Author Archives: Jacob Zenn

Chadian President Threatens Withdrawal From Multinational Joint Task Force

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Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.

“The MNJTF is today hampered by the “lack of mutualization of efforts” needed to confront this common enemy [Boko Haram].”

On 28 October 2024, Boko Haram carried out a significant attack against Chadian soldiers in Barakaram on Lake Chad, killing at least 40.[i] Chadian President Mahamat Idris Deby Itno reacted to the Barakaram attack not by requesting greater collaboration with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF),[ii] which Nigeria has done in response to Boko Haram attacks. Rather, according to the excerpted article from the French-language website airinfoagadez.com, Deby Itno is considering withdrawing Chad from the MNJTF altogether, which could add further stress to the 20-year-old organization. Niger, which itself withdrew from the MNJTF in June after alleging the Economic Community of West African States was interfering in its internal affairs, had in late August reported to Nigeria that it would renew cooperation with the MNJTF. But now a Chadian withdrawal could undermine the force.

According to the accompanying article, Deby Itno sees insufficient “mutual” contributions to the MNJTF, perhaps implying that Niger’s wavering about staying in the organization contributed to the inability to stop Boko Haram from augmenting its ranks on the lake or that Chad is shouldering an excessive burden in the force. More specifically, the president’s office alleged that the MNJTF had become “lethargic,” which hindered Chad’s ability to engage in counterterrorism operations. The article suggested that if Chad operated outside the MNJTF, it could operate more autonomously and secure the country’s borders. The article did, however, claim that a Chadian withdrawal from the MNJTF would exacerbate the security vulnerabilities of other Lake Chad countries, including Niger, even though the Chadian president hinted that withdrawing from the MNJTF would not cause Chad to abandon its commitment to the regional fight against terrorism.

It is possible that Chad simply no longer needs the MNJTF for counterterrorism against Boko Haram, or at least that Deby Itno is confident in relying on his own army, despite tactical defeats such as that in Barakaram. Alternatively, Deby Into may be using the threat to withdraw from the MNJTF to solicit more international support for the force, a demand he has also made.[iii] Indeed, given that the MNJTF is based in N’Djamena, Chad, Deby Itno’s comments represent an existential threat for the MNJTF if they become reality.

Sources:

“Le Tchad envisage un retrait de la Force Multinationale Mixte (FMM) (Chad Considers Withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force),” airinfoagadez.com (media group combining Aïr-Info Agadez, RADIO Sahara FM, Agadez Web TV in Agadez, Niger and covering Sahelian political and security affairs), 3 November 2024. https://airinfoagadez.com/2024/11/03/le-tchad-envisage-un-retrait-de-la-force-multinationale-mixte-fmm/

Chad announced it is considering a possible withdrawal of its troops from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), citing a “lack of mutualization of efforts” in this regional coalition against Boko Haram. This decision, announced on November 3, comes after a recent deadly attack by the Boko Haram sect against Chadian forces in Barkaram, in Lake Chad province. On the ground, [President Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno] oversaw security reinforcement measures and ordered the launch of Operation Haskanite to track down the attackers.

The MNJTF “seems to be falling into lethargy,” which undermines the effectiveness of the joint fight. If the withdrawal were confirmed, Chad could opt for autonomous operations and concentrate resources on securing its borders. Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno reaffirmed the duty to protect Chadian citizens first and foremost, while emphasizing that the country would continue to uphold its commitments in the regional fight against terrorism.

Notes:

[i] The recent Boko Haram attack on Barakaram is the deadliest since a raid on the Chadian base in Bohoma along Lake Chad in 2020. Nearly 80 soldiers were killed in the Bohoma raid, showcased in a Boko Haram video revealing beheadings, soldiers fleeing the base, and a helicopter flying overhead to assess the situation in the aftermath of the attack.

[ii] The MNJTF was founded in 1994 to curb banditry. In 2015, the force, which by then comprised Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin, expanded its scope to ending the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region. Its headquarters was also in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena, but the force was largely Nigeria-centric, given that it collaborated alongside multiple Nigerian counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram.

[iii] “Chad urges international community to boost support after Boko Haram attack,” france24.com. 30 October 2024. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20241030-chad-urges-international-community-to-boost-support-after-boko-haram-attack

OE Watch Insight:

TCD’s president is threatening to withdraw from MNJTF, accusing it of lacking coordination among member-states and being slow to respond to BH attacks. He may be confident TCD can counter BH independently, or indirectly seeking more international support to strengthen the MNJTF.

Image Information:

Image: Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.
Source: André Kodmadjingar (VOA), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mahamat_Idriss_Deby_(en_boubou_blanc).png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Nigerian Senator Proposes Employment of Private Military Companies Against Boko Haram

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Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.

“These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”

Nigeria is a country that has historically shied away from employing private military companies (PMCs) as a matter of national sovereignty. When the country has employed PMCs, including a South African-led contingent[i] that combatted Boko Haram in 2015, it has not yielded success beyond short-term gains. However, the excerpted Daily Trust article indicates that an influential politician in Boko Haram’s heartland, Borno State, is now calling for Nigeria to again employ PMCs. According to the article, Borno South Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume[ii] is urging Nigerian President Bola Tinubu to temporarily hire PMCs because the Nigerian military and Civilian Joint Task Force are making progress against Boko Haram but are unable to secure victory. However, the claims that progress is being made against Boko Haram is debatable. For example, the article notes that, among other larger attacks, Boko Haram (likely the faction of the late Abubakar Shekau[iii]) had just raided Ngoshe in the Gwoza local government area and abducted numerous civilians and killed six farmers.

