Iran Ready To Help Syria Rebuild Its Defense Infrastructure

Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza-Ashtiani meets with Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim, Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Army, 10 May 2023

Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza-Ashtiani meets with Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim, Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Army, 10 May 2023.


“Iran is now ready to use its capacities and capabilities to rebuild and contribute to the development of the infrastructure of the Syrian defense industry.”


The 12-year-old Syrian civil war appears to be nearing its end. As the Arab League re-embraces Syria and the international community begins to discuss reconstruction,[i] an opportunity from which Iran also seeks to profit,[ii] the Iranian Ministry of Defense also seeks to rebuild and reconstruct Syria’s military, according to the excerpted news story from Iran’s Holy Defense News Agency. While neither Tehran nor Damascus have yet reported an agreement for Iran to rebuild the Syrian military, the Iranian government expects repayment for its military investment in and dispatch of volunteers and advisers to Syria during the war.[iii] The recent visit of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Syria, among other bilateral visits and exchanges, suggest that cementing and augmenting the Iran-Syria axis is a strategic priority for Tehran. From the Iranian perspective, helping rebuild Syria’s defense sector achieves two goals. Strategically, it advances Iran’s goal of militarily eliminating Israel as a Jewish state, while operationally, it provides an important revenue stream for Iran’s domestic military industries.


Source:

“Amir Ashtiani: Amadegi Iran baraye komak beh Tawseah Zirsakht-e Sanaea’-e Defah-e Suriyah (Amir Ashtiani: Iran Ready to Help Develop Infrastructure for Syrian Defense Industry ),” Holy Defense News Agency (official news agency of Iran’s Defense Ministry), 10 May 2023. https://defapress.ir/fa/news/588336

Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, met with Lieutenant-General Abdel Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim, Chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Army. While commemorating the memory of General Haj Qasem Soleimani as a martyr in the fight against terrorism and for the security of the Syrian people and the region, Ashtiani stated, “Relations between the two countries are experiencing one of the best periods in their history. We have a strategic agreement, but this is rooted in our brotherly relations.”

The Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, stating that the recent visit of the Iranian president to Damascus and his welcome by the Syrian government and people indicates deep bilateral relations, added, “This trip and its agreements as well as the issues I discussed with the Syrian Defense Minister in Moscow and Damascus are on the agenda….”Ashtiani, emphasizing the work of the Joint Commission on Defense-Technical Cooperation between the two countries, said, “Be sure, the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran is now ready to use its capacities and capabilities to rebuild and contribute to the development of the infrastructure of the Syrian defense industry, just as it stood alongside the Syrian armed forces during the war against terrorism.”


Notes:

[i] Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime controls much of the country except for some northern districts occupied by Turkish forces or their proxies, and the far northeast of the county in which Kurds have established an autonomous administration. The war’s destruction has been vast. A quarter of the country’s population has fled creating a refugee crisis in surrounding counties, and many are Syrians are displaced inside Syria. In some towns, rocket strikes, battle damage, and looting by various militias and armies has rendered upward of 90 percent of the structures uninhabitable.

[ii] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Proposal To Build Railroads and Housing in Syria could Enrich IRGC” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/429079/download

[iii] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Basij Recruiting for Syria Fight” OE Watch, March 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195441


Image Information:

Image: Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza-Ashtiani meets with Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim, Chief of General Staff of the Syrian Army, 10 May 2023
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/05/10/3/62604330.jpg?ts=1683727966517
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency

Chinese Perspective on Manned-Unmanned Coordinated Operations on the Modern Battlefield

Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword[RG1]  (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).

Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword [RG1]  (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).


“The manned-unmanned combat team has rewritten the modern battlefield formation model, with manned platforms leading unmanned platforms to form an integrated combat team.”


Researchers with China’s Air Force Research Institute recently published an article in China’s PLA Daily outlining five trends in coordinating manned and unmanned battlefield operations. Except for the potential for clustered autonomous systems to increase battlefield uncertainty, the authors argue that recent efforts to divide labor between complementary manned and unmanned systems have provided more options for tactical configuration and combat synergy.  The authors, Guo Yilun and Ma Quan assert there are three types of manned-unmanned platforms: 1) direct transmission of unmanned information for rear control, 2) interoperability between manned and unmanned platforms under limited control, and 3) completely controlled manned-unmanned platforms. As autonomous platforms continue to develop, the Chinese military will be able to combine manned and unmanned platforms into combat groups that will facilitate information processing, mission planning and decision-making, command distribution, and formation of operations to provide flexibility in constantly developing battlefield postures. A second benefit the authors believe will result from closer man-machine coordination is increased battlefield situational awareness. A real-time tactical “cloud” system will rapidly detect, process, and distribute requirements based on developing target data. Information from space platforms, sensors, and weapon systems in the land, sea, air, and space domains will be cross-verified and integrated into a unified framework that coordinates manned and unmanned data. Third, distributed command-and-control systems will be able to disaggregate computing, collection, and decision-making functions and assign sub-problems to collaborative manned-unmanned groups. Fourth, the authors argue that systems of higher autonomous control bring greater uncertainty in warfare; as such, autonomous systems should be classified by the degree to which they are integrated with manned systems. The authors suggest four levels of autonomy: non-autonomy, single-machine autonomy, multi-machine autonomy, and clustered autonomy. Finally, the authors assert that further integrating unmanned systems will save more than 60 percent the cost of manned operations and double their effectiveness.


