Author Archives: Matthew Stein

Kazakhstan Expands Opportunities for Volunteers To Join the Armed Forces

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A U.S.-produced HMMWV of Kazakhstan’s Ground Forces equipped with a Russian-produced Konkurs anti-tank ground missile on parade.

“Deputies of the Majilis (the lower house of parliament) of Kazakhstan have adopted a bill that allows citizens to volunteer for the army during periods of mobilization, martial law, and also in wartime.”

Kazakhstan’s armed forces began to draw operational and tactical lessons from the war in Ukraine not long after Russia invaded in February 2022.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports that Kazakhstan is again using the example of the war in Ukraine to introduce a new law that allows citizens to volunteer for the military in the event of a war. The new law envisions volunteers joining units serving on the front lines or units operating in rear areas.[ii] In addition to the proposed law on volunteers, the article goes on to note that Kazakhstan will potentially set up a reserve force in 2025. The law stipulates that potential reservists will come from a wide age range (18-50 years old for enlisted and NCOs, and up to 60 years old for officers) and that they can serve in their home region. The article points out—as the war in Ukraine has revealed—that solving mobilization issues and having a trained reserve is important in modern armed conflict. In response, the new plan has the potential to draw in significant numbers of volunteers.

Remember, Kazakhstan has been concerned about Russia annexing its northern regions since it became independent in 1991. Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a group of Russian officials amplified this concern by suggesting Kazakhstan’s northern regions belong to Russia.[iii] Despite these comments, Kazakhstan and Russia have maintained good overall relations. However, the war in Ukraine and the need to have a force available for a potential conflict are pushing Kazakhstan to adapt and expand opportunities for volunteers to join the armed forces.

Sources:

“В Казахстане появятся «добровольцы» для обороны в военное время (In Kazakhstan there will be “volunteers” for defense in the event of a war),” Fergana Agency (independent Russian-language news website focusing on Central Asia), 30 October 2024.

https://fergana.agency/news/135448

Deputies of the Majilis (the lower house of parliament) of Kazakhstan have adopted a bill that allows citizens to volunteer for the army during periods of mobilization, martial law, and also in wartime…

The document, in particular, introduces the concept of “volunteer” into legislation. “Self-defense formations, which will include volunteers, will be formed on the basis of local military command units and will be directly subordinate to them. In peacetime, a number of activities have already been planned during the preparation process, including the training of volunteers,” — Deputy Minister of Defense Sultan Kamaletdinov reported…

He added that if volunteers carry out combat missions, they will be led by military command units. If they are engaged in “provision” in the rear, they will be subordinate to local executive bodies…

It was previously reported that in 2025 in Kazakhstan a new type of military service could emerge – service in the reserve. Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan from 18 to 50 years of age (this applies to soldiers and sergeants) and up to 60 years of age for the officer corps will be voluntarily accepted. Only those who have passed the medical examination and special check will be included in the reserve. It is assumed that these will be people who have already completed military service or short-term military training courses, and also studied at military departments at universities.

Reservists will be trained in military units, weapons and military equipment will be assigned to them. They will serve only in their region.

The Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan has begun to propose changes to the concept of service against the backdrop of events in Ukraine. Several years ago, the department noted that modern armed conflicts have revealed a number of problematic issues related to the mobilization of armed forces, the preparation and availability of military-trained reserves, as well as the timely arrival of military personnel from the reserve to replenish losses or rotate personnel.

Notes:

[i] Kazakhstan’s army trained on defending against unmanned aerial systems after observing how Ukraine and Russia utilized them in the first year of the war, while Kazakhstan’s armed forces incorporated several operational and tactical lessons from the war into its annual joint, large-scale exercise in 2023, see: Aygerim Ummat, “Токаеву показали, как проходят военные учения ‘Батыл тойтарыс – 2023’” (Tokayev was shown how the armed forces carried out the exercise “Batyl toytarys – 2023”),” Informburo (a semi-independent Russian-language news website in Kazakhstan), 5 September 2023. https://informburo.kz/novosti/tokaevu-pokazali-kak-proxodyat-voennye-uceniya-batyl-toitarys-2023

[ii] Even as this new legislation takes effect, Kazakhstan has been working to reduce the number of conscripts in the armed forces by enticing those conscripted, through offers of good wages and other benefits, to sign contracts after their one-year conscription period ends. This is part of a long-term effort that began in 2013 to have an all-volunteer force, though no timetable has been set for when this transition will be completed. It is estimated that Kazakhstan’s armed forces are now made up of 70 percent contract soldiers with the rest made up of conscripts.

[iii] A few months after the invasion of Ukraine, several members of Russia’s State Duma (lower house of parliament) questioned whether Kazakhstan’s northern territories belong to Russia, causing concerns in Kazakhstan that the comments could be a pretext to the territory being annexed or invaded, even though nothing further came of it, see: “Токаев выразил недоумение неуместными высказываниями российских деятелей в адрес Казахстана (Toqaev expressed surprise at the inappropriate statements of Russian officials directed at Kazakhstan),” Vlast (an independent Russian-language news website in Kazakhstan, 17 June 2022. https://vlast.kz/novosti/50438-tokaev-vyrazil-nedoumenie-neumestnymi-vyskazyvaniami-rossijskih-deatelej-v-adres-kazahstana.html

OE Insight Summary:

In addition to establishing a reserve force, KAZ passes new law allowing citizens to volunteer for the armed forces in the event of a war, both the establishment of a reserve force and the new volunteer law are a result of lessons learned from the war in UKR

Image Information:

Image: A U.S.-produced HMMWV of Kazakhstan’s Ground Forces equipped with a Russian-produced Konkurs anti-tank ground missile on parade.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HMMWV_Казахстанской_армии_с_установленным_ПТРК_Фагот.JPG
Attribution: CCO 1.0

India’s UAV Development Struggles to Take Off

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India’s Rustom-II in Flight during a testing phase. Note: the Rustom UAV is now referred to as the TAPAS.

“The TAPAS underwent tests before the armed services and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) proceeded to acquire the MQ9s.”

