Category Archives: OE Watch

Azerbaijan Protests India’s Delivery of Weapons to Armenia

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Hikmat Hajiyev has been the Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Azerbaijan since 2018.

“But the fact remains that today Armenia, even if it wants to, will not be able to transfer these weapons to the remnants of the so-called regime in Karabakh.”

For years, Armenia has watched its adversary, Azerbaijan, receive weapons from Turkey, Russia, and Israel. Armenia has a smaller defense budget than Azerbaijan’s, and thus, has not been able to match the same level of acquisitions, notably, contracting for an export version of Russia’s Iskander ballistic missile system in 2016.[i]

However, despite these challenges, according to the first excerpted article from the Azerbaijani news agency Trend, Armenia received an unnamed weapon system from India in late July 2023. The article also mentions a $400 million contract between India and Armenia signed this past year providing Armenia with the Pinaka multiple rocket launcher, 155 mm artillery systems, anti-tank rockets, and unknown quantities of ammunition.[ii] The second excerpted article from the Azerbaijani news website Caliber reports that the Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan – Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration, Hikmet Hajiyev, met with India’s ambassador to discuss his concerns about the increasing military cooperation between India and Armenia. Hajiyev noted that India’s cooperation with Armenia comes as Azerbaijan and Armenia are negotiating a peace agreement and that the delivery of new weapons aggravates the situation. The article notes that India’s ambassador would relay the message to Armenia, but that the meeting was unlikely to have a major impact. While Azerbaijan has fair relations with India, it has better relations with Pakistan, including an increasing level of security cooperation in recent years.[iii] Ultimately, the delivery of weapons to Armenia could lead Azerbaijan to deepen its relationship with Pakistan.

Sources:

Takhmaz Asadov, “Из Индии в Армению везут оружие – кто хочет накалить ситуацию в регионе? (Weapons are being delivered from India to Armenia – who wants to heat up the situation in the region?),” Trend (news agency in Azerbaijan), 26 July 2023. https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3777500.html

The movement of a vehicle column from the border checkpoint Nurduz (Iran) to Armenia was recorded. According to the spread footage, it can be seen that the cargo being transported is covered with an awning so that the destination of the cargo remains unknown. However, it is clear that the cargo transported from Iran to Armenia is for military purposes and has already been delivered to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.

As for the consignor of the cargo, this is India, with which Armenia has recently been rapidly increasing military-technical cooperation. It is known only from open sources in the media that a military contract worth more than 400 million US dollars has been signed between Armenia and India…

“Индия разжигает огонь на Южном Кавказе (India is stoking a fire in the South Caucasus),” Caliber (news website from Azerbaijan), 26 July 2023.https://caliber.az/en/post/180998/

On July 26, Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan – Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration Hikmet Hajiyev met with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India to our country Sridharan Madhusudhanan.

At the meeting, Hikmet Hajiyev noted that the Azerbaijani side is concerned about the deepening of military cooperation between Armenia and India, in particular, the photos and videos circulated in the media in recent days about the transportation of Indian-made weapons systems through Iran to Armenia…

Hikmet Hajiyev stressed that the supply of weapons by India to Armenia, at a time when Azerbaijan is negotiating a peace agreement with this country, serves to militarize Armenia and aggravate the situation, hinder the establishment of lasting peace and security in the South Caucasus region…The Indian Ambassador assured that he would inform official Delhi about the issue raised by Azerbaijan, noted the importance of dialogue between the two countries to discuss issues of concern in bilateral relations…

Notes:

[i] The export version of Iskander missile system does not have as long of a range as the version Russia uses, but it has many of the same capabilities. For background on Armenia’s acquisition of it, see: Matthew Stein “Armenia’s Acquisition of the Iskander Ballistic Missile System,” OE Watch, November 2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

[ii] For more information on Armenia’s acquisitions from India, see: Matthew Stein “Armenia Acquires Indian Multiple Rocket Launcher System Amid Delays in Russian Deliveries,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/armenia-acquires-indian-multiple-rocket-launcher-system-amid-delays-in-russian-deliveries/

 [iii] Security cooperation between Azerbaijan and Pakistan has been increasing for the past several years, see: Matthew Stein “Pakistan Providing Border Security Assistance to Azerbaijan,” OE Watch, October 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Hikmat Hajiyev has been the Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Azerbaijan since 2018.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hikmat_Hajiyev_via_VOA_(cropped).png
Attribution: Public domain

West African States Split on Potential Intervention in Niger

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Mohamed Bazoum, the former president of Niger, was deposed by a military junta in July 2023.

“Senegal, Benin, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire have said they are ready to send troops, but face internal criticism and hesitation from other West African countries.”

The overthrow of the civilian government in Niger has prompted talk of military intervention by the standby force of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to restore deposed president Mohamed Bazoum to power. Those threats by the leader of ECOWAS, Nigerian President Bola, have led to ruptures in the African international order.

On one side are those West African states that showed some support for the proposed intervention. These tended to be the region’s more democratic and pro-Western states. Nigeria, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin have all said at one time or another that they would commit troops, according to the first article from AfricaNews. The article also notes that Niger recalled its ambassador from Abidjan in protest in the aftermath of Côte d’Ivoire’s announcement of its intent to contribute forces.

On the other side are those West African states which, because of their own domestic makeup, have sided with the military junta in Niger and refused to participate in any ECOWAS intervention. As per the second article from AllAfrica.com, the most prominent among these are Burkina Faso and Mali, both of which are ruled by military juntas that came into power under-girded by anti-French, pro-Russian[i] discourse. Flatly rejecting intervention, they expressed that they would instead send a joint delegation to Niger “in solidarity” with the Nigerien junta. The article also underscores that non-ECOWAS members Chad and Algeria, both of which share borders with Niger, assured Niger that they would not participate. Thus, of the seven countries that border Niger, four have said that they would not support intervention (Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Algeria), two stated that they would (Nigeria and Benin), with the seventh, Libya, not having made a clear statement so far of its stance on intervention. Despite the different positions on possible ECOWAS intervention, some broad threads do run through the region. All current, non-suspended ECOWAS members (which excludes Mali and Burkina Faso) have condemned the overthrow and encouraged mediation, even if they do not support military intervention. Broad agreement exists outside of ECOWAS too: such a military intervention poses great risks to the security of the broader West African region, with a significant risk of leading to a region-wide war.

