Monthly Archives: February 2024

Iran Seeks To Assert Global Leadership in Determining International Cyber Policy

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Mostafa Izadi, the Iranian Armed Forces’ commander for cyber threats, speaks at a conference in Gilan, 8-9 November 2023. Izadi is now making the case for Iran’s leadership in cyber and AI technology.

“If we can dominate the field, we can influence the whole world.”

Iran has sought leadership roles at the UN and other international organizations on issues relating to human rights and crime prevention, and now it seeks to shape international cyber policy. The Iranian regime has looked at internet and cyber access as its Achilles’ heel through which Western powers could influence and corrupt Iranian youth. However, Iranian officials appear ready to go on the offensive as regime confidence grows following the suppression of the 2022-2023 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protest movement and the expiration of some sanctions associated with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[i]

According to the excerpted article from the government-affiliated Iranian Students’ News Agency,Mostafa Izadi, a previous IRGC ground forces general who heads a new headquarters to address cyber threats, argued that Iran should lead cyber policy to increase its influence in the world rather than seek to isolate itself from the internet.[ii] His comments may signal the abandonment of Iran’s effort to cut itself off from the world, and a belief that it should instead seek to sway audiences abroad.[iii] Izadi cites the information operations accompanying the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel to underline the power of the internet when harnessed in Iran’s favor. Subsequent demonstrations in favor of Hamas against Israel and the West not only in the Global South but also in Europe and the West seem to have given Izadi confidence. Izadi’s argument conforms to a historical pattern in which Iranian leaders, after trying and failing to suppress new communication technologies, instead seek to co-opt them. Today Iran translates Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website into ten languages ranging from Hindi to Russian to Spanish while state-owned and operated English-language PressTV pushes Iranian propaganda globally. Izadi’s discussion of artificial intelligence (AI) is also worth noting. While AI is a topic within regime rhetoric, Izadi’s discussion of its role in the fight for hearts and minds and his new role focusing on countering cyber and new threats suggests that the IRGC now actively seeks to utilize AI to counter liberalism and advance Iran’s line at home and abroad.

Sources:

“Izadi: Hakmiyat bar Fezaye Sybari Ya’ani Tasirgozari bar kol Jihad” (Izadi: Sovereignty over cyber space means influencing the whole world),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (an ostensibly private news agency close to Iran’s security and intelligence apparatus), 9 November 2023. https://www.isna.ir/news/1402081813261

The commander for cyber and new threats at the central headquarters for Khatam al-Anbiya of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, referring to the creation of new intellectual space in the field of cyber governance, said, “To fight the enemy’s artificial intelligence and cognitive warfare, it is necessary to address the needs of the day.” Major-General Mostafa Izadi, commander of the new command for cyber and new threats, said at the conclusion at the conclusion of the national conference on emerging maritime opportunities and threats in Gilan, stated that the country’s scientific progress in various fields has led to the strengthening of the holy system of the Islamic Republic, and stated, “Physical, informational and artificial intelligence issues have entered a new space in the world, and America has launched a cognitive war to penetrate different countries.”

Referring to the creation of a new intellectual space in the field of cyber governance, he said, “Governance in cyber space presents an opportunity for our country to achieve great success across a variety of fields….” Emphasizing the need to pay attention to the enemy’s cognitive warfare across politics, the economy, and culture, he stated, “But piety is the secret to our success.”Izadi added, “Today, our country is facing a hybrid war, and cyber, the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence and cyberspace have created a special situation that affects time, place and borders. If we can dominate the field, we can influence the whole world.

Notes:

[i] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, is the agreement reached in summer 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus the European Union restricting Iran’s nuclear program. For more information on the JCPOA see: “What is the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated 27 October 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal

[ii] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and security forces initially sought to regulate the internet in Iran, banning VPNs, slowing access, and demanding all social media operators maintain servers inside Iran. For an overview of Iranian strategies toward the internet, see: Michael Rubin, “Evolution of Iranian Surveillance Strategies Toward the Internet and Social Media” in Munir Khasru and Riasat Noor, eds. The Digital Age, Cyber Space, and Social Media: The Challenges of Security & Radicalization. Dhaka: Institute for Policy, Advocacy, and Governance, 2019. https://www.aei.org/articles/evolution-of-iranian-surveillance-strategies-toward-the-internet-and-social-media/

