2023-06-08 An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles)

An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 2 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles). Click image to download.

(Click image to download brief.)


This study describes how Russian military theorists think about the initial period of war (IPW) concept and its relation to strategic operations, and posits that due to the nature of the special military operation, the IPW concept was likely in no way a part of the operational planning process. While there were likely political motivations for the use of the term “special military operation” instead of “war,” the term “war” was not used for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, because it was not envisioned to meet the criteria for “war” as understood by Russian military theorists

An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 1 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles)

An Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022 Part 1 (Roger N McDermott & Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles). Click image to download.

(Click image to download brief.)


This study describes the historical evolution of the Russian concept of the initial period of war (IPW). The concept has evolved substantially since its inception, which can be traced back to at least the early 1900s, but it generally pertains to the decisive strategic operations that occur during the first few days of war, that set conditions for strategic success, and the activities that occur before the war (period of imminent threat or preparation period in Russian military parlance) that make these strategic operations possible;


Russia Concerned About Dependence on Chinese Technology

President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.

President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.


Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology…”


Over the past decade, as the Kremlin leadership has touted and celebrated its growing ties to China as it has sought to distance itself from the West. This turn toward Beijing accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Western governments imposed additional sanctions and many Western firms departed. As the first excerpt from Russian television channel ORT describes, during President Xi’s visit to Moscow in March, there was talk of a comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation. Having only just recently been labeled as a war criminal by the Hague, the Chinese leader’s decision to make his first foreign visit since the onset of COVID-19 speaks volumes regarding his support for Putin. While political relations today are cordial, some in Russia are beginning to question their country’s growing economic and technological dependence upon China.[i] The second excerpt from Russian-language Turkish news service TRT captures this concern, which attributes it to Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. Not only are there security concerns regarding Russia’s dependence on this technology, but “Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security.”[ii] The article concludes by quoting statistics regarding the growth of Russian firms using “Chinese cybersecurity solutions,” growing from 5 percent in 2022 to nearly 60 percent today. Should the current trend continue, China will gain considerable leverage over Russian information processing.


Sources:

Pavel Matveev, “Завершился государственный визит председателя КНР Си Цзиньпина в Россию (Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Russia ends),” ORT (Russian Main TV Channel), 22 March 2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-03-22/449553-zavershilsya_gosudarstvennyy_vizit_predsedatelya_knr_si_tszinpina_v_rossiyu

The farewell ceremony took place at Vnukovo airport. State flags, anthems of the two countries, after which the Chinese leader followed the red carpet to his plane.

…A full program, many meetings and negotiations, as a result of which important documents were signed and a joint statement was published on deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction…. In particular, Russia will support Chinese business, which is replacing Western companies. Settlements between the two countries have already mostly switched to rubles and yuan….


“Российские чиновники опасаются растущей зависимости от Huawei (Russian officials wary of growing reliance on Huawei),” TRT (Turkish News Service in Russian), 20 April 2023. https://www.trtrussian.com/novosti/rossijskie-chinovniki-opasayutsya-rastushej-zavisimosti-ot-huawei-12905704

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology, as US and EU sanctions have barred Russian firms from accessing Western technology. Instead, the Russian Federation is forced to reorient itself to Chinese developments, in particular, to deliveries from Huawei….

…The document cited by the publication says: some high-ranking Russian officials are concerned that Chinese companies such as Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. may take a dominant position in the Russian market, thereby posing a risk to the information security of the country. …In a report compiled by the Ministry of Digital Development of the Russian Federation in the summer of 2022, microcircuits, network devices and electronics are highlighted as areas of particular vulnerability.

…In addition to fears of growing dependence, Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security…

…As TRT previously wrote in Russian, more than half of companies in Russia plan to switch to Chinese equipment in the field of cybersecurity after European and American manufacturers leave the Russian market.The Russian newspaper Kommersant, citing a survey by K2Tech integrator, notes that until 2022, only 5% of Russian companies used Chinese cybersecurity solutions. Now 60% of companies have switched to them or are planning to switch to them to replace the products of departed Western players – Cisco, Palo Alto, etc….


Notes:

[i] This concern has been growing for the past several years. For additional background, see: Ray Finch, “Russia-China: Potential Allies or Adversaries?,” OE Watch, November 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/340594

[ii] The Kremlin has been careful not to publicize information regarding unfair Chinese business practices and espionage to protect the warming relationship between the two countries.  For some relatively recent background, see: Ray Finch, “Russian Concerns over Chinese Espionage,” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/379981


Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.
Source: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60669/photos
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Russia Strengthens Its Military Presence in Central Asia

 201st Military Base.

201st Military Base.


“Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.”


Russia’s military bases in Central Asia have always been important to its strategic goals in the region, particularly for dealing with potential instability in Afghanistan. While the Russian government initially accepted U.S. airbases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan beginning in 2001 to support operations in Afghanistan, it later pressed both governments to evict U.S. forces. The United States left the Kharshi-Khanbad airbase (known as K2) in Uzbekistan in 2005[i] and left the Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan in 2014. Russian officials have claimed that U.S. security cooperation with Central Asian states in the 2000s took place as part of an effort to establish permanent military bases in the region, though the United States has not used a regional military facility since it left Manas.

