Wrestling with Complexity: How the PLA Assesses Combat Capability (Kevin McCauley) (December 2024)

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Key Takeaways:

  • New quality combat capabilities [新质战斗力], which Xi Jinping prioritized for development in 2022, feature in many recent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) articles. Changes in warfare, technologies, and production are creating new combat capabilities. This creates the need to develop new combat capability assessment methods based on informationized and intelligent technologies, analysis of new-type operational forces, the expansion of operational domains, and the interaction of civilian production and military technological requirements. While the PLA is searching for improved methods to analyze the complexity of future operations, it appears to fail to factor in important data that could improve the accuracy of current capability assessments.
  • The PLA appears to use many different assessment methods with no standard method and no uniformity of factors used to assess capabilities. Combat capability assessments are important to the PLA for supporting planning, command decisions, conducting operations, modernization, force development, and training, and the evaluation factors and missions included in capability assessments provide insight into planning, operations, and the factors the PLA considers important for successful future operations. Yet some assessments exclude important areas such as training, operational methods, officers’ professional military education level, and environmental factors. The PLA’s lack of a uniform method for assessing combat capability could lead to uneven and inaccurate assessments supporting decision-making for operations. The variation in assessment factors employed in assessments would also appear to lead to variations in accuracy between the evaluations.
  • Future warfare and technological developments are creating a more complex and dynamic battlefield. This is driving PLA researchers to examine more accurate and complex methods for evaluating combat capability. The PLA increasingly seeks data-driven and qualitative features that require accurate assessment methods compared to more traditional subjective and quantitative methods.

German Opinion Divided on Increased Multi-Domain Task Force Capabilities

It is proposed that the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) surface-to-surface hypersonic missile be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Opponents to the deployment of such weapons suggest it will antagonize Moscow and lead to a new arms race.


“Two thirds of those surveyed are against the plans to station long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons in western Germany in 2026. A large majority fear that the stationing could lead to a new arms race and make Germany a target for attack.”


A U.S. and German pronouncement on 10 July 2024 that the United States will start deploying long-range fires units to Germany in 2026 sparked a sharp Russian rebuke. On 12 July, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, made a statement that involved some thinly veiled nuclear threats. [i] These events have spurred debate in Germany about whether increasing U.S./NATO capabilities will make Europe safer or will simply antagonize Russia and start a new arms race. 

The accompanying excerpted article from the German political think tank, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, specifically lays out the capabilities of the BGM-109 Tomahawk surface-to-surface missile, the SM-6 ballistic defense missile, and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon surface-to-surface hypersonic missile that are proposed to be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. The think tank, which also advises the German government, explains the advantages of deploying the weapon systems and argues against possible concerns. In contrast, the second accompanying excerpted article from the German media company Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, notes that the German civilian population is highly critical of the decision to deploy these weapons, with citizens expressing various concerns. Of particular note, the article mentions a recent poll that found that two-thirds of respondents opposed plans to station these weapons in Germany. The third accompanying article from the German business newspaper Handelsblatt, lays out some expert German opinions for and against this deployment. It also notes another German poll in which 50 percent of respondents feared that such a force structure increase would further escalate conflict with Russia. 

On 1 September 2024, state elections in the German states of Thuringia and Saxony saw significant gains for the right-leaning Alternative for Germany party and the left-leaning Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance party, which both oppose the deployment of these U.S. weapons and disapprove of German support for Ukraine in its current form. These results may be an indicator of the upcoming German federal elections in 2025 and could influence the German position on the stationing of additional U.S. weapon systems.


Sources:

“Große Mehrheit lehnt Stationierung von US-Raketen in Deutschland ab (Large majority rejects stationing of US missiles in Germany),” Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (German media company), 21 August 2024. https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/mdrfragt-umfrage-ergebnisse-waffen-raketen-stationieren-nato-100.html

Two thirds of those surveyed are against the plans to station long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons in western Germany in 2026. A large majority fear that the stationing could lead to a new arms race and make Germany a target for attack. These are two results of the current MDRfragt survey from Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia with almost 24,000 respondents…

Only one in three believes that the deployment of weapons provides Germany with protection and strengthens its own defense capabilities (31%). A quarter of respondents believe that the US weapons systems could serve as a deterrent (26%).

In recent weeks, several parties have called for parliament to be involved in such a far-reaching decision. More than three quarters of MDRfragt participants also believe that the deployment of the weapons systems announced by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz has not yet been sufficiently discussed in politics.

Source: “Gewichtig und richtig: weitreichende US-Mittelstreckenwaffen in Deutschland (Significant and Sound: US Medium-Range Missiles in Germany),“ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (The German Institute for International and Security Affairs), 29 July 2024. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/gewichtig-und-richtig-weitreichende-us-mittelstreckenwaffen-in-deutschland

The German-American plan envisages the deployment of three types of land-based US medium-range weapons in 2026. The first is the Tomahawk cruise missile… Second, the Standard Missile (SM) 6… Third, the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also called Dark Eagle…The three missiles will be deployed in Germany as part of the US Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Its core mission is to counter Russia’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities with new technologies and concepts: In the event of war, Moscow hopes to keep the bulk of NATO forces away from the combat zone along its border by using ballistic and cruise missile strikes to prevent the alliance’s troops from deploying and resupplying, or by forcing NATO to back down with strikes against individual member states. The Alliance could not effectively defend itself against these Russian options with air and missile defense systems alone because Europe’s territory is vast, and comprehensive protection against Russia’s missile arsenal would be too expensive. Nevertheless, with its own medium-range precision weapons, NATO can thwart this Russian plan in two complementary ways….

…Opponents of the deployment plan argue that the US weapons would become targets for Moscow’s missiles, thereby exposing Germany to an increased threat. This narrative must be countered: Although the Kremlin is likely to consider future medium-range US weapons legitimate targets, Putin sees Berlin as an adversary anyway. As a NATO logistics hub with many US bases, Germany is already a priority target for precision strikes if Moscow wants to keep NATO at a distance in the event of war. New US missiles deployed there will not significantly exacerbate this situation.

