Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Successes Highlights Lessons for U.S. Partners (Jacob Zenn) (April 2025)

(Click image to download brief.)


Key Takeaways:

  • Indonesia’s creation in 2003 of an elite counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88 (Densus 88), which received financial and training support from the United States and Australia, was a key factor in neutralizing Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and its offshoots.
  • The dual-track approach of combining Densus 88 counterterrorism operations with the National Counterterrorism Agency’s (BNPT) deradicalization program, which reformed several high-level terrorists, has proven remarkably successful.
  • Threats from terrorism, including the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ)–affiliated groups, have not been eliminated in Indonesia. However, terrorism is at its lowest levels since before Densus 88’s founding and JI modules are increasingly dismantling themselves and accepting the legitimacy of the state. U.S. partners could learn from aspects of Indonesia’s experience in countering their own terrorism threats.

Russia Expanding Its Military Influence in Equatorial Guinea

Only five years after Russia’s Ministry of Defense, which was then led by Sergei Shoigu, engaged in talks with officials from Equatorial Guinea in 2020, Africa Corps fighters have now landed in Equatorial Guinea to train the country’s armed forces.


“The parties discussed the prospects for the development of military and military-technical cooperation between the two countries, as well as security issues.”


Equatorial Guinea is now a target for Russian military influence and expansion on the African continent, according to the excerpted article from a Russian-language website covering Africa Corps and Russian security affairs, afrinz.ru. The article reports that Deputy Defense Minister and Africa Corps commander, Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, visited Equatorial Guinea, where he met with President Teodoro Obiang and Minister of Defense Victoriano Bibanga Nsue Okomo.[i] According to the article, Yevkurov has been enhancing military cooperation between Russia and Equatorial Guinea since October 2024.

This bilateral military cooperation follows the already agreed-upon training of soldiers from Equatorial Guinea by Russian military instructors.[ii] The training is consistent with the Africa Corps’ other activities on the continent. This training is often accompanied by Russian illicit extraction of mineral resources, specialized security for authoritarian rulers, and human rights abuses during counterinsurgency operations. Equatorial Guinea, with its authoritarian government, lacks any insurgency or security crisis around its borders but possesses petroleum, natural gas, timber, gold, diamonds, and other minerals. As a result, the Africa Corps model for Equatorial Guinea will likely follow the model of support for the Equatorial Guinea leadership in return for resource extraction rights for Africa Corps.

Equatorial Guinea is the latest West Africa country where Russia is expanding its military influence and “replacing” French or Western influence through deploying Africa Corps to those countries.[iii] The article noted the burgeoning military partnership between Russia and Equatorial Guinea followed previous talks between the Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yevkurov and the leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Togo. Although Togo is anomalous to these countries because it remains a parliamentary democracy, the country is under pressure from al-Qaeda–affiliated militants and was being “courted” by Yevkurov in late 2024 when he visited the capital, Lome.[iv]

Russia’s push into Equatorial Guinea comes amid Chinese attempts to court another West African country, Gabon, for a potential new—and what would be China’s first—military base in that region.[v] Russia, like China, considers the West as rivals and supports autocratic regimes in the region. Therefore, Russia’s activities in Equatorial Guinea and West Africa more generally have become one component of a broader competition for military influence in Africa between Russia and China on one end and the West on the other end.


Sources:

“Российская делегация провела переговоры с руководством Экваториальной Гвинеи (Russian delegation held talks with Equatorial Guinea leadership),” afrinz.ru, (pro-Russian Russia-language website tracking Russian military affairs, and especially Africa Corps, in Africa), 2 December 2024. https://afrinz.ru/2024/12/rossijskaya-delegacziya-provela-peregovory-s-rukovodstvom-ekvatorialnoj-gvinei/

On December 1, a Russian Defense Ministry delegation headed by Deputy Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov held talks with the President of the Republic Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and the Minister of Defense of Equatorial Guinea Victoriano Bibanga Nsue Okomo. During the meetings, the parties discussed the opportunities for the furthering of military cooperation between the two countries, as well as security issues. In addition, the participants addressed the issues of training military specialists and instructors for the Armed Forces of Equatorial Guinea.

Russia and Equatorial Guinea have been cooperating in this area since 2011, when an intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed and a commission on military-technical cooperation was created. Earlier, a delegation of the Russian Defense Ministry leadership held similar talks in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo.


Notes:

[i] Russian media reported on Yevkurov taking over command of Africa corps in February 2023. See, for example: Ilya Lakstigal, “Что известно об «Африканском корпусе» России (What is known about Russia’s “Afrika Korps”). Vedimosti.ru, 22 February 2023. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/12/22/1012398-chto-izvestno-ob-afrikanskom-korpuse-rossii

[ii] See: Russia Today, “Russian instructors to train African military personnel.” 10 June 2024. https://www.rt.com/africa/599072-equatorial-guinea-russia-train-armed-forces/

[iii] Reports in Russian-language media of 200 Russian military instructors seen on the streets of Equatorial Guinea’s capital, Malabo, in September 2024, provide additional evidence of Russia’s increasing militarily involvement in Equatorial Guinea. See: Gregory, Sissoev, “Что известно об отношениях России и Экваториальной Гвинеи (What is known about relations between Russia and Equatorial Guinea),” TASS (Russian state news service), 26 September 2024. https://tass.ru/info/21961363