Sources:

“Les militaires rappellent l’ambassadeur du Niger en Côte d’Ivoire, (Military junta recalls Nigerien Ambassador from Ivory Coast), AfricaNews.com. 15 August 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/08/15/les-militaires-rappellent-lambassadeur-du-niger-en-cote-divoire/

The coup leaders recalled the Nigerien envoy in Abidjan on Monday (Aug. 14) after remarks by Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara.

On his return from a summit of the ECOWAS August 10, Ouattara said the heads of state had agreed a military operation should “start as soon as possible”…

“Far from being the expression of the will of the brotherly Ivorian people, whose friendship with the people of Niger is unequivocal, this unusual declaration by President Ouattara and his eagerness to carry out an aggression against Niger which is in every way illegal and senseless, reflects in reality an order addressed to him and certain of his peers in the ECOWAS by other external powers, with the aim of preserving interests that no longer match those of today’s Niger.”…

Senegal, Benin, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire have said they are ready to send troops, but face internal criticism and hesitation from other West African countries.

Mimi Mefo Takambou, “Burkina Faso: Mali and Burkina Faso Send Joint Delegation to Niamey ‘In Solidarity’ With Niger,” AllAfrica.com, 11 August 2023.https://allafrica.com/stories/202308070483.html 

Mali and Burkina Faso will send a joint official delegation to coup-hit Niger on Monday in a show of “solidarity” between the nations – all of whom are ruled by juntas. Meanwhile a source close to regional bloc Ecowas said an immediate military intervention to restore Niger’s toppled president was not on the cards.

The delegation, announced by the Malian army, is expected to arrive in Niger on Monday, according to Niger’s foreign ministry.

The country’s coup leaders defied a Sunday deadline from the West African bloc Ecowas to reinstate democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum or face possible military action.Algeria and Chad, which are not part of Ecowas but share borders with Niger, have both stated they will not participate in any military operation.”

Notes:

[i] For more on Burkina Faso’s relationship with Wagner and Russia, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Mohamed Bazoum, the former president of Niger, was deposed by a military junta in July 2023.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/Bazoum_mhamed.jpg
Attribution: BY-SA 4.0

Anti-French Sentiment Undergirds Overthrow of Nigerien Government

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Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa and was a prominent discourse in the recent Nigerian military takeover.

“Events of an extreme gravity are unfolding in Niger as a result of the behavior of the French forces and their accomplices.”

France, and the West more generally, appear to have lost one of their last, and most consistent, West African counterterrorism allies with the ouster of Nigerien President Mohammad Bazoum on 26 July by Abdourahamane Tiani, the former leader of Niger’s presidential guard. Like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, all of which have been taken over by military juntas over the past several years,[i] Niger’s new military government has thus far painted France, and its lackluster counterterrorism and development efforts, as to blame for Niger’s woes.

As per the accompanying article from the pan-African news aggregator Africanews.fr, the military junta spokesman, COL Amadou Abdramane, has claimed France was orchestrating a concerted effort to undermine the new leadership by releasing 16 terrorists and violating Nigerien airspace. According to junta statements, “Events of an extreme gravity are unfolding in Niger as a result of the behavior of the French forces and their accomplices,” and “we are witnessing a real plan of destabilization of our country, orchestrated by French forces.” France has denied the claims. These sentiments echo previous assertions by senior officials in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, all claiming that France was funding or supporting terrorists.[ii] [iii]

These more specific claims are in line with a broader ethos of anti-French sentiment that marked the overthrow in Niger. In the immediate aftermath of the takeover, thousands of protestors attacked the French Embassy in Niamey. As in Mali and Burkina Faso, protestors displayed signs depicting anti-French (“France kills in Niger”) and pro-Russian (“Down with France, vive Russia!”) sentiments. Translating this French antipathy into policy, on 4 August, the junta declared that it had formally annulled its security cooperation activities with France that were foundational to fighting Islamist insurgencies tied to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Simultaneously, it ceased the dissemination of French-funded broadcasters France 24 and RFI, following similar moves by Burkina Faso and Mali. Unless former president Bazoum is reinstalled, the takeover in Niger portends a loss of not only French but U.S. influence, especially in the counterterrorism space. If Mali and Burkina Faso provide any guide, it is reasonable to expect Niger’s new government to pursue a similarly populist, anti-French, pro-Russian—and likely pro-Wagner[iv]—path in coordination with other African military regimes.

Source:

“Niger: la junte accuse la France d’avoir “libéré des terroristes (Niger: junta accuses France of having liberated terrorists),” Africanews.fr (pan-African news aggregator), 8 August 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/08/09/niger-la-junte-accuse-la-france-davoir-libere-des-terroristes/

Niger’s new military rulers on Wednesday accused France, the country’s traditional ally, of having “unilaterally freed captured terrorists,” a term used for jihadists, and of breaching a ban on the country’s air space.

They claimed that France released a number of jihadists, who then gathered to plan an attack on “military positions in the tri-border area,” a hotspot region where the frontiers of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali converge.

“Events of an extreme gravity are unfolding in Niger as a result of the behaviour of the French forces and their accomplices,” according to the statement issued by the new regime, called the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP).

The statement reported that a unit of the armed forces had come under attack on Wednesday, although it did not directly link this with France’s alleged release of the jihadists.

A position held by the National Guard in a locality called Bourkou Bourkou, 30 kilometres (18 miles) from a gold mine at Samira in western Niger, came under attack at 6:30 am (0530 GMT), it said.

“At present, the toll is not yet known.”

The statement called on the security forces to “raise their alert level across the country” and on the public “to remain mobilised and vigilant.”

The regime also accused France of having allowed a “military plane” to take off Wednesday from neighbouring Chad, which then crossed into Niger, defying a ban imposed on Sunday.

