Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Successes Highlights Lessons for U.S. Partners (Jacob Zenn) (April 2025)

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Key Takeaways:

  • Indonesia’s creation in 2003 of an elite counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88 (Densus 88), which received financial and training support from the United States and Australia, was a key factor in neutralizing Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and its offshoots.
  • The dual-track approach of combining Densus 88 counterterrorism operations with the National Counterterrorism Agency’s (BNPT) deradicalization program, which reformed several high-level terrorists, has proven remarkably successful.
  • Threats from terrorism, including the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ)–affiliated groups, have not been eliminated in Indonesia. However, terrorism is at its lowest levels since before Densus 88’s founding and JI modules are increasingly dismantling themselves and accepting the legitimacy of the state. U.S. partners could learn from aspects of Indonesia’s experience in countering their own terrorism threats.

Colombia Signals Intent To Join China’s Belt and Road Initiative

United Nations Secretary General António Guterres attends the annual Belt and Road Forum in China.


“Colombia intends to be part of the Belt and Road initiative…the mega infrastructure program with which China seeks to connect to the world and strengthen its geostrategic position…This is an unexpected diplomatic turn that has gone almost unnoticed.”


Despite headwinds in its domestic economy, China’s strategic advance in Latin America continues.[i] In 2023, Chinese foreign direct investment levels in the region remained high at more than $9 billion, which is equivalent to six percent of China’s total foreign direct investment.[ii] Now more than ten years old, China’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive foreign infrastructure investment program, has proven popular throughout Latin America. In a major announcement, Spain’s top daily news outlet, El País, reports that Colombia recently signaled its intent to join BRI. The outlet reports that this was an unexpected development. While over 20 countries in the region have joined BRI, Colombia—and the region’s other largest countries, Brazil and Mexico—are currently holdouts. In a recent visit to Colombia, El País reports, President Petro praised China and raised the level of relations to “strategic partner.” Colombia’s accession to the BRI will not be immediate, according to Argentine outlet, Infobae. The country will form a working group to study how to accede to the BRI and maintain a “balanced” relationship with China.

Colombia’s accession to the BRI is an important development. Not only does it signal China’s advance with one of the United States’ oldest allies, but it also is indicative of the increasing phenomenon of hedging that medium-sized powers are undertaking in a world characterized by great power rivalry.[iii] China, Russia, Iran, and other revisionist powers have positioned themselves to be the beneficiaries of hedging strategies in Latin America.


Sources:

“Colombia anuncia que se sumará al gran plan estratégico de China, la Franja y la Ruta (Colombia announces that it will join China’s grand strategic plan, the Belt and Road),” El País (Spain’s top daily with some of Latin America’s best coverage), 3 October 2024. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2024-10-04/colombia-anuncia-que-se-sumara-al-gran-plan-estrategico-de-china-la-nueva-ruta-de-la-seda.html

Colombia intends to be part of the Belt and Road initiative…the mega infrastructure program with which China seeks to connect to the world and strengthen its geostrategic position. This was announced by surprise by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Rojas, an official very close to President Gustavo Petro, on the occasion of the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China…Ambassador Zhu Jingyang immediately thanked the gesture, and assured that Beijing is willing to ‘accelerate the relevant negotiation, respecting and collaborating with the priorities and needs of Colombia.’ This is an unexpected diplomatic turn that has gone almost unnoticed.

“Colombia estrecha vínculos con China y busca sumarse a iniciativa comercial estratégica (Colombia strengthens ties with China and seeks to join strategic trade initiative),” Infobae (Argentine outlet with wide-ranging regional coverage), 13 October 2024. https://www.infobae.com/movant/2024/10/13/colombia-estrecha-vinculos-con-china-y-busca-sumarse-a-iniciativa-comercial-estrategica/    

Colombia has formed a working group with China to negotiate its incorporation into the Belt and Road Initiative, the ambitious infrastructure and trade project promoted by the Asian giant. The announcement was made during the visit of the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis Gilberto Murillo, to Beijing, who stressed that Colombia’s accession will take place ‘in a reasonable time.’…The Colombian minister stressed that his country is seeking balanced cooperation with China at a time when Bogotá is seeking to strengthen its independence in foreign policy and diversify its international relations…Murillo’s visit is part of a broader strategy that began with President Gustavo Petro’s trip to China in October 2023, when both countries agreed to elevate their relations to a strategic partnership, signing a series of agreements to deepen cooperation in key sectors such as the economy, science, and education…Although Colombia’s official accession to the BRI is still in process, Chinese investments already play a relevant role in the development of the country’s infrastructure.


Notes:

[i] The Council on Foreign Relations think tank maintains an updated document on major developments in the relationship between Latin America and China. See: “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated 10 January 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri

[ii] For more information on China’s foreign direct investment activities, see the work of Enrique Dussel Peters: “Monitor of Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 2024,” 13 May 2024. https://docs.redalc-china.org/monitor/images/pdfs/menuprincipal/DusselPeters_MonitorOFDI_2024_Eng.pdf

[iii] Matias Spektor has an excellent article on the phenomenon of hedging among medium-sized powers. See: Matias Spektor, “In Defense of Fence Sitters,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/global-south-defense-fence-sitters


Image Information:

Image: United Nations Secretary General António Guterres attends the annual Belt and Road Forum in China.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/35138985312.    
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0


Venezuela’s Maduro Completes Election Theft and Installs Himself for Another Term

In an earlier photo, Maduro swears in for his second six-year term in office, which began in 2019.


“Among the only leaders who accompanied Maduro on his day were Commander Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and the heir to Castroism, Miguel Díaz-Canel of Cuba…Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Duma, was the one Putin asked to travel to Caracas.”