As India has made a push to build up its defense industry, it occasionally allows the armed forces to make acquisitions of weapon systems outside of Indian production venues. This occurs when there is an urgent operational requirement and no viable alternative available from Indian companies.[i] To that end, officials in the Indian armed forces announced earlier this year they had purchased 31 MQ-9B Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from the United States under an Acceptance of Necessity acquisition.[ii]

India’s acquisition of the MQ-9B UAVs, instead of a system from India, brought to light ongoing issues with UAV development in India as reported on by the accompanying excerpted article from India’s independent think tank, the Observer Research Foundation. The article notes that Indian officials chose the MQ-9Bs over an equivalent Indian system, the TAPAS, due to numerous issues with the latter’s development and testing. The author points out that TAPAS is being revived by the Indian Air Force despite the MQ-9B purchase, but significant issues remain. One of the most notable challenges is that TAPAS is apparently reliant on Chinese parts like other Indian-developed UAVs. While importing parts for UAVs from China is more cost-effective, it could compromise security, and India’s Ministry of Defense has warned the defense industry about sourcing parts for UAVs from China.

The article concludes by stating that while India has yet to produce a UAV suitable for the military, like TAPAS, there is still potential for domestically produced UAVs if the government, the armed forces, the Defense Research Development Organization,[iii] and the Indian defense industry all continue to push for it. However, the impact of the Indian armed forces continued acquisitions from outside the country’s defense industry on this situation remains uncertain.

Sources:

Kartik Bommakanti, “Despite MQ9B purchase, the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy revive TAPAS,” Observer Research Foundation (independent think-tank in India), 13 September 2024.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/despite-mq9b-purchase-the-indian-air-force-and-indian-navy-revive-tapas

Earlier this year, the Modi government’s announcement that India will purchase 31 MQ9-B Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs), also known as Predators, developed by the United States’ General Atomics, came as a shot in the arm for the Indian armed forces. The Indian Navy (IN) will get 15 naval variants of the MQ9 UAVs dubbed the Sea Guardians for maritime missions, whereas the Indian Army (IA) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) will get eight each…The Reapers are primarily geared for ISR missions, but they can also perform strike missions, and the ones being purchased by India are multirole…even if this purchase is not consistent with the government’s flagship Atma Nirbhar Bharat (ANB) initiative…

All the factors mentioned above outweighed whatever capabilities the Tactical Airborne Platform for Air Surveillance (TAPAS), India’s native Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone, could bring to the armed forces…[TAPAS] was consumed by excessive development time and cost overruns, after its initial launch was pegged at a price of INR 1,650 crores or roughly US$ 200 million. By early January of 2024, the revised costs surged to INR 1,786 crores or US$ 215 million…

A key technical deficiency of the TAPAS drone is its engine, which is a fundamental weakness plaguing other Indian aircraft development programmes…The TAPAS underwent tests before the armed services and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) proceeded to acquire the MQ9s…

Thanks to the IAF and IN, the TAPAS is being revived despite its technological deficiencies. The IAF sees the TAPAS, notwithstanding its lack of endurance, worth improving on progressively, which it seeks to deploy along the Line of Actual Control (LaC)…

More recently, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has warned against both private sector enterprises and government-run entities like the DRDO sourcing drone parts from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) for military UAVs. Nevertheless, private industry still relies on Chinese supplied spares…The TAPAS may have the support of the IAF and IN, but more broadly the domestic drone industry is heavily compromised by its dependence on spares and components from China. India confronts a trade-off—allow spares for military drones in particular to be sourced exclusively from non-Chinese sources, especially from native industry, thereby driving up costs and prolonging development time, or in a bid to keep procurement costs low for UAV components, allow the security of its drones to be compromised in key areas such as camera functions, communications, radio transmission and software security that are vital to military operations…

Although there is not a single Indian drone that can be considered militarily worthy…there is no reason to feel completely bleak about the future of military drone development in India, provided there is sustained effort by the government, the armed services, the DRDO and industry.

Notes:

[i] The Indian government set this requirement as part of Prime Minster Modi’s Atma Nirbhar Bharat initiative, or the “Make in India” initiative, beginning in 2014. The initiative mandates that the Ministry of Defense make acquisitions from the Indian defense industry to bolster growth and development of Indian companies. In recent years, India’s Ministry of Defense has gone outside of the Indian defense industry under government allowed exceptions to the initiative for what Indians have called “fast track” acquisitions, which fulfill urgent operational requirements for items such as new assault rifles. For a recent example of this, see: Snehesh Alex Philip, “Indian Army orders fresh batch of 73K SIG SAUER 716 rifles from US under emergency procurement,” The Print, 27 August 2024. https://theprint.in/defence/indian-army-orders-fresh-batch-of-73k-sig-sauer-716-rifles-from-us-under-emergency-procurement/2240975/

[ii] The Acceptance of Necessity differs from the “fast track” acquisitions to allow for more expensive acquisitions, like the MQ9-B UAVs. For other recent examples of Acceptance of Necessity acquisitions, see: Dinakar Peri, “Defence Acquisition Council clears heavy weight torpedoes, mid-air refuelling aircraft among major deals,” The Hindu, 16 February 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/defence-acquisition-council-clears-heavy-weight-torpedoes-mid-air-refuelling-aircraft-among-major-deals/article67854256.ece  

[iii] India’s Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO) is an organization within the Ministry of Defense that has a history of working with companies in the defense industry to develop and produce various weapon systems.

OE Insight Summary:

IND continues to acquire foreign systems despite the government push to grow the country’s defense industry with IND acquisition of MQ-9B UAVs in 2024 instead of a domestic UAV serving as an example of ongoing issues in IND defense industry

Image Information:

Image: India’s Rustom-II in Flight during a testing phase. Note: the Rustom UAV is now referred to as the TAPAS
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Rustom_flight_2_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

India Considers Implications After the Collapse of the Bangladeshi Government

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The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Ms. Sheikh Hasina, in New York, USA on September 27, 2019.

“Referring to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine as well as Israel-Hamas conflicts and the current situation in Bangladesh, the Minister exhorted the Commanders to ‘analyze these episodes, predict the problems that the country may face in the future, and stay prepared to deal with the unexpected.”

