Category Archives: Russia

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Russia.

Russia Demonstrating Power Projection Capabilities With Havana Port Call

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An Admiral Gorshkov class frigate at sea was part of the five Russian warships that paid a port of call to Cuba in June 2024.

“Cuba is Russia’s most important partner in the Western Hemisphere from a purely geopolitical and geostrategic point of view.”

Summary: The Russian government has sent a flotilla of three warships and one nuclear-powered submarine to port in Havana, Cuba. Its stated intentions are both to punish Western countries for supporting Ukraine and to display its own power projection capabilities. 

Latin America holds an important place in Russia’s foreign and defense policy.[i] Most importantly, Latin America is a key battleground for pushing back against the United States’ operations in the European theater—specifically Ukraine.

According to the excerpted article in the Spanish daily El País, the recent port call of four Russian naval vessels in Havana, Cuba should be seen within this context. Prior to arriving in Cuba, the three surface warships and a nuclear-powered submarine participated in missile exercises in the Atlantic Ocean. While Russia’s Navy had been visiting the Caribbean more frequently in the past, COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have curtailed the number of these visits. El País also reports that once the Russian warships leave Cuba they will conduct exercises in the Caribbean before continuing onwards to Venezuela. The Cuban government was quick to point out that none of the vessels are nuclear armed. However, as reported in the second excerpted article by the Argentine outlet Infobae, Russians assured the media that the submarine carried hypersonic missiles. Furthermore, Infobae concluded that the timing of the visits was not mere coincidence: the visit came approximately one week after Russian President Vladimir Putin mused about placing weapons in countries close to the United States in response to  Washington’s support of Ukraine.

This development is significant because it reaffirms Russia’s close ties with Cuba and Venezuela and indicates that Russia continues to view Latin America as a central region in near-peer competition. It is also notable that regional responses to the visit have been muted. Few Latin American governments have said anything publicly—possibly a harbinger of broader Russian influence in keeping Latin American countries non-aligned on geopolitical issues.[ii]

Sources:

“Llega al puerto de La Habana una flotilla de buques de guerra rusos con un submarino nuclear (A flotilla of Russian warships arrives at the port of Havana with a nuclear submarine),” El País (a Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 12 June 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-12/llega-al-puerto-de-la-habana-una-flotilla-de-buques-de-guerra-rusos-con-un-submarino-nuclear.html

Until June 17, the ships will remain in Cuban waters…Before arriving in Havana, the Russian ships carried out exercises and maneuvers in the Atlantic. These are not the first naval maneuvers involving Cuba and Russia. In July the Russian Navy training ship Perekop spent several days in Havana. The frigate Almirante Gorshkov was there in 2019…Cuba is Russia’s most important partner in the Western Hemisphere from a purely geopolitical and geostrategic point of view and the meaning of this naval presence is not essentially different from the past: Russia wants to demonstrate that its navy is capable of crossing the oceans and reaching the coasts of Florida.

“Cuba profundiza su relación con Rusia: tres buques de guerra y un submarino llegarán a La Habana para ejercicios militares (Cuba deepens its relationship with Russia: three warships and a submarine will arrive in Havana for military exercises),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 6 June 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/06/06/cuba-profundiza-su-relacion-con-rusia-tres-buques-de-guerra-y-un-submarino-llegaran-a-la-habana-para-ejercicios-militares/  

Although the military maneuvers have been planned in advance, they follow the words of the President of Russia about possible retaliation due to Ukrainian attacks against Russian territory with Western weapons. The president mentioned the possibility of Moscow delivering military material to other countries to carry out ‘attacks against sensitive targets’ of Kyiv’s partners.

Notes:

[i] For more information on how Russia views Latin America, especially in the context of its war against Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “Two Years Later: LAC and Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 February 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/two-years-later-lac-and-russias-war-ukraine

[ii] To read more about Russia’s strategy and how Latin America has remained relatively silent on Russia’s recent activities, and especially its war in Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America has been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 February 27 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

Image:

Image: An Admiral Gorshkov class frigate at sea was part of the five Russian warships that paid a port of call to Cuba in June 2024.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_frigate_Admiral_Gorshkov – /media/File:Admiral_Gorshkov_frigate_03.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russian Drift Station Vital to Arctic Research Effort

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Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station.

“Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea.”

Summary: Russia is using a large drift station called Severney Polyus (North Pole) in the Arctic to gather information.

The Arctic has always been important to Russia[i] and according to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is conducting Arctic research using a large drift station, the Severny Polyus, or North Pole.[ii] The Severney Polyus is a self-propelled platform vessel that houses 34 scientists, 15 laboratories, and crew on board and is designed to autonomously drift through Arctic sea ice for up to two years. According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources, Aleksandr Kozlov, the data collected from the Severney Polyus will form the basis for “understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.” The article notes that Russia’s new Marine Doctrine includes the use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes, including not only trawlers and icebreakers, but also platforms like the Severney Polyus. The deployment of the Severney Polyus to conduct Arctic research is yet another indication of Russia’s vision of the operational environment in the Arctic region, giving Russia a continued presence in the vital region.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Russia says its North Pole platform is key to understanding climate change,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 23 May 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/05/russia-says-its-north-pole-platform-key-understanding-climate-change

Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea. On board has been a crew of 16 and a research team of 34.  The ship in late April made it out of the ice north of Svalbard and in early May sailed southwards.  On the 10th of May it was located to the west of the Ice Fjord at Svalbard and shortly later made it to the waters north of the Bear Island. For unclear reasons, the vessel for several days stayed in the waters of the Bear Island before it proceeded towards Murmansk.

According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources Aleksandr Kozlov, the Severny Polyus offers Russia unique insights into the Arctic.  “With the start of the operations of the self-propelled and ice-protected platform Russia has gotten the possibility to undertake long-term scientific experiments on high latitudes,” Kozlov said in a comment delivered in connection with the arrival of the Severny Polyus in Murmansk.

“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology. The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.”  Kozlov has been Minister of Natural Resources since 2000 and was reappointed in May 2024.  He has also been closely engaged in natural resource cooperation with several foreign countries, among them China and North Korea.

