Category Archives: OE Watch

Maduro Shakes Up Top Security Posts in Venezuela Following Disputed Election

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Nicolas Maduro casts his vote in the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election.

“These adjustments occur amid repeated attempts by the opposition to force the Armed Forces to ‘respect’ the results of the elections of July 28, after which the Chavista leader was proclaimed reelected amid allegations of fraud.”

In the aftermath of a deeply contested election, the Maduro regime in Venezuela has undertaken a major reorganization of security positions to consolidate control around the dictator.  

The Maduro regime in Venezuela confronted its toughest challenge yet in July 2024 as it faced a united opposition and a singular candidate in Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia. By most accounts, Maduro did not count the actual votes—which he likely lost by a ratio of more than 2:1—and declared himself the winner through his control of the country’s National Electoral Council.[i] Following the disputed election, the Maduro regime has engaged in a massive campaign of repression, imprisoning thousands.[ii] As reported in the excerpted article from major Spanish daily El País, Maduro has also fired several high-level regime insiders, part of his effort to solidify control. The article reports that Maduro has selected a new head of civilian and military intelligence and that he also fired several high-level generals considered close to the ruling elite.

The excerpted article from Colombian digital outlet NTN24 reports that Alexis Rodriguez Cabello, nephew of regime insider and recently promoted Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, has assumed the role of intelligence chief. The NTN24 article also reports that among other firings and personnel shuffling, the regime reconfirmed Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez to his current position. Lopez has been a loyal regime insider for more than a decade.

The shuffle within the upper ranks of the security forces is an important development for Venezuela’s operational environment. Following the election, which the opposition challenged by uploading to an online platform the polling place tally sheets showing Maduro’s electoral drubbing, Maduro is closing ranks around his regime. In these efforts, we are likely to see further purges and infighting as Maduro seeks to prevent Venezuela’s opposition from exacerbating fractures within the regime. It is highly noteworthy that Maduro has confirmed faith in the current defense minister.

Sources:

“Maduro cambia a sus altos cargos de inteligencia acusados de violaciones a los derechos humanos (Maduro replaces top intelligence officials accused of human rights violations),” El País (the Spanish newspaper of record with excellent regional coverage), 15 October 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-10-15/maduro-cambia-a-sus-altos-cargos-de-inteligencia-acusados-de-violaciones-a-los-derechos-humanos.html 

‘I ordered changes to be made to the Higher General Staff of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces,’ Maduro said in a message on Telegram that he accompanied with a video during a visit to the Military Academy where he reported on the appointments. ‘These changes serve to strengthen cohesion, organization, discipline, and Venezuela’s ability to defend itself.’…These adjustments occur amid repeated attempts by the opposition to force the Armed Forces to ‘respect’ the results of the elections of July 28, after which the Chavista leader was proclaimed reelected amid allegations of fraud… Maduro’s government lacks legitimacy after the presidential elections in July and its stability is fundamentally supported by its ironclad control of the military forces.

“Maduro hizo cambios en la Fuerza Armada, ratificó a Padrino y designó a nuevos jefes de la DGCIM y el Sebin (Maduro made changes in the Armed Forces, ratified Padrino and appointed new heads of the DGCIM and the Sebin),” NTN24 (a Colombian digital news outlet with excellent regional coverage), 14 October 2024. https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-politica/maduro-hizo-cambios-en-la-fuerza-armada-ratifico-a-padrino-y-designo-a-nuevos-jefes-de-la-dgcim-y-el-sebin-518953   

On Monday, October 14, Nicolás Maduro ordered changes in the Higher General Staff of the National Armed Forces, however he kept his Minister of Defense, Vladimir Padrino López. General Domingo Antonio Hernández Larez will also remain in his current position as head of the Strategic Operational Command. The brother of the head of CEOFANB, Johan Alexander Hernández Larez, is appointed General Command of the Army…At the head of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) and the Presidential Honor Guard (GHP), Major General Javier Marcano Tábata has been appointed. Major General Alexis Rodríguez Cabello heads the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN).

Notes:

[i] For more information on the brazen election theft that occurred in Venezuela in July 2024, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

[ii] For more information on the post-electoral crackdown, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “A Question of Staying Power: Is the Maduro Regime’s Repression Sustainable?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 21 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/question-staying-power-maduro-regimes-repression-sustainable

Image Information:

Image: Nicolas Maduro casts his vote in the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election.
Source: https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicol%C3%A1s_Maduro_casting_his_vote_%282024%29.png?uselang=de%7Chttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicol%C3%A1s_Maduro_casting_his_vote_%282024%29.png.   
Attribution: CC BY 3.0

Latin America’s Dictators Scramble To Join BRICS

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The principal members of the BRICS grouping pose for a photo at the 2018 BRICS Summit.

“Venezuela was left out of the final list of countries that aspired to be partners, at the request of Brazil…Venezuela has not commented on Brazil’s refusal to allow it to join the bloc.”

In recent years, the BRICS grouping—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has emerged as a major challenger to the Western-supported international order.[i] Led by major emerging market economies on five continents, BRICS has increased its influence over matters of global financial governance, reform of multilateral institutions, and support of a Global South agenda. The group has also pushed to expand its ranks and influence, with five countries from the Middle East and the Horn of Africa joining in 2023. At least three Latin American countries, Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia, sought entrance to the organization at the 2024 BRICS Summit, held in Kazan, Russia.[ii]

As CNN en Español notes, the regional outlet of the U.S. media company, the Maduro regime in Venezuela has pushed the hardest to gain entry. The outlet reports that Maduro traveled to Kazan, Russia, to press his country’s case and meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. As the Colombian digital news outlet NTN24 relays, this was Maduro’s first international trip after elections widely considered to be fraudulent and stolen in Venezuela.[iii] Maduro’s intention, the outlet states, is to establish diplomatic partnerships to reduce his international isolation and secure economic lifelines to avoid increasing sanctions. Both outlets report that Brazil vetoed Venezuela’s membership over concerns related to its election conduct in July 2024. For their parts, Bolivia and Cuba, two other autocratic regimes in Latin America, secured “partner status” on their way to membership in the BRICS.