[iii] The IRGC later offered to operate a national intranet, firewalling Iran from the outside world. For background on the national intranet project, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran- Armed Forces Ready to Take Over National Intranet Project” OE Watch, October 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/329811

Image Information:

Image: Mostafa Izadi, the Iranian Armed Forces’ commander for cyber threats, speaks at a conference in Gilan, 8-9 November 2023. Izadi is now making the case for Iran’s leadership in cyber and AI technology.
Source: https://media.farsnews.ir/Uploaded/Files/Images/1402/08/18/14020818000284_Test_PhotoN.jpg
Attribution: Fars News Agency

Iran’s Supreme Leader Announces Maritime Development Strategy

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Iran’s rugged but underdeveloped Makran coast littoral is pictured. Iran’s Supreme Leader has recently articulated a maritime development plan.

“It is necessary to make use of the coasts, offshore areas, and the seas effectively.”

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently announced a new, multi-decade approach to develop Iran’s coasts. While it is unclear if and how fast Iran might reconfigure or reorient its economy towards a maritime development strategy, the ambition of the maritime plan and its announcement by Khamenei set it apart from previous Iranian economic strategies and proposals.[i]

As per the excerpted article from the official web portal of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Khamenei called for a whole-of-government approach in his nine-point directive, with the formation of new bodies and government reorganization to accomplish the ambitious plan. Khamenei does not describe where Iran will acquire the billions of dollars needed to actualize this plan. Regardless, he provides the clearest indication to date that Iran seeks to develop the Makran Coast beyond the port of Chabahar, and that Khamenei envisions greater ties to Pakistan and Azerbaijan, two traditional rivals.[ii] Khamenei’s statement also provides diplomatic endorsement for ambitious north-south and east-west commercial corridor schemes involving trade across Iran to Russia through Azerbaijan and from China through Pakistan.[iii] Though his call to defend maritime resources from exploitation from other countries may signal a subtle warning about China, a country with whom Iran has developed warm diplomatic relations.[iv] Among Indian Ocean littoral states, China has a record of overfishing and illegally exploiting other country’s maritime resources. While Khamenei signals that Iran seeks to become a regional hub for commerce, his emphasis that any development should conform to Islamic-Iranian values might undercut the attractiveness of foreign investment, especially among Iran’s non-Persian, non-Islamic neighbors. Still, Iran’s attempts to reorient its economy bear watching and, if even partly successful, this regional economic integration can have great impact on the operational environment.

Sources:

“Ablagh-e Siyasatha-ye Kali Tawse’ah-e Darya Mahavar” (Communicating Sea-Oriented Development Policies),” Khamenei.ir (official web portal of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), 7 November 2023.

The oceans are divine gifts with rich reserves and resources for the development of science and technology, for achieving job growth and increased wealth, for the provision of vital needs, and for increasing the country’s strength. Since Iran has a privileged geographical position and is located between two seas with thousands of kilometers of beaches as well as islands, many of which remain untouched, it is necessary to make use of the coasts, offshore areas, and the seas effectively…. Accordingly, we have determined General Sea-based Development Policies as follows:

 1. The establishment of an integrated policy for sea-based affairs, for the division of work at the national level, and for an active, efficient management of the sea in order to make maximum use of the sea’s capacities to attain a fitting global position and to reach a top position in the region.

2. The development of sea-based-economic activities and the creation of advancied sea-based development centers to speed growth on the coasts, islands, and hinterlands in such a way that sea-based economy will always be at least twice the country’s economic growth rate over the next ten years.

3. The facilitation and development of domestic and foreign investments and partnerships by creating the necessary legal, economic, and security frameworks.

4. The formulation of a comprehensive sea-based development plan that includes zoning of the sea, the coast, and the backshore… with emphasis on an Iranian-Islamic identity….

5. Maximum, optimal utilization of the capacities, resources, and reserves of the marine ecosystem by preventing the destruction of the marine environment, especially by other countries.

6. The provision and advancement of committed, efficient human capital and management….

7. The expansion of economic and commercial cooperation…with neighboring and other countries….

8. Increasing the country’s share in sea-based transport and transit by establishing and strengthening a combined transport network.9. Supporting native and local investors in development projects… and also backing small and medium enterprises in local communities in various areas including fishing, agriculture, industry, and tourism.