…In the course of the 20-month expedition, the geologists took a number of samples from the Arctic seabed.  The samples will be used as part of Russia’s efforts to expand its borders on the Arctic shelf, representatives of the expedition say.

The Severny Polyus is designed to be able to autonomously drift through Arctic sea-ice for up to two years.  On board are 15 labs where researchers can work year-round.  The ship is operated by Russia’s meteorological service Roshydromet…

The research platform has replaced Russia’s Arctic expeditions based on ice floes organized since the 1930s.  The quickly vanishing Arctic sea-ice made it increasingly hard to organize the expeditions and the last real ice station, the “North Pole-40”, was held in the winter of 2012.

Albeit built for research purposes, the Severny Polyus  could ultimately also be applied by the Russian military.  The country’s new Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.  That could include not only trawler and icebreakers, but also the Severniy Polus.“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology.  The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route” Kozlov explained….

Notes:

[i] Russia began exploring the Arctic in the 11th century.  Trans-Artic navigation continued into the 16th century during voyages to Spitzbergen-Gruman and Novaya Zemlya. In 1764-1776, Captain Chichagov attempted an expedition across the North Pole to the Pacific Ocean. Chichagov’s attempt failed, but much scientific knowledge on the Arctic waters were gained.

[ii] In 1902, Fritjof Nansen, a famous Norwegian Arctic explorer, proposed the idea of a scientific drifting ice station to chart the Arctic waters. In the 1930s, Soviet scientists conducted studies of the Arctic on drifting ships. In 1937, the Soviets built a drifting ice station, “North Pole 1,” on an Arctic ice floe supported by Soviet aviation, followed by “North Pole 2”and so on until “North Pole 40” was built. North Pole 40 had to be evacuated in 2013 as the ice floe was breaking up.

Image Information:

Image: Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiralty_Shipyards – /media/File:Admiralty_Shipyard.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Russia Sees Need for Emphasized “React to Ambush” Training

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Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.

“Counter-ambush actions in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.”

Summary: Russian military observers have called for more emphasis on “react to ambush” training, which they see as a current weakness.

While few units from any nation’s military can survive an ambush unscathed, an article in the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik highlights the need for additional emphasis on “react to ambush drills” in Russian military training programs. These recommendations reflect continuing training deficiencies in basic soldier tasks despite lessons learned in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Ukraine.

The article’s authors recommend adding a sixth task to Chapter 5 of the Russian combat manual “Actions in Armed Conflict, Part 3: Platoon, Squad, Tank.”[i] Titling the task “Educating Personnel on Counter-ambush Activities,” the authors first highlight the need to practice counter-ambush tactics more frequently in individual and collective training. The article further outlines in detail the steps in reacting to an ambush. To begin, commanders must identify likely ambush points and plan accordingly. These points will likely be main avenues of approach containing terrain restricting movement, funneling targets, alongside cover and concealment.

The training recommendations mirror U.S. Army battle drills. Near ambushes are defined by an enemy being within hand grenade range up to 35m. Those caught within the ambush must immediately return fire with all possible weapons, directing fire against enemy positions. Smoke and fragmentation grenades are used to further suppress adversaries and conceal Russian forces in the “fire zone,” enabling assaults on the ambusher’s positions. Russian forces outside the fire zone provide supporting fire. Far ambushes are those outside of 35m. Actions of troops within the fire zone are similar to those in the near-side ambush, except the elements outside the fire zone maneuver to attack the ambusher’s flanks or rear. Those in the fire zone adjust fire as necessary to avoid fratricide. The authors acknowledge the need to train these skills is due to obvious failures and losses in both the initial steps of the Ukrainian invasion in 2022 and the First Chechen War,[ii] both of which were consequences of lack of training. Similar issues also appear in accounts from the Soviet-Afghanistan War,[iii] where Russian forces failed to recognize likely ambush points and hesitated in reacting to ambushes, costing them in men and equipment. Reacting to ambush is the antithesis to the calculated, fires-heavy tactics frequently used by Russian forces and could be a challenge to the Russian largely conscripted ground force.

Sources:

A. Levchenko, “Засада – не приговор (The Ambush is not a Sentence),” Army Review (monthly Russian military periodical), Vol. 6, June 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 30-31: “The practice of military operations in recent military conflicts showed that any movement of a unit, be it large or small, not to mention single machines, is always associated with maximum risk of being attacked by the enemy from ambush. This was especially true for the first stage of the SVO in Ukraine. So, we need to talk about it, especially since counter-ambush training developments in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.

…The word “ambush” has become something like an objective obstacle, “an irresistible force”. Meanwhile, in the overwhelming majority of the analyzed facts of being ambushed and the destruction of columns, commanders’ errors are visible in organizing and conducting a march. Although, according to all governing documents, the responsibility of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act when ambushed.

In our opinion, there is a need to add to Chapter 5 of the Manual for Training for Combined Armed Combat ‘Actions During Armed Conflict’ (Part 3 ‘Platoon, squad, tank’) one more point number 6, entitled ‘Personnel Training in counter-ambush action events.’”

Pg. 31: “The effectiveness of the actions of a unit marching through its territory and ambushed by enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups, directly depends on the degree of training of personnel to fight in data conditions. The response is usually heavy fire on ambush positions,

from all types of weapons, protection of the unit caught in the affected area, and setting up smokescreens and attacking enemy positions… To immediately attack ambush positions from the front, flank or rear, all personnel must be previously trained… Attacking the ambush’s flanks is preferable, as it is easier to organize contact… Responsibilities of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act upon contact with an ambush even without his participation.”

Pg. 80: “Every officer, sergeant and soldiers are trained to act in two situations (regardless of

type of travel). First, the enemy opened fire from a grenade throwing distance (up to 35 m). In this case part of the unit is under strong, concentrated fire from the attackers. Without additional command, this part of the unit responds with maximum fire in the direction of the ambush, throws smoke and fragmentation grenades and attacks enemy positions. Those who are outside affected areas, open fire in the direction of the ambush positions, covering the attack.Second – the enemy opened fire from a distance exceeding the above distance (more than 35 m). Part of the unit that fell into the affected area lies down, puts up a smoke screen and returns fire in the direction of the ambush. The second part of the unit, which does not fall into the affected area, can and must attack the ambush positions from the flank or from rear by fire and maneuver.”