This development signals that dictatorships in Latin America see the BRICS grouping as an economic and political lifeline amid difficult economic and diplomatic moments. Relatedly, the inclusion of a greater number of Latin American countries in BRICS will bring China and Russia further into the Western Hemisphere, where both have been increasing their influence of late.

Sources:

“Maduro se reúne con Putin durante cumbre de los BRICS en Rusia (Maduro meets Putin during BRICS summit in Russia), CNN en Español (the regional outlet of the US network), 23 October 2024. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/10/23/reunion-maduro-putin-cumbre-brics-orix

Putin, who is chairing the meeting, said he supported Venezuela’s aspiration to join the group of emerging economies. The Russian president also highlighted that both nations have several projects to cooperate in economics, politics, science and culture, among other issues. The group, which began with Russia, Brazil, China, India and South Africa, recently included Iran, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Venezuela was left out of the final list of countries that aspired to be partners, at the request of Brazil…Venezuela has not commented on Brazil’s refusal to allow it to join the bloc.

“Maduro llega a Rusia para solicitar sumarse al BRICS en su primer viaje después de las elecciones (Maduro arrives in Russia to request to join BRICS on his first trip after the elections),” NTN24 (a Colombian digital news outlet with excellent regional coverage), 22 October 2024. https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-politica/maduro-llega-a-rusia-para-solicitar-sumarse-al-brics-en-su-primer-viaje-despues-de-las-elecciones-520339  

Maduro’s visit is for the BRICS meeting, in which around twenty countries, including Venezuela, are asking to join the bloc in order to boost their economies. Maduro is traveling on the same day that marks one year since the primary elections that sparked an unprecedented citizen movement to elect the opposition candidate to face Maduro in the presidential election…One of the countries that has demanded that Maduro show the minutes and respect the will of the people [after another fraudulent election] is the president of Brazil, Luis Inacio Lula Da Silva, who is part of the BRICS and said a day earlier that he would refuse to include Venezuela in the BRICS due to what happened in the elections.

Notes:

[i] For more information about the BRICS grouping and its recent efforts at expansion, see: Mariel Ferragamo, “What is the BRICS Group and Why is it Expanding?,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 October 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding

[ii] For more analysis on Latin America’s dictatorships seeking entrance into the BRICS, see: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Rubi Bledsoe, and Henry Ziemer, “Why Are Latin American Dictators Seeking Membership in BRICS+?,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 28 October 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-are-latin-american-dictators-seeking-membership-brics

[iii] For more information on Venezuela’s July 2024 elections, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds?,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

Image Information:

Image: The principal members of the BRICS grouping pose for a photo at the 2018 BRICS Summit.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brics_Leaders_2016.jpg.  
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Kazakhstan Expands Opportunities for Volunteers To Join the Armed Forces

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A U.S.-produced HMMWV of Kazakhstan’s Ground Forces equipped with a Russian-produced Konkurs anti-tank ground missile on parade.

“Deputies of the Majilis (the lower house of parliament) of Kazakhstan have adopted a bill that allows citizens to volunteer for the army during periods of mobilization, martial law, and also in wartime.”

Kazakhstan’s armed forces began to draw operational and tactical lessons from the war in Ukraine not long after Russia invaded in February 2022.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports that Kazakhstan is again using the example of the war in Ukraine to introduce a new law that allows citizens to volunteer for the military in the event of a war. The new law envisions volunteers joining units serving on the front lines or units operating in rear areas.[ii] In addition to the proposed law on volunteers, the article goes on to note that Kazakhstan will potentially set up a reserve force in 2025. The law stipulates that potential reservists will come from a wide age range (18-50 years old for enlisted and NCOs, and up to 60 years old for officers) and that they can serve in their home region. The article points out—as the war in Ukraine has revealed—that solving mobilization issues and having a trained reserve is important in modern armed conflict. In response, the new plan has the potential to draw in significant numbers of volunteers.

Remember, Kazakhstan has been concerned about Russia annexing its northern regions since it became independent in 1991. Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a group of Russian officials amplified this concern by suggesting Kazakhstan’s northern regions belong to Russia.[iii] Despite these comments, Kazakhstan and Russia have maintained good overall relations. However, the war in Ukraine and the need to have a force available for a potential conflict are pushing Kazakhstan to adapt and expand opportunities for volunteers to join the armed forces.

Sources:

“В Казахстане появятся «добровольцы» для обороны в военное время (In Kazakhstan there will be “volunteers” for defense in the event of a war),” Fergana Agency (independent Russian-language news website focusing on Central Asia), 30 October 2024.

https://fergana.agency/news/135448

Deputies of the Majilis (the lower house of parliament) of Kazakhstan have adopted a bill that allows citizens to volunteer for the army during periods of mobilization, martial law, and also in wartime…

The document, in particular, introduces the concept of “volunteer” into legislation. “Self-defense formations, which will include volunteers, will be formed on the basis of local military command units and will be directly subordinate to them. In peacetime, a number of activities have already been planned during the preparation process, including the training of volunteers,” — Deputy Minister of Defense Sultan Kamaletdinov reported…

He added that if volunteers carry out combat missions, they will be led by military command units. If they are engaged in “provision” in the rear, they will be subordinate to local executive bodies…

It was previously reported that in 2025 in Kazakhstan a new type of military service could emerge – service in the reserve. Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan from 18 to 50 years of age (this applies to soldiers and sergeants) and up to 60 years of age for the officer corps will be voluntarily accepted. Only those who have passed the medical examination and special check will be included in the reserve. It is assumed that these will be people who have already completed military service or short-term military training courses, and also studied at military departments at universities.

Reservists will be trained in military units, weapons and military equipment will be assigned to them. They will serve only in their region.

The Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan has begun to propose changes to the concept of service against the backdrop of events in Ukraine. Several years ago, the department noted that modern armed conflicts have revealed a number of problematic issues related to the mobilization of armed forces, the preparation and availability of military-trained reserves, as well as the timely arrival of military personnel from the reserve to replenish losses or rotate personnel.

