The China-Africa Cooperation Forum Focuses on Chinese Military Expansion in Africa

First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.


“Many countries have serious security problems in society, and there is a growing trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese.”


51 African heads of state attended, the tri-annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing from 4-6 September. While China currently has one base in Africa on the Djibouti coast, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s FOCAC speech bolstered other reports about China’s ambitions to expand its military footprint on the continent, including possibly establishing other military bases.[i] Xi Jinping vowed that China would train 6,000 African soldiers and 1,000 African law enforcement officers, welcome 500 African military officers to China, commence joint patrols, mine clearance, and other military activities with African partners, and provide security for joint projects with African security officials.[ii] This latter objective was underscored in the article, where it noted the growing trend of violent crimes against Chinese-funded enterprises and employees and overseas Chinese in Africa, which are often seen as exploitative. Only 20 African countries currently have police cooperation agreements with China, a fact the article lamented and stated needs to increase. This suggests a correlation in the future between Chinese economic activities in Africa, which will inevitably lead to security incidents and Chinese security cooperation with African countries.[iii] The FOCAC and Xi Jinping’s speech, therefore, signal a growing Chinese military and security presence in Africa.


Sources:

“中非合作论坛峰会召开:为双边关系良性发展“提质增效”提供契机 (The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is held: An opportunity is provided to ‘improve the quality and efficiency’ for the healthy development of bilateral relations)” thepaper.cn (Communist Party-affiliated Chinese-language newspaper that appeals to youths and has more editorial freedom than most Chinese media), 5 September 2024. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_28634922

It is relevant to note that 51 of the African leaders who attended the summit are heads of state or government, which is far higher than other “Africa + 1” meetings, such as the US-Africa summit. Against the background of serious changes in Sino-US relations and Sino-EU relations, the importance of the “Global South” in China’s diplomatic grand strategy is rising sharply.

China’s large-scale financing and loans in Africa have become the focus of public criticism for a long time under the smearing and discrediting by the United States and Europe. In fact, this has had a negative impact on the reputations of both China and Africa.

Many countries have serious security problems, and there is a rising trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese. At present, only more than 20 African countries have signed relevant police cooperation agreements with China, so the cooperation between the two sides in the field of police law enforcement needs to be improved.


Notes:

[i] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish a Military Base in Gabon,” OE Watch, 04-2024, 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/

[ii] “Full text: Xi Jinping’s speech at opening ceremony of 2024 FOCAC summit,” CGTN, 5 September 2024, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-09-05/Full-text-Xi-s-speech-at-opening-ceremony-of-2024-FOCAC-summit-1wDYKL8FhxC/p.html

[iii] On Chinese private military contractors in Africa, see Paul Nantulya, “Chinese Security Firms Spread along the African Belt and Road,” ACSS, 15 June 2021. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinese-security-firms-spread-african-belt-road/


Image Information:

Image: First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.
Source: Stephen Wallis, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Forum_on_China-Africa_Cooperation.jpg


Egypt is Rumored To Have Signed Purchase Agreement for Chinese J-10C Fighters

PLAAF J-10C in action during the 2023 Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace (LIMA) Exhibition in Malaysia.


The decision [to acquire Chinese J-10C fighter aircraft] comes at a time of geopolitical realignment for Egypt.”


Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Egyptian Air Force may soon acquire the export variant of China’s J-10C fighter aircraft.[i] If confirmed, this would represent a clear deepening of Egypt-China military ties amidst growing regional uncertainty due to the conflict in Gaza.[ii] Although the deal remains unconfirmed by either side, various English- and Arabic-language media outlets are treating the acquisition as a fact.[iii] Many analysts and commentators, noting Egypt’s recent accession into BRICS, portray these developments as signaling an ongoing shift in Egypt’s security partnerships from the United States toward closer relations with Russia and China. The first two accompanying articles, from defense-arabic.com—an Arabic-language defense news website and discussion forum—and RT Arabic—a Russian media outlet—illustrate the kind of reporting driving this narrative. For its part, the defense-arabic.com article suggests that Egypt’s decision to do so “reflects Cairo’s intention to diversify the sources of its military equipment and thus reduce its dependence on American defense systems.” Interestingly, the RT Arabic article sources its story from an Israeli news site, nziv.net, whose reporting has portrayed Egypt as a latent security threat to Israel.[iv] Global and regional actors are likely to use this story regardless of the finalization of the deal, to further broaden agendas, particularly the notion of a growing rift between the United States and Egypt.

The strategic implications of Egypt acquiring Chinese fighter jets may be less dramatic than some predict, as suggested in the third accompanying excerpt from the prominent daily al-Araby al-Jadeed. Egypt has long pursued a policy of diversifying its arms suppliers, and it has considered upgrading its fighter aircraft through deals with Europe, the United States, and Russia. However, the region’s heightened tensions and increasing geopolitical competition could interpret even relatively routine actions as strategically significant, warranting closer attention.


Sources:

مصر تعلن رسميا اختيارها للمقاتلات الصينية J-10C لتحل محل مقاتلات F-16 الأمريكية

“Egypt officially announces its choice of Chinese J-10C to replace it’s American F-16s,” defense-arabic.com (defense news and discussion forum), September 11, 2024. https://tinyurl.com/vyfmemsj

Egypt has officially announced that it will replace its aging fleet of American F-16s with Chinese J-10C “Vigorous Dragon” fighters, after discussions that have continued over the past few months. The decision, announced during Egypt’s first international air show, reflects Cairo’s intention to diversify the sources of its military equipment, and thus reduce its dependence on American defense systems…

The decision comes at a time of geopolitical realignment for Egypt, which recently joined the BRICS bloc alongside major players such as China, Russia and India. In recent years, Egypt has also acquired defense equipment from Russia and France, including the MiG-29M and Dassault Rafale. The Chinese J-10C is set to become a key part of Egypt’s diverse arsenal.

