Author Archives: Robert Feldman

DRC Conflicts Reveal Difficulties in Deploying Regional Forces

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M23 rebels in the DRC.

M23 rebels in the DRC.

“But however noble President Kenyatta’s deployment proposal, not everyone in the DRC agrees with the regional leaders’ decision of a military solution to stabilise the restive eastern DRC provinces.”

Kenya’s influential President, Uhuru Kenyatta, recently proposed deploying the East African Standby Force (EASF) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  Regional leaders at the East African Community Heads of State Conclave even endorsed Kenyatta’s proposal, but still no troops have been sent to help combat M23 rebels as well as the multiple militias who have ramped up attacks on civilians.  As the excerpted article from the Africa-based media company The East African notes, there are several reasons for this delay.  Many politicians in the DRC, as well as a significant segment of the population, view a potential EASF deployment with distrust.  They are especially wary of having Rwandan troops in the DRC given the long history of hostility between the two nations.  Troops from Uganda and Burundi, as well as Rwanda, are also unwelcomed as they all have rebel groups in the country.  There is fear their divergent goals might further complicate an already complicated situation.  There is also concern that EASF will be comprised of countries that have formerly plundered DRC’s mineral riches.  Finally, there are traditional obstacles to deployment including logistics, communications, rules of engagement, budgets, and agreements on the status of forces.  As the article explains, no timeline exists regarding when these issues would be resolved.   Meanwhile, violence in eastern DRC is increasing, portending further destabilization and the potential interruption of the importation of critical minerals, including those for defense industries.  The recent military intervention in The Gambia by several West African countries under the auspices of ECOWAS gives some hope that East African countries can also come together and find that delicate balance whereby all parties can agree on the terms of a deployment.  Additionally, any solutions to the struggle of launching the EASF could be valuable in helping the African Union’s African Standby Force finally stand up.  Both forces have the potential to help provide the security and stability desperately needed in the DRC and elsewhere in Africa.

Source:

Patrick Ilunga and Luke Anami, “Why the EAC regional force is yet to be deployed to DR Congo,” The East African (African-based media company), 27 June 2022. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/why-the-eac-regional-force-is-yet-deployed-to-dr-congo-3861010

“All the armies from the East African Community states are already present in the east of our country in one form or another.  The Rwandan army is associated with the M23 in North Kivu and supports the Red-Tabara [Burundian rebellion based in Congo].  The Ugandan army, which you invited, has been operating openly in North Kivu and Ituri since November 2021.  The Burundian army operates regularly in South Kivu, and the South Sudanese army in the province of Haut-Uele [northeast of DRC].  The Tanzanian and Kenyan armies are already present in North Kivu and Ituri as part of the UN intervention brigade,” the letter reads.

“At least three out of seven member states of the East African Community have been involved for more than two decades in the aggression and destabilisation of our country through direct interventions of their armies or by proxy, through armed groups.  Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi accuse each other of destabilisation.  They compete for influence, even control of part of our country for security as well as economic and geopolitical reasons, so much so that more than once they have had to confront each other on our territory, directly or through armed groups,” Lucha writes.President Tshisekedi has to make tough decisions.  His main political opponent Martin Fayulu accuses him of “subcontracting the security of the country to Rwanda and Uganda and unnecessarily creating a competition of East African countries over the Congo”” He has called on the president to reveal “his secret deal.”

Image Information:

Image: M23 rebels in the DRC
Source: Al Jazeera/Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:M23_troops_Bunagana_4.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

Regional Coalitions Supersede the AU’s African Standby Force

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Should the African Standby Force become fully operational, soldiers such as these from Burundi would play a key role in peacekeeping for the organization.

Should the African Standby Force become fully operational, soldiers such as these from Burundi would play a key role in peacekeeping for the organization.

“The ASF has never seen action, with ad hoc troop coalitions instead becoming the norm in Africa.”

It has been nearly two decades since the African Union (AU) created the African Standby Force (ASF), a proposed multinational and multidisciplinary peacekeeping military organization.  However, despite numerous conflicts across the continent, the ASF has yet to respond.  Instead, as the accompanying excerpted article from South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies explains, various African regions have created their own ad hoc coalitions of troops to deal with security issues in their associated territories.  For example, seven East African Community countries established a regional military force in April 2022 that helped restore stability in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where militia groups were conducting violent attacks.  Likewise, in 2021 Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community sent forces to northern Mozambique to fight Islamic militants.

