Category Archives: OE Watch

Iran To Cooperate With Russia On Gas Infrastructure and Trade

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Iran’s gas infrastructure remains both antiquated and inefficient.

“[Mohammad Hosseini] expressed Iran’s readiness to expand its cooperation with Russia to improve the safety of gas facilities against sabotage and terrorist attacks.”

Iran has the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves and, even under sanctions, remains one of the top ten world producers. Yet Iran’s gas industry lags far behind its oil extraction capabilities due to an antiquated refinery and pipeline network. Iran must import much of the gas that it utilizes both to fuel transportation needs and to inject into oil fields to facilitate extraction. Iran is increasingly looking to Russia, for assistance.

The excerpted report from Iran-focused Dubai-based brokerage PCM Farsi, addresses a meeting between Hossein Ali Mohammad Hosseini, the director of the Corporate Planning of the National Iranian Gas Company, and Russian energy officials. Hosseini’s comments that Russia and Iran might cooperate regarding gas infrastructure modernization reflects the government’s commercial agenda: if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked National Iranian Gas Company can curb losses attributable to waste, then it will not need to spend as much to import refined gasoline.[i] The report also notes the vulnerability of Iran’s gas infrastructure . Iran has blamed Israel, without evidence, for a February 2024 explosion on a major pipeline. In the wake of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, there have been numerous other gas infrastructure explosions across the country according to reports and social media discussions by ordinary Iranians. Many of these incidents go unreported, while the official Iranian media often dismisses the reported incidents as accidents, or the result of illegal tapping of gas lines to steal petrol. To acknowledge openly the need to work with Russia against gas infrastructure sabotage and terrorism suggests that the Iranian gas industry officials do not fully believe the more innocent explanations from their government. Given the importance of hydrocarbons to Iran’s economy, a faltering gas infrastructure and any vulnerability to sabotage, vandalism, or insurgency could disproportionately affect Iran’s economy and potentially its military readiness.

Sources:

“تهران و مسکو همکاری‌های خود را در زمینه فناوری گاز گسترش می‌دهند” (Tehran and Moscow expanding their cooperation in the field of gas technology),” PCM Farsi (Persian language portal of Dubai-based PCM Brokerage), 14 May 2024. https://pcmfa.news/2024/05/14/11977/

Mohammad Hosseini mentioned the desire for Iran to expand relations with Russia in the energy sector, and said his country welcomes the proposal of the Ministry of Energy of Russia to hold a specialized meeting on digitization, monitoring, and data analysis at the Russian Energy Week, as well as at the St. Petersburg Energy Congress. In his remarks, the director of the National Iranian Gas Company stressed the need to share common experiences in area such as reducing the amount of gas loss, and he expressed Iran’s readiness to expand its cooperation with Russia to improve the safety of gas facilities against sabotage and terrorist attacks.

Notes:

[i] For discussion of Iran’s efforts for gasoline self-sufficiency, see: Michael Rubin, “Achieving Gasoline Self-Sufficiency in Iran,” OE Watch, August 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432/download

Image: Iran’s gas infrastructure remains both antiquated and inefficient.
Source: Mojtaba Mohammadgholi, Shana Photo, https://media.shana.ir/d/2023/08/20/3/392725.jpg?ts=1692521593000
Attribution: Shana.ir

Revisiting Russian “Africa Corps’” Organizational Structure

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Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.

“The Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.”

Following the death of Russian Wagner Group founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov.[i] However, in Africa, the mercenary company’s operation is rebranding as “Africa Corps” whereas the company’s operations elsewhere in the world seem to be retaining the Wagner brand. This new branding may help the company avoid the stigma of its Wagner predecessors for war crimes and smuggling and reduce international pressure against the company in Africa.

The excerpted French-language article in the Chadian publication, alwihdainfo.com, is an African perspective of the differences between Russia’s Africa Corps[ii] and its predecessor Wagner Group. The article acknowledges that Africa Corps is the successor to Wagner Group with important differences. First, it notes that Africa Corps is intended to legitimize the Russian military influence on the African continent while competing with the diminishing presence of the U.S. and European powers. Second, Africa Corps may have a smaller footprint than Wagner in Africa. For example, the article mentions it operates only in Libya, inheriting Wagner’s main bases and most of Wagner’s fighters; Burkina Faso; Mali; Central African Republic and Niger. According to the article, Libya’s position on the Mediterranean Sea facilitates military supply lines and the movement of Africa Corps personnel into Africa. The previous iteration of Wagner had also operated extensively in Sudan and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in Eastern Africa, including Mozambique and Madagascar.[iii]

Another difference highlighted in the article relates to the way that Africa Corps will operate. Africa Corps is now focusing on providing military support to African countries through instructors, weapons, and developing counter-terrorism strategies with host nations in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. In contrast, Wagner soldiers directly participated in missions against terrorist or insurgent groups and functioned separate from, albeit in support of, the Russian government. The article indicates that the new Africa Corps will be more sustainable than the previous Wagner Group because of Africa Corps’ formal integration with the Russian state, and the ministry of defense. Further the ministry’s commitment to Africa Corps indicates that Russia is serious about its geopolitical ambitions in West Africa and Africa Corps’ impact on the region will not be fleeting. At a time when Western influence and partnerships with West African states are waning, Africa Corps is becoming the entity through which Russia will reassert itself.

Sources:

Source: “De ‘Wagner’ à ‘Africa Corps’: la Russie toujours présente au Sahel (From ‘Wagner’ to ‘Africa Corps’: Russia always is present in the Sahel),” alwihdainfo.com (French-language Chadian publication with a reputation for independent reporting and being critical of the government), 3 May 2024. https://www.alwihdainfo.com/De-Wagner-a-Africa-Corps-la-Russie-toujours-presente-au-Sahel_a132053.html

Recently, many people have been curious about the difference between the Russian paramilitary group “Wagner” and the “Africa Corps”, which newly appeared on the African scene and which was also founded in Russia to be deployed in African countries. In this analysis, we will seek to explain the difference between the two organizations, how and where they operate, and what their ambitions are in Africa.

