Russian Volunteer Force Highlights the Evolution of UAV Missions in Ukraine

Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV.


“Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian daily newspaper Izvestia discusses the activities of the Volunteer Corps of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Española Brigade. The Española Brigade—currently numbering no more than 100 individuals, according to the founder—began as a volunteer formation of soccer enthusiasts, which now provides trained UAV operators and UAVs to support Russia’s conventional force in the special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestia article, the Española Brigade operates its own UAV training center and is developing its own UAVs for use in Ukraine. Although state UAV development programs are entrenched in both Russia and Ukraine, the development of UAV technologies by volunteer units and their personnel in the field also appears to be increasingly common on both sides of the front. It would now seem that the traditional model of governments procuring defense articles from private industry and then supplying these materials to the military is simply no longer effective given UAVs’ rapidly evolving technology and newfound tactical uses. Indeed, both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries are now collaborating closely with industry to quickly deliver new capabilities to the battlefield as the requirements are recognized.

The article also mentions the importance of the Baba Yaga class of large UAVs. The primary mission of the Baba Yaga-class of UAVs is not reconnaissance or bomb dropping, but logistics support. This development illustrates the expanding role of UAVs on the modern battlefield—UAVs are no longer being used just as a means of reconnaissance (intelligence) and/or fires. UAVs are now becoming key capabilities to enable success for other war-fighting functions.

Overall, although volunteer formations like Russia’s Española Brigade are relatively small, they help fill critical shortages of UAV expertise that the conventional force would be hard-pressed to stand up on its own.[ii]


Sources:

Dmitry Korneev, “«Птичья» школа: как в бригаде «Эспаньола» готовят операторов дронов

БПЛА (“Bird” school: how the “Espanola” brigade trains drone operators),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 7 November 2024.  https://iz.ru/1786422/dmitrii-korneev/ptica-skola-kak-v-brigade-espanola-gotovat-operatorov-dronov

The volunteer “Española Brigade”, the backbone of which is football fans, has a unique UAV combat training center…the commander and founder of the UAV Combat Training Center is respectfully called Petrovich…“With the start of the special operation, the idea came to organize a UAV combat training center. But it didn’t work out right away. It only opened in May 2023.  He notes that a wide variety of people came to the center.  “We invited those who had experience working with UAVs, even if it was minimal,” he recalls…They started training and preparing people on “commercial” UAVs. Gradually training switched to FPV [first-person-view] UAVs. The trainees first master the theory, and then go to the training grounds. The final stage of the program involves training on a relatively calm section of the front…There, people receive their first combat experience.  The center itself is relatively small. Its resources are designed mainly for the Española Brigade, Petrovich emphasizes…“We have been operating for only a year and a half. However, during this time, we have trained more than 100 qualified UAV operators in various areas” says Petrovich…

“Española”, like many other volunteer units, received special weapons manufactured by the so-called people’s defense industry, that is, developed and released outside the framework of the defense order…Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind…, – Petrovich points out, moving on to the scientific and practical activities of the center’s employees.  At Española, they work with the entire spectrum of UAVs…In cooperation with a young design bureau, we are currently developing and conducting experimental tests on two types of d UAVs: a night reconnaissance UAV and a high-speed Baba Yaga UAV.  Due to the abundance of FPV [first-person-view] UAVs, the enemy has problems supplying units on the front line.  “Five, seven, ten kilometers is a dead zone”, he explains.  The fact is that people who sit directly at the front, paradoxically, are sometimes safer than those who are trying to resupply them from the rear. And so the first request for such a Baba Yaga [class UAV] came from such rear detachments.

Petrovich says that the troops needed a fast “bird” that could carry a good load and do it quickly.  The primary mission is supplying provisions, ammunition, and medicine.  The secondary mission is to carry powerful munitions.  A load capacity of, for example, 10 kg allows you to transport an anti-tank mine. Moreover, ammunition can be varied. Now there is a whole line [of UAV munitions]. We call this project “Kikimora”. The active testing phase is underway…The center is also working on countering enemy electronic warfare…The second UAV currently being developed at the center is a night reconnaissance UAV. “It can stay in the air for up to an hour and a half…in terms of range, it’s at least 12 km, we want to increase it to 15-17 km”


Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Additional Russian volunteer units have filled critical positions in Russia’s war in Ukraine, especially in the field of UAVs. See Charles Bartles, “Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service,” OE Watch, 07-2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-gains-combat-power-from-volunteer-service/


Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Yaga_(aircraft)#/media/File:UA_Vampire_UCAV_01.jpg 
Attribution: АрміяІнформCC BY-SA 4.0


Russia Expands Its Arctic Research Capabilities

Russian President Vladimir Putin at Admiralty Shipyards to inspect the Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky submarine, the Ivan Papanin icebreaker patrol ship, and the Viktor Chernomyrdin icebreaker in 2019. Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg is the sight of construction of the newly announced Ivan Frolov Arctic capable research vessel.


“Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Patrushev underlined that the new vessel is aimed at strengthening Russia’s positions in the polar regions.”


In October, Russia announced the construction of its latest Arctic-capable research vessel, the Ivan Frolov. According to the first excerpted article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the Ivan Frolov, set for completion in 2028, will be the largest Arctic research vessel of its kind in the world and “the new flagship of Russia polar science.”[i] Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev noted the Ivan Frolov will collect data “for the development of navigation on the Northern Sea Route and to clarify the boundaries of the continental shelf of Russia.”

According to the second excerpted article from The Barents Observer, Russia’s research platform, the Severny Polyus, commissioned in 2022, recently began its second polar expedition.[ii] The expedition, “North Pole-42,” is expected to continue until 2026. This article also notes that while the Severny Polyus is a scientific research vessel,[iii] it could also serve Russian military purposes, as Russia’s new marine doctrine “includes a high stress on the use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.” This doctrinal emphasis not only affects the Severny Polus and the forthcoming Ivan Frolov but also all other nations with Arctic exposure.

Together, these developments underscore Russia’s continued focus on the Arctic region at a time when all nations with an Arctic foothold are also dedicating resources to the area.


Sources:

Elizaveta Vereykina, “Construction begins on a “new flagship of Russian polar research,”The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 30 October 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/construction-begins-on-a-new-flagship-of-russian-polar-research/419705

On 29 October, the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute reported on an official ceremony held at the Admiralty shipyards in St Petersburg to start the construction of a new scientific vessel named the Ivan Frolov.   The vessel – with a length of 165 meters and displacement about 25,000 tons – is planned to be able to accommodate up to 240 people. In addition to the announced 20 scientific laboratories on board, it will also have a helicopter platform.

“In 2028, the vessel will join the fleet of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute and become the new flagship of Russian polar science,” the news report says. At the ceremony, the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Patrushev underlined, that the new vessel is aimed at strengthening Russia’s positions in the polar regions:

“The vessel will have powerful scientific equipment that will allow conducting research even in the harshest conditions, including research on the ocean floor, in the atmosphere and space,” – “The study of the Arctic and Antarctic is one of the key areas of activity of the Russian Environmental Monitoring Service. More than 20 expeditions are already carried out annually.  They allow tracking climate change, collecting data for the development of navigation of the Northern Sea Route and clarifying the boundaries of the continental shelf of Russia”.