The accompanying excerpted article from Kyrgyzstan’s independent news website Kloop reports on a statement by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on 28 April 2023 in New Delhi, India about increasing the combat readiness of Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Shoigu noted that Russia made this decision to increase combat readiness because the United States is trying “to restore its military presence in Central Asia…under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism.” However, the article also notes that Shoigu did not offer facts to substantiate this this claim. When Russian officials announced measures to strengthen its military bases in Central Asia in the past, they noted specific increases in capabilities, like the transfer of S-300 [RG1] air defense systems to Tajikistan in 2019.[ii] Shoigu also stated that requests from members of the SCO to host military facilities is a “direct threat to stability in the SCO space.” Shoigu did not mention which SCO member would potentially host the U.S. military, but SCO members in Central Asia include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. There have been no reports that any of the three have been negotiating to host U.S. forces, but Shoigu is warning fellow SCO members that Russia will consider hosting the United States as a threat. The article also usefully provides a reminder of the current Russian military bases in Central Asia. These include the Kant airbase outside Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the 201st Russian military base, home of the 201st Motor Rifle Division, in Tajikistan, the latter of which is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The article ends by noting that Ukraine claimed it destroyed a tactical group from the 201st military base last year, though this has not been verified. While Russia claims it is strengthening its bases in Central Asia as a measure to maintain its presence in the region, without any specific information on how this will take place, it is possible that Russia is doing this to replace losses of the of the 201st in Tajikistan suffered in Ukraine.


Source:

Munduzbek Kalykov, “Шойгу: Россия повышает боеготовность своих военных баз в Кыргызстане и Таджикистане (Shoigu: Russia will increase the combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan),” Kloop (an independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 29 April 2023. https://kloop.kg/blog/2023/04/29/shojgu-rossiya-povyshaet-boegotovnost-svoih-voennyh-baz-v-kyrgyzstane-i-tadzhikistane/

Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.” This was stated by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu as reported by RIA Novosti.

According to Shoigu, “the United States and its allies, under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism, are trying to restore their military presence in Central Asia.” However, he did not provide specific facts.

“We regard requests to the countries of the region to deploy military infrastructure as a direct threat to stability in the SCO space…” Shoigu said on April 28 at meeting of defense ministers of the SCO member states in New Delhi.

A Russian military base has existed in Kyrgyzstan since the early 2000s. Its main forces are located in the small town of Kant, not far from Bishkek – these are Su-25 [RG1] attack aircraft and Mi-8 [RG2] helicopters. The Russian joint military base also includes a test site at Issyk-Kul, where Russian sailors test underwater torpedoes.

The 201st Russian military base is located in Tajikistan, and the garrison is deployed in the cities of Dushanbe and Bokhtar. This is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The base includes motorized rifle artillery, reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile and other units, as well as an air group……in mid-April 2022, the Ukrainian army announced the destruction of the tactical group of the 201st Russian military base, which has a permanent deployment in Tajikistan…


Notes:

[i] The withdrawal of U.S. forces from K2 cannot be solely attributed to Russian pressure. In May 2005, the Uzbek military forcefully put down public demonstrations in the Ferghana Valley, killing numerous civilians and drawing the ire of the Bush administration regarding human rights. This began a diplomatic row between the United States and Uzbekistan, which resulted in an Uzbekistani demand that the United States leave the base within six months, eventually withdrawing from K2 in November 2005.

[ii] For more background on Russia’s transfers of S-300s to Tajikistan, see: Matthew Stein “Russia Transfers S-300s to Tajikistan,” OE Watch, December 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues


Image Information:

Image: 201st Military Base.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:201_military_base_09.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russian Defense Ministry Approves Five-Year Plan To Expand and Modernize Arctic Air Bases

In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).

In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).


“Rogachevo air base is located some 10 kilometers northeast of Belushaya Guba, the main military settlement on Novaya Zemlya.  The airport serves other facilities on the archipelago with helicopters, such as the main testing area of nuclear weapons near the Matochkin Strait.  After modernization, the airfield will be able to base all types of aircraft, including long-range bombers.”


Russia is expanding its ability to maintain and launch military aircraft within its Arctic territories, possibly due to increased NATO naval exercises in the North Sea over the past three years. According to the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the Russian military is modernizing both Rogachevo air base on Novaya Zemla and Nagurskoye air base on Franz Josef Land. As the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates, Russia’s long-range bombers are a dual threat as they also serve as cruise missile launchers. Russian cruise missiles have significant range, and recent attacks on Ukrainian targets launched from military aircraft in the Caspian Sea are a poignant indication of the strategic value Russia stands to gain from these expanded and modernized Arctic bases.