Notes:

[i] Kazakhstan’s army trained on defending against unmanned aerial systems after observing how Ukraine and Russia utilized them in the first year of the war, while Kazakhstan’s armed forces incorporated several operational and tactical lessons from the war into its annual joint, large-scale exercise in 2023, see: Aygerim Ummat, “Токаеву показали, как проходят военные учения ‘Батыл тойтарыс – 2023’” (Tokayev was shown how the armed forces carried out the exercise “Batyl toytarys – 2023”),” Informburo (a semi-independent Russian-language news website in Kazakhstan), 5 September 2023. https://informburo.kz/novosti/tokaevu-pokazali-kak-proxodyat-voennye-uceniya-batyl-toitarys-2023

[ii] Even as this new legislation takes effect, Kazakhstan has been working to reduce the number of conscripts in the armed forces by enticing those conscripted, through offers of good wages and other benefits, to sign contracts after their one-year conscription period ends. This is part of a long-term effort that began in 2013 to have an all-volunteer force, though no timetable has been set for when this transition will be completed. It is estimated that Kazakhstan’s armed forces are now made up of 70 percent contract soldiers with the rest made up of conscripts.

[iii] A few months after the invasion of Ukraine, several members of Russia’s State Duma (lower house of parliament) questioned whether Kazakhstan’s northern territories belong to Russia, causing concerns in Kazakhstan that the comments could be a pretext to the territory being annexed or invaded, even though nothing further came of it, see: “Токаев выразил недоумение неуместными высказываниями российских деятелей в адрес Казахстана (Toqaev expressed surprise at the inappropriate statements of Russian officials directed at Kazakhstan),” Vlast (an independent Russian-language news website in Kazakhstan, 17 June 2022. https://vlast.kz/novosti/50438-tokaev-vyrazil-nedoumenie-neumestnymi-vyskazyvaniami-rossijskih-deatelej-v-adres-kazahstana.html

Image Information:

Image: A U.S.-produced HMMWV of Kazakhstan’s Ground Forces equipped with a Russian-produced Konkurs anti-tank ground missile on parade.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HMMWV_Казахстанской_армии_с_установленным_ПТРК_Фагот.JPG
Attribution: CCO 1.0

Chadian President Threatens Withdrawal From Multinational Joint Task Force

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Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.

“The MNJTF is today hampered by the “lack of mutualization of efforts” needed to confront this common enemy [Boko Haram].”

On 28 October 2024, Boko Haram carried out a significant attack against Chadian soldiers in Barakaram on Lake Chad, killing at least 40.[i] Chadian President Mahamat Idris Deby Itno reacted to the Barakaram attack not by requesting greater collaboration with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF),[ii] which Nigeria has done in response to Boko Haram attacks. Rather, according to the excerpted article from the French-language website airinfoagadez.com, Deby Itno is considering withdrawing Chad from the MNJTF altogether, which could add further stress to the 20-year-old organization. Niger, which itself withdrew from the MNJTF in June after alleging the Economic Community of West African States was interfering in its internal affairs, had in late August reported to Nigeria that it would renew cooperation with the MNJTF. But now a Chadian withdrawal could undermine the force.

According to the accompanying article, Deby Itno sees insufficient “mutual” contributions to the MNJTF, perhaps implying that Niger’s wavering about staying in the organization contributed to the inability to stop Boko Haram from augmenting its ranks on the lake or that Chad is shouldering an excessive burden in the force. More specifically, the president’s office alleged that the MNJTF had become “lethargic,” which hindered Chad’s ability to engage in counterterrorism operations. The article suggested that if Chad operated outside the MNJTF, it could operate more autonomously and secure the country’s borders. The article did, however, claim that a Chadian withdrawal from the MNJTF would exacerbate the security vulnerabilities of other Lake Chad countries, including Niger, even though the Chadian president hinted that withdrawing from the MNJTF would not cause Chad to abandon its commitment to the regional fight against terrorism.

It is possible that Chad simply no longer needs the MNJTF for counterterrorism against Boko Haram, or at least that Deby Itno is confident in relying on his own army, despite tactical defeats such as that in Barakaram. Alternatively, Deby Into may be using the threat to withdraw from the MNJTF to solicit more international support for the force, a demand he has also made.[iii] Indeed, given that the MNJTF is based in N’Djamena, Chad, Deby Itno’s comments represent an existential threat for the MNJTF if they become reality.

Sources:

“Le Tchad envisage un retrait de la Force Multinationale Mixte (FMM) (Chad Considers Withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force),” airinfoagadez.com (media group combining Aïr-Info Agadez, RADIO Sahara FM, Agadez Web TV in Agadez, Niger and covering Sahelian political and security affairs), 3 November 2024. https://airinfoagadez.com/2024/11/03/le-tchad-envisage-un-retrait-de-la-force-multinationale-mixte-fmm/

Chad announced it is considering a possible withdrawal of its troops from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), citing a “lack of mutualization of efforts” in this regional coalition against Boko Haram. This decision, announced on November 3, comes after a recent deadly attack by the Boko Haram sect against Chadian forces in Barkaram, in Lake Chad province. On the ground, [President Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno] oversaw security reinforcement measures and ordered the launch of Operation Haskanite to track down the attackers.

The MNJTF “seems to be falling into lethargy,” which undermines the effectiveness of the joint fight. If the withdrawal were confirmed, Chad could opt for autonomous operations and concentrate resources on securing its borders. Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno reaffirmed the duty to protect Chadian citizens first and foremost, while emphasizing that the country would continue to uphold its commitments in the regional fight against terrorism.

Notes:

[i] The recent Boko Haram attack on Barakaram is the deadliest since a raid on the Chadian base in Bohoma along Lake Chad in 2020. Nearly 80 soldiers were killed in the Bohoma raid, showcased in a Boko Haram video revealing beheadings, soldiers fleeing the base, and a helicopter flying overhead to assess the situation in the aftermath of the attack.

[ii] The MNJTF was founded in 1994 to curb banditry. In 2015, the force, which by then comprised Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin, expanded its scope to ending the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region. Its headquarters was also in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena, but the force was largely Nigeria-centric, given that it collaborated alongside multiple Nigerian counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram.

[iii] “Chad urges international community to boost support after Boko Haram attack,” france24.com. 30 October 2024. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20241030-chad-urges-international-community-to-boost-support-after-boko-haram-attack

Image Information:

Image: Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.
Source: André Kodmadjingar (VOA), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mahamat_Idriss_Deby_(en_boubou_blanc).png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Nigerian Senator Proposes Employment of Private Military Companies Against Boko Haram

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Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.