The aircraft “deliberately cut off all contact with air traffic control on entering our air space,” from 6:39-11:15 am (0539-1015 GMT), it said in a statement read on national TV.

France has around 1,500 troops in Niger, supporting the country in its fight against jihadists who swept in from Mali in 2015.

But relations broke down after French ally President Mohamed Bazoum was toppled by members of his guard on July 26.

The regime’s accusations come on the eve of a summit by the West African regional bloc ECOWAS on how to tackle the Niger crisis.ECOWAS — the Economic Community of West African States — had given the coup leaders until Sunday to reinstate Bazoum or face the risk of military intervention.

Notes:

[i] For more on the relationship between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/; Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled By Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/west-african-states-ruled-by-military-leaders-seek-to-circumvent-future-sanctions/

[ii] For more information on claims that France is funding African terrorists, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171; Jason Warner, “CAR Joins Mali in Accusing France of Funding Terrorists,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/car-joins-mali-in-accusing-france-of-funding-terrorists/

[iii] For more information on the anti-French sentiments in the security sphere in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “French Researchers Respond to Wave of Anti-French Sentiment in Africa,” OE Watch,07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/french-researchers-respond-to-wave-of-anti-french-sentiment-in-africa/; Jason Warner, Lassane Ouedraogo, and Matthew Kirwin, “The Fake News Phenomenon in the Sahel: ‘Afrancaux News’ and the Postcolonial Logics of Polemical Information,” African Studies Review, 65 (4): December 2022, 911 – 938.

[iv] For more on how post-coup African states have begun to cooperate with the Wagner Group, see: Jason Warner, “Vast Majority of Malians Express Confidence in Russian Ability To Address Jihadist Violence,” OE Watch,06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/vast-majority-of-malians-express-confidence-in-russias-ability-to-address-jihadist-violence/; Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Anti-French sentiment has been spreading in francophone Africa and was a prominent discourse in the recent Nigerian military takeover.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Flag_(5089610330).jpg
Attribution: CC By 2.0

Cameroon Requests Nigeria and Chad Prevent Boko Haram Border Attacks

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Military vehicles of the BIR in Far Northern Cameroon 2019

“Officials in northern Cameroon have called on neighboring Chad and Nigeria to deploy additional troops to their border to counter attacks by the Islamist group.”

On 1 June, the French-language Cameroonian publication actucameroun.com reported on Cameroon’s call for its neighbors, Chad and Nigeria, to bolster troop deployments to their mutual border with Cameroon to stop attacks from Boko Haram. This came after Cameroon’s Far North region governor claimed hundreds of Boko Haram members infiltrated the Cameroonian border. According to the article, Cameroonian President Paul Biya responded to the escalating Boko Haram attacks along Cameroon’s Lake Chad shoreline by ordering an emergency meeting of military and government officials in the country’s north to develop strategies to prevent further Boko Haram incursions.

The article claims that Boko Haram attacks in northern Cameroon are increasing. The group abducted six civilians in Amchidé and shot and wounded another civilian. The attack resembled those of the late Abubakar Shekau’s faction, which is notorious for harassing civilians even more than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-affiliated faction.[i] History suggests attacks around Lake Chad will escalate without sufficient regional coordination to counter both factions.[ii][iii] The second excerpted article in Nigeria’s premiumtimes.ng reported on 18 August a promise from Public Information Officer of the Multinational Joint Task Force. This force includes Nigerian, Cameroonian, Chadian, and Nigerien troops and is based in N’djamena, Chad. The officer asserted that the force’s resolve to combat Boko Haram would be enduring.

Sources:

“Des responsables du nord du Cameroun auraient demandé à leur gouvernement et au Nigeria et au Tchad de déployer des troupes supplémentaires à leur frontière (Officials in northern Cameroon reportedly asked their government and Nigeria and Chad to deploy additional troops to their border),” actucameroun.com (French-language publication covering Cameroonian affairs from a neutral perspective), 1 June 2023. https://actucameroun.com/2023/06/01/des-responsables-du-nord-du-cameroun-auraient-demande-a-leur-gouvernement-et-au-nigeria-et-au-tchad-de-deployer-des-troupes-supplementaires-a-leur-frontiere/?_unique_id=64785f3f48c1b

As Boko Haram attacks intensify, we have learned that officials in northern Cameroon have called on neighboring Chad and Nigeria to deploy additional troops to their border to counter attacks by the Islamist group. The governor of the Far North region of Cameroon, which shares a border with Chad and Nigeria, revealed that hundreds of heavily armed radical Islamists infiltrated the dangerous Lake Chad Basin region and attacked, looted, and spread fear. 

President Paul Biya ordered officials and troops in Cameroon’s Far North region to hold an emergency crisis meeting and to ensure that the armed Islamist extremists infiltrating the troubled Lake Chad region are thwarted. 

In context of this security threat, we learn that the leaders of northern Cameroon do not intend to remain only at their border but have asked the neighboring countries, Nigeria and Chad, to also deploy men at their border in order to capture the terrorists.

“MNJTF Eliminates Boko Haram Fighters in Cameroon Axis,” 18 August 2023, premumtimes.ng (Abuja-based publication noted for investigative journalism that is critical of the government) https://prnigeria.com/2023/08/18/mnjtf-eliminates-boko/

On August 17, 2023, the troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Sector 1 in Cameroon successfully intercepted remnants of the Boko Haram terrorists who were scavenging for logistics in Hile Halifa on the fringes of Lake Chad, Far North Cameroon. This successful effort signifies another major setback for the terrorist group, which continues to threaten peace and stability in the regionThe MNJTF Sector 1 continues to strengthen its resolve in dismantling Boko Haram and restoring stability in the affected areas.