Source:

郭一伦 (Guo Yilun) and 马权 (Ma Quan), “撬动战争形态衍变的新支点 (Prying a New Lever in Evolving Warfare Patterns),” PLA Dailv (PLA-owned media), 27 April 2023. http://www.81.cn/bz_208549/10165050.html

In the face of future intelligent battlefield environments, the use of a large number of intelligent, unmanned weapons and equipment will reshape battlefield combat force systems. Manned/unmanned combat forces will be flexibly organized as needed, and can be combined into different types and sizes of combat groups, which can be linked for information fusion processing, mission planning and decision-making, command distribution, and formation operations according to combat tasks and battlefield posture.


Image: Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword[RG1]  (Chinese unmanned combat aerial vehicle).
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hongdu_GJ-11#/media/File:Gongji-11_20221020.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Iran Opens New Helicopter, Drone Base in Southeastern Provincial Capital

Helicopters purportedly at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ new helicopter and drone base in Zahedan.

Helicopters purportedly at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ new helicopter and drone base in Zahedan.


“The helicopter fleet in the southeast of the country was strengthened for large security missions.”


Iran is beefing up its military strike capability in its southeastern province of Sistan va Baluchistan with a new helicopter and drone-capable air base in the provincial capital of Zahedan. While the region is the second-largest Iranian province by size, its population is sparse and the province itself has long been considered a backwater. Indian Ocean trade from its strategic port of Chabahar remains miniscule in comparison to Iran’s Persian Gulf and Caspian ports.[i] According to the following excerpted article from Azad News Agency, the base will “accommodate IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] drones…[a]ll sorts of attack and combat helicopters, search and rescue craft, and unmanned aerial vehicles.” This announcement is notable since the region has long been a strategic Achilles’ heel for the Iranian regime. Smuggling across Iran’s frontier with Afghanistan is a problem that predates Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. The region has long been restive both because its harsh terrain gives shelter to criminals and terrorists and because of sectarian and ethnic tension between the local Sunni and Baluch population and the Shi’ite Persians and Azeris who dominate the Iranian regime and the IRGC. There has been no shortage of unrest in recent years, including high-profile attacks on the IRGC in the region.[ii] These conditions may be the prime reason, albeit unstated in the Iranian press, why the IRGC has established the base in Sistan va Baluchistan. The move may also reflect the Iranian regime hedging its bets regarding future relations with the Taliban across the border in Afghanistan. Curiously, given previous Iranian investment in Chabahar, the decision to locate the base beyond helicopter range to the port raises questions about Iranian strategy, although it may reflect a rolling decision to deemphasize the strategic importance of the port in the future.


Source:

“Paygah-e Havaye va Balgard-e Niru-ye Zamini Sepah Aftah Shod (The Army Air Force Opens its Helicopter Headquarters),” Azad News Agency (an ostensibly private news agency that closely follows the government line), 10 May 2023. https://ana.press/fa/news/846682

…In the presence of General Hossein Salami, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an air and helicopter base named “Ali Arabi” was inaugurated in Zahedan, in the southeast of the country. It will also accommodate IRGC drones. All sorts of attack and combat helicopters, search and rescue craft, and unmanned aerial vehicles can use the base that is built to the latest technical specifications and aviation standards.General Mohammed Pakpour, Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces, spoke about the objectives in building the base. “With the operation of this base, the IRGC’s ground force helicopter fleet in the southeast of the country was strengthened and equipped for large security, defense, rescue and rescue missions, support, people assistance and service,” he said. “In addition to creating the capacity for maintenance and simultaneous take-off of dozens of helicopters, all capacity for refueling, hangering, repairs and maintenance have been created.”


Notes:

[i] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Construction Begins on the Chabahar-Zahedan Railway” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/359394/download

[ii] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Border Guard Post Overrun, Guards Abducted” OE Watch, December 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/252911/download


Image Information:

Image: Helicopters purportedly at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ new helicopter and drone base in Zahedan.
Source: https://ana.press/files/fa/news/1402/2/20/228265_685.jpg
Attribution: Azad News Agency

Beijing Expands Counter-Espionage Law To Crack Down on Foreign Access to Chinese Information

Activities carried out, instigated or funded … to steal, pry into, purchase or illegally provide state secrets, intelligence, and other documents, data, materials, or items related to national security.”