Source:

Thomas Nilsen, “Further expansion for Novaya Zemlya air base aims to serve long-range bombers,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 17 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/further-expansion-novaya-zemlya-airport-aims-serve-long-range-bombers

Rogachevo airfield is already upgraded to serve MiG-31 and Su-33 fighter jets.  Such aircraft have since 2020 served the Arctic airport on a rotational basis from their airports on the Kola Peninsula. The new plans include special buildings for basing aircraft equipment and new houses for the military servicemen and their families.

Rogachevo air base is located some 10 kilometers northeast of Belushaya Guba, the main military settlement on Novaya Zemlya. The airport serves other facilities on the archipelago with helicopters, such as the main testing area of nuclear weapons near the Matochkin Strait.  After modernization, the airfield will be able to base all types of aircraft, including long-range bombers, according to the plans reported by Izvestia. Today’s runway is 2,400 meters, likely too short for Russia’s long-range bombers like the Tu-95 [RG1] and Tu-160 [RG2] .At the Nagurskoye base on Franz Josef Land, work is underway to extend the runway to nearly 3,600 meters. The Russian Air Force has over the last years significantly stepped up its presence in the Arctic.


Image Information:

Image: In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:InterceptionOfMissile2018-11.jpg
Attribution: CCA x 4.0 International

Russian Domestic Support for Ukraine Invasion Weakens as Fighters Return Home

President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.

President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.


The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.”


According to the excerpted article from official Kremlin news outlet Parliamentskaya Gazeta, during the Victory Day celebration on 9 May, President Putin declared “all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine.” Despite some skepticism of such claims, indeed, most indicators suggest that Russian civil society support for the invasion has remained high over time.[i] Some of this robust domestic support stems from the Kremlin’s control over the country’s major media, which has over the past 15 months asserted that Russian soldiers are protecting their country against a quasi-Ukrainian/Nazi threat (supported by the US and NATO).[ii] Alongside the 24/7 propaganda, the Kremlin has also enacted legislation that severely punishes any attempt to protest Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[iii] Nevertheless, despite the Kremlin’s tight control over the narrative, there are growing indications that some Russians are beginning to question the costs behind this conflict, and possibly, their support.

The second excerpt from a regional source in Krasnodar, 93.RU, describes the brutal kidnapping and murder of two local residents by three ex-convicts. The victims’ car had broken down, and after offering to help, the criminals forced them to withdraw money from the bank and then murdered them. The source suggests that these ex-convicts may have recently gained their freedom from prison by volunteering to fight with the Wagner private military company in Ukraine. One of them had been sentenced to 16 years in prison in 2016 for a similar murder, and the article questions how he could have been released so soon. Since “discrediting” the military is now a serious offense in Russia, the author of the article couches the assertion that these ex-convicts had been released from prison by volunteering to fight in Ukraine in vague terms. However, anonymous reader comments to this article are more forthright, pointing out that once these convicts had spent six months fighting in Ukraine, they were now free to return to former criminal habits. Another reader warns that “now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.” These comments suggest that the blowback from using convicted criminals as soldiers could reduce Russian domestic support for fighting in Ukraine.


Sources:

Anton Grebennikov, “Президент: Вся страна сплотилась для поддержки участников спецоперации (President: The whole country rallied to support the participants of the special operation),” Parliamentskaya Gazeta (official Kremlin site), 9 May 2023. https://www.pnp.ru/politics/prezident-vsya-strana-splotilas-dlya-podderzhki-uchastnikov-specoperacii.html

Today, all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine. The country is proud of its heroes, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during the Victory Day Parade on Red Square…. “There is no more important thing now than your combat work. Today, the security of the country rests on you, the future of our statehood and our people depends on you, you honorably fulfill your military duty – you fight for Russia. Your families, children, friends are behind you, they are waiting for you,” RIA Novosti quotes the president….


Valeria Dulskaya, “Верили до последнего. Кто и зачем убил аниматоров на кубанской трассе (They believed until the very end. Who and why killed the animators on the Kuban highway),” 93.RU (Krasnodar News Site), 4 May 2023. https://93.ru/text/incidents/2023/05/04/72274256/

On the evening of April 28, animators Kirill Chubko and Tatyana Mostyko disappeared on the highway near the village of Berezanskaya in the Krasnodar Territory, who were driving home from work. They broke the wheel, and after some time they stopped communicating. Two days after the disappearance, Kirill’s car was found burned in the forest. More than 180,000 rubles disappeared from the accounts of the animators – they were withdrawn at night from different ATMs. Officers later arrested three suspects….

Unfortunately, that evening it became known that the animators were dead. On the morning of May 3, police reported that they had detained three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatiana. They were 31-year-old Demyan Kevorkyan from Krasnodar, 30-year-old Anatoly Dvoinikov from the Tikhoretsky district and 45-year-old Aram Tatosyan from the Apsheron district.

According to investigators, near the village of Berezanskaya, the alleged criminals noticed Kirill and Tatiana standing on the road on the road. The men decided to kill them in order to steal money and other valuables. They attacked the animators, took away their cards, “gaining access to the possibility of conducting banking operations on them.” Then the suspects withdrew more than 180 thousand rubles from several ATMs. Taking the money, the men killed Cyril and Tatyana. To hide the crime, they burned their car and hid the bodies, the press service of the regional Investigative Committee reported….