In addition, Ndume’s suggestion that the PMCs would only operate “temporarily” raises questions about whether they could secure victory, given the late Shekau faction and the stronger Islamic State in West Africa Province faction and their predecessors have been fighting since 2009. Since then, neither the Nigerian military nor the Multinational Joint Task Force, comprising Nigeria and its four land neighbors and previous PMCs, has come close to defeating[iv] these factions. Furthermore, Ndume has hinted that the PMCs would not only finish Boko Haram in this “temporary” time frame but also combat the possibly even more widespread problem of banditry in northwestern Nigeria. Defeating either Boko Haram or the bandits, let alone both, would be an insurmountable task for Nigeria’s military even if several thousand PMC personnel were operating alongside them.

Ndume did not mention the company or origin of the PMCs whom he is advising Tinubu to employ. Nevertheless, the main option in the region would seem to be Russia’s Africa Corps, the successor of the Wagner Group. The recent pro-Russian sentiment exhibited during anti-corruption protests in northern Nigeria, as well as the Russian efforts to displace the West, including France in the Sahel and potentially the United States in Nigeria, could represent the beginning of Russian efforts to pull Nigeria closer into its orbit for the first time since the end of the Soviet era. If Ndume’s proposal gains traction, it could herald new geopolitical contestation in Nigeria, but few favorable outcomes for counterinsurgency or counter-banditry in the country.

Sources:

“Ndume asks Tinubu to hire military contractors to flush out Boko Haram,” Daily Trust (most widely circulated newspaper in northern Nigeria, which covers the region’s affairs from a critical perspective), 2 October 2024. https://dailytrust.com/ndume-asks-tinubu-to-hire-military-contractors-to-flush-out-boko-haram/

Senator representing Borno South, Mohammed Ali Ndume, has called on President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to temporarily hire the services of “military contractors” to wipe out the remnants of Boko Haram terrorists in Borno State. Ndume, who hailed the gallant performance of the military and Civilian JTF, said they are ill-equipped to carry out the task of eliminating the remaining insurgents who operate within. “All across the world, governments hire the services of military contractors to engage in certain places. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu can consider this as a short measure. These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”

“These contractors will come with their equipment and military hardware. In a very short time, they’ll eliminate those Boko Haram terrorists. The contractors can also be used to eliminate those bandits operating in the North West. His comment comes after Boko Haram terrorists launched a fresh attack in Ngoshe, Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno, where they  slaughtered six farmers and  abducted five others including women.

Notes:

[i] In 2015, ISWAP lost territory after the armies of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and South African PMCs led by a former apartheid-era South African Defence Force officer supported the Nigerian army to expel ISWAP from towns it had controlled in northeastern Nigeria. Nevertheless, disputes over payments of the PMCs, ISWAP’s retreat into rural areas, and ISWAP’s retaliatory attacks against Niger, Chad, and Cameroon undermined the counter-ISWAP offensive’s momentum. The PMCs and Nigeria’s three neighboring countries all eventually left Nigeria and ISWAP and the Shekau faction both renewed operations in 2017 to recapture territories and overrun Nigerian military outposts and bases.

[ii] Ndume himself was suspected of supporting Boko Haram and even jailed early in the insurgency in 2012 when he reportedly contacted Boko Haram leadership 73 times in one month. It later surfaced that he was, however, attempting to negotiate.

[iii] Since the Shekau faction split from ISWAP in 2016, Gwoza has remained one of its strongholds. In addition, mass abductions and killings of civilian farmers is typical of the Shekau faction’s brutality, whereas ISWAP has generally avoided tactics that alienate and brutalize the local population.

[iv] The Nigerian president from 2015 to 2023, Muhammadu Buhari, notoriously claimed that Boko Haram was “technically defeated” after coming into office only to see the two main factions resurface stronger than before by 2017.

OE Watch Insight:

Senator proposes NIG president employ PMCs temporarily to combat Boko Haram and bandits, but both problem sets require more sustainable solutions. It remains unclear if the senator intends RUS Africa Corps PMCs to enter NIG and challenge USA influence.  

Image Information:

Image: Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.
Source: VOA, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:R%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9sMaiduguri2016.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

China’s Expands Its Influence in Africa Through Economic and Security Cooperation

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Chinese trade cooperation with Tanzania dates back to 1965, but now not only includes large-scale infrastructure projects, such as bridges, but also joint military exercises.

“The start of [China’s] joint naval exercise with Mozambique came after the conclusion of joint naval exercises with Tanzania…”

China is supporting African countries in economic and infrastructure development alongside its growing military presence in the continent. Tanzania, where China has been showing increasing interest in both the security and economic realms, is indicative of this trend. In late July China held Peace-Unity 2024, a joint military drill with Tanzania, which involved counter-terrorism exercises. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) newspaper Global Times argued those exercises “reflected China’s power projection capabilities” in Africa.[i] After the exercises in Tanzania, China held similar counterterrorism and counter-piracy exercises in neighboring Mozambique, which has borne the brunt of Islamic State (IS) affiliated militant attacks in East Africa.

Consistent with China’s game plan in Africa to combine security with economic partnerships, on 8 October, the CCP website cctv.com published the excerpted Chinese-language article discussing the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and China Railway 15th Bureau Group’s finalizing the construction of a bridge in Tanzania after four years of work. The article touts the two-mile long bridge, which connects Kigongo and Busisi on the banks of the Gulf on Mwanza in Tanzania’s north, as the longest low-tower cable-stayed bridge in Africa. Given that the China Railway 15th Bureau Group, like other railway companies,[ii] has historically performed military-related construction missions, this bridge also has military significance for China’s power projection in Africa.