Notes:

[i] Perhaps no one spoke in more detail about Shekau’s harming civilians than his own rival subcommanders. They accused him of, among other brutalities, killing displaced persons who had no other way of finding food or shelter but to seek the support of “Christian” aid organizations and the government in refugee shelters and camps. However, Shekau considered this to be “apostasy.” In addition, Shekau ordered the killing of anyone who opposed him or even disagreed with him, which earned him—and Boko Haram more generally—a notorious reputation among the civilians of northeastern Nigeria. This caused the group to lose support to the consternation of Shekau’s less radical subcommanders. See Nur, Mamman, ‘Exposé: An Open Letter to Abubakar Shekau’, in Abdulbasit Kassim, and Michael Nwankpa (eds), The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to the Islamic State, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2018.

[ii] For more on regional cooperation to counter Boko Haram, see; Jacob Zenn, “Multinational Joint Task Force Lauds Counterterrorism Success Against Boko Haram,” OE Watch, 05-2023.  https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/multinational-joint-task-force-lauds-counterterrorism-success-against-boko-haram/    

[iii] The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is the entity through which Lake Chad states, including Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, have intended to boost their “capacity by better sharing plans and intelligence, committing troops for longer operations and improving troops’ human rights compliance.” However, these states have resisted fully integrating their forces into the MNJTF, which may have contributed to the MNJTF’s lack of capacity to eliminate or significantly reduce Boko Haram attacks or border incursions around Lake Chad. See International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?,” Report  #291, July 7, 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram

Image Information:

Image: Military vehicles of the BIR in Far Northern Cameroon 2019
Source: Moki Edwin Kindzeka (VOA), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Military_vehicles_of_the_BIR_in_Far_Northern_Cameroon_2019.jpg
Attribution: (CC x 2.0)

UN Assesses Core of Islamic State Stagnating, While Some Global Affiliates Thrive

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Flag of the Islamic State.

“Despite significant attrition of the Da’esh leadership and a reduction in activity in the core conflict zone, the risk of resurgence remain[s].”

The United Nations Monitoring Team has released a new report on the status of the Islamic State (IS) around the world. The report details member states’ efforts to combat the group’s core presence as well as the activities of IS affiliate branches around the world.

The report notes that despite the international cooperation against the Islamic State, its core group, based in Iraq and Syria, still has an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 fighters. The report notes IS attacks have slowed from the previous reporting period (the second half of 2022), though the group maintains a low-level insurgency, particularly taking advantage of the security vacuums along the Kurdistan border in Iraq. The report also underscores that IS core’s reserves of $25 to $50 million have dwindled significantly, though it continues to raise funds, most commonly via kidnapping for ransom. Notably, the report relays that continued counterterror pressure from states around the world has led IS to adopt an increasingly decentralized model of governance extending to IS’s global provinces. While no evidence exists to demonstrate these provinces are being commanded and controlled by IS central, “reporting shows that financial, propaganda and other connections remain.” The satellite provinces of the Islamic State remain a concern. The report assesses the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) to be “the most serious terrorist threat in Afghanistan and the wider region.” With fighters and their family members estimated at between 4,000 and 6,000 individuals, the report notes that IS-K has adopted increasingly sophisticated tactics aimed at demonstrating the Taliban’s inability to ensure security.[i] The IS continued to demonstrate its staying power in Africa,[ii] the world region most beset by jihadist terror.[iii] In the Sahel,[iv] the report notes that the IS-Sahel province, “had become increasingly autonomous and had played a significant role in the escalation of violence in the region,” though curiously, the report makes no mention of the largest IS branch in Africa, the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP). The report notes that an estimated 300 to 500 fighters still exist in southern Libya, and that UN member states have grown concerned about the presence of a strengthening IS presence in Sudan considering the country’s recent political turmoil.

Source:

United Nations Security Council, “Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat,” United Nations Security Council, 31 July 2023. https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2023%2F568&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

During the first half of 2023, the threat posed to international peace and security by Da’esh and its affiliates remained mostly high in conflict zones and low in non-conflict areas. However, the overall situation is dynamic, with notable subregional variation in activity. Leadership attrition, as well as counter-terrorism efforts by Member States in certain regions, continue to have an impact on Da’esh activities. Multilateral cooperation has remained essential to effectively responding to the threat, including through an integrated and balanced implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy…

Despite significant attrition of the Da’esh leadership and a reduction in activity in the core conflict zone, the risk of resurgence remained. The group has adapted its strategy, embedding itself with local populations, and has exercised caution in choosing battles that are likely to result in limited losses, while rebuilding and recruiting from camps in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic and from vulnerable communities, including in neighbouring countries…

The trend of counter-terrorist pressure prompting Da’esh to adopt less hierarchical and more networked, decentralized structures has continued, with operational autonomy in the affiliated groups. Member States have little evidence that the core leadership is exercising command and control of regional affiliates, although reporting shows that financial, propaganda and other connections remain…The group’s media apparatus leverages the operations of Da’esh affiliates in conflict zones in its propaganda efforts, reaching a wide audience, with the aim of radicalizing potential recruits, gaining support and inspiring attacks beyond conflict zones. While its previously well-developed external operations capability remained diminished and largely constrained, the ambition to reconstitute is clear. The situation in Afghanistan has become more complex, with increasing Member State concerns about the ability of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) (QDe.161) to project a threat both in the region and further afield…

Notes:

[i] For more on the UN’s critiques of the Taliban, see: Jason Warner, “Taliban Responds to UN Reports Claiming Taliban Rule Aids Terrorist Expansion,” OE Watch,07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/taliban-responds-to-un-reports-claiming-taliban-rule-aids-terrorist-expansion/

[ii] For more on the status of the Islamic State in Africa, see: Jason Warner, “UN Warns About Islamic State Surging in Africa and Afghanistan,” OE Watch,03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/un-warns-about-islamic-state-surging-in-africa-and-afghanistan/

[iii] For more on Africa as the new epicenter of global terrorism, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, With the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/global-terrorism-declined-slightly-in-2022-with-the-sahel-as-the-new-epicenter/; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/african-leaders-and-un-see-terrorism-in-the-sahel-as-dire/

[iv] For more on the status of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel and Sahara, see: Jason Warner, “Leader of Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian Branch, JNIM, Explains His Group’s Goals,” OE Watch,05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/leader-of-al-qaedas-sahelian-branch-explains-his-groups-goals/; Jason Warner, “Al-Qaeda Leader in Maghreb Celebrates French Departure, Claims No Plans To Attack French Homeland,” OE Watch,04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/al-qaeda-leader-in-maghreb-celebrates-french-departure-claims-no-plans-to-attack-french-homeland/

Image Information:

Image: Flag of the Islamic State. 
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/14690988398 
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

Iran’s Supreme Leader Warns of Declining Fervor of New Generation

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Seminary students listen to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 12 July 2023.