Source:

“مصر تستبدل مقاتلات F-16 بمقاتلات صينية متطورة”.. الإعلام العبري يتحدث عن الصفقة المنتظرة

“Egypt replaces its F-16 with advanced Chinese fighter jets… Hebrew media speaks on the presumed deal,” RT Arabic (Russian media outlet), September 9, 2024. https://tinyurl.com/p9nk35mf

According to Hebrew media, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense has placed its first-ever order to purchase Chinese fourth-generation fighter jets, with an unspecified number of J-10C aircraft ordered on August 19. According to the Israeli news website “nziv”, this development comes at a time when Cairo continues to strengthen strategic and economic relations with Beijing, after joining the BRICS bloc earlier this year…

The website added: “With the exception of three squadrons of MiG-29M fighter jets that Egypt ordered from Russia in 2015, all of Egypt’s fourth-generation fighter jets are of Western origin, and the purchase of the J-10C is seen as a potential turning point for Egypt.” The Hebrew website report explained that Egypt is seeking to gradually stop relying on American weapons, especially since the United States had previously refused to sell the latest F-15 aircraft to Cairo, while it agreed to sell them to Israel, which angered the Egyptians. The website pointed out that the United States may stop the annual grant of billions of dollars to Egypt if it buys fighter jets from China.

Source:

هل تتجه مصر نحو اقتناء مقاتلات صينية؟

“Is Egypt moving toward purchasing Chinese fighter jets?” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), September 15, 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/هل-تتجه-مصر-نحو-اقتناء-مقاتلات-صينية

However, Dr. Merit Mabrouk, director of the Egypt Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, believes that Egypt cannot replace the United States with China and Russia in terms of its total reliance on armaments. She explained to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that “as for Russia, Egypt cannot buy weapons from it, because American law stipulates that military aid is not granted to countries that buy weapons from Russia, and Egypt is one of the largest countries that receive American military aid.” She added that “as for China, Egypt’s cooperation with it in the military field is not a replacement for the United States, but rather a kind of completion and diversification of weapons sources.”

“The United States was and will remain Egypt’s favorite, and it is Cairo’s first partner in this field, but it decided some time ago to expand its contacts and partnerships, and that it will not limit itself to one partner, because it is not in its interest,” Mabrouk said. “The idea is that Cairo gives itself the right not to be forced to deal with Washington alone in this field, despite its strong desire to deal with it, and this is not only for Egypt but for many other countries,” she added. 


Notes:

[i] In 2022, Pakistan became the first country to obtain the Chengdu J-10 (NATO reporting name is Firebird). If the rumors are confirmed, Egypt would become the second country to acquire the J-10. The J-10 is a relatively old aircraft, declared operational in 2003, and designed primarily for air-to air combat. However, the J-10 can also perform and participate in strike missions. In January 2024 Pakistan J-10CE’s escorted drones on a strike mission against Baloch separatists in Southeastern Iran.

[ii] In late August, Egypt hosted its first-ever International Military Airshow, where the J-10C was prominently displayed, and an alleged agreement was reportedly finalized. Egypt’s interest in the J-10C has been public for over a year, and negotiations seem to have accelerated in recent months. See for instance this May 2023 article mentioning Egypt’s interest in the fighter jets: “China in advanced negotiations for major arms deals with Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” The New Arab, 25 May 2023. https://www.newarab.com/news/china-advanced-talks-major-saudi-egypt-arms-deals; Last July, the Egyptian Air Force commander visited Beijing for discussions with his Chinese counterpart. See:

قائد القوات الجوية يلتقى نظيره الصينى

“Air Force commander meets his Chinese counterpart,” Egyptian Ministry of Defense, 16 July 2024. https://tinyurl.com/ycj3yb6t

[iii] In addition to Arabic-language outlets, an article in The National Interest reported the sale as a fact without providing evidence. See: “The Mighty F-16 Fighter Just ‘Lost’ to China’s J-10 (But Not in Battle),” The National Interest, 13 September 2024. https://tinyurl.com/6kcmcywy

[iv] See for instance: “Israel spreads false allegations to downplay severity of its military setbacks: Source,” Egypt Independent, 30 May 2024. https://www.egyptindependent.com/israel-spreads-false-allegations-to-downplay-severity-of-its-military-seStbacks-source/ and “Egypt ‘preparing for another Yom Kippur War,’ warns Israeli media site,” Middle East Monitor, 16 July 2024. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240716-egypt-preparing-for-another-yom-kippur-war-warns-israeli-media-site/


Image Information:

Image: PLAAF J-10C in action during the 2023 Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace (LIMA) Exhibition in Malaysia.
Source: https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:J-10C_LIMA_2023.jpg


Chinese Marines Participate in Brazil’s Military Exercise for the First Time

“The People’s Liberation Army will take part in joint military exercises in Brazil, a rare step for the Chinese military in the western hemisphere.”


The participation of Chinese Marines in Operation Formosa, a multinational military exercise hosted by Brazil’s Navy, caps off a diplomatically busy summer between China and Brazil.[i] However, Chinese media coverage of the military exercise was muted. The excerpted article in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported on a single statement from the Chinese Defense Ministry, which noted the exercise would “deepen friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and participating militaries and enhance their ability to jointly respond to security risk challenges.” The SCMP article noted the focus of the exercise was joint landing and anti-landing combat drills—the same type of exercises the U.S. is engaging in across the nations of the South China Sea, to include the Philippines. The SCMP article did acknowledge that the Chinese military participation in Brazil was unusual given that Chinese military exercises are overwhelmingly focused on the South China Sea.

The exercise received different coverage in the Brazilian press. According to the excerpted article in Brazilian flagship news outlet Globo, the annual exercise featured 3,000 military personnel from Brazil, 63 U.S. Marines, and 32 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Marines. Eight additional countries sent military observers.[ii] The U.S. had participated in the same exercise in previous years, but it was the first time for PLA personnel. While Brazil heralded the trilateral military exercise as significant for bringing the United States and China together, U.S. defense officials confirmed that U.S. troops participating in the exercise did not train nor participate alongside the contingent of PLA Marines participating in the exercise.[iii] No further explanations were publicized.

While minimal in scope, the participation of Chinese PLA Marines in Operation Formosa is but one of a host of other diplomatic collaborations between China and Brazil. This includes Brazil’s July pronouncement that it would like to participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative; the joint commemoration of the 50-year anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil in August; and Brazil and Chinese participation at the recent BRICS summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, in September.[iv] Seen in conjunction with these other events and pronouncements, the participation of Chinese Marines in Operation Formosa adds to the body of evidence of a deepening China-Brazil relationship.


Sources:

Yuanyue Dang,“In rare shift, China will send marine corps to Brazil for joint military exercise,” South China Morning Post, 6 September 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3277473/rare-shift-china-will-send-marine-corps-brazil-joint-military-exercise?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

The People’s Liberation Army will take part in joint military exercises in Brazil, a rare step for the Chinese military in the western hemisphere.