“These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”

Nigeria is a country that has historically shied away from employing private military companies (PMCs) as a matter of national sovereignty. When the country has employed PMCs, including a South African-led contingent[i] that combatted Boko Haram in 2015, it has not yielded success beyond short-term gains. However, the excerpted Daily Trust article indicates that an influential politician in Boko Haram’s heartland, Borno State, is now calling for Nigeria to again employ PMCs. According to the article, Borno South Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume[ii] is urging Nigerian President Bola Tinubu to temporarily hire PMCs because the Nigerian military and Civilian Joint Task Force are making progress against Boko Haram but are unable to secure victory. However, the claims that progress is being made against Boko Haram is debatable. For example, the article notes that, among other larger attacks, Boko Haram (likely the faction of the late Abubakar Shekau[iii]) had just raided Ngoshe in the Gwoza local government area and abducted numerous civilians and killed six farmers.

In addition, Ndume’s suggestion that the PMCs would only operate “temporarily” raises questions about whether they could secure victory, given the late Shekau faction and the stronger Islamic State in West Africa Province faction and their predecessors have been fighting since 2009. Since then, neither the Nigerian military nor the Multinational Joint Task Force, comprising Nigeria and its four land neighbors and previous PMCs, has come close to defeating[iv] these factions. Furthermore, Ndume has hinted that the PMCs would not only finish Boko Haram in this “temporary” time frame but also combat the possibly even more widespread problem of banditry in northwestern Nigeria. Defeating either Boko Haram or the bandits, let alone both, would be an insurmountable task for Nigeria’s military even if several thousand PMC personnel were operating alongside them.

Ndume did not mention the company or origin of the PMCs whom he is advising Tinubu to employ. Nevertheless, the main option in the region would seem to be Russia’s Africa Corps, the successor of the Wagner Group. The recent pro-Russian sentiment exhibited during anti-corruption protests in northern Nigeria, as well as the Russian efforts to displace the West, including France in the Sahel and potentially the United States in Nigeria, could represent the beginning of Russian efforts to pull Nigeria closer into its orbit for the first time since the end of the Soviet era. If Ndume’s proposal gains traction, it could herald new geopolitical contestation in Nigeria, but few favorable outcomes for counterinsurgency or counter-banditry in the country.

Sources:

“Ndume asks Tinubu to hire military contractors to flush out Boko Haram,” Daily Trust (most widely circulated newspaper in northern Nigeria, which covers the region’s affairs from a critical perspective), 2 October 2024. https://dailytrust.com/ndume-asks-tinubu-to-hire-military-contractors-to-flush-out-boko-haram/

Senator representing Borno South, Mohammed Ali Ndume, has called on President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to temporarily hire the services of “military contractors” to wipe out the remnants of Boko Haram terrorists in Borno State. Ndume, who hailed the gallant performance of the military and Civilian JTF, said they are ill-equipped to carry out the task of eliminating the remaining insurgents who operate within. “All across the world, governments hire the services of military contractors to engage in certain places. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu can consider this as a short measure. These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”

“These contractors will come with their equipment and military hardware. In a very short time, they’ll eliminate those Boko Haram terrorists. The contractors can also be used to eliminate those bandits operating in the North West. His comment comes after Boko Haram terrorists launched a fresh attack in Ngoshe, Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno, where they  slaughtered six farmers and  abducted five others including women.

Notes:

[i] In 2015, ISWAP lost territory after the armies of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and South African PMCs led by a former apartheid-era South African Defence Force officer supported the Nigerian army to expel ISWAP from towns it had controlled in northeastern Nigeria. Nevertheless, disputes over payments of the PMCs, ISWAP’s retreat into rural areas, and ISWAP’s retaliatory attacks against Niger, Chad, and Cameroon undermined the counter-ISWAP offensive’s momentum. The PMCs and Nigeria’s three neighboring countries all eventually left Nigeria and ISWAP and the Shekau faction both renewed operations in 2017 to recapture territories and overrun Nigerian military outposts and bases.

[ii] Ndume himself was suspected of supporting Boko Haram and even jailed early in the insurgency in 2012 when he reportedly contacted Boko Haram leadership 73 times in one month. It later surfaced that he was, however, attempting to negotiate.

[iii] Since the Shekau faction split from ISWAP in 2016, Gwoza has remained one of its strongholds. In addition, mass abductions and killings of civilian farmers is typical of the Shekau faction’s brutality, whereas ISWAP has generally avoided tactics that alienate and brutalize the local population.

[iv] The Nigerian president from 2015 to 2023, Muhammadu Buhari, notoriously claimed that Boko Haram was “technically defeated” after coming into office only to see the two main factions resurface stronger than before by 2017.

Image Information:

Image: Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.
Source: VOA, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:R%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9sMaiduguri2016.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Arabic-Language Media Divided on Hezbollah’s Future

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Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah during a discussion with officials from supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei’s office, circa 2019. Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli strike in late September 2024.

“If [Nasrallah’s] lasting lesson for us is to turn a threat into an opportunity, then the resistance today has an opportunity to reorganize its affairs in a way that opens the door to a qualitative renewal on several levels in its mentality, management, programs, and work tools…”

Hezbollah’s future has become a subject of intense speculation in Arabic-language media following the group’s loss of its top leadership in Israeli strikes earlier this year, including that of Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024. [i] Hezbollah’s friends and foes alike agree that the leadership decapitation was a painful blow, but they disagree on the degree to which the group will be able to adapt and reconstitute in the aftermath. Ultimately, predictions of Hezbollah’s future hinge largely on whether Hezbollah is seen primarily as a hierarchically organized Iranian proxy or as a grassroots Lebanese political movement. Those who view Hezbollah as a hierarchically organized Iranian proxy are more likely to see the leadership decapitation as a critical blow, while those who emphasize its grassroots Lebanese identity tend to view the losses as difficult but surmountable.

