Tag Archives: Africa

UN Warns About Islamic State Surging in Africa and Afghanistan

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Flag of the United Nations.

Flag of the United Nations.

“Issues of leadership were significant during the reporting period. ISIL core continues to be under pressure, with attrition in its leadership and depleting resources. It has proven resilient, but morale is low.”

In mid-February, the United Nations released its biannual report offering a broad overview of the state of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. Created with inputs from the intelligence analysis of participating UN member states, the report is a useful analysis of the state of play of transnational jihadist movements. As regards the Islamic State, the UN report underscored that the global terrorist organization is making its greatest gains in Sub-Saharan Africa,[i] via its West Africa (Lake Chad Basin) and Sahel (Niger-Mali-Burkina Faso) affiliates. The report also noted the importance of Somalia in the Islamic State’s funding efforts. Outside of Africa, it asserts that violence is surging in the Islamic State’s so-called Khorasan Province (Afghanistan-Pakistan), notably with attacks on the rival Taliban. The report emphasizes that the Islamic State’s growth and resiliency are being most clearly demonstrated outside of its original core bases of Iraq and Syria, where it is known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As it describes, “ISIL core continues to be under pressure, with attrition in its leadership and depleting resources. It has proven resilient, but morale is low.” The UN report continues to underscore that the current epicenter of terrorist violence has shifted away from being centered in the Middle East, and is now most heavily weighted in Africa and South Asia.[ii] As global focus has moved away from terrorism and towards near-peer competition, the overriding implication is that the global terrorist threat has not disappeared.

Source:

United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 13 February 2023 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, 13 February 2023 . https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/monitoring-team/reports

The threat from Al-Qaida, ISIL (Da’esh) and affiliated groups remains high in conflict zones and neighbouring countries. It remains relatively low in other areas, but both groups continue to aspire to project threat.

Africa has emerged in recent years as the continent where the harm done by terrorism is developing most rapidly and extensively. Two of the three most dynamic ISIL affiliates are in Africa, and the continent has seen the greatest growth in ISIL affiliates, with several groups expanding their radius of influence often across national borders. ISIL continues its efforts to exploit regional and local grievances throughout the continent for propaganda purposes, publicizing related events and attacks to enhance its global footprint. Equally, Al-Qaida’s most successful affiliate in Somalia, Al-Shabaab, continues to grow in strength and reach as the group’s most brutal affiliate, and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) has been able to expand its operations in West Africa and the Sahel.Issues of leadership were significant during the reporting period. ISIL core continues to be under pressure, with attrition in its leadership and depleting resources. It has proven resilient, but morale is low. The group is strengthening through its affiliates beyond Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic: in Africa and with the aggressive agenda of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan (ISIL-K) in Afghanistan, whose rivalry with the Taliban will continue to have a destabilizing effect in Afghanistan and the region. Most of the attacks by ISIL-K are against the Taliban. A new leader of ISIL was killed after barely eight months in charge. The function of leader has become almost totemic, a rallying point for the wider group. For the time being, ISIL core continues to produce leaders who meet this need, and members of affiliates pledge allegiance swiftly and without question, not anticipating close operational direction.  Member States’ predominant view is that Sayf al-‘Adl is now the de facto leader of Al-Qaida, representing continuity for now. But his leadership cannot be declared because of Al-Qaida’s sensitivity to Afghan Taliban concerns not to acknowledge the death of Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri in Kabul and the fact of Sayf al-‘Adl’s presence in the Islamic Republic of Iran. His location raises questions that have a bearing on Al-Qaida’s ambitions to assert leadership of a global movement in the face of challenges from ISIL.

Notes:

[i] For more on the Islamic State’s history and evolution in Africa, see: Jason Warner et al., The Islamic State in Africa: Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront, Hurst/Oxford University Press, 2022.

[ii] For more on how Africa has taken on new importance in the global jihadist landscape, see: Tricia Bacon and Jason Warner, “Twenty Years After 9/11: The Threat in Africa – The New Global Epicenter of Jihadi Terrorism,” CTC Sentinel, 14 (7), September 2021. https://ctc.usma.edu/twenty-years-after-9-11-the-threat-in-africa-the-new-epicenter-of-global-jihadi-terror/

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the United Nations
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_United_Nations.png
Attribution: Wilfried Huss, Public Domain, via Wikimedia Commons


South Africa Spotlighted for Links to Funding Islamic State in Africa

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Flag of the Islamic State.

Flag of the Islamic State.

“The impression created by recent events is that Washington rather than Pretoria is steering counter-terrorism operations in South Africa.”