A detachment of the PLA Marine Corps will travel to take part in Exercise Formosa 2024 at the invitation of the Brazilian military, the Chinese defence ministry said on Thursday.

The exercises, with a focus on joint landing and anti-landing combat drills, would “deepen friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and participating militaries and enhance their ability to jointly respond to security risk challenges”, the ministry said in a statement on its website.

In recent years, China has hosted military medicine forums, senior military officer seminars and defence forums for Latin American countries, but it is not common for the Chinese military to travel to the region to take part in operations.

This year has seen an improvement in relations between China and Brazil.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva announced in July that his administration planned to join the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s flagship infrastructure and investment project.

Also in July, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun met visiting Brazilian army commander Tomás Ribeiro Paiva in Beijing.

Dong said during the meeting that the two militaries should “strengthen exchanges and learn from each other” to “jointly improve capabilities and take military relations to a new level”.

Source: Filipe Vidon, “Marinha une tropas dos EUA e China pela 1ª vez em operação militar no Brasil; veja fotos (Navy unites US and Chinese troops for the first time in a military operation in Brazil; see photos),” Globo, 11 September 2024. https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2024/09/11/marinha-une-tropas-dos-eua-e-china-pela-1a-vez-em-operacao-militar-no-brasil-veja-fotos.ghtml?fbclid=IwY2xjawFOo7tleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHeVMuBtcSg4CrxXj-qkWNDCN23gW46nn_DjRQtSe3RH3p3C5Vzl6nPBQTg_aem_Q98CjbLroQQSbos97saIrg

63 US Marines and 32 Chinese Marines are participating in the exercise simultaneously.

The Brazilian Navy has achieved a feat: uniting US and Chinese troops on the same side of the “battle”. This is not a preparation for an imminent war, but rather Operation Formosa 2024, an annual military training operation that began on the 4th and will run until September 17, in Goiás.

“Foreign military personnel, together with Brazilian troops, conduct workshops to exchange experiences, known as Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE). During this exchange, various military subjects are addressed, promoting greater integration between Brazil and friendly nations,” the Navy told Globo.

As columnist Ancelmo Gois anticipated, the rivalry between the two countries is not only international, but also 63 US Marines and 32 Chinese Marines are participating in the exercise simultaneously. The Armed Forces will act together, simulating an amphibious operation, considered the most complex of military operations. All weapons used will use live ammunition. The training also aims to promote integration between the Brazilian Navy, Army and Air Force. The objective of the exercise is to prepare Brazilian military personnel to act together in live-fire activities, in controlling airspace and in executing the maneuver during the so-called “Operation of Replacement by Overtaking”. In this phase of the training, responsibilities are transferred between the Armed Forces, which take turns in controlling the actions to achieve the proposed mission. Armored vehicles from the Marine Corps (CFN), such as the JLTV, the ASTROS system, the Piranha, the Amphibious Tracked Car (CLAnf), the UNIMOG truck, in addition to the AF-1 Skyhawk fighter and Navy helicopters. The FAB’s KC-390 Millenium, A-29 Super Tucano and R-99 aircraft, as well as the Army’s ASTROS, Guarani and M60 Combat Car, will also be on display in the operation.

“The holding of major military exercises, such as the Specific Joint Training for Combined Weapons Employment, is essential for optimizing the operations of the Brazilian Armed Forces, promoting efficient integration between the Navy, Army and Air Force. These exercises are designed to improve the coordination and execution of joint operations, addressing crucial aspects such as: fire support, airspace control, command and control, maneuver and logistics,” says the Navy.


Notes:

[i] Operation Formosa has nothing to do with the island of Formosa, otherwise known as Taiwan. Brazil named the annual operation “Formosa” in the 1990s, reflecting its proximity to the Brazilian city of Formosa in the state of Goiás, near the capitol of Brasilia.

[ii] Eight countries sent military observers to Operation Formosa 2024; Argentina, France, Italy, Pakistan, South Africa, Congo, Mexico and Nigeria. See: “Marinha une tropas dos EUA e China pela 1ª vez em operação militar no Brasil (Navy joins US and Chinese troops for the first time in military operation in Brazil),” Globo (mainstream Brazilian news service), 11 September 2024. https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2024/09/11/marinha-une-tropas-dos-eua-e-china-pela-1a-vez-em-operacao-militar-no-brasil-veja-fotos.ghtml

[iii] For additional information on the U.S. position regarding Chinese PLA Marines participating in Operation Formosa, and statement by Pentagon official noting that “U.S. Marines were only at Formosa to train with their Brazilian partners,” see: “Chinese troops to join Brazil’s military drills with US forces,” Reuters, 10 September 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/china-joins-brazilian-military-exercises-alongside-us-troops-2024-09-10/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mil-ebb

[iv] For reporting on the meeting commemorating 50 years of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil, see: “Chinese vice president attends reception for 50th anniversary of China-Brazil diplomatic ties,” XinhuaNet (English language Chinese Media), 14 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240914/2a6daa8898ef41d29115085d83858256/c.html; for additional reading on the recent Meeting of BRICS High-Ranking Officials Responsible For Security Matters/National Security Advisors in St Petersburg Russia, see: “China welcomes more Global South partners to join BRICS—senior Chinese official,” XinhuaNet, 12 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240912/4f0d08a4cd98443694fa4fc8a4ddfcf0/c.html


Report Highlights North Korea’s Fixation on Information Control

North Korean students receive classroom instruction under the watchful eye of a camera and portrait of Kim Jong Un (2018).


“The Kim Jong-un regime has in earnest executed those who were caught after watching South Korean dramas, calling them traitors.”


Reports from inside North Korea of increasingly harsh prison sentences and mass executions for viewing foreign language materials underscore that the Regime assesses information control as vital to the continued existence of the North Korean state. According to a 27 June report from South Korea’s semi-official news agency Yonhap News, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, responsible for managing Seoul’s relations with the North, issued its second human rights report highlighting defector accounts of public executions carried out in the country.1 Defectors testified that many of these executions were in response to convictions for sharing South Korea dramas or music, wearing sunglasses, or for wearing white at a wedding, among other violations.2 This is the second such human rights report and is based on interviews with 141 defectors since 2023.3 According to a 27 June press release by the Unification Ministry announcing the report, “North Korean authorities actively enforce laws including the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture (2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Law (2021) and the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language (2023) aimed at suppressing its residents.”