Another concern is that the deployment of US weapons will force Russia to produce even more missiles and station them in Europe. The result would be an “arms race”. Indeed, the Russian government announced vague military countermeasures during the NATO summit… Nevertheless, due to Russia’s current arms build-up and the sanctions imposed upon the country, Russia’s defense industrial sector is already reaching its limits. Production capacity, skilled labor and financial resources are limited.  Therefore, even Russian and US experts who share concerns about an arms race have serious doubts that the Kremlin could launch a missile arms race with new programs in the short or medium term….

Source: “Was für US-Raketen in Deutschland spricht – und was dagegen (What speaks for US missiles in Germany – and what speaks against it),” Handelsblatt (German business newspaper), 20 August 2024.  https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/verteidigung-was-fuer-us-raketen-in-deutschland-spricht-und-was-dagegen/100059925.html

From 2026, the USA wants to station long-range missiles and cruise missiles in Germany. Many fear that this could escalate the conflict with Russia. Military experts assess the situation.  The USA wants to station Tomahawk cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles and SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles in Germany from 2026. This was announced by the governments of both countries in July on the sidelines of the NATO summit. Many citizens view the plan with skepticism. According to a survey for the Funke media group, 50 percent of those polled feared that this could further escalate conflict with Russia…

When the planned stationing became public knowledge, former SPD party chairman Norbert Walter-Borjans was upset. The fact that “such a far-reaching decision is practically not debated, that it is more or less made and announced unilaterally” is problematic, he told Deutschlandfunk. Walter-Borjans was still in office as party leader when the US announced in March 2021 that it would locate the second of five planned Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) in Germany and opened the headquarters in Wiesbaden in September 2021…

Sahra Wagenknecht, founder of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), described the missiles planned for deployment as “offensive weapons”. The SPD [Social Democratic Party] executive committee, however, sees things differently: The planned deployment is “not a confrontational build-up of arms, but a strengthening of our country’s defense,” it says in the three-page letter in which the executive committee recently backed Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s decision…

What is the rule now, an offensive or defensive weapon? Both. Military expert Carlo Masala from the Bundeswehr University recently said in an interview with Handelsblatt that the cruise missiles and the hypersonic missiles still under development are designed to destroy command centers, bases or supply lines far behind the front in the event of a Russian attack.  This is intended to make it impossible for the enemy to expand its attack over a large area. But if it realizes that it cannot win a major war, it will probably not attack at all, argues Masala. That is why the weapons serve as a deterrent and a defense.

FDP leader Christian Lindner recently told the newspapers of the Funke media group that Germany has been within range of Russia’s nuclear-capable missiles for years. “That is why it is of paramount importance for us to establish a balance of deterrence.”  For example, Russia has stationed Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave and in Belarus, which carry nuclear warheads and can reach Berlin. But the balance called for by Lindner is not to be achieved through nuclear weapons. The weapons planned for stationing would be “equipped with conventional warheads,” says the SPD presidium paper. “There are no plans to arm the systems with nuclear weapons.”

Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) is calling for a public debate “to make the seriousness of the situation clear…On one hand, we are experiencing a new threat situation in Europe due to Russia’s aggressive behavior, and on the other hand, we have a capability gap that we can only close in the short term with the help of our US allies until we have developed these weapons ourselves,” he emphasized…

Security expert Claudia Major from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) recently wrote in a guest commentary in the Handelsblatt that the Europeans lack their own land-based missiles with which they could reach Russian territory.  From Major’s point of view, the planned stationing of the missiles could even help to make a nuclear escalation less likely. In the event of an attack, they would give NATO additional options for action short of a nuclear counterattack, writes the SWP expert…


Notes:

[i] See: “Special op experience shows Russia needs clearer nuclear doctrine — diplomat,” TASS (Russian news agency), 12 July 2024. https://tass.com/politics/1816259


Image Information:

Image: It is proposed that the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) surface-to-surface hypersonic missile be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Opponents to the deployment of such weapons suggest it will antagonize Moscow and lead to a new arms race.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c4/LRHWfirstThunderBoltStrike.jpg


Tuareg Separatist Militants Form an Alliance Against Junta-Led Governments in Mali and Niger

Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.


“The Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to assist each other, but also to defend their interests together on the international level.”


Since 2021, West African security and political dynamics have deteriorated as a result of coups by military juntas in the region’s three central states—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In July 2024, these three juntas agreed to a new regional Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) after leaving the preexisting regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States. They replaced Western military support with that of the successor to Russia’s Wagner Group, known as the Africa Corps. Now, however, two of the Sahel’s ethnonationalist and mostly secular Tuareg rebel groups, the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) in Niger and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)[i] in Mali, have formed their own alliance.

According to the excerpted French-language article from French state-owned radio news website rfi.fr, both the FPL and CSP-DPA oppose the respective juntas that are now ruling their countries. The main function of their newly established alliance is for both rebel groups to promise to aid each other in the case of an attack by AES armies, forcing them to confront a more complex and even multi-national insurgency. The article also states that the FPL and CSP-DPA plan to defend each other’s interests on the international level, although whether that entails advocacy or operations or both is left ambiguous. However, by targeting Chinese-funded pipeline projects, the FPL insurgency has already achieved internationalized operations status. The FPL believes such projects fund the junta in Niamey at the expense of predominantly Tuareg and other minority regions of Niger.[ii] Such attacks serve as a form of leverage and pressure against the junta.

The article also highlights that the alliance-making meeting between FPL and CSP-DPA leaders occurred in the northern Malian town of Tinzaouatène. This town near the Algerian border is the CSP base, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), which is under the CSP umbrella,[iii] and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims massacred dozens of African Corps and Malian troops in separate attacks on 28 July. According to the article, the Tinzaouatène meeting sent a message that the new FPL and CSP-DPA alliance could launch similar massacres if their goals for independence or autonomy are not met. This would represent a new development in the Sahel, where Tuareg rebel groups have historically remained relatively independent of each other and have mostly focused on reacting only to their own nation’s political and military developments.