These regional coalitions of militaries have not followed the ASF’s concepts regarding how and when forces should be deployed and have called into question the ASF’s relevance.  The coalitions believe they are doing the work the ASF was designed to do but has not done.  According to the article, there are several reasons why the ASF has failed to launch.  First, there have been numerous political problems in addition to security concerns between African nations.  There have also been difficulties between the AU and the five regional economic blocs that are supposed to coordinate the ASF.  Some African countries have been slow to commit necessary resources to the ASF.  However, as the article notes, the ASFs biggest problem is that violent extremism was not originally addressed in the organization’s framework, forcing regional coalitions to fill this gap.

Efforts are underway to resolve some of the issues constraining the ASF.  These include forming mechanisms to improve decision-making, facilitating a better understanding of when to deploy the ASF, and expediting the formation of an ASF counterterrorism unit.  While these may sound promising, this is not the first time that the ASF has seen such attempts.  This inability of the AU to have a large, ready, and unified force means Western powers seeking to support peacekeeping operations must deal with several different regional forces instead of one.  Meanwhile, with regional coalitions providing forces to deal with their regional problems, the pressure is off a bit for the AU to stand up the ASF quickly.  However, the inability of the AU to do so reflects the many difficulties it faces trying to unite Africa even in the face of conflicts and terrorism. 

Source:

Meressa K. Dessu and Dawit Yohannes, “Can the African Standby Force Match Up to Current Security Threats?” Institute for Security Studies (South African think tank), 2 June 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-african-standby-force-match-up-to-current-security-threats

The ASF has never seen action, with ad hoc troop coalitions instead becoming the norm in Africa.

The ASF originated in 2003 as a multidisciplinary standby mechanism comprising soldiers, civilians and police in their countries of origin. It is coordinated by the five regional economic communities with the aim of being ready for rapid deployment at short notice. The intention is to help the AU Peace and Security Council discharge its responsibilities relating to peace support missions.

Analysts attribute this problem to the power that regional blocs have over peace and security decisions due to a lack of clarity on the subsidiarity principle between regions and the AU. This ambiguity of roles and responsibilities enables countries to opt for ad hoc security arrangements over the ASF.

Some analysts believe these ad hoc security coalitions complement the ASF and are best suited to tackling Africa’s deadliest transnational armed groups. The coalitions are seen as filling a gap in the AU’s peace and security arsenal by providing immediate responses to violent extremism and other complex threats – which the ASF’s framework doesn’t address.

Image Information:

Image: Should the African Standby Force become fully operational, soldiers such as these from Burundi would play a key role in peacekeeping for the organization.
Source: U.S. Army Africa/Wikimedia Commons/Flickr, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Burundi_peacekeepers_prepare_for_next_rotation_to_Somalia,_Bjumbura,_Burundi_012210_%284324781393%29.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Somalia: Behind Al-Shabaab’s Success in Recruiting Children

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Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.

Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.

“Over the past decade or so, Somali’s federal government has attempted to combat al-Shabaab’s child recruitment in a variety of, ultimately ineffective, ways.”

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Somalia’s newly elected president, is facing many problems in his country, including a drought that threatens millions with famine, political divisions hampering unity, and a rise in attacks by al-Shabaab despite years of combatting the terrorist group.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the pan-African independent news platform African Arguments explains, much of al-Shabaab’s strength owes to its ability to recruit children.  The group uses boys as logistics operatives, combatants, and suicide bombers, while girls are used as cleaners, cooks, and “wives” of the fighters.  The group uses both boys and girls as spies, with their young age helping to lessen suspicion of their activities.

According to the article, al-Shabaab finds it easy to recruit youth due to a variety of factors.  Work in a country with a devastatingly high unemployment rate such as Somalia is a huge draw. Power, marriage, and for those seeking one, a religious education, albeit quite radical, are other reasons for joining al-Shabaab.  There is also widespread discontent with the government, which people perceive as being deeply corrupt.  Abuse at the hands of security forces drives young people to the terrorist organization.  Additionally, impoverished parents who receive money from the organization sometimes force their young children to join the group. 

