Category Archives: Russia

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Russia.

Rationales for Russia’s Return to the Black Sea Grain Deal

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The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.

The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.

“Russia’s goal is to wrest more concessions… Russia wants to increase the volume of grains and fertilizers it’s exporting through the corridor at Ukraine’s expense.”

Russian resumption of its participation in the Black Sea Grain Agreement, following Turkey’s facilitation and mediation, helped to alleviate some concerns of a global food crisis.[i]  However, it was not clear what benefits Russia received for returning to the deal. The accompanying passages by Turkish experts offer some such rationales.

In the first accompanying passage from the regionally focused independent news site al Monitor, journalist Amberin Zaman writes that Russia wants to export more grain and fertilizer through the Black Sea corridor at Ukraine’s expense. Zaman also writes that Russia wants to resume ammonia exports via Ukraine. She notes that following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Kiev shut down a pipeline carrying Russian ammonia—a key ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilizers—to the Black Sea port of Odessa..

In the second accompanying passage from the Turkish independent news platform Dördüncü Boyut via YouTube, Turkish foreign affairs commentatorFehim Tastekin claims that Russia likely received some written guarantees that the grain corridor would not be used for military purposes.[ii] He notes Russia’s claim that the explosives used to destroy the Kerch Bridge had been brought from Odessa on a ship using that grain corridor. As such, he claims that Russia’s main benefit would be to spotlight this attack approach. He also claimed that Russia returned to the deal to avoid the perception that it was the cause of a global food and hunger crisis. Both of these views would support Russian narratives as part of their information operations.

Sources:

Amberin Zaman, “Turkey seeks to coax Russia back into Ukraine grain deal,” al-Monitor (independent news platform with local reporting from the Middle East), 1 November 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/11/turkey-seeks-coax-russia-back-ukraine-grain-deal#ixzz7k8s1EXZp

Analysts say Russia’s goal is to wrest more concessions. “They want better terms for themselves via Turkey,” said Yevgeniya Gaber, a former Ukrainian diplomat… Gaber believes that Russia wants to increase the volume of grains and fertilizers it’s exporting through the corridor at Ukraine’s expense.

Russia also wants a resumption of ammonia exports via Ukraine. A pipeline carrying Russian ammonia, a key ingredient in the production of nitrate fertilizers, to the Black Sea port of Odessa ceased to function following Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine. The United Nations has been pressing the sides to reach an agreement.

Russia likely also wants Ukraine to halt its offensive to retake Kherson, a critical port city in the country’s south, a demand that Ukraine will almost certainly spurn as it seeks to consolidate its recent battlefield gains.

Fehim Tastekin, “Arap Birliği’nin Türkiye’yi kınama iddiası ne anlama geliyor? (What does the Arab Union’s condemnation of Turkey mean?),” Dördüncü Boyut via YouTube (independent Turkish news and analysis platform on YouTube), 2 November 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruZyRUhjuE8&t=510s

Russia likely received some written guarantees that the grain corridor would not be used for military purposes.  An important detail that has been missed in the Turkish media is Russia’s claim that the explosives used to destroy the Kerch Bridge had been brought from Odessa on a ship using the grain corridor.  So the most important concession that Russia received is likely a halting of attacks on its ships in the Black Sea, to move the conflict inland.   Russia also wants to avoid the perception that it is the cause of a global food and hunger crisis. 

Notes:

[i] For a background on Turkey’s control over access to the Black Sea and the Montreux Treaty, see: Karen Kaya, “Turkey Views Treaty as Important to Limiting U.S. Naval Activity in Black Sea,” OE Watch, May 2021.

[ii] This video was later unavailable as Turkey suspended YouTube on 13 November 2022.

Image Information:

Image: The four participants to the negotiations in Istanbul of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Russia, Ukraine,Turkey and the United Nations, July 2022.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IMO_welcomes_maritime_humanitarian_corridor_in_Black_Sea_(52233881214).jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Russia Further Bolstering Iran Relations Following Ukraine Invasion

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Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

“The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that ‘Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.’”

A major tenet of the Kremlin’s current ideology revolves around transforming what it perceives as a U.S.-led global security sphere into a multipolar world order where Russia occupies one of the key poles. The Kremlin promotes this ideology globally, especially to countries that have had a troubled relationship with the United States, and Russia has increased these efforts since its invasion of Ukraine began. The accompanying excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes the recent visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to Tehran on 9 November, where he claimed, “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.” During Patrushev’s visit, the two sides “discussed all aspects of bilateral cooperation, from the economy to security,” in light of improving bilateral relations over the past decade.[i] The author suggests that the two countries traded notes regarding “the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.” The latter point was emphasized by Patrushev, who “noted the key role that Western intelligence services have played in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country.”