The first two accompanying excerpts, from the UAE think tank Emirates Policy Center and the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida, illustrate the type of analysis that emphasizes Iranian influence and hierarchical organization as central components to Hezbollah’s strength. The first excerpt warns that the loss of old-guard leadership and the transition to a younger generation beholden to Iran is unlikely to be seamless and risks creating fissures that will fracture the group into smaller—arguably more dangerous—territorial-based factions. The second excerpt, meanwhile, suggests that Tehran may seek greater direct control over Hezbollah to prevent fragmentation and ensure organizational cohesion.

On the other hand, however, supporters and sympathizers of Hezbollah argue that the movement is resilient enough to reconstitute internally in the aftermath of the losses. Although the loss of Nasrallah and other top leaders is significant, they view it as a setback rather than a death blow for an organization designed to be adaptable. Writing in the wake of Nasrallah’s death, the editor-in-chief of the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar explains how the group can be expected to restructure and rebuild in a way that addresses the vulnerabilities that allowed Israel to decimate its leadership.

Ultimately, despite varied predictions—whether of fragmentation, increased Iranian control, or adaptive transformation—all analyses seem to agree on one point: Hezbollah, even after these substantial leadership losses, will continue to exert a powerful influence on the regional strategic landscape.

Sources:

تداعيات تغييب الجيل المؤسس لـ «حزب الله» اللبناني: إعادة التشكيل، أم التشظّي والانفراط؟

“The repercussions of the absence of the founding generation of the Lebanese Hezbollah: Restructuring, or fragmentation and disintegration?” Emirates Policy Center (UAE think tank), 9 October 2024. https://www.epc.ae/ar/details/brief/tadaeiat-taghyib-aljil-almuasis-li-hezbollah

In the case of Hezbollah, the absence of the “charismatic leader” is accompanied by strategic shocks and numerous major absences, which have put the fate of the entire party in question…

The new leadership of the party is likely to be formed from the generation of youth who were educated and trained in Iran, a generation that speaks Persian fluently no less than Arabic. These sons grew up in a time of prosperity, when the party had abundant resources, its revenues were abundant from various sources, and its weapons were advanced and plentiful…

But the sudden absence of the older generation, and the rise of the new generation of sons will create a huge void. It is a generation that does not enjoy the same historical ties that their fathers enjoyed; its decisions are controlled by Shiite doctrine and Iranian directives without any significant influence from Lebanese motives…

Perhaps the greatest danger to Lebanon and the region is the possibility of Hezbollah splitting and fragmenting into a group of competing terrorist organizations and gangs spread across the Lebanese arena… Such a dangerous scenario should never be allowed to be repeated in Lebanon…

In short, the series of Israeli assassinations against Hezbollah leaders has a tactical effect that Israel wants on the battlefield; it will reduce the party’s ability to manage and fight the battle, but it will open the doors of Lebanon and the region to the unknown, and put Hezbollah on the brink of fragmentation, sliding into more extremism, chaos, and the rise of warlords…

إيران تعيّن «وصياً» على «حزب الله»

“Iran appoints Hezbollah ‘guardian’,” al-Jarid (Kuwaiti daily), 10 November, 2024. https://www.aljarida.com/article/77625

A source in the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps revealed to al-Jarida that Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, the assistant commander of the force, has been appointed as a “supervisor” of the Lebanese Hezbollah, pending the appointment of the party’s new secretary-general after the assassination of its secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah…

The source indicated that Fallahzadeh, who was the shadow of the former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, and who has extensive experience in managing wars and field battles, will temporarily supervise the party, and his appointment will not require any organizational procedures within the party, nor will it result in any change in the party’s political structure. He stressed that the party’s political decision will remain in the hands of its “Lebanese leaders,” who will remain in their positions and communicate with other Lebanese forces and with the Lebanese authorities, explaining that Fallahzadeh’s mission lies only in helping to manage the current war with Israel, and securing communication and logistical support for the party.

المقاومة أطلقت ورشة ترميم هيكليتها وقدراتها

“The resistance launched a workshop to restore its structure and capabilities,” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 10 October 2024. https://www.al-akhbar.com/Politics/385253/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87

First, the blow that the resistance received at the level of its central leadership was very harsh, very large, and very broad, and left a direct impact on everything…

Until now, it can be said that the hierarchy and mechanism for issuing essential and urgent decisions, and the sequence of work and implementation orders, are being organized in a way that provides the best organizational environment for the work of the resistance military units, whether those present in the field or those awaiting orders to join…

[Nasrallah’s] role had grown after the martyrdom of leaders from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran during the past two decades, which forced him to distribute their tasks to others, but he had his share of every issue, which was reflected in the past ten years in an extreme centralization in the leadership structure and decision-making in the party. This is what made the enemy bet that the assassination of the Sayyed constitutes a blow to the backbone not only of Hezbollah, but of an entire axis.

Therefore, we must all adapt to the new situation, and not place the burden on whoever takes over the matter after him as was the case before, and not ask anyone, not even God, to bring us an identical copy of the martyred Sayyed. If his lasting lesson for us is to turn a threat into an opportunity, then the resistance today has an opportunity to reorganize its affairs in a way that opens the door to a qualitative renewal on several levels in its mentality, management, programs, and work tools…

Notes:

[i] The speculation is hardly confined to Arabic-language media. For a sample of the debate within the U.S. think tank community, see for instance: Sarah E. Parkinson and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl. “Targeted Killings Won’t Destroy Hezbollah,” Foreign Affairs, 11 November 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/targeted-killings-wont-destroy-hezbollah; Bruce Hoffman. “The Nasrallah Killing Is a Crushing Blow to Hezbollah,” Council on Foreign Relations, 28 September 2024. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/nasrallah-killing-crushing-blow-hezbollah; “Experts react: Hassan Nasrallah is dead. What’s next for Hezbollah, Israel, and Iran?” Atlantic Council, 28 September 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-hassan-nasrallah-is-dead-whats-next-for-hezbollah-israel-and-iran/

Image Information:

Image: Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah during a discussion with officials from supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei’s office, circa 2019. Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli strike in late September 2024.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sayyid_Nasrallah.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

North Korean State Media Quickly Censors Its Own Photos

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A before and after image from the same PRK state media article reporting on the contents of a balloon launched from South Korea. The first image was downloaded before the PRK decided to censor and pixelate the image, while the second one obscures the contents (Oct 15, 2024).