“One front is the Islamic system… The other front is the deceptive front that calls itself liberal democracy.”

Within the discourse of Iran’s top religious leadership, two interlinked themes regularly surface. First is concern about decreased fertility and second is unease with the younger generation’s declining fervor. In the excerpted speech published on his official website Khamenei.ir, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warns assembled Islamic seminary students and missionaries about declining fervor among the youth and the sources to which they turn for religious education.[i] While Khamenei has previously lamented the decline of the “culture of martyrdom” among Iran’s youth, the excerpted speech goes much further into his thinking about its cause.[ii] Khamenei recognizes that young Iranians learn more about religion from their parents than from the state. This is an acknowledgment that Iran’s earlier educational revolution as well as such organs as the Islamic Propagation Organization have failed. It also suggests that the problem is not only the youngest generation but their parents as well. While Khamenei continues to embrace the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and paramilitary Basij, his broader frustration at the youth signals a growing divergence between those with elite military service and the broader population whose experience might only be as conscripts fulfilling mandatory military service.

Khamenei further blames social media and apps for providing unvetted information. Ironically, he calls out Twitter (now ‘X’), a platform he himself uses. At issue for Khamenei is not just the fact that they might provide faulty information, but that they do so purposely. He suggests social media is not simply a platform upon which individuals might communicate organically, but rather that they are the tip of a vast conspiracy designed to wage ideological war on Iran. Such a belief conforms broadly with an intellectual trend that predates the Islamic Revolution. This is best encapsulated by the late Iranian novelist Jalal Al-e Ahmed who, in 1962, published Occidentosis: A Plague from the West that critiqued Western technology and its impact on Iran. Revolutionary Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini himself seemed to build on Occidentosis (sometimes translated from Gharbzadegi as ‘Westoxification’) by suggesting that the antidote must be his vision of Shia Islam. Khamenei’s speech provides further insight into the intellectual and cultural battle in which he believes Iran now finds itself. He defines two fronts: Western liberalism and the Islamic system, and argues liberalism is both hypocritical and corrupt. Given his position at the helm of the Iranian regime and above that of any elected official, his castigation of liberalism signals very limited tolerance for those seeking to reform or democratize the Iranian regime.

Source:

“Biyanat dar Didar Mobleghin va Talab-e Hawzehha-ye ‘Ilmeah Saresar Keshvar” (Statement to a gathering of seminary students and missionaries from across the country),” Khamenei.ir (official website of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), 12 July 2023.

Parents teach many things to their children. Many of our people, perhaps even the majority, have gained their information and knowledge about religion from the words and behavior of their parents. Their voices have become weak today. In the commotion caused by the media pluralism, this voice has been drowned out….

In the past, we would counsel the youth and warn them to stay away from bad friends and companions. Now such bad companions are there right inside their pockets! They have a screen of bad companions right before their eyes and everything is in it. If our Islamic propagation material and methods do not suit our audience’s situation, we will not succeed….

If this proactive approach is to be truly realized, it is necessary to know the situation. You must know who you are up against when you are confronted with a large number of doubts in the minds of young people. Who are we up against? Now suppose that a certain editorial writer, a certain columnist for some newspaper, or a certain Tweeter posts something on a social network. Who are we up against? Who is this? Is the person doing this him or herself? It is highly likely that this is not the case. It is highly probable that something is going on behind the scenes. Who is behind the scenes? We should know who they are….

Today, another confrontation exists, a confrontation between two fronts. If we know these two fronts, then we can determine if the phenomenon that has arisen against us is independent or dependent on the opposing front. What are these two fronts? One front is the front of the Islamic system, which I will speak about briefly. The other front is the deceptive face that calls itself “liberal democracy.” But, actually, it is neither liberal nor democratic! They are lying when they say they are a liberal democracy. If you are liberal, why did you colonize others whether through traditional colonialism, modern colonialism, or neocolonialism? What kind of liberals are you? What kind of freedom-seekers are you? And what kind of free-thinkers are you that you colonized a country such as India that had a population in the millions and took control of it for over a century? You siphoned off their assets and turned them into a poor nation.

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of demography and fertility, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: We Have Five Years to Grow the Population” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/359394/download; and Michael Rubin, “Khamenei Speaks on Demography” OE Watch, December 2013. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195479

[ii] For previous discussion of revolutionary fervor, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Speaks on Martyrdom” OE Watch, December 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/399678/download; and Michael Rubin, “Khamenei Warns Veterans of Declining Revolutionary Fervor” OE Watch, February 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/310925/download

Image Information:

Image: Seminary students listen to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 12 July 2023.
Source: https://idc0-cdn0.khamenei.ir/ndata/news/53328/B/14020421_5753328.jpg
Attribution: Khamenei.ir

Source

Requirements for Desirable Iranian Oil Ministry Jobs Revealed

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Perspective employees take an exam to qualify for jobs in Iran’s Ministry of Petroleum.

“The children of martyred veteran’s quota will be 25 percent.”

While oil accounts for approximately 20 percent of Iran’s GDP, it funds 30 percent of the government’s official budget, and accounts for far more if oil smuggling by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is included. In Iran, the Ministry of Petroleum is considered more prestigious than the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Industry. The Petroleum Ministry’s staffing requirements have been long been opaque. The current Petroleum Minister Javad Owji has a background in oil engineering and subsequently led the National Iranian Gas Company, but he is the exception: many previous petroleum ministers have been IRGC officers.[i]

The excerpted article from a semi-official Iranian Students’ News Agency sheds light on the ministry’s hiring process, to include necessary exam scores and required documents for the interview phase. A quota system illustrates the segments of society the government seeks to favor, promote, or reward. The importance of the military in Iranian society is clear: candidates should demonstrate military service, be it through conscription or in more elite units like the Revolutionary Guards. There are also specific set-asides—almost one-third of the available positions—for those who are children of Iranian soldiers or paramilitary “volunteers” who died in the Iran-Iraq War or other military operations. This reflects the promotion of the culture of martyrdom and sacrifice that continues to permeate Iranian ideology.[ii] While the Iranian government is notoriously poor at veterans’ services, the high quota for children of those killed in service signals the government’s desire to take care of their posterity.

