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28 A COLD, SOGGY, BOGGY SLOG: GROUND FORCES IN HIGHER LATITUDE
COMBAT
By Dr. Lester W. Grau
34 RUSSIAN BATTALION TACTICAL GROUP MISSION TRAINING IN THE
ARCTIC
By Dr. Lester W. Grau & Dr. Charles K. Bartles
40 POLAR NIGHTS, WHITE NIGHTS, AND NORMAL DAYS AND NIGHTS:
ARCTIC GROUND TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND ENGAGEMENT
By Dr. Lester W. Grau
President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov.
“Cooperation with countries of the Islamic world in the media sphere is one of the key aspects of the Russian international policy.”
In December 2022, the Moscow headquarters of the Russian news channel RT hosted a conference titled “Russia and the Islamic World: Practical Steps in Media Cooperation.” The conference was co-sponsored by three entities: the Group of Strategic Vision Russia–Islamic World (GSV); Russia’s Sputnik International News Agency, which is highly influential in Arabic-speaking countries; and the Union of Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) News Agencies (UNA).[i] The conference featured representatives from Emirati and Turkish media and aimed to not only strengthen media coordination between Russia and OIC countries, but also to harmonize broader narratives in order to counter “misinformation.” The accompanying excerpt, published in the Saudi English-language daily Arab News, highlights how “Moscow is shifting its focus to the Muslim world.” The Kremlin is looking to deepen policies promoting Russo-Muslim cooperation mechanisms—including the annual GSV-hosted Kazan Summit, one of the primary economic summits for Russia and OIC countries—which may provide Moscow with opportunities to skirt economic sanctions. The Kremlin also hopes that such efforts may promote the continued the neutrality of Muslim countries vis-à-vis Ukraine.[ii] As GSV chairman and Tatarstan Republic leader Rustam Minnikhanov expressed in his address to the December conference, excerpted alongside this commentary from the official GSV website, “cooperation with countries of the Islamic world in the media sphere is one of the key aspects of the Russian international policy.” Especially noteworthy is the role played by the GSV and similar organizations in strengthening Russo-Turkish cooperation, given the historical links between Turkey and Russian Muslim-majority areas such as Tatarstan, which some in Turkey consider part of the broader “Turkic World.” Thus, Russo-Muslim cooperation mechanisms such as the GSV are not only fulfilling an important and immediate geopolitical role, but they also push forward the type of historical, quasi-civilizational approach to geostrategic thinking that has steadily emerged in both Putin’s Russia and Erdogan’s Turkey.[iii]
Sources:
Diana Galeeva. “Moscow shifts its focus to the Muslim world,” Arab News (English-language Saudi daily), 17 December 2022. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2217786
In addition to the activities of the Russian Muftiates, which Russia has used as part of its religious soft power since the 2000s, are the Group of the Strategic Vision “Russia-Islamic world,” the para-diplomacies of the Russian Muslim regions (Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), and the activities of Muslim NGOs, such as the Association of Muslim Businessmen of the Russian Federation. Arguably, these policies have helped Russia to achieve economic, political and security advantages, including investments in its regions (Chechnya and Tatarstan) by the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The neutral position of GCC states over the Ukraine crisis also suggests the positive outcomes of these policies.
“International Conference ‘Developing Media Cooperation with the Islamic World – Russia’s Most Important Doctrine’,” Group of Strategic Vision Russia – Islamic World, 15 December 2022. https://russia-islworld.ru/en/novosti//international-conference-developing-media-cooperation-with-the-islamic-world-russias-most-important-doctrine-2022-12-15-29854/ Moreover, regular events held by the Group of Strategic Vision ‘Russia – Islamic World’ testify to the dynamics of fruitful international relations. Cooperation with countries of the Islamic world in the media sphere is one of the key aspects of the Russian international policy. Rustam Minnikhanov expressed his opinion that in the current difficult geopolitical situation the role of mass media was increasing and that the journalistic work of honest and verified mass media was crucial in combating false information and promoting traditional spiritual values.
Notes:
[i] The GSV is a Russian entity formed in 2006 to coordinate Moscow’s relations with the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a multilateral forum of Muslim-majority countries in which Russia is an observer state. In 2014, President Putin bolstered the GSV’s capabilities as a conduit for Russian influence in Muslim-majority countries by increasing its visibility and appointing Tatarstan Republic leader Rustam Minnikhanov as its head.
[ii] In January 2023, a presidential decree made the Kazan Summit an annual event. The summit’s website is available at: https://kazansummit.ru/en/
[iii] One of the most visible proponents of this type of thinking in Russia is Alexander Dugin, a Russian political philosopher whose geopolitical musings are thought to influence the strategic thinking of the Russian armed forces’ leadership. See: Lucas Winter, “The Appeal of ‘Duginism’ in the Middle East,” OE Watch. 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/427403
Image Information:
Image: President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Rustam_Minnikhanov_official_portrait.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0
Map of Central Asia.
“China can successfully form the image of a guarantor of the security of the countries of the region, replacing Russia in this capacity.”
The ripple effects of the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022 continue to reverberate around the world, particularly among China and Russia’s other neighbors. As the excerpted article from the semi-independent Russia-based Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye[i] indicates, given the demands of fighting in Ukraine, “it is increasingly difficult for Russia to ensure the security of Central Asia.” Furthermore, after its poor military performance in Ukraine, regional leaders see that the Russian armed forces are not nearly as formidable as they were once believed to be. And yet, Russia’s unprovoked attack has led certain Central Asian countries to worry about being met with the same fate as Ukraine.