[iv] See: BBC Monitoring, “Briefing: Russia’s Africa Corps chief discusses military cooperation with Togo.” 1 December 2024. https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0002vxf

[v] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish a Military Base in Gabon,” OE Watch, 06-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/


Image Information:

Image: Only five years after Russia’s Ministry of Defense, which was then led by Sergei Shoigu, engaged in talks with officials from Equatorial Guinea in 2020, Africa Corps fighters have now landed in Equatorial Guinea to train the country’s armed forces.
Source: Mil.ru, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russia-Equatorial_Guinea_military_talk_2020.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0


China Upgrades Strategic Partnership With Nigeria

The Nigerian army, whose largest base in southern Nigeria is located in Cantonment Ikeja, is upgrading its relationship with the Chinese government, which will support Nigeria’s domestic weapons production. This will allow the Nigerian army to overcome potential procurement restrictions from the West over concerns about Nigerian human rights abuses.


“Nigeria and China have announced a significant military partnership, focusing on local arms production and military training as part of efforts to improve security in Nigeria and across Africa.”


On 10 January, the Chinese foreign ministry reported on a meeting between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar in Abuja. According to the first excerpted article, Wang Yi proclaimed three significant results of the meeting: first, upgrading Chinese-Nigerian relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership;” second, holding the inaugural China-Nigeria Intergovernmental Committee; and, third, pledging to work together to promote the development of the Global South. More broadly, despite China’s global influence being far greater than that of Nigeria or other African states, and despite China’s antagonism toward smaller and weaker states in the South China Sea, the Chinese foreign ministry’s narrative remains that China is an ally to the developing world.[i]

As per the second excerpted article from the Nigerian media website newscentral.africa, the upgraded military partnership between the two countries will involve China supporting Nigeria to locally produce more arms to combat Boko Haram, the Islamic State–West Africa Province, and other terrorist and criminal groups more effectively. Although there was no explicit mention of the United States, the article notes that Chinese support for Nigeria’s arms production would help Nigeria bypass delays and regulatory issues associated with international procurement.[ii] China and Russia have gained influence in the region by providing military aid to West African governments without conditions attached.[iii] In the long run, weapons in the hands of undisciplined militaries in West Africa will often be used against civilians, political opponents, or other marginalized groups and lead to resentment against those regimes and their foreign backers. This has been seen in northern Mali, where Fulani and Tuareg groups have sought vengeance against the Malian Army’s Africa Corps backers.[iv]

Lastly, the newscentral.africa article notes that during Wang Yi’s visit to Nigeria, the Chinese foreign ministry committed to train 6,000 troops in Africa and support an African standby force and rapid response force to carry out counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations. This resembles the China-centric Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Central Asia, which has a similar function and has been a means of projecting Chinese military influence in that region.[v] However, RATS has not been a major tool for counterterrorism in Central Asia, and a similar force in Africa may also become an avenue for China to extend its own military influence without any tangible security benefit on the continent. Nonetheless, this African force, according to the article, safeguards African rights and avoids bullyism, which indicates its existence is also part of a Chinese narrative war in Africa against the West.


Sources:

“中国和尼日利亚关系取得三大突出成果(China-Nigeria relations have achieved three outstanding results),” fmprc.gov.cn, (official Chinese-language website of the foreign ministry of the People’s Republic of China), 10 January 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202501/t20250110_11530245.shtml

Wang Yi introduced the circumstances of his visit to Nigeria and stated that under the strategic guidance of President Xi Jinping and President Tinubu the evolution of China-Nigeria relations achieved three outstanding results: First, the two heads of state jointly announced that China-Nigeria relations have been upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Second, a new basis for unity and cooperation was established. The first plenary session of the China-Nigeria Intergovernmental Committee was successfully held. Third, international cooperation has reached a new level. The two sides closely coordinated in international and regional affairs and worked together to promote the mutual rise and development and revitalization of the “Global South”.

“Nigeria Partners with China for Local Arms Production, Military Training,” newscentral.africa, (southern Nigerian newspaper focusing on politics and African affairs), 10 January 2025. https://newscentral.africa/nigeria-partners-with-china-for-local-arms-production-military-training/

Nigeria and China have announced a significant military partnership, focusing on local arms production and military training as part of efforts to improve security in Nigeria and across Africa. [Tuggar] expressed the nation’s desire to establish local production of military equipment, which would help bypass the delays and regulatory issues often associated with international procurement. [Wang Yi] pledged a CN¥1 billion military assistance package to help improve peace and security across the continent. The package includes training for 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police officers from various African countries, including Nigeria.


Notes:

[i] The article and other Chinese foreign ministry statements, for example, portrayed China as seeking “international fairness,” combating “climate injustice” presumably caused by the West, and advocating multipolarity and inclusive economic development in contrast to a supposedly “unilateral” or exploitative Western-led order. Fmprc.gov. “Wang Yi: Set a Benchmark for China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era.” 8 January 2025. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202501/t20250108_11529111.html

[ii] The United States has historically prohibited, at least temporarily, the sale of certain weapons to Nigeria, such as AH-1Z Cobra attack helicopters and Super Tucano fighter jets, due to concerns about Nigerian army human rights abuses. Therefore, the article was subtly indicating that China would overlook such concerns.