“The security forces organs in the areas where the report of discovery was made have blocked the relevant districts and are conducting the work for searching, gathering and disposal.”

For more than a decade, South Korean NGOs have routinely launched balloons into North Korea containing anti-regime leaflets, USB drives, and CD/DVDs containing foreign media and news reporting, food, medicine, and other items. North Korea considers these launches to be a serious threat to regime stability because the items provide information outside the control of its oppressive and all-consuming censorship apparatus. The balloon launches occur along or near the demilitarized zone when winds are favorable to carry them into the North. North Korea has threatened to attack balloon launch sites or military targets, as Pyongyang claims Seoul is responsible for not stopping the NGOs.

North Korean state-controlled general circulation major daily newspaper Rodong Sinmun recently released several photos of items contained in a probable South Korean NGO-launched balloon into North Korea. However, within 24 hours of releasing the photos, North Korea redacted them by pixelating the balloon’s contents. This appears to be an act of narrative damage control by Pyongyang. North Korean state media at all levels has been criticizing these balloon launches for months, with increasingly frustrated commentaries and threats by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong, who is vice chair of the central committee of ruling Korean Workers Party.[i]

In an unusual move, Rodong Sinmun attached the images to another warning commentary by Kim Yo Jong. North Korea characterizes the contents of the balloons as a provocation and sanitizes the areas where they land like a hazardous materials spill site. North Korean state media had not discussed the contents of the balloons before, rather referring to them as “dirty rubbish” that “even a mutt dislikes to touch.” By not providing too much information, it allowed the readers, both domestic and international, to infer the contents. By explicitly showing the contents of the balloon, North Korea removed the mystery. The balloon in this image contains choco-pies (a South Korean favorite) and other snacks, possibly some sanitary napkins or baby wipes, and medicine, among other things. It is probable, but again unclear because of the image quality, that it also contained media or anti-regime materials.

North Korea would likely be reacting similarly even if the balloons contained only food, hygiene, and personal items. The quality of these items, information about the outside world, the hint of a better life in South Korea, and the opportunity it holds anger the North Korean regime more than the items themselves. North Korea has consistently demonstrated in its actions that it considers external information to be a critical threat to the Kim Jong Un regime.

Sources:

“김여정 조선로동당 중앙위원회 부부장 담화 (Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the C.C., WPK),” Rodong Sinmun (main party newspaper for general audiences), 18 November 2024. http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?MTVAMjAyNC0xMS0xOC1OMDA1QA

Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued the following statement on November 17:

On November 16, various kinds of political agitation leaflets and dirty things sent by the ROK scum were dropped in many areas near the southern border and even in the depth area of the DPRK.

A continuous report of this was made from various parts all day long yesterday.

The security forces organs in the areas where the report of discovery was made have blocked the relevant districts and are conducting the work for searching, gathering and disposal.

We strongly denounce the shameful and dirty acts of the ROK scum who committed the provocation of scattering anti-DPRK political and conspiratorial agitation things once again in disregard of our repeated warnings.

There will be no house owner who hardly gets enraged at such dirty rubbish scattered in the clean yard, which even a mutt dislikes to touch.

The inviolable territory of the DPRK is being polluted, and much labor had to be used in disposing of these wastes.

There is a limit to patience. The DPRK people’s anger at the most disgusting curs has reached the extremes. The scum will have to pay a dear price.

“조선민주주의인민공화국 사회안전성 대변인발표 (Spokesman for DPRK Ministry of Public Security Releases Statement),” Korean Central News Agency (state-controlled news service), 18 October 2024. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/31281702f661bf24e69b10aab3345c6e.kcmsf

Pyongyang, October 18 (KCNA) — On Friday morning, rubbish scattered by a large balloon sent by the ROK scum was found again in Hwaam-ri and Munbong-ri of Phyonggang County in Kangwon Province and in Ryonghak-ri of Cholwon County of the province near the southern border of the DPRK.

The security organs in those areas blockaded and searched the areas and forensically examined and disposed of the collected rubbish.

The Ministry of Public Security informed the KPA General Staff of the results of the examination.

“김여정 조선로동당 중앙위원회 부부장 담화 발표 (Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong),” Korean Central News Agency (state-controlled news service), 10 June 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/8ec19906a01596bdfc2ca10bf9f8d555.kcmsf

Pyongyang, June 10 (KCNA) — Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued the following press statement on Sunday.

The ROK connived at the provocative act of scattering the political agitation rubbish across the border of the DPRK again on June 6 and 7 despite our repeated warning against the intemperate psychological warfare of the scum who defected from the DPRK, thus aggravating the situation.

In the period between June 6 and 8, the despicable political agitation rubbish was discovered in Singye and Thosan counties of North Hwanghae Province, Jangphung County and Phanmun District of Kaesong Municipality, Kosan, Phyonggang and Cholwon counties of Kangwon Province and other areas of the DPRK near the border.

This is a prelude to a very dangerous situation.

Politicians of Seoul are trying hard to justify their stand with the only and strange deformed logic in the world that regulates and judges the “freedom of expression” and “provocation” in the windward direction. And they formalized their behavior just like a guilty filing the suit first that they have resumed the loudspeaker broadcasting smear campaign again against the DPRK’s counteraction against their challengeable act, thus creating a new crisis.

We strongly denounce the despicable and childish behavior of the ROK and clarify our stand responding to it.

Notes:

[i] Kim Yo Jong comments are likely intended to convey authoritative messages from the PRK government without restraining leader Kim Jong Un’s options. Her messages are undoubtedly authoritative, but not final.

Image Information:

Image: A before and after image from the same PRK state media article reporting on the contents of a balloon launched from South Korea. The first image was downloaded before the PRK decided to censor and pixelate the image, while the second one obscures the contents (Oct 15, 2024).
Source: http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTJAMjAyNC0xMS0xOC1IMDAzQDE1QDFAQDBAMTA==
Attribution: Public Domain under Art. XII of the Copyright Act of North Korea, aka PD-KPGov, which is “government or other works in the public domain”

Iran Struggles to Supply Its Electric Grid

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The Tehran headquarters of Tavanir, a subsidiary electricity company of Iran’s Ministry of Electricity.

“There will be electricity cuts in the domestic and commercial sectors.”