Notes:

[i] Across the Middle East, populations settled and cities grew alongside coastlines and rivers. See: Baghdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Casablanca, Tel Aviv, Tunis, and Tripoli for example. Iran has been the exception. Cities developed across the Iranian plateau, separated from the Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea and Indian Ocean by mountain ranges or inhospitable badlands. While the 20th century oil boom brought some development to the Persian Gulf coast, nine of Iran’s top ten cities by population are landlocked, with Ahvaz connected to the Persian Gulf by the Karun, Iran’s only navigable river.

[ii] For previous discussion of Chabahar development, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Construction Begins on the Chabahar-Zahedan Railway” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/379863

[iii] For background into Iran’s developing ties with Azerbaijan, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran Agrees To Gas Swap with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan” OE Watch, 01-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/403778

[iv] For background about Iran-China economic ties, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Trade With China Is Up, but So Is Political Risk” OE Watch, 08-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/42208

Image Information:

Image: Iran’s rugged but underdeveloped Makran coast littoral is pictured. Iran’s Supreme Leader has recently articulated a maritime development plan.
Source: https://www.ibena.ir/files/fa/news/1401/9/27/24702_342.jpg
Attribution: Ibena.ir

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Seeks Dominant Role in Maritime Development

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Maj.-Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, speaks about Iran’s new maritime strategy on the sidelines of a conference in Gilan on 8 November 2023.

“This scientific work of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Navy will be important for other organizations involved in the maritime sector.”

In November 2023, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced a new maritime development plan to jumpstart Iran’s “sea-based economy.” The next day, according to the excerpted article from the Iranian Ministry of Defense’s Holy Defense News Agency, former Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander and senior advisor to the Supreme Leader, General Yahya Rahim Safavi, expressed at a maritime conference the value of Iran’s coastline and sea resources. His comments reflect how the IRGC will likely seek a central, organizing role in the implementation of the maritime scheme.[i] Safavi understands that government contracts to build ports, lay highways and railroads, and erect apartment blocks will funnel tens of billions of dollars into IRGC coffers. The participation of both civilian and military universities at the conference highlights academia’s close cooperation with the IRGC, which includes collaboration on Iran’s ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle programs.[ii] Safavi also noted that the IRGC Navy (IRCGN) would play an increased role in offshore scientific missions, conducting operations in the strategic Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, where Iran’s oil and gas interests lie. The regular Iranian Navy, in contrast, focused on blue water operations in the northern Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and further afield. For the IRGCN to take the lead on scientific missions gives it a reason to encroach on the regular Navy’s traditional area of operation in a way that may complicate the operational environment for other navies in the region. After all, the regular Iranian Navy tends to maintain professional relations, even with ships from countries with which Iran has no diplomatic relations.

Sources:

“Major-General Safavi: ‘Eghtesad-e Daryamahavar’ az bistarha-ye Tahaval-e Navin-e Eghtesad ast” (Commander Safavi: The ‘Sea-Oriented Economy’ is One of the Foundations of the New Evolution of Iran’s Economy),” Holy Defense News Agency (official news agency of the Iranian Ministry of Defense), 8 November 2023. https://defapress.ir/fa/news/629041

Major General Sayyid Yahya Safavi, senior advisor to the Supreme Leader, stated shortly before noon on Wednesday [8 November 2023], on the sidelines of the national conference on “Emerging Maritime Opportunities and Threats,” told journalists, “This conference has been organized by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy with the cooperation of several civilian and military universities and will continue for two days in Gilan. It is the culmination of a year of scientific study and research. About 300 papers were submitted from public universities and both military and governmental organizations, of which 30 were selected.

General Safavi, with reference to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic’s emphasis on maritime policies, stated, “Iran is blessed with a coastline of 2,700 kilometers [1,680miles] in the south and along the Caspian Sea. There are 20 islands, and these islands provide a great opportunity for economic development, paying attention to the maritime economy, resolving economic bottlenecks, and solving the problems of the water crisis and producing renewable energy….”

The advisor to the Supreme Leader added, “We hope that by announcing the policies with a ten to 20-year plan, we can better focus on augmenting the private sector, encourage academic study, and adjust foreign policy to better attract investment in Iran. By having a codified plan to use the scientific capacities of the country, we can solve people’s problems according to the values and natural blessings of our country.Emphasizing the necessity of maximizing capacity of the North-South and East-West transit corridors through Iran, he added, “Producing renewable energy and bringing fresh water from the shores of the Oman Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea to the central plateau of Iran are other goals that will be pursued. This scientific work of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- Navy will be important for other organizations involved in the maritime sector.”