The report underscores that the North Korean government views information control as critical to its survival. North Korean state media routinely characterizes South Korea as a feral wasteland of dystopian anarcho-capitalism. The upbeat messages and spectacle of K-pop and the fictionalized daily life of wildly popular Korean dramas strike at the very heart of a message North Korea’s state propagandists have taken great pains to create. This also explains why North Korea reacts so angrily, and sometimes violently, to the balloons that South Korea-based NGOs release into the North that carry thumb drives and other media. In the author’s own interviews and conversations with North Korean defectors, some report that the North Korean authorities respond as if to a chemical spill by cordoning off the area and thoroughly searching the homes of anyone nearby.4


Sources:

KIM Soo-yeon, “N. Korea ramps up public executions of people distributing S. Korean movies: unification ministry,” Yonhap (semiofficial South Korean news agency), 27 June 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240627002651315?section=search

The ministry made public a report on the North’s human rights situation for the second straight year in 2024, with this year’s documents mainly based on additional testimonies from 141 North Korean defectors in 2023.

For the first time, the report included an example of a public execution for violating the law adopted in 2020 on the rejection of “the reactionary ideology and culture.”

“The Kim Jong-un regime has in earnest executed those who were caught after watching South Korean dramas, calling them traitors,” she told reporters.

The law calls for a sentence of up to 10 years of hard labor for people who bring and spread outside culture and information. Punishment is known to be tougher in the case of those watching and disseminating South Korean dramas, movies and music. The North views such behaviors as anti-socialist acts that could threaten the very existence of the regime.

A defector who fled North Korea last year said he witnessed the public execution of a 22-year-old in South Hwanghae Province in 2022 for listening to 70 South Korean songs, watching three South Korean movies, and distributing them to seven people.

“Since the law took effect, a person could be sent to a prison camp just because of watching (South Korean movies). The person who initially brought them in will face the most severe punishment — being shot by a firing squad,” the defector was quoted as saying in the report.

Wearing a white wedding dress as a bride, a groom carrying the bride on his back, and wearing sunglasses are also stated as examples of violating the anti-reactionary ideology law, it said.

Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, “Ministry of Unification releases the 2024 Report on North Korean Human Rights,” Ministry of Unification (official government site), 27 June 2024. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54305

On June 27, 2024, the Ministry of Unification released the 2024 Report on North Korean Human Rights, featuring a case involving a 22-year-old man from South Hwanghae Province who was publicly executed for listening to 70 South Korean songs, watching three movies and distributing them to others.

The report draws on various testimonies from North Korean defectors, underscoring how North Korean authorities actively enforce laws including the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture (2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Law (2021) and the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language (2023) aimed at suppressing its residents.

Furthermore, North Korea has intensified its social education and punishments under these three laws, which were designed to restrict residents’ access to outside information, particularly targeting the youth.

Authorities frequently inspect residents’ mobile phones, checking for contacts and any usage of South Korean language styles or expressions, such as nicknames or abbreviations.

In particular, any non-socialist style is deemed “reactionary ideology,” leading to severe punishments, including brides wearing white dresses, grooms carrying brides at weddings, and the wearing of sunglasses.


Notes:

1 Official South Korean government reports on North Korean human rights were apparently discouraged during the presidency of Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) because they interfered with Moon’s focus on improving diplomatic and economic ties with the North. That likely explains why this Unification Ministry report, which has been required by law since 2018, is only the second one to be made public.

2 It is possible that the North Korean authorities’ standard for punishment is any North Korean who does something they more likely than not learned from a Korean drama specifically or outside information generally. North Korea likely views wearing white at weddings as an imported Western, and therefore counter-revolutionary, concept.  Formal white attire has a strong association with death or mourning in China, Japan, and the Koreas, so would be suspect if worn at a wedding. Another associated concept is bride carrying, which is a common tradition in South Korea that is apparently less so in the north.

3 See Lee Minji, “S. Korea publishes hard copies of English report on N. Korea’s human rights,” Yonhap (semiofficial South Korean news agency), 7 July 2023. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230707003500325

4 Defector reports must be carefully evaluated because defectors from North Korea are, by their very nature, a self-selecting group. Moreover, they may be motivated to embellish the scale and scope of the atrocities they have witnessed because the defectors may believe it is what South Korean authorities and the media want to hear. In coverage of North Korea-related issues, salaciousness is often as important as fact for foreign media sources.


Image Information:

Image: North Korean students receive classroom instruction under the watchful eye of a camera and portrait of Kim Jong Un (2018).
Source: http://ellsworth.ca/dprk/2018-08/608.jpg
Attribution: David Clayton Ellsworth, CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


North Korea Previews Hypothetical Negotiating Strategy

North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un meets U.S. President Trump in the Joint Security Area of the Demilitarized Zone (2019).


“The foreign policy of a state and personal feelings must be strictly distinguished.”


North Korea previewed its negotiating strategy in a hypothetical future Trump Administration via a recent high-level commentary in its main state-run party newspaper. The commentary both dismissed Pyongyang’s interest in negotiating with the United States and refuted former U.S. President Trump’s statement that his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un would make future negotiations easier. North Korea’s Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) on 23 July addressed statements made by former U.S. President Donald Trump in his speech accepting the nomination for president.1 After recounting the litany of grievances the North attaches to the United States, the commentary briefly acknowledges the “special personal relations” between former President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un before dismissing it with the phrase “we do not care about [Kim Jong Un’s personal relationship or affinity to former President Trump].” The KCNA piece argues that “personal feelings” between leaders and the affairs of state must be separate. The commentary goes on to make veiled threats against the United States and states the U.S. is responsible for correcting the relationship through action.

This commentary offers clues as to how it will approach negotiations with a potential future Trump Administration. A common North Korean negotiating tactic is to portray itself as indifferent to talks and resigned to potential conflict. Pyongyang wants to be seen as “doing you a favor” by agreeing to talk and subsequently rewarded for its magnanimity. This tactic encourages the other party to negotiate with itself over concessions to get North Korea to the bargaining table and keep it there. This tactic is tried-and-true, and the referenced commentary should be interpreted in light of that pattern.