In April 2023 Chinese lawmakers passed a wide-ranging update to Beijing’s counter-espionage legislation banning the transfer of “all documents, data, materials, and items related to national security and interests” and broadening the definition of spying.[i] The amendments, as published in the excerpted statement from the Chinese government’s China.gov website, note that they will take effect on 1 July 2023. The amendments appear to target foreign information-gathering efforts, especially by limiting access to key government and economic data and expanding the range of legal definitions of espionage.[ii] Since the introduction of the legislation in 2014, Beijing has detained dozens of Chinese and foreign nationals on suspicion of espionage.[iii] Several high-profile incidents have emerged, including those involving an Australian journalist and former TV anchor; a Japanese executive; and even a U.S. citizen who has been detained in China since 2016 on charges of espionage related to research he published using open-source information that the Chinese government later deemed to be “state secrets.” Collectively, these incidents have brought attention to Beijing’s unclear definition of what constitutes “espionage.” Earlier this year, Chinese government raids on foreign firms conducting due diligence work in China further underscored the often-questionable lengths to which Beijing will go to control access to information that could be used for a variety of efforts that run counter to the Chinese Communist Party’s interests. [iv]


Source:

“中国人民共和国反间谍法 (People’s Republic of China’s Counter-Espionage Law),” China.gov (Official Website of the People’s Republic of China’s Central People’s Government), 27 April 2023. http://www.gov.cn/yaowen/2023-04/27/content_5753385.htm.

Article 4: “Acts of espionage” as used in this Law refers to the following conduct:

(1) Activities that endanger the national security of the People’s Republic of China that are carried out, prompted, or funded by an espionage organization and its agents, or carried out by agencies, organs, individuals, or other collaborators domestically or outside the PRC borders;

(2) Participation in an espionage organization or acceptance of tasks from an espionage organization and its agents, or seeking to align with an espionage organization and its agents;

(3) Activities carried out, instigated or funded by foreign institutions, organizations, and individuals other than espionage organizations and their representatives, or in which domestic institutions, organizations or individuals collude, to steal, pry into, purchase or illegally provide state secrets, intelligence, and other documents, data, materials, or items related to national security, or in which state employees are incited, enticed, coerced, or bought over to turn traitor.

(4) Network attacks, intrusions, obstructions, control, or disruptions targeting state organs, units involved with secrets, or critical information infrastructure, that are carried out, prompted, or funded by a espionage organization and its agents, or carried out by agencies, organs, individuals, or other collaborators domestically or outside the PRC borders;

(5) indicating targets for enemies;

(6) conducting other espionage activities.

This law applies where espionage organizations and their agents engage in espionage activities targeting a third country within the territory of the People’s Republic of China or using citizens, organizations, or other conditions of the PRC, endangering the PRC’s national security.

Article 14: No individual or organization may unlawfully obtain or possess any documents, data, materials or items that are state secrets.


Notes:

[i] For an English-language translation of the Counter-Espionage Law, see: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/counter-espionage-law-2023/

[ii] For a detailed analysis of China’s Counter-Espionage Law and the new amendments, see: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/bad-as-it-ever-was-notes-on-the-espionage-law/

[iii] The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) has determined many foreign citizens, including U.S. citizens, have been denied due process rights and that they are arbitrarily detained in violation of international law. In March 2023, China’s Foreign Ministry released a report accusing the United States of arbitrary detention of individuals at home and abroad one month prior to releasing its amendments to its counter-espionage legislation. See: “The United States’ Arbitrary Detention at Home and Abroad: Truth and Facts,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 29 March 2023,  https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202303/t20230329_11050809.html

[iv] In addition to due diligence firms, Beijing has blocked access to the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), China’s largest academic database, in an effort that analysts assess is aimed at limiting foreign researchers’ access to public discourse and government data. For more on Beijing’s restriction of access to CNKI, see: Lin Yang, “China to Limit Access to Largest Academic Database,” Voice of America, 30 March 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-to-limit-access-to-largest-academic-database-/7029581.html


Iran Unveils New Thermobaric Warhead

An Iranian Fajr-5 rocket launch, February 6, 2017

An Iranian Fajr-5 rocket launch, February 6, 2017.


“Fajr-5 missiles…are now equipped with a new warhead with greater destructive power.”


Iran has long been an indigenously equipped military power,[i] and the Iranian press seemingly announces new weapons every few weeks. However, these announcements are often exaggerations As not every prototype makes it into the arsenals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or the regular army. Those that do are apparent on the battlefield and across the broader region: Mohajer[GRLCUT(1]  and Ababil [GRLCUT(2] drones,[ii] Moudge-class destroyers, and Fateh-110 [RG3] and Fajr-5 missiles, for example. The Fajr-5 missile is an IRGC staple, which[iii] Tehran has acknowledged giving to U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups. In 2012, a Fajr-5 fired by Hamas hit on an apartment building just outside Tel Aviv.  It is against this backdrop that reports like the accompanying article from IRGC news affiliate Tasnim News Agency, about a new, upgraded warhead for the Fajr-5 are notable. While Iranian press discussion focuses on the thermobaric warhead’s potential for Iran’s own counterterror fight, presumably against Kurdish and Baluchi separatists (respectively located in the country’s rugged northwest and southeast border regions), regional states and actors should assume that the IRGC will not limit a new thermobaric warhead solely to use in its domestic arsenal. Discussion of warhead stability also implies safer shipping and handling by groups less well-trained than the Iranian military. Should reports about the thermobaric warhead be accurate, a greater blast radius like that produced by the new thermobaric warhead, especially when fired against urban targets, will increase damage and lower the threshold for retaliation.