Notes:

[i] The other five tasks within Chapter 5 are “Common Actions (ex. conduct counterterrorism operations, maintain border integrity), Blocking (more similar in definition to the US Army ‘isolating’ tactical task), Searching and Reconnaissance, Serving in a Checkpoint, and Convoys.”

[ii]  For case studies on Chechen ambush tactics during the first and second Chechen wars, see; Dodge Billingsley, “Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian Chechen Wars 1994-2009,” Foreign Military Studies Office and United States Marine Corp’s Studies and Analysis Division. 2012. 

[iii] These include “The Other Side of the Mountain” by LTC(R) Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali which provide insights on mujahadin activities against Soviet and Afghan government forces during the Soviet-Afghan War. Vignettes 1-16, particularly Vignettes 6 and 16, detail mujahadin ambush tactics and Soviet responses. Chapter 5 of “The Bear Went over the Mountain” by LTC(R) Grau discusses from the Soviet perspective reactions to ambushes.

Image Information:

Image: Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.
Source: Andrew Fisher
Attribution: Author grants permission to use

Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service

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Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.

“The unit [GROM “Kaskad”] is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war.”

Summary: Russia volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, provide Russia additional avenues of generating combat power.

Russia’s volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, are increasingly providing Russia with additional avenues of generating combat power during its war in Ukraine. However, the ways that such formations are portrayed and understood in Russia and Ukraine vary significantly.

The first accompanying article excerpted from the website of United Russia (Putin’s political party), extols the values of the GROM “Kaskad”unmanned aircraft brigade and features information about a memorial (monument) to its servicemen.[i] GROM “Kaskad” has its roots in October 2022, when Dmitrii Sablin (a retired Colonel, prominent businessman, ‘United Russia’ party member, and Duma deputy) signed a contract with the Russian Armed Forces and created the BARS “Kaskad” UAV unit, a volunteer formation.[ii] In October 2023, the unit was upgraded to a brigade and subordinated to the Russian Aerospace Forces. By March 2024, GROM “Kaskad” reportedly consisted of two reconnaissance-strike UAV battalions, two reconnaissance-strike UAV squadrons, and supporting units—in total, 54 UAV crews, with 10 different types of UAVs. GROM “Kaskad” crews have reportedly destroyed over 7,000 targets and flown 18,000 combat missions.

The second accompanying article excerpted from the pro-Ukrainian Center of Journalistic Investigations, gives a more negative take on GROM “Kaskad,” purporting that the brigade “is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line.” Although GROM “Kaskad” almost certainly has a lower casualty rate than Russia’s assault detachments, both Ukrainian and Russian UAV operators are often targeted, and are very much “on the front line.” Service in GROM “Kaskad” is likely far safer than other forms of Russia service in Ukraine, but the likely real benefit is that GROM “Kaskad,” and other volunteer formations offer fixed contracts for terms of service that cannot be involuntarily extended or “stop lossed,” unlike contract servicemen, including the involuntarily mobilized, with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

GROM “Kaskad” and other such volunteer formations are showing the innovative ways that Russia is creating and projecting combat power. Aggressive contract service recruitment and partial mobilization have filled Russian ranks showing that centrally managed, top-down control is still needed. But volunteer formations also appear to be important, as they offer more flexibility and provide a more palatable form of service for elites and those with vital technical skills that might otherwise shirk from military service.

Sources:

Alexey Mikhailov, Roman Kretsul, and Vladimir Matveev, “В Москве открыт мемориал бойцам бригады беспилотной авиации ГРОМ «Каскад» (A memorial to the fighters of the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade has been opened in Moscow),” Yedinaya Rossiya (website of the ‘United Russia’ political party), 31 May 2024.

https://er.ru/activity/news/v-moskve-otkryt-memorial-bojcam-brigady-bespilotnoj-aviacii-grom-kaskad

In Moscow, on the territory of the central headquarters of the “Combat Brotherhood”, a military memorial was opened to the “Stuntmen” – fallen and alive.” It is dedicated to the fighters of the separate GROM “Kaskad” [ГРОМ «Каскад»] unmanned aircraft brigade. The idea of opening the monument was proposed by a colonel, State Duma deputy from United Russia, first brigade commander Dmitry Sablin.

“This monument is not just a perpetuation of the memory of heroes, it is a memorial of true love for one’s Motherland, dedication, and courage. The BARS “Kaskad” detachment, today the GROM “Kaskad” brigade, is first and foremost a symbol of volunteerism. Not only for people with military experience, but also people of civilian professionals.  And, most importantly, those who did not have the obligation to do this by order,” said the First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko, who took part in the opening ceremony of the memorial.

He noted that Kaskad had seven thousand destroyed targets, behind which stood thousands of saved lives of Russian military personnel and civilians.  “Thank you very much, guys, you are an example of colossal courage and real heroism for us,” said Sergei Kiriyenko…

In turn, Dmitry Sablin noted that the “stuntmen” conducted more than 18 thousand combat missions.  “I want to say words of gratitude to all military personnel, volunteers, who are currently serving in the brigade, and who served in it. Thank you for your courage and fearlessness. We will always remember the fallen and continue our work. Our motto: a “stuntman” is someone who can do what others won’t do. And may this always accompany you in life. Victory will be ours!” – he said…

On October 1, 2023, the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aviation brigade was created as part of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the commander of which was Colonel, State Duma deputy Dmitry Sablin. The GROM “Kaskad” brigade has at its disposal all currently available UAVs in service with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The unit’s crews are concentrated along the entire front line and destroy enemy equipment, including Western equipment. Many GROM “Kaskad” fighters were awarded state awards, some of them posthumously.