Given Russia’s growing absence from Central Asia, the author, military journalist Alexander Khramchikhin, asserts that “with all these circumstances, China can dominate the region almost automatically.”[ii] He continues to say that a Chinese military presence in Central Asia is steadily developing, since over the last several years, the People’s Liberation Army of China and the People’s Armed Police have already conducted numerous joint exercises with the armies, border police, and internal troops of various Central Asian countries. The author then concludes that “China can successfully form the image of a guarantor of the security of the countries of the region…replacing Russia in this capacity.” The author reviews Chinese involvement in all five Central Asian countries, reminding readers of the recently constructed Chinese base in Tajikistan, claiming that “the place of Moscow as a guarantor of the security of Dushanbe is confidently taken by Beijing.” To ensure that China’s economic interests are well protected, he maintains that it is only a matter of time before further Chinese bases materialize in other Central Asian countries. Khramchikhin concludes that “Beijing will act on the principle of ‘crossing the river, groping for stones,’” suggesting that this transformation of China’s growing military presence in Central Asia will be gradual.
Source:
Alexander Khramchikhin, “Пекин прибирает к рукам страны Центральной Азии (Beijing takes over the countries of Central Asia),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (semi-independent Russian news source focused on military topics), 26 January 2023. https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2023-01-26/5_1222_asia.html
…Central Asia is now in the deep shadow of the Ukrainian events. But this does not mean at all that the struggle for it has ceased. In addition to geographic proximity, Russia has powerful historical, linguistic, cultural, economic, political, and military ties with the countries of Central Asia. To a large extent, the labor markets of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are oriented towards Russia. This explains the very significant influence of Moscow in the region….
…However, these ties are also gradually beginning to blur and weaken. In particular, Ukrainian events contribute to this. Because of them, it is increasingly difficult for Russia to ensure the security of Central Asia: too large forces are deployed by Moscow in Ukraine. In addition, the countries of the region see that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are by no means as strong as previously thought. On the other hand, some of these countries are beginning to fear sharing the fate of Ukraine…. In connection with all these circumstances, China can dominate the region almost automatically. In fact, competitors themselves give him this dominance….
The growth of China’s economic influence in the countries of Central Asia automatically leads to an increase in political influence…. If the growth of China’s economic influence in Central Asia is automatically followed by the growth of its political influence, then, obviously, the growth of political influence will be followed by the growth of military influence, which is already happening. In addition, most of China’s economic projects in the countries of Central Asia are part of the global One Belt, One Road project. Accordingly, Beijing wants to ensure the safety of these projects.
…In the 21st century, the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) have already conducted dozens of joint exercises with the armies, border and internal troops of the Central Asian countries.… Accordingly, China can successfully form the image of a guarantor of the security of the countries of the region from the well-known “three evils” (terrorism, separatism, extremism), replacing Russia in this capacity.
…The highest form of military cooperation between China and the countries of Central Asia is the deployment of Chinese military bases in the region…. Quite expectedly, it began with Tajikistan – the weakest country in Central Asia militarily and economically, the most remote from Russia, while having the longest border with Afghanistan… Dushanbe is experiencing a serious security deficit and is not sure that Moscow is able to solve this problem (especially now, in the context of the Ukrainian campaign). Therefore, the place of Moscow as a guarantor of the security of Dushanbe is confidently taken by Beijing….
The deployment of Chinese military bases in other countries of the region is apparently a matter of time. The pace and order of deployment of Chinese military facilities in the countries of Central Asia will be determined both by the general geopolitical situation and the degree of economic dependence of each specific country on China. …Most likely Tajikistan will be followed by Kyrgyzstan, then Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The last one, apparently, will give consent to the deployment of PLA facilities in the country Kazakhstan…. Chinese military bases in Central Asia will ensure the smooth functioning of the Belt and Road Initiative and the stability of local regimes. At first, Chinese facilities in the countries of the region are unlikely to be too large, but gradually the presence of the PLA and the PAP in these states will expand. As in all other areas, Beijing will act on the principle of ‘crossing the river, groping for stones.’ Almost always, the implementation of this principle leads China to success.
Notes:
[i]Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (Independent Military Review).
[ii] Alexander Khramchikhin was one of the few Russian military analysts who warned against an invasion of Ukraine, arguing that such an attack could have catastrophic consequences for Russia. See: Alexander Khramchikhin, “Полураспад Украины (Half-life of Ukraine),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye, 11 March 2021. https://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2021-03-11/8_1132_ukraine.html
Image Information:
Image: Map of Central Asia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Central_Asia_-_political_map_2008.svg
Attribution: CCA-SA 3.0
Air Defense Forces.
“The main goal of the exercise was to test the readiness to repulse enemy air attacks on military and civilian infrastructure.”