South African reactions to the newest round of U.S. counterterrorism sanctions on its citizens underscore systemic policing challenges in the field of counterterrorism. In November 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned four South Africans and eight South African businesses for offering material support to the Islamic State (IS),[i] namely, its newest branches in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique.[ii] This follows similar sanctions of four South Africans, also listed for supporting the IS, in March 2022.[iii] Commentaries from two noted South African geopolitical commentators shed light on how South Africans understand the degree of threat that the IS poses to their country and just why it has become a target for U.S. sanctions.

In the first of the two excerpted articles from the noted centrist pan-African think tank The Institute for Security Studies, South African foreign policy analyst Peter Fabricius questions whether the threat of IS in South Africa is overblown. On the one hand, since the warnings of IS within South Africa are coming from external entities—namely the United States—some citizens perceive the threat as minimal and sanctions as simply being an extension of Western “obsession” with terrorism. On the other, he notes that there may well be an air of legitimacy to such sanctions, given that assessments by international monitoring entities have underscored South Africa’s lackluster counterthreat finance efforts.

In the excerpted article from The Conversation Africa, noted South Africa terrorism scholar Hussein Solomon articulates his lack of surprise that South Africa has emerged as a relative hotspot for terrorism threat financing. At the source of its institutional insufficiency in counterthreat financing, Solomon notes South African “corruption, general lawlessness, and a security apparatus focused on party factional battles.” Long regarded as a bastion of security in a continent recently beset by terrorism, cracks are beginning to show in South Africa as well.

Sources:

Peter Fabricius, “Are red flags about the Islamic State in South Africa alarmist?” Institute for Security Studies (centrist pan-African think tank), 11 November 2022.

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/are-red-flags-about-islamic-state-in-south-africa-alarmist

Alarm bells about the threat of terrorism in South Africa have recently been sounding more stridently and more often. Are these false alarms or is the danger growing?

This question is complicated by the fact that the warnings are largely from foreigners, especially the United States (US). To many, this indicates alarmism or even outside interference. To others, panic buttons are being pressed because South Africa’s law enforcement, intelligence and prosecution services aren’t doing their jobs well enough.

South Africa’s failure to deal effectively with IS and terrorist financing has a host of causes. These include problems in the intelligence, detection and prosecution services still recovering from the ravages of state capture during Jacob Zuma’s presidency…These issues are aggravated by political factors such as an ideological disposition to underestimate the terror threat and see it as an obsession of the West….

The impression created by recent events is that Washington rather than Pretoria is steering counter-terrorism operations in South Africa. That obviously can’t be good.

Hussein Solomon, “South Africa Provides Fertile Ground for Funders of Terrorism. Here’s Why,” The Conversation Africa (centrist pan-African editorial site), 10 November 2022. https://theconversation.com/south-africa-provides-fertile-ground-for-funders-of-terrorism-heres-why-194282

There is a long history of concerns about [South Africa’s] deficiencies in dealing with terrorism financing activities within its borders…

The latest US action comes as South Africa is rushing to avert “greylisting”: being placed on the list of countries subject to increased monitoring by the Financial Action Task Force. The inter-governmental task force has identified deficiencies in the country’s policies and efforts to combat money laundering and terrorism financing…

In its last evaluation, published in October 2021, the task force said South Africa had a strong legal framework against money laundering and terrorism financing. But its implementation had significant shortcomings, including a failure to prosecute criminal cases….

Since 2007, the South African government has not done much to ensure that the country does not become a terrorist haven. Corruption, general lawlessness, and a security apparatus focused on party factional battles all account for why terrorist financiers thrive in the country.

Notes:  

[i] For the official statement from the November 2022 sanctions, see: “Treasury Designates Members of ISIS Cell in South Africa,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 7 November 2022.https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0616

[ii] For an extensive overview of the emergence and evolution of the Islamic State in Africa, see: Jason Warner et al., The Islamic State in Africa: Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront, (Hurst/Oxford University Press), 2022.

[iii] For the official statement from the November 2022 sanctions, see: “Treasury Sanctions South Africa-based ISIS Organizers and Financial Facilitators,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1 March 2022.  https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0616

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Islamic State. 
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/14690988398 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0.

Russia Laying Groundwork Ahead of July 2023 Russia-Africa Summit 

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South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019.

“Increasingly isolated by the West because of its special operation in Ukraine, Russia is actively turning to Africa, which it seeks to seduce”

As Russia prepares to host the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in the summer of 2023, commentators from across the African continent are offering insights as to how they perceive Russia trying to making inroads. In the first excerpted article from central African news aggregator L’Agence d’Information d’Afrique Centrale, writer Noël Ndong articulates the widely held perception that Russia seeks to expand its reach beyond its foothold of partners in Mali, the Central Africa Republic, and possibly Burkina Faso—most notably in other francophone African states. Ndong highlights former French stalwart ally Chad, as well as Morocco and Cameroon, noting Moscow’s rhetoric about aiding African states in their quests for energy independence.