There have been programs to persuade young recruits to leave al-Shabaab as well as dissuade those who have not yet joined from doing so.  However, as the article notes, these attempts usually have little impact because they focus on the evils of al-Shabaab as opposed to the actual needs of the children.  Meanwhile, Western powers, the African Union, and the Somali military are finding it quite difficult to eliminate al-Shabaab because even when they eliminate large numbers of its fighters, new ones soon appear.  Until the factors that draw young people into the terrorist group are significantly mitigated, the pipeline of recruits ready to take up arms will very likely remain quite full.

Source:

Liban Osiye and Liban A. Hussien, “To counter al-Shabaab, Somalia’s new govt must do something for the kids,”African Arguments (pan-African independent news platform), 24 May 2022. https://africanarguments.org/2022/05/to-counter-al-shabaab-somalias-new-govt-must-do-something-for-the-kids/

Tackling this war crime head on will be critical to saving thousands of children from myriad forms of abuse and, in some instances, death. But it will also be essential to combating the al-Shabaab threat as a whole. In almost all the groups’ acts of terrorism, young people are involved in some capacity.

Over the past decade or so, Somali’s federal government has attempted to combat al-Shabaab’s child recruitment in a variety of, ultimately ineffective, ways.

Unless President Mohamud’s administration honestly examines the reasons that many young people and their families see joining al-Shabaab as an attractive or necessary option, the Islamist militants will keep winning the radicalisation war. To truly tackle child recruitment, his new government will have to recognise that al-Shabaab’s greatest tools in turning Somalia’s future generations against its present leadership are issues such as endemic poverty, social exclusion, lack of basic public services, endemic corruption, paralysed politics, and poor governance. An effective military strategy is also essential to combatting al-Shabaab – insecurity allows militants to use brute force, torture and abductions to recruit many child soldiers – but not sufficient.

Most of al-Shabaab’s child recruits are from areas the group holds or has a significant presence in. But it is notable that its level of recruitment in big cities like the capital Mogadishu is reportedly increasing.

And it has been found to use girls as cooks, cleaners, and “wives” as well as to spy or move weaponry.

Image Information:

Image: Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.
Source: AMISOM/Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/7306922512/in/album-72157629979805598/
Attribution: Public Domain

A Complex Link Between Coups and Jihadism in West Africa

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Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.

Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.

“Analysts say that while there is no mutually beneficial relationship between jihadist groups and coup plotters, there is a linkage between the increase of jihadism and the protracted insecurity across the region.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the non-profit scholarly publication The Conversation: Africa examines the possible connections between coups and the presence of Islamic terrorists in African states.  There have been three coups in West Africa’s Sahel Region in since 2021:  Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso, as well as a fourth failed attempt in Guinea-Bissau.  The author found the link between coups and jihad to be complex, with jihadism not necessarily a direct precursor.

The author notes jihadism and coups are precipitated by similar factors such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, ignorance, political instability, and the inability of governments to meet these challenges.  These conditions serve as excellent recruiting tools for jihadist groups looking to increase their ranks with jobless, angry youth.  These conditions also encourage soldiers, sometimes with a disgruntled populace backing them, to overthrow a corrupt government that is unable to provide for its citizens.  Finally, the military is more likely to attempt a coup when the government appears unable to defeat terrorist organizations.  This was the case in Burkina Faso, where the military overthrew President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in January 2022, after feeling their forces were not being adequately supplied to defeat the jihadists and becoming disenchanted as the number of casualties within their ranks grew. Coup leaders often adopt a very militaristic approach to defeating jihadists. Instead of attacking the root causes of discontent, such as high unemployment and lack of essential services, they implement forceful measures that tend to drive the poor into the arms of jihadist recruiters.  As such, their harsh measures lead to more jihadist recruits, leading to harsher crackdown measures, and so on.  Ultimately, the outcome of the coup-jihadism relationship becomes increased instability.  Meanwhile, the African Union and Western nations, see their efforts at democratization and counterterrorism in the Sahel undermined.