Like other countries around the world, Kazakhstan appears to be drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine to guide training for its armed forces, particularly in the use of or defense against unmanned aerial systems. In the accompanying excerpted article from Kazakhstan’s Inform Buro, Kazakhstan’s air defense forces carried out training on the “detection and destruction of drones for the first time” with the primary intent of the exercise being to “test the readiness to repulse enemy air attacks on military and civilian infrastructure.” The article also notes that Kazakhstani air defense forces worked on eliminating “several small-sized, low-flying targets at once” as well as destroying “high-speed targets.” While the article does not mention the war in Ukraine specifically, the scenario of the exercise resembles the types of attacks by unmanned systems being carried out in that theater of operations. Kazakhstan has always been concerned that the northern regions of the country would be annexed by Russia under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians and the predominantly Russian-speaking population. A few Russian media outlets have been critical of Kazakhstan since the war in Ukraine began, particularly after Kazakh officials announced in the spring of 2022 that its armed forces would not take part in a Victory Day parade on 9 May to mark the Soviet Union’s victory in the Second World War, but would instead carry out a training exercise to improve combat readiness.[i] These Russian news outlets went as far as to suggest that Kazakhstan could share the same fate as Ukraine. Despite this rhetoric, the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan have maintained mostly good relations since the war in Ukraine began.[ii] However, Kazakhstan’s air defense exercise shows that Kazakh officials are probably watching the war in Ukraine with concern and have carried out relevant military training to prepare for a similar conflict on its own territory.
Source:
“Силы воздушной обороны Казахстана впервые отработали уничтожение беспилотников (The air defense forces of Kazakhstan worked out the destruction of unmanned aerial vehicles for the first time),” Inform Buro (news website in Kazakhstan), 2 February 2023.
The live-firing of anti-aircraft missiles of the air defense forces took place at the Sary-Shagan training facility…According to the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan, soldiers trained on the detection and destruction of drones for the first time…
The main goal of the exercise was to test the readiness to repulse enemy air attacks on military and civilian infrastructure…“(they) practiced actions to detect, track, and destroy several small-sized, low-flying targets at once,” said Colonel Berik Moldakulov, commander of the air defense brigade…they also worked out tasks to detect and destroy high-speed targets.…the exercise also showed the ability of anti-aircraft missile systems to rapidly deploy…
Notes:
[i] For more information on Kazakhstan’s exercise and the cancelled parade, see: Matthew Stein “Kazakhstan Cancels Soviet-Era Parade To Focus on Combat Readiness,” OE Watch, 3-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues
[ii] For more on the nature of recent Kazakh-Russian relations, see: Jacob Zenn, “Russian-Led Military Alliance in Central Asia Weakening Amid Quagmire in Ukraine,” OE Watch, 1-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/434130; Matthew Stein, “Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/427937; Matthew Stein, “Ukraine War Likely To Reduce Russian Security Commitments in Central Asia,” OE Watch, 8-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/422028.
Image Information:
Image: Air Defense Forces.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakh_Air_Defense_Forces#/media/File:Coa_vvsrk.svg
Attribution: Public Domain
VDV (airborne) troopers on parade repetition.
“Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the rights of the Russian military and their families must be protected.”
Despite Russian propaganda efforts to promote military service, the Kremlin and the Defense Ministry have struggled to enlist adequate manpower to fight Ukraine. Even after mobilizing 300,000 new soldiers in the fall of 2022, the Defense Ministry continues to seek new and capable fighters, including immigrants and convicted felons. As the accompanying excerpts illustrate, additional incentives have been introduced to attract new recruits and to further motivate those already in uniform. The first article from the pro-Kremlin news outlet Izvestiya describes how Russian veterans of the Ukraine invasion can expect extensive benefits. The list includes incentives such as vouchers for sanatoriums, free prostheses, and various housing, tax, and health benefits. While the list is long, obtaining promised benefits is often another story. Recall that Russia has no equivalent to the U.S. Veterans Administration. As such, depending on the type of uniformed service and current place of residence, there is often a wide disparity of benefits and care provided to Russian military veterans.[i] The second excerpted article from the government site Rossiyskaya Gazeta describes additional payments Russian soldiers can receive “for destroyed or captured equipment of Ukrainian militants.” For example, soldiers can earn 300,000 rubles ($4,300) for a downed aircraft or 100,000 rubles ($1,450) for having “destroyed a large number of enemy manpower.” The article, however, does not spell out the procedures for receiving these payments. Finally, the third article, from the pro-Kremlin site RT, briefly describes a recent meeting between Putin and Russian judges, where they discussed “grounds for suspending legal proceedings, including if a citizen who is a party to the case participates in hostilities as part of the Russian Armed Forces or other military formations.” Behind this bureaucratic language, Putin is telling the judges that Russian military personnel should have criminal charges dismissed if they fight in Ukraine.[ii] The variety of additional benefits and incentives being introduced by Moscow suggest that Russian recruiting efforts have not proven sufficient, and that the Kremlin may soon have to rely more upon coercion to replenish its military ranks.
Sources:
“Какие выплаты положены ветеранам боевых действий в России (What payments are due to war veterans in Russia),” Izvestiya (pro-Kremlin source), 16 January 2023. https://iz.ru/1455408/2023-01-16/kakie-vyplaty-polozheny-veteranam-boevykh-deistvii-v-rossii-grafika
Veterans of military operations in Russia can count on financial and other support from the state. They are entitled to monthly payments and a number of benefits….
Combat veterans can apply for: cash supplement to the pension; partial compensation of expenses for housing and communal services; free vouchers for sanatoriums; free prostheses and rehabilitation aids; extraordinary service; a one-time payment for the construction of a house or the purchase of housing; tax and land benefits; other social preferences….