Africa Corps is a Russian military company that was created in early 2024 as a replacement for the Wagner Group. This organization reflects Russia’s desire to extend its military influence on the African continent and to provide legitimacy to its official and public presence in the face of the European and American presence. Africa Corps is deployed in 5 countries: Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Central African Republic and Niger. Libya represents the core of the corps due to the previous activity of Wagner elements in the city of Tripoli…. Another factor in the choice of Libya as the headquarters of this corps is its strategic geographical location due to its connection with the Mediterranean coast, which ensures military supply lines and movement of corps members to other countries The Africa Corps’ modus operandi is entirely dependent on providing military support to African countries such as instructors and weapons. The company also is concerns with the development of strategies in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, such as is the case in Mali and Niger… In short, the Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.

Notes:

[ii] Since the death of Russian Wagner Group founder and CEO, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov. For a profile of Evkurov, which argues that he “has the full backing of Russia’s military establishment and will not have to beg for ammunition or restrict himself to the use of contractors and mercenaries,” see: Andrew McGregor, “Yunus-Bek Yevkurov: A Profile of Russia’s New Ingush African Corps Leader,” Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume: 15 Issue: 3, 18 April 2024. (URL?) The article notes that under Yevkurov “the Africa Corps will have greater access to resources, but will be expected to be self-sufficient in many ways. This means Wagner-style associations with business interests will likely continue, although disentangling these interests from the Wagner network will be challenging.” In addition, it asserts that “Improving battlefield performance will be a priority for Yevkurov. Thus far, Russian fighters have not proven any more effective in eliminating Sahelian terrorist formations than their French predecessors.”

[iii] See, for example, Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies, CSIS, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/

Image Information:

Image: Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.
Source:kremlin.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deputy_Defence_Minister_Yunus-Bek_Yevkurov_and_Wagner_leader_Andrei_Troshev.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0

Russia Redeploys Military Police to Southern Syria

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Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).

“The [Russian] Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.”

After over a year of absence, Russian forces have returned to Syrian territory near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, in theory, to curb spillovers of violence from Israel to Syria. Russia’s deployments to date have largely been symbolic, including occasional aerial patrols and the establishment of three military police observation posts in the Syrian provinces of Quneitra and Daraa, near the buffer zone separating Syria and Israel. As reported in the first accompanying article from the Syrian opposition news website Enab Baladi, Russia established its third observation post in the area in early April 2024, after establishing two similar posts in January.

Southern Syria is often considered the cradle of the Syrian civil war, and was a hardened rebel bastion for several years. Daraa province remained highly volatile until Russian-sponsored settlements with rebel groups in 2018 stabilized local security conditions. With a modicum of peace achieved, Russian presence and influence in this part of Syria dwindled beginning in 2018 while Iranian-backed Syrian government forces and militias strengthened their grip in former rebel territory. Following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian forces all but disappeared from southern Syria, allowing Iranian militias to expand their influence in the area, often through local proxies and under the cover of Syrian Army forces.[i] Iranian influence in Syrian territory close to Israel has become a source of heightened concern not just for Israel but also for Russia, which fears that Gaza spillover could threaten Syria’s delicate status quo.

In the months following the 7 October attack, Russia successfully blocked Iranian attempts to launch attacks from southern Syria in support of Hamas in Gaza per the second accompanying excerpt, published in January 2024 in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed. The redeployment of Russian military police to this part of Syria may therefore be seen as bolstering Russia’s ability to continue preventing escalation on this front. Indeed, Russia’s observation posts have all been set up in the aftermath of Israeli assassinations of high-ranking Iranian officials in Syrian territory: the first two posts were set up in the weeks following the killing of General Razi Mousavi in late December 2023, and the third one the day after General Mohammad Reza Zahedi was killed in April 2024. Russia’s return to southern Syria is less about supporting Iran against Israel than it is about deterring Tehran’s use of Syrian soil to respond to Israeli attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria notwithstanding the deepening Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation. , However, experts are skeptical of Russia’s ability to succeed. According to Mustafa al-Naimi, a Turkey-based Syrian analyst cited in the third accompanying excerpt, also from Enab Baladi, Russia’s efforts are bound to fail. Even if it succeeds in preventing Iran from opening the Syria front against Israel, Russia will be unable to remove Iranian influence from the area, given that its proxies will simply “return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime.” As such, al-Naimi conjectures, Russia’s symbolic redeployment near the Syria-Israel border is unlikely to do anything other than postpone the inevitable: an expansion of the Gaza conflict into southern Syria.

Sources:

Source: “Russia establishes third military post on borders of occupied Golan Heights,” Enab Baladi English (Syrian opposition English-language news website), 2 April 2024. https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2024/04/russia-establishes-third-military-post-on-borders-of-occupied-golan-heights/

The Deputy Chief of the Russian Center for Reconciliation of the Opposing Parties in Syria (a division of the Russian Ministry of Defense), Major General Yury Popov, stated that the Military Police has set up an additional post near the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights… This Syrian military post is the third of its kind established since the beginning of the current year, after Russia reduced its deployment in southern Syria at the beginning of 2022 following its invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

Source:

ما أهداف روسيا من نشر نقاط مراقبة في القنيطرة؟ “What are Russia’s goals in setting up observation posts in Quneitra?” Al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 6 January 2024. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9

[Researcher Rachid] Hourani added to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that, after the launch of the Israeli military operation against the Gaza Strip, Iran tried to activate several fronts based on the principle of “unifying the arenas.” There were several visits by Iranian military officials to Syria with the aim of opening that front, but they did not amount to much due to Russian rejection and its tendency to use the so-called “Iranian card” and control Tehran’s behavior in Syria.