Since the Kremlin officially denies receiving military assistance from Iran, the article carefully cites foreign reports on “the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine.” For the Kremlin and the wider Russian audience, admitting the need for Iranian military technology would be regarded as humiliating. Not that long ago, it was Iran who requested Russian military assistance, and now the tables have turned.[ii] The article concludes by asserting that increased Western pressure on Iran will likely result in “closer cooperation between Russia and Iran.”

Source:

Marianna Belenkaya, “Совбезы РФ и Ирана поговорили на одном языке (Security Councils of Russia and Iran spoke the same language),” Kommersant (pro-business news outlet), 9 November 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/amp/5653639

Russia and Iran held interdepartmental consultations on security issues in Tehran on Wednesday (9 Nov). The Russian delegation was led by Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev. In the Iranian capital, he was received by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. According to official reports, the meeting discussed various issues of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of security, as well as a number of international problems….

The two countries have accumulated a lot of common themes, or rather, common problems. Among them are the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.

Iranian politicians do not need to explain anything to their Russian colleagues. They understand everything themselves, moreover, they speak the same language. Thus, at a meeting with an Iranian colleague, Nikolai Patrushev noted “the key role of Western intelligence services in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country based on the Persian-language Western media controlled by them.” …The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order” and this “is confirmed by the unprecedented pressure on our countries from Washington and its satellites.”

…From the very beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, Tehran stated that they understood Russian security concerns and believed that the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv was provoked by NATO… The atmosphere in Iranian-Ukrainian relations escalated after the media reported on the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine….

… Against this background, experts believe that the stronger the pressure of the West on Iran, including in the form of strengthening the sanctions regime, and the more elusive the chance to restore the “nuclear deal” becomes, the closer cooperation between Russia and Iran will become.

Notes:

[i] For additional background on Russian-Iran relations, see Ray Finch, “Russian Views of Iran,” Review of Persidskij bastion (Persian Bastion) in NATO Defense Review, edited by R. N. Pukhov and Yu. Yu. Lyamin, Moscow, CAST, 2019, 320pp. https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=668

[ii] For additional background on Russian arms sales to Iran, see Ray Finch, “Russian Arms Sales to Iran,” OE Watch, July 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/365980

Image Information:

Image: Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Patrushev_NP.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

Russian Military Experiencing Pay Problems

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“Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.”

The Kremlin continues to wrestle with manpower issues related to its so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine. What was envisioned as a quick operation with minimal forces has become a difficult slog requiring ever-more military personnel. The accompanying excerpt from an article in the semi-independent Nezavisimaya Gazeta highlights that after Russia’s September 2022 “partial mobilization,” which added 318,000 new soldiers, there are now questions regarding how to pay for this additional manpower, as well as growing pay disparities within the ranks of the Russian military. 

The article reminds readers that the Russian Defense Ministry reported “that the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195,000 rubles (USD $3,145) per month.” After calculating personnel costs for the entire military, the author asserts that now at least 30 percent of defense spending will go to manpower. Traditionally, personnel costs have hovered around 15 percent of the defense budget. The author complains that “defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation,” and that therefore, “he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives.” Mere patriotic rhetoric, however, has proven inadequate in motivating Russian soldiers.

Of note, the article also discusses the pay differential among those Russians who were recently mobilized and contract soldiers already serving in the military.[i] The article cites a retired general officer who claims that some of the recently mobilized are getting paid more than the officers who are training them. He warns that “social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army.” Another excerpt talks about “the danger of the material stratification of military personnel,” wherein certain soldiers are getting paid more than others doing similar work merely because they were mobilized.  The article concludes by looking at some of the problems family members of mobilized soldiers have had in gaining access to their pay. In addition to causing morale problems in the Russian ranks, such high levels of manpower expenditures are likely to slow Russia’s investments in rearmament in the latter phases of the war and perhaps long after it ends.

Source:

Vladimir Mukhin, “Монетизация СВО способна привести к разложению армии (Monetization of the SVO can lead to the decomposition of the army),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent news source), 8 November 2022. https://www.ng.ru/armies/2022-11-08/1_8584_monetization.html

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported that “the minimum amount that military personnel called up as part of partial mobilization will receive will be 195 thousand rubles.” A simple calculation shows that at least 62 billion rubles ($1bn) a month will be spent on paying for the military labor of 318,000 mobilized people participating in a special military operation (SMO). And if we take into account similar expenses for more than a million military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, then at least 1.5 trillion rubles will be spent on the payment of monetary allowances per year, that is, almost every third ruble planned in the expenditure side of the budget for national defense in 2023…. In any case, the conflict with Ukraine turned out to be costly for the Russian budget….