The combination of constructing major infrastructure projects in Tanzania followed by joint military training exercises with the same country and its strife-ridden neighbor reflects China’s modus operandi in Africa. Developing African infrastructure not only opens economic opportunities for Chinese commerce on the continent but also enables China to expand its military influence in Africa. In addition, large-scale Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa can obscure the arguably more significant military influence China is acquiring there, which China does not wish to highlight internationally for fear it could be perceived as threatening.

China will continue to exert influence and enhance its military footprint in African countries by linking its ability to support economic development and infrastructure projects with joint military exercises and potentially other objectives in those countries, such as basing rights. This promotes China’s Belt and Road Initiative and broader global security objectives. If there is a new “great game” in Africa, Tanzania is among the numerous countries on the continent where China is playing aggressively.

Sources:

“China-Tanzania joint military drill kicks off, ‘reflects Chinese continental power projection capabilities,” Global Times (Chinese Communist Party news service focusing on international affairs from a Chinese nationalist and populist perspective). 6 August 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1317509.shtml

On its way to Mozambique from Tanzania, the Qilianshan conducted joint search and rescue as well as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy training in preparation of the joint exercises, the PLA Navy confirmed. The start of the joint naval exercise with Mozambique came after the conclusion of joint naval exercises with Tanzania, also under the banner of the “Peace-Unity 2024” joint exercises.

With a focus on counter-terrorism and counter-piracy in the joint exercises, Zhang Junshe, a Chinese military expert, told the Global Times that the drills are of pragmatic significance in Africa where terrorist and pirate attacks occur frequently

“中企承建非洲最长矮塔斜拉桥顺利合龙 (The longest low-tower cable-stayed bridge in Africa built by a Chinese company was successfully closed),” news.cctv.com (website of national television broadcaster of China, which reports to the Chinese Communist Party), 8 October 2024. https://news.cctv.com/2024/10/08/ARTIEo5gdghwYT812Y5y9lRG241008.shtml

The Magufuli Bridge in Tanzania, jointly constructed by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and China Railway 15th Bureau Group, was successfully completed. After more than four years of non-stop construction, the longest low-tower cable-stayed bridge in Africa has been fully connected, and the countdown to the completion and opening of the entire line has begun. The Magufuli Bridge is located on the southern shoreline of Lake Victoria, which is the largest lake in Africa.

There was no underwater casting during the entire pedestal construction process, which minimized the impact of construction on the water quality of the lake and effectively protected the “Mother Lake” of the African people. During the construction process, the construction team strictly implemented quality control standards. After completion, it will become the first bridge project on Lake Victoria, which is of great significance for enhancing Tanzania’s national image and promoting local social and economic development.

Notes:

[i] See Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, “China-Tanzania joint military drill kicks off, ‘reflects Chinese continental power projection capabilities’”, Global Times (daily English language newspaper under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party’s People’s Daily newspaper), 30 July 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1317046.shtml

[ii] The China Railway 15th Bureau Group was formerly the fifth and sixth divisions of the Chinese Railways Corps, which was considered a “special force” of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since 1949. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00809A000700070455-8.pdf

OE Watch Insight:

CHN infrastructure projects in TZA coincide with joint military exercises, which allows CHN to present an image of supporting African nations while taking the focus off its increasing military influence in the region.

Image Information:

Image: Chinese trade cooperation with Tanzania dates back to 1965, but now not only includes large-scale infrastructure projects, such as bridges, but also joint military exercises.
Source: Xinhua, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:China-Tanzania_trade_agreement_signed.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

China Sets Sight on Gabon for Second African Military Base

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Gabon’s Port Gentil is the country’s second largest city and its airport and seaport will likely increasingly host military and business visitors from China as China courts Gabon as a close partner in West Africa.

“The visit of the [Chinese] Peace Ark highlights the friendly relations between Gabon and China, and brings glory and well-being to the Gabonese people.”

Beijing is targeting Gabon to host the second Chinese military base on the African continent, marking its first military base on Africa’s western coast. On 9 October, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation website published the excerpted Chinese-language article, which highlighted the Chinese naval visit to Gabon. The visit came amid a Chinese push to possibly establish its first military base on the western coast of Africa—and Gabon is a prospect to host this base.[i] The article indicates China’s goal was to cultivate goodwill in Gabon through the visit of its Peace Ark naval hospital ship to Gabon’s Owendo Port in the country’s capital. Among the participants in the farewell ceremony with the Gabonese Navy, for example, were non-military personnel, such as overseas Chinese businesspeople in Gabon, Confucius Institute[ii] representatives, and Chinese diplomatic personnel and medical teams.

The Peace Ark naval hospital ship held joint exercises with the Gabonese Navy on maritime rescue and evacuation between 26 September and 3 October. Yet, the most impactful mission of the hospital ship during the visit to Gabon was related to “soft power,” with it providing medical treatment to 6,934 Gabonese civilians, including 171 surgeries, and delivering four babies. Further, as part of the visit, Chinese medical teams were dispatched from the naval hospital ship to schools to promote health education and to hospitals to support Gabonese doctors, while also playing a friendly soccer match with the Gabonese military.

The Chinese campaign for influence in Gabon differs from Russia, which is unable to provide the same breadth of combined military and medical support to a country like Gabon. China is able to parlay its military support with significant investment, including more than 4 million Euros to Gabon in the weeks prior to this naval hospital ship’s visit to the country, which again Russia is unable to match.[iii] The Chinese campaign in Gabon is seeing results, with the Gabonese president publicly welcoming the Belt and Road Initiative’s expansion into the country.[iv] China is, therefore, primed to increase its influence in Gabon, including potentially establishing a base in the country, while also outflanking other geopolitical powers, such as Russia, for influence in Africa in the long run.