The Governor of St Petersburg, Alexander Beglov, called the new ship “the largest scientific research vessel in the world”. The two well-known large scientific -the RV Kronprins Haakon (Norway) or RRS Sir David Attenborough (UK), are smaller than the new Russian vessel. The technology used in the construction has previously been tested at the floating Arctic research station “North Pole” [“Severny Polyus”], according to the head of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute Alexander Makarov.

Atle Staalesen, “With the North Pole platform, Russia has returned to the Arctic for good,” The Baltic Observer,(independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 17 September 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/arctic/with-the-north-pole-platform-russia-has-returned-to-the-arctic-for-good/142846

Russia’s North Pole (Severny Polyus) research platform has started its second comprehensive Arctic expedition.  The 83-meter-long vessel this week set out from Murmansk with course for the high Arctic.  It will sail into the polar sea-ice north of the New Siberian Islands and drift with the currents for the next two years.  Experts at the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute are now scanning satellite images for the most suitable icefloe for the drift. The search will continue as the vessel approaches the area.

“With the expeditions of the ice-protected self-propelled platform Severny Polyus Russia has returned to the Arctic for good,” says Aleksandr Kozlov, the Russian Minister of Natural Resources.  According to the minister, who is also known for his key role in Russia’s cooperation with North Korea, the researchers will gather materials of great importance for the protection of Arctic ecology, understanding of climate change, as well as safe sailing on the Northern Sea Route.  The expedition is named “the North Pole-42” and is expected to continue until 2026.

The Severny Polyus has the shape of a bathtub and is often referred to as a platform. It has a ship crew of 16 and a research team of up to 34 people. Ship operator is Roshydromet, the Russian state meteorological service.  The Severny Polyus is capable of geological, acoustic, geophysical and marine research under the harshest Arctic conditions.  In temperatures down to minus 50°C it is reportedly able to provide comfortable living and working conditions for researchers and crew.

On board are 15 labs where researchers can work year-round.  The research platform has replaced Russia’s Arctic expeditions based on ice floes organized since the 1930s. The quickly vanishing Arctic sea-ice has made it increasingly hard to organize the expeditions and last real ice station, the “North Pole-40”, was held in the winter of 2012.  Albeit built for research purposes, the vessel could ultimately also be applied by the Russian military. The country’s new Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes. That could include not only trawlers and icebreakers, but also the Severniy Polus.


Notes:

[i] The Soviet Union and its successor state, Russia, have conducted a sustained Arctic maritime research effort since the 1930s and a sustained Antarctic research effort since 1955. The Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute (Арктический и антарктический научно-исследовательский институт) was founded in 1920 and still heads the country’s polar exploration with close to a thousand land and sea expeditions to its credit.

[ii] For additional reporting on the Severny Polyus, see: Les Grau, “Russian Drift Station Vital To Arctic Research Effort,” OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russian-drift-station-vital-to-arctic-research-effort/

[iii] For additional reporting on Russian research efforts in the Arctic, see: Les Grau, “China and Russia Expand Agreement For Arctic Strategic Resource Development,” OE Watch, 08-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/china-and-russia-expand-agreement-for-arctic-strategic-resource-development/


Image Information:

Image: Russian President Vladimir Putin at Admiralty Shipyards to inspect the Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky submarine, the Ivan Papanin icebreaker patrol ship, and the Viktor Chernomyrdin icebreaker in 2019. Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg is the sight of construction of the newly announced Ivan Frolov Arctic capable research vessel.
Source: Office of the Russian President, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62143
Attribution: Public Domain


Russia Offers Financial Incentives To Meet Troop Recruiting Targets

Russian soldiers fast-rope from helicopter during Centre 2019 strategic command-and-staff exercises.


“Russians are actively signing contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry for service in the special operation zone.”


In September, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for the “mobilization” of an additional 180,000 new service members. However, the meaning of “mobilization” appears to be a question of semantics: Russian media has reported that there is no talk in Moscow of a partial mobilization similar to the one conducted in the autumn of 2022, which led to tens of thousands of Russians fleeing the country. According to the first excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin Russian news source Izvestia, the press secretary for the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov, stated in November that “there is no talk of mobilization,” instead claiming that Russians are actively signing contracts for service in Ukraine.

Russia is mobilizing troops, not by traditional forced means, but financial inducements are now a key component of Russia’s recruitment tactics. According to the second excerpted article from the Russian news agency Interfax, a new debt law is the most recent incentive passed to encourage participation in the military. The new law allows up to 10 million rubles ($96,000) of outstanding debt facing collection, previously incurred by a recruit and/or his or her spouse, to be written off if a recruit joins the force.[i] Further, according to the third excerpted article from the Russian news tabloid Ragnum News Agency, on 25 November, Russia extended a one-time 400,000 ruble ($3,800) payment to those who sign a contract with the Russian Guard (Rosgvardiya) “for participation in the special military operation” in Ukraine.

The combination of financial incentives, which amounts to a windfall for many Russians, dead or alive, may well help the Russian armed forces continue to meet its recruiting goals, extending the war in Ukraine.[ii]


Sources:

“Песков сообщил об отсутствии планов по проведению мобилизации в России (Peskov reported no plans to conduct mobilization in Russia),” Izvestia (pro-Kremlin Russian news source), 23 November 2024. https://iz.ru/1795673/2024-11-23/peskov-soobshchil-ob-otsutstvii-planov-po-provedeniiu-mobilizatcii-v-rossii

Russia is not planning to conduct mobilization. This was announced on November 23 by the press secretary of the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov.

The official representative of the Kremlin added that at present, Russians are actively signing contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry for service in the special operation zone.

“There are a lot of these people — hundreds of people sign contracts every day and go to a special military operation,” Peskov noted.

Assembly point: Putin announced the completion of mobilization within two weeks

At the same time, the president emphasized that the conscription process needs to be improved.

Earlier, on October 27, when the agency asked whether there were enough volunteers and whether mobilization might be required, Peskov also answered that there was no talk of mobilization in Russia.

Before that, in May, Peskov stated that there was no need for mobilization in Russia, commenting on an article in the Financial Times (FT) that the country was actively recruiting volunteer contract soldiers.

“Правительство доработало программу списания кредитов военнослужащих (The government has finalized the program for writing off military personnel’s loans),” Interfax (Russian news agency), 15 November 2024. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/992965

The government proposes to write off overdue loans of up to 10 million rubles for which judicial collection has already begun for mobilized personnel, conscripts (except for cadets) and military contract soldiers during military service to perform the tasks of the Air Defense Forces, from December 1, 2024, follows from the amendments submitted to the State Duma.