Source:

“Roketha-ye Fajr-5 Sepah Termobaric Shod (Revolutionary Guards’ Fajr-5 Rockets are now Thermobaric),” Tasnim News Agency (news agency affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 8 May 2023. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/02/17/2887806

…The test of the new type of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’s Fajr-5 rocket equipped with thermobaric warhead has been successfully completed. The IRGC’s 333-mm Fajr-5 missiles, which had previously been delivered to the force as the Fajr-5C rocket, are now equipped with a new warhead with greater destructive power. This new warhead, produced by specialists of the IRGC’s Ground Force’s Self-Sufficiency Research and Jihad, has an explosive power of 1.5 times that of TNT, resulting in a greater radius of destruction and thermal effects. In addition, its lower sensitivity compared with TNT makes it safer to use than conventional warheads.

…When this type of ammunition explodes in the indoor space of underground bunkers or trenches, its destructive pressure stays in the shelter’s enclosed space for longer and causes more destruction, and thus is an efficient weapon for clearing fortifications and trenches….This new type of combat head for these rockets, due to their specific type of performance, is also a suitable weapon to deal with terrorist groups, especially in mountainous and difficult areas because these groups create shelters and strongholds in these areas using natural effects or engineering measures.


Notes:

[i] While many of Iran’s neighbors purchase off-the-shelf platforms and weaponry from the global arms market, the isolation Iran suffered during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War changed Iran’s strategic doctrine to favor production rather than acquisition of armaments. For more information, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Domestic Weapons Production Up 69 Percent,” OE Watch, March 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195239/download

[ii] For previous reporting on Fajr-5 development, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: IRGC Debuts New Explosive Plant,” OE Watch, July 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195435

[iii] For background, see: Michael Rubin, “A Short History of the Iranian Drone Program,” American Enterprise Institute, 26 August 2020. https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/a-short-history-of-the-iranian-drone-program/


Image Information:

Image: An Iranian Fajr-5 rocket launch, February 6, 2017
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1395/11/18/139511181130493069920644.jpg
Attribution: Tasnim News Agency

Russia Concerned About Dependence on Chinese Technology

President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.

President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.


Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology…”


Over the past decade, as the Kremlin leadership has touted and celebrated its growing ties to China as it has sought to distance itself from the West. This turn toward Beijing accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Western governments imposed additional sanctions and many Western firms departed. As the first excerpt from Russian television channel ORT describes, during President Xi’s visit to Moscow in March, there was talk of a comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation. Having only just recently been labeled as a war criminal by the Hague, the Chinese leader’s decision to make his first foreign visit since the onset of COVID-19 speaks volumes regarding his support for Putin. While political relations today are cordial, some in Russia are beginning to question their country’s growing economic and technological dependence upon China.[i] The second excerpt from Russian-language Turkish news service TRT captures this concern, which attributes it to Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. Not only are there security concerns regarding Russia’s dependence on this technology, but “Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security.”[ii] The article concludes by quoting statistics regarding the growth of Russian firms using “Chinese cybersecurity solutions,” growing from 5 percent in 2022 to nearly 60 percent today. Should the current trend continue, China will gain considerable leverage over Russian information processing.


Sources:

Pavel Matveev, “Завершился государственный визит председателя КНР Си Цзиньпина в Россию (Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Russia ends),” ORT (Russian Main TV Channel), 22 March 2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-03-22/449553-zavershilsya_gosudarstvennyy_vizit_predsedatelya_knr_si_tszinpina_v_rossiyu

The farewell ceremony took place at Vnukovo airport. State flags, anthems of the two countries, after which the Chinese leader followed the red carpet to his plane.

…A full program, many meetings and negotiations, as a result of which important documents were signed and a joint statement was published on deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction…. In particular, Russia will support Chinese business, which is replacing Western companies. Settlements between the two countries have already mostly switched to rubles and yuan….


“Российские чиновники опасаются растущей зависимости от Huawei (Russian officials wary of growing reliance on Huawei),” TRT (Turkish News Service in Russian), 20 April 2023. https://www.trtrussian.com/novosti/rossijskie-chinovniki-opasayutsya-rastushej-zavisimosti-ot-huawei-12905704

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology, as US and EU sanctions have barred Russian firms from accessing Western technology. Instead, the Russian Federation is forced to reorient itself to Chinese developments, in particular, to deliveries from Huawei….

…The document cited by the publication says: some high-ranking Russian officials are concerned that Chinese companies such as Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. may take a dominant position in the Russian market, thereby posing a risk to the information security of the country. …In a report compiled by the Ministry of Digital Development of the Russian Federation in the summer of 2022, microcircuits, network devices and electronics are highlighted as areas of particular vulnerability.