On May 3, the Investigative Committee announced the arrest of three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatyana – Demyan Kevorkyan, Anatoly Dvoinikov and Aram Tatosyan. According to the Russian Investigative Committee, all three had previous convictions…. The media suggest that they participated in the SMO, but there is no official confirmation of this.

Reader Comments:

One convict, who in 2016 was sentenced to 18 years for a similar murder, teleported out of the colony in some completely unknown way and killed the victims.

The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.I don’t understand either, they gave him 18 years and he is free. Everything goes according to plan…


Notes:

[i] Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?,” Atlantic Council, 2 May 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine/#:~:text=The%20Levada%20Center%2C%20which%20is,public%20backing%20of%20over%2070%25

[ii] For additional background on how the Kremlin has used the media to generate support for its policies, see” Ray Finch, CHAPTER 6. THE MOBILIZATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 1 September 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20098.10

[iii]Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian media space had become tightly controlled, especially on matters dealing with national security. For a brief snapshot on some of these restrictive measures, see: Ray Finch, “More Restrictions on Defense Information,” OE Watch, October 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376377; “Russia Moves Forward with New Restrictions on Military Reporting,” OE Watch, November, 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/397980


Image Information:

Image: President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.
Source: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/photos/big2x/EONAWWmXRIkYHMVEZf8vmNhVq99RsGK3.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Regional Analyst Questions Effectiveness, Sustainability of Russian Missile Strikes in Ukraine

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.


“Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.”


Although the intensity of Russian missile strikes against Ukraine increased from March and April 2023 to May 2023, the somewhat limited nature of the strikes may be an indication that Russia is running into a supply problem that could have a strategic impact on its ambitions in Ukraine and its ability to sell weapons on the international arms market. According to the recent accompanying article from Republic of Georgia-based Resonance Daily, which monitors the war in Ukraine and Russian military affairs in general, Russia may be squandering its missile stockpile in a somewhat piecemeal effort to break or find a weakness in Ukraine’s missile defense that it cannot currently exploit. From the perspective of the Georgian defense analyst quoted in the article, “Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.” This, the analyst points out, is due to Russia’s inability to achieve any breakthroughs in the ground war. The article, published in the wake of a barrage of Russian missile and drone strikes on Kyiv on 16 May, underscores that Russia is thought to possess only 80 Kinzhal (dagger) hypersonic missiles, and that Ukrainian missile defenses destroyed one “dagger” on 6 May and six more on 16 May. Accordingly, it asserts, Russia now likely has 73 “daggers” in its arsenal. Collectively, these developments suggest that the Kinzhal [RG1] , as well as other missiles in Russia’s arsenal, are quickly becoming a finite resource due to attrition and sanctions, the latter of which makes it much more difficult to manufacture more of these weapons.[i] If the estimations of Russia’s stockpiles are correct, and current sanctions hold, Russia will not be able to replenish its stockpiles in any meaningful way in the near future. As a result, Russia does not possess weapon systems in sufficient numbers to allow it to strike Ukraine with enough salvos to overwhelm Ukrainian missile defense. Moreover, Moscow will be severely impacted in its ability to wage war on any front, threatening its positions in Ukraine and Syria, as well as curtailing its ambitions elsewhere.


Source:

Tamta Chachanidze, “ყველაზე მასირებული სარაკეტო დარტყმა კიევზე და „სათაგური“ ბახმუტში – ბოლო ცნობები ფრონტიდან (The most massive missile attack on Kiev and the “keystone” in Bakhmut – latest news from the front),” Resonance Daily (Georgia based media outlet focused on foreign affairs)16 May 2023. http://www.resonancedaily.com/mobile/index.php?id_rub=8&id_artc=181367&fbclid=IwAR39bK06tvFq8JAzCvR9QhAJVVqUvU3uFI4iITkgHFPXru72jkKrz5f4yQQ

On May 16, Russia launched the most massive three-hour missile attack on Kiev in the history of war. Aeroballistic missiles of the “Kinjali” type were also used. According to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the air defense forces of the country neutralized all the missiles. The Russian side claims the opposite – that with one “Kinjali” the Ukrainians destroyed the air defense system “Patriot”….

From the footage spread on social networks, it can be seen that there were indeed fires in Kyiv after the May 16 rocket attack, however, according to the administration of the capital city, it was caused by the fragments of the downed rockets. According to military analysts, the Russians are already trying to force Ukraine to make some kind of concession with intense air strikes. Or is this a new strategy to “somehow look ugly” to the Western anti-aircraft systems transferred to Ukraine.

They also do not rule out that “Kinjal” was hit by “Patriot”, because there is no such thing as 100% and ideal air defense, and “one or two missiles will defeat even the best air defense”.

At dawn on May 16, the Russians launched the most massive missile attack on Kiev in the last year, which lasted more than three hours….