Sources:

““和平方舟”号医院船结束访问加蓬，离港时与加蓬海军举行联合演练 (The “Peace Ark” Hospital Ship Ends Visit to Gabon, Conducting a Joint Exercise with the Gabonese Navy When Leaving the Port),” focac.org, (official website of FOCAC, which is the official forum between all African states except Eswatini and China), 9 October 2024. https://www.focac.org/zfgx/hpaq/202410/t20241009_11504024.htm

The Chinese Navy’s Peace Ark hospital ship slowly sailed away from the Port of Owendo, Gabon, after successfully completing its visit to Gabon. More than 300 people, including Ambassador to Gabon Zhou Ping, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Gabonese Navy Diwaku, embassy staff, overseas Chinese in Gabon, representatives of the Confucius Institute and the medical aid team to Gabon attended the farewell ceremony. This was the first joint maritime search and rescue exercise between the Chinese and Gabonese navies.

In addition to the main platform for treatment, the hospital ship also sent expert teams and patrol teams to local hospitals for diagnosis and treatment The visit of the Peace Ark hospital ship was highly appreciated by the Gabonese government.

Notes:

[i] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish A Military Base In Gabon,” OE Watch, 06-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/

[ii] China’s Confucius Institutes are often situated at university campuses abroad “to promote the Chinese language and cultural activities among students and researchers” but they “unswervingly” serve the Communist Party’s goals and are, therefore, part of Chinese soft power projection. As a result of Confucius Institutes’ ties with the Communist Party, an increasing number of them have been shut down in the West, but they are still expanding in Africa and the Middle East. Mordechai Chaziza, “China’s Soft Power Projection Strategy: Confucius Institutes in the MENA Region,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 25 July 2023. https://besacenter.org/chinas-soft-power-projection-strategy-confucius-institutes-in-the-mena-region/

[iii] “Le Gabon attire 4,3 milliards $ d’investissements chinois (Gabon attracts $4.3 billion of Chinese investment),” Agence Ecofin [Cameroon— and Switzerland-based French-language website primarily covering African political economics]. 4 September 2024. https://www.agenceecofin.com/economie/0409-121241-le-gabon-attire-4-3-milliards-dinvestissements-chinois

[iv] See: “(FOCAC) Interview: China is a true friend that stands with Gabon through thick and thin, says Gabonese president,” news.cn [website of the official state news agency of the People’s Republic of China]. 5 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240905/11512527b9eb47799078488bbb0c3e31/c.html

OE Watch Insight:

A CHN naval hospital ship visited GAB to participate in joint maritime search and rescue exercises. Another key mission was to provide medical care to GAB military personnel and civilians to build goodwill amid a possible attempt by CHN to build its first West Africa military base in GAB.

Image information:

Image: Gabon’s Port Gentil is the country’s second largest city and its airport and seaport will likely increasingly host military and business visitors from China as China courts Gabon as a close partner in West Africa.
Source: Brian Ecton, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:POG-Airport.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Terrorist Attack in Togo Reveals Turkish Counter-Terrorism Role

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Togo’s Savanes Region is JNIM’s latest area of expansion, but it remains unclear whether Turkish PMCs can support the Togolese army to repel JNIM over the long term.

“The [JNIM] attack targeted soldiers who were patrolling the trenches under construction, and who were trying to prevent terrorist incursions at the border.”

The littoral West African country of Togo, along with its neighbor Benin, is a main target of expansion for the al-Qaeda affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).[i] As discussed in a French-language article in the Burkinabe publication, 24heures.bf, on 2 October, JNIM attacked a construction site in northern Togo engaged in the building of trenches to defend against JNIM incursions. The attack claimed the lives of nine Togolese soldiers and 10 civilians. This is not the first time JNIM has specifically destroyed trench-building projects and killed construction workers. The article notes that Togolese Army reinforcements accompanied by Turkish instructors in helicopters, finally repelled the attack by firing on the JNIM militants.

Although Turkish instructors have reportedly operated in Niger alongside Russian Africa Corps personnel, it was previously unclear whether Turkish instructors operated in Togo.[ii] The article, in fact, asserts that two Turkish instructors have been killed in previous JNIM attacks in Togo, which suggests Turks may be more involved in counter-insurgency operations in Togo than previously known.

The involvement of Turkish instructors in Togo seemingly differs from that of African Corps personnel operating in the Sahel, who not only engage in counterinsurgency operations against JNIM but are also involved in propping up post-coup junta military regimes in the Sahel, including Burkina Faso. Notably, Africa Corps has suffered numerous setbacks in battles with JNIM. The Turkish private military company, Sadat, had reportedly been active in Niger and Burkina Faso. The presence of Turkish instructors in Togo implies a likely expansion of the Turkish PMC and instructor presence in West Africa

Sources:

“Attaque terroriste au Togo: 19 morts près de la frontière du Burkina (Terrorist attack in Togo: 19 dead near the Burkina border),” 24heures.bf (independent French-language Burkina Faso-based publication with a focus on defense and security affairs), 4 October 2024. https://www.24heures.bf/attaque-terroriste-au-togo-19-morts-pres-de-la-frontiere-du-burkina/

A terrorist attack struck, on October 2, the town of Fanworgou in the Kpendjal region in northern Togo, exactly on the border with Burkina. The [JNIM] attack targeted soldiers who were patrolling along the trenches under construction, and who were trying to prevent terrorist incursions at the border. The result: 19 dead, including 9 soldiers and 10 civilians, including EBOMAF machine operators and technicians.