The need to photocopy both sides of the national identity card likely is part of a loyalty test. The Iranian regime uses periodic elections to prove its legitimacy through popular participation at the ballot box. Outside of the major cities and especially in regions with large ethnic or sectarian minorities, access to civil service jobs and various social services requires demonstrating proof of participation in such elections. Accordingly, Iranians in these areas often ask election workers to stamp their identity cards. (Those who do not wish to endorse the regime then spoil their ballots).[iii] Finally, the requirement to prove residence for a decade reflects a distrust of the Iranian diaspora whose departure is seen as evidence of an unwillingness to sacrifice, or insufficient loyalty, to the Islamic Revolution’s principles. This distrust also explains in part the purpose for the more subjective psychological interviews.

Source:

“Karnameh va Barnameh-e Da’vat beh Mosahebeh Estikhodami Azmun Viarat-e Naft ‘Alam Shod” (Exam Scores and the Invitation to Interview for Oil Ministry Employment Announced),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (an ostensibly private news agency close to Iran’s security and intelligence apparatus), 23 July 2023. https://www.isna.ir/news/1402050100565

The country’s education testing organization announced the schedule for the invitation to job interviews with the Ministry of Petroleum in 2022. Candidates can access their records via the https://result2.sanjesh.org/RSEmp/NOETEmpOilResultKrn140204 / address. The first candidates of the recruitment test for the subsidiaries of the Ministry of Oil for 2022 must carry out the interview process with the following documents….

1) Original and legible image of all birth certificate pages.

2) Original and scanned image of national ID card (front and back)

3) The original and legible copy of both sides of the conscription card or permanent legal exemption or valid certificate showing elite service.

4) Principle and legible image of the required valid educational degree (with mention of grade, major, grade point average and date of graduation)

5) An original and legible copy of self-sacrifice [martyrdom] documents for those seeking qualification to the [children of] martyred veteran’s quota of 25 percent or the martyred volunteer [Basij] quota of five percent. 6) Original and legible image of valid disability certificate with the type of disability (only for candidates participating in the quota of three percent for disabled people)7) The original and legible copy of all pages of the birth certificate of the child or children for those seeking to benefit from the youth law.8) The original completed and verified residence declaration form stamped with the seal of the post office or local police station (for candidates who have resided for 10 years at their residence in Iran)9) The original certificate of education from elementary, middle and high school or the first or second year of high school with the approval of the education department of the relevant province or city with regard to the ten-year history of residence, on the condition of providing a local certificate of the person’s current residence in the province or city where the application is made. 10) Dissertation (only for participants with a master’s degree)The schedule cannot be changed/extended and failure to attend in the assigned time will be considered as a definite withdrawal. A valid invitation is necessary when attending the interview. The supplemental assessment consists of two sections of technical-specialized and psychological interviews, and the participation of volunteers in both sections is mandatory….

Notes:

[i] The Petroleum Ministry’s vital role makes it an important partner for the IRGC whose economic wing, Khatam al-Anbiya, regularly receives no-bid, single-source contracts from the Petroleum Ministry. The United States has sanctioned the government-owned National Iranian Oil Company used by the Ministry of Petroleum to distribute Iranian oil for its IRGC links.

[ii] See: Michael Rubin, “Khamenei Warns Veterans of Declining Revolutionary Fervor” OE Watch, February 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/310925/download

[iii] For example, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Explains Spoilt Ballots” OE Watch, August 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/387127/download

Image Information:

Image: Perspective employees take an exam to qualify for jobs in Iran’s Ministry of Petroleum.
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/06/02/3/62627499.jpg?ts=1685702176414
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency

Iran Claims Development of Cruise Missiles Guided by Artificial Intelligence

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Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps- Navy, and regular Navy Commander Shahram Irani at a ceremony unveiling the Abu Mahdi cruise missile.

“This system is strategic and, in fact, we can say it has no equal.”

The excerpted article from Iran’s Fars News Agency claims that Iran is developing a cruise missile guided by artificial intelligence (AI). While Iran has a long history of claims that never materialize, these announcements do reflect the emphases of Iranian military thinking and the trajectory of Iranian military investment. Frequent announcements about drones and precision missiles, for example, reflect the growing arsenal of both, even though capabilities fall short of Tehran’s claims.

Iran’s desire to expand the capabilities of its cruise missile arsenal poses a real and growing threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf and northern Indian Ocean. Still, when Iranian military leaders first announced that they would field the Abu Mahdi cruise missile on naval vessels three years ago, they made no mention of AI.[i] Likewise, a claim by the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Navy that the Abu Mahdi cruise missile can turn “American aircraft carriers into metal scrap” is almost certainly bluster. Nevertheless, the announcement of AI-guided cruise missiles and the targeting of American shipping reflect both the hostility and ambition of the Iranian military industry. The name “Abu Mahdi” also reflects anti-American sentiment, given the United States was responsible for the death of Iraqi Popular Mobilization Unit commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in the same 3 January 2020 strike that killed Iranian Qods Force Chief Qassem Soleimani. As AI technologies become more accessible, it is inevitable that the Iranian military will try to incorporate elements of autonomous decision-making into targeting. Iranian military industries will likely be able to incorporate AI rapidly because so much AI remains open source and Iran has a large diaspora studying computer science and engineering in India, Russia, and Europe.. The greatest impact on the operational environment may be in allowing Iran’s missile arsenal to more broadly evade anti-aircraft defenses or strike targets of opportunity in dense maritime or urban settings.