At a time when the AES military juntas have largely lost legitimacy internationally and when Africa Corps is reeling from the massacre it suffered at the hands of the CMA, the FPL and CSP-DPA are escalating their confrontation with the embattled juntas in the political, military, and international realm. Neither group is particularly antagonistic towards the United States or the West. However, even if democratic rule eventually returns, their strengthening insurgencies will make it more difficult to reunite Mali and Niger and restore sovereignty to both nations.


Sources:

“À Tinzaouatène, les rebellions du Niger et du Mali se réunissent pour renforcer leurs relations (In Tinzaouatène, rebellions from Niger and Mali meet to strengthen relations)),” Radio France Internationale (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 28 August 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240901-%C3%A0-tinzaouat%C3%A8ne-les-rebellions-du-niger-et-du-mali-se-r%C3%A9unissent-pour-renforcer-leurs-relations

The delegation of the Niger rebels of the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) was led by Barak Taher Hamit, who holds the title of “commander-in-chief” of the armed movement opposed to the Niger junta. The delegation of the Malian rebels of the Strategic Framework for Defense (CSP) was headed by Alghabass Ag Intalla, who is the leader of the militant group and opponent of the Malian junta. To begin discussions with an aim towards strengthening relations between them, the site of the meeting was quite symbolic: Tinzaouatène in northern Mali, located on the Algerian border.

During the meeting, no document was signed, or at least not made public. But the Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to aid each other, and also to defend their interests together on the international level. According to sources close to both parties, other meetings are being planned about “fighting hand in hand against the militaries in power in Mali and Niger”.


Notes:

[i] “Azawad” is the term that Tuareg ethnonationalists use to refer their homeland.

[ii] In June 2024, the FPL, for example, disabled a section of Niger’s PetroChina-funded crude oil pipeline with the intent to force China to cancel a deal between the junta and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC). See: Emmanuel Addeh, “Tensions Escalate As Armed Group Attacks Niger’s PetroChina-Funded Pipeline, Threatens More Attacks,” Arise.TV, 19 June 2024. https://www.arise.tv/tensions-escalate-as-armed-group-attacks-nigers-petrochina-funded-pipeline-threatens-more-attacks/

[iii] See: “Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors,” ICG, 13 October 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur


Image Information:

Image: Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.
Source: Magharebia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Le_Mali_confront%C3%A9_aux_sanctions_et_%C3%A0_lavanc%C3%A9e_des_rebelles_islamistes_(6904946068).jpg


India Considers Implications After the Collapse of the Bangladeshi Government

The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Ms. Sheikh Hasina, in New York, USA on September 27, 2019.


“Referring to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine as well as Israel-Hamas conflicts and the current situation in Bangladesh, the Minister exhorted the Commanders to ‘analyze these episodes, predict the problems that the country may face in the future, and stay prepared to deal with the unexpected.”


In early August 2024, protests in Bangladesh resulted in the collapse and resignation of the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. While this did not result in an immediate threat for India, the accompanying excerpted article shows how the situation in Bangladesh will remain a security issue for India. The article from the Indian independent think tank The Centre for Land Warfare Studies examines what happened in Bangladesh and outlines what India can do to adjust. The author, a retired Indian Army general, provides some background on what led to Sheikh Hasina’s resignation.[i] As the author points out, the history between India and Bangladesh has at times been contentious, but India and Hasina had favorable relations for a number of years due to Hasina’s working closely with India on security issues. This included India and Bangladesh cooperating to resolve their border and maritime disputes and Hasina working with India to help end its conflict with the United Liberation Front of Assam.[ii] The author goes on to note how China has gained considerable influence in Bangladesh through exports of weapons. He also mentions that because the Bangladeshi Army has played a role in the regime change, India should reach out to work closely and strengthen military ties. This could set up further competition between India and China in the region. Lastly, the author states that India needs to do everything possible to protect Indian nationals and ethnic minorities in Bangladesh, with the latter group referencing the Hindu religious minority in the country. The majority Muslim population in Bangladesh has periodically attacked Hindus, but Hasina’s government has provided them with protection. Indian Prime Minister Modi and the interim government in Bangladesh appear to have established positive relations, but the status of Hindus in Bangladesh could be a point of contention and an issue for India to resolve.


Sources:

Lt Gen PS Rajeshwar, (Ret), “India – Bangladesh Relations: Navigating The Turmoil,” The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (independent think tank in India), 16 August 2024. https://www.claws.in/analysis-india-bangladesh-relations-navigating-the-turmoil/

The developments of 5 August had resulted in very short notice to Indian authorities…What appeared initially to be a student movement against the quota system for descendants of freedom fighters in government jobs finally turned into a call for the resignation of the then Prime Minister…

Under these circumstances, how does one look at the strategic dimensions of India-Bangladesh relations? The ties between the two nations were forged through the sacrifices of people in both countries during the Liberation War of 1971. The economic, cultural, and linguistic aspects were strengthened further during the last 15 years of the Sheikh Hasina rule.

Bangladesh has a special place in our policy matrix and security calculations…She shares a more than 4000 km border, much of which abuts our critical NE region. In a significant 2015 agreement, the border was simplified by exchanging enclaves trapped in each other’s territories…The two countries also settled their maritime dispute amicably. Earlier, in 2010, the Awami League government had helped India by removing all camps of Indian rebel groups, which broke the back of the ULFA, pushing it to a peace agreement.

India has been very concerned about China’s influence in Bangladesh, from participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2016 to importing 72% of its arms from China in 2019-2023…

Second is our strategic intelligence, which must be comprehensively improved to anticipate such abrupt events better…

Fifth, since the Bangladesh Army has played a defining role in this crisis and could remain a key factor, we must strengthen our military-to-military ties.

Finally, we need to do everything to secure Indian nationals while insisting on the safety and protection of minority communities in Bangladesh, lest there be a backlash back home.