[iii] See: Andrew Korybko. “Western pressure fails to waver African states’ determination. Global Times. 29 July 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202307/1295280.shtml.

[iv] See: Assala Khettache. “Mercenary Politics: Algeria’s Response to Wagner in Mali,” RUSI. 3 October 2024. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mercenary-politics-algerias-response-wagner-mali

[v] An article in The Diplomat, for example, argued that “The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the SCO remains a mere monument of the organization’s objectives against combating terrorism, but it is toothless in practice.” Syed Hassan, “The SCO Needs To Be More Than a China-Russia Front Against the West.” The Diplomat. 6 August 2024.


Image Information:

Image: The Nigerian army, whose largest base in southern Nigeria is located in Cantonment Ikeja, is upgrading its relationship with the Chinese government, which will support Nigeria’s domestic weapons production. This will allow the Nigerian army to overcome potential procurement restrictions from the West over concerns about Nigerian human rights abuses.
Source: Kaizen Photography, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nigeria_Army_Cantoment_1.jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0


Chadian President Threatens Withdrawal From Multinational Joint Task Force

Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.


“The MNJTF is today hampered by the “lack of mutualization of efforts” needed to confront this common enemy [Boko Haram].”


On 28 October 2024, Boko Haram carried out a significant attack against Chadian soldiers in Barakaram on Lake Chad, killing at least 40.[i] Chadian President Mahamat Idris Deby Itno reacted to the Barakaram attack not by requesting greater collaboration with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF),[ii] which Nigeria has done in response to Boko Haram attacks. Rather, according to the excerpted article from the French-language website airinfoagadez.com, Deby Itno is considering withdrawing Chad from the MNJTF altogether, which could add further stress to the 20-year-old organization. Niger, which itself withdrew from the MNJTF in June after alleging the Economic Community of West African States was interfering in its internal affairs, had in late August reported to Nigeria that it would renew cooperation with the MNJTF. But now a Chadian withdrawal could undermine the force.

According to the accompanying article, Deby Itno sees insufficient “mutual” contributions to the MNJTF, perhaps implying that Niger’s wavering about staying in the organization contributed to the inability to stop Boko Haram from augmenting its ranks on the lake or that Chad is shouldering an excessive burden in the force. More specifically, the president’s office alleged that the MNJTF had become “lethargic,” which hindered Chad’s ability to engage in counterterrorism operations. The article suggested that if Chad operated outside the MNJTF, it could operate more autonomously and secure the country’s borders. The article did, however, claim that a Chadian withdrawal from the MNJTF would exacerbate the security vulnerabilities of other Lake Chad countries, including Niger, even though the Chadian president hinted that withdrawing from the MNJTF would not cause Chad to abandon its commitment to the regional fight against terrorism.

It is possible that Chad simply no longer needs the MNJTF for counterterrorism against Boko Haram, or at least that Deby Itno is confident in relying on his own army, despite tactical defeats such as that in Barakaram. Alternatively, Deby Into may be using the threat to withdraw from the MNJTF to solicit more international support for the force, a demand he has also made.[iii] Indeed, given that the MNJTF is based in N’Djamena, Chad, Deby Itno’s comments represent an existential threat for the MNJTF if they become reality.


Sources:

“Le Tchad envisage un retrait de la Force Multinationale Mixte (FMM) (Chad Considers Withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force),” airinfoagadez.com (media group combining Aïr-Info Agadez, RADIO Sahara FM, Agadez Web TV in Agadez, Niger and covering Sahelian political and security affairs), 3 November 2024. https://airinfoagadez.com/2024/11/03/le-tchad-envisage-un-retrait-de-la-force-multinationale-mixte-fmm/

Chad announced it is considering a possible withdrawal of its troops from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), citing a “lack of mutualization of efforts” in this regional coalition against Boko Haram. This decision, announced on November 3, comes after a recent deadly attack by the Boko Haram sect against Chadian forces in Barkaram, in Lake Chad province. On the ground, [President Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno] oversaw security reinforcement measures and ordered the launch of Operation Haskanite to track down the attackers.

The MNJTF “seems to be falling into lethargy,” which undermines the effectiveness of the joint fight. If the withdrawal were confirmed, Chad could opt for autonomous operations and concentrate resources on securing its borders. Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno reaffirmed the duty to protect Chadian citizens first and foremost, while emphasizing that the country would continue to uphold its commitments in the regional fight against terrorism.


Notes:

[i] The recent Boko Haram attack on Barakaram is the deadliest since a raid on the Chadian base in Bohoma along Lake Chad in 2020. Nearly 80 soldiers were killed in the Bohoma raid, showcased in a Boko Haram video revealing beheadings, soldiers fleeing the base, and a helicopter flying overhead to assess the situation in the aftermath of the attack.

[ii] The MNJTF was founded in 1994 to curb banditry. In 2015, the force, which by then comprised Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin, expanded its scope to ending the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region. Its headquarters was also in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena, but the force was largely Nigeria-centric, given that it collaborated alongside multiple Nigerian counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram.