Reinforcements, especially airborne, were deployed to the site to counter the attackers, who were repelled by military units supported by helicopters and piloted by Turkish instructors. Despite the construction of trenches, the terrorists seem to continue to adapt their tactics.

Notes:

[i] Jacob Zenn, “Al-Qaeda’s Sahel Affiliate Targets Togo,” OE Watch, 07-2022, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/420353?pi296680=2

[ii] According to Africa Defense Forum, “some of Sadat’s Syrian fighters in Niger have ended up under Russian command fighting violent extremist organizations affiliated with al-Qaida and the Islamic State group in the Liptako-Gourma region, the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.” Africa Defense Forum, “Turkish PMC ‘Sadat’ Competes for Sahel Influence,” adf-magazine.com, 30 July 2024. https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/turkish-pmc-sadat-competes-for-sahel-influence/

OE Watch Insight:  

TUR PMCs are providing support to Togolese army to combat AQ-affiliated JNIM’s attempts to move south from BFA into TGO.

Image Information:

Image: Togo’s Savanes Region is JNIM’s latest area of expansion, but it remains unclear whether Turkish PMCs can support the Togolese army to repel JNIM over the long term.
Source: EC-JRC/ECHO, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Togo_Base_Map.png
Attribution: CC x 2.

Tuareg Separatist Militants Form an Alliance Against Junta-Led Governments in Mali and Niger

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Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.

“The Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to assist each other, but also to defend their interests together on the international level.”

Since 2021, West African security and political dynamics have deteriorated as a result of coups by military juntas in the region’s three central states—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In July 2024, these three juntas agreed to a new regional Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) after leaving the preexisting regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States. They replaced Western military support with that of the successor to Russia’s Wagner Group, known as the Africa Corps. Now, however, two of the Sahel’s ethnonationalist and mostly secular Tuareg rebel groups, the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) in Niger and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)[i] in Mali, have formed their own alliance.

According to the excerpted French-language article from French state-owned radio news website rfi.fr, both the FPL and CSP-DPA oppose the respective juntas that are now ruling their countries. The main function of their newly established alliance is for both rebel groups to promise to aid each other in the case of an attack by AES armies, forcing them to confront a more complex and even multi-national insurgency. The article also states that the FPL and CSP-DPA plan to defend each other’s interests on the international level, although whether that entails advocacy or operations or both is left ambiguous. However, by targeting Chinese-funded pipeline projects, the FPL insurgency has already achieved internationalized operations status. The FPL believes such projects fund the junta in Niamey at the expense of predominantly Tuareg and other minority regions of Niger.[ii] Such attacks serve as a form of leverage and pressure against the junta.

The article also highlights that the alliance-making meeting between FPL and CSP-DPA leaders occurred in the northern Malian town of Tinzaouatène. This town near the Algerian border is the CSP base, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), which is under the CSP umbrella,[iii] and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims massacred dozens of African Corps and Malian troops in separate attacks on 28 July. According to the article, the Tinzaouatène meeting sent a message that the new FPL and CSP-DPA alliance could launch similar massacres if their goals for independence or autonomy are not met. This would represent a new development in the Sahel, where Tuareg rebel groups have historically remained relatively independent of each other and have mostly focused on reacting only to their own nation’s political and military developments.

At a time when the AES military juntas have largely lost legitimacy internationally and when Africa Corps is reeling from the massacre it suffered at the hands of the CMA, the FPL and CSP-DPA are escalating their confrontation with the embattled juntas in the political, military, and international realm. Neither group is particularly antagonistic towards the United States or the West. However, even if democratic rule eventually returns, their strengthening insurgencies will make it more difficult to reunite Mali and Niger and restore sovereignty to both nations.

Sources:

“À Tinzaouatène, les rebellions du Niger et du Mali se réunissent pour renforcer leurs relations (In Tinzaouatène, rebellions from Niger and Mali meet to strengthen relations)),” Radio France Internationale (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 28 August 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240901-%C3%A0-tinzaouat%C3%A8ne-les-rebellions-du-niger-et-du-mali-se-r%C3%A9unissent-pour-renforcer-leurs-relations

The delegation of the Niger rebels of the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) was led by Barak Taher Hamit, who holds the title of “commander-in-chief” of the armed movement opposed to the Niger junta. The delegation of the Malian rebels of the Strategic Framework for Defense (CSP) was headed by Alghabass Ag Intalla, who is the leader of the militant group and opponent of the Malian junta. To begin discussions with an aim towards strengthening relations between them, the site of the meeting was quite symbolic: Tinzaouatène in northern Mali, located on the Algerian border.

During the meeting, no document was signed, or at least not made public. But the Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to aid each other, and also to defend their interests together on the international level. According to sources close to both parties, other meetings are being planned about “fighting hand in hand against the militaries in power in Mali and Niger”.

Notes:

[i] “Azawad” is the term that Tuareg ethnonationalists use to refer their homeland.

[ii] In June 2024, the FPL, for example, disabled a section of Niger’s PetroChina-funded crude oil pipeline with the intent to force China to cancel a deal between the junta and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC). See: Emmanuel Addeh, “Tensions Escalate As Armed Group Attacks Niger’s PetroChina-Funded Pipeline, Threatens More Attacks,” Arise.TV, 19 June 2024. https://www.arise.tv/tensions-escalate-as-armed-group-attacks-nigers-petrochina-funded-pipeline-threatens-more-attacks/

[iii] See: “Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors,” ICG, 13 October 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur

Image Information:

Image: Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.
Source: Magharebia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Le_Mali_confront%C3%A9_aux_sanctions_et_%C3%A0_lavanc%C3%A9e_des_rebelles_islamistes_(6904946068).jpg

The China-Africa Cooperation Forum Focuses on Chinese Military Expansion in Africa

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First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.