Hourani considered that Russia can actually curb Iran in southern Syria “because it fully controls the military decision-making in regime areas, in addition to being a major party to the understandings related to Israel’s security threats from Syria, such as the settlement agreement with the Syrian opposition factions in mid-2018 and the Israeli-American-Russian security meeting that took place in mid-2019″…

Source:

ما وراء نشر روسيا نقاطًا عسكرية على حدود الجولان المحتل “What is behind Russia’s setting up military posts on the occupied Golan border?” Enab Baladi (Syrian opposition news website), 14 January 2024. https://www.enabbaladi.net/682917/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88/

Mustafa Al-Naimi, a researcher on Iranian affairs, told Enab Baladi, “We are facing a scene of gradual escalation from both the Iranian and Israeli sides.” Al-Naimi believes that the Russian side is trying to reposition itself to ward off any attempt by the Israeli side to advance on the ground along this front by, at the very least, removing the Iranian militias from the southern region adjacent to the Golan.He added that this measure will not work for these militias, because they will return to the region wearing the uniform of the Syrian regime… because of this and the fact that the Israeli side does not trust that Russia has the ground forces needed to control the region at a depth of 45 kilometers, al-Naimi suggests that these measures are “postponing the battle, not preventing it.”

Notes:

[i] For more on the 2018 agreement, see: Armenak Tokmajyan. “A Flashpoint Looms in Southern Syria,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 26 March 2024. https://carnegie-mec.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/04/a-flashpoint-looms-in-southern-syria?lang=en&center=middle-east

For more on post-Ukraine Russian and Iranian presence in Syria, see: Lucas Winter, “Iran Repositions Its Proxies In Syria As Russia Turns Focus To Ukraine,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-repositions-its-proxies-in-syria-as-russia-turns-focus-to-ukraine/;  Lucas Winter, “Iran Digs Into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left By Russia,” OE Watch, May 2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/iran-digs-into-central-syria-filling-vacuum-left-by-russia/; Lucas Winter, “Russian Influence Fades In Southern Syria,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-influence-fades-in-southern-syria/

Image Information:

Image: Map showing Syria, Israel, and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (1991).
Source: https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-pclmaps-oclc-25871248-golan_heights-1991.jpg
Attribution: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Public Domain

Russia Withdraws Its Forces from Nagorno-Karabakh

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Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

“Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.”

In April 2024, the government of Azerbaijan announced that the Russian peacekeeping mission had started withdrawing personnel, marking one of only a few instances a Russian peacekeeping mission in the Commonwealth of Independent States has ended.[i] The excerpted article from Azerbaijan’s news agency Trend reports that the Russian peacekeeping force from Nagorno-Karabakh has relocated to temporary deployment points in Armenia.[ii] Armenia’s Secretary of the Security Council noted that these units cannot remain in Armenia. Lastly, the article notes that Azerbaijan requested the removal of the Russian peacekeeping force and the Russian government complied but does not mention where Russian personnel will eventually be redeployed.

Additionally, a joint Russia-Turkey observation center in Azerbaijan that once monitored the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also closed. The excerpted article from Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency notes that the joint observation center had been based in Azerbaijan since early 2021 as part of an agreement between Russia and Turkey to observe the ceasefire agreement. The article notes that the work of the center is no longer needed since Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023.[iii] As a result, Russian and Turkish personnel, 60 from each country, are leaving. Overall, the total number of Russian personnel redeploying from the peacekeeping mission and the joint monitoring center is not significant but is worth noting as Russia has historically reached agreements to leave some units in place even after a peacekeeping mission has changed or ended. Russia will likely continue to be involved in developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan going forward, but Azerbaijan’s complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh frees up Russian forces to use elsewhere, potentially in Ukraine.[iv]

Sources:

Source: Rena Abdurakhmona, “Российские миротворцы направились из Карабаха в Армению (Russian peacekeepers have deployed from Karabakh to Armenia),” Trend (news agency in Azerbaijan), 23 April 2024. https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3889409.html

Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh went to temporary deployment points in Gorus and Garakils (Sisian)…(the) Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan told the Armenian media…

“Since Russian peacekeeping troops are leaving Karabakh, they, of course, cannot remain in the Republic of Armenia either. A group and convoy of peacekeepers from Karabakh headed to temporary deployment points in Goris and Garakils (Sisian),” he said.

Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.

Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan – Head of the Department for Foreign Policy of the Presidential Administration Hikmet Hajiyev, answering a question from AZERTAG regarding information about the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the territory of Azerbaijan, said that the top leadership of both countries made a decision on the early withdrawal of peacekeepers…

Source: Ruslan Rehimov, “Turkish-Russian joint center completes mission in Azerbaijan,” Anadolu Agency (state-run news agency of Turkey), 26 April 2024.https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkish-russian-joint-center-completes-mission-in-azerbaijan/3203012

The Turkish-Russian joint observation center established in Azerbaijan’s Aghdam region has completed its mission after three years of service.

The center was established to monitor cease-fire and prevent violations after the Second Karabakh War, when Azerbaijan liberated most of the Karabakh region from decades of occupation by Armenia.

Karim Valiyev, Azerbaijan’s chief of general staff, praised the center’s contributions to peace at a ceremony on Friday attended by Azerbaijani, Russian, and Turkish officials.

Valiyev said Azerbaijan has fully established its sovereignty in Karabakh, and therefore the mission of the monitoring center had been completed…The center, established near the Marzili village of Aghdam, opened on Jan. 30, 2021, with 60 Turkish and 60 Russian soldiers…Azerbaijan established full sovereignty in Karabakh after an “anti-terrorism operation” in September 2023, after which separatist forces in the region surrendered.