In early January 2025, President Nicolás Maduro took the oath of office for another six-year term, setting him up to govern Venezuela for longer than his political mentor, Hugo Chávez. The inauguration, occurring in a tense climate of military deployments throughout major cities, was a product of what many experts consider the regime’s most brazen election theft. Unlike previous elections, Venezuela’s opposition possesses vote tallies from electronic voting machines proving Maduro lost by a ratio of more than 2:1.[i] Spain’s top daily, El País, reports that the inauguration was a poorly attended affair. Presidents Díaz-Canel from Cuba and Daniel Ortega from Nicaragua, leftist allies of Maduro, were the only heads of state from Latin America to attend. In a show of support, Russian President Vladimir Putin did send the head of the lower house, Vyacheslav Volodin.[ii]

Maduro’s inauguration for a third term is important for the region’s operational environment for several reasons.[iii] First, despite Maduro’s highly authoritarian regime, the brazen nature of the electoral theft, against transparent proof that he lost the election, indicates the regime may no longer care to have a semblance of democracy undergirding claims of legitimacy. Second, after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Russia’s authoritarian allies have been nervous about continued support from Moscow. The attendance of lower house speaker Vyacheslav Volodin was notable for Putin to demonstrate support for Maduro in the wake of letting Syria fall. Maintaining the Maduro regime in Venezuela is key for Putin in a region where Russia has few natural allies.


Sources:

“Solo los presidentes latinoamericanos de Cuba y de Nicaragua asisten a la toma de posesión de Maduro (Only the Latin American presidents of Cuba and Nicaragua attend Maduro’s inauguration), El País (Spain’s top daily with some of Latin America’s best coverage), 10 January 2025. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2025-01-10/solo-los-presidentes-latinoamericanos-de-cuba-y-de-nicaragua-asisten-a-la-toma-de-posesion-de-maduro.html 

Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro is said to be increasingly isolated, but the country’s president did not seem worried about it on Friday during his inauguration in the National Assembly…The number of 125 was somewhat misleading, because not all those present at Maduro’s proclamation were diplomatic officials, and very few were heads of state or foreign ministers. Among the only leaders who accompanied Maduro on his day were Commander Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and the heir to Castroism, Miguel Díaz-Canel of Cuba…Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Duma, was the one Putin asked to travel to Caracas…Much of Latin America’s democratic left, however, was absent.


Notes:

[i] For more on the Maduro regime’s election theft, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

[ii] For more information on the opposition’s claims to victory and their plans to inaugurate Edmundo González, see: Stefano Pozzebon, “Fear on the streets of Caracas as Maduro’s inauguration looms,” CNN.com, 9 January 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/09/americas/venezuela-protests-maduro-inauguration-intl-latam/index.html

[iii] For more information on regional insecurity generated by the Maduro regime, see: Ryan C. Berg, “Maduro’s Venezuela Continues Its Campaign of Regional Destabilization,” OE Watch, April 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/383027


Image Information:

Image: In an earlier photo, Maduro swears in for his second six-year term in office, which began in 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maduro_with_supportes_at_Jan_2019_inauguration.jpg.   
Attribution: CC0 1.0 Universal


Turkish Defense Industry Celebrates Record Year

Alongside Baykar, Turkish Aerospace Industries has developed unmanned aerial systems like the Aksungur (pictured) for reconnaissance and strike missions.


“Europe emerged as the top market for Turkish exports, with demand focusing on UAVs, smart missiles, land vehicles, military vessels, and radar systems.”


The Turkish defense industry is experiencing significant growth and has recently announced a record-breaking year. The accompanying excerpted article from Turkey’s state-run news agency Anadolu Ajansi reports on the Turkish defense industry’s record year of exports in 2024. The article notes several statistics on the defense exports, including the different types of weapon systems Turkey exported and the large number of countries that received Turkish systems. Notably, Turkey exported several hundred unmanned aerial systems to various countries, though the article does not mention specific models. Indeed, the Turkish defense industry has gained a reputation for providing effective weapon systems at a lower cost than other Western weapon systems. This is specifically due to the use of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAVs by Azerbaijan (in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020) and Ukraine.[i] The article also mentions that Europe emerged as the top market for Turkish exports with a demand for UAVs, among other items.[ii] The article ends by stating that the Turkish defense industry is made up of over 3,500 companies working on over 1,100 projects and that the industry continues to be heavily involved with NATO member states. As NATO increases its defense spending over the next few years and beyond, the Turkish defense industry could be primed for additional growth.


Sources:

Zeynep Duyar, “Turkish defense products empower, protect world armies,” Anadolu Ajansi (Turkey’s state-run news agency), 24 January 2025.

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkish-defense-products-empower-protect-world-armies/3461489

Türkiye’s domestically produced defense products achieved global prominence in 2024, reaching a record export value of nearly $7.2 billion…Ranked 11th among global defense exporters, Türkiye’s advancements in mass production, research and development, and technological innovation significantly boosted its global footprint…

Turkish defense products were exported to over 180 countries, with major contributions to land, naval, aerial, and advanced weaponry sectors. Over 4,500 land vehicles were delivered to 40 countries, and 140 naval platforms reached more than 10 nations.

Additionally, 770 UAVs and UCAVs were sent to over 50 countries, while three nations received Turkish-built corvettes.

Other highlights included exports of 1,200 electro-optical and stabilized weapons systems, radar systems to 10 countries, and 1,500 loitering munitions to 11 nations…

Haluk Gorgun, president of Türkiye’s Defense Industry Agency (SSB), emphasized the breadth of the country’s defense production. Türkiye achieved over 80% indigenous technology utilization in its defense products, supported by a research and development budget nearing $3 billion

…Europe emerged as the top market for Turkish exports, with demand focusing on UAVs, smart missiles, land vehicles, military vessels, and radar systems. A key milestone was the export of Aselsan’s ASELFLIR-500 electro-optical reconnaissance system to 16 countries…

The country’s defense sector comprises over 3,500 firms and more than 1,100 active projects, demonstrating its robust position in global markets. Last year, Türkiye applied for the highest number of NATO projects, solidifying its role as a major contributor to allied defense capabilities.