The second excerpted article from Malian newspaper Le Journal de l’économie Malienne confirms the leader of Mali’s junta government, Assimi Goïta, recently received his invitation to the July 2023 meeting. The amity between two international pariahs should be unsurprising given that Goïta’s government relies on Russian Wagner mercenaries to stave off its spiraling jihadist insurgency, reportedly paying Wagner $10 million a month. A noted commentator on African geopolitical affairs, Gustavo de Carvalho, argues in the South Africa’s The Daily Maverick that in advance of the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit, the African Union needs to lead African efforts to have a unified front. While noting that in 2021, Russia was the largest arms supplier in Africa—supplying 44 percent of major arms to the continent—he also urges caution about what Moscow’s aggressive new posture means: “Given the continent’s relatively weak global position…Africa urgently needs a Russia strategy.”

Sources:

Noël Ndong, “Coopération: la Russie à l’assaut de l’Afrique (Cooperation: Russia on the assault in Africa),” L’Agence d’Information d’Afrique Centrale (Central Africa news aggregator), 18 October 2022. https://www.adiac-congo.com/content/cooperation-la-russie-lassaut-de-lafrique-142170

After Central African Republic, Mali, and Burkina Faso, Moscow is now on the hunt to conquer Morocco, Chad, and Cameroon…

With Morocco, Russia has approved a cooperation agreement in the field of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…. The agreement stipulates that Moscow will assist Rabat in the creation and improvement of nuclear energy infrastructure, the design and construction of nuclear reactors, as well as water desalination plants and particle accelerators. The agreement also consists of the provision of services in Morocco in the field of the fuel cycle, spent and radioactive nuclear fuel and waste management.

Increasingly isolated by the West because of its special operation in Ukraine, Russia is actively turning to Africa, which it seeks to seduce. Ambassador Extraordinary Oleg Ozerov, Head of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Secretariat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said: “We see that African countries currently want to ensure an industrial transition of their economies. It will nevertheless be impossible to solve the problem of industrialization without having solved the problems of energy, without having granted access to electricity to the population and to the companies which must create industry and production.”

The second summit of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum is scheduled for the summer of 2023. It aims to give new impetus to Russian-African political, trade, economic, investment, scientific, technical and humanitarian cooperation.

Aboubacar Traoré, “Mali: Le colonel Assimi Goïta invité au Sommet Russie-Afrique (Mali: Colonel Assimi Goïta invited to the Russia-Africa Summit),” Le Journal de l’économie Malienne (online Malian news source), 14 November 2022.  https://www.lejecom.com/Mali-Le-colonel-Assimi-Goita-invite-au-Sommet-Russie-afrique_a6505.html

According to the diplomatic source, the Russian ambassador had come to officially deliver to Minister [of Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye] Diop the letter by which the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, invites his Malian counterpart, Colonel Assimi Goïta, to participate in the Russia-Africa Summit scheduled for July 2023 in St. Petersburg.

­­Also, the Russian diplomat took this opportunity to inform the Malian authorities of the upcoming visit to Africa, including to Mali, of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Gustavo de Carvalho, “Africa needs to forge a unified approach to Russia before 2023 Russia-Africa Summit,” The Daily Maverick (centrist South African newspaper), 3 August 2022. https://saiia.org.za/research/africa-needs-to-forge-a-unified-approach-to-russia-before-2023-russia-africa-summit/

For five days in July 2022, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov traveled to four African nations to signal Russia’s push into the continent. The visit to Egypt, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia symbolises the Russian offensive to gain and reinforce international support…

While the July 2022 engagements in Africa yielded few tangible outcomes, Lavrov reinforced the criticism of Western policies in Africa, with a complementing narrative of the independent stance Africa has taken….

Russia has been ramping up its military relationships with several African countries for at least a decade. Its approach is often influenced by close ties between Russia’s arms industry and its infamous private security contractor, the Wagner Group. According to Sipri, a Swedish think tank, Russia was the largest arms supplier to Africa in 2021, accounting for 44% of continental imports of major arms. In total, Russia has signed military agreements with more than 20 African countries…

Given the continent’s relatively week global position…Africa urgently needs a Russia strategy. To that end, the AU can — and should — engage with its members in a more structured manner and help them put together joint positions on critical issues related to Russia and other partners, like the US, China, Europe and others…

Image Information:

Image: South African President Cyril Ramaphosa during a plenary session at the Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/48951692933
Attribution: CC BY-ND 2.0

India Moves To Compete With China in Africa

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3rd India-Africa Forum Summit.

3rd India-Africa Forum Summit.

“Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks during the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 here in Gujarat, are being seen as a counter to China’s growing influence in Africa.”