Notes:

[i] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is made up of former Soviet Republics and remains an area where the Russian government has special relationships and works to maintain influence. Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS in the past have typically been open-ended with Russian forces remaining in place in some capacity, which has allowed Russia to maintain influence. The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) peacekeeping mission to Kazakhstan in January 2022 marks the other example of Russian forces ending a peacekeeping mission in the CIS and withdrawing its forces. For background on Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS, see: Matthew Stein, “The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare,” FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief, 24 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-24-the-evolutionary-russian-view-of-peacekeeping-as-part-of-modern-warfare-matthew-stein-update/

[ii] The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh deployed in November 2020 as part of the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. The peacekeeping force included around 2,000 Russian personnel, who established two dozen observation posts in Nagorno-Karabakh to monitor the ceasefire under a five-year mandate that would automatically renew for an additional five years unless Armenia or Azerbaijan gave notice to the other two parties to the agreement to terminate the mission.

[iii] In September 2023, Azerbaijani forces carried out an operation in Nagorno-Karabakh which resulted in Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region from ethnic Armenians and ended the existence of the self-proclaimed breakaway region of Artsakh. The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh closed a few observation posts following the September 2023 operation,but remained largely in place with the consent and cooperation of Azerbaijani authorities.

[iv] Russian peacekeepers dealt with several ceasefire violations from both sides in the years since then and notably allowed activists from Azerbaijan to blockade the Lachin Corridor, the single road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, starting in December 2022 until September 2023. For background on the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, see: Matthew Stein, “Ongoing Clashes In Nagorno-Karabakh Threaten Fragile Truce,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/ongoing-clashes-in-nagorno-karabakh-threaten-fragile-truce/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_war.svg
Attribution: CCA 3.0

Russian Iskandar Brigade Moves Closer to Finland

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A member of the Finnish Army watches a K-9 Thunder [RG1] 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer drive by after a live fire exercise with U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, on a range near Rovaniemi, Finland, May 17, 2024.

“Iskanders performed very well during the Special Military Operation [read: war], so the Finns should know that if something happens, such joy can come to them,” military expert Dmitry Boltenkov said to Izvestia.”

With the reestablishment of the Leningrad Military District, previously neutral Finland has become a focus of Russian and NATO interests. The excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer highlights Russia’s decision to form a missile brigade featuring Iskander missiles in the Republic of Karelia, near Finland. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu noted that due to Finland’s decision to join NATO, and “NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden,” Russia was required to undertake “retaliatory measures…to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia.” Russia’s decision to form a missile brigade so close to Finland also coincided with the annual U.S.-led Immediate Response 2024 exercise which took place in northern Europe in April and included Finland. Immediate Response featured U.S. equipment sent to Europe to support the exercise.[i] What probably interests Russia most is how much of what equipment the U.S. leaves behind and where they leave it.

Sources:

Source: Thomas Nielsen, “Finland relaxed over Moscow’s plans to deploy Iskander-M missiles near border”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 24 April 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/04/finland-relaxed-over-moscows-plans-deploy-iskander-missiles-near-border

In its Kremlin-loyal newspaper Izvestia the Russian Defense Ministry reports on the new formation of a separate missile brigade in the Republic of Karelia. “Iskanders performed very well during the Special Military Operation [read: war], so the Finns should know that if something happens, such joy can come to them,” military expert Dmitry Boltenkov said to Izvestia.

Iskander-M [RG1] is mobile and each vehicle can carry two missiles. The missile flies ballistic at a hypersonic speed of Mach 6 and has a range of 400-500 kilometers.  Several different conventional warheads can be attached to the missiles, including a cluster munitions warhead, enhanced-blast warhead, high-explosive fragmentation warhead, an earth penetrator for bunker busting and an electromagnetic pulse device for anti-radar missions. The missile can also carry nuclear warheads.

Moscow has repeatedly said Finland’s decision to join NATO is provocative and will destabilize the security landscape in northern Europe. “Given NATO’s desire to build up military potential near the Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden, retaliatory measures are required to create an appropriate grouping of troops in Northwest Russia,” Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu previously stated.

The fact is that it was Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine that destabilized geopolitics in all of Europe. Finnish NATO-membership was not on the political agenda in Helsinki before February 24, 2022.

Finland shares a 1,340 km border with Russia from the Baltic Sea in the south to the Kola Peninsula in the north. The border has been closed by Helsinki since last fall when Russia’s FSB directed huge crowds of migrants to enter Finland in what Finnish authorities have called a hybrid operation.

…Finland joined NATO in April 2023, a move that caused Russia to restructure its military forces by depriving the Northern Fleet of the status as a military district. Reestablishing the Leningrad Military District is considered a sign that Russia’s military planners now see the entire western border as one theater of operation in case of war.

Notes:

[i] Equipment belonging to the US Army 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division has been sent to support Immediate Response 2024 (IR24). The exercise includes allied training in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Czechia and Poland taking place between 21 April – 31 May, according to the Norwegian Armed Forces. See: Atle Staalesen, “US Army sends heavy equipment to Norwegian Arctic port of Narvik for transfer to Finland”, The Barents Observer, 24 April 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/04/us-army-sends-heavy-equipment-norwegian-arctic-port-narvik-transfer-finland

Image Information:

Image: A member of the Finnish Army watches a K-9 Thunder 155mm Self-propelled Howitzer drive by after a live fire exercise with U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, on a range near Rovaniemi, Finland, May 17, 2024. 
Source: DVIDS, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/8418866/northern-forest-exercise
Attribution: Public Domain

Russian Import-Substitution Impacts Armored Vehicle Production

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Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities.

“Currently, measures are being taken to engage specialized enterprises and organizations in the development and manufacturing of domestic components necessary for the production of protected military vehicles. Solving these issues is now considered by military leadership as one of the priority directions for enhancing combat readiness and reducing combat losses of the troops.”