Attention is drawn to the fact that the lion’s share of the planned defense spending – at least 30% – will be directed to the material motivation of the military to serve. Russia has never foreseen such expenses in its recent history. Previously, the share of spending on military salaries in the defense budget was no more than 12-15%. But the defense of the Fatherland is a constitutional duty of a citizen of the Russian Federation, and ideally, he should fulfill it without powerful material incentives….  

…Military expert, retired lieutenant general Yuri Netkachev believes that the state has correctly taken care of the material problems of the mobilized citizens and it is good that the families of the country’s defenders will receive financial support. “But why does this process apply only to the mobilized? There is a large stratum of servicemen in the Armed Forces who also participate in the SMO. But they do not have such material incentives as those announced by the Ministry of Defense for the mobilized,” General Netkachev told NG. “Social injustice in the payment of military labor can become a prerequisite for the disintegration of the army. In all my military service, I have never seen ordinary soldiers get more than the officers who command them. Right now, mobilized servicemen are being trained by officers of training platoons and companies. They are regular military men who, as a rule, have extensive combat experience. But it turns out that these experienced warriors, who train “green soldiers” called up from the civilians, to whom the state has already pocketed 200,000 rubles, receive several times less.”

Andrey Poleshchuk, chairman of the All-Russian Trade Union of Military Personnel (OPSV), also speaks about the danger of the material stratification of military personnel. He believes that “the financial decisions of the president, taken at the suggestion of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, cannot but raise questions.” “We understand that it is necessary to materially interest the mobilized, to stimulate them to successfully solve combat missions, to reduce the intensity of passions in society,” he says. – But how to explain the situation to the officers who command these mobilized in the combat area, and they are not subject to the instructions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on additional monetary surcharges. It turns out that they, professionals, should receive less or, at best, commensurate with the monetary allowance of their subordinates.” 

…According to the representative of the Ministry of Defense Sergey Mikischenko, at the request of a soldier, his family will be able to receive monetary allowance: “The monetary allowance of a serviceman is credited to his current account, which the serviceman submitted. At the request of a serviceman, monetary allowance can be transferred to his relatives; for this, the serviceman must issue a power of attorney…. Andrey Poleshchuk draws attention to the organizational problem associated with this: “We are faced with the fact that not everyone managed to issue powers of attorney for relatives to receive funds. Now they don’t have that option. Perhaps it makes sense to consider the issue of transferring notarial powers to the commanders of military units. A similar practice existed in the USSR.” 

Notes:

[i] For additional background on pay for Russian contract soldiers, see: Ray Finch, “Increase in Pay and Benefits for Contract Soldiers,” OE Watch, September 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/323757

Russia Conducts Nuclear-Delivery Tests in the Arctic

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“Ballistic missiles were launched both from a nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea and from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk region towards the Kura range on Kamchatka.  Cruise missiles were launched toward targets in the Komi Republic from strategic bombers.”

In late October, Russia carried out a nuclear weapons exercise in the Arctic. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, it is the second major nuclear-delivery test of Russia’s sea-land-air Triad in 2022. The previous exercise was conducted in February, prior to the current Russian incursion into Ukraine.  President Putin oversaw the exercise, which included submarine, land, and bomber missile firings. The intended message is that Russia is a competent nuclear power in the Arctic. As the threat of the use of nuclear weapons circulates in the context of the Ukraine war, Russia’s nuclear delivery tests in the Arctic serve as a stark reminder to the world of its capabilities.

Source:

Thomas Nielsen, “Russia tested all legs of nuclear triad over the Arctic,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 26 October 2022.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/10/russia-tested-all-legs-nuclear-triad-over-arctic

Ballistic missiles were launched both from a nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea and from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk region towards the Kura range on Kamchatka.  Cruise missiles were launched toward targets in the Komi Republic from strategic bombers.

For the second time this year, President Vladimir Putin ordered a massive nuclear weapons exercise.  Last time was a few days before the invasion of Ukraine in late February.

The October 26 strategic drill included all three legs of Russia’s nuclear triad; submarine, land-based missiles and long-range bomber planes.

“During the event, the level of preparedness of military command and control structures, and the skills of the leadership and operation staff in the troops were checked,” the Kremlin said in a statement.

The President’s office added that all tasks were fulfilled, all missiles reached their targets.

While Putin oversaw the exercise, his Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, gave the orders to the involved strategic nuclear forces.

Russia Demands Mandatory History Lessons for College Students

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Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky on Red Square, 4 November 2020.

Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky on Red Square, 4 November 2020.

“The focus of the course on the formation of Russian patriotism is ensured by priority attention to the heroic pages of Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence against foreign invaders, for ensuring national interests and security.”