Notes:

[i] For more background on the medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) Bayraktar TB2 and its use in recent conflicts, see: Karen Kaya, “Turkey as a Drone Superpower: A Case Study of a Mid-Size Power Driving the Operational Environment,” FMSO Foreign Perspectives Briefs, 28 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-28-turkey-as-a-drone-superpower-a-case-study-of-a-mid-size-power-driving-the-operational-environment-karen-kaya-update/ 

[ii] Turkey not only exported a number of weapon systems to Europe in 2024, the Turkish company Baykar, which produces the Bayraktar TB2, bought Italy’s Piaggio Aerospace in December 2024. While it remains to be seen what Baykar will do with its newfound subsidiary, it marked increased involvement of the Turkish defense industry’s involvement in Europe, see: Ezgi Akin, “Buoyed by drones, NATO deals, Turkey defense exports hit record $7.1B,” Al-Monitor (English-language independent news website focusing on Turkey and the Middle East), 3 January 2025. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/01/buoyed-drones-nato-deals-turkey-defense-exports-hit-record-71b


Image Information:

Image: Alongside Baykar, Turkish Aerospace Industries has developed unmanned aerial systems like the Aksungur (pictured) for reconnaissance and strike missions.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TAI_Aksungur_(3).jpg
Attribution: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.


The Radical Transformation of Syria’s Military Leadership

Mugshot of Syrian militant Abu Mohammad al-Jolani after his 2006 capture by U.S. forces in Iraq. In December 2024, al-Jolani became the de facto leader of Syria. 


[O]f the nearly fifty officers who were promoted on Sunday to be supervisors of the establishment of the new army, more than ten of them do not have Syrian nationality.”


After decades of Ba’athist, secular ideology, and Alawite leadership, the Syrian military’s upper echelons are undergoing a radical transformation steered by the one-time Sunni rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).[i] As widely reported in Arabic-language media and discussed in the first accompanying article, from the Lebanese daily al-Nahar, these moves have “raised widespread doubts and fears.” HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) is now the de facto leader of the Syrian armed forces, by virtue of his command over the HTS-led “Military Operations Department” that seized power in Damascus in December 2024. In late December, al-Sharaa issued a decree promoting several HTS and allied commanders to top ranks in the new Syrian military. The list of promotions was headlined by two HTS military leaders who were given the rank of Major General, one of whom—Murhaf abu Qasra—was appointed as defense minister and the other—Ali Nur al-Din al-Naasan—as armed forces chief of staff. Both hail from Tabyat al-Imam, a Sunni town on the outskirts of the city of Hama.[ii] In addition, five leaders were promoted to Brigadier General, three of whom are non-Syrian nationals who were part of foreign jihadist groups that supported the 2010s Syrian armed uprising.[iii]

The promotion of foreign one-time jihadists to top leadership posts in the Syrian Army has “shocked the Syrian street,” according to the al-Nahar piece. Notably absent from the promotions list are former Assad regime officers who defected to form the Free Syrian Army in 2012, as well as leaders from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, the Kurdish-led, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, and armed factions from southern Syria. The dominance of HTS cadres within the new military establishment, as noted in the second accompanying article from the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, seems likely to create a rift between HTS and other opposition armed groups, perhaps most importantly the southern militias. Although al-Sharaa has voiced his intention to create a unified national army, his initial actions suggest an effort to consolidate power within HTS and its allies before other factions are incorporated into the armed forces.


Sources:

الجولاني يشكّل قيادة جيشه… خليط من أنصاره بينهم عرب وتركستان في رتب رفيعة”


(Al-Jolani sets up his military leadership…a mixture of his supporters, including Arabs and Turkestanis in high ranks),” al-Nahar (Lebanese daily), 31 December 2024. https://www.annahar.com/arab-world/arabian-levant/183813/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A9


While the commander of the military operations department in Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa (al-Jolani), seemed to be in no hurry to draft a new constitution for the country and hold elections, he is, on the contrary, moving at a rapid pace to restructure the security services and the Syrian military institution. This has raised widespread doubts and fears about his priorities and the reality of their goals, and whether they are related to actually imposing security and safety or point to the desire to impose the pillars of the new rule through newly established security and military institutions that will not change after the elections, which al-Sharaa said may not be held for four years. What reinforced the fears is that out of the nearly fifty officers who were promoted on Sunday to be supervisors of the establishment of the new army, more than ten of them do not have Syrian nationality…


Speaking to Al Arabiya on Sunday, Al Sharaa confirmed that the upcoming Syrian National Conference will witness several measures, including the dissolution of armed factions and the cancellation of the current constitution. This raised many constitutional questions about the extent to which Sharaa has the authority to make such a decision, given that some argue that promoting officers under the current constitution requires the issuance of a presidential decree…


In terms of regionalism, it was noted that Sharaa relied on officers from Hama to assume the highest ranks (Major General), as well as the Minister of Defense, Marhaf Abu Qasra, and the Chief of the General Staff, Ali Nour al-Din al-Naasan. As for the Brigadier General ranks, which are five, there were only two Syrians among them… The remaining brigadiers are of different nationalities: Abdul Aziz Daoud Khodaberdi, known as Abu Muhammad al-Turkistani, is the leader of the “Turkistani Islamic Party” wing that pledged allegiance to al-Jolani in the past. The second wing is “Foreigners of Turkistan.” Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib is Jordanian and was known in Syria as Abu Hussein al-Urduni. The third brigadier is Omar Muhammad Jaftshi, one of the most prominent military leaders close to Ahmad al-Sharaa. He worked in complete secrecy without revealing his identity and was known by the nickname Mukhtar al-Turki. 42 officers were promoted to the rank of colonel, including several names belonging to non-Syrian nationalities such as Albanian (Abdul Samriz Yashari), Egyptian (Alaa Muhammad Abdul Baqi), Jordanian (Abnian Ahmad al-Hariri), and Tajik (Molan Tarson Abdul Samad). Among these names are a large number who have no military background, but were ordinary civilians before they participated in the fighting against the former regime…


The Syrian street was overwhelmed by feelings of real shock when this formation was issued due to the reliance on different nationalities in building an army that is supposed to be national. However, the supporters of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” justified this by saying that the decision to naturalize these people with Syrian nationality will be issued soon, as al-Sharaa promised in previous statements.