In early August 2024, protests in Bangladesh resulted in the collapse and resignation of the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. While this did not result in an immediate threat for India, the accompanying excerpted article shows how the situation in Bangladesh will remain a security issue for India. The article from the Indian independent think tank The Centre for Land Warfare Studies examines what happened in Bangladesh and outlines what India can do to adjust. The author, a retired Indian Army general, provides some background on what led to Sheikh Hasina’s resignation.[i] As the author points out, the history between India and Bangladesh has at times been contentious, but India and Hasina had favorable relations for a number of years due to Hasina’s working closely with India on security issues. This included India and Bangladesh cooperating to resolve their border and maritime disputes and Hasina working with India to help end its conflict with the United Liberation Front of Assam.[ii] The author goes on to note how China has gained considerable influence in Bangladesh through exports of weapons. He also mentions that because the Bangladeshi Army has played a role in the regime change, India should reach out to work closely and strengthen military ties. This could set up further competition between India and China in the region. Lastly, the author states that India needs to do everything possible to protect Indian nationals and ethnic minorities in Bangladesh, with the latter group referencing the Hindu religious minority in the country. The majority Muslim population in Bangladesh has periodically attacked Hindus, but Hasina’s government has provided them with protection. Indian Prime Minister Modi and the interim government in Bangladesh appear to have established positive relations, but the status of Hindus in Bangladesh could be a point of contention and an issue for India to resolve.

Sources:

Lt Gen PS Rajeshwar, (Ret), “India – Bangladesh Relations: Navigating The Turmoil,” The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (independent think tank in India), 16 August 2024. https://www.claws.in/analysis-india-bangladesh-relations-navigating-the-turmoil/

The developments of 5 August had resulted in very short notice to Indian authorities…What appeared initially to be a student movement against the quota system for descendants of freedom fighters in government jobs finally turned into a call for the resignation of the then Prime Minister…

Under these circumstances, how does one look at the strategic dimensions of India-Bangladesh relations? The ties between the two nations were forged through the sacrifices of people in both countries during the Liberation War of 1971. The economic, cultural, and linguistic aspects were strengthened further during the last 15 years of the Sheikh Hasina rule.

Bangladesh has a special place in our policy matrix and security calculations…She shares a more than 4000 km border, much of which abuts our critical NE region. In a significant 2015 agreement, the border was simplified by exchanging enclaves trapped in each other’s territories…The two countries also settled their maritime dispute amicably. Earlier, in 2010, the Awami League government had helped India by removing all camps of Indian rebel groups, which broke the back of the ULFA, pushing it to a peace agreement.

India has been very concerned about China’s influence in Bangladesh, from participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2016 to importing 72% of its arms from China in 2019-2023…

Second is our strategic intelligence, which must be comprehensively improved to anticipate such abrupt events better…

Fifth, since the Bangladesh Army has played a defining role in this crisis and could remain a key factor, we must strengthen our military-to-military ties.

Finally, we need to do everything to secure Indian nationals while insisting on the safety and protection of minority communities in Bangladesh, lest there be a backlash back home.

Notes:

[i] For a more detailed timeline and background on the protests in Bangladesh in 2024, see: “From job quota to Sheikh Hasina’s resignation: Timeline of the Bangladesh student protests,” The Hindu, 5 August 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/from-protests-to-sheikh-hasina-resignation-timeline-of-bangladesh-student-protest/article68488361.ece

[ii] The ULFA was a militant group that had operated out of Bangladesh with a goal of establishing an independent government in India’s State of Assam (bordering Bangladesh) until Hasina’s government agreed to eliminate its safe have in Bangladeshi territory. India and the ULFA reached a peace agreement in December 2023, see: Gaurav Dwivedi, “The Path To Peace: ULFA’s Journey From Insurgency To Accord,” NDTV, 29 December 2023. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/the-path-to-peace-ulfas-journey-from-insurgency-to-accord-4763730

Image Information:

Image: The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Ms. Sheikh Hasina, in New York, USA on September 27, 2019
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Prime_Minister,_Shri_Narendra_Modi_meeting_the_Prime_Minister_of_Bangladesh,_Ms._Sheikh_Hasina,_in_New_York,_USA_on_September_27,_2019_(1).jpg

Armenia Continuing Its Move Away From Russian Reliance

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French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.

“Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said.”

Armenia continues taking steps away from Russia by working with other partners. The majority of Armenia’s weapons inventory is made up of Russian systems, leaving the Armenian government largely reliant on Russia. However, the accompanying excerpted articles report that Armenia reached a military-technical cooperation agreement with France in June 2024. The first excerpted article from the independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyansigned a military-technical cooperation agreement with the French company KNDS during his visit to France in June. The article notes that Papikyan also met with his French counterpart during his visit, but the details of their meeting were not disclosed. It is also mentioned that Armenia purchased French armored personnel carriers and radar systems in the past year, with negotiations still underway for Armenia to acquire the Mistral 3 short-range air defense system.

The second excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports that the meeting between the defense ministers of Armenia and France resulted in an agreement for Armenia to purchase an unknown number of French CAESAR 155mm self-propelled artillery systems. The article also includes a statement from Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan that Armenia has significantly reduced its military-technical cooperation with Russia since 2020.[i] Overall, Armenia’s recent acquisition of the French CAESAR 155mm artillery provides another system of non-Russian origin for the country’s inventory in the short-term, while the military-technical agreement with France could provide additional systems over the next several years. Both will help Armenia rely less on Russia going forward.[ii]

Sources:

“Армения и Франция достигли новых договорённостей в сфере ВТС (Armenia and France reached a new agreement on military-technical cooperation),” Eurasia Daily (an independent Russian-language news website), 18 June 2024.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/06/18/armeniya-i-franciya-dostigli-novyh-dogovoryonnostey-v-sfere-vts

As part of a working visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France, an agreement on military-technical cooperation (MTC) was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Armenia and the military-industrial company KNDS on 17 June…

Before that, Suren Papikyan met with his French counterpart Sebastien Lecornu…The parties noted the importance of military-technical cooperation, around which new agreements were reached, the Armenian Defense Ministry reported, without disclosing their content…

In October 2023, in Paris, the Ministers of Defense of Armenia and France signed agreements on the supply of weapons to Armenia. France has already supplied Armenia with 24 Bastion armored personnel carriers, with another 26 combat vehicles in the production stage. Yerevan has also placed an order for three GM200 radars, and negotiations are underway on the supply of Mistral 3 portable anti-aircraft missile systems…

“Армения договорилась с Францией о поставке самоходок Caesar (Armenia reached an agreement with France on the delivery of the self-propelled Caesar),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 18 June 2024.

https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/401043

Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said. The document was signed during the visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France…

The Caesar self-propelled artillery unit is equipped with a 155-mm cannon and is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 40 kilometers…

In March, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan noted that since 2020, Russia’s share in military-technical cooperation has decreased from 96% to less than 10%…

Notes:

[i] In the years since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in November 2020, the government of Armenia stated that it will reduce the number of weapon systems it acquires from Russia, because it does not believe Russia has been a reliable partner.