[iii] “Chad urges international community to boost support after Boko Haram attack,” france24.com. 30 October 2024. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20241030-chad-urges-international-community-to-boost-support-after-boko-haram-attack


Image Information:

Image: Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.
Source: André Kodmadjingar (VOA), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mahamat_Idriss_Deby_(en_boubou_blanc).png
Attribution: CC x 2.0


Nigerian Senator Proposes Employment of Private Military Companies Against Boko Haram

Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.


“These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”


Nigeria is a country that has historically shied away from employing private military companies (PMCs) as a matter of national sovereignty. When the country has employed PMCs, including a South African-led contingent[i] that combatted Boko Haram in 2015, it has not yielded success beyond short-term gains. However, the excerpted Daily Trust article indicates that an influential politician in Boko Haram’s heartland, Borno State, is now calling for Nigeria to again employ PMCs. According to the article, Borno South Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume[ii] is urging Nigerian President Bola Tinubu to temporarily hire PMCs because the Nigerian military and Civilian Joint Task Force are making progress against Boko Haram but are unable to secure victory. However, the claims that progress is being made against Boko Haram is debatable. For example, the article notes that, among other larger attacks, Boko Haram (likely the faction of the late Abubakar Shekau[iii]) had just raided Ngoshe in the Gwoza local government area and abducted numerous civilians and killed six farmers.

In addition, Ndume’s suggestion that the PMCs would only operate “temporarily” raises questions about whether they could secure victory, given the late Shekau faction and the stronger Islamic State in West Africa Province faction and their predecessors have been fighting since 2009. Since then, neither the Nigerian military nor the Multinational Joint Task Force, comprising Nigeria and its four land neighbors and previous PMCs, has come close to defeating[iv] these factions. Furthermore, Ndume has hinted that the PMCs would not only finish Boko Haram in this “temporary” time frame but also combat the possibly even more widespread problem of banditry in northwestern Nigeria. Defeating either Boko Haram or the bandits, let alone both, would be an insurmountable task for Nigeria’s military even if several thousand PMC personnel were operating alongside them.

Ndume did not mention the company or origin of the PMCs whom he is advising Tinubu to employ. Nevertheless, the main option in the region would seem to be Russia’s Africa Corps, the successor of the Wagner Group. The recent pro-Russian sentiment exhibited during anti-corruption protests in northern Nigeria, as well as the Russian efforts to displace the West, including France in the Sahel and potentially the United States in Nigeria, could represent the beginning of Russian efforts to pull Nigeria closer into its orbit for the first time since the end of the Soviet era. If Ndume’s proposal gains traction, it could herald new geopolitical contestation in Nigeria, but few favorable outcomes for counterinsurgency or counter-banditry in the country.


Sources:

“Ndume asks Tinubu to hire military contractors to flush out Boko Haram,” Daily Trust (most widely circulated newspaper in northern Nigeria, which covers the region’s affairs from a critical perspective), 2 October 2024. https://dailytrust.com/ndume-asks-tinubu-to-hire-military-contractors-to-flush-out-boko-haram/

Senator representing Borno South, Mohammed Ali Ndume, has called on President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to temporarily hire the services of “military contractors” to wipe out the remnants of Boko Haram terrorists in Borno State. Ndume, who hailed the gallant performance of the military and Civilian JTF, said they are ill-equipped to carry out the task of eliminating the remaining insurgents who operate within. “All across the world, governments hire the services of military contractors to engage in certain places. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu can consider this as a short measure. These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”

“These contractors will come with their equipment and military hardware. In a very short time, they’ll eliminate those Boko Haram terrorists. The contractors can also be used to eliminate those bandits operating in the North West. His comment comes after Boko Haram terrorists launched a fresh attack in Ngoshe, Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno, where they  slaughtered six farmers and  abducted five others including women.


Notes:

[i] In 2015, ISWAP lost territory after the armies of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and South African PMCs led by a former apartheid-era South African Defence Force officer supported the Nigerian army to expel ISWAP from towns it had controlled in northeastern Nigeria. Nevertheless, disputes over payments of the PMCs, ISWAP’s retreat into rural areas, and ISWAP’s retaliatory attacks against Niger, Chad, and Cameroon undermined the counter-ISWAP offensive’s momentum. The PMCs and Nigeria’s three neighboring countries all eventually left Nigeria and ISWAP and the Shekau faction both renewed operations in 2017 to recapture territories and overrun Nigerian military outposts and bases.

[ii] Ndume himself was suspected of supporting Boko Haram and even jailed early in the insurgency in 2012 when he reportedly contacted Boko Haram leadership 73 times in one month. It later surfaced that he was, however, attempting to negotiate.

[iii] Since the Shekau faction split from ISWAP in 2016, Gwoza has remained one of its strongholds. In addition, mass abductions and killings of civilian farmers is typical of the Shekau faction’s brutality, whereas ISWAP has generally avoided tactics that alienate and brutalize the local population.

[iv] The Nigerian president from 2015 to 2023, Muhammadu Buhari, notoriously claimed that Boko Haram was “technically defeated” after coming into office only to see the two main factions resurface stronger than before by 2017.


Image Information:

Image: Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.
Source: VOA, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:R%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9sMaiduguri2016.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0


China’s Expands Its Influence in Africa Through Economic and Security Cooperation

Chinese trade cooperation with Tanzania dates back to 1965, but now not only includes large-scale infrastructure projects, such as bridges, but also joint military exercises.