Over the past two decades, and especially since February 2022, the Kremlin leadership has used its extensive media resources to promulgate its version of Russian history. Key components of this narrative revolve around the continuity of the Russian state and how the West has always presented an existential threat. As the first excerpt from Russian government news source Rossiyskaya Gazeta points out, college students will now receive a mandatory “144 hours for the study of the history of Russia… in all universities without exception.” Students will not be permitted to review the materials on their own, but as the excerpt emphasizes, “educational institutions will have to spend 80 percent of this time on the so-called contact work, that is, not online.”

The second excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes one of the concepts prepared by the Russian Historical Society (RHS), which might be selected to write the curriculum. Rather than allowing individual universities to develop their own courses of instruction, the draft concept developed by the RHS urges the “unity of historical education at the country’s universities and is aimed at the formation of a common civic identity of Russian society.” Not surprisingly, this draft concept mimics the Kremlin’s view of history, where to the focus is on “the heroic pages of Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence against foreign invaders, for ensuring national interests and security.” The Kremlin’s perspective on current events is given special emphasis. For instance, describing the situation in Ukraine, “whose leadership turned it into ‘anti-Russia’ and, with the help of NATO, was preparing for the ‘return of Crimea and Donbass,’ led to the inevitability of a special military operation by Russia in 2022.” The article cites a Russian historian who refers to the official description of the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as propaganda. It also raises the “question of how modern students will relate to the words of the teacher in the presence of many sources of information.”  Nevertheless, the article concludes by stating that “RHS representatives promised that the document would undergo a wide public discussion” prior to being finalized. However, this discussion may not be very candid given the current political climate in Russia today.

Sources:

Elena Novoselova, “Во всех неисторических вузах вводится 114 часов истории России (All non-historical universities introduce 114 hours of Russian history),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Official government source), 7 October 2022. https://rg.ru/2022/10/07/vo-vseh-neistoricheskih-vuzah-vvoditsia-114-chasov-istorii-rossii.html

It was decided to allocate 144 hours for the study of the history of Russia in non-historical specialties in all universities without exception. Educational institutions will have to spend 80 percent of this time on the so-called contact work, that is, not online.

Anna Vasilyeva, “От Руси до спецоперации (From Russia to special operation),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 10 October 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5606420

The Russian Historical Society has prepared a draft concept for a university course in the history of Russia for all students, regardless of their specialization. It covers the period from Ancient Russia to modern Russia and ends with the expansion of NATO, the entry of Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine and the announcement of Western sanctions. As conceived by the authors, such a concept should form in students the ideas of citizenship, patriotism and all-Russian unity. Teachers are advised to “avoid negative bias and slander” when talking about the problems and contradictions of Russian history.

A team of experts from the Russian Historical Society (RIO), led by Yuri Petrov, director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has developed a draft unified concept of teaching Russian history for non-historical faculties…. Now universities have the right to determine the content of the subject, its chronological and geographical scope, as well as methodological aspects. As a result, “conflict persists and even deepens in approaches to the selection of content, in interpretations and concepts in relation to both the history of Russia as a whole and many topical problems of the past,” the concept says.

According to the authors’ plans, it should ensure the unity of “historical education at the country’s universities” and is aimed “at the formation of a common civic identity of Russian society.” … “The focus of the course on the formation of Russian patriotism is ensured by priority attention to the heroic pages of Russia’s struggle for freedom and independence against foreign invaders, for ensuring national interests and security.”…

…The “anti-constitutional coup in Kyiv” in 2014 and the circumstances of the annexation of the Crimean peninsula are also mentioned. The relevant appeals of President Vladimir Putin are almost directly quoted here: “The situation in Ukraine, whose leadership turned it into “anti-Russia” and, with the help of NATO, was preparing for the “return of Crimea and Donbass,” led to the inevitability of a special military operation by Russia in 2022,” the concept says….

…Candidate of Historical Sciences, teacher at Tyumen State University Alexander Fokin directly calls ‘propaganda’ that part of the concept that describes the latest events: “It is clear that they need to show that we have developed, and here we are faced with villains that hinder development. But it is difficult to evaluate the present from the point of view of a historical view…. It seems to them that if a teacher at a university begins to bend a certain line, then students will believe it as the truth. But the big question is how modern students will relate to the words of the teacher in the presence of many sources of information.”…So far, the concept has been sent to the Ministry of Education and Science and presented on Friday at the forum of history teachers in Tobolsk. There, RHS representatives promised that the document would undergo a wide public discussion.

Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin laid flowers at the monument to Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky on Red Square, 4 November 2020.  
Source: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64332/photos
Attribution: CCA-4.0

Lack of PTSD Treatment for Russian Soldiers

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President Putin meets with injured Russian soldiers, 25 May 2022.

President Putin meets with injured Russian soldiers, 25 May 2022.