Notes:

[i] IRGC firms dominate Iran’s construction industry, road building, and port operations. For discussion about the IRGC’s economic work, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Proposal To Build Railroads and Housing in Syria Could Enrich IRGC” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429284

[ii] For background on other aspects of IRGC-university partnerships, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/312353

Image Information:

Image: Maj.-Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, speaks about Iran’s new maritime strategy on the sidelines of a conference in Gilan on 8 November 2023.
Source: https://defapress.ir/files/fa/news/1402/8/17/2245434_929.jpeg
Attribution: Defapress.ir

Russia Denies that North Korea Is Supplying It With Weapons for Use in Ukraine

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Meeting of Russian and North Korean Defense Ministers at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang on 25 July 2023.

“The accusations made by the ‘collective West’ of ‘illegal’ military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea are unfounded and unsubstantiated.”

Relations between Russia and North Korea are drawing concern as new evidence emerges that Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with conventional munitions and missiles for use in Ukraine. Satellite activity from October 2022 revealed that North Korea supplied an arsenal of weapons – including short-range ballistic missiles, anti-tank missiles, and portable anti-air missiles as well as rifles, rocket launchers, mortars and shells.[i] If confirmed, North Korean sales of weapons to Russia would violate several UN Security Council resolutions  (1718, 2270, and 2321) going back to 2006, which ban the sales of all arms, ballistics systems, and related materials to and from Pyongyang. 

It is estimated Russia received some 350,000 artillery shells from North Korea. At a rate of fire of 10,000 per day at its high at the time of this writing (down from an estimated peak of 60,000 per day in 2022[ii]), that gives Russia just short of a two months’ supply. To put that figure in comparison, given American production levels of 24,000 artillery shells per month, that is more than the US produces in an entire year. The slower pace of Russian missiles fired (based on the 10,0000 per shells per day statistic) on Ukrainian cities could reflect its lack of supply, or it could be a sign of stockpiling in anticipation of a winter offensive, as some analysts suspect.[iii]  

For its part, Russia’s foreign ministry has vehemently denied any violations. According to the excerpted article in the pro-Kremlin news site Sputnik News, Russia denies any “illegal” weapons transfers. Yet satellite imagery starting in August 2023 captures some 1,000 containers leaving North Korea’s Rajin port bound for an ammunition dump near Ukraine’s border.[iv] Indeed, as of October 2023, research from CSIS indicates that cross-border activity at North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility has spiked to its highest levels since before the pandemic.

In exchange, Russia has reportedly provided technical support to North Korea’s nascent space program, as well as ICBM technology. Such assistance is likely needed given Pyongyang’s two previous attempts to launch reconnaissance satellites failed due to booster malfunctions. Theodore Postol of MIT has suggested that Russia also supplied North Korea with the Topol-M [R1] ICBM, the basis for its solid-fuel Hwasong-18 [RG2] missile.[v] Though these reported arms transfers are notable, the Russia-North Korean nexus is not new. After the Cold War, observers raised fears that out-of-work Russian nuclear scientists were assisting Pyongyang to develop nuclear weapons. Today, fears of an arms race are rising in Seoul.[vi] That has prompted South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. to begin sharing real-time missile warning data emanating from North Korea.[vii] Experts disagree whether the Russia-North Korea nexus is a sign of Russian weakness (Russia is badly in need of arms) or strength (Moscow has allies and an arsenal it can call on rapidly for arms). Whatever the assessment, this nexus bears attention from the U.S. Army.

Sources:

“МИД РФ отрицает нарушение резолюций СБ ООН по Северной Корее (Russian Foreign Ministry Denies Violating UNSC Resolutions on North Korea),” Sputnik News (pro-Kremlin news outlet directed at foreigners), 11 November 2023. https://sputnikglobe.com/20231111/russian-foreign-ministry-denies-violating-unsc-resolutions-on-north-korea-1114884101.html  

“The accusations made by the ‘collective West’ of ‘illegal’ military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea are unfounded and unsubstantiated … Russia is responsible in fulfilling its international obligations, including Security Council resolutions. This does not prevent us from deepening traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with our neighbors, including North Korea,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova was quoted as saying by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador at Large Oleg Burmistrov told Sputnik that Russia thoroughly abides by its international obligations towards Pyongyang within the Security Council’s resolutions.