…In addition to fears of growing dependence, Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security…

…As TRT previously wrote in Russian, more than half of companies in Russia plan to switch to Chinese equipment in the field of cybersecurity after European and American manufacturers leave the Russian market.The Russian newspaper Kommersant, citing a survey by K2Tech integrator, notes that until 2022, only 5% of Russian companies used Chinese cybersecurity solutions. Now 60% of companies have switched to them or are planning to switch to them to replace the products of departed Western players – Cisco, Palo Alto, etc….


Notes:

[i] This concern has been growing for the past several years. For additional background, see: Ray Finch, “Russia-China: Potential Allies or Adversaries?,” OE Watch, November 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/340594

[ii] The Kremlin has been careful not to publicize information regarding unfair Chinese business practices and espionage to protect the warming relationship between the two countries.  For some relatively recent background, see: Ray Finch, “Russian Concerns over Chinese Espionage,” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/379981


Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.
Source: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60669/photos
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Russia Strengthens Its Military Presence in Central Asia

 201st Military Base.

201st Military Base.


“Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.”


Russia’s military bases in Central Asia have always been important to its strategic goals in the region, particularly for dealing with potential instability in Afghanistan. While the Russian government initially accepted U.S. airbases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan beginning in 2001 to support operations in Afghanistan, it later pressed both governments to evict U.S. forces. The United States left the Kharshi-Khanbad airbase (known as K2) in Uzbekistan in 2005[i] and left the Transit Center at Manas in Kyrgyzstan in 2014. Russian officials have claimed that U.S. security cooperation with Central Asian states in the 2000s took place as part of an effort to establish permanent military bases in the region, though the United States has not used a regional military facility since it left Manas.

The accompanying excerpted article from Kyrgyzstan’s independent news website Kloop reports on a statement by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on 28 April 2023 in New Delhi, India about increasing the combat readiness of Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Shoigu noted that Russia made this decision to increase combat readiness because the United States is trying “to restore its military presence in Central Asia…under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism.” However, the article also notes that Shoigu did not offer facts to substantiate this this claim. When Russian officials announced measures to strengthen its military bases in Central Asia in the past, they noted specific increases in capabilities, like the transfer of S-300 [RG1] air defense systems to Tajikistan in 2019.[ii] Shoigu also stated that requests from members of the SCO to host military facilities is a “direct threat to stability in the SCO space.” Shoigu did not mention which SCO member would potentially host the U.S. military, but SCO members in Central Asia include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. There have been no reports that any of the three have been negotiating to host U.S. forces, but Shoigu is warning fellow SCO members that Russia will consider hosting the United States as a threat. The article also usefully provides a reminder of the current Russian military bases in Central Asia. These include the Kant airbase outside Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the 201st Russian military base, home of the 201st Motor Rifle Division, in Tajikistan, the latter of which is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The article ends by noting that Ukraine claimed it destroyed a tactical group from the 201st military base last year, though this has not been verified. While Russia claims it is strengthening its bases in Central Asia as a measure to maintain its presence in the region, without any specific information on how this will take place, it is possible that Russia is doing this to replace losses of the of the 201st in Tajikistan suffered in Ukraine.


Source:

Munduzbek Kalykov, “Шойгу: Россия повышает боеготовность своих военных баз в Кыргызстане и Таджикистане (Shoigu: Russia will increase the combat readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan),” Kloop (an independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 29 April 2023. https://kloop.kg/blog/2023/04/29/shojgu-rossiya-povyshaet-boegotovnost-svoih-voennyh-baz-v-kyrgyzstane-i-tadzhikistane/

Russia decided to increase the readiness of its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan because of “US attempts to restore its military presence in Central Asia.” This was stated by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu as reported by RIA Novosti.

According to Shoigu, “the United States and its allies, under the pretext of helping in the fight against terrorism, are trying to restore their military presence in Central Asia.” However, he did not provide specific facts.

“We regard requests to the countries of the region to deploy military infrastructure as a direct threat to stability in the SCO space…” Shoigu said on April 28 at meeting of defense ministers of the SCO member states in New Delhi.

A Russian military base has existed in Kyrgyzstan since the early 2000s. Its main forces are located in the small town of Kant, not far from Bishkek – these are Su-25 [RG1] attack aircraft and Mi-8 [RG2] helicopters. The Russian joint military base also includes a test site at Issyk-Kul, where Russian sailors test underwater torpedoes.

The 201st Russian military base is located in Tajikistan, and the garrison is deployed in the cities of Dushanbe and Bokhtar. This is Russia’s largest military facility outside its borders. The base includes motorized rifle artillery, reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile and other units, as well as an air group……in mid-April 2022, the Ukrainian army announced the destruction of the tactical group of the 201st Russian military base, which has a permanent deployment in Tajikistan…


Notes:

[i] The withdrawal of U.S. forces from K2 cannot be solely attributed to Russian pressure. In May 2005, the Uzbek military forcefully put down public demonstrations in the Ferghana Valley, killing numerous civilians and drawing the ire of the Bush administration regarding human rights. This began a diplomatic row between the United States and Uzbekistan, which resulted in an Uzbekistani demand that the United States leave the base within six months, eventually withdrawing from K2 in November 2005.