According to Valery Zaluzhn, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the early hours of May 16, the Russian occupation forces attacked Ukraine from the northern, southern and eastern directions with 18 missiles. According to him, the opponent used 6 aeroballistic missiles “Kinjali”, 9 missiles “Calibre [RG1] ” from naval bases and 3 ground missiles “Iskander [RG2] “. Air defense forces destroyed all 18 missiles.

Several buildings and vehicles were damaged in different districts of Kyiv. 3 people were injured. According to Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko, it was caused by debris from Russian missiles. However, the Russian side claims otherwise.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, on May 16, a “Patriot” air defense system was destroyed with a “Kinjali” missile. In addition, according to the agency, “high-precision weapons struck warehouses of Ukrainian ammunition and weapons, which the West supplied to Kyiv”.

On the same day the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that, “Russian air defense systems shot down seven Storm Shadow [GRLCUT(3] long-range cruise missiles recently handed over to Ukraine by Britain, the same number of Hymars shells, as well as three Harm-type radar-detecting missiles. In addition, 22 Ukrainian planes were destroyed in Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine responded to the deadly attack on Kiev and thanked the Air Force of Ukraine for its work and impressive results. “The next incredible success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine! Last night, our sky defenders shot down six Russian hypersonic ‘Daggers’ and 12 more missiles,” Reznikov wrote on Twitter.

In addition, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine wrote an arithmetic equation: “80-1-6=X”, implying the total number of “Kinjali” missiles possessed by Russia to be only 80. On May 6, the Ukrainians destroyed 1 and 6 additional “daggers” on May 16. Accordingly, the Russians now likely have 73 “daggers” in their arsenal.

Colonel Lasha Beridze states to Resonance Daily that the Russians no longer have the resources of a ground attack and are now trying to compensate for this with air strikes.

“Russia no longer has options for a ground attack. They understand very well that they will not be able to defend themselves for a long time, and that is why they are already trying to take Ukraine to some kind of favorable concession with such airstrikes, or it is simply a punitive operation.

“Ukraine already has “Patriot” systems that can fight with “Kinjals” and quite successfully. It has been neglected many times already. Even the best air defense will be hit by one or two missiles, there is no such thing as perfect. Many developed countries could not withstand airstrikes like Ukraine.

“The Ukrainians are successfully repelling the attacks, and as time goes by, these air defense capabilities will increase.

“At the end of the day, Russian armaments with Western technologies have no chance to win and turn the battlefield in their favor. It seems they will increase their airstrikes if they have the chance. However, no matter how they increase missile strikes, there are all indications that they will not be able to increase its effectiveness. Don’t get angry and the “daggers” will come out”, said Lasha Beridze to “Resonance”.

Caucasus International University professor and military analyst Vakhtang Maisaya told “Resonance” that massed strikes have become a common strategy of the Russians, which may be aimed at disrupting the existing anti-aircraft systems in Ukraine.“It seems that this is already a kind of strategy of the Russians, when they try to break through the anti-missile defense, which is very effective, and they increase the intensity to somehow find a loophole in these systems and break through them. When the Ukrainians started intercepting missiles, the Russians now switched to intensive strikes,” Maisaya said.


Notes:

[i] Missiles are not the only Russian weapon system to be in short supply. The number of Russian aircraft are also being diminished. For insight regarding the limited number of Su-35 fighter bombers, see: “Russia’s Su-35: Are Its Military Aircraft Exports Headed for a Fall?,” The Rand Blog, 20 October 2022. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/10/russias-su-35-are-its-military-aircraft-exports-headed.html


Image Information:

Image: Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K [RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2018_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_66.jpg
Attribution: Kremlin.ru, CCA 4.0 International

Retired SHAPE Vice Chief of Staff Shares His Thoughts on Russia’s War in Ukraine

Ukrainian first responders clear debris from location of Russian missile strike_Uman Ukraine_29 April 2023

Ukrainian first responders clear debris from location of Russian missile strike_Uman Ukraine_29 April 2023.


“I think this war has gone too far and exposed too much of the incompetence and the basic inhumanity of the current regime, and all the signs, for me, of the unravelling of the Russian Federation are there. I think it’s a disaster in the making, a trainwreck in the making and we’ll have to sort it out.”


Former Vice Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Lt. Gen. Michel Yakovleff (France) believes that Russia’s stalled invasion of Ukraine cannot be won by any decisive Russian military campaign. He also believes Ukraine’s military is incapable of “winning” in its current condition. According to an 11 April interview published in the Krakow-based New Eastern Europe[i] foreign affairs journal, Yakovleff believes Russia is already engaged in an offensive of its own but that its forces are “so diluted all along the line in Donbas” that “it will not collapse the Ukraine line” and thus be inconsequential. He also believes Ukraine is unlikely to have any meaningful offensive and should instead wait for Russia to make an operational blunder of which it can take advantage.