“Many countries have serious security problems in society, and there is a growing trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese.”

51 African heads of state attended, the tri-annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing from 4-6 September. While China currently has one base in Africa on the Djibouti coast, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s FOCAC speech bolstered other reports about China’s ambitions to expand its military footprint on the continent, including possibly establishing other military bases.[i] Xi Jinping vowed that China would train 6,000 African soldiers and 1,000 African law enforcement officers, welcome 500 African military officers to China, commence joint patrols, mine clearance, and other military activities with African partners, and provide security for joint projects with African security officials.[ii] This latter objective was underscored in the article, where it noted the growing trend of violent crimes against Chinese-funded enterprises and employees and overseas Chinese in Africa, which are often seen as exploitative. Only 20 African countries currently have police cooperation agreements with China, a fact the article lamented and stated needs to increase. This suggests a correlation in the future between Chinese economic activities in Africa, which will inevitably lead to security incidents and Chinese security cooperation with African countries.[iii] The FOCAC and Xi Jinping’s speech, therefore, signal a growing Chinese military and security presence in Africa.

Sources:

“中非合作论坛峰会召开：为双边关系良性发展“提质增效”提供契机 (The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is held: An opportunity is provided to ‘improve the quality and efficiency’ for the healthy development of bilateral relations)” thepaper.cn (Communist Party-affiliated Chinese-language newspaper that appeals to youths and has more editorial freedom than most Chinese media), 5 September 2024. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_28634922

It is relevant to note that 51 of the African leaders who attended the summit are heads of state or government, which is far higher than other “Africa + 1” meetings, such as the US-Africa summit. Against the background of serious changes in Sino-US relations and Sino-EU relations, the importance of the “Global South” in China’s diplomatic grand strategy is rising sharply.

China’s large-scale financing and loans in Africa have become the focus of public criticism for a long time under the smearing and discrediting by the United States and Europe. In fact, this has had a negative impact on the reputations of both China and Africa.

Many countries have serious security problems, and there is a rising trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese. At present, only more than 20 African countries have signed relevant police cooperation agreements with China, so the cooperation between the two sides in the field of police law enforcement needs to be improved.

Notes:

[i] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish a Military Base in Gabon,” OE Watch, 04-2024, 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/

[ii] “Full text: Xi Jinping’s speech at opening ceremony of 2024 FOCAC summit,” CGTN, 5 September 2024, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-09-05/Full-text-Xi-s-speech-at-opening-ceremony-of-2024-FOCAC-summit-1wDYKL8FhxC/p.html

[iii] On Chinese private military contractors in Africa, see Paul Nantulya, “Chinese Security Firms Spread along the African Belt and Road,” ACSS, 15 June 2021. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinese-security-firms-spread-african-belt-road/

Image Information:

Image: First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.
Source: Stephen Wallis, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Forum_on_China-Africa_Cooperation.jpg

Nigerian Security Services Crackdown on Russian Flag Protesters

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Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.

“The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag….”

Russian influence in Francophone West African countries that have experienced military coups in the last few years is a clear trendline. One of the most notable examples of this influence has been the expansion of the Wagner Group – or Africa Corps as the company is now known – in the region. However, the excerpted punch.ng report about Russian flags being seen at anti-government protests in northern Nigeria is a new and unexpected development, and a possible indication that Russian information operations are contributing to a positive image of Russia in parts of Nigeria. This is despite Russia’s dubious counter-insurgency record in the Sahel and its support for anti-democratic military juntas in West Africa.[i] According to the article, certain northern elite politicians provided Russian flags to #EndBadGovernance protesters, who are disappointed with the government’s inability to address hunger and hardship in the country. The article further suggests that these elites seek to remove the current Nigerian president, Bola Tinubu, from power. The Russian flags served as a threat to Tinubu’s administration that what happened to leaders deposed in coups in Francophone West Africa could occur in Nigeria as well. According to the article, the response of the Nigerian military to these Russian flags could lead to an excessive reaction towards the flag holders and their alleged sponsors. The military has a history of cracking down on dissent with excessive violence.[ii] The article quotes top military officials as stating the protesters holding the Russian flags are treasonous could indicate harsh action will be taken against them, including at least 10 protesters and flag makers who have already been arrested.

Sources:

“Russian flag: FG probes four northern political bigwigs,” punch.ng (Lagos-based publication with a southern Nigerian perspective often critical of the government and northern Nigerian powerbrokers) 7 August 2024. https://punchng.com/russian-flag-fg-probes-four-northern-political-bigwigs/

The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag as they chanted “Tinubu must go.” Russia, an Eastern power currently mired in a cold war with the West, has been blamed for several unconstitutional changes of government in West African countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and among others. The Nigerian military said persons flying the Russian flag were committing treason and will, therefore, be “prosecuted”.

This act not only disrespects our national symbols but also commits treasonable felony and related offences. Hence, 10 suspects were arrested flying Russian flags,” Public Relations Officer ASP Buhari Abdullahi stated while parading the suspects.