Source:

Folahanmi Aina, “Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship,” The Conversation: Africa (non-profit scholarly publication), 17 February 2022. https://theconversation.com/jihadism-and-coups-in-west-africas-sahel-region-a-complex-relationship-176988

Most of these groups are affiliated with global jihadist groups such Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

This has led to repeated tensions in relations between the state and society, which the jihadist groups have exploited in intensifying their recruitment drive.

On the other hand, the activities of these jihadist groups have also mounted additional pressure on the fragile democratic systems across the region.

This encourages state capture by the military, who see themselves as “guardians of the state” and the “last hope” of the common citizen.

The continued emergence of coups is likely to be capitalised upon by jihadists as reflecting efforts which are finally yielding desired results – the forced displacement of democratic systems of government. The jihadists could use this as a tactic to get more fighters to join them.The military juntas now in power must urgently seek to establish mutuality with the societies they now rule. It’s a tall order, given that they don’t prioritise the relationship between state and society. Doing so would require giving voice to the concerns and grievances of citizens they rule over.

Image Information:

Image: Colonels Ismaël Wagué and Malick Diaw of Mali’s ruling junta.
Source: Kassim Traoré /VOA/Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Comit%C3%A9_national_pour_le_salut_du_Peuple_-_2020_Malian_coup_d%27Etat_2.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Al Shabaab Takes Advantage of Somalia’s Disjointed Election Process To Ramp Up Attacks

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A female soldier belonging to the Somali National Army.

A female soldier belonging to the Somali National Army.

“Security analysts said the brazen attacks were a fresh demonstration of al-Shabab’s goal of destabilizing the government in Mogadishu.”

As the accompanying excerpted article from Somali independent news outlet Shabelle Media Network explains, al Shabaab is involved in two aspects of the country’s dragged out elections.  First, it is delaying the voting process by targeting politicians and the means to conduct an election.  As the article notes, the election was originally scheduled for July 2021.  At that time, 329 seats in parliament were to be filled.  Second, it is taking advantage of the confusion caused by the delay to launch additional terrorist attacks, including two bombings in the city of Beledweyne, which claimed at least 48 lives.  Among the dead is Amina Mohamed Abdi, a young lawmaker who had been a strong critic of the government.  She is the fifth parliamentary candidate killed in two months.

Political disputes between President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, as well as  disagreements between the central and provincial governments, have had a significant role in knocking the election process off kilter.  All of this has played into the hands of al Shabaab, which has found the disarray an opportune time to strike at targets that compound the government’s inability to keep a firm election date.  Additionally, al Shabaab’s attacks have created concern among the civilian populace about their safety, likely suppressing the actual number who will go to the polls.  On the same day as the Beledweyne bombings, two al Shabaab militants breached Mogadishu’s heavily fortified airport, which was the designated location for the presidential elections.  It is also the location of the UN, AMISOM, and several Western embassies.  Western powers have been pushing Somalia to conduct elections, hoping they might help unify the divided nation and strengthen its ability to combat al Shabaab.  Al Shabaab’s recent attacks are a strong reminder that despite repeated pronouncements of the terrorist organization being weakened, it is still a potent force capable of frustrating both the Somali government and Western powers.

Source:

“Al-Shabaab Increases Attacks as Elections Drag in Somalia,” Shabelle Media Network (independent news outlet), 26 March 2022. https://shabellemedia.com/al-shabaab-increases-attacks-as-elections-drag-in-somalia/

 Security analysts said the brazen attacks were a fresh demonstration of al-Shabab’s goal of destabilizing the government in Mogadishu.

 Among the dead was a firebrand woman member of parliament, Amina Mohamed, who was on the campaign trail when she was targeted and killed by a suicide bomber.

 “If the election is being delayed then they must have got time, so that at least they can easily target the elders, who select the candidates,” Abdisamad said. “They can easily kill candidates vying for the seats. They can easily interrupt the entire election process, so that they see failed outcome at the end of the day.”

 Safiina said security has been tightened at all polling stations and is provided by national police as well as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Safiina said anyone who wants to undermine the election by acts of terrorism or disruption will fail.