We are talking about writing off obligations under loan agreements that were concluded before December 1, 2024 and for which a court order on debt collection has already entered into legal force or enforcement proceedings have been initiated. Up to 10 million rubles can be written off for a certain category of citizens – these are conscripts for military service upon mobilization; conscripted military personnel (except for cadets of military schools or universities); other citizens who are not undergoing military service, but who concluded a contract for military service for a period of one year or more to perform the tasks of a special military operation no earlier than December 1, 2024. The write-off also applies to spouses of this category of citizens.

“The obligations of a citizen called up for military service upon mobilization into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, a serviceman who has served in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by conscription (except for a serviceman holding a military position as a cadet in a military professional educational organization, a military educational organization of higher education under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), another citizen who is not serving in the military, who concluded no earlier than December 1, 2024, a contract for military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for a period of one year or more to perform the tasks of a special military operation, and (or) his (her) spouse, arising from a loan agreement, if before December 1, 2024 a judicial act on the collection of debt on these obligations entered into legal force and (or) in order to fulfill such obligations, a writ of execution was issued to a bank or other credit organization and (or) enforcement proceedings were initiated based on the applications of the said organizations (the writ of execution was presented for execution), shall be terminated in parts, not exceeding in total 10 million rubles, from the date of conclusion of the said contract,” the text of the amendment says.

“Путин распространил на Росгвардию разовую выплату в 400 тыс. Рублей (Putin Extends One-Time Payment of 400,000 Rubles to the Russian Guard),” Regnum News Agency (Russian tabloid), 25 November 2024. https://regnum.ru/news/3931489?utm_source=iz&utm_campaign=vidjet&utm_medium=8&utm_content=3931489

The Russian Guard has been extended a one-time payment of ₽400,000 upon signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense.

Russian President Vladimir Putin extended the provision on a one-time payment of 400,000 rubles to the Russian Guard upon signing a contract for participation in a special military operation. The corresponding decree was published on November 25.

“This decree shall enter into force on the date of its signing and shall apply to legal relations that arose from August 1, 2024,” the document says.

Putin introduced a payment of 400 thousand rubles for participants in the special operation who signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense for a period of one year or more in August. Foreign citizens who decided to go to the combat zone also received the right to it.

The press secretary of the Russian president Dmitry Peskov explained that the payment is aimed at supporting the fighters of the special operation. He emphasized that this does not mean a change in the goals of the SVO.


Notes:

[i] In April 2024, the Russian government clarified its position vis-a-vie Russian banks regarding debt and interest reduction for those serving in Ukraine. As per when the article was written, the price tag for the debt forgiveness would be in the neighborhood of 11 billion rubles, half of which will be paid by the banks. The other half would be paid for by the government, adding an additional 5-6 billion rubles to defense expenditures. See: “Принят закон о компенсации банкам 50% потерь от списания процентов по кредитам военных (A law has been adopted to compensate banks for 50% of losses from writing off interest on military loans),” Interfax (Russian news agency), 2 April 2024. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/953642

[ii] For reporting on the positive economic impact of financial payment to family members of deceased service members, see: Georgi Kantchev and Matthew Luxmoore, “The ‘Deathonomics’ Powering Russia’s War Machine,” The Wall Street Journal, 13 November 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-ukraine-war-military-death-pay-6cfe936e?mod=world_lead_pos3


Image Information:

Image: Russian soldiers fast-rope from helicopter during Centre 2019 strategic command-and-staff exercises.
Source: Russian Office of the President, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61584
Attribution: Public Domain


Russia and Belarus To Strengthen Security Guarantees

The Polish-Belarusian border, photo taken on 11 November 2021.


“This is also a very important strategic document. Work on these two documents has been completed, and we plan, together with the Secretariat of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, to submit [them] for approval by the heads of our states at the Supreme State Council.”


Russia and Belarus have nearly finalized a “Treaty on Security Guarantees of the Union State,” according to an interview with Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic Alexander Wolfovich in Izvestia, a pro-Kremlin Russian newspaper. The document, which will be sent for ratification by the Supreme State Council in December, will replace the 1999 union concept. Belarus will receive substantial security guarantees, including the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, “due to external threats.”

The intention of the original treaty was to achieve a federation not unlike the Soviet Union, whereby Belarus and Russia would share a head of state, legislature, flag, currency, coat of arms, anthem, and other insignia of a unified state.[i] The full extent of the Union State never came to fruition, largely because both leaders of the federation, Presidents Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and Alexander Lukashenko (Belarus), quickly lost interest in the provisions of the treaty because both feared it would weaken their own power. Belarus suspended the customs union a few years later, and they never developed a common currency. 

The revised treaty comes amid heightened tensions along Belarus’ borders with Ukraine and Poland, due to a migrant crisis (involving asylum-seekers from the wider Middle East),[ii] nuclear drills conducted on Belarusian territory summer 2024,[iii] and rumors that Belarusian soldiers may be sent to fight in Ukraine.[iv] The security guarantees of the new document suggest that an attack against Belarus, conventional or otherwise, would be considered an attack against Russia.

Interestingly, the original intention of signing the 1999 treaty was economic, not security related. Back then, commercial and economic interests trumped security concerns.[v] Going back to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has been Belarus’ largest economic and political partner. Vladimir Putin has sought greater integration of the two countries’ economies. As reported by Izvestia, trade between the two neighbors in the first half of 2024 ($25 billion) was up 6.4 percent from the same time last year, with some 133 investment projects underway in the fields of agriculture, energy, tourism, IT, medicine, and pharmaceuticals, according to Deputy Minister of Economic Development of Russia Dmitry Volvach. The revised treaty should strengthen economic integration and trade between the two neighbors.

More importantly, the revised Union State treaty signals greater security cooperation and guarantees between Minsk and Moscow. Belarus has long acted as a strategic buffer zone between Russia and NATO. Although President Alexander Lukashenko sought greater autonomy after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, a disputed election in 2020 and a popular uprising forced the Belarusian leader to seek greater integration with Russia. The revised Union State treaty will further isolate Belarus from Europe and make it more dependent on Russia for its security, both internal and external. While the long-term consequences of the revised Union State remain uncertain, given that Russia and Belarus have both sought to maintain their post-Soviet era borders and independence, greater military cooperation between Belarus and Russia is expected, including closer economic and potential territorial integration and even Belarus playing a larger role in the war in Ukraine, beyond just hosting Russian nuclear and military assets.


Sources:

Elizaveta Borisenko, “Взаимное действие: Москва и Минск подготовили договор о гарантиях безопасности (Union proposal: Moscow and Minsk strengthen cooperation against Western pressure),” Izvestia (a pro-Kremlin Russian newspaper), 11 November 2024. https://iz.ru/1787861/elizaveta-borisenko/vzaimnoe-deistvie-moskva-i-minsk-podgotovili-dogovor-o-garantiah-bezopasnosti

According to [Wolfovich], the provisions of the document will be published in the near future. The document will include the principle of the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as other methods of protecting the Union State. “What our president recently said, what Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin recently said that, God forbid, there will be some aggressions towards the Republic of Belarus, is all true. If today it has the character of protecting the joint and protection of Belarus through the deployment of nuclear weapons on our territory, de facto in December, by the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on the establishment of the Union State, this treaty will already be legally signed,” Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov said earlier.