Recent articles in Russian military publications regarding Typhoon [i] armored vehicle production  highlight the advantages – and tradeoffs – of import-substitution measures across Russia’s defense industry. Moscow’s inability to import critical components has forced Russian manufacturers to simplify designs and shift component production to domestic manufacturers. According to the Russian military journal Material’no-tehnicheskoe obespechenie Vooruzhennyh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, initial development of the Typhoon series of 4×4 and 6×6 armored vehicles in the 2010s was in response to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) order to create vehicles capable of protecting crews on par with foreign offerings through 2020. The Typhoon-Kand Typhoon-Y capable of carrying a variety of armaments depending on mission requirements were Russia’s answer to the American-made Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle. Despite their official adoption by the Russian MoD, the number of components of foreign origin prevented mass production of initial models.

The journal further details how the military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 underscored the urgent need for armored transport. While domestic production has been a Russian military focus prior to the Ukrainian conflict, the war has accelerated import-substitution measures. Using existing multi-purpose vehicle chassis and domestic components, Russian military manufacturers began rapidly producing armored vehicles to meet pressing battlefield needs. However, current Typhoons suffer from reduced payload capacity, mobility, and less protection than initial test models using foreign produced parts. Some variants, such as the Typhoon-VDV, remain in limited production due to continued reliance on foreign parts.

The second excerpted article from the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik noted the extent of these changes in manufacturing and capability to the current Ground Forces model BMM,[ii] the ZCA-T “Linza,” a Typhoon-K variant. The “simplified chassis” version of the Linza features transmission, transfer block, bridge, power steering, and armor made by domestic manufacturers—primarily KamAZ but lacks a multi-functional command and control terminal. The case of the Typhoon demonstrates the impacts of import-substitution measures on the Russian defense industry and the rapid tradeoffs being made to maintain the current manufacturing tempo.

Sources:

Source: Evgeniy I. Kotyga, Vasily A. Novikov, Ksenia N. Moskalyuk, “Броня На Колесах (Armor on Wheels),” Logistics of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation (Monthly Russian military periodical), No. 4, April 2024. https://on-demand.eastview.com/browse/publication/144326

Pg. 75-76: “Following the tests, the protected vehicles OKR “Typhoon-K” and “Typhoon-U” were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. However, due to the high complexity of the design and the large number of imported components, they were not mass-produced.

With the beginning of a special military operation, the issue of equipping the forces with protected vehicles became acute. To meet the urgent operational needs of the troops, the production of protected vehicles was organized based on the chassis and components of existing domestic multi-purpose vehicles (similar to unrealized projects with codes “Vodnik,” “Medved,” “Karatel,” etc.).

Pg. 78: “To address technical issues related to “import substitution” in protected vehicles of the “Typhoon-K” 4×4 wheeled formula and “Typhoon-VDV” families, a series of measures have been taken and is currently being implemented in the following main directions:

  • Utilization of domestic armored steels, titanium alloys, and composite ceramic panels instead of foreign-produced armor materials like Armox and Plasan.
  • Full localization of Cummins engines and ZF transmissions by domestic enterprises.
  • Import substitution of automotive components in suspension systems, steering control, electrical equipment, and other vehicle systems and assemblies with domestic counterparts.”

Pg. 80: “The effectiveness of the introduced changes in the design of protected vehicles has been positively evaluated based on the results of the conducted tests. Samples of modernized protected vehicles were accepted for supply to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the beginning of 2023. Thus, summing up the creation of new and modernization of existing protected vehicles, it should be noted the effectiveness of measures for ‘import substitution,’ simplification of sample designs, and the use of domestic materials, components, and assemblies, which meets the high demand of the troops for this type of equipment.

Source: R. Pokutny, R. Kurmaev, V. Stolbunov, “Красный Крест На Броне (A Red Cross on Armor),” Army Digest (Monthly Military journal), No. 4 (128-129), April 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 129: However, during the operation of the BMM (Armored Medical Vehicle), a number of shortcomings related to the excessive complexity of the design were identified. Taking into account the changes made (Table 1), on the basis of the ZSA-T “Linza” was created with a simplified design. The goals of creating this modification are to eliminate unnecessary complexity, reduce cost and time indicators at the production and operation stage, and replace imported components with domestic ones. The main changes to the ZSA-T “Linza” of a simplified design include the use of a single-volume body layout formula with a simultaneous increase in the protection class of the medical department, the provision of a spare wheel, and the installation of a “Tucha” smoke screen system, while BIUS (multifunction command and control system) and ABS (most likely the acronym for “anti-brake system”) are excluded.”

Notes:

[i] The Typhoon armored vehicle is produced by ROSOBORONEXPORT, a subsidiary of Rostec State Corporation and manufacturer of military equipment across the Russian Ground, Air, Naval, and Air Defense Forces. Products range from the T-90 tank to the Orlan family of UAVs.

[ii] “BMM” is the overarching term in the Russian Ground Forces for armored medical vehicles.

Image Information:

Image: Typhoon K-4386 “Typhoon-VDV” at Armiya-2021. Issues in bringing the Typhoon-VDV to serial production, due to the number of imported components and sophistication in design, illustrates the gap between Russia’s military modernization aspirations and industrial base capabilities. 
Source: ROSOBORONEXPORT, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Air-droppably_special-purpose_protected_vehicle_%28ZASN-D%29_during_the_%22Armiya_2021%22_exhibition.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED

Russia Evaluates Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Combat Missions

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“One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs.”

The accompanying excerpted article in a monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the modern battlefield. Russia believes that current UAV usage is not just a feature of the current conflict, but also indicative of the changing character of war. Therefore, Russia is now considering how UAV usage will be employed for all types of combat actions (offense, defense, raid, meeting battle) and when on the march.[i] Although not explicitly stated, the article suggests that UAVs will no longer be concentrated in a single unit as they were before 2022.[ii] Russia’s understanding of the situation suggests that individual units will likely each have their own UAVs and counter-UAV technologies. In the Russian view, success on the modern battlefield requires that all types of units, not just electronic warfare and air defense personnel, need some degree of UAV and counter-UAV technologies to accomplish their respective missions.