Notes:

[i] For a more detailed timeline and background on the protests in Bangladesh in 2024, see: “From job quota to Sheikh Hasina’s resignation: Timeline of the Bangladesh student protests,” The Hindu, 5 August 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/from-protests-to-sheikh-hasina-resignation-timeline-of-bangladesh-student-protest/article68488361.ece

[ii] The ULFA was a militant group that had operated out of Bangladesh with a goal of establishing an independent government in India’s State of Assam (bordering Bangladesh) until Hasina’s government agreed to eliminate its safe have in Bangladeshi territory. India and the ULFA reached a peace agreement in December 2023, see: Gaurav Dwivedi, “The Path To Peace: ULFA’s Journey From Insurgency To Accord,” NDTV, 29 December 2023. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/the-path-to-peace-ulfas-journey-from-insurgency-to-accord-4763730


Image Information:

Image: The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Ms. Sheikh Hasina, in New York, USA on September 27, 2019
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Prime_Minister,_Shri_Narendra_Modi_meeting_the_Prime_Minister_of_Bangladesh,_Ms._Sheikh_Hasina,_in_New_York,_USA_on_September_27,_2019_(1).jpg


Cartel Internecine Warfare Erupts in the State of Sinaloa

Mugshot of Sinaloa Cartel leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, one of the most wanted men in the world, extradited to the United States in 2016.


“President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called on the criminal groups—Mayos and Chapitos—that are facing the attack to act “with a minimum of responsibility.”


The state of Sinaloa, along Mexico’s Pacific coast, is synonymous with cartels and home to one of the most notorious transnational criminal groups in the country.[i] Following the arrest of longtime cartel kingpin, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada García, at the U.S. southern border, violence has broken out between two opposing factions of the Sinaloa Cartel.[ii] Anticipating further violence between the two major factions, one controlled by the children of former Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera and the other by those loyal to El Chapo’s former business associate, El Mayo, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador pleaded with the cartel to “act with a minimum of responsibility,” according to the excerpted article from right-leaning Mexican daily El Universal. The newspaper reports that the Mexican government is downplaying the number of deaths in Sinaloa; however, the violence has escalated rapidly, triggering the cancellation of Mexico’s Independence Day celebrations in the state of Sinaloa.

Argentine news outlet Infobae reports that at least 18 people have reportedly died in a wave of violence that includes roadblocks, the destruction of public infrastructure, and the closure of businesses. The escalating turf war between the two factions of the Sinaloa Cartel has significant ramifications for the operational environment. First, incoming president Claudia Sheinbaum will likely start her term on 1 October with an escalating security crisis in the Sinaloa state. Second, whichever faction emerges victorious in this internecine battle will have more consolidated control over Mexico’s criminal landscape and lucrative routes to traffic, among other things, fentanyl to the United States.


Sources:

“AMLO llama a grupos criminales que se enfrentan en Sinaloa a actuar ‘con un mínimo de responsabilidad’ (AMLO calls on criminal groups fighting in Sinaloa to act ‘with a minimum of responsibility’),” El Universal (right-leaning Mexican daily), 13 September 2024. https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/amlo-llama-a-grupos-criminales-que-se-enfrentan-en-sinaloa-a-actuar-con-un-minimo-de-responsabilidad/

After four days of violence in Culiacán, Sinaloa, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called on the criminal groups—Mayos and Chapitos—that are facing the attack to act ‘with a minimum of responsibility.’ He said, ‘With the presence of the Armed Forces to ensure that there is no confrontation, to protect the population, they must also act with a minimum of responsibility. It is their family, their fellow countrymen, their municipality, their state and their country.’ At a press conference, the President considered that the violence in Culiacán so far ‘is not a major issue.’…Out of prudence, the Independence Day celebrations in Culiacán were cancelled.

Source: “Al menos 18 muertes en una nueva ola de violencia en Sinaloa (México) (At least 18 dead in a new wave of violence in Sinaloa (Mexico)),” Infobae (Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 15 September 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2024/09/15/al-menos-18-muertes-en-una-nueva-ola-de-violencia-en-sinaloa-mexico/   

During the second week of September, 18 homicides, 36 carjackings and 28 reports of deprivation of liberty have been recorded, in an escalation of violence carried out by criminal groups in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, according to authorities…Sinaloa Governor Rubén Rocha Moya has acknowledged the seriousness of the situation and has attributed these clashes to disputes between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel, specifically between Los Chapitos and Los Mayos.


Notes:

[i] For an updated profile of the Sinaloa Cartel and its activities, see: Insight Crime, “Sinaloa Cartel,” last updated 15 March 2024. https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/

[ii] The story of El Mayo’s arrival at the U.S. southern border is long and still not fully known, but for a comprehensive background on what may have transpired, see: José de Córdoba, “Betrayal and Capture of Sinaloa Cartel Leaders Spark Fears of Turf War,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 August 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/betrayal-and-capture-of-sinaloa-cartel-leaders-spark-fears-of-turf-war-d1a805f8


Image Information:

Image: Mugshot of Sinaloa Cartel leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, one of the most wanted men in the world, extradited to the United States in 2016.
Source: https://picryl.com/media/booking-photo-of-joaquin-el-chapo-guzman-front-873b60


Drone Warfare Is Becoming a Common Tactic in Mali

A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.


“The use of drones by the CSP rebels, if it were to increase, could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels.”


Recent reporting indicates that both the Malian military and Tuareg separatist groups are utilizing drone warfare.[i] According to the first excerpted article from the Africa-focused UK-based news publication Qiraat Africa,rebel forces reported 21 civilian deaths, including 11 children, following Malian military air strikes on the village of Tinzaouatine.[ii] The strike was part of intensified fighting following the recent defeat of Malian Army and Africa Corps mercenaries by rebel fighters who allied with militants from the Al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) is a coalition of Malian separatist groups fighting against government forces in northern Mali and is the latest evolution of the Tuareg rebellion. The Tuareg people, who inhabit the areas of northern Mali, Niger, and parts of western Libya, have been fighting with the Malian government for autonomy on and off since the 1990s. While these separatist groups have been geographically close to radical Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, also based in northern Mali, their motivation has consistently been about independence as opposed to an Islamic caliphate. According to the rebels, the airstrikes allegedly targeted a pharmacy and groups of gathered people in the village. The Malian Armed Forces confirmed the attack but stated that the strikes were precise and specifically targeted terrorists. These strikes and associated civilian casualties are likely to continue as fighting persists, and government forces cannot conduct a persistent ground campaign in the Kidal region of the country.