Russia previously decided to amend the nuclear doctrine, which was last updated in 2020. In particular, we are talking about the expansion of scenarios in which the Russian authorities reserve the right to use nuclear weapons. In the updated version of the document, aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of nuclear, is proposed to be considered as their joint attack on the Russian Federation. In addition, there are provisions that concern Belarus.

“We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in case of aggression against Russia and Belarus as a member of the Union State. All these issues have been agreed with the Belarusian side and the President of Belarus. Including if the enemy, using conventional weapons, creates a critical threat to our sovereignty,” Vladimir Putin said on September 25.

As for the new concept of the security of the Union State, which will replace the document adopted back in 1999, it will enshrine a provision on joint counteraction to the policies of the United States, unfriendly NATO states and the European Union to achieve strategic goals for mutually beneficial and equal international cooperation. Such strengthening of cooperation in the field of security is primarily related to the foreign policy situation, Dmitry Zhuravlev, scientific director of the Institute of Regional Problems, associate professor of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, tells Izvestia.


Notes:

[i] “The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation signed the Union State Treaty on 8 December 1999,” Press Service of the President of the Republic of Belarus, https://president.gov.by/en/belarus/economics/economic-integration/union-state?TSPD_101_R0=08eaf62760ab20008e25be59f2426da6e735002c3eb769d3b553a73ed46fd82fa95c1f4983143a0a086c7a2488143000ed156aeeac2db1eb09822ff7aca3ea7bcda21c0e8cb9ef3c1a0b6b7c0271930783b0b327184c7aa97f0896aae08327fc

[ii] See: “Poland to temporarily suspend asylum rights amid Belarus border tensions,” Al-Jazeera, 12 October 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/12/poland-to-temporarily-suspend-asylum-rights-amid-belarus-border-tensions

[iii] See: “Belarus launches nuclear drills a day after Russia announces them amid tensions with West,” AP News, 7 May 2024. https://apnews.com/article/russia-belarus-nuclear-drills-ukraine-war-144422347bb168878cebc0b78071dd99

[iv] See: Mark Temnycky, “Will Belarus join North Korea in fighting Russia’s war?” The Hill, 17 November 2024. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4993006-ukraine-north-korean-fighting/

[v] For analysis, see Helene Alstad Dyndal, “The Union State of Russia and Belarus at the present stage,” Strategem, 11 April 2024 https://www.stratagem.no/the-union-state-of-russia-and-belarus-at-the-present-stage/


Image Information:

Image: The Polish-Belarusian border, photo taken on 11 November 2021.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/premierrp/51674607554
Attribution: Irek Dorozanski


Russia Accused of Interference in Moldovan and Georgian Elections

Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has called for protests in response to what she and opposition parties have claimed is Russian interference in parliamentary elections. Protests have been a semi-common occurrence in Georgia for years for a variety of causes. In this photo Georgians protest the arrest and imprisonment of those involved in violent attacks on journalists in July 2021.


“Pro-Western Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, who has broken with the ruling Georgian Dream party, said she will not recognize the results of parliamentary elections held on October 26 and alleged that the country has been the ‘victim of a Russian special operation.’”


Election interference allegations against Russia have disrupted Moldova and Georgia’s progress towards EU integration. According to the excerpted article from independent but partially U.S.-funded FRE/RL’s Georgian Service, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili declared that “as the only remaining independent institution,” she would not recognize the election results. According to Zurabishvili, Georgia was the “victim of a Russian special operation.” However, according to the excerpted article from the Russian daily Izvestia, the pro-Moscow Georgian Dream party,[i] won approximately 90 of the 150 seats in Georgian parliamentary elections, giving it “the opportunity to once again form a one-party government.” The Izvestia article confirms that the election was marred by tensions, intimidation, and physical violence but implies that Western observers present in Georgia, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “recognized the elections as legitimate.” Multiple opposition parties, which had hoped to build a pro-Western coalition government, secured only 37 percent of the vote as a bloc and have vowed to challenge the election results.

Meanwhile, Moldova also held an election for president and a referendum on EU integration in October. According to the excerpted article from RFE/RL’s Moldova Service, the election was also marred by Russian election interference, including a vote-buying scheme orchestrated by Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor.[ii] Shor is a convicted criminal and fugitive in Moldova and is thought to be residing in Russia. Pro-EU Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who failed to secure enough votes to win reelection outright and will now have to face a pro-Moscow candidate in a runoff election, accused “foreign forces” of the outcome.[iii] In response, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called on Sandu to “‘produce proof’ to back up her accusations.”

If substantiated, election interference in both Georgia and Moldova is a clear indication of Russia’s ability to influence areas using what has loosely been referred to as hybrid operations, non-lethal operations, or influence operations, all of which fall short of actual armed conflict, but which are very difficult to counter.


Sources:

“Georgian President Won’t Recognize Vote Results, Calls For Protests, Alleges Russian Interference,” RFE/RL’s Georgian Service (independent but partially U.S. funded news service), 27 October 2024. https://www.rferl.org/a/33175194.html?utm_source=onesignal&utm_medium=pn-msg&utm_campaign=2024-10-27-Crisis-In-Georg

Pro-Western Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, who has broken with the ruling Georgian Dream party, said she will not recognize the results of parliamentary elections held on October 26 and alleged that the country has been the “victim of a Russian special operation.”

Zurabishvili did not present any evidence to back up her claim in a brief statement to the media in Tbilisi on October 27.

“As the only remaining independent institution in this state, I want to say that I do not recognize this election. It cannot be recognized. It would be the same as recognizing Russia’s entry here — Georgian subordination to Russia,” she said.

“I didn’t come to Georgia for [Russian domination]. Our ancestors did not live for this. We will not tolerate this. It cannot be taken away from Georgia — its European future,” she added.

She called for street protests starting on October 28 at 7 p.m. in the South Caucasus nation, which has seen mass demonstrations in recent months against the ruling Georgian Dream party, which critics accuse of being pro-Russian and of having eroded democratic norms.

She blasted what she called a “Russian special operation — one of the new forms of hybrid warfare carried out on our people, our country.”

The Georgian Dream party celebrated an apparent win in the vote, but the pro-Western opposition cried foul and election monitors said that “critical violations took place,” including voter intimidation and physical violence.

Western observers also demanded an investigation into alleged irregularities.

The vote was seen as a crucial test of the EU-candidate country’s democratic credentials, and one that Brussels had said could determine Georgia’s chances of joining the bloc.

The OSCE also decried recorded instances of vote buying, double voting, physical violence, and intimidation.