As the U.S. election approaches, North Korea is likely to issue messages from increasingly authoritative sources within the party’s hierarchy, such as Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jung or ultimately Kim Jong Un himself.  As a rule, the more authoritative the source, the less ambiguity in the North’s course of action and the more likely that the statement represents Pyongyang’s preferences or plans. Although it will be somewhat flexible on the scale, before agreeing to even sit down with the United States, Pyongyang, at minimum, is likely to demand unilateral sanctions relief and cessation of military exercises. North Korea’s ultimate negotiating position is U.S. acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state toward the ultimate objective of ending Washington’s alliance with South Korea.


Sources:

“조미대결의 초침이 멎는가는 미국의 행동여하에 달려있다 조선중앙통신사 론평 (Whether Second Hand of DPRK-U.S. Confrontation Stops or Not Depends on U.S. Act: KCNA Commentary),” Korea Central News Agency (official North Korean propaganda agency), 23 July 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/389b4b6d4d92a66d210125543c87c1d6502d45160a9c295724db5424054b5cfc.kcmsf

Amid the full-dress presidential election race in the U.S., Trump, who has been officially confirmed as a candidate for the Republican Party, said in his speech of acceptance for candidate that “I got along with them and it is nice to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons and otherwise”, thus buoying a lingering desire for the prospects of the DPRK-U.S. relations. Even if any administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this.

It is true that Trump, when he was president, tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of states in the relations between states, but he did not bring about any substantial positive change.

He that puts on a public gown must put off a private person. The foreign policy of a state and personal feelings must be strictly distinguished.

For nearly 80 years since the founding of the DPRK, the U.S. has pursued the most vicious and persistent hostile policy toward it.

The DPRK has bolstered up its self-defensive capabilities to safeguard its ideology, social system, dignity and life and is fully ready for all-out confrontation with the U.S.

Due to the serious strategic mistakes of the successive administrations, the era has come when the U.S. should really worry about its security.


Notes:

1 An unsigned KCNA commentary is the lowest level of authoritative statement made in DPRK propaganda. It is designed to show an external audience that North Korea is aware of and discussing a particular issue, but either has not yet decided upon a course of action or is not yet ready to reveal it.


Image Information:

Image: North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un meets U.S. President Trump in the Joint Security Area of the Demilitarized Zone (2019).
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Trump_Meets_with_Chairman_Kim_Jong_Un_(48162628746).jpg
Attribution: Executive Office of the President of the United States, Public Domain


Electoral Fraud in Venezuela Assists Axis of Authoritarians

Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, which announced fabricated numbers on election night.


‘The governments of China, Russia, and Iran, close to the regime of Nicolás Maduro and with major economic and military interests in Venezuela, congratulated the Venezuelan dictator for the electoral victory that he has claimed for himself amid accusations of fraud.”


Venezuela’s recent presidential election has been the subject of significant criticism from election observers and the international community.[i] In addition to the electoral irregularities and uneven playing field before election day, the Maduro regime delayed the announcement of election results due to an alleged cyber-attack from North Macedonia. When the regime’s National Electoral Council, an institution it firmly controls, eventually announced the results, voters immediately knew the numbers were fabricated.[ii] The first excerpted article from Excelsior, Mexico’s second-oldest daily newspaper, reports that much of Latin America sees the situation similarly, and many countries have decided to withhold their recognition of the election results until the National Electoral Council shows the vote tallies proving Maduro’s win. Thus far, the outlet reports, the regime has provided incredible excuses for why it cannot provide them—first, the purported cyber-attack, followed by the claim of a hack by Elon Musk.[iii] In response, the outlet says Maduro decided to break diplomatic relations with seven Latin American countries that criticized Venezuela’s electoral process and lack of transparency.

Contrary to much of Latin America’s criticism, Venezuela’s authoritarian allies were quick to recognize Maduro’s victory. The second excerpted article from Argentine media outlet Infobae, recounts how China, Russia, and Iran immediately recognized Maduro’s “victory” given the importance of their alliance. Russia, the outlet states, went beyond recognition and pledged further military support for Caracas. Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Honduras have also recognized Maduro’s claim of victory.

Maduro’s inability to produce vote tabulations proving his victory will further isolate him from the West and send him deeper into the arms of his fellow authoritarians. This is notable given the months preceding the election featured regional diplomatic engagement to keep the elections on track. Conversely, China, Russia, and Iran have an interest in keeping Maduro in power because his regime thumbs its nose at the United States and continues to provide them with a strong foothold in Latin America.


Sources:

“Venezuela rompe relaciones diplomáticas con 7 países latinoamericanos (Venezuela breaks diplomatic relations with 7 Latin American countries),” Excelsior (Mexico’s second-oldest daily newspaper), 29 July 2024. https://www.excelsior.com.mx/global/venezuela-maduro-rompe-relaciones-diplomaticas-siete-paises-latinoamericanos/1665230 

Venezuela decided…to withdraw all its diplomatic personnel from its missions in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, hours after these countries demanded ‘a complete review of the results’ of the elections with the presence of independent observers…The result sparked a wave of protests in Venezuelan territory and condemnation, as well as calls for transparency from the international community. In response to the request of Latin American countries, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry said it decided to ‘withdraw all diplomatic personnel from the missions in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay, while demanding that those governments immediately withdraw their representatives from Venezuelan territory.’

“China, Rusia e Irán felicitaron a Nicolás Maduro tras el fraude electoral en Venezuela (China, Russia and Iran congratulate Nicolas Maduro after electoral fraud in Venezuela),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 29 July 2024. https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/07/29/china-rusia-e-iran-felicitaron-a-nicolas-maduro-tras-el-fraude-electoral-en-venezuela/ 

The governments of China, Russia, and Iran, close to the regime of Nicolás Maduro and with major economic and military interests in Venezuela, congratulated the Venezuelan dictator for the electoral victory that he has claimed for himself amid accusations of fraud…Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said at his daily press conference that Moscow intends to continue deepening cooperation with Caracas in all areas, including ‘sensitive’ ones, such as military-technical cooperation. In Latin America, the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia, which are all sympathetic to the Chavista regime,also spoke in favor of Maduro.