“The start of [China’s] joint naval exercise with Mozambique came after the conclusion of joint naval exercises with Tanzania…”


China is supporting African countries in economic and infrastructure development alongside its growing military presence in the continent. Tanzania, where China has been showing increasing interest in both the security and economic realms, is indicative of this trend. In late July China held Peace-Unity 2024, a joint military drill with Tanzania, which involved counter-terrorism exercises. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) newspaper Global Times argued those exercises “reflected China’s power projection capabilities” in Africa.[i] After the exercises in Tanzania, China held similar counterterrorism and counter-piracy exercises in neighboring Mozambique, which has borne the brunt of Islamic State (IS) affiliated militant attacks in East Africa.

Consistent with China’s game plan in Africa to combine security with economic partnerships, on 8 October, the CCP website cctv.com published the excerpted Chinese-language article discussing the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and China Railway 15th Bureau Group’s finalizing the construction of a bridge in Tanzania after four years of work. The article touts the two-mile long bridge, which connects Kigongo and Busisi on the banks of the Gulf on Mwanza in Tanzania’s north, as the longest low-tower cable-stayed bridge in Africa. Given that the China Railway 15th Bureau Group, like other railway companies,[ii] has historically performed military-related construction missions, this bridge also has military significance for China’s power projection in Africa.

The combination of constructing major infrastructure projects in Tanzania followed by joint military training exercises with the same country and its strife-ridden neighbor reflects China’s modus operandi in Africa. Developing African infrastructure not only opens economic opportunities for Chinese commerce on the continent but also enables China to expand its military influence in Africa. In addition, large-scale Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa can obscure the arguably more significant military influence China is acquiring there, which China does not wish to highlight internationally for fear it could be perceived as threatening.

China will continue to exert influence and enhance its military footprint in African countries by linking its ability to support economic development and infrastructure projects with joint military exercises and potentially other objectives in those countries, such as basing rights. This promotes China’s Belt and Road Initiative and broader global security objectives. If there is a new “great game” in Africa, Tanzania is among the numerous countries on the continent where China is playing aggressively.


Sources:

“China-Tanzania joint military drill kicks off, ‘reflects Chinese continental power projection capabilities,” Global Times (Chinese Communist Party news service focusing on international affairs from a Chinese nationalist and populist perspective). 6 August 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1317509.shtml

On its way to Mozambique from Tanzania, the Qilianshan conducted joint search and rescue as well as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy training in preparation of the joint exercises, the PLA Navy confirmed. The start of the joint naval exercise with Mozambique came after the conclusion of joint naval exercises with Tanzania, also under the banner of the “Peace-Unity 2024” joint exercises.

With a focus on counter-terrorism and counter-piracy in the joint exercises, Zhang Junshe, a Chinese military expert, told the Global Times that the drills are of pragmatic significance in Africa where terrorist and pirate attacks occur frequently

“中企承建非洲最长矮塔斜拉桥顺利合龙 (The longest low-tower cable-stayed bridge in Africa built by a Chinese company was successfully closed),” news.cctv.com (website of national television broadcaster of China, which reports to the Chinese Communist Party), 8 October 2024. https://news.cctv.com/2024/10/08/ARTIEo5gdghwYT812Y5y9lRG241008.shtml

The Magufuli Bridge in Tanzania, jointly constructed by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and China Railway 15th Bureau Group, was successfully completed. After more than four years of non-stop construction, the longest low-tower cable-stayed bridge in Africa has been fully connected, and the countdown to the completion and opening of the entire line has begun. The Magufuli Bridge is located on the southern shoreline of Lake Victoria, which is the largest lake in Africa.

There was no underwater casting during the entire pedestal construction process, which minimized the impact of construction on the water quality of the lake and effectively protected the “Mother Lake” of the African people. During the construction process, the construction team strictly implemented quality control standards. After completion, it will become the first bridge project on Lake Victoria, which is of great significance for enhancing Tanzania’s national image and promoting local social and economic development.


Notes:

[i] See Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, “China-Tanzania joint military drill kicks off, ‘reflects Chinese continental power projection capabilities’”, Global Times (daily English language newspaper under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party’s People’s Daily newspaper), 30 July 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1317046.shtml

[ii] The China Railway 15th Bureau Group was formerly the fifth and sixth divisions of the Chinese Railways Corps, which was considered a “special force” of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since 1949. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00809A000700070455-8.pdf


Image Information:

Image: Chinese trade cooperation with Tanzania dates back to 1965, but now not only includes large-scale infrastructure projects, such as bridges, but also joint military exercises.
Source: Xinhua, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:China-Tanzania_trade_agreement_signed.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0


China Sets Sight on Gabon for Second African Military Base

Gabon’s Port Gentil is the country’s second largest city and its airport and seaport will likely increasingly host military and business visitors from China as China courts Gabon as a close partner in West Africa.


“The visit of the [Chinese] Peace Ark highlights the friendly relations between Gabon and China, and brings glory and well-being to the Gabonese people.”