[ii] Armenia has acquired a few weapon systems from India in the years since, but these were not part of a long-term agreement with India. The systems from India included counter battery radar, multiple rocket launchers, and towed 155mm artillery. For more information on Armenia’s acquisitions of new weapon systems from India, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023.
https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/armenia-takes-another-step-away-from-russia/

OE Insight Summary:

In June 2024, ARM signed a military-technical agreement with FRA, including for the purchase of CAESAR artillery systems. The move marked another example of ARM moving away from RUS as a security cooperation partner since 2023.

Image Information:

 Image: French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Caesar_self-propelled_howitzer_in_Iraq.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Pakistan Under Pressure To Protect China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Projects

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China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

“Pakistan’s economy is in the throes of a deep crisis, and a massive military operation would entail its own costs.”

Summary: After several terrorist attacks against China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects in 2024, China is pressuring Pakistan to launch counterterrorism operations to protect Chinese interests. However, such operations would incur significant costs to Pakistan at a time when its economy is struggling.

Pakistan has been under pressure for years from its partners to do more to counter violent extremist groups operating within its territory. On 26 March 2024, a suicide bomber struck a bus in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan, killing five Chinese nationals and the vehicle’s driver. It marked the third attack on Chinese interests in Pakistan that month, though no group claimed responsibility for the bombing.[i] The Chinese nationals were engineers working on the Dasu Dam, a hydroelectric dam under construction by a joint Pakistan-China venture set to begin operation in 2025. The accompanying excerpted articles report on the fallout of the attack and how China could push Pakistan to do more to deal with violent extremist groups in its territory.

The first excerpted article from Pakistan’s English-language newspaper Dawn reports that Pakistani officials recently completed an investigation into the 26 March attack. However, it may not be enough to satisfy China that Pakistan can deal with the threat from extremist groups. The author points out that an operation against those responsible for the 26 March attack that killed the Chinese engineers is not feasible, as Pakistan believes the group responsible for the attack is based in Afghanistan and any operation would be costly and likely lead to broader conflict in the region.[ii]

The second excerpted article from Dawn reports on an official visit by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to China in early June. Sharif, accompanied by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, met with President Xi Jinping, who stated China supports Pakistan but noted security issues. While the article does not mention China specifically requesting Pakistan carry out a counterterrorism operation in light of the recent attacks, it does mention that President Xi Jinping asked Sharif to step up efforts to ensure the security of Chinese projects in Pakistan. This is in addition to Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Sharif holding a meeting, and both pledging to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor “from its detractors and adversaries.” For the time being, China is not openly pressuring Pakistan to launch an operation against extremist groups. However, the attacks earlier this year and the June meeting show that Pakistan remains under considerable pressure to deal with extremist groups for the sake of its relations with China and its economy.

Sources:

Muhammad Amir Rana, “Chinese advice,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 2 June 2024. https://www.dawn.com/news/1837210

Pakistan’s law-enforcement agencies have completed the investigation of the Dasu terrorist attack carried out against Chinese nationals in March, in record time. This is, indeed, a remarkable achievement, but it does not seem to have impressed the Chinese authorities very much, as there have been reports that Beijing wants a large-scale anti-terrorism operation, like Zarb-i-Azb, against the militants.

On March 26, a convoy of Chinese nationals travelling from Islamabad to the Dasu Hydropower Project site in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kohistan district was attacked by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists…A joint investigation team comprising police and intelligence agencies’ personnel was immediately formed to address Chinese concerns regarding the capability of Pakistani law enforcers to probe a high-profile terrorist attack.

The reports of China’s demand for a massive counterterrorism operation are reflective of Beijing’s concerns over the escalating threats to Chinese nationals working on CPEC-related and other projects in this country. Pakistan has a history of launching such counterterrorism operations at the request of China. The Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad in 2007 was launched after Chinese President Hu Jintao called Gen Musharraf…

International pressure, including from the Chinese, also worked in 2014 when the Pakistan military launched Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan…China’s latest demand regarding a large-scale operation does not seem feasible, as the TTP and its affiliates are hiding in Afghanistan, and cross-border operations would trigger a major conflict in the region…

Pakistan’s economy is in the throes of a deep crisis, and a massive military operation would entail its own costs…

Syed Irfan Raza, “Beijing vows to uphold Pakistani sovereignty,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 8 June 2024. https://www.dawn.com/news/1838561

Acknowledging the all-weather strategic partnership between Pakistan and China, President Xi Jinping on Friday renewed his resolve to safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity besides extending financial support through investment in different sectors.

“China will, as always, firmly support Pakistan and safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” President Xi told Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif…

Besides federal ministers and senior officials, Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir is also a part of the delegation. This was the first meeting of PM Shehbaz with President Xi since assuming office…At the meeting, President Xi told the premier that the two neighbours should focus on “promoting the joint construction of CPEC”, and asked PM Shehbaz to step up efforts to ensure the security of Chinese projects in Pakistan.

…Earlier, PM Shehbaz met Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Beijing, where they resolved to protect CPEC “from its detractors and adversaries”, the Foreign Office said.