Notes:

[i] For more information on the fraud and how it was committed, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

[ii] Writing in the Wall Street Journal, opposition leader Maria Corina Machado details how the opposition mobilized a volunteer network to collect electronic voting tabulations from voting machines, giving them proof of Maduro’s fraud. See: “I Can Prove Maduro Got Trounced,” Wall Street Journal, 1 August 2024. https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-can-prove-maduro-got-trounced-venezuela-election-stolen-772d66a0

[iii] After a highly public back-and-forth with Elon Musk on X (formerly Twitter), Maduro blocked access to X in Venezuela for an initial period of 10 days. See: Vivian Sequera and Mayela Armas, “Venezuela’s Maduro blocks X access in country for 10 days,” Reuters, 9 August 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-maduro-signs-decree-blocking-x-access-10-days-2024-08-08/


Image Information:

Image: Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, which announced fabricated numbers on election night.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Consejo_Nacional_Electoral_Cne_Fachada_Posterior.JPG.      
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0.


Nigerian Security Services Crackdown on Russian Flag Protesters

Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.


“The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag….”


Russian influence in Francophone West African countries that have experienced military coups in the last few years is a clear trendline. One of the most notable examples of this influence has been the expansion of the Wagner Group – or Africa Corps as the company is now known – in the region. However, the excerpted punch.ng report about Russian flags being seen at anti-government protests in northern Nigeria is a new and unexpected development, and a possible indication that Russian information operations are contributing to a positive image of Russia in parts of Nigeria. This is despite Russia’s dubious counter-insurgency record in the Sahel and its support for anti-democratic military juntas in West Africa.[i] According to the article, certain northern elite politicians provided Russian flags to #EndBadGovernance protesters, who are disappointed with the government’s inability to address hunger and hardship in the country. The article further suggests that these elites seek to remove the current Nigerian president, Bola Tinubu, from power. The Russian flags served as a threat to Tinubu’s administration that what happened to leaders deposed in coups in Francophone West Africa could occur in Nigeria as well. According to the article, the response of the Nigerian military to these Russian flags could lead to an excessive reaction towards the flag holders and their alleged sponsors. The military has a history of cracking down on dissent with excessive violence.[ii] The article quotes top military officials as stating the protesters holding the Russian flags are treasonous could indicate harsh action will be taken against them, including at least 10 protesters and flag makers who have already been arrested.


Sources:

“Russian flag: FG probes four northern political bigwigs,” punch.ng (Lagos-based publication with a southern Nigerian perspective often critical of the government and northern Nigerian powerbrokers) 7 August 2024. https://punchng.com/russian-flag-fg-probes-four-northern-political-bigwigs/

The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag as they chanted “Tinubu must go.” Russia, an Eastern power currently mired in a cold war with the West, has been blamed for several unconstitutional changes of government in West African countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and among others. The Nigerian military said persons flying the Russian flag were committing treason and will, therefore, be “prosecuted”.

This act not only disrespects our national symbols but also commits treasonable felony and related offences. Hence, 10 suspects were arrested flying Russian flags,” Public Relations Officer ASP Buhari Abdullahi stated while parading the suspects.


Notes:

[i] See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Army, Wagner Group Atrocities Against Civilians,” 28 March 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/mali-army-wagner-group-atrocities-against-civilians

[ii] Just five years ago, in 2019, for example, the Nigerian military cracked down on the Shia Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and killed several dozen of its members who had been protesting in the streets and nearly killed their leader, Ibrahim al-Zakaky. He was forced to recover from his injuries while under long-term house arrest. See Faiza Mawani, “Persecution of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria,” October 19, 2020, UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog. https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2020/10/19/persecution-of-the-shia-islamic-movement-of-nigeria/



Image Information:

Image: Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.
Source: TobiJamesCandids, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Protest_against_the_Special_Anti-Robbery_Squad_(SARS)_in_Lagos,_Nigeria.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0


Armenia Continuing Its Move Away From Russian Reliance

French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.


“Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said.”


Armenia continues taking steps away from Russia by working with other partners. The majority of Armenia’s weapons inventory is made up of Russian systems, leaving the Armenian government largely reliant on Russia. However, the accompanying excerpted articles report that Armenia reached a military-technical cooperation agreement with France in June 2024. The first excerpted article from the independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyansigned a military-technical cooperation agreement with the French company KNDS during his visit to France in June. The article notes that Papikyan also met with his French counterpart during his visit, but the details of their meeting were not disclosed. It is also mentioned that Armenia purchased French armored personnel carriers and radar systems in the past year, with negotiations still underway for Armenia to acquire the Mistral 3 short-range air defense system.

The second excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports that the meeting between the defense ministers of Armenia and France resulted in an agreement for Armenia to purchase an unknown number of French CAESAR 155mm self-propelled artillery systems. The article also includes a statement from Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan that Armenia has significantly reduced its military-technical cooperation with Russia since 2020.[i] Overall, Armenia’s recent acquisition of the French CAESAR 155mm artillery provides another system of non-Russian origin for the country’s inventory in the short-term, while the military-technical agreement with France could provide additional systems over the next several years. Both will help Armenia rely less on Russia going forward.[ii]


Sources:

“Армения и Франция достигли новых договорённостей в сфере ВТС (Armenia and France reached a new agreement on military-technical cooperation),” Eurasia Daily (an independent Russian-language news website), 18 June 2024.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/06/18/armeniya-i-franciya-dostigli-novyh-dogovoryonnostey-v-sfere-vts

As part of a working visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France, an agreement on military-technical cooperation (MTC) was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Armenia and the military-industrial company KNDS on 17 June…

Before that, Suren Papikyan met with his French counterpart Sebastien Lecornu…The parties noted the importance of military-technical cooperation, around which new agreements were reached, the Armenian Defense Ministry reported, without disclosing their content…

In October 2023, in Paris, the Ministers of Defense of Armenia and France signed agreements on the supply of weapons to Armenia. France has already supplied Armenia with 24 Bastion armored personnel carriers, with another 26 combat vehicles in the production stage. Yerevan has also placed an order for three GM200 radars, and negotiations are underway on the supply of Mistral 3 portable anti-aircraft missile systems…

“Армения договорилась с Францией о поставке самоходок Caesar (Armenia reached an agreement with France on the delivery of the self-propelled Caesar),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 18 June 2024.

https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/401043

Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said. The document was signed during the visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France…

The Caesar self-propelled artillery unit is equipped with a 155-mm cannon and is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 40 kilometers…

In March, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan noted that since 2020, Russia’s share in military-technical cooperation has decreased from 96% to less than 10%…


Notes:

[i] In the years since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in November 2020, the government of Armenia stated that it will reduce the number of weapon systems it acquires from Russia, because it does not believe Russia has been a reliable partner.