Seemingly in retaliation for the Tinzaouatine attack, the rebels conducted a drone strike against a Malian Army camp. According to the second excerpted article from French news radio RFI, rebel forces struck a Malian Army camp approximately 60 miles from Timbuktu, though no casualties were reported. The strike marked an evolution in the conflict, with both sides now utilizing drone warfare. Although the rebel forces indicated they did not acquire the drones through Ukraine or JNIM, there are few open-source details on the type or quantity of drones they use. The leadership of the rebel faction did acknowledge that they have had access to the drones for ten months to train with and manufacture grenades. While still an effective tool, rebel forces are likely not using as technologically advanced drones as the Malian Army, who, alongside their Africa Corps counterparts, have been using Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones with significant effect.[ii]

Drone warfare in Mali and possibly other non-state actors could signal a fundamental shift in the conduct of battles and the power balance in the region. The only other time rebel forces utilized drones was in July 2024, when they defeated Africa Corps and the Malian armed forces. Though the CSP currently denies drone use in conjunction with terrorist organizations like JNIM, their successful use in the region has the potential to also expand the usage by jihadist groups. Drone warfare on both sides will also likely impact civilian casualties and cause problems for the Malian armed forces, similar to what the Russian military is currently facing in Ukraine.


Sources:

“Au moins 21 civils tués par un drone dans le nord du Mali, selon un groupe dirigé par des Touaregs (At least 21 civilians killed by drone strike in northern Mali, Tuareg-leg group says),” Qiraata Africa (independent UK-based magazine focused on sub-Saharan Africa), 26 August 2024.
https://qiraatafrican.com/fr/12604/au-moins-21-civils-tues-par-un-drone-dans-le-nord-du-mali-selon-un-groupe-dirige-par-des-touaregs/

Airstrikes on a village in northern Mali near the Algerian border killed 21 civilians on Sunday, including 11 children, a spokesman for a coalition of predominantly Tuareg pro-independence groups said. The attack on the village of Tinzaouatine marks the highest number of civilians killed by drones since the breakdown of a peace deal between the country’s ruling military junta and pro-independence armed groups in northern Mali last year.

The Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad is a coalition of predominantly Tuareg groups fighting for the independence of northern Mali, which they call Azawad. Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy, followed by additional strikes targeting people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “The provisional toll of these criminal strikes stands at 21 civilians killed, including 11 children and the head of the pharmacy, dozens of injured and enormous material damage,” said the statement signed by Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, spokesman for the rebel coalition present in the village.

In a statement broadcast on national television, the Malian armed forces confirmed these strikes. “The army general staff confirms the airstrikes in the Tinzaouatine sector on the morning of August 25, 2024. These precision strikes targeted terrorists,” the press release states. The strikes come weeks after the Malian army and mercenaries from the Russia-based Wagner Group were defeated by Tuareg rebels and fighters from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, a group linked to al-Qaeda.

Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy; then others targeted people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “Both Malian forces and Russian mercenaries lack a strong ground presence in the Kidal region, so using air assets, including drones, is the only way for them to engage armed groups in the region,” said Rida Lyammouri, a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, a Moroccan think tank. “Therefore, airstrikes, including on civilians, are likely to increase as revenge for the recent major setback suffered by Wagner mercenaries in northern Mali”

Source: “Mali: les rebelles du CSP combattent désormais avec des drones (Mali: CSP rebels now fight with drones),” RFI (French-based radio station and part of the France Medias Monde group), 12 September 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240912-mali-les-rebelles-du-csp-combattent-d%C3%A9sormais-avec-des-drones

In Mali, the rebels of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) are now fighting with drones. They used them on September 11, 2024, against a Malian army camp about a hundred kilometers from Timbuktu. No casualties were reported. But it was on this occasion that the rebels revealed that they had drones and that it was the second time they had used them. A new addition to their arsenal could change the shape of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the rebels in the North.

The rebels claim to have used it [drones] for the first time at the end of July in Tinzaouatène, during their only but important victory against the Malian soldiers and the Wagner group, who had lost several dozen men and were forced to turn back. Where do these drones come from? How many do the rebels have? What model exactly? No details have been released. CSP spokesman Mohamed el Maouloud Ramadane says only that they were “purchased,” and assures that they were not supplied by Ukraine – nor by the al-Qaeda-linked Jnim (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims). The jihadists, who are also fighting the Malian army in northern Mali , use drones to film their propaganda videos. To date, JNIM has not claimed responsibility for any drone attacks.

According to several CSP fighters contacted by RFI, the rebels have had these drones for about ten months now. “We had to train people and make the grenades; it’s dangerous, and it takes time,” explains one of them. Regarding their use in Tinzaouatène at the end of July, the rebels assure that it was ” decisive “, particularly ” against the armored vehicles”. At the time, the CSP rebels had not communicated on the unprecedented use of these drones. Nor had the Malian army, which had exceptionally acknowledged ” a significant number of losses in human and material life ” (press release of July 29).

The Fama (Malian Armed Forces) and their Wagner auxiliaries themselves use armed drones. The first Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s, acquired by the Malian army, were received in December 2022. Other deliveries followed, always relayed on state media to illustrate the army’s “rise in power”. These drones actually proved decisive during the capture of Kidal, a rebel stronghold, last November. The strikes forced the CSP men to withdraw, without even attempting ground combat. If the use of drones by the CSP rebels were to increase, it could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels. It could help to rebalance the forces because, until now, the Malian army and Wagner dominate the terrain. Since the use of armed drones requires particularly reliable intelligence and careful targeting, it could also increase the risk for civilians, whom the CSP rebels have made it their mission to protect.