دمج الفصائل السورية متعثّر: الشرع يسير في حقل ألغام”

(The Integration of Syrian faction falters: Sharaa treading in a minefield),” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 11 January 2025. https://www.al-akhbar.com/arab/819090/%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AB%D8%B1–%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85

The commander of the Military Operations Department, which currently runs Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is walking through a minefield that was planted and nurtured over the past 14 years of war…
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the arrival of the factions to Damascus, the signs of a rift have clearly emerged between the faction that entered Damascus first (the Eighth Brigade and the coalition of opposition factions in southern Syria led by Ahmed al-Awda), and the man who rose to the top of the political and military scene in Syria, namely al-Sharaa…


Notes:

[i] For the approximately five decades of Assad family rule starting in the 1970s, the Syrian Armed Forces were ideologically linked to the Baath Party, which espoused Arab nationalism and secularism. The military’s top leadership posts were filled by members of the minority Alawite sect, to which the Assad family belongs.

[ii] The city of Hama has deep historical significance to the struggle between the Assad-era armed forces and Sunni rebels, as the site of a major uprising that was violently suppressed in the early 1980s. See: “Why the rebel capture of Syria’s Hama, a city with a dark history, matters,” AP, 5 December 2024. https://apnews.com/article/syria-aleppo-hama-massacre-assad-799f37fd2608532a253cccb48df4e613

[iii] Of the three foreigners, one is Jordanian, one Turkish and the other a member of the Turkistan Islamic Party, which advocates for Uyghur independence from China. Based on statements made by al-Sharaa, it seems likely they and other foreign fighters will be granted Syrian nationality in the future. For more see: Lucas Winter, “The Knotted Future of the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria,” OE Watch, January 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/302489


Image Information:

Image: Mugshot of Syrian militant Abu Mohammad al-Jolani after his 2006 capture by U.S. forces in Iraq. In December 2024, al-Jolani became the de facto leader of Syria. 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mugshot_of_Abu_Mohammad_al-Jolani.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain


Taliban-Fueled Terrorism in Pakistan Threatens Afghans in Exile

Torkham Gate area on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a major crossing point and the location of Pakistan deportation efforts. Most Afghans holding a Pakistani visa are required to cross the border every 30 to 60 days to get their visa stamped. It is a dangerous and harrowing trip.


One of the reasons for the detention and deportation of these migrants is their link to security issues in the country. We are witnessing the security incidents and attacks that are taking place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.”


The rise of Taliban-fueled terrorism in Pakistan threatens former U.S. and NATO allies hiding out in Islamabad awaiting relocation to the United States and other western destinations. According to the excerpted news clip from U.S.-funded VOA Dari on its Facebook page, “there are now massive arrests and operations in Islamabad” against Afghans living in the Pakistani capital. The crackdown comes amidst increasing terrorist activity from Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, i.e., the Pakistani Taliban. According to the VOA Dari news clip, the primary reason for the detention and deportation of these migrants is Pakistan’s belief that the terrorism taking place in Pakistan is in part fueled or supported by Afghan refugees living in Pakistan.

The second clip, from Afghanistan International, also noted that Pakistani police were sweeping through neighborhoods detaining Afghans, and that in the past ten days, many Afghans have committed suicide rather than return to Afghanistan. The clip also noted that 400 Afghans were rounded up, including former journalists, civil society employees, and former military and security personnel, all of whom cannot return to Afghanistan for fear of imprisonment, torture, and death at the hands of the Taliban government.[i]

Former Afghan military personnel hiding out in Pakistan awaiting visas to the United States and other western countries corroborate the sweeps taking place throughout Islamabad. Many leave their temporary homes for days at a time waiting for the police to finish detention operations in their neighborhood.[ii] It is a perilous but necessary game of cat and mouse. U.S. visa applicants need to be near a U.S. consulate to process their visa. Also, an active Pakistan visa, which offers some protection from deportation, is harder and harder to get. Pakistan visas for Afghans have been substantially shortened and become more expensive, making it nearly impossible for former Afghan military and political individuals and their families to stay in Pakistan without a foreign donor.


Sources:


”پاکستان جمع آوری و اخراج مهاجران افغان فاقد مدرک را تشدید کرده است

(Pakistan steps up collection and deportation of undocumented Afghan migrants),” VOA Dari, 5 January 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U5_3InKmidg

There are now massive arrests and operations in Islamabad. Afghan harassment in different parts of Islamabad has accelerated in the past week, with a large number of Afghans complaining about this problem. Even today, we have had hourly videos and messages from Afghans saying that police are going from house to house at their workplaces and where they live. They arrest Afghans who are documented or undocumented, including women and children.

They were in Pakistan and cannot return to Afghanistan.

One of the reasons for the detention and deportation of these migrants is their link to security issues in the country. We are witnessing the security incidents and attacks that are taking place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.

بازرسی خانه‌به‌خانه برای بازداشت مهاجران افغان در اسلام‌آباد پاکستان”

(House-to-house search to arrest Afghan migrants in Islamabad, Pakistan),” Afghanistan International, 5 January 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPaijVV8eXM

Today, throughout Islamabad, the police are collecting [Afghan] refugees and not allowing anyone to remain.

In the past ten days, many people have taken their own lives. They are facing a very new problem. Their lives are in danger. And God forbid, this will not happen. I hope that these people who are trying to detain around 600-700 people in the city today.

They will transfer them to Afghanistan. I think that in the city where we live, around 400 people were taken. These were journalists, Afghans who served in civil society, from the military, they took everyone.