“…[W]ork[ing] to preserve the psychological health of military personnel in the SMO zone should now be a priority.”

The accompanying excerpt from the semi-independent Russian news site Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye looks at the question of repairing military morale, arguing that Russia “lacks comprehensive measures to preserve the mental state of people who are in the zone of the SMO [special military operation].” The article begins by pointing out that Russian medical personnel have experience with dealing with “stress, trauma, [and] post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).” It describes how during operations in Chechnya (1994-1996), Ministry of Defense doctors developed a multi-step process to identify “servicemen with adaptation disorders caused by severe psycho-emotional stress” and then provided treatment based on the degree of trauma. The article also discusses research and methods recently demonstrated at the Army-2022 exercise designed “to increase the efficiency of the professional activities of servicemen and extend their professional longevity.” However, Russia has not yet fielded the new diagnostic equipment required even though, as the article points out, “such complexes are now in great demand among the troops.” The article further asserts that “work to preserve the psychological health of military personnel in the SMO zone should now be a priority.” The article concludes by warning that “due to psycho-traumatism, we expect an increase in cardiovascular and nervous diseases, alcoholism, disability, and mortality among various categories of citizens.” 

Source:

Yuri Avdeev, “Психологические травмы войны излечимы (The psychological trauma of war is curable),” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (semi-independent site), 22 September 2022. https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2022-09-22/7_1207_medicine.html

…For more than six months, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been conducting a special military operation (SMO) to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. At the same time, in many ways, there is a lack of comprehensive measures to preserve the mental state of people who are in the zone of the SMO, in the territory controlled by the RF Armed Forces….

Combat operations are accompanied by social stress, which arises in the event of an extreme threat to the survival of the individual personality. Or the survival of entire social groups to which it belongs…. However, practicing physicians and psychologists have their own view of psychological trauma. They consider them treatable and distinguish between concepts such as stress, trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

…During the operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya in 1994–1996, doctors from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and other interested departments searched for the most informative psycho-diagnostic and effective psycho-corrective methods used at various stages of medical care. The result of the work done was the formation of a three-stage (three-stage) system for the provision of psychological and psychiatric assistance, which has been actively used since the beginning of the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus region in 1999.

The first stage was carried out by specialists (psychologists and psycho-neurologists) directly in units and subunits using express diagnostic and express correction techniques. Active identification of servicemen with adaptation disorders caused by severe psycho-emotional stress, when the human psyche is not able to adapt to the changes in life, was carried out. The second stage is the provision of medical and psychological assistance to military personnel with a treatment period of up to seven days…. The third stage is specialized medical care for military personnel with treatment periods of up to 30 days. 

In January 2021, the Military Medical Academy. Kirov, under the leadership of the Main Military Medical Directorate on the basis of the ERA Military Innovation Technopolis, created a laboratory where a project is being implemented to study and implement technologies of the platform for medical and psychological monitoring of the professional reliability of military personnel based on the principles of personalized medicine. The main goal of scientific research was to increase the efficiency of the professional activities of servicemen and extend their professional longevity….

Active work is underway to develop specialized psychophysiological equipment. One of its samples was demonstrated at the international forum “Army-2022″…. Made in the interests of the main military medical department of the Ministry of Defense, it is compact and allows in the field using various sensory sensors placed on a soldier to determine his psychophysiological state in a few minutes. 

…Representatives of the department could not give any intelligible explanations about the possibilities of finalizing the system in the interests of the Ministry of Defense. It is also unclear why there are no developed mobile models of complexes for psychological relief rooms. Meanwhile, such complexes are now in great demand among the troops.While in the profile of psychologists, work to preserve the psychological health of military personnel in the SMO zone should now be a priority. And also, if necessary, the fastest restoration of their combat capability and ability to work. …Those who do not think about distant difficulties are sure to face close troubles. Therefore, today the primary task of Russian health care is the creation and effective operation of a system of medical and social support aimed at restoring the mental and somatic health of citizens who were on the territory of the SMO. Otherwise, due to psycho-traumatism, we expect an increase in cardiovascular and nervous diseases, alcoholism, disability, and mortality among various categories of citizens. 

Image Information:

Image: President Putin meets with injured Russian soldiers, 25 May 2022
Source: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68479
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russian Airborne Troops Get First Material-Technical Support Brigade

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KAMAZ-4386 Typhoon-VDV rigged for air drop.

KAMAZ-4386 Typhoon-VDV rigged for air drop.

“The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has made a fundamental decision to form a material-technical support (MTO) [logistics] brigade for the Airborne Troops.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin daily newspaper Izvestiya discusses Russian plans to establish the Russian Airborne Troops’ (VDV) first material-technical support (MTO) brigade. Currently, MTO brigades are only found in the Russian Ground Forces’ Combined Arms Armies and one Tank Army. According to the Izvestiya article, VDV operations in Syria, Kazakhstan, and presumably in Ukraine, have shown that the VDV requires a dedicated logistics formation (soyedineniye) to support the VDV’s unique needs for not only long-term combat operations and/or deployment abroad, but also peacekeeping operations.