Notes:

[i] The linked article by Le Monde goes in-depth on the Tuareg rebellion that has been going on in Mali since the 1990s. For more information, see: Philippe Baqué, “For the Tuaregs, unite or disappear (Mali’s Tuaregs: ‘For us, this war is existential’),” Le Monde, April 2024. https://mondediplo.com/2024/04/13mali

[ii] The Bayraktar TB2 is described as a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE), Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, capable of a 27-hour maximum flight time and a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet. For additional information see: “Bayraktar TB2,” Bayraktar, n.d. https://baykartech.com/en/uav/bayraktar-tb2/


Image Information:

Image: A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bayraktar_TB2_Runway.jpg


North Korea Reveals Previously Undisclosed Uranium Enrichment Site

“Noting that anti-DPRK nuclear threat moves of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces have become more undisguised and crossed the red-line…require the DPRK to steadily expand and bolster up its military capability for self-defense and the capability for preemptive attack with the nuclear force as the backbone.”


North Korean state media is releasing stories at a steady pace highlighting its advancements and intent regarding its illicit nuclear weapons program and associated delivery systems. According to a 13 September article in state-controlled broadcaster Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim Jong Un visited a previously undisclosed uranium enrichment facility designed to produce material for nuclear weapons. Notably, North Korea emphasized that the facility was for development of nuclear weapons targeted against the United States, not for the productions of civilian nuclear fuel, as the regime routinely claims.

This disclosure comes as part of a weeks-long celebration of the 76th anniversary of the founding of North Korea, during which state media has issued a steady drumbeat of articles about the party’s military plans and goals. During the same period, North Korea also released an image of a new 12-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL) for a possible new type of ICBM, the test firing of a new 600mm MRLS,[i] and Kim inspecting special operations forces training.[ii]

Over the last decade, North Korea has sought to portray its nuclear weapons and missile program as what a “normal nation” would do. However, North Korean media historically fluctuated between two extremes. On one hand, it would aggressively hype the program, threaten the United States and our allies, promise first strikes, and publicly identify its intended nuclear targets on the U.S. mainland. Then, depending on the political environment, it would shift to a message of simple deterrence, disclaiming any first use, and promising to be a responsible nuclear power.

North Korea is portraying its nuclear weapons development targeted at the United States as the new normal, similar to its uncharacteristic restraint in unveiling its new 12-axle TEL. The Regime probably does not feel the need to use its trademark over-the-top, anti-U.S. rhetoric to justify the program when matter-of-fact statements will do. The Regime’s message is clearly that this is the way things are now.


Sources:

“경애하는 김정은동지께서 핵무기연구소와 무기급핵물질생산기지를 현지지도하시였다 (Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Nuclear Weapons Institute and Production Base of Weapons-grade Nuclear Materials),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 13 Sepetember 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/8bc7076c7ecb6af9065c66977903f00c.kcmsf

Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, inspected the Nuclear Weapons Institute and the production base of weapons-grade nuclear materials, acquainted himself with the production of nuclear warheads and the current production of nuclear materials and set forth important tasks concerning a long-term plan for increasing the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.

He highly praised the scientists, technicians and officials in the field of nuclear weapons production for carrying out without fail the plan for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials needed for manufacturing nuclear warheads, cherishing the firm and steadfast revolutionary spirit and faith to firmly defend the victorious advance of the revolutionary cause of Juche with the strongest nuclear force.

He expressed great satisfaction after being briefed on the fact that the base is dynamically producing nuclear materials by studying, developing and introducing all the system elements including centrifugal separators and various kinds of sensors and controllers with its own efforts and technology.

Personally looking round the production site, he said that it is invigorating to see the place, and continued: In order to exponentially multiply the nuclear weapons for self-defence true to the Party’s line of building the nuclear force, it is necessary to further increase the number of centrifuges, not content with the successes achieved, and, at the same time, to enhance the individual separation ability of the centrifuge and push forward with the introduction of a new-type centrifuge, which has already reached the completion stage, as planned, so as to consolidate the foundation for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials.

Going round the construction site for expanding the capacity for the current production of nuclear weapons, he learned in detail about the daily plan for the assembly of equipment.

Noting that anti-DPRK nuclear threat moves of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces have become more undisguised and crossed the red-line, he said the security environment facing the DPRK, the peculiarity of the Korean revolution compelling the country to constantly confront the U.S. and contain it and prospective threats require the DPRK to steadily expand and bolster up its military capability for self-defence and the capability for preemptive attack with the nuclear force as the backbone. He stressed again that a more rapid and sure advance should be made in the struggle to always maintain the thoroughgoing counteraction posture of the nuclear force and improve the posture to a high level.

The combatants in the field of nuclear weapons production, assuming the most important responsibility, that is, the historic mission to bolster up the nuclear war deterrent of the country in quality and quantity and in a sustained and accelerated way, should keep exerting themselves in production and thus more creditably fulfil the sacred duty they took on for the Party and the revolution, he instructed.

He stressed the need to set a higher long-term goal in producing nuclear materials necessary for the manufacture of tactical nuclear weapons and concentrate all efforts on making a fresh leap forward, and set forth important tasks and orientation.


Notes:

[i] See: “경애하는 김정은동지께서 새형의 600㎜방사포차성능검증을 위한 시험사격을 보시였다 (Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Test-fire for Verifying Performance of New-type 600mm Multiple Rocket Launcher),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 13 September 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/d5a6198af96d278695d7978c6d8bd74f.kcmsf

[ii] See: “경애하는 김정은동지께서 조선인민군 특수작전무력훈련기지를 현지시찰하시였다  (Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Training Base of Special Operation Forces of KPA),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 13 September 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/b9243d11f2d74891bab7867dcaf965f0.kcmsf


North Korea Unveils New 12-Axle ICBM Launcher

“Kim Jong Un acquainted himself with the production of military hardware in the second half of the year.”


North Korea publicly revealed a new, larger ICBM transporter erector launcher (TEL) system, potentially for a new ICBM class. The communist Workers’ Party of Korea newspaper Rodong Sinmun, released a picture of Kim Jong Un inspecting a new 12-axle TEL. The disclosure happened as Kim Jong Un visited a defense industrial enterprise site on 8 September as part of events commemorating the 76th anniversary of the founding of the state.