Image Information:

Image: A female soldier belonging to the Somali National Army.
Source: AMISOM/Flickr, https://flickr.com/photos/61765479@N08/27519432255
Attribution: Public Domain

Sanctions Likely To Weaken Russian Arms Flow to Africa

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Ethiopian soldier holding an AK-47.

Ethiopian soldier holding an AK-47.

“The wide-ranging sanctions could have serious implications for Africa. Importantly, they could affect the continent’s ability to procure and maintain military hardware from Russia.”

Economic sanctions on Russia will likely jeopardize African countries’s ability to purchase new weapons and maintain existing stockpiles, according to the excerpted article from South African news source The Conversation Africa.  As the article points out, African countries import 49 percent of its military hardware from Russia, everything from battleships and fighter jets to handguns and rifles. 

The article notes five ways the sanctions on Russia are likely to impact African defense contractors and/or militaries.  First, Russia cannot deliver military hardware that is already on order.  Second, African militaries will struggle to maintain their vast inventories of Russian weapons because the supply of spare parts is now in jeopardy.  Third, various contractual obligations between Russian arms suppliers and African nations will not be met, possibly leaving some difficult issues for courts to decide.  Fourth, arms merchants from numerous countries will try to fill the void created by Russia’s absence.  However, since so much of Africa’s weaponry is Russian made, it will not be easy for many African countries to replace their Russian weapons with Western armaments.  Fifth and finally, the already present black market in arms transfers is likely to grow as Russia and possibly some African nations look to skirt the sanctions.

The absence of Russian weapons could also prove to be an incentive for African defense industries to increase the quantity of their output as well as try to manufacture larger and more complex weapons platforms.  As the article points out, Russia might even transfer some of its defense contracts to countries such as Nigeria and South Africa, which already have a enough industrial capacity to manufacture arms.

Source:

Moses B. Khanyile, “Sanctions against Russia will affect arms sales to Africa: the risks and opportunities,” The Conversation Africa (South African independent news source), 27 March 2022. https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038

 The wide-ranging sanctions could have serious implications for Africa. Importantly, they could affect the continent’s ability to procure and maintain military hardware from Russia.

The biggest buyers of armaments from Russia – and most long-standing importers – are Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco and Uganda.

In the past Russia has been astute in filling the void left by western countries. It did this in 2013 when the US cut off military aid and arms to Egypt after the military staged a coup. Suppliers such as Russia and France were happy to fill the gap.

The comprehensive sanctions imposed on Russia are likely to last beyond the current conflict. This implies that what may be regarded as ‘interim measures’ to fill a temporary void may end up being a long-lasting solution to Africa’s desire to produce its own military hardware for its own use, and also to reduce reliance on external suppliers.

African countries should therefore make a concerted effort to look towards defence companies on the continent for support. The African Union and South Africa, in particular, given its BRICS link, should play a central role in driving such a campaign.

Image Information:

Image: Ethiopian soldier holding an AK-47.
Source: U.S. government via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afrimil-ethiopiansoldier.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Somalia: How Al Shabaab’s Arsenal Grows

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Weapons captured by AMISOM forces from al Shabaab.

Weapons captured by AMISOM forces from al Shabaab.

“The acquisition of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other lethal capacity remains a priority for [al Shabaab] but is poorly understood as a system essential to the effectiveness of the insurgency.”

The Somali government and AMISOM have been unable to defeat al Shabaab in large part due to the terrorist group’s ability to procure weapons.  According to the accompanying excerpted report from a Somali organization that studies security issues, the Hiraal Institute, al Shabaab annually spends approximately $24 million acquiring weapons through several sources.  These sources include arms directly purchased by the group, including from corrupt government officials; those bought from dealers who frequently sell lethal wares from Yemen; and various small arms obtained in Somali black markets. Al Shabaab spends an additional $1.8 million per year on its in-house explosives and weapons manufacturing activities, with much of that money used to obtain chemical precursors to explosives.

Though al Shabaab is sometimes depicted as having internal divisions and problems, acquisition of these weapons as described by the report hardly appears haphazard.  Instead, consultative bodies and so-called ministries play a large role in properly arming the terrorist organization’s members.  Most important for regular arms procurement is the organization’s defense ministry, which receives a substantial monthly allotment of funds. 

