” de Tambela told the Transitional Legislative Assembly. 

Hassane Koné and Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, “Is Niger’s counter-terrorism approach an exception in the Sahel?” Institute for Security Studies (centrist pan-African think tank), 5 April 2023. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-nigers-counter-terrorism-approach-an-exception-in-the-sahel  

In early 2022, Nigerien authorities recognised the need for dialogue with jihadist leaders in Tillabéri. This was inspired after several Nigeriens defected from their extremist groups, and violence in the Diffa region decreased after a disarmament and reintegration process launched in 2016…. 

The use of dialogue in Tillabéri shows strong political will on the part of the government, which is keen to disincentivise engagement with extremist groups, and stabilise the region. Niger’s approach, which combines dialogue and military action, starkly contrasts with the regional trend. Neighbouring countries have reinforced their military tactics through diversifying strategic alliance and employing armed civilians…  

By including dialogue in its counter-terrorism efforts, Niger is experimenting with an approach similar to those in Algeria and Mauritania, underpin their decade-long protection against jihadist violence. 

Niger’s neighbours in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea that are affected by violent extremism should take inspiration from the country’s strategy as they tackle the insecurity afflicting their populations. A coordinated regional approach would also exert pressure on terrorist groups and ultimately deprive them of human resources.

Notes:

[i] For more on the Sahel’s role as the new center of global jihadism, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, With the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch, 05-2023, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/global-terrorism-declined-slightly-in-2022-with-the-sahel-as-the-new-epicenter/; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429303

[ii] For more on the status of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel and Sahara, see: Jason Warner, “Leader of Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian Branch Explains His Group’s Goals,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/leader-of-al-qaedas-sahelian-branch-explains-his-groups-goals/; Jason Warner, “Al-Qaeda Leader in Maghreb Celebrates French Departure, Claims No Plans To Attack French Homeland,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/al-qaeda-leader-in-maghreb-celebrates-french-departure-claims-no-plans-to-attack-french-homeland/

[iii] For more on the status of the Islamic State in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “”UN Warns About Islamic State Surging in Africa and Afghanistan,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/un-warns-about-islamic-state-surging-in-africa-and-afghanistan/

[iv] For more on the VDP and critiques of it, see: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

[v] For more on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Wagner and Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Niger and Burkina Faso, both afflicted with jihadist violence, demonstrate divergent views on negotiating with jihadists from the Islamic State (flag pictured below) and Al-Qaeda  
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/14690988398  
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

French Researchers Respond to Wave of Anti-French Sentiment in Africa

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Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa

“[African critics] no longer even need to prove that France supports jihadism. [They] just say so.”

Unprecedented waves of anti-French sentiment have swept over many francophone African countries over the past four years. These manifest in large-scale civil society protests in Mali and Burkina Faso, the targeting of French counterterror convoys throughout the Sahel, and accusations from both Mali and the Central African Republic that France is actively funding terrorists. [i]

The reasons why anti-French sentiment has become so pervasive are detailed in the accompanying article from the pan-African news aggregator Africanews.com. . The article is based on the findings of an upcoming report from noted French think tank, the Institute for International Relations (IFRI). The report suggests there are three issues: African critiques of the French military and counterterrorism presence, a lack of development, and disdain over the CFA (Communauté financière d’Afrique) currency. The report also notes that France is consistently scapegoated by African political and military leaders for their own failures: “It is always an argument that comes to explain, and ultimately absolve, the responsibility of these elites.” The pervasiveness of simple untruths maligning French military and counterterror presence in the Sahel—what some researchers have called “Afrancaux News”[ii]—is similarly driving the pervasiveness of the anti-French sentiment. The IFRI report notes that African critics “no longer even need to prove that France supports jihadism. [They] just say so.” While Russian disinformation campaigns vilifying France and promoting Russia exacerbate the sentiment, the report’s authors recognize that France itself does bear some responsibility for its declining reputation on the continent, with French leaders long believing that anti-French sentiment was merely tied to episodic crises and was not part of longstanding grievances tied to the colonial legacy of France in Africa. Understanding African public opinion remains imperative as many countries in francophone Africa—Mali, Burkina Faso, the Central Africa Republic most prominently—move even further away from France and toward Russia.[iii]

