First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.

“One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland.”

The Russian State Duma announced on Telegram it will be transforming its Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, or Rosmolodyozh, into a larger body to strengthen and consolidate the country’s youth ideological education initiatives, from kindergarten to higher education. According to the excerpted 12 September post, the Duma introduced a draft law titled “On Systematizing the Sphere of Youth Policy” to instill “a willingness in young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland.” The restructuring may signal a need to whip up patriotism and pro-Kremlin ideology in younger generations, as the Kremlin looks to rally more support for its “special military operation” in Ukraine, especially after the Ukrainian Army’s incursion into Kursk and the potential use of longer-range missiles into Russian territory.

Modern Russian state support of youth movements has historical roots and contemporary benefits. The youth movements are a modern analog to the Soviet-era “pioneer camps” that indoctrinated young Russians with Leninist dogma. In recent years, a number of patriotic youth movements backed by the Ministry of Defense emerged to educate youth about Russian and Soviet history.[i] In Fall 2023, the Kremlin held a nationwide school lesson to teach children that Russian elections were free and fair.[ii]  Prior to that, in 2022, the Russian government launched an outfit called The Movement of the First, a pro-Kremlin youth movement aimed at “preparing children and youth for a full-fledged life in society, including shaping their world views on the basis of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” and instilling “love and respect for the Homeland.”[iii] The former head of this movement, Grigory Gurov, will lead the newly restructured Rosmolodyozh.[iv] The latest restructuring may indicate an unease among Russian leaders about the “forever war” in Ukraine and the need to recruit more young conscripts. The move could also signal flagging domestic support for the war. Surveys suggest that two out of three Russians support it,[v] yet these polls may not reflect the true sentiment of most Russians, including Russian youth.

Sources:

Artem Metelev (a member and spokesperson of the State Duma), post on Telegram (a social messaging app) from 2 September 2024. https://t.me/artemmetelev/7162

The special military operation and modern challenges make logical adjustments to the state youth policy. Patriotic education of youth has always been a priority. We propose to reflect new tasks and work tools in federal legislation.

After the adoption of our law this fall:

• Patriotic clubs, historical and local history and search organizations, specialized military-patriotic centers will receive priority support from the state;

• One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland;

• The effectiveness of patriotic work will be analyzed as part of annual monitoring;

• A set of measures to educate youth in citizenship, patriotism, respect for history and readiness to serve their country will be approved at the federal and regional levels.

Notes:

[i] Evan Gershkovich, Russia’s Fast-Growing ‘Youth Army’ Aims to Breed Loyalty to Fatherland,” The Moscow Times, 17 April 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/17/russias-fast-growing-youth-army-aimst-to-breed-loyalty-to-the-fatherland-a65256

[ii] Pyotr Kozlov, “As Putin’s Re-election Looms, Kremlin Pushes to Indoctrinate a New Generation of Voters,” The Moscow Times, 29 September 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/29/as-putins-re-election-looms-kremlin-pushes-to-indoctrinate-a-new-generation-of-voters-a82580

[iii] Website of Movement of the First. http://wefirst.ru

[iv] Maxim Ivanov, Elena Mukhametshina, “Новым начальником Росмолодежи может стать глава «Движения первых» Григорий Гуров” (“The head of the ‘Movement of the First’ Grigory Gurov may become the new head of Rosmolodezh”), Vedemosti (Moscow-based business newspaper) 12 September 2024. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2024/09/12/1061695-novim-glavoi-rosmolodezhi-mozhet-stat-glava-dvizheniya-pervih

[v] Vladimir Milov, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?”Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert blog, 9 January 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine-2/

Image Information:

Image: First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.
Source: Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, https://tinyurl.com/2×725577

Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station.

“Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea.”

Summary: Russia is using a large drift station called Severney Polyus (North Pole) in the Arctic to gather information.