Valentyna Samar and Vladyslav Marchenko “«GROM Kaskad». Who Fights against Ukraine in the First Russian Drone Brigade,” Center of Journalistic Investigations (Pro-Ukrainian website), 18 May 2024. https://investigator.org.ua/en/investigations/266753/

In December 2022, Vladimir Putin awarded Dmitrii Sablin as commander of BARS «Kaskad» with the Order of Courage. The first official report about «Kaskad» by the Russian Ministry of Defence appeared on March 22, 2024, i.e. half a year after its creation. Minister Sergei Shoigu sent greeting telegrams to five Russian military units for their achievements in so-called «special military operation».[i]

Russian telegram channel «ВЧК-ОГПУ» treats BARS «Kaskad» as the unit for Russian parliamentarians who would like to receive «the status of participant of special military operation». The unit is «for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war».

«Kaskad» is full of politicians and high rank officials. Besides Sablin, five members of the Russian State Dume voluntary joined «Kaskad»: Yevgenii Pervyshov, Oleg Golikov, Sergei Sokol, Dmitrii Khubezov and Oleg Kolesnikov. There are also members of legislative assemblies of Russian regions, two «parliamentarians of «Donetsk People’s Republic» and a lot of public officials.

Some of them have served minimum term of three months. Other people served several terms. Many politicians made short visits to «Kaskad». It is interesting that Russian media «The Insider» found that commander of «Kaskad» Dmitrii Sablin relaxed in Turkish resort areas.Major Oleg Alekseevich Kolesnikov is the commander of the 2nd reconnaissance attack battalion of brigade «GROM «Kaskad». He is the member of the Russian State Duma (for the fourth time in a row) and millionaire from Chelyabinsk region of Russia…

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Notes:

[i] (ГРОМ «Каскад»): The term “Kaskad” is likely in reference to the KGB’s “Kaskad” special operations task force in Afghanistan. “Grom” is the Russian word for thunder, but the term is likely used in reference to the well-regarded General Boris Gromov, the commander of the Soviet 40th Army.  General Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan.

[ii] The Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Специальный (БАРС)], in some sources the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны (БАРС)] began as an operational reserve program of record for the Russian Armed Forces around 2021.  Since the start of the special military operation, many of Russia’s newly formed units are designated as “BARS” formations.

Image Information:

Image: Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саблин,_Дмитрий_Вадимович#/media/Файл:Дмитрий_Саблин_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: Aleksey Klimov, CC BY-SA 4.0

Revisiting Russian “Africa Corps’” Organizational Structure

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Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.

“The Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.”

Following the death of Russian Wagner Group founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov.[i] However, in Africa, the mercenary company’s operation is rebranding as “Africa Corps” whereas the company’s operations elsewhere in the world seem to be retaining the Wagner brand. This new branding may help the company avoid the stigma of its Wagner predecessors for war crimes and smuggling and reduce international pressure against the company in Africa.

The excerpted French-language article in the Chadian publication, alwihdainfo.com, is an African perspective of the differences between Russia’s Africa Corps[ii] and its predecessor Wagner Group. The article acknowledges that Africa Corps is the successor to Wagner Group with important differences. First, it notes that Africa Corps is intended to legitimize the Russian military influence on the African continent while competing with the diminishing presence of the U.S. and European powers. Second, Africa Corps may have a smaller footprint than Wagner in Africa. For example, the article mentions it operates only in Libya, inheriting Wagner’s main bases and most of Wagner’s fighters; Burkina Faso; Mali; Central African Republic and Niger. According to the article, Libya’s position on the Mediterranean Sea facilitates military supply lines and the movement of Africa Corps personnel into Africa. The previous iteration of Wagner had also operated extensively in Sudan and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in Eastern Africa, including Mozambique and Madagascar.[iii]

Another difference highlighted in the article relates to the way that Africa Corps will operate. Africa Corps is now focusing on providing military support to African countries through instructors, weapons, and developing counter-terrorism strategies with host nations in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. In contrast, Wagner soldiers directly participated in missions against terrorist or insurgent groups and functioned separate from, albeit in support of, the Russian government. The article indicates that the new Africa Corps will be more sustainable than the previous Wagner Group because of Africa Corps’ formal integration with the Russian state, and the ministry of defense. Further the ministry’s commitment to Africa Corps indicates that Russia is serious about its geopolitical ambitions in West Africa and Africa Corps’ impact on the region will not be fleeting. At a time when Western influence and partnerships with West African states are waning, Africa Corps is becoming the entity through which Russia will reassert itself.

Sources:

Source: “De ‘Wagner’ à ‘Africa Corps’: la Russie toujours présente au Sahel (From ‘Wagner’ to ‘Africa Corps’: Russia always is present in the Sahel),” alwihdainfo.com (French-language Chadian publication with a reputation for independent reporting and being critical of the government), 3 May 2024. https://www.alwihdainfo.com/De-Wagner-a-Africa-Corps-la-Russie-toujours-presente-au-Sahel_a132053.html

Recently, many people have been curious about the difference between the Russian paramilitary group “Wagner” and the “Africa Corps”, which newly appeared on the African scene and which was also founded in Russia to be deployed in African countries. In this analysis, we will seek to explain the difference between the two organizations, how and where they operate, and what their ambitions are in Africa.

Africa Corps is a Russian military company that was created in early 2024 as a replacement for the Wagner Group. This organization reflects Russia’s desire to extend its military influence on the African continent and to provide legitimacy to its official and public presence in the face of the European and American presence. Africa Corps is deployed in 5 countries: Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Central African Republic and Niger. Libya represents the core of the corps due to the previous activity of Wagner elements in the city of Tripoli…. Another factor in the choice of Libya as the headquarters of this corps is its strategic geographical location due to its connection with the Mediterranean coast, which ensures military supply lines and movement of corps members to other countries The Africa Corps’ modus operandi is entirely dependent on providing military support to African countries such as instructors and weapons. The company also is concerns with the development of strategies in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, such as is the case in Mali and Niger… In short, the Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.

Notes:

[ii] Since the death of Russian Wagner Group founder and CEO, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov. For a profile of Evkurov, which argues that he “has the full backing of Russia’s military establishment and will not have to beg for ammunition or restrict himself to the use of contractors and mercenaries,” see: Andrew McGregor, “Yunus-Bek Yevkurov: A Profile of Russia’s New Ingush African Corps Leader,” Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume: 15 Issue: 3, 18 April 2024. (URL?) The article notes that under Yevkurov “the Africa Corps will have greater access to resources, but will be expected to be self-sufficient in many ways. This means Wagner-style associations with business interests will likely continue, although disentangling these interests from the Wagner network will be challenging.” In addition, it asserts that “Improving battlefield performance will be a priority for Yevkurov. Thus far, Russian fighters have not proven any more effective in eliminating Sahelian terrorist formations than their French predecessors.”