Sources:

“Pourquoi le sentiment anti-français imprègne l’Afrique francophone? (Why is anti-French sentiment so pervasive in Africa?) Africanews.com (pan-African news aggregator),” 15 June 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/06/14/pourquoi-le-sentiment-anti-francais-impregne-lafrique-francophone/ 

Anti-French rhetoric in French-speaking Africa has spread beyond the educated urban elite, and the phenomenon could “take root for a long time,” says Alain Antil, a researcher at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), in an interview. 

In recent years, criticism of France’s policies has been accompanied by violent demonstrations against French companies such as Total and against diplomatic representations in Chad, Mali, and, more recently, Burkina Faso. 

The depth of the phenomenon is “nothing like what we saw in previous decades,” points out Antil, who heads Ifri’s Sub-Saharan Africa Centre and who on Wednesday, with his colleague Thierry Vircoulon, is publishing a study devoted to “Themes, actors, and functions of anti-French discourse in French-speaking Africa”. 

We are a long way from the days ”when highly articulate criticism (…) was confined to leading circles of intellectuals and sometimes, during serious political crises, spilled out onto the streets,” he says. 

It is striking to note that critics no longer even try to demonstrate untruths: ”We no longer even need to prove that France supports jihadism. We just say so,” he observes. 

For the researcher, the intensification of anti-French sentiment can be explained by ”disappointing economic and political trajectories” in countries where the population had once pinned their hopes on economic progress and democracy. 

Faced with the failure of their own policies, the leaders of these countries resort to ”scapegoating techniques”: “France is ultimately responsible for the non-development of these countries and the corruption of their elites,” explains Antil. ”It is always an argument that comes to explain, and ultimately absolve, the responsibility of these elites.” 

At the same time, this anti-French rhetoric has been able to flourish because French leaders have been slow to react. 

Until very recently, the French authorities ”were in a kind of denial,” seeing it simply as a correlation with crises, ”outbreaks of hives” or manipulation by the Russians, explains the researcher. 

The study does show ”a link between this Russian propaganda war and certain segments of African social networks.” 

It is undeniable that social networks have massively circulated false information, such as videos or photos showing French soldiers ”supposedly” stealing gold or ”consorting with jihadists,” stresses Alain Antil. 

But the expert warns against the temptation to explain everything in terms of Russian propaganda. 

“Obviously, the Russians are playing their part, having an impact and funding anti-French campaigns,” he says.  

However, he warns that it would be a mistake to think that ”explaining to Africans that they are being manipulated by the Russians will put an end to it.” 

Far from abating, this rhetoric will take root ”for a long time in the politics and public opinion of these countries,” he adds, citing three factors fuelling anti-French sentiment: the military presence, the development aid policy, and the currency. 

While the number of French troops has fallen drastically from 30,000 in the early 1960s to around 6,100 today, ”interventionism has not diminished,” notes the researcher.

Notes:

[i] For more information on claims that France is funding African terrorists, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171

[ii] For more information on the anti-French counterterror sentiment, see: Jason Warner, Lassane Ouedraogo, and Matthew Kirwin, “The Fake News Phenomenon in the Sahel: ‘Afrancaux News’ and the Postcolonial Logics of Polemical Information,” African Studies Review, 65 (4): December 2022, 911 – 938.

[iii] For more on African states’ growing alliances with Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Top Ugandan General Adds to List of Growing Pro-Russian African Military Personnel” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/top-ugandan-general-adds-to-growing-list-of-pro-russian-african-military-personnel/; Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso: A Bellwether on Russian and French Presence,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429302

Image Information:

Image: Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa  
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Flag_(5089610330).jpg  
Attribution: CC BY 2.0