Sources:

Source: V. Dyatchin and I. Starodubtsev, “Влияние беспилотных летательных аппаратов на способы действий общевойсковых подразделений (The influence of unmanned aerial vehicles on the methods of action of combined arms units),” Armeisky Sbornik (monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense), May 2024.  https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/573847/

One of the main military-technical features of the special military operation in Ukraine, along with the use of high-precision and hypersonic missiles, has been the massive use of small commercial UAVs. [i] Without UAVs, it is impossible to imagine the actions of assault detachments and groups, the destruction of the enemy by tube artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, including the use of high-tech weapons, the conduct of actions by reconnaissance elements, the fight against special detachments of foreign states and illegal armed groups, and other armed sabotage and terrorist formations. This also applies to the work of the command staff of combined arms formations in assessing the current situation and organizing combat actions.

Combined arms units participating in military conflicts use various forms and methods of action in the defense; on the offense; conducting combat, route, and direct security; enforcing martial law; during administrative movements; maneuvering on the battlefield, when locating targets.

The method of action means the sequence of use of all available forces and means, chosen by the unit commander and approved by the higher-level commander. When combined arms units are saturated with UAVs, unit commanders make changes to all methods of action, thereby achieving high efficiency when performing combat missions.

In the defense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

  • conduct reconnaissance of enemy targets in front of the forward edge of the defense and in the immediate depths of their combat formations, transmit enemy target coordinates to artillery, combat vehicles, and air defense systems in real time;
  • support air, missile, artillery and combat vehicle (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles) fires in order to increase their accuracy, increase damage and reduce the combat potential of attacking enemy units;
  • inflict effective defeat on the opposing group of troops with fires from the defending combined arms formations;
  • help unit commanders study the terrain in combat areas and assess the nature of the actions of advancing enemy units;
  • monitor the nature of the actions of the enemy’s second echelons and reserves, and changes in the combat area;
  • control the actions of enemy units, their sabotage, reconnaissance and terrorist groups in the gaps between defensive strongpoints and on the flanks of units;
  • provide assistance to combat, route, and direct security elements in carrying out their tasks;
  • intensify electronic warfare against enemy electronic zones in order to disrupt the work of troops and weapons control centers;
  • perform other tasks in the interests of achieving defensive tasks by combined arms units.

In the offense, UAVs conduct the following tasks in support of combined arms units:

Laying fires, correcting air and artillery fires, increasing the accuracy of the destruction of targets by determining their coordinates in real time, reducing ammunition consumption, and assisting in creating the required superiority [of forces and means] over the defending enemy. They also help carry out the tasks of assault, raid and encircling detachments to destroy strongpoints, fortified areas (objects) and command posts of the opposing group.  Thanks to UAVs, which perform tasks to identify strongpoints, artillery and mortar firing positions, and the nature of the defending enemy’s actions, the losses of friendly personnel and equipment in an offensive are significantly reduced.When combined arms units are on the march, UAVs are used to strengthen route security and inflict preemptive fires on enemy formations that attempt to impede the movement of the column, as well as when encountering an enemy group and conducting meeting combat. When units occupy rest areas, UAVs take an active part in protecting them and repelling surprise enemy attacks…

Notes:

[i] For additional recent analysis on Russian drone development and operations, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies,” OE Watch, 02-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-details-plan-to-overcome-military-drone-deficiencies/; and Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] Typically, a UAV company for a maneuver brigade or division.

Peru’s Stance On Megaport Is a Test of China’s Influence

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“Now the National Port Authority is trying to rescind the exclusivity, claiming it made a mistake…The Chinese company, however, remains firm and even hints that it could withdraw if it does not obtain exclusive access.”

China’s megaport in Chancay, Peru, just north of Lima, is set to be inaugurated by Chinese President Xi Jinping later this year during the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference. One of the largest deep-water ports of its kind, Chancay represents one of China’s most ambitious projects in South America. Built by state-owned enterprise Cosco Shipping, Chancay is meant to catalyze the China’s food security and dominance over critical minerals, while cutting shipping times to Asia by around one week. However, according to Argentine media outlet Infobae, Peruvian officials have announced an “administrative error” permitting Cosco Shipping to both build and operate the port exclusively.[i] According to the article, Peruvian regulators have rejected Cosco’s exclusivity, declaring it incompatible with having built the port under domestic law.[ii] As per the second excerpted article from Infobae, Cosco has said it will initiate legal action against Peruvian regulators, insisting on its economic model of exclusivity. The fallout from the Port of Chancay legal wrangling is notable, and likely to have a lasting impact. China sees the moment as precedent-setting for other countries with Chinese state-owned enterprises controlling key infrastructure projects, while Peru finds itself in a major bind after years of burgeoning Chinese influence over strategic sectors in the country. If Cosco manages to win exclusive control of Chancay, China will further solidify its control over strategic infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere; if Peru manages to safeguard its autonomy, it may furnish a blueprint for other regional powers willing to test the limits of China’s infrastructure ownership models.

Sources:

Source: “El ‘error administrativo’ que pone en jaque al Perú: dio el control total a China del Megapuerto de Chancay (The ‘administrative error’ that puts Peru in check: it gave China full control of the Chancay Megaport),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 14 May 2024. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2024/05/14/el-error-administrativo-que-pone-en-jaque-al-peru-dio-el-control-total-a-china-del-megapuerto-de-chancay/  

With a projected investment of more than three billion, China is now bringing out its true intentions and at the same time taking advantage of an ‘administrative error’ on the part of Peruvian officials by granting operational exclusivity to Cosco, which has put the project in check…a situation that the National Port Authority of Peru is currently trying to solve…The Peruvian government assumed that the Chinese shipping giant would simply use the port of which it will be the majority owner and would not have exclusive rights over it. But during the negotiations, Cosco somehow obtained precisely these rights. Now the National Port Authority is trying to rescind the exclusivity, claiming it made a mistake…The Chinese company, however, remains firm and even hints that it could withdraw if it does not obtain exclusive access.