Notes:

[i] See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Army, Wagner Group Atrocities Against Civilians,” 28 March 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/mali-army-wagner-group-atrocities-against-civilians

[ii] Just five years ago, in 2019, for example, the Nigerian military cracked down on the Shia Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and killed several dozen of its members who had been protesting in the streets and nearly killed their leader, Ibrahim al-Zakaky. He was forced to recover from his injuries while under long-term house arrest. See Faiza Mawani, “Persecution of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria,” October 19, 2020, UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog. https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2020/10/19/persecution-of-the-shia-islamic-movement-of-nigeria/

OE Watch Insight:

NGA protesters with RUS flags during anti-govt protests indicate desire to remove NGA president from office as has occurred in other Sahelian states. NGA mil officials allege northern elites sponsor the flags but risk excessively cracking down on flagholders for their “treason.”


Image Information:

Image: Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.
Source: TobiJamesCandids, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Protest_against_the_Special_Anti-Robbery_Squad_(SARS)_in_Lagos,_Nigeria.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Russia’s Africa Corps Personnel Redeploy From the Sahel to Kursk

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Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.

“He emphasized that the Wagner fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions.”

On 28 July, Tuareg rebels in the Coordination of Azawad Movements, a mostly secular Tuareg ethnonationalist militant and political coalition, together with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), massacred dozens of Africa Corps fighters (formerly the Wagner Group) and Malian soldiers in northern Mali near the Algerian border.[i] This was the most severe loss of life in a battle for Africa Corps since the mercenary contingent increased its presence on the continent in 2020. It would be politically untenable for Russia to reveal weakness and pressure Africa Corps to fully cut and run from its mission in Mali. However, this disaster in northern Mali and the simultaneous difficulties Russia is facing in responding to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk on Russian territory could lead to the redeployment of Africa Corps fighters from Mali and the Sahel region to Kursk. This, in turn, could result in a reduction of Russian counter-insurgency support to Mali and Sahelian states, which are already being engulfed by JNIM and its rival Islamic State in Greater Sahara.

This possibility is furthered in the pro-Russian government Russian-language website gazeta.ru, which reported that the Ukrainian offensive into Russia’s Kursk oblast is requiring Russia to call for assistance from Africa Corps. The article notes that Wagner Group, forces are returning from missions abroad to Ukraine and highlights how many Africa Corps fighters died in the ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM in Mali on 28 July. It further implies, based on a message from a prominent Russian Telegram user, that Africa Corps fighters who participated in conflicts in Africa would be among those transferred to Kursk. While details about this transfer are scant in the gazeta.ru article, such reports have also emerged from Russian-language websites critical of the Russian government. The second excerpted article in the Moscow Times also claims that Africa Corps fighters are being transferred from Africa to Kursk. The article emphasized that Africa Corps forces were previously sent to “distant” African countries, including Mali, where the junta leader extended the group’s contract. However, after the Russian Army’s encirclement in Kursk, those same forces are needed on the Russian home front. It remains unclear how this massacre and the fighting in Kursk will ultimately affect Africa Corps, but it is likely Africa Corps’ presence—and certainly its confidence—is less sustainable now than at any time in the recent past.

Sources:

“Бойцы «ЧВК Вагнер» прибыли в Курскую область. Что происходит в регионе на четвертые сутки боев? (Wagner ‘PMC fighters’ arrived in Kursk Oblast. What is happening in the region on the fourth day of fighting?),” www.gazeta.ru (Russian-language website that tends to be pro-Russian government but with a focus on social issues often more than politics) 9 August 2024. https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2024/08/09/19545865.shtml

Wagner PMC fighters and Akhmat special forces arrived in Kursk Oblast to join the battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The situation in the region is tense: a State of Smergency was declared, and border area residents of were evacuated. President Putin ordered that help be provided to the population.

Wagner PMC fighters arrived in Kursk Oblast and entered into battles against the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sudzha, the SHOT Telegram channel reported. The total number of fighters sent to the combat zone was not specified. According to the channel, brigades of the Ministry of Defense’s volunteer corps are also joining in the fighting.

Military correspondent Yegor Guzenko, who publishes under the pseudonym Thirteenth, also reported that fighters from Wagner PMC were sent to the Kursk region. He emphasized that the fighters are returning to Russia, which means that they are being transferred from foreign missions. Recently, Wagner PMC fighters participated in African conflicts, and especially fought against the Tuaregs in Mali. As a result of these battles, the PMC endured losses, which numbered several dozen people.

В Курскую область начали перебрасывать бойцов «Вагнера» из Африки (Wagner fighters from Africa began being transferred to Kursk region), Moscow Times (independent Russian bi-lingual on-line newspaper previously located in Russia, but since relocated to Amsterdam to avoid government sensorship), 8 August 2024. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/08/08/vkurskuyu-oblast-nachali-perebrasivat-boitsov-vagnera-izafriki-a138964

Russia is transferring Wagner PMC fighters from Africa to the Kursk region amid a successful offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, Z-blogger and the Telegram channel “Novorossiya Militia Reports” claim.

At the end of July in Mali, a contingent of government troops and Russian Wagner fighters near the border with Algeria were ambushed by Tuareg rebels. During the battle, Wagner and government troops were destroyed, and the losses of the Russian PMCs alone, according to various sources, may have reached 80 people.

Notes:

[i] Both al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM and the Tuareg rebel group Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) claimed the massacre of Wagner and Malian army fighters. However, both groups denied any cooperation with each other due to their conflicting Islamist and secular ethno-nationalist ideologies, respectively, if not also the CMA’s desire to receive international support for its cause, which would be jeopardized by any association with an al-Qaeda affiliate. See “Au Mali, le lourd revers des mercenaires russes de Wagner (In Mali, a large setback for Wagner’s Russian mercenaries),” Le Figaro, 29 July 2024. lefigaro.fr/international/au-mali-le-lourd-revers-des-mercenaires-russes-de-wagner-20240729

OE Watch Insight:

Former RUS Wagner paramilitary forces, now referred to as Africa Corps, have been redeployed from MLI to RUS in wake of UKR invasion of RUS’s Kursk region.