India has taken various steps to counter China since a series of border clashes took place along the Line of Actual Control in 2017 and 2020.[i] While most of these initiatives involved developing operational and tactical capabilities in the Indian Army, the Indian government has also taken a few strategic-level measures to strengthen its position in the Indo-Pacific region against China.[ii] However, a new playing field for Indian and Chinese competition is showing itself: the accompanying excerpted articles report on recent Indian efforts to sell weapon systems to governments in Africa, offering insights into Indian efforts to counter China at the strategic level.

The excerpted article from India’s independent think-tank Center for Land Warfare Studies examines Chinese exports of weapons in Africa. The author notes how China has been increasing arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa in recent years and that this has been taking place alongside the use of ports in the region. The author also points out how China is in a position to continue sales of weapons in Africa as the war in Ukraine could reduce Russia’s share of the arms market in the region. While India’s defense industry has yet to export significant numbers of weapon systems in the way that China can, a second article provides insight into Indian plans to change this status quo.

This excerpted article from India’s independent English-language news website, The Print, reports on the India-Africa Defense Dialogue, held in October in India alongside the most recent iteration of the country’s defense exposition. The article states that a number of participants from Africa attended and that India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh wanted to explore new areas of security cooperation between India and African states, “including capacity-building, training, cybersecurity, maritime security, and counter-terrorism.” Singh also stated that India and Africa are “important stakeholders in ensuring a safe and secure maritime environment, especially in the Indian Ocean region.” He further commented that India will partner with any African country on the “basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect.” Lastly, the article references an extensive list of weapons that might be of interest to African militaries, which could give India another opportunity to counter China if New Delhi is able to supply these systems as part of a different partnership than Beijing offers. 

Sources:

Dr. Manjari Singh, “China’s Increasing Arms Supply to the Middle East and Beyond: Another Dimension to the New Silk Road?,” Center for Land Warfare Studies (independent think-tank in India), 28 October 2022, No. 367.

https://www.claws.in/publication/chinas-increasing-arms-supply-to-the-middle-east-and-beyond-another-dimension-to-the-new-silk-road/

China has been expanding its arms export beyond Asia and for the last half a decade, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have become its favourite destinations. From the region’s side, China is emerging as the second-best choice for arms imports after the US. Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has added a new dimension to the existing global arms industry with an anticipated boost to China’s overall arms diplomacy particularly in the Middle East…

China has been exporting armed drones to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan since 2020…This change in position is also reflective of the East Asian economy’s

increasing weapon’s platform outreach—from 40 countries to 53, over a span of one decade from 2010 to 2019…

It is noteworthy that between 2015 and 2022, China has leased ownership of as many as

10 ports. Apart from these ports, China has been building seven more ports which are strategically significant, and serves as economic and political outposts for its expansionist approach. The Karachi Deepwater Port in Pakistan, Sokhna port in Egypt, CICT Terminal in Sri Lanka, Chittagong and Payra Ports in Bangladesh, CSP Terminal, Khalifa Port in the UAE, Sudan Port, Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam Ports in Tanzania, and Lamu & Mombasa ports in Kenya, are some of the other ports developed by Chinese firms…

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is likely to dent Russian economy and the former’s aggression will presumably lead to its diplomatic isolation, both of which are likely to provide a favourable environment to Chinese arms market. Additionally, maritime connectivity and building of Chinese ports in the Western Indian Ocean will further facilitate China’s arms sale…

Snehesh Alex Philip, “To counter China’s influence, India seeks to boost defence cooperation with African countries,” The Print (independent English-language news website from India), 18 October 2022.

https://theprint.in/defence/to-counter-chinas-influence-india-seeks-to-boost-defence-cooperation-with-african-countries/1173223/

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks during the India-Africa Defence Dialogue (IADD), held on the sidelines of DefExpo 2022 here in Gujarat, are being seen as a counter to China’s growing influence in Africa.

Fifty African countries participated in the India-Africa Defence Dialogue initiated during the last DefExpo held in Lucknow in 2020. Among the attendees were defence ministers of 20 African countries…

During his address Tuesday, the Defence Minister stressed the need to explore new areas of convergence for defence engagements between India and Africa, including capacity-building, training, cybersecurity, maritime security and counterterrorism. He added that India and African countries are important stakeholders in ensuring a safe and secure maritime environment, especially in the Indian Ocean region.

“We do not believe in making or becoming a client or satellite state, and so, when we partner with any country, it is on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect…” he said.