Ilya Maksimov, “Представлен список поощрений за уничтожение и захват техники ВСУ (A list of rewards for the destruction and capture of Ukrainian military equipment),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Government newspaper), 15 November 2023. https://rg.ru/2022/11/15/predstavlen-spisok-pooshchrenij-za-unichtozhennuiu-tehniku-vsu.html
A list of rewards for destroyed or captured equipment of Ukrainian militants is presented… The biggest bonus is for those who were able to destroy an enemy aircraft – 300,000 rubles will be paid for this. The helicopter was valued at 200 thousand rubles, the drone – at 50 thousand.
The award is also given for the destruction of ground equipment. The fighter who eliminated the tank can claim a bonus of 100 thousand rubles. For the destruction of infantry fighting vehicles, BMDs, armored personnel carriers, MTLBs, self-propelled guns, S-300 [GRLCUT(1] systems, Buk[GRLCUT(2] , Tor, Osa complexes or MLRS launchers, they will pay 50 thousand rubles.
Bonus payments are also possible to military personnel who have destroyed a large number of enemy manpower or who have completed other tasks assigned to them. This premium is up to 100 thousand rubles.
“Путин: права российских военных и их семей должны быть защищены (Putin: the rights of the Russian military and their families must be protected),” RT (pro-Kremlin news outlet), 14 February 2023. https://russian.rt.com/russia/news/1111177-putin-voennye-semi
Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the rights of the Russian military and their families must be protected. The President stated this during a meeting with the judges. He recalled the recent adoption of a number of legislative decisions on social support for the military, mobilized citizens and their families.The new measures provide additional grounds for suspending legal proceedings, including if a citizen who is a party to the case participates in hostilities as part of the Russian Armed Forces or other military formations. According to him, the courts should carefully consider issues involving the military, taking into account not only legal aspects, but also specific life circumstances and situations….
Notes:
[i] For additional background on benefits for Russian veterans, see: Ray Finch, “Proposal to Restore Veterans’ Benefits,” OE Watch, July 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/277121; Ray Finch, “Russian Military Experiencing Pay Problems,” OE Watch, 1-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/433072; Ray Finch, “Lack of PTSD Treatment for Russian Soldiers,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429190.
[ii] Notably, a similar strategy has also been used by the Russian private military company Wagner, wherein convicts can have their records expunged and earn their freedom in exchange for a six-month tour in Ukraine.
Image: VDV (airborne) troopers on parade repetition
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Comp_41.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 3.0
“The most important issue on today’s agenda is the fulfillment of President Putin’s instructions to increase shipping volumes on the Northern Sea Route to 80 million tons by the year 2024.”
According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer,despite fighting in Ukraine and sanctions by the West, Russia continues to strongly push the expansion of the Northern Sea Route’s capacity. Most notably, the accompanying article notes that Russia seeks to expand from a shipment of 34 million tons of goods in 2022 to a projected 80 million tons by 2024. It also notes that Russia has set a target of implementing the construction of 41 new cargo vessels by 2030. In the past, President Putin has set increased shipping goals for the Northern Sea Route and, officially, they have been met. Yet, given the significantly ambitious increase from 34 million metric tons to 80 million metric tons, we do not know what goods are being shipped and who the customers are. Today, much of the Northern Sea Route shipping goes east to the Russian Far East and China; it also remains the case that many non-European countries are ready to expand trade with Russia regardless of its invasion of Ukraine. In terms of what will get shipped, given Russia’s natural resources and the never-ending need for sources of energy, much of this cargo will be liquified natural gas (LNG), coal, oil, timber, and processed metals. Grain shipments by barge up the Lena River to the Arctic Ocean and on to China have already been accomplished at a cheaper rate than rail. Still, it may be the case that the new proposed capacities might exceed demand. Annual increases of two to four million metric tons are achievable, but an increase to of the likes projected here would be unprecedented. If accomplished, though, any increase in shipping capacity could help Russia offset export losses due to ongoing sanctions.
Source:
Atle Staalesen, “Moscow assures it will not lower ambitions in Arctic,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 13 February 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2023/02/moscow-assures-it-will-not-lower-ambitions-arctic
“The most important issue on today’s agenda is the fulfillment of President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin’s instructions to increase shipping volumes on the Northern Sea Route to 80 million tons by the year 2024,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister YuriTruter said as he on the 11th of February opened a meeting in the State Commission on Arctic Development.
In the room were representatives of key federal ministries, regional governments, and state companies. Western sanctions have caused certain difficulties in reaching the president’s objectives, the high-ranking government official admitted. But investment projects in the Arctic are still proceeding according to plans, he assured the group.
In 2022, a total of 34 million tons of goods was shipped on the route. “It is a good result,” Trutnev underlined, and explained that the original plan for the year was only 32 million tons.
Despite the war against Ukraine and the severe economic hardships facing the country, the Northern Sea Route remains a top priority for the Russian government.
The cabinet headed by Premier Mikhail Mishustin continues to aim for an unprecedented boost in Arctic shipping, and the ambitions outlined in the federal” Plan on the development of the Northern Sea Route” as adopted in August 2022 remains intact.
The document says shipping on the route is to increase to 80 million tons in 2024 and later to 150 million tons in 2030 and 220 million tons in 2035.