While Iran boasts the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves after Russia, it is increasingly difficult for it to provide enough supply to its electrical generating stations to power its electric grid. The problem is especially severe in the winter as consumption increases. Iran’s failure to provide electricity has ramifications for domestic stability and could affect the larger regional operational environment.[i]

The excerpted notice, first posted on the Iranian Ministry of Electricity’s website, noted that there will be forthcoming power disruptions, partially due to the decision not to use mazut. This heavy, low-quality fuel oil is a byproduct of refining but degrades electrical generating plants and causes heavy air pollution. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s decision to shutter mazut-burning plants suggests regime fear of popular backlash to air pollution trumps the discord of suffering power cuts.[ii] He is right to worry; Iran has experienced nationwide protests over poor stewardship of the environment.[iii]

While Iranian analysts place responsibility for the energy shortfall on growing consumption, especially during the cold winter months, such an explanation may be too straightforward and exculpatory toward the regime: Iran’s population growth rate is only 0.8 percent. More likely is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which dominates the power industry, is diverting resources for its own aims and agendas. It is unclear if the pending energy cuts will spare the IRGC’s manufacturing base, but, if so, it will likely spark popular antagonism against the elite military force and its domination of Iran’s industrial sector.

Because Iran’s refinery network is decrepit, Iran cannot adequately refine gasoline domestically. This forces the regime to export gas for refining and then reimport it for use in power generation and to inject into oil fields to enable further oil extraction. This creates a lose-lose situation for the Iranian leadership: either it reverts to burning highly polluting substances and risks public protest, or it suffers more frequent power shortfalls and risks public unrest and industrial shortfalls. The danger of either scenario for those outside Iran is similar: When Iran faces domestic unrest, it often lashes out militarily to distract its own public around the nationalist flag.

Sources:

 “اطلاعیه شماره ۱ شرکت توانیر درباره برنامه قطع برق”(Announcement No. 1 of Tavanir Company about the power cut program),” Donya-e-Eqtesad.com (nominally independent center-right financial newspaper), 9 November 2024. https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/بخش-سایت-خوان-62/4121436-فوری-اطلاعیه-شماره-شرکت-توانیر-درباره-برنامه-قطع-برق  

“We would like to inform our dear compatriots that due to the onset of the cold season and the increase in gas consumption in the domestic sector and the restriction of the supply of gas fuel to power plants, and in accordance with the decisions taken not to consume mazut in some power plants, there will be electricity cuts in the domestic and commercial sectors. Respected subscribers can be informed about the time schedule for imposing electricity restrictions from the relevant electricity distribution companies on the My Electricity System website.”

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of Iranian blackouts, see: Michael Rubin, “Blackouts in Bushehr Province Risk Unrest,” OE Watch, August 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/387127/download/

[ii] For previous discussion of Iranian air pollution, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Pollution Problems Peak,” OE Watch, September 2021. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-39-51-99/2021_2D00_09_2D00_01-Iran_1920_s-Pollution-Problems-Peak-_2800_Rubin_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true&_=465e6ac6175646f29c3498916f3fcd2f

[iii] For discussion of Iran’s arrests of environmental activists, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Environmentalists Arrested as Spies,” OE Watch, April 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-28-50-74/2018_2D00_04_2D00_01-Iranian-Environmentalists-Arrested-as-Spies-_2800_Rubin_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true&_=401ef985fd9b4fb89199f41137332cb3

Image Information:

Image: The Tehran headquarters of Tavanir, a subsidiary electricity company of Iran’s Ministry of Electricity.
Source: https://static.neshanmap.ir/places/images/dca/1043877_3901745–شرکت-توانیر.jpeg
Attribution: Nashan.ir

Iranian Navy Closely Monitors U.S. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf

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“Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shahram Irani,” published on 3 November 2024.

“The U.S. aircraft carrier, as well as sixteen destroyers and frigates present in the region, are monitored by our reconnaissance drones, and we are surveilling them from above.”

As tensions stemming from the Gaza war continue, Iran claims that it is sending a message through its monitoring of U.S. naval vessels in regional waters, which it believes do not belong there. As per the excerpted article published by the semi-official Iranian news outlet Mehr News Agency, on 3 November, marking the anniversary of the 444-day hostage crisis, the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, said, “The U.S. aircraft carrier, as well as sixteen destroyers and frigates present in the region, are monitored by our reconnaissance drones, and we are surveilling them from above.” Irani noted that Iranian reconnaissance drones could be seen with the naked eye, and their presence was intended to send a clear message to the United States that its presence is not welcomed in the Middle East and that its naval movements in the region are being monitored. He added, “This is a very important point that we have the ability to monitor the enemy at sea, and it’s become a concern for the Americans.”

Previously, the rear admiral made a reference to the Marshall Islands-flagged Suez Rajan oil tanker (renamed St. Nikolas), which the United States confiscated in 2023 for carrying Iranian oil as it headed to the Bahamas. The rear admiral stated Tehran was able to seize it back from the Gulf of Oman.[i] Irani also said that Iran is capable of escorting oil and commercial shipments   point of strength.”

Although Irani made his comments prior to the U.S. presidential election, it is worth noting that the previous Trump administration’s oil embargo—as part of its maximum pressure strategy—escalated U.S.-Iran tensions to a historic high with the regular seizing and sabotaging of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Tehran has always threatened to shut down the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil passes.[ii] As these comments were made on the anniversary of the Iran hostage crisis, Irani appears to have wanted to emphasize Tehran has command of the waters in the region regardless of tensions and whatever the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.

Sources:

“ناو هواپیمابر، ۱۶ ناوشکن و ناوچه آمریکا را در منطقه رصد می کنیم (We monitor US aircraft carrier, 16 destroyers and frigates in the region)” Mehr News Agency (Iranian state media outlet), 3 November 2024. http://mehrnews.com/x36nJL

According to Mehr News Agency, Shahram Irani, the commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, met with Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Saeedi, custodian of the holy shrine of Fatima Masuma, stated in reference to the National Day of the Fight Against Global Arrogance: “The US aircraft carrier, as well as sixteen destroyers and frigates present in the region, are monitored by our reconnaissance drones, and we are surveilling them from above.”