Notes:

[i] Earlier in March, insurgents in the Balochistan, Province, Pakistan attacked a Pakistani naval facility that helps provide security for the Gwadar Port, an important component of Chinese economic activity in Pakistan, in addition to an attack on the Gwadar Port Authority Complex, see: Avinash Mohananey, “Attacks on Chinese infrastructure in Pakistan disrupt CPEC, raise security concerns,” Economic Times, 28 March 2024. https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/attacks-on-chinese-infrastructure-in-pakistan-disrupt-cpec-raise-security-concerns/articleshow/108829369.cms

[ii] One estimate from an analyst with Pakistan’s National Defense University put the cost of Operation Zarb-i-Azb alone at nearly $2 billion, with the government of Pakistan also spending an unknown amount on the creation of additional security forces in the wake of the operation to help protect projects in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), see: Bhaswar Kumar, “Pakistan Army can’t afford China’s expensive security demand. What is it?,” Business Standard, 3 June 2024.

https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/china-s-latest-demand-is-a-bitter-pill-to-swallow-for-pakistan-here-s-why-124060200665_1.html

OE Insight Summary:

After several terrorist attacks against CPEC projects in 2024, PAK is under pressure by CHN to launch a counterterrorism operation to protect CHN interests, while any operation will incur significant costs at a time when PKN economy is struggling

Image Information:

Image: China Pakistan Economic Corridor
Source:   
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russia Withdraws Its Forces from Nagorno-Karabakh

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Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

“Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.”

In April 2024, the government of Azerbaijan announced that the Russian peacekeeping mission had started withdrawing personnel, marking one of only a few instances a Russian peacekeeping mission in the Commonwealth of Independent States has ended.[i] The excerpted article from Azerbaijan’s news agency Trend reports that the Russian peacekeeping force from Nagorno-Karabakh has relocated to temporary deployment points in Armenia.[ii] Armenia’s Secretary of the Security Council noted that these units cannot remain in Armenia. Lastly, the article notes that Azerbaijan requested the removal of the Russian peacekeeping force and the Russian government complied but does not mention where Russian personnel will eventually be redeployed.

Additionally, a joint Russia-Turkey observation center in Azerbaijan that once monitored the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also closed. The excerpted article from Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency notes that the joint observation center had been based in Azerbaijan since early 2021 as part of an agreement between Russia and Turkey to observe the ceasefire agreement. The article notes that the work of the center is no longer needed since Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023.[iii] As a result, Russian and Turkish personnel, 60 from each country, are leaving. Overall, the total number of Russian personnel redeploying from the peacekeeping mission and the joint monitoring center is not significant but is worth noting as Russia has historically reached agreements to leave some units in place even after a peacekeeping mission has changed or ended. Russia will likely continue to be involved in developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan going forward, but Azerbaijan’s complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh frees up Russian forces to use elsewhere, potentially in Ukraine.[iv]

Sources:

Source: Rena Abdurakhmona, “Российские миротворцы направились из Карабаха в Армению (Russian peacekeepers have deployed from Karabakh to Armenia),” Trend (news agency in Azerbaijan), 23 April 2024. https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3889409.html

Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh went to temporary deployment points in Gorus and Garakils (Sisian)…(the) Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan told the Armenian media…

“Since Russian peacekeeping troops are leaving Karabakh, they, of course, cannot remain in the Republic of Armenia either. A group and convoy of peacekeepers from Karabakh headed to temporary deployment points in Goris and Garakils (Sisian),” he said.

Let us note that a few days ago, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov confirmed the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh.

Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan – Head of the Department for Foreign Policy of the Presidential Administration Hikmet Hajiyev, answering a question from AZERTAG regarding information about the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the territory of Azerbaijan, said that the top leadership of both countries made a decision on the early withdrawal of peacekeepers…

Source: Ruslan Rehimov, “Turkish-Russian joint center completes mission in Azerbaijan,” Anadolu Agency (state-run news agency of Turkey), 26 April 2024.https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkish-russian-joint-center-completes-mission-in-azerbaijan/3203012

The Turkish-Russian joint observation center established in Azerbaijan’s Aghdam region has completed its mission after three years of service.

The center was established to monitor cease-fire and prevent violations after the Second Karabakh War, when Azerbaijan liberated most of the Karabakh region from decades of occupation by Armenia.

Karim Valiyev, Azerbaijan’s chief of general staff, praised the center’s contributions to peace at a ceremony on Friday attended by Azerbaijani, Russian, and Turkish officials.

Valiyev said Azerbaijan has fully established its sovereignty in Karabakh, and therefore the mission of the monitoring center had been completed…The center, established near the Marzili village of Aghdam, opened on Jan. 30, 2021, with 60 Turkish and 60 Russian soldiers…Azerbaijan established full sovereignty in Karabakh after an “anti-terrorism operation” in September 2023, after which separatist forces in the region surrendered.

Notes:

[i] The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is made up of former Soviet Republics and remains an area where the Russian government has special relationships and works to maintain influence. Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS in the past have typically been open-ended with Russian forces remaining in place in some capacity, which has allowed Russia to maintain influence. The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) peacekeeping mission to Kazakhstan in January 2022 marks the other example of Russian forces ending a peacekeeping mission in the CIS and withdrawing its forces. For background on Russian peacekeeping missions in the CIS, see: Matthew Stein, “The Evolutionary Russian View of Peacekeeping as Part of Modern Warfare,” FMSO’s Foreign Perspectives Brief, 24 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-24-the-evolutionary-russian-view-of-peacekeeping-as-part-of-modern-warfare-matthew-stein-update/

[ii] The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh deployed in November 2020 as part of the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. The peacekeeping force included around 2,000 Russian personnel, who established two dozen observation posts in Nagorno-Karabakh to monitor the ceasefire under a five-year mandate that would automatically renew for an additional five years unless Armenia or Azerbaijan gave notice to the other two parties to the agreement to terminate the mission.

[iii] In September 2023, Azerbaijani forces carried out an operation in Nagorno-Karabakh which resulted in Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region from ethnic Armenians and ended the existence of the self-proclaimed breakaway region of Artsakh. The Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh closed a few observation posts following the September 2023 operation,but remained largely in place with the consent and cooperation of Azerbaijani authorities.

[iv] Russian peacekeepers dealt with several ceasefire violations from both sides in the years since then and notably allowed activists from Azerbaijan to blockade the Lachin Corridor, the single road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, starting in December 2022 until September 2023. For background on the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, see: Matthew Stein, “Ongoing Clashes In Nagorno-Karabakh Threaten Fragile Truce,” OE Watch, 05-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/ongoing-clashes-in-nagorno-karabakh-threaten-fragile-truce/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_war.svg
Attribution: CCA 3.0

India Successfully Tests Agni-V Ballistic Missile Upgrade

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Agni-V ICBM Range Envelope centered at Integrated Test Range, Odissa. Declared range of 5500 km in pale indigo and estimated expanded range of 7000+ km in faded circumference.