In order to reach the target, a total of 41 new cargo vessels must be built by 2030, the leader of the Arctic Commission argued in last week’s meeting. Trutnev also underlined that the goods capacity of seaports along the Northern Sea Route will increase to 36 million tons in 2023 and to 83 million tons in 2024.
Behind the port development stands nuclear power company Rosatom, that in 2022 completed the construction of the Utrenneye terminal in the Gulf of Ob. In 2024, Rosneft’s Sever Bay terminal will stand ready on the coast of the Kara Sea, and the same year — the nearby new coal terminal of the Severnaya Zvezda.
But there are looming financial troubles in the horizon. “I do not exclude that we will have to find new solutions to financing the operations, so that there appears no deficit of funds in any phases of development,” Trutnev told his commission colleagues.And despite the dramatic increase in federal deficit, the government official underlined that the state is ready to offer support. “If one of the companies will not have financing, that does not mean that it will be abandoned, [but] we must help,” Trutnev said.
The Conduct of Wagner Assault Units Against Positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
“The main task of the assault detachment for the day is to capture a platoon strongpoint.”
In February 2023, a pro-Russian Telegram channel called Institute of the SMO / People’s Translation, which translates Ukrainian-language documents into, posted a document purported to be a translation of a Ukrainian General Staff analysis regarding private military company Wagner assault detachments. The accompanying excerpts from the document describe the composition and tactics of Wagner detachments. The document also included the accompanying graphic depicting two dismounted Wagner assault platoons, supported by one tank and two bronnegruppa—infantry fighting vehicles, minus dismounts, providing supporting fires—attacking and penetrating a layered Ukrainian defense. There is an artillery platoon of two 82mm or 120mm mortars and one D-30 [GRLCUT(1] towed 122mm howitzer. The graphic depicts many planned artillery concentrations, annotated as three-digit numbers, and shows how fires will shift in relation to the advance of the Wagner assault platoons. The artillery platoon fires on the 100-level positions first, then and shifts fire to the 200 level, and then subsequent firing positions as the assault platoons advance. This scheme of fire suggests that the Wagner forces are expecting the Ukrainians to be well dug-in and dispersed. The relatively large number of artillery concentrations given such few artillery assets also suggests that there are additional artillery assets (not indicated on the graphic) that are supporting the attack, since the artillery platoon has insufficient assets and range (mortars) to fire the missions as depicted. There is likely an evacuation group that will advance behind the attack to repair or evacuate damaged vehicles. The adoption of these formations by Wagner illustrates how Russia is adapting trench warfare conditions more reminiscent of the First World War, as opposed to the high-speed maneuver warfare that was practiced during and after the Cold War. If these formations are deemed successful by Russia, it is likely the Russian Armed Forces will adopt similar ad-hoc structures for fighting in these conditions.
Source:
“Тактика ВСУ По Противодействию ЧВК «Вагнер» (Tactics of the Ukrainian Armed Forces against PMC ‘Wagner’),” Institute of the SMO / People’s Translation, a pro-Russian Telegram channel that translates Ukrainian language documents into Russian for the benefit of those fighting against Ukraine, 2 February 2023. https://tgstat.ru/channel/@svo_institute
This text is a direct translation from the Ukrainian language, compiled for scientific, educational, and reference purposes, has not been edited, should not be used for learning without understanding and interpretation, taking into account the circumstances of its origin. It does not reflect the position of translators and other participants in the “People’s Translation” project…
In the areas of concentration of the main efforts by the enemy, the units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine are increasingly faced with active opposition from the units of the Wagner PMC [private military company]. The enemy is trying to exert constant pressure on the chosen directions, so the attacks actually have the character of constant battle of small groups of light infantry. The first attack involves location of our fires assets for the enemy’s aerial reconnaissance platforms, and additional reconnaissance. As a result, the shelling of our positions after a repulsed attack is carried out in a way that is more massed than preparatory artillery strikes. And then a new attack is readied. This makes it possible to concentrate forces where Ukrainian troops have weaker reconnaissance, have fewer means of destruction, and have less resilience.
The enemy continues to apply new methods of warfare, testing them with the more trained units of the PMC “Wagner”, further spreading the experience gained in the infantry units. Based on the generalized data, it has been established that in order to carry out counteroffensive (assault) operations in the Liman direction, the enemy uses assault detachments (groups) (hereinafter referred to as assault units) and “fixing” units. If earlier assault detachments were mainly involved in conducting assault operations in the city, now the enemy uses assault units to carry out an offensive in all sectors of the line of contact and various types of terrain (urbanized terrain, forest, swamps, steppe zone, etc.).
Assault detachments are formed on the basis of a motorized rifle company, which is reinforced with tanks, flamethrower [thermobaric rocket launcher] and mortar crews, and ATGM crews. The team may also include:
• an engineer squad;
• a group from the GRU Spetsnaz brigade (reconnaissance unit);
• a UAV crew;
• an evacuation group.
The assault detachment is divided into 5-8 assault groups.
The assault group includes: a motorized rifle squad, reinforced with a grenade launcher and flamethrower crew.
The main task of the assault detachment for the day is to capture a platoon strongpoint. After completing the task, the detachment is withdrawn for 1-2 days to recover and rest. In place of the assault unit, “fixing” units are brought in. After reconstitution, the assault units can again be involved in combat.A “fixing” unit is a reinforced motorized rifle company or (motorized rifle platoon), from among the combined arms units (military units), as well as BARS [reserve] units and/or territorial troops…
Image Information:
Image: The Conduct of Wagner Assault Units Against Positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Source: Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army,
Attribution: Public Domain
Conscripts being inducted for military service.