[iii] See, for example, Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies, CSIS, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/

Image Information:

Image: Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.
Source:kremlin.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deputy_Defence_Minister_Yunus-Bek_Yevkurov_and_Wagner_leader_Andrei_Troshev.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0

Russia Redeploys Military Police to Southern Syria

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Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).

“The [Russian] Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.”

After over a year of absence, Russian forces have returned to Syrian territory near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, in theory, to curb spillovers of violence from Israel to Syria. Russia’s deployments to date have largely been symbolic, including occasional aerial patrols and the establishment of three military police observation posts in the Syrian provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, near the buffer zone separating Syria and Israel. As reported in the first accompanying article from the Syrian opposition news website Enab Baladi, Russia established its third observation post in the area in early April 2024, after establishing two similar posts in January.

Southern Syria is often considered the cradle of the Syrian civil war, and was a hardened rebel bastion for several years. Daraa province remained highly volatile until Russian-sponsored settlements with rebel groups in 2018 stabilized local security conditions. With a modicum of peace achieved, Russian presence and influence in this part of Syria dwindled beginning in 2018 while Iranian-backed Syrian government forces and militias strengthened their grip in former rebel territory. Following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian forces all but disappeared from southern Syria, allowing Iranian militias to expand their influence in the area, often through local proxies and under the cover of Syrian Army forces.[i] Iranian influence in Syrian territory close to Israel has become a source of heightened concern not just for Israel but also for Russia, which fears that Gaza spillover could threaten Syria’s delicate status quo.

In the months following the 7 October attack, Russia successfully blocked Iranian attempts to launch attacks from southern Syria in support of Hamas in Gaza per the second accompanying excerpt, published in January 2024 in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed. The redeployment of Russian military police to this part of Syria may therefore be seen as bolstering Russia’s ability to continue preventing escalation on this front. Indeed, Russia’s observation posts have all been set up in the aftermath of Israeli assassinations of high-ranking Iranian officials in Syrian territory: the first two posts were set up in the weeks following the killing of General Razi Mousavi in late December 2023, and the third one the day after General Mohammad Reza Zahedi was killed in April 2024. Russia’s return to southern Syria is less about supporting Iran against Israel than it is about deterring Tehran’s use of Syrian soil to respond to Israeli attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria notwithstanding the deepening Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation. , However, experts are skeptical of Russia’s ability to succeed. According to Mustafa al-Naimi, a Turkey-based Syrian analyst cited in the third accompanying excerpt, also from Enab Baladi, Russia’s efforts are bound to fail. Even if it succeeds in preventing Iran from opening the Syria front against Israel, Russia will be unable to remove Iranian influence from the area, given that its proxies will simply “return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime.” As such, al-Naimi conjectures, Russia’s symbolic redeployment near the Syria-Israel border is unlikely to do anything other than postpone the inevitable: an expansion of the Gaza conflict into southern Syria.

Sources:

Source: “Russia establishes third military post on borders of occupied Golan Heights,” Enab Baladi English (Syrian opposition English-language news website), 2 April 2024. https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2024/04/russia-establishes-third-military-post-on-borders-of-occupied-golan-heights/

The Deputy Chief of the Russian Center for Reconciliation of the Opposing Parties in Syria (a division of the Russian Ministry of Defense), Major General Yury Popov, stated that the Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights… This Syrian military post is the third of its kind established since the beginning of the current year, after Russia reduced its deployment in southern Syria at the beginning of 2022 following its invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

Source:

ما أهداف روسيا من نشر نقاط مراقبة في القنيطرة؟ “What are Russia’s goals in setting up observation posts in Quneitra?” Al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9

[Researcher Rachid] Hourani added to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that, after the launch of the Israeli military operation against the Gaza Strip, Iran tried to activate several fronts based on the principle of “unifying the arenas.” There were several visits by Iranian military officials to Syria with the aim of opening that front, but they did not amount to much due to Russian rejection and its tendency to use the so-called “Iranian card” and control Tehran’s behavior in Syria.

Hourani considered that Russia can actually curb Iran in southern Syria “because it fully controls the military decision-making in regime areas, in addition to being a major party to the understandings related to Israel’s security threats from Syria, such as the settlement agreement with the Syrian opposition factions in mid-2018 and the Israeli-American-Russian security meeting that took place in mid-2019″…

Source:

ما وراء نشر روسيا نقاطًا عسكرية على حدود الجولان المحتل “What is behind Russia’s setting up military posts on the occupied Golan border?” Enab Baladi (Syrian opposition news website), 14 January 2024. https://www.enabbaladi.net/682917/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88/

Mustafa Al-Naimi, a researcher on Iranian affairs, told Enab Baladi, “We are facing a scene of gradual escalation from both the Iranian and Israeli sides.” Al-Naimi believes that the Russian side is trying to reposition itself to ward off any attempt by the Israeli side to advance on the ground along this front by, at the very least, removing the Iranian militias from the southern region adjacent to the Golan.He added that this measure will not work for these militias, because they will return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime… because of this and the fact that the Israeli side does not trust that Russia has the ground forces needed to control the region at a depth of 45 kilometers, al-Naimi suggests that these measures are “postponing the battle, not preventing it.”

Notes:

[i] For more on the 2018 agreement, see: Armenak Tokmajyan. “A Flashpoint Looms in Southern Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 26 March 2024. https://carnegie-mec.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/04/a-flashpoint-looms-in-southern-syria?lang=en&center=middle-east

For more on post-Ukraine Russian and Iranian presence in Syria, see: Lucas Winter, “Iran Repositions Its Proxies In Syria As Russia Turns Focus To Ukraine,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-repositions-its-proxies-in-syria-as-russia-turns-focus-to-ukraine/;  Lucas Winter, “Iran Digs Into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left By Russia,” OE Watch, May 2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-digs-into-central-syria-filling-vacuum-left-by-russia/; Lucas Winter, “Russian Influence Fades In Southern Syria,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-influence-fades-in-southern-syria/

Image Information:

Image: Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).
Source: https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-pclmaps-oclc-25871248-golan_heights-1991.jpg
Attribution: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Public Domain

Russia Withdraws Its Forces from Nagorno-Karabakh

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Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

“Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.”