Antonio Lopez-Isturiz White, the head of the European Parliament monitoring delegation, said Georgian Dream used hostile rhetoric and “promoted Russian disinformation” and conspiracy theories ahead of the election in an attempt to “undermine and manipulate the vote.”

“During our observation, we noted cases of vote buying and double voting before and during elections, especially in rural areas,” said Romanian lawmaker Iulian Bulai, head of the delegation sent by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), speaking at a joint news conference held in Tbilisi by heads of election-observation missions.

“Давняя «Мечта»: готова ли Грузия к смене внешнеполитического курса после выборов (Long-standing “Dream”: Is Georgia Ready to Change Its Foreign Policy Course After the Elections),” Izvestia (long running Russian daily newspaper, sanctioned by the EU in May 2024 for spreading propaganda), 27 October 2024. https://iz.ru/1781219/elizaveta-borisenko/davniaia-mechta-gotova-li-gruziia-k-smene-vneshnepoliticheskogo-kursa-posle-vyborov

The Georgian Dream, which has ruled the country since 2012, managed to win a convincing victory. According to the Central Election Commission, it gained almost 54% of the votes in the parliamentary elections held on October 26, almost the same as in the previous elections in 2020. This gives it the opportunity to claim about 90 of the 150 seats in parliament and once again form a one-party government.

Nevertheless, the defeated united opposition actively tried to destabilize the situation. They planned to form a coalition government, but gained only half as many votes as the Georgian Dream, about 37%. Of the 18 registered political forces, in addition to the Dream, only four overcame the five percent barrier [to be represented in parliament].

OSCE observers recognized the elections as legitimate, but warned that “they will observe how the new government will adhere to the European path.” Later, the recognition of the elections as legitimate was confirmed by the Georgian Prime Minister, who called the OSCE’s conclusions quite logical.

It is not entirely clear how the relationship between the Georgian Dream and President Salome Zurabishvili, who openly supports the opposition, will develop. The head of state is exclusively in favor of the country’s European integration, and the government and parliament are in favor of balanced relations with both the West and the Russian Federation…

The question of how Georgia’s relations with Western countries will develop after the victory of the Georgian Dream also remains open. It is worth noting that the dialogue between Tbilisi and the West sharply worsened in the spring, when the authorities initiated the adoption of the law “On the transparency of foreign influence”, which provides for assigning the status of a foreign agent to an NPO or media outlet if a “foreign force” receives more than 20% of its income from abroad during a calendar year… In addition, at the instigation of the “Dream”, a law banning LGBT propaganda was adopted in Georgia. Then, at the stage of opening negotiations on joining the union, the EU announced the suspension of the country’s integration.

…If the West decides to push Georgia away, the political vector may change. So far, there is no clear political line on tearing the republic away from the West, says Vadim Mukhanov.

As for relations with Russia, they are unlikely to change significantly. After the elections, Irakli Kobakhidze said that Georgia does not plan to restore diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation due to the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Tbilisi considers its territories. It is worth noting that on the eve of the elections, the Georgian Dream promised to “apologize” to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

“Moldovan Police Accuse Pro-Russian Oligarch Of $39M Vote-Buying Scheme.” RFE/RL’s Moldovan Service (partially U.S. State Department funded but independent regional news service), 25 October 2024.

https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-police-accuse-shor-russia-oligarch-39m-vote-buying/33172951.html

Moldovan police have accused convicted fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor of transferring $39 million into the bank accounts of thousands of Moldovans over the past two months allegedly to buy votes for the pro-Russian camp in a referendum and the first round of presidential elections last week.

Investigators said on October 25 that they uncovered about 1 million bank transfers, which reached the personal accounts of Moldovan citizens in September and October through the Russian bank Promsvyazbank (PSB), Moldovan police chief Viorel Cernauteanu told a news conference in Chisinau.

He added that some 500 people had already been fined for “passive electoral corruption,” without clarifying what that means. No direct evidence of vote buying has been released, but under Moldovan law, it is illegal to accept large sums of money from abroad for political purposes.

Despite expectations of a landslide “yes,” the October 20 referendum on Moldova’s integration into the European Union only passed by a razor-thin margin of less than 1 percentage point…

The referendum was held simultaneously with a presidential vote, won by incumbent Sandu with some 42.5 percent of the vote — less than the 50 percent plus one vote needed to avoid a runoff.

She will face pro-Moscow ex-Prosecutor-General Alexandr Stoianoglo in a crucial runoff on November 3.

On October 21, Sandu indicated that the stronger-than-expected showing of the pro-Moscow camp in both elections was due to what she said was an “unprecedented” assault from “criminal groups,” which she said tried to buy off as many as 300,000 votes with tens of millions of euros in an attempt to “undermine the democratic process.”

Russia has denied any interference, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov calling on Sandu to “produce proof” to back up her accusations.

The police investigation found that, in September, PSB bank, which has been under international sanctions for its support of Russia’s war in Ukraine, sent $15 million followed by a further $24 million this month. Cernauteanu said investigators had established the identities of some 138,000 Moldovan citizens in whose bank accounts the money ended up. The real number of those allegedly bribed by Shor, however, “is even higher” than the 300,000 mentioned by Sandu, because transfers made to one account were then shared between more people, he said.


Notes:

[i] Georgian Dream party, founded in 2012, won the general election the same year as part of a coalition. It proceeded to win the 2016 and 2020 general elections as an independent party as well. Upon establishment, Georgian Dream was largely considered favorable to EU integration. However, it is now considered to be pro-Moscow by Georgian opposition parties and the current Georgian President, Salome Zourabichvili, based on its support of a number of controversial laws and the dissemination of anti-Western narratives. Georgian Dream leadership dispute this vilification claiming that their current platform seeks to look to both Russia and the West equally.

[ii] Shor, who also holds Russian and Israeli citizenship, was sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison by a Moldovan court in April 2023 over a $1 billion bank fraud. He is believed to be in Russia.

[iii] See: “Еврореферендум и выборы сделали Санду политическим трупом, считает эксперт (The Euroreferendum and elections have turned Sandu into a political corpse, says expert),” Ria Novosti (Russian daily), 23 October 2024. https://ria.ru/20241023/sandu-1979672826.html


Image Information:

Image: Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has called for protests in response to what she and opposition parties have claimed is Russian interference in parliamentary elections. Protests have been a semi-common occurrence in Georgia for years for a variety of causes. In this photo Georgians protest the arrest and imprisonment of those involved in violent attacks on journalists in July 2021.
Source: Jelger Groeneveld, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Protest_in_Tbilisi_against_arrest_of_journalists_(26_Sept_2021).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-2.0


Gabon Shadow Tanker Fleet Transports Sanctioned Russian Oil

Russia’s Sakhalin-1 oil project, one of many Russian oil facilities in the Arctic, extracts oil that is moved to international markets via an expansive shadow fleet of tankers.


“Since Moscow launched its war against Ukraine and the international community introduced sanctions against the Russian oil and gas industry, the small West African state [of Gabon] has offered shelter to a quickly expanding fleet of shadow vessels that carry sanctioned Russian oil.”