Notes:

[i] The United Nations published a report confirming 218 extrajudicial killings in the summer of 2023. See: “Afghanistan’s Taliban responsible for revenge killings, torture of former officials,” UN News, 22 August 2023. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139962; However, Afghans continue to post across various social media and messaging platforms, what is effectively a body count of former military and political officials killed or “disappeared” by the Taliban.

[ii] Author’s conversations with many former ANASOC personnel currently residing in Pakistan.


Image Information:

Image: Torkham Gate area on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a major crossing point and the location of Pakistan deportation efforts. Most Afghans holding a Pakistani visa are required to cross the border every 30 to 60 days to get their visa stamped. It is a dangerous and harrowing trip.
Source: Global QRF on Instagram; https://www.instagram.com/p/DFaxW6vP5zj/?next=%2F
Attribution: By permission of Global QRF


Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Efforts Could Ignite Wider Conflict in the Region

A map of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, including part of the Paktika Province, Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, the latter of which is where a number of terrorist attacks have taken place.


“Islamabad has repeatedly demanded Kabul to take action against hideouts of the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on its soil.”


Pakistan continues to be at odds with the Taliban government in Afghanistan for allowing the Pakistani Taliban safe haven to carry out attacks across the border into Pakistan. On 25 December 2024, Pakistan carried out an airstrike in the Paktika Province, Afghanistan, against members of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, also known as the Pakistani Taliban, resulting in 46 people killed, including civilians. The airstrike was in response to a cross-border attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, by the Pakistani Taliban that killed 16 members of Pakistan’s security forces a few days prior.[i] Additional clashes between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani forces have taken place since the airstrike.

The accompanying excerpted article from Pakistan’s English-language newspaper Dawn reports on a December 2024 press conference given by Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, the Director General of the Inter-Services Public Relations of Pakistan’s Armed Forces and provides context to Pakistan’s efforts to deal with terrorism. General Chaudhry acknowledged the dispute surrounding the Pakistani Taliban safe haven and asserted that “Pakistan will leave no stone unturned to eliminate the terrorist networks and keep our citizens safe.” General Chaudry also referenced Operation Azm-i-Istehkam, launched in June 2024, in which Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif emphasized that Pakistan could strike targets in Afghanistan.[ii] Chaudhry also mentioned the high number of operations against terrorists that Pakistan carried out in 2024—a particularly deadly year for Pakistani security forces in the country’s fight against terrorism.[iii]

In addition to internal political pressure to combat terrorism,[iv] Pakistan is also under pressure from China to deal with terrorist groups. Attacks on Chinese nationals working on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor infrastructure projects have escalated in recent years. These projects and Chinese support are vital to Pakistan’s economy. As Pakistan remains under pressure to combat terrorism, additional strikes or clashes by Pakistan against targets in Afghanistan are likely but may come with a cost of fueling a wider conflict with Afghanistan.


Sources:

“Banned outfits provided with sanctuaries, support on Afghan territory: ISPR,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 27 December 2024.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1881429

The press conference took place amid heightened security concerns, with a sharp uptick in the number of attacks targeting security forces and other law enforcement agencies, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa…

During the wide-ranging press conference today in Rawalpindi, the DG ISPR addressed counterterrorism efforts, Pakistan’s reservations with Afghanistan…“All evidence related to terrorism can be traced back to the safe havens enjoyed by terrorists in Afghanistan,” Gen Chaudhry said….“Pakistan will leave no stone unturned to eliminate the terrorist networks and keep our citizens safe.”

Islamabad has repeatedly demanded Kabul to take action against hideouts of the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on its soil…

Gen Chaudhry said security forces conducted a total of 59,775 operations this year, noting that Pakistan has rendered a lot of sacrifices in its fight against terrorism.

“During these successful operations, 925 terrorists, including khawarij, were sent to hell while numerous were arrested,” he said, highlighting that the number of terrorists killed was the largest in the last five years…

Answering a query on the effectiveness of intelligence-based operations (IBOs), Gen Chaudhry responded: “In the war against terrorism, there is a fundamental thing that the army and the LEAs fight against the terrorist [but] the nation fights against terrorism. All segments and political parties agree on this point.”

Referring to the National Action Plan (NAP) of 2014, its revised version from 2021, and the Azm-i-Istehkam campaign, the ISPR DG stressed that it had been decided that the entire nation had to combat terrorism together with all state institutions…

Speaking on action taken against terrorism in Balochistan, the DG ISPR detailed that some high-value targets were eliminated in the region.

He said that “Baloch terrorists’ most-wanted leaders Sana urf Baro, Bashir urf Pir Jan, Niaz urf Gumman, Zareef Shah Jehan, Hazrat Ali urf Asad, Lak Jan Chakirabadi urf Sawara were also sent to hell”…


Notes:

[i] For more information on the airstrike, see: Mohammad Yunus Yawar, “Pakistani airstrikes on Afghanistan kill 46 people, Taliban official says,” Reuters (international news agency), 26 December 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/least-46-killed-pakistani-bombardment-afghanistan-afghan-taliban-spokesperson-2024-12-25/

[ii] For more background on Operation Azm-i-Istehkam, see: “Azm-e-Istehkam operation: Terrorist hideouts may be hit on Afghan soil, says minister,” The News International (English-language newspaper in Pakistan), 28 June 2024. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1204305-azm-e-istehkam-operation-terrorist-hideouts-may-be-hit-on-afghan-soil-minister

[iii] The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), an independent think-tank based in Pakistan, published a study which noted that 2024 marked the largest number of casualties that Pakistan’s security forces sustained combating terrorists in a decade. Pakistan has been fighting not only the Pakistani Taliban, but also the Balochistan Liberation Army, a group that seeks to gain the independence of the Balochistan Province, in western Pakistan. For the full CRSS report, see: https://crss.pk/2024-marks-deadliest-year-for-pakistans-security-forces-record-high-fatalities-in-a-decade/

[iv] Terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban and the Balochistan Liberation Army against civilian and military targets in Pakistan rose considerably in 2024 compared prior years, forcing the government of Pakistan to increase its response. The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, an NGO in Pakistan, published a report documenting the rise in the number of attacks in the country in 2024, see: https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Overview_PIPS-Security-Report-2024.pdf 


Image Information:

Image: A map of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, including part of the Paktika Province, Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, the latter of which is where a number of terrorist attacks have taken place.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afghanistan-Pakistan_-_northern_border._LOC_2010594050.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain


North Korean Media Stays Quiet Despite Global Concerns

PRK state media’s recent turn toward more matter-of-fact reporting and abandonment of its trademark rhetorical belligerence is in and of itself noteworthy. This probably reflects PRK desire to see how politics will play out in the USA and KOR.