Sources in the defence establishment also said equipment of interest to Africa includes light combat helicopters, patrol vessels, small arms, shoulder-fired rockets, Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, and surveillance drones, among others…

Notes:

[i] For more background on the clashes, see: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Pangong Pickle: New Delhi’s Options After Its Clash with China,” War on the Rocks, 2 July 2022. https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/indias-pangong-pickle-new-delhis-options-after-its-clash-with-china/

[ii] The government of India increased its security cooperation with Vietnam in 2022 as one strategic-level measure to counter China. For more see: Matthew Stein, “India Strengthens Security Cooperation with Vietnam,” OE Watch, Issue #8, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/422297

Image Information:

Image: 3rd India-Africa Forum Summit
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:3rd_India-Africa_Forum_Summit_4.jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

“The Islamic State’s “African Turn”: Why the African Continent Is Showing Outsized Importance for IS” (Jason Warner) (November 2022)

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(Click image to download brief.)

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Islamic State Central is increasingly publicizing the achievements of its affiliated African
    provinces, leading to what the FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief authors call “The Islamic
    State’s African Turn.”
  • The authors detail six potential benefits that IS Central might gain with such an “African
    Turn,” as well as what downsides might also accompany such a turn.
  • Overall, the authors assess that the Islamic State’s African Turn is likely more tied to
    temporary successes of African provinces than it is an attempt to change the Middle Eastern
    character of the group.

African Leaders and UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire

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President of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo.

President of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo.

“All of us in the [West African] region are being forced to spend huge amounts of money on security.”

Terrorism in the Sahelian region of Africa—broadly, the area of desert south of the Sahara—is among the world’s most active locations of terrorist activity.  The UN recently released a sobering report detailing that in 2021, nearly half of the world’s victims of terrorism came from Sub-Saharan Africa, nearly 3,500 people. The Sahel accounted for a significant percentage of those.[i] Across coastal West Africa, countries historically spared from terrorist violence, like Ghana and Togo, are now preparing for an impending wave of terrorist threats from the Sahel.[ii]

Ghanaian President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo underscored the severity of the terrorist threat in the Sahel in his recent address to the UN General Assembly’s 77th Session in New York. As the accompanying transcript, taken from the Office of the Presidency of Ghana, recounts of his speech, he summarized: “[Terrorism in the Sahel] might look to many, today, as a local conflict which affects only the countries in that region. We, in Ghana, know differently, we have watched in horror as the unrest has moved from the Sahel, inexorably, to the West African coastal countries. All of Ghana’s neighbors have suffered terrorist attacks, and some have lost territorial space to the invading forces.” He then connected the prevalence of terrorist violence in the Sahel to the significant number of coups that have affected West African states over the past several years. At the core, he said, West African states have been forced to spend so much money on security that they can no longer adequately provide social services, thus leading to civil unrest.

Source:

“Address By President Akufo-Addo at the 77th Session Of The United Nations’ General Assembly,” The Presidency of the Republic of Ghana (Office of the President of Ghana), 21 September 2022. https://presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/speeches/2285-address-by-president-akufo-addo-at-the-77th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly

 …A case in point is the destabilising conflict in the Sahel. It might look to many, today, as a local conflict which affects only the countries in that region. We, in Ghana, know differently, we have watched in horror as the unrest has moved from the Sahel, inexorably, to the West African coastal countries. All of Ghana’s neighbours have suffered terrorist attacks, and some have lost territorial space to the invading forces.

Furthermore, the terrorist pressure has provided a pretext for the unhappy reappearance of military rule in three (3) of the fifteen (15) member ECOWAS Community, two (2) of whom have borne the brunt of the terrorist outrages in the Region – Mali and Burkina Faso. It is a development we are determined to reverse, so that the ECOWAS space remains a democratic one.

All of us in the Region are being forced to spend huge amounts of money on security. This is money we should be spending on educating and giving skills to our young people; on building much needed roads, bridges, hospitals and other such infrastructure, which we are spending to fight terrorists or to keep them out from destabilising our countries.This is a global problem, deserving the attention of the world community for a global solution.

Notes:

[i] For more on the UN report, see: “Nearly half of the world’s terror victims are African, with organized crime increasingly entrenched,” UN News, 6 October 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129312

[ii] For more on the preparations West African states are taking as they brace for a wave of terror from northern Sahelian neighbors, see: Jason Warner, “Coastal West African States Brace for Wave of Terrorism from the Sahel,” OE Watch, Issue 10, 2022.

Image Information:

Image: President of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nana_Akufo_Addo,_Jan._2020.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine War Demonstrate Reliance on, Antipathy Toward West

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 “The West wants its African partners to share its condemnation of Russia. African states meanwhile cling to their monopoly on victimhood and historical resentment of Western domination in world affairs.”

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, official reactions from African nations have varied.  For instance, the March 2022 UN vote to condemn Russian aggression showed that 27 African states voted for the resolution, one state (Eritrea) voted against, 17 abstained, and nine more were absent for the vote.  As commentary from the respected Pan-African Institute for Security Studies lays out, the range of African reactions to the war is guided by logics not always appreciated from the outside.