He stated that our reconnaissance drones can be seen with the naked eye to tell the Americans that their place isn’t in the region and that we are always monitoring their movements. He added: “This is a very important point that we have the ability to monitor the enemy at seas, and it’s become a concern for the Americans.”

The commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that our navy was able to escort the ships of the countries… the navy escorts oil and commercial shipments from the shores of Venezuela to America, Europe, and Africa, and if any aggression is made against our ships, we will respond to it.

He added, “One of the recent actions we carried out was recapture an oil shipment that had been seized by the United States, along with the vessel that was transporting it, despite the US having renamed it.”

Irani added: “We are going after showing system authority in the depths of the oceans, and our actions will be a point of strength for the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Notes:

[i] Kathryn Armstrong, “Iran seizes oil tanker St Nikolas near Oman,” BBC News, 11 January 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67948119

[ii] Mark Landler, Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, “US Puts Iran on Notice and Weighs Response to Attack on Oil Tankers,” New York Times, 14 June 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/us/politics/trump-iran-tanker-hormuz.html

Image Information:

Image: “Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shahram Irani,” published on 3 November 2024.
Source: Mehr News Agency, http://mehrnews.com/x36nJL
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran and Saudi Arabia Deepen Defense and Bilateral Ties

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General chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, and his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, in Tehran.

“We are interested in having the Saudi navy in the coming year participate in a naval exercise with Iran, either with its naval units or as an observer.”

Iran and Saudi Arabia’s defense ties grow despite Donald Trump winning the 2024 U.S. presidential election—known for his maximum pressure strategy on Tehran. According to the semi-official media outlet Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA), on 10 November, the general chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, met with his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, in Tehran, where they discussed “the development of defense diplomacy and the expansion of bilateral cooperation.”

According to the excerpted article from the semi-official news outlet Mehr News Agency, during the meeting, Major General Bagheri also invited the Saudi defense minister to visit Iran and said Tehran is “interested in having the Saudi Navy participate in a naval exercise with Iran in the coming year, either with its naval units or as an observer.” The countries recently participated in a joint naval exercise with Russia and Oman, as well as five other observer countries—among those Saudi Arabia—in the Sea of Oman.[i] General Bagheri is the second high-ranking Saudi official to visit Iran after Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan visited in June 2023.[ii]

The storming of the Saudi missions in Tehran and Mashhad following the execution of prominent Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in January 2016 prompted Saudi Arabia to sever ties with Iran.[iii] In the years since, particularly under the Trump administration, Riyadh had taken a harder stance against Tehran. After the 2019 Aramco attacks, Saudi Arabia felt vulnerable due to Iran-backed attacks, which the administration failed to address. This led to a reassessment of its approach to Tehran and a de-escalation of tensions. It was not until a China-brokered deal in March 2023 that the two neighbors recommenced relations with the reopening of embassies in their respective countries.[iv] According to the Mehr News Agency article, Ruwaili called the Beijing deal “a good basis for increasing bilateral work together between the two countries,” noting that Riyadh considers “this agreement as a strategic opportunity.”

The rare Saudi visit to Iran demonstrates that rapprochement will continue despite a new U.S. administration that is expected to resume its maximum pressure strategy on Tehran. Iran’s “neighborly policy” of improving ties with its Arab neighbors appears to be paying off for now.

Sources:

“رئیس ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح عربستان با سرلشکر باقری دیدار کرد (Saudi Arabia’s chief of staff of the armed forces met with Major General Bagheri),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA; semi-official news agency), 13 November 2024. isna.ir/xdSfrg

General Fayyadh bin Hamed al-Ruwaili met with the chief of staff of the armed forces. According to ISNA, quoting the public relations office of the general staff of the armed forces, General Fayyadh bin Hamed al-Ruwaili, [Saudi] chief of staff of the armed forces, met and talked with Major General Mohammad Bagheri, the[ Iranian] chief of staff of the armed forces.

The development of defense diplomacy and the expansion of bilateral cooperation are among the main topics of this meeting.

Today at noon, the Saudi chief of staff of the armed forces arrived in Tehran as the head of a high-ranking military delegation.

“همکاری‌های دوجانبه دفاعی و نظامی ایران و عربستان بررسی شد (The bilateral defense and military cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia was reviewed),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news outlet), 13 November 2024. mehrnews.com/x36rn3

Major General Mohammad Bagheri, after greeting and welcoming, said: “We believe that cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, given numerous commonalities and abundant potential, can increase.”

The chief of staff of the armed forces of Iran emphasized improving cooperation in the fields of defense and exchanging experiences in the education and sports sectors, adding: “We are interested in having the Saudi navy in the coming year participate in a naval exercise with Iran, either with its naval units or as an observer.”

Examining the improvement of bilateral defense and military cooperation and the Palestine issue was among the topics that were part of the parties’ discussion.

Army General Fayyadh bin Hamed al-Ruwaili, at the time of thanking for the hospitality of the chief of staff of the armed forces, highlighted and emphasized the improvement of the level of cooperation in various fields in the armed forces of the two countries and stated: “The Bejing agreement was a good basis for increasing bilateral work together between the two countries and we consider this agreement as a strategic opportunity.”

He also emphasized the importance of the two countries’ role-playing and influence in uniting the Islamic and regional countries and the continuation of political and defense relations between the two countries.

At the end, Major General Mohammad Bagheri invited the Saudi defense minister to visit Iran.

Notes:

[i] “Iran and Saudi Arabia hold joint naval exercise in Sea of Oman,” Times of Israel, 24 October 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-and-saudi-arabia-hold-joint-naval-exercise-in-sea-of-oman/

[ii] Amir Vahdat, “Saudi foreign minister in Iran as part of restoration of diplomatic ties after a 7-year rift,” Associated Press, 17 June 2024. https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-iran-c04f4483f660c65229535ae80083dbd6

[iii] “Saudi Arabia breaks off ties with Iran after al-Nimr execution,” BBC News, 4 January 2016.  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35217328

[iv] “What You Need to Know About China’s Saudi-Iran Deal,” United States Institute of Peace, 16 March 2023. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal

Image Information:

Image: General chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, and his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, in Tehran,”.
Source: mehrnews Mehr News Agency (semi-official news outlet), 13 November 2024, com/x36rn3
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.