Despite international sanctions passed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian oil is still available on the international market. According to the excerpted article from Norwegian news site The Barents Observer, a Gabonese-registered shadow fleet is now moving Russian oil through the Arctic. Many of the ships flying Gabon’s standard are doing so under a flag of convenience or open registry. International law requires the registration of merchant ships in a host country. Ships registered in a different country than their ownership may fly the ensign, or flag, of the host country and abide by its laws. This flag of convenience, or open registry, may avoid the strict regulations of its home country, skirt safety standards, avoid taxes, or, in this case, provide political advantages. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Gabon has increased its ship registry by dozens, and that all of those newly registered ships are “engaged in shipments of sanctioned Russian oil,”[i] according to the article. The inability of the international community to police shadow fleets like Gabon’s will continue to weaken and ultimately render international sanctions against Russia ineffective. This situation will provide Russia with hard currency to fund its military operations in Ukraine and abroad, and stabilize its domestic economy during war.[ii]


Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Under flag of Gabon, tankers sail sanctioned Russian oil through Arctic ice”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 27 September 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/under-flag-of-gabon-tankers-sail-sanctioned-russian-oil-through-arctic-ice/231598

The Sai Baba is sailing the Northern Sea Route from Murmansk to China and is part of a major Africa-registered shadow fleet that now operates in Russian Arctic waters.  Several more tankers are following in its wake.  The Sai Baba is believed to have loaded crude oil in Murmansk in mid-September. It subsequently set course for the Arctic route that connects the North Atlantic with the Pacific. On the 18th of September, the tanker was located near the Kola Bay. Nine days later, it was sailing through the Kara Sea, according to data from Russia’s Northern Sea Route Administration.

As it sails further east, the almost 20-year-old tanker with a deadweight of 158,889 tons will run into a major layer of multi-year sea-ice.  The sea-ice in the Chukchi Sea has troubled regional shipments this summer.  The Sai Baba is ice-class2.

The tanker carries the flag of Gabon and appears to be managed by a company from the United Arab Emirates.  Judging from the Northern Sea Route Administration, it has permission to sail without icebreaker escort in light sea-ice conditions during the period from 10th of September to 31st of October.

The 274-meter-long tanker was built in 2006 and used to operate under the name Cap Guillaume under a Belgian shipper.  It was sold in November 2022 and has since sailed under the name Sai Baba.  It is due to arrive in the Chinese port of Huizhou on October 15.

The Sai Baba  is not the only Gabon-registered tanker that now sails through the rough Arctic waters of the Northern Sea Route.  As it embarked on its Arctic voyage to China, two other Gabon-registered tankers were waiting in the waters outside Murmansk to be loaded.  The NS Nordic (Liberia) and SCF Baltika (Russian Sovcomflot) are likely to follow in the wake of the Sai Baba.  At the same time, the Moskovsky Prospect appears to be embarking on an East-West voyage on the route from India to Murmansk.  Also, the SCF Yenisey, the Suvorovsky Prospect and the Nanda Devi sailed on the Arctic route in late September.

Since Moscow launched its war against Ukraine and the international community introduced sanctions against the Russian oil and gas industry, the small West African state has offered shelter to a quickly expanding fleet of shadow vessels that carry sanctioned Russian oil.

The country that experienced a coup d’état in 2023 is today one of the Russian oil industry’s best friends.  In addition to the seven tankers that currently sail in Russian Arctic waters, dozens of more carriers have been listed in the Gabon ship registry over the last two years.  Among them are reportedly 50 ships owned by Sovcomflot.According to Lloyd’s List (behind paywall), the African nation has employed a private company based in the United Arab Emirates to run the registry.  Almost all the tonnage of the Gabon-registered ships are now engaged in shipments of sanctioned Russian oil.  In 2024, Gabon had the world’s quickest growing ship registry.


Notes:

[i] For a description of how Russia has regained its ability to drill for oil in spite of Western led international sanctions, see: Nidhi Verma, “Russia’s Sakhalin-1 near full oil output after Exxon exit,” Reuters, 9 January 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-sakhalin-1-near-full-oil-output-after-exxon-exit-source-2023-01-09/

[ii] For a recent article regarding flow of and impacts of shadow fleets moving sanctioned oil around the world, see: Rebecca Tan, Pei-Lin Wu and Julia Ledur, “‘Dark’ tanker crash exposes dangers of China’s thirst for cheap oil,” The Washington Post, 2 September 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/china-da…F62dc0753ccfdb80ba057ddcf%2F11%2F38%2F66d5d9c2e3b3f24f5576e400


Image Information:

Image: Russia’s Sakhalin-1 oil project, one of many Russian oil facilities in the Arctic, extracts oil that is moved to international markets via an expansive shadow fleet of tankers.
Source: Politikparadox, https://politikparadox.blogspot.com/2014/10/russen-finden-ol-in-der-arktis.html
Attribution: Creative Commons


Russia Pledges To Boost Support Abroad and Criminalize Russophobia

An antiwar protest in central London on 12 March 2022.


“They need to provide all kinds of assistance and even more – both in terms of granting citizenship and in terms of legal protection from the persecution they have in European states, to build a system of constant communication with them, to provide work and so on.”


In October, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new decree pledging humanitarian support for “people who share our values.” The decree was short on specifics of what the support would entail, which values were taken into consideration, or who would be eligible for the assistance, but in a recent interview published by Russian news website Pravda, Dmitry Solonnikov, an influential political scientist and director of the Institute of Modern State Development, said the decree would apply to “all citizens of European states who have a positive attitude towards Russia and are often persecuted for it in their homeland.” The decree would also reportedly apply to people living in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Commentary on the new decree suggests it would chiefly be applied to migrant workers and others seeking Russian citizenship.

The new decree comes at a time of heightened awareness within Russian society—and the halls of power—of criticisms against the country. Russia’s State Duma just approved a bill, first proposed last summer, that would criminalize foreigners accused of “acts of Russophobia.”[i] The Ministry of Internal Affairs defines Russophobia as “a prejudiced, hostile attitude towards Russian citizens, the Russian language, and culture, expressed, among other things,” through the attitudes of individuals, groups, or “unfriendly” states. The bill also establishes “legal norms, legal decisions” regarding “criminal liability” for acts of Russophobia exhibited by Russian officials, citizens, or nationals living across the post-Soviet space.