First, and most important, the authors underscore that the continent’s 54 states are in no way a monolithic bloc and would not share a singular, unified viewpoint of the war given their varying goals, positions in international society, and international alliances.  Second, the authors note that African states are not affected by the war in the same ways.  While extreme food shortages were felt in certain states throughout the continent as a result of Russian blockades of grain and fertilizer, for many African countries, these issues “[don’t] compare with the Western aid that enables African countries to function.”  Third, the authors note that the war has been a litmus test bringing to light variations in African states’ interpretations of the international system.  Certain African states seek to maintain the Western “rules-based” order, and thus find more sympathy with Ukraine.  Conversely, other African states, with lingering antipathy to a global order in which they view themselves to be marginalized, are thus more sympathetic with revisionist, non-rule-abiding states like Russia. The authors sum up their assessments, saying: “Western surprise at most African countries’ limited emotion towards Russia’s invasion, and Africa’s neutral stance, point to a self-centeredness on both sides.  The West wants its African partners to share its condemnation of Russia.  African states meanwhile cling to their monopoly on victimhood and historical resentment of Western domination in world affairs.” 

Source:

Paul-Simon Handy and Félicité Djilo, “Unpacking Africa’s Divided Stance on the Ukraine War,” Institute for Security Studies (pan-African think tank), 12 August 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/unpacking-africas-divided-stance-on-the-ukraine-war  

“African votes in the United Nations (UN) on the war revealed sharp divisions between countries… The high number of abstentions was widely interpreted as a sign of Russian influence or evidence of the growing anti-Westernism of African governments and citizens.  This view wrongly assumes that Africa is a political monolith.  It also suggests an underlying expectation by the West that states on the continent should align with them because of the West’s pre-eminence in development and humanitarian aid, and their shared historical past. 

Western surprise at most African countries’ limited emotion towards Russia’s invasion, and Africa’s neutral stance, point to a self-centredness on both sides.  The West wants its African partners to share its condemnation of Russia. African states meanwhile cling to their monopoly on victimhood and historical resentment of Western domination in world affairs. 

How do African states benefit from proclaiming non-alignment?  Although the conflict reveals the extent of the continent’s dependence on grain and fertiliser from Ukraine and Russia, it doesn’t compare with the Western aid that enables African countries to function.  The increasing price of hydrocarbons is affecting Africa’s most fragile states.  While European countries imposed sanctions against Russia despite the costs to their energy supplies, many African countries feel less able to adopt a principled and values-based foreign policy. 

The divide, however, runs deeper – extending to perceptions about the international order itself.  Western states defend a rules-based system in which they are pre-eminent.  African states have a more cynical view of a global order whose rules seem to be determined by the West.  This difference in outlook may explain Africa’s leniency towards Russia, even though the latter has violated a cardinal AU principle on territorial integrity. 

African states’ position is not without contradictions – which isn’t surprising given the many norms and values on a continent of 54 states.  They aspire to an international order based on rules, not force, while at the same time sympathizing with Russia and China, which challenge this order for different reasons.”  

Regional Coalitions Supersede the AU’s African Standby Force

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Should the African Standby Force become fully operational, soldiers such as these from Burundi would play a key role in peacekeeping for the organization.

Should the African Standby Force become fully operational, soldiers such as these from Burundi would play a key role in peacekeeping for the organization.

“The ASF has never seen action, with ad hoc troop coalitions instead becoming the norm in Africa.”

It has been nearly two decades since the African Union (AU) created the African Standby Force (ASF), a proposed multinational and multidisciplinary peacekeeping military organization.  However, despite numerous conflicts across the continent, the ASF has yet to respond.  Instead, as the accompanying excerpted article from South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies explains, various African regions have created their own ad hoc coalitions of troops to deal with security issues in their associated territories.  For example, seven East African Community countries established a regional military force in April 2022 that helped restore stability in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where militia groups were conducting violent attacks.  Likewise, in 2021 Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community sent forces to northern Mozambique to fight Islamic militants.

These regional coalitions of militaries have not followed the ASF’s concepts regarding how and when forces should be deployed and have called into question the ASF’s relevance.  The coalitions believe they are doing the work the ASF was designed to do but has not done.  According to the article, there are several reasons why the ASF has failed to launch.  First, there have been numerous political problems in addition to security concerns between African nations.  There have also been difficulties between the AU and the five regional economic blocs that are supposed to coordinate the ASF.  Some African countries have been slow to commit necessary resources to the ASF.  However, as the article notes, the ASFs biggest problem is that violent extremism was not originally addressed in the organization’s framework, forcing regional coalitions to fill this gap.