Al Shabaab’s security committee, which draws from both the military command and executive leadership, makes the decisions for acquiring large amounts of equipment in preparation for an increased operational tempo, or for purchasing very expensive individual items.  Al Shabaab’s finance ministry is responsible for acquiring the funds necessary for these weapons purchases mainly through illicit taxation.  The report notes that the farmers, merchants, and others who are barely eking out a living are being extorted so that the terrorists can purchase more weapons which can be used to extort and hurt these people further.  Though the finance ministry’s methods can be quite brutal, they are also quite profitable, enabling continued weapons proliferation in a country already awash in arms from decades of inter-clan warfare.   The ready availability of so many weapons, especially in the hands of al Shabaab, has made the pursuit of peace, security, and stability by the Somali National Army and AMISOM, and the Western powers backing such efforts, extremely difficult.

Source:

“Al Shabaab’s Arsenal; From Taxes to Terror,” Hiraal Institute (Somali organization that studies security issues), February 2022. https://hiraalinstitute.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Al-Shabaabs-Arsenal-From-Taxes-to-Terror-Web.pdf

The situation in Somalia is increasingly one of stalemate, with little prospect of either the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with AMISOM and international support, or al Shabaab (AS) delivering a decisive military victory. However, AS remains adaptive and in control of large parts of Somalia, in particular in the south, with partial control over other areas. It is clear that AS has access to several sources to acquire weapons. The acquisition of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other lethal capacity remains a priority for AS but is poorly understood as a system essential to the effectiveness of the insurgency. In October 2021, the Hiraal Institute undertook a four-month project to research the scope, scale, system, and use of AS resources to obtain lethal materiel, both in Somalia and from outside.

… It needs to be emphasised that all of AS’s actions within the security field – including arms procurement, capability acquisition, and distribution – are enabled by the extensive finance operations that the group undertakes, notably its illicit taxation collection and revenue gathering. In essence, the money that AS gathers illegally from those it forces to pay tax in Somalia funds the ability of the group to purchase weapons, arms, and ammunition that it then uses in its operations and attacks in the country.

Within Somalia, AS operates a hierarchical financial administrative structure. A central Finance Maktab headquarters oversees a financial centre under which provincial financial centres (one per AS designated province) operate. Funds are moved through regular AS financial channels, utilising a number of methods and in a corresponding variety of forms – cash, bank accounts and mobile money transfer, and hawala – to channel funds to where they are intended.

While Somalia and Yemen are largely excluded from the international banking system, the use of banks for transfers of illicit payments within Somalia is commonplace; again, reporting states that transactions are made via accounts in the name of friendly legitimate businesses or individuals.

Image Information:

Image: Weapons captured by AMISOM forces from al Shabaab
Source: Omar Abdisalan/AMISOM/flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/49590723103
Attribution: Public Domain

African Leaders Take Cautious Approach to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

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Putin with Faustin Archange Touadera, President of the Central African Republic, whose nation has used Russia’s Wagner Group on several occasions, including to prevent an overthrow of the government.

Putin with Faustin Archange Touadera, President of the Central African Republic, whose nation has used Russia’s Wagner Group on several occasions, including to prevent an overthrow of the government.

“African countries are treading carefully in the Russia-Ukraine war to protect their national interests even as they defend the rights of Africans trapped in war zones.”

Many African leaders are choosing their words carefully when discussing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the East African explains, these leaders’ cautious approach is based on the close relationships their countries have with Russia.  This is especially evident in the area of arms sales.  Many African nations purchase their military hardware from Russian arms dealers.  For example, Ethiopia’s entire fleet of jetfighters, 20 Sukhoi-27s and nine Mig-23s, are from Russia.  Russia supplies three quarters of Uganda’s combat helicopters.  Across Africa it is not just aircraft, but rather a wide range of military materiel, including small arms such as the ubiquitous AK-47.

As the article explains, Russia has also fostered military alliances with Mali, the Sudan, Mozambique and other countries facing insurgencies or political instability, which has tempered still more African leaders’ reactions to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  The Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked paramilitary force, helped quash an attempt to overthrow the government in the Central African Republic.  The appreciation for these Russian interventions, combined with a sense among many Africans that their nations should remain neutral with regard to European problems, contributes to the lack of enthusiasm some African leaders have for denouncing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  Reports of African students fleeing Ukraine only to be subjected to extreme racism in Europe may have exacerbated these concerns.