The latest raft of bills seeking to criminalize anti-Russia attitudes and incentivize greater support for the Kremlin could be an indicator of concerns within Moscow that Russia is facing greater isolation internationally. The recent moves may also be a reflection of growing anti-Kremlin sentiments in Russia and the former Soviet Union, primarily on account of Russia’s stalled special military operation in Ukraine. The new laws could have implications for the millions of migrants currently seeking Russian citizenship, as now they must register for military registration or risk having their application—or citizenship—revoked.[ii]


Sources:

Dmitry Plotnikov, “Собрать адекватных в стране. Для кого новый указ Путина по поддержке разделяющих ценности РФ” (“To Gather Greater Support in Country, Putin’s Signs New Decree to Support Those Who Share Values of the Russian Federation”), Pravda (Russian news website—formerly the official press organ of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party), 19 August 2024. https://www.pravda.ru/politics/2084910-putin-podpisal-ukaz/  

If for their [pro-Russia] views, or their point of view, people suffer from the pressure of political circles in Europe, the United States, then we should support them, probably since they are our workers. But it is not limited only to Europe. Of course, we need to talk about citizens of all countries, both in Asia and in the ‘new world,’ no matter in Latin or North America. Therefore, there is no need to single out someone. These can be both citizens from far afield and citizens of the former Soviet Union.

We help citizens from the Baltic States, former republics of the USSR who treat us positively. And if these are citizens in distant Chile or in distant Venezuela, in Colombia, it’s quite different. We’re talking about everyone.

We are building special relations with Asian countries. Russia talks about a turn to the East, as well as the fact that our main allies are now in Asia. And secondly, the African strategy of the Russian Federation is one of the most important key tasks of the foreign policy course of our country. A year ago, the second ‘Russia-Africa’ Forum was held. And we are talking about the fact that we are actively entering the African continent.

Therefore, of course, we must build relationships with them. The question is not where these citizens came from. Yes, the question is that … [we should] let everyone, anyone, come here to visit us and let’s report that we have accepted 10,000 such citizens, or 100,000 such citizens. It’s about who needs help in this situation, not where they will come from.


Notes:

[i] Konstantin Pakhalyuk, “What does the Kremlin Mean by ‘Russophobia’?” The Moscow Times (English language online newspaper in Russia previously based in Moscow), 11 October 2024. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/10/11/what-does-the-kremlin-mean-by-russophobia-a86664

[ii] Dmitry Plotnikov, “Новый российский закон для мигрантов: не встал на воинский учёт — давай, до свидания! (“New Russian law for migrants: If you do not register for the military – good-bye!”),  Pravda (Russian news website—formerly the official press organ of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party), 9 August, 2024.
https://military.pravda.ru/2080796-voinskiiuchet/


Image Information:

Image: An antiwar protest in central London on 12 March 2022
Source: Alisdare Hickson, https://www.flickr.com/photos/alisdare/51937772099
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0


Russia Continues To Adapt Training, Incorporating Lessons From Ukraine

Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.


“The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the major Russian daily newspaper Izvestia, discusses how Russia continues to change soldier training based on lessons learned from its special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestiya article, the changing character of war necessitates combining both traditional combined arms warfare tactics with new skills to achieve success in modern warfare. In addition, many Russian forces in the security services, including the Ministry of Defense, and private military organizations are fighting as assault detachments/companies/groups, a method of organization that was widely practiced during the Second World War and abandoned as the Soviets/Russians fielded a fully mechanized force during the Cold War. Therefore, Russia is now using a combination of Second World War, Soviet-era combined arms, and emerging tactics from its combat experience in Ukraineto train its force. Specifically, Russia has regained its dismounted infantry culture, a marked change from the start of the war in 2022, when Russia suffered an inordinate number of casualties among troops riding to battle within their armored vehicles.[ii]


Sources:

Dmitry Astrakhan, “«Нет понятия идеального штурма, каждая операция планируется индивидуально»: Как новобранцы учатся навыкам ближнего боя на полигоне в ДНР (‘There is no such thing as an ideal assault; each operation is planned individually’: How recruits learn close combat skills at a training ground in the Donetsk People’s Republic),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 3 October 2024. https://iz.ru/1768527/dmitrii-astrakhan/net-poniatiia-idealnogo-shturma-kazhdaia-operatciia-planiruetsia-individualno

The experience of the special military operation has a significant impact on combat training. Now volunteer assault troops practice close combat in confined spaces of trenches and buildings, approaching strongpoints, clearing, evacuating the wounded and many other specific exercises. Izvestia visited at one of the training grounds and learned how recruits practice vital skills under the guidance of instructors with combat experience.

[T]raining takes place every day. On one day, recruits practice interactions with infantry fighting vehicles, on another day they focus on combating drones. In particular, they practice shooting at UAVs by shooting at clay pigeons.  Camouflaging and stealth movement are also practiced to remain invisible to enemy UAVs…

Combination of the “old” school and the “new”

The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.  At the same time, the latest experience is being implemented on the fly, since the character of battles is constantly changing — a combination of the “old” and the “new.”

So, from the old school we take the experience of moving on armored vehicles, moving along a trench. But in any case, “adjustments” are always necessary in tactical terms, since FVP [first person view] UAVs have appeared now.  “There is no concept of an ideal assault, it is important to act quickly, harmoniously and carefully,” says a fighter with the call sign Potap.

Each trench, each settlement has its own differences, and therefore each assault operation is planned individually, without a specific template, he clarified…

NATO learns from our fighters’ assaults

It is worth noting that NATO is also looking at the experience of fighting in small groups at equipped strong points with trenches and dugouts. Almost all exercises held in Europe and the US in the last year have included practicing scenarios for storming forest belts and trenches, both according to old instructions and taking into account the experience of the special military operation. In addition, fighting in trenches has become part of the reservist training program in the British Army.


Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Interestingly, this was the same observation made by Chechens and outside observers during the Russian assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny in December 1994. Russian armored columns attacked from multiple directions, but mechanized infantry did not dismount and were cut down in their vehicles or dismounting under ambush conditions, before they could protect themselves and the armored columns.


Image Information:

Image: Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/AssaultTraining2015-01.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0


The Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Ukraine

A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.


“One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned — aircraft and robotic systems.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Voyennaya Mysl, discusses the evolution of UAV use since the inception of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine.[i] The article notes that, early in the conflict, UAV use was primarily characterized by reconnaissance and strike missions, carried out by larger UAVs, such as the large Turkish Bayraktar TB2. As the conflict progressed, these types of UAVs were supplanted by small and relatively cheap UAVs, such as the Chinese-manufactured DJI family of commercial drones, also used for reconnaissance or modified to carry explosive devices. Those drones were then complemented by a new class of first-person view (FPV) kamikaze/suicide UAVs that have recently dominated UAV use on the battlefield. Bayraktar TB2 Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).

Undoubtedly, UAV use is one of the most salient aspects of the current conflict in Ukraine, and it is clear small and relatively cheap UAVs will play a part in future armed conflict. The wide-scale use of UAVs solves a wide range of problems in modern war, such as: providing situational awareness; acquiring and lasing targets; signal retransmission; electronic reconnaissance and warfare; isolating a given area; interfering with supplies, rotations, and evacuations; destroying stationary and moving targets; supporting assault operations; mining, demining of terrain and water obstacles; and resupply. Although large weapon systems have certainly proved their value in Ukraine, these UAVs show that there is also an important role for relatively cheap electronics in the hands of innovative personnel.