Sources:

Roman Kretsul and Alexey Ramm, “Снаряд вне очереди: в ВДВ появится собственное тыловое соединение: В Воздушно-десантных войсках сформируют отдельную бригаду материально-технического обеспечения (Projectile out of turn: the Airborne Troops will have their own logistic formation: A separate logistics brigade will be formed in the Airborne Troops),” Izvestiya  (Pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 12 October 2022.  https://iz.ru/1408667/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/snariad-vne-ocheredi-v-vdv-poiavitsia-sobstvennoe-tylovoe-soedinenie

…The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has made a fundamental decision to form a material-technical support (MTO) [logistics] brigade for the Airborne Troops. The organizational and staffing structure, composition and tasks of the formation are still being worked out, sources in the military department told Izvestia. The brigade will report directly to the Airborne Troops command, working in the interests of the paratroopers. Almost all the equipment of the formation will be able to land by airborne means, and some by parachute.

“In general, it is difficult to organize a system of interaction with the regular structures of logistic support, subordinate to the Deputy Minister of Defense for Logistics,” said Colonel Alexander Perendzhiev, Associate Professor at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. – As they say, “the convoys are late.” And the Airborne Troops move very quickly, and so it is necessary that the “wagons” keep up with them. I think that this is shown from not only the experience of Syria, but also CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] operations at the beginning of the year in Kazakhstan, where paratroopers formed the basis of Russian forces. “the usual logistic services do not act quickly enough, because they are not paratroopers,” said Alexander Perendzhiev. – They can supply motorized rifle and tank units. But the Airborne Troops are special, rapid reaction forces. Today the winner is the one who builds a more effective system of combat and logistics support. Much depends on the delivery of shells, cartridges, grenades, and the ability to quickly repair damaged equipment…

In January of this year, at the request of the government of Kazakhstan, peacekeeping forces of the CSTO countries arrived in the unrest-ridden republic. The Russian contingent was represented by the Airborne Forces. All units, together with equipment, were transferred to the airfield near Alma-Ata within one or two days by Il-76 military transport aircraft. After the situation stabilized, units of Russia and other countries participating in the treaty left this state just as quickly. This was the first experience in history of the real use of the CSTO forces.

The operational transfer of troops to one direction or another and the organization of their supply are also being actively worked out during the exercises of the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. So, last year, near Orenburg, in the rear of a mock enemy, helicopter landings were landed, which cut off the path to retreat. During the maneuvers, the “militants” were squeezed out of the border…

Image Information:

Image: KAMAZ-4386 Typhoon-VDV rigged for air drop
Source: https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2021-Static-part-2/i-Px9gHXf/A
Attribution: CCA-4.0

Russian Military Watcher Identifies Problems With the Russian VDV and Parachute Assaults

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Combat Vehicle of the Airborne BMD-4M.

Combat Vehicle of the Airborne BMD-4M.

“These issues have led to the fact that, as after every war in the past, the future of the Airborne Troops is now being called into question.  We will also call it into question, but at the same time it is necessary “not to throw out the baby with the bathwater” and assess what of the existing potential of the Airborne Troops still needs and should be preserved…”

The accompanying excerpted article from aRussian military enthusiast website, Voyennoye Obozreniye (notably still allowed to remain active), features a Russian military watcher’s assessment of issues concerning, and possible reforms of, the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV). As some of his chief concerns, the author highlights insufficient armor, artillery, air defenses, and airlift capabilities for the VDV. He also posits that the requirement of air supremacy for parachute landings and the hazards of the proliferation of air defense systems make parachute landings unfeasible. Although the author questions current VDV equipment and doctrine, he seems confident the overall VDV concept is sound and may just need to be updated.

Source:

Alexander Timokhin, “Реформа ВДВ в свете опыта боёв на Украине и предшествующих войн (Reform of the Airborne Troops: In light of the experience of fighting in Ukraine and previous wars),” Voyennoye Obozreniye (Russian military enthusiast website that has been allowed to remain active), 13 September 2022. https://topwar.ru/201636-reforma-vdv-v-svete-opyta-boev-na-ukraine-i-predshestvujuschih-vojn.html

…Let us briefly list the problems that arose in connection with the large-scale use of the Airborne Troops in military operations.