[ii] For more background on Russia’s transfers of S-300s to Tajikistan, see: Matthew Stein “Russia Transfers S-300s to Tajikistan,” OE Watch, December 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues


Image Information:

Image: 201st Military Base.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:201_military_base_09.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russian Defense Ministry Approves Five-Year Plan To Expand and Modernize Arctic Air Bases

In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).

In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).


“Rogachevo air base is located some 10 kilometers northeast of Belushaya Guba, the main military settlement on Novaya Zemlya.  The airport serves other facilities on the archipelago with helicopters, such as the main testing area of nuclear weapons near the Matochkin Strait.  After modernization, the airfield will be able to base all types of aircraft, including long-range bombers.”


Russia is expanding its ability to maintain and launch military aircraft within its Arctic territories, possibly due to increased NATO naval exercises in the North Sea over the past three years. According to the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the Russian military is modernizing both Rogachevo air base on Novaya Zemla and Nagurskoye air base on Franz Josef Land. As the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates, Russia’s long-range bombers are a dual threat as they also serve as cruise missile launchers. Russian cruise missiles have significant range, and recent attacks on Ukrainian targets launched from military aircraft in the Caspian Sea are a poignant indication of the strategic value Russia stands to gain from these expanded and modernized Arctic bases.


Source:

Thomas Nilsen, “Further expansion for Novaya Zemlya air base aims to serve long-range bombers,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 17 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/further-expansion-novaya-zemlya-airport-aims-serve-long-range-bombers

Rogachevo airfield is already upgraded to serve MiG-31 and Su-33 fighter jets.  Such aircraft have since 2020 served the Arctic airport on a rotational basis from their airports on the Kola Peninsula. The new plans include special buildings for basing aircraft equipment and new houses for the military servicemen and their families.

Rogachevo air base is located some 10 kilometers northeast of Belushaya Guba, the main military settlement on Novaya Zemlya. The airport serves other facilities on the archipelago with helicopters, such as the main testing area of nuclear weapons near the Matochkin Strait.  After modernization, the airfield will be able to base all types of aircraft, including long-range bombers, according to the plans reported by Izvestia. Today’s runway is 2,400 meters, likely too short for Russia’s long-range bombers like the Tu-95 [RG1] and Tu-160 [RG2] .At the Nagurskoye base on Franz Josef Land, work is underway to extend the runway to nearly 3,600 meters. The Russian Air Force has over the last years significantly stepped up its presence in the Arctic.


Image Information:

Image: In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:InterceptionOfMissile2018-11.jpg
Attribution: CCA x 4.0 International

Russian Domestic Support for Ukraine Invasion Weakens as Fighters Return Home

President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.

President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.


The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.”


According to the excerpted article from official Kremlin news outlet Parliamentskaya Gazeta, during the Victory Day celebration on 9 May, President Putin declared “all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine.” Despite some skepticism of such claims, indeed, most indicators suggest that Russian civil society support for the invasion has remained high over time.[i] Some of this robust domestic support stems from the Kremlin’s control over the country’s major media, which has over the past 15 months asserted that Russian soldiers are protecting their country against a quasi-Ukrainian/Nazi threat (supported by the US and NATO).[ii] Alongside the 24/7 propaganda, the Kremlin has also enacted legislation that severely punishes any attempt to protest Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[iii] Nevertheless, despite the Kremlin’s tight control over the narrative, there are growing indications that some Russians are beginning to question the costs behind this conflict, and possibly, their support.

The second excerpt from a regional source in Krasnodar, 93.RU, describes the brutal kidnapping and murder of two local residents by three ex-convicts. The victims’ car had broken down, and after offering to help, the criminals forced them to withdraw money from the bank and then murdered them. The source suggests that these ex-convicts may have recently gained their freedom from prison by volunteering to fight with the Wagner private military company in Ukraine. One of them had been sentenced to 16 years in prison in 2016 for a similar murder, and the article questions how he could have been released so soon. Since “discrediting” the military is now a serious offense in Russia, the author of the article couches the assertion that these ex-convicts had been released from prison by volunteering to fight in Ukraine in vague terms. However, anonymous reader comments to this article are more forthright, pointing out that once these convicts had spent six months fighting in Ukraine, they were now free to return to former criminal habits. Another reader warns that “now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.” These comments suggest that the blowback from using convicted criminals as soldiers could reduce Russian domestic support for fighting in Ukraine.


Sources:

Anton Grebennikov, “Президент: Вся страна сплотилась для поддержки участников спецоперации (President: The whole country rallied to support the participants of the special operation),” Parliamentskaya Gazeta (official Kremlin site), 9 May 2023. https://www.pnp.ru/politics/prezident-vsya-strana-splotilas-dlya-podderzhki-uchastnikov-specoperacii.html

Today, all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine. The country is proud of its heroes, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during the Victory Day Parade on Red Square…. “There is no more important thing now than your combat work. Today, the security of the country rests on you, the future of our statehood and our people depends on you, you honorably fulfill your military duty – you fight for Russia. Your families, children, friends are behind you, they are waiting for you,” RIA Novosti quotes the president….