Some African leaders are not only refusing to condemn Russia but are actually praising it.  The most prominent example of such behavior comes from LTG Kainerugaba, Commander of Ugandan Land Forces, who is also President Musevini’s son.  While Uganda abstained from a UN vote condemning Russian aggression, citing the African country’s nonaligned status, Kainerugaba claimed Putin was right and that a majority of non-whites support Russia.  Even Senegal, which has a long history of receiving military assistance from the West, abstained from the UN vote to condemn Russian aggression.

Source: Aggrey Mutambo, “National interests prevail as African leaders tread carefully on Ukraine crisis,” The East African (African-based media company), 6 March 2022. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/national-interests-african-leaders-careful-ukraine-crisis-3738398

African countries are treading carefully in the Russia-Ukraine war to protect their national interests even as they defend the rights of Africans trapped in war zones.

Senegalese President Macky Sall, chair of the African Union and the African Union Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat said they were “particularly disturbed” by reports that some Africans had been turned away at European borders while trying to leave the war-wracked country.

Save for Kenya, Eastern African states have stayed away from vigorously commenting on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but the racism in its wake has angered Africans.

The United Nations, which operates a huge fleet of Russian fixed-wing and helicopter transports, will not be spared the sanctions. Also, hard-hit will be a helicopter overhaul and maintenance repair facility that Uganda jointly owns with Russia’s Pro-heli International Services, that was launched by President Museveni in late January. The facility was among others targeting the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan’s Darfur region, in which a substantial number of UN transport helicopters operate.

“Outside of the Central African Republic, which openly sympathises with Moscow, other countries have largely chosen a middle plan in this conflict, even as they share (Kenya’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Dr Martin) Kimani’s sentiments on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. They are, however, united on the plight of Africans in Ukraine,” he said.

Image Information:

Image: Putin with Faustin Archange Touadera, President of the Central African Republic, whose nation has used Russia’s Wagner Group on several occasions, including to prevent an overthrow of the government.
Source: Mikhail Metzel/Kremlin Pool/Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_%26_Faustin_Touadera_-_2019.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Wagner’s Questionable Operations in Africa

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The arrival of Russian military equipment, including these BRDM-2 armored vehicles, along with members of the Wagner Group helped prevent a rebel army from taking the Central African Republic’s capital in 2021.

The arrival of Russian military equipment, including these BRDM-2 armored vehicles, along with members of the Wagner Group helped prevent a rebel army from taking the Central African Republic’s capital in 2021.

“If no one else can provide it, African countries may continue to turn to the likes of Wagner…”

In 2021, Russia’s Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked private military force, made a significant difference in the Central African Republic (CAR) when somewhere between 1,200 and 2,000 of its mercenaries, aided by 300 Rwandan soldiers, prevented rebels from capturing CAR’s capital, Bangui.  Wagner’s success was initially lauded by much of CAR’s populace, but as the accompanying excerpted article from South African Institute for Security Studies notes, those feelings of appreciation for restoring security have morphed into anger as Wagner has been accused of human rights abuses against civilians.  As the article states, Wagner has a mixed record in several African nations, including Libya, Sudan, and Mozambique.

In addition to the Wagner Group’s human rights record, people are asking questions about how the organization is paid.  As the article notes, no one has seen a contract between Wagner and CAR, leading to allegations that lucrative mining deals are the paramilitary force’s method of payment.  Further muddying the waters is the government of Mali, which denies the presence of the Wagner Group, claiming instead that it only has Russian instructors on its soil.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Wagner Group does not care that it is supporting undemocratic regimes.  This is particularly obvious in Mali, where Wagner did not arrive until after Colonel Assimi Goïta’s coup.  Still, as the article points out, despite the anguish of Western countries over Wagner’s involvement in Africa and the backlash of some African nations over the deplorable human rights abuses committed by the organization, there is grudging acceptance that in some beleaguered nations, Wagner has helped stabilize the situation by driving off terrorists.