Source: “Megapuerto de Chancay: Cosco Shipping no da su brazo a torcer y anuncia sus acciones legales por conflicto con el Estado peruano (Chancay Megaport: Cosco Shipping does not give in and announces its legal actions due to conflict with the Peruvian State),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 8 May 2024. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2024/05/07/megapuerto-de-chancay-consorcio-chino-no-dara-su-brazo-a-torcer-y-anuncia-sus-acciones-legales-por-conflicto-con-el-estado-peruano/  Through a statement, the Chinese consortium Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Peru SA, in charge of the megaproject, recognized that the port infrastructure work in the country has been ‘seriously harmed’ by a change in the regulatory scheme…the company reported that they have found it necessary to initiate legal actions to defend its operating model and ensure its classification as private infrastructure, despite the public benefits it offers.

Notes:

[i] At an earlier period, U.S. officials warned Peru about China exerting control and exclusivity over Chancay. See: Michael Stott and Joe Daniels, “U.S. Raises Concern with Peru over Chinese Control of Infrastructure,” Financial Times, 3 October 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/2c77be69-60d7-4d5c-a0c6-c7978bde3888

[ii] According to noted analyst Elisabeth Braw, this situation is likely the result of Peru failing to read the fine print of the agreement. See: Elisabeth Braw, “Peru Learns to Read the Fine Print in China Deals,” Foreign Policy, 13 May 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/13/peru-learns-to-read-the-fine-print-in-china-deals/

Potential Flashpoint Stemming From Undersea Data Cable Network Access Restrictions

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Underwater fiber optic cable on the ocean floor

China has arisen as an economic superpower rivaling the U.S. and now consumes large amounts of data… [however] China’s presence in subsea cable networks is fading rapidly.”

The United States is working with global technology companies, and regional neighbors, to actively exclude China from future undersea cable networks that will connect the region to the rest of the world according to the excerpted article from Japan-based Nikkei news agency. Subsea cables form the backbone of the exchange of global information, carrying 99% of the world’s data traffic—including information considered important to national security. While the Nikkei article doesn’t delve into the geopolitical concerns between the United States and China, the move to restrict the flow of data available to China via these undersea cables, should be seen as a mechanism to isolate China. China, which was once expected to be the future hub for subsea networks that form vital arteries of international communication, is on schedule to receive only three cables laid after this year. All three to Hong Kong, which was relatively more independent when the contracts to lay those undersea cables were struck. By comparison, in the next few years an additional 11 cables are scheduled to be laid in the region: four cables to Japan and seven to Singapore. According to a researcher interviewed for the article, the moves to isolate China from the conduit that carries global information is manifestation of a “subsea cold war” going on between the United States and its partners and China.[i] The U.S. process to isolate China began in 2020 when the Trump administration, “adopted The Clean Network initiative[ii] to freeze Chinese businesses out of telecom infrastructure projects.” This initiative has continued under the Biden administration, citing the “need to ensure data security.”[iii] The article notes that with the decrease in this important data conduit, the share of data centers in China will stay stagnant or begin to recede as well, while increasing in other Asian countries such as Japan, Philippines, and Southeast Asia. This hi-tech form of economic blockade will be a risk to China as its technology prowess begins to lag behind its regional competitors. These second and third order of effects make the subsea cable issue another potential flashpoint between U.S. – China relations, which given the numerous flashpoints between the two super powers, could result in additional tension and possible military action.[iv]

Sources:

Kentaro Takeda, “More subsea cables bypass China as Sino-U.S. tensions grow,” Nikkei, 11 May 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/More-subsea-cables-bypass-China-as-Sino-U.S.-tensions-grow?utm_campaign=IC_asia_daily_free&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=1&pub_date=20240513123000&seq_num=3&si=91811959-21c4-44f4-9028-13136a8d0104

Growing geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China have begun to affect the flow of global data due to an expected sharp fall in new undersea cables linking China with the rest of the world…

China is expected to see only three cables laid after this year — fewer than half the number planned for Singapore. The lack of undersea projects is also expected to weigh on the construction of data centers in the country.

Subsea cables form the backbone of the internet, carrying 99% of the world’s data traffic. Roughly 140,000 kilometers of such cables will be completed this year, three times more than five years ago… The increase reflects growing demand for data traffic prompted by the spread of video streaming and cloud services.

On April 10, Google announced a $1 billion project to build two submarine cables to connect Japan, Guam and Hawaii…The leaders said in a joint statement that they welcomed the investment “to improve digital communications infrastructure between the United States, Japan and Pacific Island Nations.”

Behind this seemingly coordinated public-private initiative was “the subsea cold war” between the U.S. and China, said TeleGeography’s research director, Alan Mauldin.

China has arisen as an economic superpower rivaling the U.S. and now consumes large amounts of data. Fifteen 1,000-km-plus submarine cables, all put into use since 1994, link China and the rest of the world….

The tide began to change around 2020, when the U.S., led by then-President Donald Trump, adopted the Clean Network initiative to freeze Chinese businesses out of telecom infrastructure projects. The U.S. has since kept this tough stance against Beijing, citing the need to ensure data security…

China’s presence in subsea cable networks is fading rapidly. Three international cables to connect Hong Kong are due for completion in 2025, but no undersea projects are scheduled for the country thereafter. There are plans to lay four cables to Japan and seven to Singapore after 2024. In addition, nine cables will be laid to Guam, midway between the U.S. mainland and Southeast Asia.Subsea cables and call centers are two pillars of digital infrastructure that move large amounts of data. Their presence could determine the power and influence of host countries and the businesses operating within them.