1. The seeming senselessness of using these [VDV] formations as paratroopers in a war against an enemy with a conventional army, air defenses and aviation.  It is worth recalling that part of the forces that were planned to be dropped near Kyiv from the air (presumably also near Gostomel) were preparing specifically for a parachute landing…Today, knowing the situation there and then, we can only be glad that this landing did not happen.  Military transport aircraft loaded with parachute platforms with airborne equipment, prepared for a parachute landing on the Gostomel airfield. The parachute landing was later cancelled.

2. Low survivability of airborne armored vehicles at a huge price. It is known that the BMD-4 [Combat Vehicle of the Airborne] costs approximately the same amount as a T-90M tank.  However, it (BMD-4) can be destroyed by small arms fire. Despite the very light weight, the BMD uses a very advanced fire control system by Russian standards and uses powerful weapons — 100mm and 30mm guns.  The BMD’s thin aluminum armor provides little protection, but there is no alternative, as it must be [lite enough to be] dropped by parachute.  The BMD-4 has performed well in Ukraine (aside from survivability issues), but only two can be air dropped from an airplane [presumably the Il-76] as opposed to three. [of older versions of the BMD]

3. The parachute squad [3-4 dismounts] is too small and lightly armed to fight on foot, the Airborne Troops have few heavy weapons, tanks, large-caliber artillery, however, now it is being attached to units or the artillery is being upsized from D-30 122mm howitzers to Msta-B 152mm howitzers or other howitzers of the same caliber.  At the same time, the Airborne Troops have weak strike capabilities compared to motorized rifle troops and are relatively expensive.

4. During Soviet times, the Airborne Troops could parachute not only their light armored vehicles and artillery, but also vehicles (GAZ-66 cars), and even multiple launch rocket systems. Now the Airborne Troops has vehicles that cannot be dropped by parachute, such as tanks, and the vehicles that can be dropped by parachute are lightly armored.

5. Insufficient number of military transport aircraft.  It is currently not possible to parachute drop a VDV division.

6. The lack of a clear concept of the use of the troops in combat, which require [for a parachute drop] complete air supremacy over the areas of flight and landing, with the subsequent retention of such air supremacy over the combat area, parachute drops are almost impossible against an enemy with at least some kind of air defense.

7. The need to keep in the Airborne Troops very large number of selected personnel who are much better trained and more expensive than those in the Ground Forces, whose potential cannot be fully realized due to the afore mentioned shortcomings.

8. The lack of VDV air defense capabilities, despite the fact that the VDV must act in isolation from the main forces.

In addition to these issues, there is a deficit of infantry in the Russian Armed Forces for the conduct of operations in the mountains and other such inaccessible terrain, as well as during assaults on cities.  Also, the Russian Armed Forces lack airborne assault units and formations trained to operate in conjunction with helicopters and parachute from them.  These issues have led to the fact that, as after every war in the past, the future of the Airborne Troops is now being called into question.  We will also call it into question, but at the same time it is necessary “not to throw out the baby with the bathwater” and assess what of the existing potential of the Airborne Troops still needs and should be preserved…

Image Information:

Image: Combat Vehicle of the Airborne BMD-4M
Source: https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/Moscow-Victory-Parade-Vehicles-9-May-2019/i-LvCkZHZ
Attribution: CCA-4.0

Russia Conducts Submarine Sea Trials and Amphibious Landing Exercise in Arctic

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“Two of Russia’s newest nuclear-powered submarines have completed a 5,500 nm voyage under the Arctic ice cap.”

Historically, the Russian Far East has not been a high priority on the Kremlin’s military spending list, but that is changing. According to independent Norwegian news site The Barents Observer, Russia has added two new nuclear-powered submarines to its Pacific Fleet. The Pacific Fleet now has three of the latest long-range nuclear-powered strategic Borei-class submarines, while the Northern Fleet has two. The second excerpted article from The Barents Observer reports that the Northern Fleet’s annual summer/autumn exercise continues as scheduled with amphibious assault landings, but no riverine exercise up the Yenisei River to the riverport of Dudinka and then overland to Norilsk. Riverine exercises are complicated, and according to the excerpted article, elements of the Arctic brigades have fought in Ukraine and many of the current soldiers and sailors of the brigades are new. Amphibious assault landings are a good starting point before attempting a riverine exercise in the Arctic.

Sources:

Thomas Nielsen, “Nuclear subs made trans-Arctic under-ice transfer from Barents to Pacific,”The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 28 September 2022.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/09/nuclear-subs-made-trans-arctic-under-ice-transfer-barents-pacific

Two of Russia’s newest nuclear-powered submarines have completed a 5,500 nm voyage under the Arctic ice cap. Built at Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk and tested in the White- and Barents Seas, the two submarines “Novosibirsk” and “Knyaz Oleg” are now ready for combat patrols.