In the interview, Yakovleff, a descendent of Russian emigrants, discussed critical issues surrounding the conflict, including the conditional transfer of arms from the West to Ukraine. He recognized that high-end weapon systems like fighter aircraft and longer-range artillery and rocket systems would likely continue to be given only with promises that Ukraine would not use the systems to attack Russian territory. Yet Yakovleff noted that Belarus posed an interesting dilemma possible for exploitation: “If you allow a force on your territory to launch an attack from your territory, to launch missiles, with aircraft flying in your airspace, have artillery deployed on your soil firing barrages into your neighbour’s territory – you are a participant to the war.” According to Yakovleff, while Russia is off limits. Belarus, may be a different story Yakovleff also expects, and favors, regime change in Russia. According to Yakavleff, “it will happen. Will it happen in months or years, I don’t know… But I think this war has gone too far and exposed too much of the incompetence and the basic inhumanity of the current regime.” His sentiment cuts to the heart of conflicting views of the war in Ukraine and the desirable outcomes. Ukraine views its conflict with Russia as total war, a fight for its very existence and thus the demise of Russia is the most favorable outcome. As the piecemeal and slower than requested weapons transfers might suggest, the West prefers to manage the war, to keep the war limited. Removing Putin may or may not be an objective of the conflict as a highly destabilized Russia and unknown leadership may be considered too high a cost for total Ukrainian victory.[ii]


Source:

“Russia has already taken “Ukrainium” and its fatal,” New Eastern Europe (Krakow based foreign affairs journal focused on Eastern Europe), 11 April 2023. https://neweasterneurope.eu/2023/04/11/russia-has-already-taken-ukrainium-and-its-fatal/

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: We recently marked the anniversary of the infamous Russian attempt –

or rather the failure – called “Take Kyiv in three days”. We are witnessing a new Russian

offensive gaining traction, as we speak. How do you rate their chances this time?

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, pretty dismal. It looks like the Russians have been engaged in an offensive for three or four weeks now. But it is diluted all along the line in Donbas with a focal point around Bakhmut. Even if they achieve success in Bakhmut, beyond symbolic value it doesn’t take them much further than the next town of middling importance. So I don’t believe they will collapse the Ukrainian lines. So okay, they may conquer a few square kilometres of real estate at tremendous cost. I have a suspicion they are wasting their resources, both human and ammunition. It’s not a very pointed thrust.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: If that blunder does not come to pass, is the Ukrainian counter-offensive still a foregone conclusion? Must they attack?

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, I wouldn’t advise them to attack if they don’t have the necessary mass to do so. And the necessary reserves and ammunition and so on. They’ve been very good at this war without taking any advice of mine. So I’ve got to be humble about that. You know, and they know better in what situation they are.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: On the warplanes, French President Emmanuel Macron said that if France did send warplanes, he would not want any to be used to “touch Russian soil”. Do you see that becoming a pre-condition for the rest of the would-be donors as well?

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, I suspect so. And I do think that the Ukrainians get the message, that they’re reasonable themselves, they understand. In essence, we are in a limited war, as Russian doctrine written in the times of Putin calls it – a limited regional war. It’s not limited in terms of violence and assets involved and numbers. It’s limited in the geographical sense. So, the guarantee that warplanes wouldn’t be used to attack targets on Russian territory – I can understand why strategically it’s sound, because Russia is essentially sanctuary-ised in reality. It’s immoral and it’s not legally sound by the way – you have every right to strike an aggressor, including on his territory. And all nations have done that routinely, if I dare say so. But in this case, okay – it may be right, it may be legal, it may be moral – but it is not politically expedient. And it is not even politically expedient for the Ukrainians. So, of course, there would be guarantees. And I don’t doubt the Ukrainians would abide by them.

I must say there’s an interesting side story, which is Belarus. Because Belarus, legally speaking, is an aggressor to the same degree as Russia. If you allow a force on your territory to launch an attack from your territory, to launch missiles, with aircraft flying in your airspace, have artillery deployed on your soil firing barrages into your neighbour’s territory – you are a participant to the war. It’s not complicit, it’s a participant. And in that respect, technically speaking – and it would be amusing to see how politically expedient this would be, you know maybe Russia is off limits. Belarus, may be a different story. I think it’s an interesting discussion.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: To go back to the earlier argument that you made that the West is providing Ukraine with enough weaponry and just in time for it to save itself from being crushed. – every now and then we have distinctions being made between Ukraine winning this war and Ukraine not losing this war. And I would like to ask what this “not losing” stands for, what it might look like.

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, not losing means Ukraine is still alive and kicking, not necessarily in control of all this territory.

So it’s the situation now. Victory for me – the only measure of victory for Ukraine is that the bear

has been defanged, and that the fear of Russia coming back recedes seriously. I have a suspicion

that that does imply Ukraine recovering all its territory, if only so the Russian body politic

understands that there was no reward in aggression, starting from 2014. That is a very extreme

measure of victory, to be honest, and I don’t think it is achievable right now, much to my regret.