Earlier in the day North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a statement distributed by the Korean media that friendship between Russia and North Korea will only strengthen in the future, and the United States will face a “powerful and coordinated response” if it attempts to disrupt stability in the region.“Relations of friendship and cooperation between two countries – Korea and Russia, striving for independence, peace and friendship, will unshakably strengthen and develop, and any attempts by the United States and its satellites aimed at disrupting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region will face a powerful and coordinated response from independent sovereign states,” the statement said. It said the US administration should get used to the “new realities of Korean-Russian relations.”

Notes:

[i] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun, “Ongoing Arms Transfer Activity at Najin Port,” Beyond Parellel, CSIS, 17 October 2023. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/ongoing-arms-transfer-activity-at-najin-port/

 [ii] Jeff Schogol, “Russia is hammering Ukraine with up to 60,000 artillery shells and rockets every day,” Taks and Purpose. 13 June 2022. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russia-artillery-rocket-strikes-east-ukraine/

[iii] Dara Massicot, “Putin’s Cannon Fodder: Foreign Affairs Interview,” Foreign Affairs, 2 November 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D2sUEB_rRhA

[iv] The shipment came shortly before the leaders of Russia and North Korea met for five hours at Russia’s Vostochny Spaceport, according to TASS, the Russian News Agency. See: Five hours at Vostochny Spaceport: Putin, Kim Jong Un meet again four years later,” TASS (Russia’s main state news agency), 13 September 2023. https://tass.com/politics/1674459: The satellite imagery is further backed up by recent analysis by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that found that two Russian vessels made at least five round trips between North Korea and Russia, believed to be arms transfers. See: Song Sang-Ho, “2 Russian ships made 5 trips between N. Korea, Russia since mid-Aug. in suspected arms transfers,” YonHap News Agency (South Korea’s leading news agency) 17 October 2023. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231017000351315

 [v] Theodore Postol of MIT suggests that Russia also had supplied North Korea with the Topol-M ICBM, the basis for its solid-fuel Hwasong-18 missile. See: Theodore Postol, “The Transfer of a Russian ICBM to North Korea?” Beyond Parallel, 17 August 2023. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/the-transfer-of-a-russian-icbm-to-north-korea/

[vi] Simon Hutagalung, “Russia and North Korea relations in transition,” Korea Times (English-language newspaper in Seoul), 5 November, 2023. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2023/11/137_362456.html

[vii] Anastasia Kostina, “Учения обстоятельств: США и Южная Корея отработают оборону от КНДР (Exercises of circumstances: the United States and South Korea will practice defense against the DPRK: How Pyongyang and Beijing react to the maneuvers of Washington and Seoul),” Izvestia (Russian news outlet), 30 October 2023. https://iz.ru/1596255/anastasiia-kostina/ucheniia-obstoiatelstv-ssha-i-iuzhnaia-koreia-otrabotaiut-oboronu-ot-kndr

Image Information:

Image: Meeting of Russian and North Korean Defense Ministers at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang on 25 July 2023.
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Meeting_of_Russian_and_North_Korean_Defense_Ministers_(2023)_01.png
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Russian Arctic Naval Activity and Capability Continue To Expand

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The Knyaz Oleg arrives at the Northern Fleet in February 2022. The Knyaz Oleg is the fifth Borei-class submarine on active duty.

“Each of the Borei submarines can carry 16 ballistic Bulava missiles, each armed with 4 to 10 nuclear warheads.”

Despite the fighting in Ukraine, a military commitment in Syria, and Western sanctions, Russia continues to test new strategic systems and expand its Northern Fleet[i]—but not without a few hiccups. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, a Russian Borei-class strategic ballistic missile firing submarine, the Imperator Aleksandr III, is currently undergoing sea trials in the Arctic. The Imperator Aleksandr III is the seventh Borei-class [R1] submarine in operation with three more under construction and an additional two planned, for a total of twelve. The article notes that the Imperator Aleksandr III launched a Bulava strategic missile across the Russian Arctic from the White Sea to Kamchatka as part of its sea trials.[ii] The article also notes that a nuclear triad exercise on 25 October featured a canceled Bulava launch. According to the second excerpt, from the Russian Telegram channel Sirena, there have been six failed or canceled missile tests since June 2023. Despite the setbacks, and if a Bulava ballistic missile was fired from the Imperator Aleksandr III, Russia would continue to improve its missile capabilities and advance its strategic power in the Arctic.