In April 2024, the government of Azerbaijan announced that the Russian peacekeeping mission had started withdrawing personnel, marking one of only a few instances a Russian peacekeeping mission in the Commonwealth of Independent States has ended.[i] The excerpted article from Azerbaijan’s news agency Trend reports that the Russian peacekeeping force from Nagorno-Karabakh has relocated to temporary deployment points in Armenia.[ii] Armenia’s Secretary of the Security Council noted that these units cannot remain in Armenia. Lastly, the article notes that Azerbaijan requested the removal of the Russian peacekeeping force and the Russian government complied but does not mention where Russian personnel will eventually be redeployed.

Additionally, a joint Russia-Turkey observation center in Azerbaijan that once monitored the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also closed. The excerpted article from Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency notes that the joint observation center had been based in Azerbaijan since early 2021 as part of an agreement between Russia and Turkey to observe the ceasefire agreement. The article notes that the work of the center is no longer needed since Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023.[iii] As a result, Russian and Turkish personnel, 60 from each country, are leaving. Overall, the total number of Russian personnel redeploying from the peacekeeping mission and the joint monitoring center is not significant but is worth noting as Russia has historically reached agreements to leave some units in place even after a peacekeeping mission has changed or ended. Russia will likely continue to be involved in developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan going forward, but Azerbaijan’s complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh frees up Russian forces to use elsewhere, potentially in Ukraine.[iv]

Sources:

Source: Rena Abdurakhmona, “Российские миротворцы направились из Карабаха в Армению (Russian peacekeepers have deployed from Karabakh to Armenia),” Trend (news agency in Azerbaijan), 23 April 2024. https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3889409.html

Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh went to temporary deployment points in Gorus and Garakils (Sisian)…(the) Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan told the Armenian media…

“Since Russian peacekeeping troops are leaving Karabakh, they, of course, cannot remain in the Republic of Armenia either. A group and convoy of peacekeepers from Karabakh headed to temporary deployment points in Goris and Garakils (Sisian),” he said.

Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.

Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan – Head of the Department for Foreign Policy of the Presidential Administration Hikmet Hajiyev, answering a question from AZERTAG regarding information about the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the territory of Azerbaijan, said that the top leadership of both countries made a decision on the early withdrawal of peacekeepers…

Source: Ruslan Rehimov, “Turkish-Russian joint center completes mission in Azerbaijan,” Anadolu Agency (state-run news agency of Turkey), 26 April 2024.https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkish-russian-joint-center-completes-mission-in-azerbaijan/3203012

The Turkish-Russian joint observation center established in Azerbaijan’s Aghdam region has completed its mission after three years of service.

The center was established to monitor cease-fire and prevent violations after the Second Karabakh War, when Azerbaijan liberated most of the Karabakh region from decades of occupation by Armenia.

Karim Valiyev, Azerbaijan’s chief of general staff, praised the center’s contributions to peace at a ceremony on Friday attended by Azerbaijani, Russian, and Turkish officials.

Valiyev said Azerbaijan has fully established its sovereignty in Karabakh, and therefore the mission of the monitoring center had been completed…The center, established near the Marzili village of Aghdam, opened on Jan. 30, 2021, with 60 Turkish and 60 Russian soldiers…Azerbaijan established full sovereignty in Karabakh after an “anti-terrorism operation” in September 2023, after which separatist forces in the region surrendered.

Notes:

[i] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is made up of former Soviet Republics and remains an area where the Russian government has special relationships and works to maintain influence. Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS in the past have typically been open-ended with Russian forces remaining in place in some capacity, which has allowed Russia to maintain influence. The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) peacekeeping mission to Kazakhstan in January 2022 marks the other example of Russian forces ending a peacekeeping mission in the CIS and withdrawing its forces. For background on Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS, see: Matthew Stein, “The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare,” FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief, 24 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-24-the-evolutionary-russian-view-of-peacekeeping-as-part-of-modern-warfare-matthew-stein-update/

[ii] The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh deployed in November 2020 as part of the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. The peacekeeping force included around 2,000 Russian personnel, who established two dozen observation posts in Nagorno-Karabakh to monitor the ceasefire under a five-year mandate that would automatically renew for an additional five years unless Armenia or Azerbaijan gave notice to the other two parties to the agreement to terminate the mission.

[iii] In September 2023, Azerbaijani forces carried out an operation in Nagorno-Karabakh which resulted in Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region from ethnic Armenians and ended the existence of the self-proclaimed breakaway region of Artsakh. The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh closed a few observation posts following the September 2023 operation,but remained largely in place with the consent and cooperation of Azerbaijani authorities.

[iv] Russian peacekeepers dealt with several ceasefire violations from both sides in the years since then and notably allowed activists from Azerbaijan to blockade the Lachin Corridor, the single road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, starting in December 2022 until September 2023. For background on the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, see: Matthew Stein, “Ongoing Clashes In Nagorno-Karabakh Threaten Fragile Truce,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/ongoing-clashes-in-nagorno-karabakh-threaten-fragile-truce/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_war.svg
Attribution: CCA 3.0

Russian Iskandar Brigade Moves Closer to Finland

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A member of the Finnish Army watches a K-9 Thunder [RG1] 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer drive by after a live fire exercise with U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, on a range near Rovaniemi, Finland, May 17, 2024.

“Iskanders performed very well during the Special Military Operation [read: war], so the Finns should know that if something happens, such joy can come to them,” military expert Dmitry Boltenkov said to Izvestia.”

With the reestablishment of the Leningrad Military District, previously neutral Finland has become a focus of Russian and NATO interests. The excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer highlights Russia’s decision to form a missile brigade featuring Iskander missiles in the Republic of Karelia, near Finland. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu noted that due to Finland’s decision to join NATO, and “NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden,” Russia was required to undertake “retaliatory measures…to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia.” Russia’s decision to form a missile brigade so close to Finland also coincided with the annual U.S.-led Immediate Response 2024 exercise which took place in northern Europe in April and included Finland. Immediate Response featured U.S. equipment sent to Europe to support the exercise.[i] What probably interests Russia most is how much of what equipment the U.S. leaves behind and where they leave it.