Military document issued to new conscripts.
“Against the backdrop of a special military operation (SMO), State Duma deputies have raised the issue of increasing military service to two years.”
The accompanying excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin daily newspaper, Izvestiya, discusses the possibility of Russia extending the mandatory military conscription period from one to two years.[i] This change, in conjunction with the Russian military’s absorption of the separatist forces from Luhansk and Donetsk, will likely result in the Russian military adding more than 300,000 personnel to its ranks. In addition, a two-year conscription period will also likely lead to an overall qualitative improvement in Russian military capabilities because, according to Russian commanders, a one-year term of service for conscripts is too short for them to become fully combat capable. For this reason, Russia employs conscript-manned battalions and contract-manned battalions that have abbreviated training schedules for the conscript units.[ii] A change to a two-year conscription model will likely allow conscript units to be trained on the same schedule as their contract brethren.
Source:
Maria Shaipova, “Два против одного: в России обсуждают увеличение срока службы в армии (Two Against One: In Russia They Are Discussing an Increase to The Length of Military Service),” Izvestiya (Pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 3 November 2022.
Against the backdrop of a special military operation (SMO), State Duma deputies have raised the issue of increasing military service to two years. The Kremlin says that these issues should be resolved in the Ministry of Defense. What will be the term of service in the army in 2023, as well as how the conditions for recruits have changed?
Yury Shvytkin, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense, announced on November 3 that he would return to two-year service against the backdrop of the SMO. According to him, this is due to the need to securely consolidate the knowledge the conscripts gain during military training. The idea was supported by State Duma deputy from Crimea, Mikhail Sheremet. He did not rule out that the corresponding initiative could be submitted for consideration by the deputies of the State Duma.
However, the Federation Council questioned the need to return to the two-year system. According to Andrey Klishas, the head of the Federation Council committee on constitutional legislation and state building, the number of contract servicemen affects the combat capability of the army. And an increase in conscription service is unlikely to significantly affect the quality of the troops. Both the senators and the press secretary of the President of Russia Dmitry Peskov said that the opinion of the head of the Ministry of Defense will be decisive in regard to the term of service in 2023…
Currently, the term of service in the army is 12 months for all branches of service. The call is held twice a year: from April 1 to July 15 and from October 1 to December 31…As emphasized by the Ministry of Defense, the recruits of the autumn draft-2022 will not be sent to the SMO zone or serve in the newly annexed territories…The term of service in the Russian army was reduced from two to one year in 2008, in parallel with this, the troops were reoriented to the contract method of manning. A transitional period was established, and some of the conscripts served 18 months from 2007 to 2008…During the period of military reform in the country, the total size of the army was reduced to 1 million people, while the proportion of conscripts decreased, and the number of contract soldiers increased.
The transition to a voluntary (contract) principle of manning the Russian army has been discussed since the early 1990s. In 1992, it was supported by the Supreme Council and the President of the Russian Federation, but the Ministry of Defense insisted on maintaining the conscription service. As a result, in 2003, it was decided to equip individual units and branches of the Armed Forces, as well as Border Troops, also with contract troops. For the Internal Troops (MVD-VV), it was decided to maintain conscription, but to reduce the term of service.
Notes:
[i] Russian military conscription dates to Peter the Great (1672-1725), when the selected individuals served for life. From 1874, the entire male population of the country over the age of 21 was subject to conscription with a term of 15 years, six on active duty and nine years in the reserve. By the beginning of the 1900s, the term of service in the Ground Forces was reduced to three or four years, while in the Navy, it was five years. During World War Two (Great Patriotic War), the entire Russian population was considered “mobilized.” In 1967, conscripts began to serve two years in the Ground Forces and three years in the Navy. In 1993, the term of service was reduced to one-and-half years but raised to two years in 1996 amid the first Chechen War. Since 2008, Russia has practiced a one-year conscription period.
[ii] By regulation, most Russian Ground Forces maneuver (motorized rifle or tank) units (regiments or brigades) are required to maintain two battalion tactical groups that are fully manned with contract soldiers. Since motorized rifle units have three motorized rifle battalions and one tank battalion, the third motorized rifle battalion is manned with conscript soldiers and is sometimes colloquially referred to as a “reserve” battalion.
Russian Naval Infantry.
Russian Naval Infantry.
“The current world tectonic events require a significant strengthening…of the Naval Infantry of the Russian Navy.”
At the beginning of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian Naval Infantry included five brigades and one regiment. During the invasion, Russia has formed at least three more naval infantry battalions from volunteers and mobilized personnel, trained based on existing naval infantry formations such as the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade in Primorye.[i] In late December, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced a large expansion of the Russian Armed Forces, including the addition of 12 new divisions. Five of these new divisions will be formed by converting five naval infantry brigades into naval infantry divisions.[ii] The accompanying excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin daily newspaper Izvestiya states that these new naval infantry divisions will consist of two naval infantry regiments, a tank battalion, reconnaissance battalion, artillery regiment, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) battalion. The naval infantry regiments in the divisions will likely resemble the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment subordinated to the Caspian Flotilla, consisting of three battalions, an airborne reconnaissance company, UAV company, artillery, and other units. These divisions will be much smaller than equivalent U.S./NATO echelons, likely having less than 5,500 personnel per division when fully staffed.