Beijing is targeting Gabon to host the second Chinese military base on the African continent, marking its first military base on Africa’s western coast. On 9 October, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation website published the excerpted Chinese-language article, which highlighted the Chinese naval visit to Gabon. The visit came amid a Chinese push to possibly establish its first military base on the western coast of Africa—and Gabon is a prospect to host this base.[i] The article indicates China’s goal was to cultivate goodwill in Gabon through the visit of its Peace Ark naval hospital ship to Gabon’s Owendo Port in the country’s capital. Among the participants in the farewell ceremony with the Gabonese Navy, for example, were non-military personnel, such as overseas Chinese businesspeople in Gabon, Confucius Institute[ii] representatives, and Chinese diplomatic personnel and medical teams.

The Peace Ark naval hospital ship held joint exercises with the Gabonese Navy on maritime rescue and evacuation between 26 September and 3 October. Yet, the most impactful mission of the hospital ship during the visit to Gabon was related to “soft power,” with it providing medical treatment to 6,934 Gabonese civilians, including 171 surgeries, and delivering four babies. Further, as part of the visit, Chinese medical teams were dispatched from the naval hospital ship to schools to promote health education and to hospitals to support Gabonese doctors, while also playing a friendly soccer match with the Gabonese military.

The Chinese campaign for influence in Gabon differs from Russia, which is unable to provide the same breadth of combined military and medical support to a country like Gabon. China is able to parlay its military support with significant investment, including more than 4 million Euros to Gabon in the weeks prior to this naval hospital ship’s visit to the country, which again Russia is unable to match.[iii] The Chinese campaign in Gabon is seeing results, with the Gabonese president publicly welcoming the Belt and Road Initiative’s expansion into the country.[iv] China is, therefore, primed to increase its influence in Gabon, including potentially establishing a base in the country, while also outflanking other geopolitical powers, such as Russia, for influence in Africa in the long run.


Sources:

““和平方舟”号医院船结束访问加蓬,离港时与加蓬海军举行联合演练 (The “Peace Ark” Hospital Ship Ends Visit to Gabon, Conducting a Joint Exercise with the Gabonese Navy When Leaving the Port),” focac.org, (official website of FOCAC, which is the official forum between all African states except Eswatini and China), 9 October 2024. https://www.focac.org/zfgx/hpaq/202410/t20241009_11504024.htm

The Chinese Navy’s Peace Ark hospital ship slowly sailed away from the Port of Owendo, Gabon, after successfully completing its visit to Gabon. More than 300 people, including Ambassador to Gabon Zhou Ping, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Gabonese Navy Diwaku, embassy staff, overseas Chinese in Gabon, representatives of the Confucius Institute and the medical aid team to Gabon attended the farewell ceremony. This was the first joint maritime search and rescue exercise between the Chinese and Gabonese navies.

In addition to the main platform for treatment, the hospital ship also sent expert teams and patrol teams to local hospitals for diagnosis and treatment The visit of the Peace Ark hospital ship was highly appreciated by the Gabonese government.


Notes:

[i] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish A Military Base In Gabon,” OE Watch, 06-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/

[ii] China’s Confucius Institutes are often situated at university campuses abroad “to promote the Chinese language and cultural activities among students and researchers” but they “unswervingly” serve the Communist Party’s goals and are, therefore, part of Chinese soft power projection. As a result of Confucius Institutes’ ties with the Communist Party, an increasing number of them have been shut down in the West, but they are still expanding in Africa and the Middle East. Mordechai Chaziza, “China’s Soft Power Projection Strategy: Confucius Institutes in the MENA Region,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 25 July 2023. https://besacenter.org/chinas-soft-power-projection-strategy-confucius-institutes-in-the-mena-region/

[iii] “Le Gabon attire 4,3 milliards $ d’investissements chinois (Gabon attracts $4.3 billion of Chinese investment),” Agence Ecofin [Cameroon— and Switzerland-based French-language website primarily covering African political economics]. 4 September 2024. https://www.agenceecofin.com/economie/0409-121241-le-gabon-attire-4-3-milliards-dinvestissements-chinois

[iv] See: “(FOCAC) Interview: China is a true friend that stands with Gabon through thick and thin, says Gabonese president,” news.cn [website of the official state news agency of the People’s Republic of China]. 5 September 2024. https://english.news.cn/20240905/11512527b9eb47799078488bbb0c3e31/c.html


Image information:

Image: Gabon’s Port Gentil is the country’s second largest city and its airport and seaport will likely increasingly host military and business visitors from China as China courts Gabon as a close partner in West Africa.
Source: Brian Ecton, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:POG-Airport.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0


Terrorist Attack in Togo Reveals Turkish Counter-Terrorism Role

Togo’s Savanes Region is JNIM’s latest area of expansion, but it remains unclear whether Turkish PMCs can support the Togolese army to repel JNIM over the long term.


“The [JNIM] attack targeted soldiers who were patrolling the trenches under construction, and who were trying to prevent terrorist incursions at the border.”


The littoral West African country of Togo, along with its neighbor Benin, is a main target of expansion for the al-Qaeda affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).[i] As discussed in a French-language article in the Burkinabe publication, 24heures.bf, on 2 October, JNIM attacked a construction site in northern Togo engaged in the building of trenches to defend against JNIM incursions. The attack claimed the lives of nine Togolese soldiers and 10 civilians. This is not the first time JNIM has specifically destroyed trench-building projects and killed construction workers. The article notes that Togolese Army reinforcements accompanied by Turkish instructors in helicopters, finally repelled the attack by firing on the JNIM militants.