Since North Korea’s first ICBM test launch on 4 July 2017, the PRK has been testing progressively larger ICBM missile systems and associated TELs. The Hwaseong-17, North Korea’s known largest ICBM, tested in 2023, already has an associated 11-axle TEL.1

The 12-axle TEL’s unveiling was uncharacteristically subdued by North Korean standards, presented almost as an afterthought buried in a technical piece about the PRK’s defense manufacturing goals. Apart from the associated image, the Rodong Sinmun article makes no reference to the TEL, instead highlighting Kim Jong Un’s visit to the site and his speech about the important work of the national defense industrial enterprise.

However, the photo release could not have been an accident and most likely had a messaging purpose.2 These could have included promoting a new, even larger missile system under development which the regime might reveal or test closer to the U.S. presidential election. Possibly, but less likely, it could represent a new and more survivable design for the existing Hwaseong systems. The subdued nature of the unveiling could likewise represent North Korea’s attempt to influence the narrative in Western, Japanese, and South Korean media, a sort of “we are still here” message that carries an implied threat to the next U.S. administration.


Sources:

Rodong Sinmun, “경애하는 김정은동지께서 국방공업기업소를 현지지도하시였다 (Dear Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Defense Industrial Enterprises),” Rodong Sinmun (communist Workers’ Party of Korea daily newspaper), 8 Sep 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/8bc7076c7ecb6af9065c66977903f00c.kcmsf

Pyongyang, September 8 (KCNA) — Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, visited a defence industrial enterprise under the Second Economy Commission to learn about the production of military hardware…

Highly appreciating the indomitable fighting spirit and extraordinary ideological and spiritual world of its officials and workers, he expressed thanks to them for carrying out the huge munitions production tasks in a responsible and correct way and making a great contribution to the development of our armed forces, true to the Party’s policy on munitions industry.

Learning about the structural characteristics, performance and tactical and technical specifications of military hardware under development and production, he stressed the need to put the munitions production on a more scientific and modern basis and thoroughly guarantee the combat performance of military hardware.

Repeatedly expressing his satisfaction over the fact that the prospect for confidently attaining the goal of military hardware production within the five-year period decided and assigned by the Eighth Party Congress is guaranteed thanks to the dynamic struggle of the munitions industry workers, he clarified the principles and ways for the defence industrial enterprise to hold fast to in the munitions production permanently.


Notes:

1 For more information on North Korean Hwaseong tests over the last three years, see: https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/weapons/north-korea-reveals-12-axle-tel

2 North Korea has a pattern in engaging new U.S. administrations in order to achieve its diplomatic and military goals. For further discussion on Pyongyang’s assessed course of action, see: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/How-North-Korea-will-seek-to-play-the-next-U.S.-president


Iran Believes Israel is Too Weak to Take on Hezbollah

Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, speaking out against Israel on 10 September 2024.


“The Zionists alone lack the capability to open a new front in the region, and the continuation of the Gaza war is not feasible for them and will not achieve anything for them.”


As tit-for-tat strikes continue between Israel and Lebanon since 7 October 2023, Iran believes the Jewish state is too weak to take on a new war front with Hezbollah. As reported by Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, said on 10 September that Israel lacks “the capability to open a new front in the region, and the continuation of the Gaza war is not feasible for them and will not achieve anything for them.” The comments come after Lebanese Hezbollah retaliated on 25 August for Israel’s assassination of its military commander, Fuad Shukr, at the end of July.[i]

In the excerpted article, Brigadier General Akraminia explained that Israel continues to threaten  the Lebanese militant group, which he believes has “precise” missile and drone capabilities, due to Israel’s failure to destroy Hamas and release the remaining hostages, as well as its inability to stop the Hezbollah’s attacks. He emphasized that “internal issues and high casualties in the Gaza war have left the occupiers with no choice but to retreat and accept a ceasefire,” referring to Israel.

Due to its failures, the Brigadier General believes Israel is trying “to draw actors such as the United States and Europe into the battlefield, hoping to save itself from the Gaza quagmire.” In other words, Israel is trying to start a war with its northern neighbor to distract from its failings in Gaza. However, Akraminia noted that the upcoming U.S. presidential election makes it unlikely a full-scale war would be supported. Akraminia’s comments suggest that Tehran and the Resistance Axis—led by its crown jewel proxy, Hezbollah—believe they have been in a position of strength since 7 October 2023, suggesting that these proxy groups will continue responding to Israel as long as the Gaza war continues.


Sources:

“صهیونیست‌ها قادر به نبرد همه‌جانبه با حزب‌الله نیستند (The Zionists are not capable of an all-out battle with Hezbollah),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 10 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00I9ou.

According to IRIB News Agency, Brigadier General [Mohammad] Akraminia, in an interview regarding the Zionist authorities’ threat of a full-scale attack on Lebanon, stated: “Given the failure of the Zionist regime in achieving its declared goals, including the release of prisoners, the destruction of Hamas, and the inability to stop Hezbollah’s attacks, the authorities of this regime are constantly threatening the Lebanese resistance forces.”

The Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization added: “The Zionist regime is trying to expand the war in the region in order to draw actors such as the U.S. and Europeans into the battlefield, hoping to save itself from the Gaza quagmire.”

Noting that the Zionist regime is battling the Resistance Axis on several fronts, Brigadier General Akraminia said: “The Zionists alone lack the capability to open a new front in the region, and the continuation of the Gaza war is not feasible for them and will not achieve anything for them.”

The Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization stated that the Gaza battle is being fought directly with U.S. and Western countries’ military aid and remarked: “Considering the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, it is unlikely that they would support a full-scale attack on Lebanon and the opening of a new front in the region.”

Brigadier General Akraminia stressed the precision of Hezbollah’s missiles and drones and their success in various operations against the Zionists, stating: “The Zionists are well aware of Lebanese Hezbollah’s capabilities, and we only witnessed a small part of these capabilities during the Arbaeen operations,” referring to Fuad Shukr retaliation.

The Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, referring to the Zionist officials’ acknowledgment of Hezbollah’s high capabilities, noted: “Internal issues and high casualties in the Gaza war have left the occupiers with no choice but to retreat and accept a ceasefire.”


Notes:

[i] Ronen Bergman, Adam Rasgon, Euan Ward, Farnaz Fassihi, and Hwaida Saad, “Israel Says It Killed Hezbollah Commander in Airstrike Near Beirut,” New York Times, 30 July 2024.https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/30/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-lebanon.html


Image Information:

Image: Deputy Coordinator of the Army Ideological-Political Organization, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, speaking out against Israel on 10 September 2024.
Source: IRIB (Iranian media outlet) https://www.iribnews.ir/00I9ou


Iran Is Building a Wall Along Its Afghan Border

“The length of this wall is extensive, and it takes time, but these security plans are being implemented at the border with the cooperation of the caretaker government.”


As border tensions between Iran and neighboring Afghanistan continue, Tehran has started building a border wall. Per the excerpted article by the Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, Brigadier General Kiumars Heydari of the Iranian Army’s ground forces visited the Iran-Afghanistan border on 11 September, where the army’s engineering units are building the “physical blockade.” This news comes as Iran struggles with an influx of Afghan refugees, drug trafficking, and border disputes.

According to the second excerpted article by IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council support the 330-kilometer wall being built in Razavi Khorasan province, reinforcing how the project is a critical national security issue. The border wall, which is in collaboration between the IRGC and the Army, has been a topic of discussion for months. In February, the brigadier general declared, “We intend to block our borders, and no one can object why we erect a fence near their border. This is not unjust to neighboring countries, as it is common practice in all countries,” an indirect reference to Pakistan’s border wall with Afghanistan.[i] At the time, Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi described it as “not a wall” but a “border blockade that is being pursued according to the plan.”[ii]

Iran appears to be being building the border wall for several national security reasons. Since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in 2021, tensions have been at an all-time high between the eastern neighbors over the Helmand River, which flows from Afghanistan into Iran, leading to numerous clashes on the border and political tensions.[iii] However, the second excerpted article states, “these security plans are being implemented at the border with the cooperation of the caretaker government,” referring to the Taliban, which Tehran doesn’t recognize.

At the same time that it is building this wall, Iran is now the largest host for refugees in the world, with the majority coming from Afghanistan, though Tehran has expelled approximately 100,000 refugees since the beginning of the year.[iv] While drug smuggling has always been a contentious issue, Iranian officials are also thinking about the reality that its eastern neighbor is now host to an array of terrorist groups—including the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham-Khorasan Province and al-Qaeda—raising concerns about their potential to launch attacks into Iran.

With anti-Afghan sentiment at an all-time high in Iran, Tehran’s building of a border wall may appease some Iranians. Nevertheless, this project demonstrates the complex relationship between Tehran and Kabul since the Taliban takeover and how Iran has evolved its thinking about its national security to prevent further escalation.


Sources:

بازدید فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش از طرح انسداد مرزهای شرقی (Visit of the commander army ground forces to the plan to block the eastern border),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 11 September 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00IA6v

According to IRIB, the commander of the army’s ground forces, during his trip to the eastern borders of the country, visited this morning the construction sites where Iran-Afghanistan border is being physically blocked by army engineering units.

During the visit, he inspected the progress of the project and reviewed the activities of the army’s engineering combat units involved in the construction. The visit also included assessments of the military and operational readiness of soldiers stationed along the border, with a focus on enhancing security measures in the region.

Amir Brigadier General [Kiumars] Heydari also visited the bases of the 277th Mobile Assault Brigade of Shahid Tolaei in order to check the military and operational preparations of the soldiers and had a conversation with them at the border’s zero point.

The deputy commander of the Northeast Regional Headquarters, the commander of the 77th Division of Saman Al-Aimeh/Eighth Imam Division, the commander of the 277th Mobile Assault Brigade, and Shahid Tolaei Brigade, accompanied Brigadier Heydari on this visit and business trip.

The project of physical blocking the eastern borders of the country for a length of 330 km in Razavi Khorasan is being implemented by four engineering brigades.

The Islamic Republic of Iran shares a 945-kilometer common border with Afghanistan, where the provinces of Razavi Khorasan, South Khorasan, and Sistan and Baluchistan are situated.

Source:

جزئیات انسداد فیزیکی مرز با افغانستان

(Details of the physical blockade of the border with Afghanistan),” Tasnim News Agency (IRGC), 13 September 2024. https://tn.ai/3155310

According to the foreign policy correspondent of Tasnim [News Agency], Hassan Kazemi Qomi, the acting head of the Iranian embassy in Afghanistan, explained in a discussion regarding the plan to physically block the border with Afghanistan: We in Afghanistan with the caretaker government have the same border security issue, which is the issues of fighting terrorism, drug trafficking, and similar issues.

He added: One of the issues is that the caretaker government supports the plan to physically block the border. The work has already begun along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and fortunately it is in line with the directives of the Supreme National Security Council and orders of the Supreme Leader, as commander-in-chief. 

The special representative of the president for Afghanistan affairs stated: The general staff of the armed forces started this movement in collaboration with the IRGC and the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of course, the length of this wall is extensive, and it takes time, but these security plans are being implemented at the border with the cooperation of the caretaker government.


Notes:

[i] “Iran Insists On Its Right To Block Borders With Afghanistan,” Iran International, 16 February 2024. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402167106.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Christina Goldbaum, “At Least Three Are Killed in Clashes on Iranian-Afghan Border,” New York Times, 28 May 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/28/world/asia/afghanistan-iran-border-clashes.html

[iv] Ayaz Gul, “Taliban: Pakistan, Iran expelled over 400,000 Afghan refugees so far in 2024,” VOA, 10 June 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-pakistan-iran-expelled-over-400-000-afghan-refugees-so-far-in-2024/7650196.html