In the lead-up to the January 2025 inauguration of U.S. President Trump, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (PRK) media landscape has been rather quiet, focusing instead on domestic political issues and reporting about the news in a matter-of-fact manner, rather than its typically belligerent tone. 

Why is the PRK remaining quiet? First, North Korea is dealing with two major political events at once: the return of the Trump administration in the United States and the impeachment and likely removal of the president of South Korea. As regards the strategy of silence vis-à-vis the United States, Kim Jong Un had a personal relationship with President Trump that may lead the PRK to decide that discretion is the better part of valor, at least at first. When it comes to South Korea, the PRK media is likely staying silent to preserve its options because it expects the pro-engagement and accommodationist left to win any election to replace the ousted Yoon.  This would potentially allow the PRK to receive aid and other concessions from the South.

Indeed, while notable, this approach is not unsurprising. This understated and matter-of-fact account typifies North Korean state media reporting on foreign and military matters in the period between the U.S. presidential election and the inauguration of the new administration on 20 January.

Second, to the extent that it is reporting, what is North Korean media talking about? On 6 January 2025, state central broadcaster KCNA published an article heralding what North Korea claimed to be the successful test of a new type of hypersonic vehicle. The report does not take the characteristic step of labeling the United States as the cause of PRK weapons development, instead focusing on Kim Jong Un’s pride in the scientists and how possessing this capability puts North Korea in the realm of world military powers. The article even notes that the test did not negatively affect the security of its neighbors and is for defensive purposes. KCNA published similar articles for a launch on 14 January 2025.[i]

Instead, South Korean media has made little mention of the topics that seem to concern it most. As concerns the South Korean constitutional crisis, North Korea has had just one observed report on the martial law crisis in South Korea in its externally facing media after having spent months issuing threats at increasingly higher levels of authoritativeness. Similarly, North Korean state media did not mention President Trump until a 22 January two-sentence report that he had been inaugurated.[ii] State media has published its commonplace articles detailing observed U.S. military activities in the region[iii] and a propagandistic accounting of the U.S. defense budget,[iv] but these appear to be pro forma. For the fifth year in a row, Kim Jong Un also did not give a public New Year’s Address to the nation.[v],[vi] PRK leaders traditionally used annual New Year’s addresses to announce major military milestones and defense priorities for the coming year. Moreover, the leaders would lay out foreign policy objectives. These speeches provided valuable insights for those observing the PRK from overseas.


Sources:

“조선민주주의인민공화국 미싸일총국 신형극초음속중장거리탄도미싸일시험발사 진행 (DPRK Missile Administration Succeeds in Test-fire of New-type Intermediate-range Hypersonic Ballistic Missile),” Korean Central News Agency (North Korean state-owned broadcaster), 7 January 2025. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/0e333077f3ca892b65f0abad00e47aef.kcmsf

The Missile Administration of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea successfully conducted a test-fire of a new-type intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile on January 6.

The test of the new strategic weapon system is part of the plans for the development of the national defence capabilities to raise the durability and effectiveness of the strategic deterrent against the potential enemies in conformity with the changing regional security environment.

Expressing great satisfaction over the result of the test-fire, the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, with regard to the new weapon system, said:

The current test-fire proved without doubt that we are steadily upgrading the powerful new-type weapon systems like the intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile to cope with different security threats posed by the hostile forces against our state at present.

A few countries in the world might possess such a weapon system.

This is clearly a plan and effort for self-defence, not an offensive plan and action.

The hypersonic missile system will reliably contain any enemies in the Pacific region that can affect the security of our state.

We have acquired a technical force which is by no means easy to achieve.

This is a remarkable achievement and a special event in strengthening the self-defensive capabilities, which we should be proud of.

I express thanks to all the researchers and technicians and the workers of munitions industry enterprise, who contributed to the successful development of the new-type strategic weapon system.

The hypersonic glide vehicle of the missile, fired northeastward at a launch site in a suburb of Pyongyang, made a flight along the scheduled trajectory, attaining its first peak height of 99.8 kilometres and the second peak height of 42.5 kilometres at the speed amounting to twelve times of the speed of sound, and accurately landed on the simulated target waters in the open sea 1 500 kilometres away.

The test-fire had no negative impact on the security of the neighbouring countries.

The development of the defence capabilities of the DPRK aiming to be a military power will be further accelerated.