[ii] Armenia has acquired a few weapon systems from India in the years since, but these were not part of a long-term agreement with India. The systems from India included counter battery radar, multiple rocket launchers, and towed 155mm artillery. For more information on Armenia’s acquisitions of new weapon systems from India, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023.
https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/armenia-takes-another-step-away-from-russia/


Image Information:

 Image: French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Caesar_self-propelled_howitzer_in_Iraq.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Russia’s Africa Corps Personnel Redeploy From the Sahel to Kursk

Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.


“He emphasized that the Wagner fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions.”


On 28 July, Tuareg rebels in the Coordination of Azawad Movements, a mostly secular Tuareg ethnonationalist militant and political coalition, together with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), massacred dozens of Africa Corps fighters (formerly the Wagner Group) and Malian soldiers in northern Mali near the Algerian border.[i] This was the most severe loss of life in a battle for Africa Corps since the mercenary contingent increased its presence on the continent in 2020. It would be politically untenable for Russia to reveal weakness and pressure Africa Corps to fully cut and run from its mission in Mali. However, this disaster in northern Mali and the simultaneous difficulties Russia is facing in responding to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk on Russian territory could lead to the redeployment of Africa Corps fighters from Mali and the Sahel region to Kursk. This, in turn, could result in a reduction of Russian counter-insurgency support to Mali and Sahelian states, which are already being engulfed by JNIM and its rival Islamic State in Greater Sahara.

This possibility is furthered in the pro-Russian government Russian-language website gazeta.ru, which reported that the Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk oblast is requiring Russia to call for assistance from Africa Corps. The article notes that Wagner Group, forces are returning from missions abroad to Ukraine and highlights how many Africa Corps fighters died in the ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM in Mali on 28 July. It further implies, based on a message from a prominent Russian Telegram user, that Africa Corps fighters who participated in conflicts in Africa would be among those transferred to Kursk. While details about this transfer are scant in the gazeta.ru article, such reports have also emerged from Russian-language websites critical of the Russian government. The second excerpted article in the Moscow Times also claims that Africa Corps fighters are being transferred from Africa to Kursk. The article emphasized that Africa Corps forces were previously sent to “distant” African countries, including Mali, where the junta leader extended the group’s contract. However, after the Russian Army’s encirclement in Kursk, those same forces are needed on the Russian home front. It remains unclear how this massacre and the fighting in Kursk will ultimately affect Africa Corps, but it is likely Africa Corps’ presence—and certainly its confidence—is less sustainable now than at any time in the recent past.


Sources:

“Бойцы «ЧВК Вагнер» прибыли в Курскую область. Что происходит в регионе на четвертые сутки боев? (Wagner ‘PMC fighters’ arrived in Kursk Oblast. What is happening in the region on the fourth day of fighting?),” www.gazeta.ru (Russian-language website that tends to be pro-Russian government but with a focus on social issues often more than politics) 9 August 2024. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2024/08/09/19545865.shtml

Wagner PMC fighters and Akhmat special forces arrived in Kursk Oblast to join the battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The situation in the region is tense: a State of Smergency was declared, and border area residents of were evacuated. President Putin ordered that help be provided to the population.

Wagner PMC fighters arrived in Kursk Oblast and entered into battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sudzha, the SHOT Telegram channel reported. The total number of fighters sent to the combat zone was not specified. According to the channel, brigades of the Ministry of Defense’s volunteer corps are also joining in the fighting.

Military correspondent Yegor Guzenko, who publishes under the pseudonym Thirteenth, also reported that fighters from Wagner PMC were sent to the Kursk region. He emphasized that the fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions. Recently, Wagner PMC fighters participated in African conflicts, and especially fought against the Tuaregs in Mali. As a result of these battles, the PMC endured losses, which numbered several dozen people.

В Курскую область начали перебрасывать бойцов «Вагнера» из Африки (Wagner fighters from Africa began being transferred to Kursk region), Moscow Times (independent Russian bi-lingual on-line newspaper previously located in Russia, but since relocated to Amsterdam to avoid government sensorship), 8 August 2024. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/08/08/vkurskuyu-oblast-nachali-perebrasivat-boitsov-vagnera-izafriki-a138964

Russia is transferring Wagner PMC fighters from Africa to the Kursk region amid a successful offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, Z-blogger and the Telegram channel “Novorossiya Militia Reports” claim.

At the end of July in Mali, a contingent of government troops and Russian Wagner fighters near the border with Algeria were ambushed by Tuareg rebels. During the battle, Wagner and government troops were destroyed, and the losses of the Russian PMCs alone, according to various sources, may have reached 80 people.


Notes:

[i] Both al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and the Tuareg rebel group Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) claimed the massacre of Wagner and Malian army fighters. However, both groups denied any cooperation with each other due to their conflicting Islamist and secular ethno-nationalist ideologies, respectively, if not also the CMA’s desire to receive international support for its cause, which would be jeopardized by any association with an al-Qaeda affiliate. See “Au Mali, le lourd revers des mercenaires russes de Wagner (In Mali, a large setback for Wagner’s Russian mercenaries),” Le Figaro, 29 July 2024. lefigaro.fr/international/au-mali-le-lourd-revers-des-mercenaires-russes-de-wagner-20240729



Image Information:

Image: Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.
Source: Информационное агентство БелТА, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PMC_wagner_in_belarus_3.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0


Sahelian States Sever Ties with Ukraine

Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.


“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect.”


Allegations of an “African Front” being opened in Russia’s war on Ukraine have caused multiple nations in the Sahel to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine as African and Russian leaders accuse Ukraine of supporting terrorist organizations. According to the first excerpted article from French daily Le Monde, Niger and Mali ceased diplomatic relations with Ukraine on 7 August 2024. The decision was made in response to separatist and jihadist fighters in Mali killing dozens of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) and Malian military personnel fighting in northeastern Mali. In the wake of the battle, Andriy Yusov, the press representative of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, stated: “The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details.”[i] While this is not a direct admission of Ukrainian involvement in the Sahel, Moscow has unsurprisingly sided with Niger and Mali, condemning Kyiv.