…I don’t think liberating all its territory is within reach now of the Ukrainian army in the foreseeable future. And that is months, not years. The only real chance for Ukraine to recover its territory is the demise of the Putin regime, and bitter infighting inside Russia and the crumbling of Russia, and that will reopen the discussion. That is, that’s not something I call for, advocate or desire. But I think it is the logic of this war. That’s what I call Ukrainium. Ukrainium is the same as polonium. You know, it’s Russian, and it’s fatal. And it’s tearing through the fabric of Russia now. Even if they win the war, by the way, the Russians, I think society has been too much stressed. So ultimately, I believe that the desirable outcome for Ukraine will he a change of regime in Moscow.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: How far-fetched a future are we talking about here?MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: I think it’s the logic of what’s happening now – it will happen. Will it happen in months or years, I don’t know. And I am not very good at predicting. But I think this war has gone too far and exposed too much of the incompetence and the basic inhumanity of the current regime, and all the signs, for me, of the unravelling of the Russian Federation are there. I think it’s a disaster in the making, a trainwreck in the making and we’ll have to sort it out. And then, part of the sorting out will be Georgia, Transnistria, maybe Chechnya, Dagestan and other places, and of course, Ukraine [would] include Crimea.


Notes:

[i] New Eastern Europe (NEE) foreign affairs journal is based in Krakow, Poland. While relatively unknown, it’s readership has expanded greatly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is also subscribed to by significant research and academic institutions in the West. Most of the experts and authors featured in the journal are from Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, giving the NEE an Eastern European perspective, counterbalancing the Western European and U.S. publications that look at the conflict from further afar.

[ii] Yakovleff has not been spared Russian criticism for his outspokenness regarding how the war in Ukraine should be fought and the future of Russia. His comments and publications have earned him a spot on the Russia-run Foreign Combatants website, which tracks foreigners fighting in Ukraine. According to Foreign Combatants, Yakovleff “became famous for a number of public statements fueling conflict,” including statements in August 2022 suggesting the French government should “introduce French armed forces into Ukraine.” For additional information from a pro-Russian perspective see: Michel Yakovleff, Foreign Combatants, https://foreigncombatants.ru/en//index.php?title=Michel_Yakovleff


Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian first responders clear debris from location of Russian missile strike_Uman Ukraine_29 April 2023
Source: Author’s own and given by permission
Attribution: Dodge Billingsley, Combat Films and Research

Facing European Sanctions, Russian Redirects Grain and Coal to Asian Customers

“As Europe no longer buys Russian coal and new markets in Asia take over, the export hub in Murmansk manifest itself as the world’s longest detour.”


In the face of sanctions and economic isolation from Europe, Russia’s longtime export hub in Murmansk has become, at least for now, an unnecessary and out-of-the-way detour for Russian commodities being shipped abroad, especially to Asia. According to the excerpted article in the Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is increasing its exports to Asia on the northbound Siberian rivers to the Northern Sea Route. Grain barges have successfully shipped north on the Lena River to the Northern Sea Route to China at substantial savings over rail. Coal will now move by rail from the Siberian coal fields to the river port of Krasnoyarsk and by barge on the north flowing Yenesei River to the Arctic Circle port region and then be loaded onto bulk carriers for China and India. Exploiting these additional routes will be more cost effective, quicker, and sanction-free, while providing Russia access to friendly markets and much needed export revenue.


Source:

Thomas Nilsen, “Asia-bound coal finds Siberian shortcut route, avoiding Murmansk,”

The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 3 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2023/04/asia-bound-coal-finds-siberia-shortcut-route-avoiding-murmansk

As Europe no longer buys Russian coal and new markets in Asia take over, the export hub in Murmansk manifest itself as the world’s longest detour. The first test batch with 30,000 tons of coal from Kuzbass will be shipped via the Yenisei River and Northern Sea Route when ice is gone and the waterways open for navigation later this year.

“It is planned to organize an experimental shipping in 2023 […] from Kuzbass with transshipment in Krasnoyarsk and Lesosibirsk. In Ust-Port region, the coal will be reloaded to ships and sent to China,” stated head of the Yenisey inland waterways, Leonid Fedorov.

The coal will be sent by rail to Lososibirsk and Krasnoyarsk where it will be loaded on barges and shipped north the Yenisey River to Ust-Port inside the Arctic Circle. A larger bulk carrier will take over the cargo and sail to the outlet of the river and further east along the Northern Sea Route towards Asia. About half of all Russian coal comes from the Kuzbass region southeast of Krasnoyarsk.Over the last decade, export via Murmansk has increased from about 9,5 million tons in 2010 to 16,2 million tons in 2019. After Putin’s full-scale military attack on Ukraine last year, the European Union decided to ban Russian coal, and export from the ice-free port on the coast to the Barents Sea is now shipped via the Suez channel to Asia, for the most part to India and China. If increasing to large volume, export via the Yenisey River and the Northern Sea Route will be substantially shorter than the route via Murmansk.

Russia Tries To Appeal to New Contract Soldiers in Moscow

Russian advertisement for contract military service.

Russian advertisement for contract military service.


“The general atmosphere in the Center is strikingly different from the environment of the draft board familiar to every male Russian.”