Sources:

Source: Thomas Nielsen, “Finland relaxed over Moscow’s plans to deploy Iskander-M missiles near border”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 24 April 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/04/finland-relaxed-over-moscows-plans-deploy-iskander-missiles-near-border

In its Kremlin-loyal newspaper Izvestia the Russian Defense Ministry reports on the new formation of a separate missile brigade in the Republic of Karelia. “Iskanders performed very well during the Special Military Operation [read: war], so the Finns should know that if something happens, such joy can come to them,” military expert Dmitry Boltenkov said to Izvestia.

Iskander-M [RG1] is mobile and each vehicle can carry two missiles. The missile flies ballistic at a hypersonic speed of Mach 6 and has a range of 400-500 kilometers.  Several different conventional warheads can be attached to the missiles, including a cluster munitions warhead, enhanced-blast warhead, high-explosive fragmentation warhead, an earth penetrator for bunker busting and an electromagnetic pulse device for anti-radar missions. The missile can also carry nuclear warheads.

Moscow has repeatedly said Finland’s decision to join NATO is provocative and will destabilize the security landscape in northern Europe. “Given NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden, retaliatory measures are required to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia,” Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu previously stated.

The fact is that it was Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine that destabilized geopolitics in all of Europe. Finnish NATO-membership was not on the political agenda in Helsinki before February 24, 2022.

Finland shares a 1,340 km border with Russia from the Baltic Sea in the south to the Kola Peninsula in the north. The border has been closed by Helsinki since last fall when Russia’s FSB directed huge crowds of migrants to enter Finland in what Finnish authorities have called a hybrid operation.

…Finland joined NATO in April 2023, a move that caused Russia to restructure its military forces by depriving the Northern Fleet of the status as a military district. Reestablishing the Leningrad Military District is considered a sign that Russia’s military planners now see the entire western border as one theater of operation in case of war.

Notes:

[i] Equipment belonging to the US Army 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division has been sent to support Immediate Response 2024 (IR24). The exercise includes allied training in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Czechia and Poland taking place between 21 April – 31 May, according to the Norwegian Armed Forces. See: Atle Staalesen, “US Army sends heavy equipment to Norwegian Arctic port of Narvik for transfer to Finland”, The Barents Observer, 24 April 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/04/us-army-sends-heavy-equipment-norwegian-arctic-port-narvik-transfer-finland

Image Information:

Image: A member of the Finnish Army watches a K-9 Thunder 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer drive by after a live fire exercise with U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, on a range near Rovaniemi, Finland, May 17, 2024. 
Source: DVIDS, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/8418866/northern-forest-exercise
Attribution: Public Domain

Russian Import-Substitution Impacts Armored Vehicle Production

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Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities.

“Currently, measures are being taken to engage specialized enterprises and organizations in the development and manufacturing of domestic components necessary for the production of protected military vehicles. Solving these issues is now considered by military leadership as one of the priority directions for enhancing combat readiness and reducing combat losses of the troops.”

Recent articles in Russian military publications regarding Typhoon [i] armored vehicle production  highlight the advantages – and tradeoffs – of import-substitution measures across Russia’s defense industry. Moscow’s inability to import critical components has forced Russian manufacturers to simplify designs and shift component production to domestic manufacturers. According to the Russian military journal Material’no-tehnicheskoe obespechenie Vooruzhennyh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, initial development of the Typhoon series of 4×4 and 6×6 armored vehicles in the 2010s was in response to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) order to create vehicles capable of protecting crews on par with foreign offerings through 2020. The Typhoon-Kand Typhoon-Y capable of carrying a variety of armaments depending on mission requirements were Russia’s answer to the American-made Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle. Despite their official adoption by the Russian MoD, the number of components of foreign origin prevented mass production of initial models.

The journal further details how the military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 underscored the urgent need for armored transport. While domestic production has been a Russian military focus prior to the Ukrainian conflict, the war has accelerated import-substitution measures. Using existing multi-purpose vehicle chassis and domestic components, Russian military manufacturers began rapidly producing armored vehicles to meet pressing battlefield needs. However, current Typhoons suffer from reduced payload capacity, mobility, and less protection than initial test models using foreign produced parts. Some variants, such as the Typhoon-VDV, remain in limited production due to continued reliance on foreign parts.

The second excerpted article from the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik noted the extent of these changes in manufacturing and capability to the current Ground Forces model BMM,[ii] the ZCA-T “Linza,” a Typhoon-K variant. The “simplified chassis” version of the Linza features transmission, transfer block, bridge, power steering, and armor made by domestic manufacturers—primarily KamAZ but lacks a multi-functional command and control terminal. The case of the Typhoon demonstrates the impacts of import-substitution measures on the Russian defense industry and the rapid tradeoffs being made to maintain the current manufacturing tempo.

Sources:

Source: Evgeniy I. Kotyga, Vasily A. Novikov, Ksenia N. Moskalyuk, “Броня На Колесах (Armor on Wheels),” Logistics of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation (Monthly Russian military periodical), No. 4, April 2024. https://on-demand.eastview.com/browse/publication/144326

Pg. 75-76: “Following the tests, the protected vehicles OKR “Typhoon-K” and “Typhoon-U” were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. However, due to the high complexity of the design and the large number of imported components, they were not mass-produced.

With the beginning of a special military operation, the issue of equipping the forces with protected vehicles became acute. To meet the urgent operational needs of the troops, the production of protected vehicles was organized based on the chassis and components of existing domestic multi-purpose vehicles (similar to unrealized projects with codes “Vodnik,” “Medved,” “Karatel,” etc.).