Valeria Dulskaya, “Верили до последнего. Кто и зачем убил аниматоров на кубанской трассе (They believed until the very end. Who and why killed the animators on the Kuban highway),” 93.RU (Krasnodar News Site), 4 May 2023. https://93.ru/text/incidents/2023/05/04/72274256/

On the evening of April 28, animators Kirill Chubko and Tatyana Mostyko disappeared on the highway near the village of Berezanskaya in the Krasnodar Territory, who were driving home from work. They broke the wheel, and after some time they stopped communicating. Two days after the disappearance, Kirill’s car was found burned in the forest. More than 180,000 rubles disappeared from the accounts of the animators – they were withdrawn at night from different ATMs. Officers later arrested three suspects….

Unfortunately, that evening it became known that the animators were dead. On the morning of May 3, police reported that they had detained three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatiana. They were 31-year-old Demyan Kevorkyan from Krasnodar, 30-year-old Anatoly Dvoinikov from the Tikhoretsky district and 45-year-old Aram Tatosyan from the Apsheron district.

According to investigators, near the village of Berezanskaya, the alleged criminals noticed Kirill and Tatiana standing on the road on the road. The men decided to kill them in order to steal money and other valuables. They attacked the animators, took away their cards, “gaining access to the possibility of conducting banking operations on them.” Then the suspects withdrew more than 180 thousand rubles from several ATMs. Taking the money, the men killed Cyril and Tatyana. To hide the crime, they burned their car and hid the bodies, the press service of the regional Investigative Committee reported….

On May 3, the Investigative Committee announced the arrest of three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatyana – Demyan Kevorkyan, Anatoly Dvoinikov and Aram Tatosyan. According to the Russian Investigative Committee, all three had previous convictions…. The media suggest that they participated in the SMO, but there is no official confirmation of this.

Reader Comments:

One convict, who in 2016 was sentenced to 18 years for a similar murder, teleported out of the colony in some completely unknown way and killed the victims.

The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.I don’t understand either, they gave him 18 years and he is free. Everything goes according to plan…


Notes:

[i] Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?,” Atlantic Council, 2 May 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine/#:~:text=The%20Levada%20Center%2C%20which%20is,public%20backing%20of%20over%2070%25

[ii] For additional background on how the Kremlin has used the media to generate support for its policies, see” Ray Finch, CHAPTER 6. THE MOBILIZATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 1 September 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20098.10

[iii]Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian media space had become tightly controlled, especially on matters dealing with national security. For a brief snapshot on some of these restrictive measures, see: Ray Finch, “More Restrictions on Defense Information,” OE Watch, October 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376377; “Russia Moves Forward with New Restrictions on Military Reporting,” OE Watch, November, 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/397980


Image Information:

Image: President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.
Source: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/photos/big2x/EONAWWmXRIkYHMVEZf8vmNhVq99RsGK3.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Regional Analyst Questions Effectiveness, Sustainability of Russian Missile Strikes in Ukraine

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.


“Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.”


Although the intensity of Russian missile strikes against Ukraine increased from March and April 2023 to May 2023, the somewhat limited nature of the strikes may be an indication that Russia is running into a supply problem that could have a strategic impact on its ambitions in Ukraine and its ability to sell weapons on the international arms market. According to the recent accompanying article from Republic of Georgia-based Resonance Daily, which monitors the war in Ukraine and Russian military affairs in general, Russia may be squandering its missile stockpile in a somewhat piecemeal effort to break or find a weakness in Ukraine’s missile defense that it cannot currently exploit. From the perspective of the Georgian defense analyst quoted in the article, “Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.” This, the analyst points out, is due to Russia’s inability to achieve any breakthroughs in the ground war. The article, published in the wake of a barrage of Russian missile and drone strikes on Kyiv on 16 May, underscores that Russia is thought to possess only 80 Kinzhal (dagger) hypersonic missiles, and that Ukrainian missile defenses destroyed one “dagger” on 6 May and six more on 16 May. Accordingly, it asserts, Russia now likely has 73 “daggers” in its arsenal. Collectively, these developments suggest that the Kinzhal [RG1] , as well as other missiles in Russia’s arsenal, are quickly becoming a finite resource due to attrition and sanctions, the latter of which makes it much more difficult to manufacture more of these weapons.[i] If the estimations of Russia’s stockpiles are correct, and current sanctions hold, Russia will not be able to replenish its stockpiles in any meaningful way in the near future. As a result, Russia does not possess weapon systems in sufficient numbers to allow it to strike Ukraine with enough salvos to overwhelm Ukrainian missile defense. Moreover, Moscow will be severely impacted in its ability to wage war on any front, threatening its positions in Ukraine and Syria, as well as curtailing its ambitions elsewhere.