“The opacity surrounding this MIRV missile is about the number of warheads it can carry, which in all likelihood would remain classified.”

India’s ability to carry out a strategic or tactical nuclear strike has been limited compared to that of its adversary, China. However, in recent years, India has made efforts to match Chinese capabilities. In early March 2024, India announced the successful test of a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) for its Agni-V [R1] ballistic missile, further strengthening India’s nuclear strike capabilities even as it maintains a “no first use” policy.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the conservative-leaning English-language newspaper The Hindu, reports on the recent MIRV test for the Agni-V and considers what it means for India. The article suggests that with a MIRV capable 3100 mile range Agni-V missile, India has now achieved more balance in its nuclear deterrence capability with China. The article acknowledges that some of its specific capabilities remain unknown, critical being how many warheads it can carry (the authors speculate that it carries three) and whether it can carry decoys. Finally, the article mentions that India’s defense industry will test a long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile, likely the latest variant of the K-series, at some point in the future.[ii] Altogether, the successful MIRV test for the Agni-V, and future testing for its submarine-launched ballistic missile, indicate that India will continue to seek nuclear parity with China.

OE Insight Summary:

In March 2024 IND successfully tested a MIRV, with a reported three-warhead capacity, for its Agni-V ICBM as part of a long-term deterrence effort to match CHN strategic nuclear strike capabilities.

Sources:

Harsh V. Pant and Kartik Bommakanti, “The MIRV leap that fires up India’s nuclear deterrence,” The Hindu (privately owned, conservative-leaning English-language newspaper in India), 19 March 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-mirv-leap-that-fires-up-indias-nuclear-deterrence/article67965762.ece

The Agni-5 ballistic missile test dubbed the “Divyastra”, that was conducted by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), is strategically consequential. With a range of over 5,000 kilometres, the Agni-5 is the longest-range missile India has tested so far. But it is not simply its range but, equally, its potency which represents a watershed moment for India’s nuclear deterrent. The potency of India’s nuclear deterrent is enhanced because this variant is integrated with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs)…

Though MIRV technology is not new, it is to India…MIRV-tipped missiles are a necessity simply because they strike multiple targets simultaneously and help evade ballistic missiles defences. China is building ballistic missile defences such as the Hongqi (HQ-19) ground-based ballistic missile interceptors, which have been tested, but their capacity to intercept Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMS) such as the Agni-5 is still suspect…

Now that India has integrated the Agni-5 with multiple warheads, greater balance has been restored in the Sino-Indian nuclear deterrent relationship. To be sure, more testing of the MIRV-capable Agni-5 will be required…

The opacity surrounding this MIRV missile is about the number of warheads it can carry, which in all likelihood would remain classified. Going by speculation, it is improbable that it can carry more than three warheads. Further, the yield of the nuclear warheads is likely to be limited due to the small number of atomic tests India has conducted. In addition, it is unclear whether the Agni-5 can carry decoys and chaff, especially during the boost and intermediate phase of the missile’s flight. Agni-5 will in all probability be launched from a road mobile platform.This is a China-specific missile. There could be more to come from the DRDO and AEC with India adding more punch to its nuclear arsenal when it tests a long-range Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), which India’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines can launch. The Agni-5 with MIRV capability bolsters India’s nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis China. It puts China on notice — that India is preparing itself to counter the advances Beijing has made with its missile and missile defence programmes…

Notes:

[i] India adopted its “no first use” policy shortly after its first successful nuclear test in the late 1990s. In August 2019, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh mentioned that India’s policy might change depending on the circumstances, but India continues to have a no first use policy when it comes to its nuclear arsenal.

[ii] In November 2018, Indian officials announced the country had joined the ranks of nuclear triad governments when the INS Arihant, a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, carried out its first deterrence deployment that month. While India reportedly only maintains the triad when one of its ballistic missile submarines are deployed, the 2018 deployment demonstrated India’s long-term goals of nuclear deterrence. For background, see: Matthew Stein, “Is India’s Nuclear Triad Complete?,” OE Watch, January 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/296884

Armenia Distances Itself From Instruments Of Russian Security

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An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.

“The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia.”

Armenia has been critical of both Russia and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) over their responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Some Armenian officials have even called for the country to leave the CSTO and limit cooperation with Russia, though Armenia has continued to engage with both since the end of the 2020 war because of a lack of other options.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel, reports that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on 22 February 2024 that Armenia had ended its participation in the CSTO, though he did not go as far as to say that Armenia is leaving the organization. The article notes that the decision is based on the CSTO’s responses to the 2020 war and the numerous clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan since then. The article also relays that Armenia has been critical of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh for not favorably dealing with Azerbaijan’s blockade of the breakaway region and not preventing Azerbaijan’s operation in September 2023, which ended with Azerbaijan regaining full control of the region. The article ends with a statement from Pashinyan, who claims that the CSTO is a threat to the national security of Armenia. Based on this statement, it is possible that Armenia will leave the CSTO, but the country will still be home to a Russian military base and Russian border guards in its territory for the foreseeable future.[ii] In a seemingly related development, the second excerpted article, from the Armenian news website News.am, reports that Armenia has notified Moscow that Russian border guards will need to be removed from the Zvartnots International Airport. Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyancommented that Armenian border guards are capable of taking over duties at the airport. The article clarifies that Armenia is not asking the Russian border guards to leave their positions on the border with Turkey or Iran, but only to leave the airport. While this development has yet to play out, it is one step Armenia has taken to rely less on Russia.

Sources:

“Главное о критике Арменией ОДКБ и Кремля (The heart of Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO and the Kremlin),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 29 February 2024. https://www.caucasianknot.com/articles/386973

After Russia’s refusal to intervene in the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020, Armenia’s confidence in the benefits of participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization weakened to the point of threats to leave the CSTO. The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared a report on how the degree of Armenia’s unfriendly rhetoric towards Russia increased and what steps Armenia took in its attempts to look for an alternative to the CSTO…

During the escalation of the Karabakh conflict in 2020, Armenia turned to the CSTO for help. Moscow responded by saying that it could not help, since the borders of Armenia were not violated and the war took place on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh…the Kremlin limited itself to political support for Yerevan, and after that it sent peacekeepers to the Karabakh… conflict zone.