Source:

“Behregiri Mushak-e Kruz Abu Mahdi a Hush-e Mosnava’i” (Abu Mahdi Cruise Missile Uses Artificial Intelligence),” Fars News Agency (news agency closely affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 25 July 2023. https://www.farsnews.ir/news/14020503000068

Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, participated this morning transferring the Abu Mahdi cruise missile to both the regular Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Navy. He said, “By the grace of God, and in line with the defense doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran to improve missile power for defense, today we are witnessing the ceremony for the Abu Mahdi long-range cruise missile joining the arsenal. This system is strategic and, in fact, we can say it has no equal. He added, “This system has special features, including a range of 1,000 kilometers [621 miles] which will increase the range of our naval defense several times. It is a very important point.”

Referring to other aspects of the Abu Mahdi missile, the Minister of Defense said, “Other features include pinpoint accuracy, high destructive power, the ability to maneuver around geographic obstacles, and cruising at a very low altitude.” He added, “The Abu Mahdi cruise missile can confront electronic warfare, evades radar systems and has utilized artificial intelligence to chart its optimal flight path.Ashtiani said, “We will be able to produce Abu Mahdi missiles.”

Notes:

[i] For previous mention of the Abu Mahdi cruise missile, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Navy Soon to Field Abu Mahdi Cruise Missile” OE Watch, November 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/356999/download

Image Information:

Image: Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps- Navy, and regular Navy Commander Shahram Irani at a ceremony unveiling the Abu Mahdi cruise missile.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1402/05/03/14020503000088_Test_PhotoN.JPG
Attribution: FarsNews.ir

Abkhazia Pushes Back Against Russia’s Suggestion of Incorporation

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Map of Republic of Georgia featuring the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

“We tread a distinct path. We haven’t received any formal requests to join the Russian Federation, and I’m yet to identify any political faction within Abkhazia that envisions such a relationship dynamic with Russia.”

In an interview published on 22 August in the pro-Russian media outlet Arguments and Facts, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, suggested that for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the “idea of joining Russia is still popular[i] and it may well be implemented if there are good reasons.” Medvedev’s commentwas not well received by Abkhazian officials, regardless of whether it was an off-the-cuff remark or a more calculated statement. As per the excerpted article on pro-Abkhaz media source Abkhaz World, the Secretary of the Security Council of Abkhazia, Sergey Shamba, responded to Medvedev’s statement by declaring that he was unaware of any political parties or groups that preferred incorporation into Russia, insisting that Abkhazia “tread” its own path. Shamba also noted that Abkhazia “is keen on fostering close and allied relations with Russia,” but that the tiny republic remains committed to independence. A statement from the Foreign Ministry of Abkhazia published in a second excerpted article from Abkhaz World declared that “The millennia-old statehood of Abkhazia is not a subject for debate.”[ii] The same article also included comments by other Abkhaz officials, including Aslan Kabakhia, who declared that it was “very unpleasant to hear of talks of a potential change in Abkhazia’s status from the very individual who [previously] endorsed our independence,” and another official, Akhra Bzhaniya, who noted that “our sovereignty is not a toy.” Abkhazia remains defiant regarding independence, suggesting that a miscalculation by Russian or other regional leaders could reignite conflict in the breakaway republic. For example, some Ukrainian officials continue to call on Georgia to open a second front in the Caucasus by militarily invading Abkhazia, assuming Russia will be forced to divert military forces in defense of Abkhazia.

Sources:

“Abkhazia: Seeking Alliance but Standing Apart from Russian Federation,” Abkhaz World (pro-Abkhaz media outlet based in London and Istanbul), 24 August 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2484-abkhazia-seeking-alliance-but-standing-apart-from-russian-federation

The Secretary of the Security Council of Abkhazia, Sergey Shamba, emphasised that while Abkhazia is in favour of forming an alliance with Russia, the nation is open to various forms of bilateral relations.

Abkhazia is keen on fostering close and allied relations with Russia. However, Sergey Shamba highlighted that there currently aren’t any political entities within the republic expressing a desire to become part of the Russian Federation.

Shamba’s remarks were in response to the statements made by Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Head of the Russian Federation’s Security Council. In a previous article on the http://aif.ru website, Medvedev pointed out that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia still harbour sentiments of aligning with Russia, suggesting that this aspiration “might very well materialize given compelling reasons.”

Medvedev further elaborated, “South Ossetia has, on multiple occasions, held referendums on the prospect of joining Russia. This aligns naturally with the trajectory of uniting North and South Ossetia — a single people. I believe this resonates with Dmitry Medvedev’s statements. I’m optimistic that in due course, the right conditions will emerge, culminating in the unification of the North and South.”

Shamba, speaking of Abkhazia, added, “We tread a distinct path. We haven’t received any formal requests to join the Russian Federation, and I’m yet to identify any political faction within Abkhazia that envisions such a relationship dynamic with Russia.” He reiterated that while Abkhazia is eager to bolster allied relations with Russia, they remain flexible in exploring different relational frameworks.

“Невыученные уроки. Дмитрий Медведев проанализировал события 2008 года (Unlearned lessons. Dmitry Medvedev analyzed the events of 2008),” Arguments and Facts (pro-Moscow media outlet) 23 August 2023. https://aif.ru/politics/world/nevyuchennye_uroki_dmitriy_medvedev_proanaliziroval_sobytiya_2008_goda

At one time, Saakashvili became the first US proxy leader in the Caucasus with a single mission – to incite the hatred of the inhabitants of Georgia towards Russia, shake its position in the Transcaucasus, overshadow the centuries-old friendship of the two peoples. This strange creature brought the war closer with all its might. She pretended to be an “Old Testament shepherd David” – and at the same time did everything so that the Georgians would forget their common history, break ties with Russia, hate their closest neighbors – Russians, Ossetians, Abkhazians – and wish them death. The latest performances of Russophobes in Georgia show that this public is still counting on revenge. Although he constantly runs into rebuff from his fellow citizens, who do not intend to elevate hatred of Russia to the rank of a national idea and are quite warm towards our citizens. This is also obvious: the majority of Georgians are much more comfortable living with our state in peace. Russia is nearby, America is overseas. For Georgia, a country of the richest culture, connected with Russia by thousands of threads, Russophobia is nonsense, ugliness, a serious illness. Luckily, it’s completely curable.