Efforts are underway to resolve some of the issues constraining the ASF.  These include forming mechanisms to improve decision-making, facilitating a better understanding of when to deploy the ASF, and expediting the formation of an ASF counterterrorism unit.  While these may sound promising, this is not the first time that the ASF has seen such attempts.  This inability of the AU to have a large, ready, and unified force means Western powers seeking to support peacekeeping operations must deal with several different regional forces instead of one.  Meanwhile, with regional coalitions providing forces to deal with their regional problems, the pressure is off a bit for the AU to stand up the ASF quickly.  However, the inability of the AU to do so reflects the many difficulties it faces trying to unite Africa even in the face of conflicts and terrorism. 

Source:

Meressa K. Dessu and Dawit Yohannes, “Can the African Standby Force Match Up to Current Security Threats?” Institute for Security Studies (South African think tank), 2 June 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-african-standby-force-match-up-to-current-security-threats

The ASF has never seen action, with ad hoc troop coalitions instead becoming the norm in Africa.

The ASF originated in 2003 as a multidisciplinary standby mechanism comprising soldiers, civilians and police in their countries of origin. It is coordinated by the five regional economic communities with the aim of being ready for rapid deployment at short notice. The intention is to help the AU Peace and Security Council discharge its responsibilities relating to peace support missions.

Analysts attribute this problem to the power that regional blocs have over peace and security decisions due to a lack of clarity on the subsidiarity principle between regions and the AU. This ambiguity of roles and responsibilities enables countries to opt for ad hoc security arrangements over the ASF.

Some analysts believe these ad hoc security coalitions complement the ASF and are best suited to tackling Africa’s deadliest transnational armed groups. The coalitions are seen as filling a gap in the AU’s peace and security arsenal by providing immediate responses to violent extremism and other complex threats – which the ASF’s framework doesn’t address.

Image Information:

Image: Should the African Standby Force become fully operational, soldiers such as these from Burundi would play a key role in peacekeeping for the organization.
Source: U.S. Army Africa/Wikimedia Commons/Flickr, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Burundi_peacekeepers_prepare_for_next_rotation_to_Somalia,_Bjumbura,_Burundi_012210_%284324781393%29.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

A Complex Link Between Coups and Jihadism in West Africa

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Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.

Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.

“Analysts say that while there is no mutually beneficial relationship between jihadist groups and coup plotters, there is a linkage between the increase of jihadism and the protracted insecurity across the region.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the non-profit scholarly publication The Conversation: Africa examines the possible connections between coups and the presence of Islamic terrorists in African states.  There have been three coups in West Africa’s Sahel Region in since 2021:  Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso, as well as a fourth failed attempt in Guinea-Bissau.  The author found the link between coups and jihad to be complex, with jihadism not necessarily a direct precursor.

The author notes jihadism and coups are precipitated by similar factors such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, ignorance, political instability, and the inability of governments to meet these challenges.  These conditions serve as excellent recruiting tools for jihadist groups looking to increase their ranks with jobless, angry youth.  These conditions also encourage soldiers, sometimes with a disgruntled populace backing them, to overthrow a corrupt government that is unable to provide for its citizens.  Finally, the military is more likely to attempt a coup when the government appears unable to defeat terrorist organizations.  This was the case in Burkina Faso, where the military overthrew President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in January 2022, after feeling their forces were not being adequately supplied to defeat the jihadists and becoming disenchanted as the number of casualties within their ranks grew. Coup leaders often adopt a very militaristic approach to defeating jihadists. Instead of attacking the root causes of discontent, such as high unemployment and lack of essential services, they implement forceful measures that tend to drive the poor into the arms of jihadist recruiters.  As such, their harsh measures lead to more jihadist recruits, leading to harsher crackdown measures, and so on.  Ultimately, the outcome of the coup-jihadism relationship becomes increased instability.  Meanwhile, the African Union and Western nations, see their efforts at democratization and counterterrorism in the Sahel undermined.

Source:

Folahanmi Aina, “Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship,” The Conversation: Africa (non-profit scholarly publication), 17 February 2022. https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-coups-in-west-africas-sahel-region-a-complex-relationship-176988

Most of these groups are affiliated with global jihadist groups such Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

This has led to repeated tensions in relations between the state and society, which the jihadist groups have exploited in intensifying their recruitment drive.

On the other hand, the activities of these jihadist groups have also mounted additional pressure on the fragile democratic systems across the region.

This encourages state capture by the military, who see themselves as “guardians of the state” and the “last hope” of the common citizen.

The continued emergence of coups is likely to be capitalised upon by jihadists as reflecting efforts which are finally yielding desired results – the forced displacement of democratic systems of government. The jihadists could use this as a tactic to get more fighters to join them.The military juntas now in power must urgently seek to establish mutuality with the societies they now rule. It’s a tall order, given that they don’t prioritise the relationship between state and society. Doing so would require giving voice to the concerns and grievances of citizens they rule over.