The Arctic has always been important to Russia[i] and according to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is conducting Arctic research using a large drift station, the Severny Polyus, or North Pole.[ii] The Severney Polyus is a self-propelled platform vessel that houses 34 scientists, 15 laboratories, and crew on board and is designed to autonomously drift through Arctic sea ice for up to two years. According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources, Aleksandr Kozlov, the data collected from the Severney Polyus will form the basis for “understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.” The article notes that Russia’s new Marine Doctrine includes the use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes, including not only trawlers and icebreakers, but also platforms like the Severney Polyus. The deployment of the Severney Polyus to conduct Arctic research is yet another indication of Russia’s vision of the operational environment in the Arctic region, giving Russia a continued presence in the vital region.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Russia says its North Pole platform is key to understanding climate change,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 23 May 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/05/russia-says-its-north-pole-platform-key-understanding-climate-change

Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea. On board has been a crew of 16 and a research team of 34.  The ship in late April made it out of the ice north of Svalbard and in early May sailed southwards.  On the 10th of May it was located to the west of the Ice Fjord at Svalbard and shortly later made it to the waters north of the Bear Island. For unclear reasons, the vessel for several days stayed in the waters of the Bear Island before it proceeded towards Murmansk.

According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources Aleksandr Kozlov, the Severny Polyus offers Russia unique insights into the Arctic.  “With the start of the operations of the self-propelled and ice-protected platform Russia has gotten the possibility to undertake long-term scientific experiments on high latitudes,” Kozlov said in a comment delivered in connection with the arrival of the Severny Polyus in Murmansk.

“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology. The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.”  Kozlov has been Minister of Natural Resources since 2000 and was reappointed in May 2024.  He has also been closely engaged in natural resource cooperation with several foreign countries, among them China and North Korea.

…In the course of the 20-month expedition, the geologists took a number of samples from the Arctic seabed.  The samples will be used as part of Russia’s efforts to expand its borders on the Arctic shelf, representatives of the expedition say.

The Severny Polyus is designed to be able to autonomously drift through Arctic sea-ice for up to two years.  On board are 15 labs where researchers can work year-round.  The ship is operated by Russia’s meteorological service Roshydromet…

The research platform has replaced Russia’s Arctic expeditions based on ice floes organized since the 1930s.  The quickly vanishing Arctic sea-ice made it increasingly hard to organize the expeditions and the last real ice station, the “North Pole-40”, was held in the winter of 2012.

Albeit built for research purposes, the Severny Polyus  could ultimately also be applied by the Russian military.  The country’s new Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.  That could include not only trawler and icebreakers, but also the Severniy Polus.“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology.  The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route” Kozlov explained….

Notes:

[i] Russia began exploring the Arctic in the 11^th century.  Trans-Artic navigation continued into the 16^th century during voyages to Spitzbergen-Gruman and Novaya Zemlya. In 1764-1776, Captain Chichagov attempted an expedition across the North Pole to the Pacific Ocean. Chichagov’s attempt failed, but much scientific knowledge on the Arctic waters were gained.

[ii] In 1902, Fritjof Nansen, a famous Norwegian Arctic explorer, proposed the idea of a scientific drifting ice station to chart the Arctic waters. In the 1930s, Soviet scientists conducted studies of the Arctic on drifting ships. In 1937, the Soviets built a drifting ice station, “North Pole 1,” on an Arctic ice floe supported by Soviet aviation, followed by “North Pole 2”and so on until “North Pole 40” was built. North Pole 40 had to be evacuated in 2013 as the ice floe was breaking up.

OE Watch Insight:

RUS is using a large drift station called Severney Polyus (North Pole) in the Arctic to gather information.

Image Information:

Image: Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiralty_Shipyards – /media/File:Admiralty_Shipyard.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.

“Counter-ambush actions in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.”

Summary: Russian military observers have called for more emphasis on “react to ambush” training, which they see as a current weakness.

While few units from any nation’s military can survive an ambush unscathed, an article in the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik highlights the need for additional emphasis on “react to ambush drills” in Russian military training programs. These recommendations reflect continuing training deficiencies in basic soldier tasks despite lessons learned in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Ukraine.

The article’s authors recommend adding a sixth task to Chapter 5 of the Russian combat manual “Actions in Armed Conflict, Part 3: Platoon, Squad, Tank.”[i] Titling the task “Educating Personnel on Counter-ambush Activities,” the authors first highlight the need to practice counter-ambush tactics more frequently in individual and collective training. The article further outlines in detail the steps in reacting to an ambush. To begin, commanders must identify likely ambush points and plan accordingly. These points will likely be main avenues of approach containing terrain restricting movement, funneling targets, alongside cover and concealment.