Sources:
Dmitry Boltenkov,“Морскими темпами: как изменится структура черных беретов в ближайшие годы (At the Sea’s Pace: How the Structure of Black Berets Will Change in the Coming Years),” Izvestiya (Pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 3 January 2023.
The current world tectonic events require a significant strengthening, first of all, of the Naval Infantry of the Russian Navy. On December 21, 2022, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced plans to form five Naval Infantry divisions.
In 2018, the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment was created in Kaspiysk to support the Caspian Flotilla. It consists of three battalions, an airborne reconnaissance company, UAV company, artillery and other units. Most likely this promising regimental structure will be basis for future naval infantry regiments…
In Kamchatka, the 40th Krasnodar-Kharbinskaya twice Red Banner Brigade is practically the only formation capable of resisting the attempts of a potential enemy to seize this remote territory… In Primorye, the 155th Guards Brigade is also, in fact, the only large formation in the Vladivostok region capable of defending the region and participating in counter-landing operations on Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands… In the north, on the Kola Peninsula, Russia currently has only three brigades: the 61st Kirkenesskaya Red Banner MP, the 200th motorized rifle and Arctic brigades. Sweden and Finland finally decided to break with their neutrality and join NATO. Accordingly, Russia will have to strengthen its northern borders. The 336th Guards Brigade and a number of other units of the coastal troops of the Baltic Fleet are deployed in the Kaliningrad exclave. The exclave is surrounded by the most hostile NATO states to Russia – Poland and the Baltic states. In 2023, we should expect the integration of parts of the DPR and LPR into the Russian Armed Forces. It is possible that the Black Sea division of the Naval Infantry will be deployed on the basis of these units. And in general, the situation in the Ukrainian direction for many years will require the presence of powerful forces capable of also conducting amphibious assault operations.
Do not forget the fact that on long-distance cruises there are groups of Naval Infantry on warships and auxiliary vessels to defend these units themselves from enemy saboteurs. With the increase in the naval fleet and the intensification of the Russian Navy’s combat service, more Naval Infantry are required to defend our ships.Thus, at present there is a direct need for Russia to increase the number and power of its amphibious strike formations. Even now such work is underway. So, for example, in the brigades of the Naval Infantry of the Pacific Fleet operating in the Donbass, 152-mm artillery systems are observed, these systems were not previously in service with the Naval Infantry units. The divisions themselves, presumably, will look like this: two regiments of naval infantry, tank battalion, reconnaissance battalion, artillery regiment, and UAV battalion…
Notes:
[i] Russian Naval Infantry have been active in Ukraine since the first day of Russia’s 2022 invasion. The Naval Infantry reportedly conducted a successful landing in Berdyansk and was involved with the taking of Mariupol. Russian sources also claim that the possibility of a landing of Black Sea Fleet Naval Infantry units near Odessa, which never materialized, was successful in the sense that many Ukrainian forces were fixed for a time to defend against the landing, providing freedom of maneuver for other Russian forces. Naval Infantry units were also active around Kyiv, Kharkov, and Pavlovka. Eight Naval Infantrymen have earned the title “Hero of Russia,” some posthumously, since the onset of the conflict. The honorary title of “Guards” was bestowed on the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet, and the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Baltic Fleet was awarded the Order of Zhukov. The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade reportedly requested to have “Mariupol” added to its official unit title due to its role in supposedly liberating the city.
[ii] The Naval Infantry has been reorganized many times since its inception in 1705. The most recent organization occurred during the “New Look” reforms, resulting in each Russia’s four fleets having its own Naval Infantry brigade (although the Pacific Fleet has two Naval Infantry brigades). By 2017, the standard structure of Naval Infantry brigades consisted of a reconnaissance battalion, an air assault battalion, one or two naval infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a tank battalion or company, a UAV company, a sniper company, and a few other units.
Image Information:
Image 1: Russian Naval Infantry
Source: https://tinyurl.com/47f4pcny
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0
Image 2: Russian Naval Infantry
Source: https://tinyurl.com/47f4pcny
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0
Nikol Pashinyan.
“It is dispiriting that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions.”
Armenia’s frustration with Russia and its role as the de facto leader of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) appeared to reach a head at the organization’s November 2022 summit, when Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan abruptly ended a meeting with leaders of the other member states and refused to sign two documents drafted during the summit. For his part, Pashinyan had previously criticized Russia’s response to multiple attacks by Azerbaijan against Armenia in 2022 and Russia’s inability to deliver weapons that Armenia purchased.[i] The accompanying excerpted articles provide additional context on Pashinyan’s actions during the recent CSTO summit as well as how the Armenian government continues to pursue other security cooperation partnerships—namely with India—due to what it perceives to be continued failures by Russia and the CSTO.