Notes:

[i] For more information, see: “극초음속미싸일시험발사 진행 (Hypersonic Missile Launch Test Conducted),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA, major state-owned broadcaster), 15 January 2024.

http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/64e900f5bd0353837ca02d7babcce3ad6c73263e00a38ff0e08c8c90fdb5f0b71866e0c7bc6571e831ca2182de7032d0.kcmsf

[ii] See: “극초음속미싸일시험발사 진행 (Donald Trump Inaugurated as U.S. President,)” Rodong Sinmun (major Workers Party-owned newspaper for general consumption), 22 January 2025. http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyNS0wMS0yMi1OMDMxQDE1QDNAQDBAMzE==

[iii] For more information, see: “조선민주주의인민공화국 외무성 대외정책실장 담화 발표 (Statement by the Director of the Foreign Policy Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA, major state-owned broadcaster), 18 January 2025.  http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/64e900f5bd0353837ca02d7babcce3ad002dfbba9ac7d0a69e1e969df566d4026a47505ba5268fd7749c0fe11e4b24b4.kcmsf

[iv] See: “조선중앙통신사 론평 미국의 방위예산증가는 전지구적동란의 증대를 예고한다, (Commentary by the Korean Central News Agency: U.S. Defense Budget Increase Portends Increased Global Turmoil),” Korean Central News Agency (primary state-owned broadcaster), 18 January 2025.

http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyNS0wMS0xOC1OMDMwQDE1QDJAQDBAMzA==; for English mirrored link, see: https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1737174772-447573523/kcna-commentary-on-u-s-increase-in-defence-budget/

[v] See: “Why Kim Jong Un Ditched the Iconic New Years Speech and Penned a Tender Letter,” NK News, 1 January 2021.

https://www.nknews.org/2021/01/why-kim-jong-un-ditched-the-iconic-new-years-speech-and-penned-a-tender-letter

[vi] New Year’s is among the most important cultural holidays in Korea. New Year’s is usually celebrated with leaders giving speeches, announcing resolutions, and goals for the year ahead. It is probable that Kim Jong Un still gives these speeches, but they are no longer broadcast for outsiders.


Image Information:

Image: North Korean state media published this image of its purported new hypersonic vehicle tested on 6 January 25.
Source: http://kcna.kp/siteFiles/photo/202501/PIC0086739.jpg
Attribution: KCNA, state news agency of North Korea. Not subject to copyright because North Korea has not signed on to the international conventions protecting its or other state’s copyrighted materials.


 Iran Projects Confidence Undeterred by Weakening of Resistance Axis

“IRGC Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini speaking at an armed forces presser for the Eghtedar drill,” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 6 January 2025.


“We tell the enemy that we are always ready to act at the moment, we are not complacent and procrastinators. When the command is given, we will demonstrate our power as before and change the enemy’s cognition and calculations once again.”


Despite the severe weakening of the Iran-led Resistance Axis[i] in recent months, Tehran continues to seek to show itself projecting power. According to state broadcaster Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, on 6 January, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spokesman and deputy of public relations Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini said, “We tell the enemy that we are always ready to act at the moment,” adding, “When the command is given, we will demonstrate our power as before and change the enemy’s cognition and calculations once again.” The comments were made at an armed forces presser for the Eghtedar drill[ii] on the fifth anniversary of the U.S. assassination of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani.

Naeini emphasized that Iran’s enemies—the United States and Israel—have “a false enthusiasm and misconception” of recent regional developments. Particularly, he noted their use of “psychological and cognitive warfare” to hide the truth, which, in Tehran’s mind, is that it continues to be in a position of strength. Naeini appeared to be referring to the major setbacks experienced by Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, as well as the ouster of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Despite these major blows to the Resistance Axis, the IRGC spokesman argued, “We never had an intelligence defeat from the enemy. It’s the enemy that always engages with cognitive warfare to make up for its intelligence and military defeats.”

Naeini, presumably taking note that morale was low after Assad’s downfall, emphasized that “Today’s generation of the armed forces is more revolutionary and anti-American than the previous generations” and that it will continue to sacrifice itself for the “Iranian people” and the “oppressed worldwide.” Par for the course of commentary coming out of Tehran for the past four decades, the United States and Israel are to blame for the breakdown of the Resistance Axis.


Sources:

“برای امنیت ایران هر اقدام نظامی متعارفی انجام می‌دهی (For Iran’s security any military action will be done),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 6 January 2025. https://www.iribnews.ir/00IZ2n.

According to IRIB, the full statement of deputy of public relations and spokesman [of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini]…

We also commemorate the fifth anniversary of the martyrdom of IRGC Commander Qasem Soleimani and his comrades…

In the past few weeks, due to new developments in the region, a false enthusiasm and misconception have formed in the enemy (the United States and Israel), and the enemy has tried with cognitive warfare to portray the ongoing developments as a weakening of Iran’s power. We know the reality is something else.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has long been fully prepared for large, complex, and heavy battles on any scale. We trust in the infinite divine power and our endogenous strength, especially the people-based deterrent power…

The dear nation of Iran should know that the enemy has never had an advantage over us in any battle. We never had an intelligence defeat from the enemy. It’s the enemy that always engages with cognitive warfare to make up for its intelligence and military defeats against the Islamic Republic of Iran to weaken its national spirit.

We are in an environment of psychological and cognitive warfare.

Every day, the enemy creates issues and casts doubt to influence national will and spirit. We tell the enemy that we are always ready to act at the moment, we are not complacent and procrastinators. When the command is given, we will demonstrate our power as before and change the enemy’s cognition and calculations once again…

Supporting the broad resistance front and developing global basij cores are key principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and is a serious agenda for the IRGC in realizing Islamic civilization. The enemy’s military threats have increased the convergence of society and made our armed forces more synergic and integrated. The IRGC moves to strengthen the foundations of security and national power by solidifying its combined power infrastructure with the people and for the people.

Today’s generation of the armed forces is more revolutionary and anti-American than the previous generations. Unity and empathy in the IRGC have always been a thorn in the enemy’s side. The culture of obedience in the IRGC is based on Quranic culture and the path of leadership. The IRGC considers itself sacrificing its life for the Iranian people and the oppressed worldwide, and the power exercises conducted by the IRGC show the determination and readiness of Islam’s guardians to defend Iran’s sovereignty and ensure the peace and security of the Iranian people.