At a meeting with Putin on December 27, 2022, the Armenian prime minister again recalled the responsibility of Russian peacekeepers. “The Lachin corridor has been blocked for almost 20 days. This is the area of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. And I want to remind you that according to the trilateral statement of the presidents of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia, the Lachin corridor should be under the control of Russian peacekeepers,” said Pashinyan…

On September 21, 2023, the day after the end of hostilities in Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sharply criticized Russian peacekeepers. “The Russian peacekeeping contingent was supposed to guarantee the safety of the civilian population…We bear our share of responsibility. But I don’t think that we should turn a blind eye to the failures that the Russian peacekeeping force had contingent,” he said…“Due to the inaction of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, over 100 thousand Armenians left their homes and native places in Nagorno-Karabakh in a week,” Pashinyan said…

On February 22, 2024, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, in an interview with France 24 TV channel, stated that the CSTO reaction did not correspond to reality in relation to the Republic of Armenia, in particular in 2021 and 2022. “And, obviously, this could not go unnoticed by Armenia. Today, in practice, we have actually frozen our participation in this agreement in this organization,” said the Prime Minister of Armenia…

On February 28, 2024, answering questions from deputies in the Armenian parliament, Nikol Pashinyan stated that “The CSTO, instead of fulfilling its obligations to Armenia in the field of security, on the contrary, creates security problems. And this position, I say frankly, is a threat to the national security of Armenia…”

“Armenia FM comments on Russian border guards’ presence on Turkey border,” News.am (Armenian news website), 7 March 2024. https://news.am/eng/news/811212.html

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan explained how Yerevan informed Moscow about the matter of the Russian border guards at Zvartnots International Airport of the Armenian capital city of Yerevan.

At Thursday’s press conference, the FM confirmed the statement by the secretary of the Council of Armenia regarding the aforementioned matter, and stated that the Russian side was informed about the initiative to remove the Russian border guards from Zvartnots airport…

“Now we believe that Armenia is institutionally capable of independently implementing border guard service at the [Yerevan] airport, about which we have informed the Russian side. I believe that this will be enough for the Russian side and the matter will be over,” Mirzoyan noted, adding that it is about the entire package of jurisdiction at the airport…To the question about the presence of Russian border guards in other places in Armenia, for example on the Turkish border, the minister responded that the matter is only about Zvartnots airport. “Therefore, we are talking only about the airport,” added the Armenian FM.

Notes:

[i] Russia and the CSTO have had separate responses to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and subsequent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia deployed a peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the ceasefire agreement, but the peacekeepers are not affiliated with the CSTO. The CSTO declined to intervene in the 2020 war or the clashes on the grounds that the organization stated Armenia itself was not attacked in any of the instances and thus, does not necessitate a collective defense response from the organization.

[ii] Russia’s 102nd Military Base is located near the city of Gymuri, Armenia with an estimated 3,000 soldiers garrisoned there, while Russian border guards provide security on Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran as well as operating at the Zvartnots International Airport outside of the capital Yerevan.

Image Information:

Image: An image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan from 2023. Armenia is currently taking steps to distance itself from both the CSTO and Russia.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nikol_Pashinyan_-_2023_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 2.0

Uzbekistan and China Sign Strategic Partnership Agreement

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Official portrait of Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev

“According to Xi, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway should be started as soon as possible and help transform Uzbekistan from a landlocked country into a country connected by land routes.”

Uzbekistan conducts bilateral cooperation across political, economic, or security spheres with several different partners, including Russia, China, and the United States, but rarely engages too closely with any one partner. Despite precedent, the accompanying excerpted article from the independent Russian-language news website Fergana Agency reports that China and Uzbekistan signed an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” in late January 2024 during President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visit to China. The article includes a quote from President Xi Jinping, who stated that China supports Uzbekistan’s “national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and in choosing its own development path.” In turn, Mirziyoyev stated that Uzbekistan supports the “one China principle.” Uzbekistan has previously stated it supports the one China principle, but Mirziyoyev went on to note that Uzbekistan now firmly supports Beijing on its core[i] interests, including Taiwan. He also noted that Uzbekistan will cooperate with China in the fight against the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Uzbekistan already cooperates with China on “three evils” through the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but this could be a sign of deeper cooperation in this area and might include an increase in bilateral security cooperation. China has already signed similar comprehensive agreements with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in recent years.[ii] Overall, the most recent agreement with Uzbekistan strengthens China’s position in the region.

Sources:

“Узбекистан и Китай повысили отношения до всепогодного всестороннего партнерства (Uzbekistan and China have increased relations to an all-weather comprehensive partnership),” Fergana Agency (independent Russian-language news website focusing on Central Asia), 25 January 2024. https://fergana.agency/news/132723

Uzbekistan and China have increased relations to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era.” The corresponding joint statement was signed by the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev and the President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping following negotiations in Beijing on January 24…

Xi Jinping noted that 32 years ago, Uzbekistan became the first Central Asian country to establish diplomatic relations with China…“In particular, over the past seven-plus years, we have been working together to establish healthy and prosperous bilateral cooperation in various fields,” the Chinese President said.

China firmly supports Uzbekistan in defending its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and in choosing its own development path, Xi emphasized…

According to Xi, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway should be started as soon as possible and help transform Uzbekistan from a landlocked country into a country connected by land routes…

Shavkat Mirziyoyev noted the symbolic significance of choosing China as the first country he visited this year…

Mirziyoyev stated that Uzbekistan:

  • firmly adheres to the “one China principle”
  • resolutely opposes the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of the PRC 
  • [is] ready to firmly support Beijing on issues related to its core interests, including Taiwan, Xinjiang, human rights 
  • [will] cooperate with the PRC in the fight against the “three forces of evil” (terrorism, separatism and extremism) and ensuring security in both countries and the region as a whole.

The parties welcomed the launch of a pilot project to introduce the Lu Ban Workshop, the Chinese vocational education system, in Uzbekistan. During the negotiations, it was noted that by the end of 2023, mutual trade between the two countries had reached $14 billion. The leaders expressed the opinion that in the near future trade turnover could be increased to $20 billion.