The first article, from the Armenian state news agency Armenpress, reports on Pashinyan’s speech during the CSTO summit. Pashinyan mentions the three major clashes that took place between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War ended and how “Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions.”[ii] He states that these clashes caused “great damage to the image of the CSTO both within our country and abroad.” Pashinyan goes on to outline the Armenian government’s position on how its borders have been violated by Azerbaijan and that these actions should have been considered an attack that would have necessitated a strong response from the CSTO. According to the CSTO’s charter, this could have included military assistance, but the organization denied Armenia’s request. Pashinyan ends his speech by explaining how his government proposed negotiating the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s forces from Armenian territory through the CSTO Security Council, but that he would not sign the draft put together by the council because he believes it is an insufficient to prevent Azerbaijan from continuing to act with impunity.
Underscoring Armenia’s disillusionment with Russia, the second accompanying article from the Armenian independent online newspaper Hetq reports on an agreement Armenia signed with India’s Kalyani Strategic Systems two weeks before the CSTO summit to acquire 155 mm artillery systems. The article notes that Armenia’s Defense Minister visited India’s defense exposition in October and that this most recent agreement comes after Armenia signed a contract in September to purchase India’s Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher as well as anti-tank rockets and different types of ammunition.
Overall, there is no indication that Armenia will be leaving the Russia-led CSTO despite calls to do so from Pashinyan’s political opposition. Armenia’s bilateral economic and military ties to Russia make this difficult. Instead, Armenia’s refusal to sign the CSTO’s official response to the situation with Azerbaijan is an example of the types of protest steps we expect the Armenian government to continue to register.
Sources:
“Для нас принципиальную важность имеет подтверждение зоны ответственности ОДКБ в Армении: речь премьера на СКБ ОДКБ (The confirmation of the zone of responsibility of the CSTO in Armenia has the most significance for us: the address of the prime minister at the Special Security Council of the CSTO),” Armenpress (state news agency in Armenia), 23 November 2022.
https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1098011.html
“…The presidency of the Republic of Armenia in the CSTO ends today. This period was very eventful…Over the past two years, the CSTO member state Armenia has been subjected to aggression by Azerbaijan at least three times.
It is dispiriting that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO did not deter Azerbaijan from aggressive actions…These facts cause great damage to the image of the CSTO both within our country and abroad, and I regard this as the main failure of Armenia’s chairmanship in the CSTO…
Our position is as follows: according to the Alma-Ata Declaration of December 21, 1991, the founding countries of the CIS, as independent states, recognized each other’s territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders. This means that the aforementioned countries became independent with the administrative borders that existed between the republics during the Soviet Union. That is, the former administrative borders became state borders, and the territories of the above-mentioned countries were determined by these borders. It is within these borders that the Republic of Armenia became a member of the UN and the CSTO.
Since May 11, 2021, Azerbaijan has used armed forces three times and occupied approximately 140 square kilometers of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia. This happened on May 11 and November 14, 2021 and September 13, 2022.
So, according to the UN resolution of December 14, 1974, number 3314, the above actions of Azerbaijan are regarded as aggression.
What do we expect from the CSTO in this regard? Statements of this fact, in the form of a clearly formulated political assessment. To refrain from such an assessment, saying that there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, means to assert that there is no zone of responsibility of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and if there is no zone of responsibility, then there is no organization itself. It can at least be interpreted that way.
These nuances are also important because they play a decisive role in further collective actions. In this context, I want to respond to comments according to which Armenia is trying to draw the CSTO countries into a war with Azerbaijan. This is pure manipulation, because Armenia cannot be interested in a war, if only because it has suffered enough from wars, including in September of this year.
…Armenia also proposes, by decision of the CSTO CSC, to accelerate the necessary political and diplomatic work with the Azerbaijani side, aimed at the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia to their original positions as of May 11, 2021.
Such a position is important not only for restoring the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia, but also for deterring Azerbaijan from further aggressive actions against our country…Under these conditions, the lack of a clear political assessment of the situation and the failure to make the above decision may mean not only the CSTO’s refusal of allied obligations, but may also be interpreted by Azerbaijan as a green light from the CSTO for further aggression against Armenia…
Therefore, based on this, dear colleagues, at the moment I believe that the draft “Declaration of the CSTO CSC and on joint measures to provide assistance to the Republic of Armenia” submitted for signing is not sufficiently finalized, and in this form, with all due respect, I am not ready to sign these documents…
Vahe Sarukhanyan, “$155M for Artillery: Armenia Signs Another Arms Deal with India,” Hetq (independent online newspaper in Armenia), 11 November 2022.
https://hetq.am/en/article/150099
The Indian press, referring to a November 9 statement released by the local Bharat Forge company, reports that the latter’s military-industrial subsidiary, Kalyani Strategic Systems, has received a US $155 million order to export 155 mm artillery gun systems to Armenia over the next three years.
Although Bharat Forge didn’t disclose the identity of the customer, the Indian Business Standard news site writes that according to its sources in the Indian Defense Ministry the contract was signed with the Armenian government…
…In October, Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan led a delegation to a defense industry exhibition (DefExpo-2022) in Gandhinagar, India displaying locally manufactured armaments and defense systems.
This latest arms deal follows a September 2022 $245 million contract Armenia signed with India to purchase Indian-made Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank rockets and various types of ammunition…
Notes:
[i] For more context on Armenia’s acquisition of Indian systems, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries,” OE Watch, Issue #11, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429405
[ii] For background on the recent incidents between Armenia and Azerbaijan, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Questions Russian Peacekeeping After Nagorno-Karabakh Incident,” OE Watch, Issue #9, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425540
Image Information:
Image: Nikol Pashinyan
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_April_2021_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0