Although Turkish instructors have reportedly operated in Niger alongside Russian Africa Corps personnel, it was previously unclear whether Turkish instructors operated in Togo.[ii] The article, in fact, asserts that two Turkish instructors have been killed in previous JNIM attacks in Togo, which suggests Turks may be more involved in counter-insurgency operations in Togo than previously known.

The involvement of Turkish instructors in Togo seemingly differs from that of African Corps personnel operating in the Sahel, who not only engage in counterinsurgency operations against JNIM but are also involved in propping up post-coup junta military regimes in the Sahel, including Burkina Faso. Notably, Africa Corps has suffered numerous setbacks in battles with JNIM. The Turkish private military company, Sadat, had reportedly been active in Niger and Burkina Faso. The presence of Turkish instructors in Togo implies a likely expansion of the Turkish PMC and instructor presence in West Africa


Sources:

“Attaque terroriste au Togo: 19 morts près de la frontière du Burkina (Terrorist attack in Togo: 19 dead near the Burkina border),” 24heures.bf (independent French-language Burkina Faso-based publication with a focus on defense and security affairs), 4 October 2024. https://www.24heures.bf/attaque-terroriste-au-togo-19-morts-pres-de-la-frontiere-du-burkina/

A terrorist attack struck, on October 2, the town of Fanworgou in the Kpendjal region in northern Togo, exactly on the border with Burkina. The [JNIM] attack targeted soldiers who were patrolling along the trenches under construction, and who were trying to prevent terrorist incursions at the border. The result: 19 dead, including 9 soldiers and 10 civilians, including EBOMAF machine operators and technicians.

Reinforcements, especially airborne, were deployed to the site to counter the attackers, who were repelled by military units supported by helicopters and piloted by Turkish instructors. Despite the construction of trenches, the terrorists seem to continue to adapt their tactics.


Notes:

[i] Jacob Zenn, “Al-Qaeda’s Sahel Affiliate Targets Togo,” OE Watch, 07-2022, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/420353?pi296680=2

[ii] According to Africa Defense Forum, “some of Sadat’s Syrian fighters in Niger have ended up under Russian command fighting violent extremist organizations affiliated with al-Qaida and the Islamic State group in the Liptako-Gourma region, the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.” Africa Defense Forum, “Turkish PMC ‘Sadat’ Competes for Sahel Influence,” adf-magazine.com, 30 July 2024. https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/turkish-pmc-sadat-competes-for-sahel-influence/


Image Information:

Image: Togo’s Savanes Region is JNIM’s latest area of expansion, but it remains unclear whether Turkish PMCs can support the Togolese army to repel JNIM over the long term.
Source: EC-JRC/ECHO, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Togo_Base_Map.png
Attribution: CC x 2.


Tuareg Separatist Militants Form an Alliance Against Junta-Led Governments in Mali and Niger

Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.


“The Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to assist each other, but also to defend their interests together on the international level.”


Since 2021, West African security and political dynamics have deteriorated as a result of coups by military juntas in the region’s three central states—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In July 2024, these three juntas agreed to a new regional Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) after leaving the preexisting regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States. They replaced Western military support with that of the successor to Russia’s Wagner Group, known as the Africa Corps. Now, however, two of the Sahel’s ethnonationalist and mostly secular Tuareg rebel groups, the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) in Niger and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)[i] in Mali, have formed their own alliance.

According to the excerpted French-language article from French state-owned radio news website rfi.fr, both the FPL and CSP-DPA oppose the respective juntas that are now ruling their countries. The main function of their newly established alliance is for both rebel groups to promise to aid each other in the case of an attack by AES armies, forcing them to confront a more complex and even multi-national insurgency. The article also states that the FPL and CSP-DPA plan to defend each other’s interests on the international level, although whether that entails advocacy or operations or both is left ambiguous. However, by targeting Chinese-funded pipeline projects, the FPL insurgency has already achieved internationalized operations status. The FPL believes such projects fund the junta in Niamey at the expense of predominantly Tuareg and other minority regions of Niger.[ii] Such attacks serve as a form of leverage and pressure against the junta.

The article also highlights that the alliance-making meeting between FPL and CSP-DPA leaders occurred in the northern Malian town of Tinzaouatène. This town near the Algerian border is the CSP base, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), which is under the CSP umbrella,[iii] and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims massacred dozens of African Corps and Malian troops in separate attacks on 28 July. According to the article, the Tinzaouatène meeting sent a message that the new FPL and CSP-DPA alliance could launch similar massacres if their goals for independence or autonomy are not met. This would represent a new development in the Sahel, where Tuareg rebel groups have historically remained relatively independent of each other and have mostly focused on reacting only to their own nation’s political and military developments.

At a time when the AES military juntas have largely lost legitimacy internationally and when Africa Corps is reeling from the massacre it suffered at the hands of the CMA, the FPL and CSP-DPA are escalating their confrontation with the embattled juntas in the political, military, and international realm. Neither group is particularly antagonistic towards the United States or the West. However, even if democratic rule eventually returns, their strengthening insurgencies will make it more difficult to reunite Mali and Niger and restore sovereignty to both nations.