Notes:

[i] See: “US-China tech war’s new battleground: undersea internet cables,” South China Morning Post,” 14 December 2019. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3042058/us-china-tech-wars-new-battleground-undersea-internet-cables

[ii] For more information on The Clean Network, see U.S. Department of State summary. https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/

[iii] In 2021 Google and Facebook announced they had halted efforts to lay undersea cable connecting California and Hong Kong due to U.S.-China tension. See: “Google, Facebook unveil new Asia undersea data cable plan linking Singapore, Japan, others,” South China Morning Post, 16 August 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3145253/google-facebook-unveil-new-asia-undersea-data-cable-plan?campaign=3145253&module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

[iv] The gradual restricting of subsea cables to China is occurring at the same time that the U.S. officials are warning that existing subsea cables could be sabotaged or tampered with by Chinese maintenance vessels contracted to maintain existing subsea cables. See: “U.S. Fears Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Espionage From Chinese Repair Ships,” The Wall Street Journal, 19 May 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-internet-cables-repair-ships-93fd6320

Image Information:
Image: Underwater fiber optic cable on the ocean floor
Source: https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/article/protecting-submarine-cables-enhanced-connectivity-subsea/155612/
Attribution: CC by 4.0

China Introduces People’s Liberation Army-Information Support Force

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“The Information Support Force is a newly created strategic force and a key support for coordinating the construction and application of network information systems. It plays an important role and has a major responsibility in promoting the high-quality development of the army and winning modern wars.”

On 19 April, the Chinese Communist Party joined the Central Military Commission to unveil the new People’s Liberation Army-Information Support Force (PLA-ISF), a strategic arm of the PLA responsible for overseeing the development and application of the network information system. The PLA-ISF appears to have replaced the PLA Strategic Support Force, which was responsible for strategic missions including space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, signals intelligence, information warfare, and communications.[i] The role and responsibilities of the PLA-ISF are expected to be much broader and will integrate artificial intelligence into military operations.

While there are still few specifics available about the PLA-ISF, the first article, published in one of Asia’s largest English-language pan-Asia digital news platforms, Asia Times, opines that the aim of the PLA-ISF is to “better integrate emerging AI, Quantum, and other technologies into multi-domain operational concept against the United States and its allies.” The author argues that this new development underscores the importance to the PLA of shifting its warfare strategy from informationized to intelligentized.  The establishment of the PLA-ISF is being hailed as a significant move. According to the second excerpted article from the PLA’s official newspaper PLA Daily, the PLA-ISF is the key support for coordinating the construction and application of network information systems.  It will improve the army’s joint combat capability and multi-domain combat capability by having a network information system at its core. Finally, it will help to achieve China’s goal of becoming a world-class force by  the 100th anniversary of the founding the PLA in 2027. This sentiment is echoed in the third excerpted article published on the website of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. In it, Senior Colonel Wu Qian, Director of the Information Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, gave a press conference in which he explained that establishing the PLA-ISF will accelerate the pace of China’s national defense and military modernization and give the country “the ability to fight and win in modern warfare.”

Sources:

Gabriel Honrada, “New PLA Unit Underscores Intelligentized Warfare Shift,” Asia Times, (one of the region’s largest English-language pan-Asia digital news platforms.), 22 April 2024. https://asiatimes.com/2024/04/new-pla-unit-underscores-intelligentized-warfare-shift/

PLA-ISF aims to better integrate emerging AI, quantum and other technologies into multi-domain operational concept against the US and its allies.

China has just unveiled its People’s Liberation Army-Information Support Force (PLA-ISF), a rebranding of its previous PLA-Strategic Support Force (PLA-SSF) to reflect new responsibilities and capabilities and guide the military’s technology-driven integrated combat concept, Chinese state media reports said.

In contrast to traditional PLA services such as the Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force, the PLA’s strategic arms, such as the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force and Joint Logistics Support, focus on more specialized areas critical to modern warfare.

Source:  “解放军报评论员：努力建设一支强大的现代化信息支援部队 (PLA Daily Commentator: Strive to Build a Strong Modern Information Support Force),” Chinese Ministry of National Defense, reposted from PLA Daily (Official newspaper of the PLA), 20 April 2024. http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16302172.html

… As a newly created strategic branch of the military, the information support force is the key support for the coordinated construction and application of network information systems, and plays an important role in promoting the high-quality development of our army and winning the battle against the enemy. The information support force plays an important role and has great responsibilities in modern warfare. Reform will be successful and a strong army can be expected. The establishment of the information support force will definitely help improve our army’s joint combat capability and all-domain combat capability based on the network information system, and will definitely help achieve the goal of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the army as scheduled and accelerate the construction of the people’s army into a world-class army.

The reform and strengthening of the army is in full swing, and the clarion call is sounded to open a new chapter. At present, the entire army is going all out to fight a tough battle to achieve the goal of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the army. The responsibility is heavy and the mission is urgent.

Source: “信息支援部队是全新打造的战略性兵种 (The Information Support Force is a New Strategic Branch of the Military),” Chinese Ministry of National Defense website, 19 April 2024. http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16302053.html

Question: The conference inaugurates the Information Support Force. What kind of force is it?Wu Qian: The adjustment and establishment of information support forces is a major decision made by the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission from the overall perspective of strengthening the military. It is a strategic move to build a new type of military structure and layout and improve the modern military force system with Chinese characteristics. It has great and far-reaching significance for accelerating the modernization of national defense and the military and effectively fulfilling the mission and tasks of the people’s army in the new era…

Notes:

[i] China’s Strategic Support Force was responsible for strategic missions including space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, signals intelligence, information warfare, and communications. See Kevin McCauley, “People’s Liberation Army Changing Mission Of Civilian Personnel,” OE Watch, 06-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/peoples-liberation-army-changing-mission-of-civilian-personnel/; and Tim Thomas, “China’s New ‘4+2’ Service Branch Structure,” OE Watch, Volume 06, Issue 10, p27. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195241