Source:

Tamta Chachanidze, “ყველაზე მასირებული სარაკეტო დარტყმა კიევზე და „სათაგური“ ბახმუტში – ბოლო ცნობები ფრონტიდან (The most massive missile attack on Kiev and the “keystone” in Bakhmut – latest news from the front),” Resonance Daily (Georgia based media outlet focused on foreign affairs)16 May 2023. http://www.resonancedaily.com/mobile/index.php?id_rub=8&id_artc=181367&fbclid=IwAR39bK06tvFq8JAzCvR9QhAJVVqUvU3uFI4iITkgHFPXru72jkKrz5f4yQQ

On May 16, Russia launched the most massive three-hour missile attack on Kiev in the history of war. Aeroballistic missiles of the “Kinjali” type were also used. According to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the air defense forces of the country neutralized all the missiles. The Russian side claims the opposite – that with one “Kinjali” the Ukrainians destroyed the air defense system “Patriot”….

From the footage spread on social networks, it can be seen that there were indeed fires in Kyiv after the May 16 rocket attack, however, according to the administration of the capital city, it was caused by the fragments of the downed rockets. According to military analysts, the Russians are already trying to force Ukraine to make some kind of concession with intense air strikes. Or is this a new strategy to “somehow look ugly” to the Western anti-aircraft systems transferred to Ukraine.

They also do not rule out that “Kinjal” was hit by “Patriot”, because there is no such thing as 100% and ideal air defense, and “one or two missiles will defeat even the best air defense”.

At dawn on May 16, the Russians launched the most massive missile attack on Kiev in the last year, which lasted more than three hours….

According to Valery Zaluzhn, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the early hours of May 16, the Russian occupation forces attacked Ukraine from the northern, southern and eastern directions with 18 missiles. According to him, the opponent used 6 aeroballistic missiles “Kinjali”, 9 missiles “Calibre [RG1] ” from naval bases and 3 ground missiles “Iskander [RG2] “. Air defense forces destroyed all 18 missiles.

Several buildings and vehicles were damaged in different districts of Kyiv. 3 people were injured. According to Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko, it was caused by debris from Russian missiles. However, the Russian side claims otherwise.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, on May 16, a “Patriot” air defense system was destroyed with a “Kinjali” missile. In addition, according to the agency, “high-precision weapons struck warehouses of Ukrainian ammunition and weapons, which the West supplied to Kyiv”.

On the same day the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that, “Russian air defense systems shot down seven Storm Shadow [GRLCUT(3] long-range cruise missiles recently handed over to Ukraine by Britain, the same number of Hymars shells, as well as three Harm-type radar-detecting missiles. In addition, 22 Ukrainian planes were destroyed in Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine responded to the deadly attack on Kiev and thanked the Air Force of Ukraine for its work and impressive results. “The next incredible success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine! Last night, our sky defenders shot down six Russian hypersonic ‘Daggers’ and 12 more missiles,” Reznikov wrote on Twitter.

In addition, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine wrote an arithmetic equation: “80-1-6=X”, implying the total number of “Kinjali” missiles possessed by Russia to be only 80. On May 6, the Ukrainians destroyed 1 and 6 additional “daggers” on May 16. Accordingly, the Russians now likely have 73 “daggers” in their arsenal.

Colonel Lasha Beridze states to Resonance Daily that the Russians no longer have the resources of a ground attack and are now trying to compensate for this with air strikes.

“Russia no longer has options for a ground attack. They understand very well that they will not be able to defend themselves for a long time, and that is why they are already trying to take Ukraine to some kind of favorable concession with such airstrikes, or it is simply a punitive operation.

“Ukraine already has “Patriot” systems that can fight with “Kinjals” and quite successfully. It has been neglected many times already. Even the best air defense will be hit by one or two missiles, there is no such thing as perfect. Many developed countries could not withstand airstrikes like Ukraine.

“The Ukrainians are successfully repelling the attacks, and as time goes by, these air defense capabilities will increase.

“At the end of the day, Russian armaments with Western technologies have no chance to win and turn the battlefield in their favor. It seems they will increase their airstrikes if they have the chance. However, no matter how they increase missile strikes, there are all indications that they will not be able to increase its effectiveness. Don’t get angry and the “daggers” will come out”, said Lasha Beridze to “Resonance”.

Caucasus International University professor and military analyst Vakhtang Maisaya told “Resonance” that massed strikes have become a common strategy of the Russians, which may be aimed at disrupting the existing anti-aircraft systems in Ukraine.“It seems that this is already a kind of strategy of the Russians, when they try to break through the anti-missile defense, which is very effective, and they increase the intensity to somehow find a loophole in these systems and break through them. When the Ukrainians started intercepting missiles, the Russians now switched to intensive strikes,” Maisaya said.


Notes:

[i] Missiles are not the only Russian weapon system to be in short supply. The number of Russian aircraft are also being diminished. For insight regarding the limited number of Su-35 fighter bombers, see: “Russia’s Su-35: Are Its Military Aircraft Exports Headed for a Fall?,” The Rand Blog, 20 October 2022. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/10/russias-su-35-are-its-military-aircraft-exports-headed.html


Image Information:

Image: Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K [RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2018_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_66.jpg
Attribution: Kremlin.ru, CCA 4.0 International