Image Information:

Image: Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.
Source: Kassim Traoré /VOA/Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Comit%C3%A9_national_pour_le_salut_du_Peuple_-_2020_Malian_coup_d%27Etat_2.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Algeria Sees Threat from Morocco as Western Sahara Conflict Threatens To Reignite

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Morocco from space.

Morocco from space.

“…Algeria strongly condemns the targeted assassinations by the Kingdom of Morocco using advanced military weapons outside of its internationally recognized borders…”

The long-frozen dispute over the Western Sahara, in which Morocco claims sovereignty over the territory and Algeria supports the Polisario Front’s independence aspirations, continues to thaw amid sporadic military activity.  The latest incident occurred in early April, when a Moroccan UAV purportedly struck a convoy near the border between Mauritania and the Western Sahara. There are conflicting reports of what happened.  The Algerian government, through its foreign affairs ministry, called it “a targeted assassination” carried out by Morocco outside of its internationally recognized borders.  The Qatari-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadid cites a source that claimed a Moroccan drone had fired eight missiles at two Algerian trucks that had delivered their commercial cargo in Mauritania and were returning to the Algerian city of Tindouf.  The Moroccan government did not comment on the matter, but according to the Facebook page of the quasi-official Moroccan military chat forum FAR Maroc, Moroccan authorities had conveyed to the UN that 10 trucks transporting weapons and ammunition were struck within territory that the Polisario Front controls.  It added that Polisario had prevented UN forces from accessing the site for 72 hours, during which the group altered the scene to make it appear as if the missiles struck a civilian convoy. The Algerian military’s main articulated concern vis-à-vis Morocco are not UAVs, but rather the broader threat of “new generation warfare.”  In a speech immediately following the incident described above, Saïd Chengriha, Chief of Staff of the Algerian military, emphasized the importance of maintaining national cohesion amid external attempts to sow discord through misinformation and influence campaigns.  Chengriha has stated on more than one occasion that the key battle for Algeria’s youth is a battle of conscience, “in which new and unconventional weapons are used, and which uses virtual space as its theater of operations, in an attempt to manipulate opinions, especially young people.” 

Sources:

Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Twitter account, @Algeria_MFA, 12 April 2022. https://twitter.com/Algeria_MFA/status/1513918713086492676

Algeria strongly condemns the targeted assassinations by the Kingdom of Morocco using advanced military weapons outside of its internationally recognized borders against innocent civilians from three countries of the region.

Source:

“قصف جديد لشاحنات جزائرية في الصحراء قرب الحدود الموريتانية

(New attack on Algerian trucks in the Sahara near the Mauritanian border),” al-Araby al-Jadid (Qatari-aligned daily), 10 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/ydf7uemn

Local sources told al-Araby al-Jadid that Moroccan drones fired eight missiles at two Algerian trucks, which caused their destruction and the injury of more than two people. They added that the two trucks had unloaded their cargo in Mauritania and were on their way back to the city of Tindouf, in southern Algeria.

Source: FAR Maroc (quasi-official Moroccan military news forum), Facebook page (Arabic), 21 April 2022. https://www.facebook.com/1529080437316937/posts/3255921981299432

Regarding the Bir Lahlu operation on April 10, the [UN] mission confirmed that Morocco had informed that it targeted, in a specific operation, about 10 trucks and vehicles loaded with ammunition and weapons targeting the security of Morocco. However, the Polisario prevented members of the mission from inspecting the site for 72 hours, after which they found only two trucks and a vehicle. It also monitored the presence of another operation near the location of the two trucks, confirming that Polisario had manipulated the scene to prove its allegation that Morocco had targeted civilians.

Source: “Les nouveaux défis exigent la consolidation du front interne,” Algeria Press Service (Algerian oficial news agency), 8 May 2022. https://www.aps.dz/algerie/139409-les-nouveaux-defis-exigent-la-consolidation-du-front-interne-et-une-confiance-totale-dans-les-institutions-de-l-etat

According to El Djeich, “the various challenges which Algeria is currently facing, and which it will have to take up in the future, have led the High Command of the People’s National Army (ANP)… to carry out a vast program of modernization and capacity-renewal of the ANP battle corps and its implementation on the ground, in order to achieve a high level of competence at all levels and therefore operational availability”

… “The real battle that our young people must win today is essentially a battle of conscience, Lieutenant General Saïd Chengriha has said on numerous occasions,” per the Editorial. “It is a battle in which new and unconventional weapons are used, and which uses virtual space as its theater of operations, in an attempt to manipulate opinions, especially young people…”

Image Information:

Image:  Morocco from space
Source: NASA, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/751371/morocco-image-day]  
Attribution: Public Domain