Image Information:

Image: Russian Wagner fighters have been active along the border of Belarus since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021, but now they are operating along the border with Ukraine, including some who reportedly returned to Russia from Africa.
Source: Информационное агентство БелТА, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PMC_wagner_in_belarus_3.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Turkey Deploying Syrian Private Security Contractors to Niger

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Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.

“The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.”

Summary: Turkey is deploying Syrian militants to Niger to protect economic interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles Russia’s Wagner mercenaries in West Africa, the Syrian militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.

Russia’s Wagner Group, and its successor Africa Corps, have received significant international attention and notoriety because of their operations propping up of post-coup military regimes in West Africa. While their objectives ostensibly include combating Islamist militants and protecting mining and other extractive industries whose exports benefit Russia, they have also partaken in the excessive killing of civilians during counter-insurgency operations.[i] The excerpted French-language article in L’Orient Le Jour highlights Turkey’s recent programs to deploy militants to West Africa, whose activities can be juxtaposed against those of Wagner and Africa Corps.

According to the article, the program involves hundreds of pro-Turkish Syrians—and not Turks themselves—from the Sultan Murad brigade.[ii] This differs from Russia’s Wagner and Africa Corps, whose members are primarily Russians, despite recent evidence of an African member in Wagner ranks in Ukraine.[iii] The Syrians have been contracted by a Turkish private military company, which has paid the Syrian fighters up to $1,500 per month. This is almost ten times more than they had received when fighting in Turkish-controlled areas of Syria. Like with Wagner and Africa Corps members, remuneration is, therefore, a primary incentive for the Syrians to travel to Niger.

The exact activities of these Turkish mercenaries remain unclear. On one hand, the article asserts that their main role is to protect Turkish interests and projects in Niger, including mining operations. In this sense, they would be functioning much like private security contractors, rather than mercenaries. On the other hand, one of the Syrian contractors interviewed for the article noted that the outfit was deployed to combat Boko Haram. If true, this would likely mean that they were based in southeastern Niger near Lake Chad, where iron ore and other minerals are mined, where Boko Haram factions have pillaged villages and even taken over military outposts in the last few years. If this were the outfit’s primary role, it would appear to function more closely to Wagner, though without the regime protection efforts.

Although the interviewee states that his cohorts arrived in Niger only around one year ago, the article claims Turkey had been preparing for their deployment by sending Syrian fighters to train in Libya for several years. This provided the fighters with combat experience in Africa and a gateway for further travel to Niger. In addition, in 2020, Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement with Niger, which involved the sale of armed drones from Turkey to Niger. However, this may have since evolved into the additional deployment of these pro-Turkish Syrians to Niger as well.

The article does not indicate the Syrians in Niger will play as significant of a counter-insurgency role as Wagner or Africa Corps in West Africa, which also means their presence in the country is less likely to generate international concerns on humanitarian grounds. However, the Syrians’ primary motivation of remuneration and the challenging security environment in Niger, including with Boko Haram and other al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated fighters in their midst, raises questions about their ability to successfully defend Turkish interests, let alone enhance security in the region. Another question lingers about whether friction will develop between Turkey and Russia in West Africa through their deployment of fighters to protect their respective interests in similar areas.

Sources:

“Le Niger, nouvel Eldorado des mercenaires proturcs de Syrie (Niger, the new Eldorado of pro-Turkish mercenaries from Syria),” www.lorientlejour.com (Lebanon-based French-language publication covering Francophone international affairs, including coverage of Islamist militancy) 3 May 2024. https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1413977/le-niger-nouvel-eldorado-des-mercenaires-proturcs-de-syrie-enquete.html

A thousand Syrian fighters from areas under Turkish control have left for Niger for a year to protect Turkish interests and projects. In the areas of northern Syria controlled by Turkey, where recruitment into pro-Ankara factions is the main driver, according to Omar, his monthly salary never exceeded $46. “Here in Niger, we are paid $1,500,” added the young man, who supports his mother and brothers and sisters.

At the group’s headquarters, they signed six-month contracts with a private Turkish military consulting company that protects Turkish interests, including mines, in Niger.

The military regime of Niger, as a result of a coup d’état perpetrated on July 26, 2023, has reoriented its foreign policy and denounced military cooperation agreements with France and the United States, while Russia is advancing its interests in this country. For its part, Turkey has increased its influence in Niger over the past decade through humanitarian aid, development and trade. The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.

Notes:

[i] For an analysis of Russia’s Africa Corps, please see: (last Zenn OE Watch)

[ii] The Sultan Murad brigade in Syria was comprised primarily of ethnic Turkmen from Syria and specialized in fighting Islamic State (IS) forces, as opposed to forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The brigade was part of the Jaysh al-Fateh (“Army of Victory”) coalition, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey and reached its peak in 2015 before suffering from internal factional disputes. See: Fabrice Balanche, “The Battle of Aleppo Is the Center of the Syrian Chessboard,” WINEP, 5 February 2016.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/battle-aleppo-center-syrian-chessboard

[iii] See, for example, Jacob Zenn, “Russia’s Africa Corps Appears to Be Recruiting African Militants,” Terrorism Monitor, July 9, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russias-africa-corps-appears-to-be-recruiting-african-militants/

OE Insight Summary:

TUR is deploying militants from SYR to NER to protect econ interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles RUS Wagner mercenaries in WA, the SYR militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.


Image Information:

Image: Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.
Source: Saotura, https://commons.wikim edia.org/wiki/File:Niger_Turkey_Locator.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0