Recent actions by Mali and Niger have sparked discussion that a proxy war could be starting in Africa between Russian-backed militaries and separatist groups accused of being backed by Ukraine. According to the second excerpted article from the Africa-based think tank, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), there are likely far more significant geopolitical implications for Africa than regional conflicts between warring tribes and jihadist groups. Russia’s information campaigns in numerous nations have been widely reported on. However, recently, Ukraine’s special envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Maksym Subkh, announced new embassies throughout Africa to help combat the influence of Russia’s Africa Corps. Ukrainian intervention against Russia, indirectly through support or through kinetic operations, would not be unheard of. ISS also reported that Ukrainian special forces were deployed to operate in Sudan to support the Sudanese Armed Forces fighting against Africa Corps mercenaries and allied Rapid Support Forces.

Mali, Niger, and several other nations in the Sahel have faced complex security issues stemming from armed rebellion to radical jihadism and foreign influence for several years. The possible expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war to other portions of the globe, such as Africa, has received mixed reactions. The Economic Community of West African States, a political and economic union of fifteen African nations, including Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, and Niger, condemned any foreign influence and the expansion of geopolitical events to Africa.[ii] Others may view any attempt to combat Russian expansion and aggression as a net positive. However, if Ukraine does become openly involved in attempting to subvert Russian expansion in Africa, it will undoubtedly cause a shift in the momentum of ongoing armed conflicts in the region. Though, with multiple armed groups active in Sahelian states with varying motivations and allegiances, it would be difficult to limit the extent of foreign aid and influence to exclude all jihadist groups.


Sources:

“Le Niger rompt « avec effet immédiat » ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Ukraine, deux jours après le Mali (Niger breaks off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect”, two days after Mali),” Le Monde, 7 August 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/08/07/le-niger-rompt-avec-effet-immediat-ses-relations-diplomatiques-avec-l-ukraine-deux-jours-apres-le-mali_6270883_3212.html

Niger announced on Tuesday, August 6, that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with Ukraine “with immediate effect,” two days after Mali accused Kyiv of “supporting” “terrorist groups” after a heavy defeat of the Malian army at the end of July during fighting with separatists and jihadists.

“The government of the Republic of Niger, in total solidarity with the government and people of Mali, has decided in all sovereignty (…) to sever diplomatic relations between the Republic of Niger and Ukraine with immediate effect,” declared the spokesman for the Niger government, Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, in a statement read on public television.

At the end of July, separatists and jihadists claimed to have killed dozens of members of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner and Malian soldiers during fighting in Tin Zaouatine (north-east Mali). This defeat is the heaviest suffered in a battle by the Wagner Group in Africa, analysts agree.

A Ukrainian military intelligence official, Andri Yusov, had implied that Kiev had provided information to the rebels so they could carry out their attack. “The government of the Republic of Niger learned with great shock and deep indignation about the subversive and unacceptable remarks of Mr. Andri Yusov, spokesman for the Ukrainian military intelligence agency ,” Abdramane said on Tuesday…

“The fact that the rebels received the necessary data that allowed them to successfully carry out an operation against Russian war criminals has already been observed by the whole world. Of course, we will not disclose the details. More information to come here too,” Yusov told Ukrainian television. The video of his statement was relayed by the Ukrainian ambassador to Senegal.

Following these statements, Mali announced the severance of its relations with Ukraine, which on Monday rejected the accusations and regretted the decision, which it considered “hasty” . The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry affirmed that Kyiv “unconditionally adheres to the norms of international law” and “reserves the right to take all necessary political and diplomatic measures in response to unfriendly actions.”

Peter Fabricius, “La guerre de la Russie contre l’Ukraine s’étend-elle à l’Afrique? (Is Russia’s War on Ukraine Spreading to Africa?),” Institute for Security Studies (pan-African think tank), 9 August 2024. https://issafrica.org/fr/iss-today/la-guerre-de-la-russie-contre-l-ukraine-s-etend-elle-a-l-afrique.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield.

Russia appears to be stepping up its multi-pronged offensive to increase its influence in Africa, while Ukraine is fighting back, threatening to turn the continent into a major proxy battlefield. Military skirmishes erupted last week in Africa, when Moscow’s Wagner force (now Africa Corps) suffered heavy losses in a battle against Tuareg separatists and jihadists in Tinzawatene, Mali. The setback marks a major blow to the Kremlin, which appeared to be expanding its presence or at least countering Western efforts to regain ground.

After last week’s intense battle in Tinzawatene, in which Tuareg separatists claim to have killed 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers, officer Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for Ukraine’s intelligence agency, said Malian rebels had received the “necessary” information to carry out the attack, hinting at possible Ukrainian involvement. In response, Mali’s military junta severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine, accusing it of supporting “international terrorism.” Ukraine denied the accusation, saying Mali acted hastily, without investigating the incident or providing evidence of its involvement. The military junta of Mali’s neighbor Niger has also severed diplomatic ties with Kiev. Russia has accused Ukraine of opening a new front in Africa, an accusation tinged with irony.

The consequences of the war between Russia and Ukraine could be serious for Africa. The Economic Community of West African States condemned “foreign interference in the region […] and any attempt to drag the region into the current geopolitical confrontations.” The African Union did not respond. This development may not be entirely new in Africa. For Ramani, if Ukraine did indeed contribute to Wagner’s defeat in Mali, it is part of his two-pronged strategy in Africa. On the one hand, diplomatic openness with the establishment of new embassies and, on the other, “discreet special operations like those observed against the RSF in Sudan.”

The “RSF” refers to the Rapid Support Forces, which are engaged in a violent conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It is well known that Russia, including Wagner, supports the RSF. In February, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces were operating in Sudan, supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces against Wagner’s forces, allied with the RSF. For Ramani, Wagner’s defeat in Mali will lead to introspection. Wagner’s forces will likely be more controlled by the state, “like the process going on in Libya.”


Notes:

[i] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine responded to Niger’s decision in a press release, denying support for terrorist organizations. Located here: “Statement by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry regarding the decision of the authorities of the Republic of Niger to sever diplomatic relations with Ukraine,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 8 August 2024. https://mfa.gov.ua/fr/news/zayava-mzs-ukrayini-shchodo-rishennya-vladi-respubliki-niger-rozirvati-diplomatichni-vidnosini-z-ukrayinoyu

[ii] ECOWAS has a long-standing history in Africa, founded in 1975, and contributes to many social and economic projects including election monitoring, clean water initiatives, human development, regional security, and more. For more information on ECOWAS visit: “About ECOWAS,” ECOWAS, Updated 2024.  https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/


Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_Special_Operations_Forces_of_Ukraine.svg
Attribution: Public Domain