Sources:

N.A. Sokolov, “Анализ тенденций применения беспилотных платформ в специальной военной операции (Analysis of trends in the use of unmanned platforms in the special military operation),” Voyennaya Mysl, (Monthly journal of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces),August 2024.  https://vm.ric.mil.ru/upload/site178/PWOpmGbLL3.pdf

The experience of military conflicts and crisis situations of recent decades, the analysis of the actions of terrorist organizations, testify to the increasing role of promising means of conducting armed conflict. One of the main military-technical components of combat actions in the special military operation in Ukraine is the mass use of unmanned ­aircraft and robotic systems.

A special feature of the use of ­unmanned platforms at the initial stage of the special military operation was the widespread use of reconnaissance and strike systems created on the basis of operational-tactical unmanned aircraft of the medium-altitude class.  As in the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.  The strike loitering munitions class of UAVs were also used ­as part of mixed groups for reconnaissance ­and strike UAVs (Orion, Bayraktar TB2).

Currently, the main ­emphasis in methods and technical means of development and application has shifted towards the mini class and micro class of UAVs, which is due to the massive use of affordable consumer components, and so are being seen in all environments — air, land, and sea.

Small attack UAVs were used to some extent in Libya, Syria, etc. (mainly of Israeli, Turkish, Chinese manufacture), but in the conditions ­of the special military operation, they became the very means that changed the situation on the battlefield.  The increase in the share of aerial UAVs began with the use of civilian products from the well-known Chinese ­company DJI. At the initial ­stage, these UAVs had a number of advantages (flight time, altitude, modular high-resolution optical-electronic modules), but they also had disadvantages associated with their built-in software, which significantly limited their use. The relatively high cost of DJI UAV kits also ­dictated the requirements for their reusability, limiting the range of tasks to observation and one-time drops of combat loads.

The situation with DJI changed with ­the appearance of alternative factory firmware, which removed the altitude restrictions, no-fly zones, and added additional functionality for flight in difficult weather conditions and at night.  The modified firmware currently supports the entire Mavic 3 series of DJI UAVs, including the Classic Рrо, Епterprise, and Matrice 30. After reprogramming, the DJI UAVs are usually used as relatively reusable reconnaissance and surveillance assets (day and night); as part of reconnaissance and strike loops, including systems that have wired power sources that can provide constant situational awareness; electronic warfare systems; and repeaters for other UAVs…

However, the most widespread class of airborne UAVs during the special military operation are the kamikaze UAVs, also known as FPV UAV (from English – “first person view”), or simply FPV. From the point of view of an external observer, these devices are controlled by their operator as an “avatar”, from the point of view of the operator himself — immersively, with the operator immersed in reality, as broadcast “from the point of view” of the UAV. FPV UAVs are used, as a rule, together with homemade munitions or standard munitions, which are modified for use with UAVs.  The use of FPV UAVs is characterized by flight ranges up to 20 km (with a repeater), and with an average aloft time of up to 10 minutes. 


Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.


Image Information:

Image: A Russian First-Person-View UAV with small payload attached.
Source: https://tinyurl.com/44sn36pk


Russian Duma to Strengthen Pro-Kremlin Youth Movements

First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.


“One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland.”


The Russian State Duma announced on Telegram it will be transforming its Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, or Rosmolodyozh, into a larger body to strengthen and consolidate the country’s youth ideological education initiatives, from kindergarten to higher education. According to the excerpted 12 September post, the Duma introduced a draft law titled “On Systematizing the Sphere of Youth Policy” to instill “a willingness in young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland.” The restructuring may signal a need to whip up patriotism and pro-Kremlin ideology in younger generations, as the Kremlin looks to rally more support for its “special military operation” in Ukraine, especially after the Ukrainian Army’s incursion into Kursk and the potential use of longer-range missiles into Russian territory.

Modern Russian state support of youth movements has historical roots and contemporary benefits. The youth movements are a modern analog to the Soviet-era “pioneer camps” that indoctrinated young Russians with Leninist dogma. In recent years, a number of patriotic youth movements backed by the Ministry of Defense emerged to educate youth about Russian and Soviet history.[i] In Fall 2023, the Kremlin held a nationwide school lesson to teach children that Russian elections were free and fair.[ii]  Prior to that, in 2022, the Russian government launched an outfit called The Movement of the First, a pro-Kremlin youth movement aimed at “preparing children and youth for a full-fledged life in society, including shaping their world views on the basis of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” and instilling “love and respect for the Homeland.”[iii] The former head of this movement, Grigory Gurov, will lead the newly restructured Rosmolodyozh.[iv] The latest restructuring may indicate an unease among Russian leaders about the “forever war” in Ukraine and the need to recruit more young conscripts. The move could also signal flagging domestic support for the war. Surveys suggest that two out of three Russians support it,[v] yet these polls may not reflect the true sentiment of most Russians, including Russian youth.


Sources:

Artem Metelev (a member and spokesperson of the State Duma), post on Telegram (a social messaging app) from 2 September 2024. https://t.me/artemmetelev/7162

The special military operation and modern challenges make logical adjustments to the state youth policy. Patriotic education of youth has always been a priority. We propose to reflect new tasks and work tools in federal legislation.

After the adoption of our law this fall:

• Patriotic clubs, historical and local history and search organizations, specialized military-patriotic centers will receive priority support from the state;

• One of the areas of youth policy will be devoted to developing the readiness of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty to protect the Fatherland;

• The effectiveness of patriotic work will be analyzed as part of annual monitoring;

• A set of measures to educate youth in citizenship, patriotism, respect for history and readiness to serve their country will be approved at the federal and regional levels.


Notes:

[i] Evan Gershkovich, Russia’s Fast-Growing ‘Youth Army’ Aims to Breed Loyalty to Fatherland,” The Moscow Times, 17 April 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/17/russias-fast-growing-youth-army-aimst-to-breed-loyalty-to-the-fatherland-a65256

[ii] Pyotr Kozlov, “As Putin’s Re-election Looms, Kremlin Pushes to Indoctrinate a New Generation of Voters,” The Moscow Times, 29 September 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/29/as-putins-re-election-looms-kremlin-pushes-to-indoctrinate-a-new-generation-of-voters-a82580

[iii] Website of Movement of the First. http://wefirst.ru

[iv] Maxim Ivanov, Elena Mukhametshina, “Новым начальником Росмолодежи может стать глава «Движения первых» Григорий Гуров” (“The head of the ‘Movement of the First’ Grigory Gurov may become the new head of Rosmolodezh”), Vedemosti (Moscow-based business newspaper) 12 September 2024. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2024/09/12/1061695-novim-glavoi-rosmolodezhi-mozhet-stat-glava-dvizheniya-pervih

[v] Vladimir Milov, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?”Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert blog, 9 January 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine-2/


Image Information:

Image: First meeting of the patriotic youth movement called Yunarmiya 2 June 2016.
Source: Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, https://tinyurl.com/2×725577