Pg. 78: “To address technical issues related to “import substitution” in protected vehicles of the “Typhoon-K” 4×4 wheeled formula and “Typhoon-VDV” families, a series of measures have been taken and is currently being implemented in the following main directions:

  • Utilization of domestic armored steels, titanium alloys, and composite ceramic panels instead of foreign-produced armor materials like Armox and Plasan.
  • Full localization of Cummins engines and ZF transmissions by domestic enterprises.
  • Import substitution of automotive components in suspension systems, steering control, electrical equipment, and other vehicle systems and assemblies with domestic counterparts.”

Pg. 80: “The effectiveness of the introduced changes in the design of protected vehicles has been positively evaluated based on the results of the conducted tests. Samples of modernized protected vehicles were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the beginning of 2023. Thus, summing up the creation of new and modernization of existing protected vehicles, it should be noted the effectiveness of measures for ‘import substitution,’ simplification of sample designs, and the use of domestic materials, components, and assemblies, which meets the high demand of the troops for this type of equipment.

Source: R. Pokutny, R. Kurmaev, V. Stolbunov, “Красный Крест На Броне (A Red Cross on Armor),” Army Digest (Monthly Military journal), No. 4 (128-129), April 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 129: However, during the operation of the BMM (Armored Medical Vehicle), a number of shortcomings related to the excessive complexity of the design were identified. Taking into account the changes made (Table 1), on the basis of the ZSA-T “Linza” was created with a simplified design. The goals of creating this modification are to eliminate unnecessary complexity, reduce cost and time indicators at the production and operation stage, and replace imported components with domestic ones. The main changes to the ZSA-T “Linza” of a simplified design include the use of a single-volume body layout formula with a simultaneous increase in the protection class of the medical department, the provision of a spare wheel, and the installation of a “Tucha” smoke screen system, while BIUS (multifunction command and control system) and ABS (most likely the acronym for “anti-brake system”) are excluded.”

Notes:

[i] The Typhoon armored vehicle is produced by ROSOBORONEXPORT, a subsidiary of Rostec State Corporation and manufacturer of military equipment across the Russian Ground, Air, Naval, and Air Defense Forces. Products range from the T-90 tank to the Orlan family of UAVs.

[ii] “BMM” is the overarching term in the Russian Ground Forces for armored medical vehicles.

Image Information:

Image: Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities. 
Source: ROSOBORONEXPORT, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Air-droppably_special-purpose_protected_vehicle_%28ZASN-D%29_during_the_%22Armiya_2021%22_exhibition.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED

Russia Evaluates Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Combat Missions

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“One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs.”

The accompanying excerpted article in a monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the modern battlefield. Russia believes that current UAV usage is not just a feature of the current conflict, but also indicative of the changing character of war. Therefore, Russia is now considering how UAV usage will be employed for all types of combat actions (offense, defense, raid, meeting battle) and when on the march.[i] Although not explicitly stated, the article suggests that UAVs will no longer be concentrated in a single unit as they were before 2022.[ii] Russia’s understanding of the situation suggests that individual units will likely each have their own UAVs and counter-UAV technologies. In the Russian view, success on the modern battlefield requires that all types of units, not just electronic warfare and air defense personnel, need some degree of UAV and counter-UAV technologies to accomplish their respective missions.

Sources:

Source: V. Dyatchin and I. Starodubtsev, “Влияние беспилотных летательных аппаратов на способы действий общевойсковых подразделений (The influence of unmanned aerial vehicles on the methods of action of combined arms units),” Armeisky Sbornik (monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense), May 2024.  https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/573847/

One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs. [i] Without UAVs, it is impossible to imagine the actions of assault detachments and groups, the destruction of the enemy by tube artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, including the use of high-tech weapons, the conduct of actions by reconnaissance elements, the fight against special detachments of foreign states and illegal armed groups, and other armed sabotage and terrorist formations. This also applies to the work of the command staff of combined arms formations in assessing the current situation and organizing combat actions.

Combined arms units participating in military conflicts use various forms and methods of action in the defense; on the offense; conducting combat, route, and direct security; enforcing martial law; during administrative movements; maneuvering on the battlefield, when locating targets.

The method of action means the sequence of use of all available forces and means, chosen by the unit commander and approved by the higher-level commander. When combined arms units are saturated with UAVs, unit commanders make changes to all methods of action, thereby achieving high efficiency when performing combat missions.

In the defense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

  • conduct reconnaissance of enemy targets in front of the forward edge of the defense and in the immediate depths of their combat formations, transmit enemy target coordinates to artillery, combat vehicles, and air defense systems in real time;
  • support air, missile, artillery and combat vehicle (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles) fires in order to increase their accuracy, increase damage and reduce the combat potential of attacking enemy units;
  • inflict effective defeat on the opposing group of troops with fires from the defending combined arms formations;
  • help unit commanders study the terrain in combat areas and assess the nature of the actions of advancing enemy units;
  • monitor the nature of the actions of the enemy’s second echelons and reserves, and changes in the combat area;
  • control the actions of enemy units, their sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist groups in the gaps between defensive strongpoints and on the flanks of units;
  • provide assistance to combat, route, and direct security elements in carrying out their tasks;
  • intensify electronic warfare against enemy electronic zones in order to disrupt the work of troops and weapons control centers;
  • perform other tasks in the interests of achieving defensive tasks by combined arms units.

In the offense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

Laying fires, correcting air and artillery fires, increasing the accuracy of the destruction of targets by determining their coordinates in real time, reducing ammunition consumption, and assisting in creating the required superiority [of forces and means] over the defending enemy. They also help carry out the tasks of assault, raid and encircling detachments to destroy strongpoints, fortified areas (objects) and command posts of the opposing group.  Thanks to UAVs, which perform tasks to identify strongpoints, artillery and mortar firing positions, and the nature of the defending enemy’s actions, the losses of friendly personnel and equipment in an offensive are significantly reduced.When combined arms units are on the march, UAVs are used to strengthen route security and inflict preemptive fires on enemy formations that attempt to impede the movement of the column, as well as when encountering an enemy group and conducting meeting combat. When units occupy rest areas, UAVs take an active part in protecting them and repelling surprise enemy attacks…

Notes:

[i] For additional recent analysis on Russian drone development and operations, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-details-plan-to-overcome-military-drone-deficiencies/; and Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] Typically, a UAV company for a maneuver brigade or division.