Notes:

[i] The Axis of Resistance is a self-described informal coalition of Iranian supported militias and political organizations across the Middle East. The Axis includes Hamas in Gaza, the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon; the Houthi movement in Yemen; and various Shi’ite armed groups in Iraq and Syria. See: “What is Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’?,” Reuters (global news service), 13 April 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/

[ii] The Eqtedar drill is part of a larger joint air defense exercise. See: “Iran Launches ‘Eqtedar 1403’ (Great Prophet 19) Drills Near Natanz Nuclear Facility,” Islamic World News, 7 January 2025. https://english.iswnews.com/37209/iran-launches-eqtedar-1403-great-prophet-19-drills-near-natanz-nuclear-facility/


Image Information:

Image: “IRGC Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini speaking at an armed forces presser for the Eghtedar drill,” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 6 January 2025.
Source: https://www.iribnews.ir/00IZ2n
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl


Revolutionary Guard Chief Downplays Departure From Syria

IRGC commander-in-chief Hossein Salami speaking in the wake of Bashar al-Assad regime collapse.


“Some in political, intellectual, and public circles are promoting that the military of the Islamic Republic of Iran has lost its regional arms. No, the system has not lost its arms. We make decisions and act based on our internal capacities and capabilities to fight the infidels.”


The fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria is a major blow to Tehran, but Iranian officials are not taking the blame. Per reporting by state broadcaster Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), on 10 December 2024, just days after Assad’s overthrow, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander-in-chief Hossein Salami told a gathering of fellow commanders that “Some in political, intellectual, and the public circles are promoting that the military of the Islamic Republic of Iran has lost its regional arms. No, the system has not lost its arms,” referring to its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip known as the Resistance Axis.[i] He added, “We make decisions and act based on our internal capacities and capabilities to fight the infidels.”[ii]

Salami seemed to cast blame on the Assad regime’s military and political apparatus for not heeding their warnings months before about the movements of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other anti-regime groups. Salami, who said the IRGC tried its best to preserve the regime, also justified why the IRGC did not intervene: “Some expected us to fight instead of the Syrian Army. Is it logical that we involve all the IRGC and basij in a battle of another country when the army of that country is just a spectator?” Still, Salami was proud to note that the IRGC was the last to leave Syria. Interestingly, he compared Hezbollah in Lebanon to Assad, noting how the militant group was able to survive the events of recent months—the Israeli onslaught, twin communication attacks, and the assassination of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.

The commander-in-chief appeared to not give up on Syria and the Resistance Axis. He explained, “It is not that all paths are limited to Syria. It is also possible that there, too, little by little, it will take a different shape again.” While much of the Resistance Axis has crumbled, the IRGC is not giving up on its project of exporting the Islamic revolution abroad and is merely readjusting its security strategy to the post-October 7 world. [iii]


Sources:

“سردار سلامی: بچه‌های سپاه تا لحظه آخر در سوریه بودند (Commander Salimi: The children of the IRGC were in Syria until the last moment),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 12 December 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00ITrZ.

According to IRIB, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, on Tuesday, 10 December 2024, in a gathering of IRGC commanders, explained the causes and consequences of recent security and military events in Syria, highlighting the most important parts as follows:

Some expected us to fight instead of the Syrian army. Is it logical that we involve all of the IRGC and basij in a battle of another country when the army of that country is just a spectator? Furthermore, all the routes to Syria were closed. Day and night, the system really attempted to help in any way it could. We have to live with the realities of Syria. We see the realities, and we act on the facts. However, let me proudly tell all of you this: The last people in the line of resistance in Syria who left were IRGC folks. The last person who left this battlefield was a guard. Strategies must change according to circumstances. We cannot address many global and regional issues with stagnation and stability in strategies.

From months before, we were aware of the movements of militants and takfiris (referring to Jihadists). Even our brothers were able to use intelligence tactics to find their axes of attack and transfer them to the political and military levels in Syria. However, because there was no will to change, fighting and perseverance did not exist in their true sense; unfortunately, this incident you saw took place. In contrast, look at Hezbollah, which has been able to pull itself out from under the heavy rubble of bombings and was able to find hope in strength in a truly unbelievable scene.

We thank God Almighty that the resistance front has become independent from our geography. Hezbollah still exists, it’s alive, it’s vibrant. The face of the Zionist regime (referring to Israel) is now met with political hatred in the world. These are major defeats in any form…

Some in political, intellectual, and the public circles are promoting that the military of the Islamic Republic of Iran has lost its regional arms. No, the system has not lost its arms. We make decisions and act based on our internal capacities and capabilities to fight the infidels. We have a strong political logic to fight, we have a strong legitimacy to defend. We have a great nation to stand firm. We have a great leader to provide guidance and inspiration. We have powerful armed forces. They have not been touched. If we had become weakened, we would not have fulfilled our honest promises.

Now, the paths are open to back the resistance front. It is not that all paths are limited to Syria. It is also possible that there, too, little by little it will take a different shape again.


Notes:

[i] The Axis of Resistance is a self-described informal coalition of Iranian supported militias and political organizations across the Middle East. The Axis includes Hamas in Gaza, the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon; the Houthi movement in Yemen; and various Shi’ite armed groups in Iraq and Syria. See: “What is Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’?” Reuters (global news service), 13 April 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-irans-axis-resistance-which-groups-are-involved-2024-01-29/; Lucas Winter, “Gaza War’s Impact on the Middle East Strategic Landscape,” FMSO, June 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/gaza-wars-impact-on-the-middle-east-strategic-landscape-lucas-winterjune-2024/

[ii] The comments were made as many Iranian officials and the public alike began to question the merits of having spent more than a decade propping up the Assad regime financially—between $30 to $50 billion—and materially with weapons, training, and troops. See: “‘Iran was Defeated Very Badly’ in Syria a Top General Admits,” The New York Times, 8 January 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-general-syria-defeat.html

[iii] “Iran has no regrets over Syria costs, says national security chief,” Iran International, 20 December 2024. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202412207613.


Image Information:

Image: IRGC commander-in-chief Hossein Salami speaking in the wake of Bashar al-Assad regime collapse.
Source: Semi-official Islamic Republic News Agency, 12 December 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00ITrZ
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.