Mirziyoyev called on Chinese partners to actively participate in the processes of privatization of state-owned enterprises and banks in Uzbekistan. As a result of the negotiations, over 15 cooperation documents were signed regarding the joint construction of the Belt and Road, economic and technological cooperation, interconnectedness, environmental protection, new energy sources, science and culture…

[i] For additional information on China’s position regarding Taiwan being a “core interest,” see: Dodge Billingsley, “Chinese Officials Justify Reaction to Western Presence in Taiwan Strait,” OE Watch, 07-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/chinese-officials-justify-reaction-to-western-presence-in-taiwan-strait-2/

[ii] The separate agreements between China and individual Central Asian states exemplify China’s preference for bilateral relations over regional frameworks. For background on China and Tajikistan’s security cooperation agreement, see: Matthew Stein and Peter Wood “Chinese-Tajikistani Security Cooperation Gaining Momentum,” FMSO Foreign Perspective Brief, January 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinese-tajikistani-security-cooperation-gaining-momentum-stein-wood/

Image Information:

Image: Official portrait of Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shavkat_Mirziyoyev_official_portrait_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Sri Lanka Suspends Chinese Research Vessel Visits

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Map of South Asia, India featured.

“In the immediate (time frame), it means that China’s third ‘research/spy vessel’ Xiang Yang Hong 3 is not welcome in the first week of the New Year.”

India has been wary of Chinese research vessels docking in Sri Lankan ports and has pushed Sri Lanka to prevent these port calls. China claims the vessels are only for scientific purposes, but the Chinese ships that have docked in Sri Lanka are known to have dual scientific and intelligence-gathering purposes.[i] The accompanying excerpted articles report on Sri Lanka’s recent decision for a one-year moratorium on foreign research vessels docking in the country’s ports beginning 1 January 2024, and demonstrate how Sri Lanka continues to be a focal point in tensions between India and China.

The first excerpted article from India’s independent think tank Observer Research Foundation states that Sri Lanka’s moratorium is an attempt to appease India by not allowing Chinese ships to carry out intelligence gathering activities so close to India under the guise of scientific research. While Sri Lanka has become more economically tied with China over the past several years, it still relies on India as an economic and political partner. Sri Lanka’s ties with India, while strained at times, go back further than its ties with China. An immediate impact of the moratorium resulted in the Chinese ship Xiang Yang Hong 3 being prohibited from docking in Sri Lanka in early January. The author mentions that China sought permission from both Sri Lanka and the Maldives to dock the Xiang Yang Hong 3 late last year. The second excerpted article from India’s English-language daily Deccan Herald reports that in light of the Sri Lankan moratorium, the Maldives is allowing the Xiang Yang Hong 3 docking rights. The purpose of the Chinese visit is for the rotation of personnel and replenishment for the ship, and not for research, according to the article. Nevertheless, the decision by the Maldives enables China a port visit close to India. The article also mentions that there will likely be some political fallout between India and the Maldives over this authorization, though it is unclear how this will play out. Overall, Sri Lanka’s one year moratorium on foreign ships reflects India’s influence in Sri Lanka. However, the docking of the Xiang Yang Hong 3 in the Maldives likewise demonstrates that India’s ability to influence only extends so far, allowing China to project power and maintain a presence near India.

Sources:

N. Sathiya Moorthy, “Decoding Sri Lanka’s moratorium on foreign research vessels,” Observer Research Foundation (independent think-tank in India), 8 January 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/decoding-sri-lanka-s-moratorium-on-foreign-research-vessels

On the face of it, the recent Sri Lankan government’s decision to ‘declare a pause’ on foreign research vessels for one year beginning 1 January 2024 is an attempt to buy peace with the large-hearted Indian neighbour, and also the United States…

In the immediate, it means that China’s third ‘research/spy vessel’ Xiang Yang Hong 3 is not welcome in the first week of the New Year…

“The arrival of these ships creates serious diplomatic tensions, and it (2024) is an election year,” Foreign Minister Ali Sabry said, by way of explanation. “Such ship visits can be highly disruptive for the region and Sri Lanka, because of the pressure the government may come under…” he added…

For instance, Shi Yan 6 was not the first Chinese research/survey ship, otherwise considered a ‘spy ship’, to visit Sri Lanka…A year earlier in 2022, Yuan Wang 5 had berthed at the Chinese-controlled Hambantota Port in the south, unlike Shi Yan 6, which docked at the capital Colombo…

In the case of the new vessel, Xiang Yang Hong 3, China had sought permission from both Sri Lanka and neighbouring Maldives, to dock it in these waters from 5 January to the end of May, a long five-month haul. As the intention was to map the ocean in these parts, the long stay should be a cause for concern for the larger Indian neighbour.

It should be equally so for the US, whose Diego Garcia military base is situated 700 km away…

Anirban Bhaumik, “India wary as Maldives allows China ‘research vessel’ to dock at port,” Deccan Herald (English-language daily newspaper in India), 23 January 2024.

https://www.deccanherald.com/world/india-wary-as-maldives-allows-china-research-vessel-to-dock-at-port-2861168

…President Mohamed Muizzu’s government on Tuesday stated that it had decided to allow Chinese PLAN’s ‘research vessel’ Xiang Yang Hong 3 to dock at Malé, the main port of the Maldives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the government of the Maldives stated that the decision to allow the ship to make the port call followed a diplomatic request from Beijing. It, however, claimed that Xiang Yang Hong 3 would dock at Malé only for the rotation of personnel and replenishment and would not conduct any research as long as it would remain in the territorial waters of the Maldives.New Delhi, however, is not convinced and, according to the sources, would soon convey its concerns to Malé through diplomatic channels. A source in New Delhi told DH that India would use its assets to keep watch on the Xiang Yang Hong 3 during its port call in the Maldives…

Notes:

[i] For background on India pressuring Sri Lanka to prevent Chinese vessels docking in Sri Lankan ports, see: Matthew Stein “India Works To Maintain Sri Lankan Foothold Amid Growing China Presence,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/india-works-to-maintain-sri-lankan-foothold-amid-growing-china-presence/

Image Information:

Image: Map of South Asia, India featured.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:South_Asia._LOC_2001622357.jpg
Attribution: Public domain