Sources:

“À Tinzaouatène, les rebellions du Niger et du Mali se réunissent pour renforcer leurs relations (In Tinzaouatène, rebellions from Niger and Mali meet to strengthen relations)),” Radio France Internationale (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 28 August 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240901-%C3%A0-tinzaouat%C3%A8ne-les-rebellions-du-niger-et-du-mali-se-r%C3%A9unissent-pour-renforcer-leurs-relations

The delegation of the Niger rebels of the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) was led by Barak Taher Hamit, who holds the title of “commander-in-chief” of the armed movement opposed to the Niger junta. The delegation of the Malian rebels of the Strategic Framework for Defense (CSP) was headed by Alghabass Ag Intalla, who is the leader of the militant group and opponent of the Malian junta. To begin discussions with an aim towards strengthening relations between them, the site of the meeting was quite symbolic: Tinzaouatène in northern Mali, located on the Algerian border.

During the meeting, no document was signed, or at least not made public. But the Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to aid each other, and also to defend their interests together on the international level. According to sources close to both parties, other meetings are being planned about “fighting hand in hand against the militaries in power in Mali and Niger”.


Notes:

[i] “Azawad” is the term that Tuareg ethnonationalists use to refer their homeland.

[ii] In June 2024, the FPL, for example, disabled a section of Niger’s PetroChina-funded crude oil pipeline with the intent to force China to cancel a deal between the junta and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC). See: Emmanuel Addeh, “Tensions Escalate As Armed Group Attacks Niger’s PetroChina-Funded Pipeline, Threatens More Attacks,” Arise.TV, 19 June 2024. https://www.arise.tv/tensions-escalate-as-armed-group-attacks-nigers-petrochina-funded-pipeline-threatens-more-attacks/

[iii] See: “Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors,” ICG, 13 October 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur


Image Information:

Image: Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.
Source: Magharebia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Le_Mali_confront%C3%A9_aux_sanctions_et_%C3%A0_lavanc%C3%A9e_des_rebelles_islamistes_(6904946068).jpg


The China-Africa Cooperation Forum Focuses on Chinese Military Expansion in Africa

First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.


“Many countries have serious security problems in society, and there is a growing trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese.”


51 African heads of state attended, the tri-annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing from 4-6 September. While China currently has one base in Africa on the Djibouti coast, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s FOCAC speech bolstered other reports about China’s ambitions to expand its military footprint on the continent, including possibly establishing other military bases.[i] Xi Jinping vowed that China would train 6,000 African soldiers and 1,000 African law enforcement officers, welcome 500 African military officers to China, commence joint patrols, mine clearance, and other military activities with African partners, and provide security for joint projects with African security officials.[ii] This latter objective was underscored in the article, where it noted the growing trend of violent crimes against Chinese-funded enterprises and employees and overseas Chinese in Africa, which are often seen as exploitative. Only 20 African countries currently have police cooperation agreements with China, a fact the article lamented and stated needs to increase. This suggests a correlation in the future between Chinese economic activities in Africa, which will inevitably lead to security incidents and Chinese security cooperation with African countries.[iii] The FOCAC and Xi Jinping’s speech, therefore, signal a growing Chinese military and security presence in Africa.


Sources:

“中非合作论坛峰会召开:为双边关系良性发展“提质增效”提供契机 (The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is held: An opportunity is provided to ‘improve the quality and efficiency’ for the healthy development of bilateral relations)” thepaper.cn (Communist Party-affiliated Chinese-language newspaper that appeals to youths and has more editorial freedom than most Chinese media), 5 September 2024. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_28634922

It is relevant to note that 51 of the African leaders who attended the summit are heads of state or government, which is far higher than other “Africa + 1” meetings, such as the US-Africa summit. Against the background of serious changes in Sino-US relations and Sino-EU relations, the importance of the “Global South” in China’s diplomatic grand strategy is rising sharply.

China’s large-scale financing and loans in Africa have become the focus of public criticism for a long time under the smearing and discrediting by the United States and Europe. In fact, this has had a negative impact on the reputations of both China and Africa.

Many countries have serious security problems, and there is a rising trend of heinous crimes against Chinese-funded companies and employees as well as overseas Chinese. At present, only more than 20 African countries have signed relevant police cooperation agreements with China, so the cooperation between the two sides in the field of police law enforcement needs to be improved.


Notes:

[i] See: Jacob Zenn, “China’s Initiates Push To Establish a Military Base in Gabon,” OE Watch, 04-2024, 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/chinas-initiates-push-to-establish-a-military-base-in-gabon/

[ii] “Full text: Xi Jinping’s speech at opening ceremony of 2024 FOCAC summit,” CGTN, 5 September 2024, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-09-05/Full-text-Xi-s-speech-at-opening-ceremony-of-2024-FOCAC-summit-1wDYKL8FhxC/p.html

[iii] On Chinese private military contractors in Africa, see Paul Nantulya, “Chinese Security Firms Spread along the African Belt and Road,” ACSS, 15 June 2021. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinese-security-firms-spread-african-belt-road/


Image Information:

Image: First held in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has grown significantly over the past two decades and is now the largest diplomatic event organized by China.
Source: Stephen Wallis, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Forum_on_China-Africa_Cooperation.jpg