The training recommendations mirror U.S. Army battle drills. Near ambushes are defined by an enemy being within hand grenade range up to 35m. Those caught within the ambush must immediately return fire with all possible weapons, directing fire against enemy positions. Smoke and fragmentation grenades are used to further suppress adversaries and conceal Russian forces in the “fire zone,” enabling assaults on the ambusher’s positions. Russian forces outside the fire zone provide supporting fire. Far ambushes are those outside of 35m. Actions of troops within the fire zone are similar to those in the near-side ambush, except the elements outside the fire zone maneuver to attack the ambusher’s flanks or rear. Those in the fire zone adjust fire as necessary to avoid fratricide. The authors acknowledge the need to train these skills is due to obvious failures and losses in both the initial steps of the Ukrainian invasion in 2022 and the First Chechen War,[ii] both of which were consequences of lack of training. Similar issues also appear in accounts from the Soviet-Afghanistan War,[iii] where Russian forces failed to recognize likely ambush points and hesitated in reacting to ambushes, costing them in men and equipment. Reacting to ambush is the antithesis to the calculated, fires-heavy tactics frequently used by Russian forces and could be a challenge to the Russian largely conscripted ground force.

Sources:

A. Levchenko, “Засада – не приговор (The Ambush is not a Sentence),” Army Review (monthly Russian military periodical), Vol. 6, June 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 30-31: “The practice of military operations in recent military conflicts showed that any movement of a unit, be it large or small, not to mention single machines, is always associated with maximum risk of being attacked by the enemy from ambush. This was especially true for the first stage of the SVO in Ukraine. So, we need to talk about it, especially since counter-ambush training developments in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.

…The word “ambush” has become something like an objective obstacle, “an irresistible force”. Meanwhile, in the overwhelming majority of the analyzed facts of being ambushed and the destruction of columns, commanders’ errors are visible in organizing and conducting a march. Although, according to all governing documents, the responsibility of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act when ambushed.

In our opinion, there is a need to add to Chapter 5 of the Manual for Training for Combined Armed Combat ‘Actions During Armed Conflict’ (Part 3 ‘Platoon, squad, tank’) one more point number 6, entitled ‘Personnel Training in counter-ambush action events.’”

Pg. 31: “The effectiveness of the actions of a unit marching through its territory and ambushed by enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups, directly depends on the degree of training of personnel to fight in data conditions. The response is usually heavy fire on ambush positions,

from all types of weapons, protection of the unit caught in the affected area, and setting up smokescreens and attacking enemy positions… To immediately attack ambush positions from the front, flank or rear, all personnel must be previously trained… Attacking the ambush’s flanks is preferable, as it is easier to organize contact… Responsibilities of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act upon contact with an ambush even without his participation.”

Pg. 80: “Every officer, sergeant and soldiers are trained to act in two situations (regardless of

type of travel). First, the enemy opened fire from a grenade throwing distance (up to 35 m). In this case part of the unit is under strong, concentrated fire from the attackers. Without additional command, this part of the unit responds with maximum fire in the direction of the ambush, throws smoke and fragmentation grenades and attacks enemy positions. Those who are outside affected areas, open fire in the direction of the ambush positions, covering the attack.Second – the enemy opened fire from a distance exceeding the above distance (more than 35 m). Part of the unit that fell into the affected area lies down, puts up a smoke screen and returns fire in the direction of the ambush. The second part of the unit, which does not fall into the affected area, can and must attack the ambush positions from the flank or from rear by fire and maneuver.”

Notes:

[i] The other five tasks within Chapter 5 are “Common Actions (ex. conduct counterterrorism operations, maintain border integrity), Blocking (more similar in definition to the US Army ‘isolating’ tactical task), Searching and Reconnaissance, Serving in a Checkpoint, and Convoys.”

[ii]  For case studies on Chechen ambush tactics during the first and second Chechen wars, see; Dodge Billingsley, “Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian Chechen Wars 1994-2009,” Foreign Military Studies Office and United States Marine Corp’s Studies and Analysis Division. 2012. 

[iii] These include “The Other Side of the Mountain” by LTC(R) Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali which provide insights on mujahadin activities against Soviet and Afghan government forces during the Soviet-Afghan War. Vignettes 1-16, particularly Vignettes 6 and 16, detail mujahadin ambush tactics and Soviet responses. Chapter 5 of “The Bear Went over the Mountain” by LTC(R) Grau discusses from the Soviet perspective reactions to ambushes.

OE Watch Insight:

RUS military observers see the need to improve “react to ambush drill” training, which they see as a current weakeness.

Image Information:

Image: Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.
Source: Andrew Fisher
Attribution: Author grants permission to use