Over the past 15 months, polls in Russia have indicated significant public support (ranging from around 70 to 80 percent) for its invasion of Ukraine. Given the government’s control over the media (and most polling agencies), the genuine level of support could be considerably lower. The Kremlin’s ongoing challenge in attracting sufficient contract-military manpower may better reflect the actual public mood regarding this conflict. Few young Russian men appear willing to enlist as contract soldiers. As the accompanying excerpt from the popular Russian site Moskovskiy Komsomolets points out, Russian officials in Moscow are now pulling out all stops to attract sufficient contract military personnel for the so-called “special military operation” (SMO) in Ukraine.

Until recently, processing centers for Russian contract soldiers were bureaucratic, bare-boned operations with minimal staffing and infrastructure. As the article describes, this has all changed (at least in Moscow) with the recent inauguration of the new “five-story Unified Selection Point for military service under contract.” Instead of long lines amid grim surroundings, this new induction center boasts of “electronic queues, comfortable waiting rooms, with trained and competent specialists.” All the administrative and medical facilities are co-located, allowing potential contract soldiers to “comfortably and quickly go through a full cycle of events related to admission to the army.” The center is open all week and has the capacity to process 300 new contract soldiers daily. The article also describes some of the terms and benefits of becoming a contract soldier. Quoting a Moscow military commissar, “each candidate has the right to choose his specialty,” and the ages of admission for contractors is between 18 and 60. Candidates can come from anywhere in Russia, as well as from any other neighboring country. According to the article, the pay and benefits package for new contract soldiers is quite impressive. Besides their regular contract pay, soldiers from Moscow will receive a one-time payment of 195,000 rubles ($2,500) as well as similar monthly payments while participating in the SMO. There are also schooling benefits for eligible children and retired parents of contract soldiers. As the Kremlin continues to wrestle with manpower challenges, contract military service may become a more attractive option for Russians living in Moscow.[i]


Source:

Yury Sukhanov, “В столице открылся сверхсовременный Единый пункт отбора на контрактную службу (An ultra-modern unified selection point for contract service was opened in the capital),” Moskovskiy Komsomolets (popular Russian site), 3 April 2023.  https://www.mk.ru/moscow/2023/04/03/v-stolice-otkrylsya-sverkhsovremennyy-edinyy-punkt-otbora-na-kontraktnuyu-sluzhbu.html

In Moscow, the modernization of all contours of the urban environment and public services continues. Following health care, education, housing and communal services, transport, the sphere of manning the Armed Forces, which is vital for the country, is brought to the standards of the 21st century. Within the framework of this program, a five-story Unified Selection Point for military service under a contract was opened …where volunteers can comfortably and quickly go through a full cycle of events related to admission to the army….

“What I would like to note: with all candidates, events will be held for selection for a contract on the principle of one window, without leaving the territory of this building, – says the military commissar of the city of Moscow Maxim Loktev. – All logistics are thought out taking into account the wishes of those who have already been on the contract. All the services participating in the selection procedure are located in one building, and all the logistics of those wishing to enter the contract are organized along the lines of multifunctional centers that are well known to Muscovites. Electronic queues, comfortable waiting rooms, trained and competent specialists are just the tip of the iceberg: the basis is a competent division of the functionality of employees, verified routes and procedures….

… “Each candidate has the right to choose his specialty,” Loktev added. According to him, people from 18 to 60 years old can become contractors… After the interview and clarification of the capabilities and intentions of the applicant entering the Armed Forces, it is the turn of doctors…

…according to the military commissar of Moscow, candidates from all regions of the country are accepted. “We are faced with the fact that guys who want to serve under a contract work in Moscow and often represent different regions….  This option is also provided for those who are not citizens of the Russian Federation, from neighboring countries, we will also consider these candidates and offer them military service under the contract,” said Maxim Loktev.

…The center in its current configuration with specialists is designed to receive a hundred people per day, but it is possible to expand its capacity to 300 people daily…. The general atmosphere in the Center is strikingly different from the environment of the draft board familiar to every male Russian.

…Before leaving for the special operation zone, all contract soldiers… will undergo special professional training at the best training grounds in the Moscow region.

As for material support for military personnel and their families, in Moscow it includes regular monthly payments, as well as lump sum payments upon signing a contract and sending them to the SMO zone. When signing a contract for a year or more, a person entering the Armed Forces will receive a lump sum of 195,000 rubles from the city. Further, the system guarantees regular additional payments depending on rank and military position.Moscow currently has one of the most extensive packages of social support and benefits for military personnel, primarily for participants in the special operation. These benefits apply not only to the soldiers themselves, but also to their families. Thus, the children of combatants have the right to extraordinary admission to the kindergarten closest to their home, the school of their choice (regardless of the place of permanent registration). And social workers will help elderly relatives of Muscovite soldiers in everyday life.


Notes:

[i] For additional background on recent incentives to attract new soldiers, see: Ray Finch, “Added Incentives for Those who Fight in Ukraine,” OE Watch, 3-2023.


Image Information:

Image: Russian advertisement for contract military service.
Source: https://www.n-vartovsk.ru/news/citywide_news/bvk/381142.html
Attribution: CCA-SA 3.0 Public Domain