The inter-fleet transit from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet contributes a substantial strength to the submarine forces in the Russian Far East. “Knyaz Oleg” of the Borei-class carries 16 ballistic nuclear missiles, while the “Novosibirsk” is armed with some of the navy’s most modern long-range cruise missiles, torpedoes and mines.

Both submarines participated in the Umka-2022 naval exercise taking place in the Chucki Sea in September before sailing into Vilyuchinsk naval base near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy according to the Defense Ministry.

There are now three Borei-class ballistic missile submarines in active service with the Pacific Fleet. The “Novosibirsk” is the first 4th generation Yasen-class multi-purpose sub to be deployed in the Pacific. 

Thomas Nilsen, “Russia shows off Arctic Military Power”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 22 September 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/09/russia-shows-arctic-military-drill-amid-ukraine-war

The official press statement says nothing about how the mock enemy managed to get to Cape Chelyuskin. The cape is the northernmost tip of the Taymyr Peninsula, also known to be the northernmost coastline of the Eurasian mainland.

Here, between icebergs and frozen tundra, the soldiers of Russia’s Northern Fleet countered an imagined illegal armed sabotage reconnaissance group. The drill this week included landing amphibious assault forces supported by choppers and artillery fire from the destroyer “Admiral Levchenko” – the lead warship on the Arctic voyage.

September expeditions with exercises along the Northern Sea Route have been an annual highlight for the Russian navy over the last decade. This year, the voyage is supervised by Vice Admiral Oleg Golubev, Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet.

Armored personnel carriers were brought to shore by “Aleksandr Otrakovsky”, the landing ship that last year sailed side-by-side in the Black Sea with the cruiser “Moskva”. That warship sank after being hit in Putin’s war off the coast of Ukraine earlier this year.

Troops now training for Arctic warfare on the top of the world come from the same infantry brigades that have lost hundreds of soldiers on the battlefields in Ukraine since Putin ordered them to invade on February 24th.

Thousands of kilometers from the violent fighting in Ukraine, the soldiers practiced tactical actions to capture the beach and made a five-kilometer march on the permafrost of the peninsula.

The navy ships set out from the Kola Bay on August 10 and have conducted navy drills at Franz Josef Land, near the offshore oil rig Priazlomnaya in the eastern Barents Sea and in the Kara Sea on their way to Severnaya Zemlya and the Laptev Sea where a drill took place at the Kotelny Island last week. 

Kazakhstan Suspends Defense Exports, Denying Russia Purchases

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President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia.

The export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.

When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, international sanctions forced the Russian defense industry to consider purchasing military equipment from defense companies in Kazakhstan as a workaround to meet requirements for the Russian Armed Forces. In 2014, no significant Russian acquisitions from Kazakh companies ultimately took place. However, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a new round of international sanctions against Moscow have reportedly caused Russia to look again at Kazakhstan’s defense industry. However, as the accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports, the Kazakh government’s announcement on 27 August that it is suspending all defense exports for one year. The ban includes “the export of weapons, military equipment and military products,” and it appears to have the greatest impact on Russia. The move is viewed as a direct effort by Kazakhstan to avoid violating sanctions levied against Russia, which it has stated multiple times that it seeks not to violate. The article notes that Russia had been planning to make a $46 million defense purchase from a Kazakh company, including acquiring shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, and even armored personnel carriers. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development denied this. The article notes that the pro-Russian Rybar Telegram channel tried to refute the Kazakh government by publishing documents for the purchase, but they could not be verified. Regardless of whether the Kazakh government agreed to the purchase, the one-year suspension of defense exports ultimately deprives Russia of a supplier of weapons and equipment that closely matches its own armed forces.

Sources:

“Казахстан на год приостановит экспорт вооружений (Kazakhstan is suspending defense exports for one year),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 29 August 2022.

https://fergana.agency/news/127503/

Kazakhstan will suspend the export of military products for a year. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of the country came up with such an initiative, and it was supported by the Commission on Defense Industry, the website of the Prime Minister reports…the export of weapons, military equipment and military products will be suspended until the end of August 2023.

In the middle of this month, Russian Telegram channels reported on an allegedly planned deal for the sale of Soviet and Russian-made ammunition by the Kazakh company Technoexport…They said that the contract in the amount of $46 million was concluded on July 16, 2022. The reports also provided a list of weapons – shells for howitzers, ammunition for mortars, rockets, armored personnel carriers and so on. The Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development of Kazakhstan denied this information a few days later.

In response, the Rybar Telegram channel published documents (without specifying their origin) that cast doubt on the refutation of the Kazakh authorities.

On August 19, a meeting was held in Sochi between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. As the Kremlin reported, the agenda of the talks included the development of Russian-Kazakh relations, strategic partnership and cooperation.

Image Information:

Image: President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Sochi, Russia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin-Tokayev_(2022-08-19).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0