We do not need a repetition of history-2008. We remain ready to tackle problems at the negotiating table in the spirit of the UN Charter. But if our concern has real outlines, we will not hesitate. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the idea of joining Russia is still popular. And it may well be implemented if there are good reasons for that.

“Abkhazia’s Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Medvedev’s Remarks,” Abkhaz World, 24 August 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2486-abkhazia-s-foreign-ministry-issues-statement-on-medvedev-s-remarks

“In today’s environment, the international security system is under significant strain. We note a substantial escalation in tensions between the Russian Federation and the collective West. Many statements made in the media are viewed as outcomes of the intensifying geopolitical contest.

The millennia-old statehood of Abkhazia is not a subject for debate. Our legislation provides clear insight into this. The Republic of Abkhazia stands as a steadfast ally of the Russian Federation.

Our relations are governed by an extensive legal framework, comprising over 200 agreements. In the Republic of Abkhazia, repeated statements by senior Russian officials regarding the impossibility of revising the fundamental principles of bilateral relations are highly valued.The irrevocable path towards development as a sovereign, independent legal state has been chosen by the people and is protected by the paramount law – the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia.”

Notes:

[ii] The statement by Medvedev set off a firestorm of media responses, but to put it in perspective, his comment was said at the end of a very lengthy diatribe in which he insulted, criticized, and lambasted the U.S. and the West in general, declaring western influence and intrigue as the roots of all problems Russia faces in Georgia and Ukraine. Despite the context Ukraine Pravda and Reuters for example led with the headline that Russia might “annex” Abkhazia and South Ossetia although that is not the word that Medvedev used.  see: “Russia May Annex Georgian Breakaway Regions-Medvedev,” Reuters, 22 August 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-may-annex-georgian-breakaway-regions-medvedev-2023-08-22/

Image Information:

Image: Map of Republic of Georgia featuring the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Source: Ssolbergj, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Abkhazia_and_South_Ossetia – /media/File:Georgia,_Ossetia,_Russia_and_Abkhazia_(en).svg
Attribution: CC BY SA-3.0

Russia Announces New Combined Arms Army in Arctic To Offset NATO Expansion

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Map of Russian Federation with the Kola Peninsula highlighted, a strategically important space for Russian defense in the Arctic.

“While Sweden and Finland were conditionally neutral countries, there was no need to keep any large forces in the region.  However, now that Finland has joined NATO, and Sweden is on this path, it is necessary to strengthen the northwestern direction.”

Russia will form a new Combined Arms Army (CAA) in the Arctic North as a response to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, according to a recently published article from the pro-government daily Izvestia. The Russian military expert featured in the article claims the Northern Fleet’s 14th Army Corps will likely be the nucleus of this new CAA, while the Arctic 200th and/or 80th brigades will likely be upsized to divisions. The new divisions will likely see the incorporation of a new Iskander missile brigade and air defense brigade to somewhat standardize the structure with other CAAs. Russian ground forces in the Baltic region facing Sweden and Finland, recently renamed the Leningrad Military District, will probably also expand to meet the new threat. The Northern Fleet Strategic Command covers the bulk of the Northern Sea route, but the Eastern Strategic Command controls the Chukotka Peninsula. There is currently a motorized rifle regiment stationed there, and plans exist to expand this to a division. Due to the distance involved, it is unlikely that the new CAA will expand to incorporate this other Russian Arctic ground force. The focus of the new CAA will be the defense of the Kola Peninsula.

Source:

Roman Kretcul and Aleksei Ramm, “Полярный округ: в составе Северного флота создадут общевойсковую армию (Arctic circle:  A new combined arms army will form as part of the Northern Fleet),” Izvestia (large pro-government Russian daily), 1 July 2023. https://iz.ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu.

A new combined-arms army will be formed as part of the Northern Fleet.

This decision was made by the Russian Defense Ministry.  It will cover the Russian border in the north, including the border with Finland and Norway. The defense of the Kola Peninsula is a vital task for Russia since strategic missile submarines are based there.  The creation of a new army is especially important due to the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO. The new formation will be based on the current army corps. The army will include motorized rifle brigades, regiments and divisions. Their personnel will be trained in Arctic combat.

“While Sweden and Finland were conditionally neutral countries, there was no need to keep any large forces in the region,” military historian Dmitry Boltenkov explained to Izvestia. “However, now that Finland has joined NATO, and Sweden is on this path, it is necessary to strengthen the northwestern direction.” The expert noted that the 200th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 80th Arctic Brigade, and the 61st Separate Marine Brigade are now stationed there. He did not rule out that the 200th and 80th brigades would be reorganized into divisions, and the 14th Army Corps, of which they are now a member, into an army. The most important thing is that with the creation of this army, powerful separate formations will also appear – a missile brigade, an air defense brigade and others. This will significantly increase the group’s capabilities in the region. According to Dmitry Boltenkov, the protection of the Kola Peninsula is vital, if only because strategic missile submarines are based there.

In recent years, Allies have shown an increased interest in the Arctic region. Norway hosts large-scale exercises of the Cold Response Alliance every two years. In the spring of 2022, over 30 thousand military personnel, more than 200 aircraft and 50 ships took part in them. The Russian Armed Forces regularly conduct exercises in polar latitudes. In particular, the annual maneuvers “Umka”, during which both personnel training and polar research are performed. On July 1, the press service of the Northern Fleet reported that the Arctic grouping, which includes warships of the Kola flotilla, will conduct a traditional Arctic campaign with a set of tactical exercises on the continental coast, islands and in the waters of the seas of the Arctic Ocean.

Image Information:

Image: Map of Russian Federation with the Kola Peninsula highlighted, a strategically important space for Russian defense in the Arctic.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Murmansk_in_Russia.svg
Attribution: CCA-Share Alike 3.0