Source:

Peter Fabricius, “Wagner’s Dubious Operatics in CAR and beyond, Institute for Security Studies (South African think tank), 21 Jan 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/wagners-dubious-operatics-in-car-and-beyond

Russia has established a strong military presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the past four years, clandestinely using dubious actors like the military company Wagner, which is allegedly close to President Vladimir Putin. Wagner has become the deniable vanguard of a major Russian push into Africa, many analysts believe.

France has threatened to completely withdraw military support to Mali. Sweden has already announced its exit from the European force Takuba because of Wagner’s arrival. Such decisions are difficult because they may further weaken the fight against the common enemy – violent extremism.

But Wagner’s growing presence on the continent also poses some difficult questions to the international community, including the West. The problem is not only about democracy but also stability and security. If no one else can provide it, African countries may continue to turn to the likes of Wagner – though it’s too soon to judge its overall effectiveness either.

He says complicating any analysis or comparison is that Russia’s involvement in the CAR and elsewhere in Africa is probably more covert, so it’s hard to know just where it is and what it’s doing. (There are rumours that Russia has its eyes on Burkina Faso, for example.)

Image Information:

Image: The arrival of Russian military equipment, including these BRDM-2 armored vehicles, along with members of the Wagner Group helped prevent a rebel army from taking the Central African Republic’s capital in 2021.
Source: UN Security Council/Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:RussiansinBangui.png
Attribution: Public Domain

Somalia: Puntland Troops Fight Each Other, Not Terrorists

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While this al-Shabaab leader was killed, future progress against the terrorist organization in Puntland is threatened by military in-fighting.

Somalia’s forces in Puntland State have turned their guns against one another, leading to fears that al-Shabaab could take advantage to establish their base in the area.

Puntland’s armed forces are expected to fight al-Shabaab and Islamic State terrorists.  However, according to the excerpted accompanying article from a Kenyan media group’s publication, The East African, the military members from this autonomous, federal state of Somalia recently turned their weapons on each other in the port town of Bossaso.  Specifically, fighting occurred between forces loyal to Puntland’s government and an elite antiterrorism brigade known as the Puntland Security Force (PSF).  Heavy and light arms were used in the fighting, reportedly intense at times, resulting in both combatant and civilian casualties.

Purportedly, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni’s attempt in November to sack Mohamud Osman Diyaano, the director of the PSF, was the cause of the hostilities.  The same decree that dismissed Diyaano also appointed Brigadier General Mohamed Amin Abdullahi as his replacement.  As the article notes, Diyaano rejected the move and, along with top PSF officers, declared the dismissal and replacement to be illegal.

There are concerns that the clash between the two components of the armed forces will weaken its capabilities and resolve to combat al-Shabaab and the Islamic State.  Unlike neighboring Somaliland, which has declared its independence from Somalia and wishes to be recognized as a sovereign nation, Puntland has decided to remain part of Somalia.  Puntland’s contribution to combating al-Shabaab and the Islamic State is valued and important, and any distraction from its military objective benefits these terrorist organizations.  Unfortunately, the terrorists threaten the stability not just of Puntland but of the entire geostrategic nation of Somalia, whose neighboring waters see tremendous amounts of tanker traffic helping to supply the world with oil.

Source:

Abdulkadir Khalif, “Puntland soldiers turn weapons on each other,” The East African (a Kenyan media group), 25 December 2021.  https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/puntland-soldiers-turn-weapons-on-each-other-3662910

Somalia’s forces in Puntland State have turned their guns against one another, leading to fears that al-Shabaab could take advantage to establish their base in the area.

In the past couple of weeks, an armed clash in the port city, some 1,500km northeast of Mogadishu, has seen the law enforcers mostly engage in vicious fights, rather than guarding civilians.

Neither the pro-government side nor the PSF officers have issued clear information on the status of the fighting and the casualty levels.

Bossaso, the commercial capital and the main port of Puntland, had become a ghost town as residents fled for cover on Tuesday. Businesses remained largely closed.

Image Information:

Image: While this al-Shabaab leader was killed, future progress against the terrorist organization in Puntland is threatened by military in-fighting.
Source: Wargeyska Saxafi, Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Godane.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0