Sources:

Thomas Nilsen, “Newest submarine launched Bulava [R1] missile from White Sea,”

The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 5 November 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/11/newest-strategic-submarine-launched-bulava-missile-white-sea

It was Sunday morning, 5 November, when the Defense Ministry in Moscow reported that the Imperator Aleksandr III was sailing under the surface in the White Sea and launched a Bulava. A few minutes after breaking the surface in Russia’s northwestern region, the missile hit the designated target at the Kura range on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

The Imperator Aleksandr III (K-554) was launched in December last year from the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk and has since been undergoing state trials at sea and while at berth at the yard.

The submarine is the 7th Borei-class submarine and will likely be transferred to the Navy before New Year. Like the sixth submarine in the class, Generalissimus Suvorov, also the Imperator Aleksandr III will cross under the Arctic ice and sail for Russia’s Pacific Fleet.

Each of the Borei submarines can carry 16 ballistic Bulava missiles, each armed with 4 to 10 nuclear warheads. Three more subs of the class are currently under construction in Severodvinsk, and two more are planned, but no contracts have been signed.

When Russia tested its nuclear deterrence triad on October 25, the only submarine-launched ballistic missile fired was an older Sineava, fired from the Northern Fleet’s Delta-IV class Tula in the Barents Sea.

“Шесть испытаний российских ракет отменились или провалились с июня (Six Russian missile tests have been canceled or failed since June). Sirena (Russian Telegram Channel), 1 November 2023. https://t.me/news_sirena/20870

Since June 30, 2023, at least six unsuccessful rocket tests have taken place in Russia, a source at one of the rocket and space industry enterprises told Sirena . Some launches failed altogether. Here are the details:

On June 30, the Poseidon device was tested unsuccessfully – an underwater nuclear torpedo that should hit coastal areas, ships and naval bases. According to our source, the cooling sensor showed a lack of coolant, the reactor did not start, and the Poseidon was thrown out of the shaft, after which it sank. The next launch was planned for late October – early November, but it has been postponed.

On August 30, the third launch of the Sarmat complex did not take place. It was postponed due to a failure in the missile’s centralized control system, Sirena’s interlocutor claims.

On October 25, “presidential launches” took place – Putin led the tests. The Kremlin then stated that all the objectives of the exercises had been completed. Our source says that the Yars missile fell during the second stage of flight, and the Bulava launch was canceled at the last moment.

On October 31, the next Sarmat launch failed because the telemetry system failed. According to the source, this was explained by a mistake by the maintenance staff.

Today, the Sarmat fell 77 seconds into the flight, 300 kilometers from the launch site. This already happened to the complex in February. Test participants do not have clear versions of why something goes wrong.In September, the head of Roscosmos, Yuri Borisov, said that the Sarmat complexes were put on combat duty. Sirena’s source believes that the Russian authorities were “obviously in a hurry” with this.

Notes:

[i] It was previously reported that the Northern Fleet is expanding its capability by acquiring ice-class minesweepers for their Arctic waters.  See: Atle Staalesen, “Three ships of Russia’s new class of minesweepers are being built for Arctic waters,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 22 June 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/06/new-minesweepers-coming-northern-fleet

[ii] For more information on the Bulava nuclear capable submarine launched ballistic missile see: RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32), MissileThreat, CSIS Missile Defense Project, CSIS, 2 August 2021. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-32-bulava/

Image Information:

Image: The Knyaz Oleg arrives at the Northern Fleet in February 2022. The Knyaz Oleg is the fifth Borei-class submarine on active duty.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_submarine_Knyaz_Oleg – /media/File:K-552_at_Northern_fleet.jpg
Attribution: CC by 4.0

Russia’s Federal Budget Puts Economy on War Footing

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The new Russian budget, 2024-2026, will throw a lifeline to the Russian defense industry as well as the war in Ukraine. Russian pavilion at a previous International Defence Exhibition & Conference (IDEX) held in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

“Everything for the front, everything for victory,” – Head of the Ministry of Finance, Anton Siluanov

On 27 November 2023, Russian President Putin signed the federal budget for 2024-2026. The budget dedicates a dramatic 30 percent of total expenditures to the Armed Forces and military industrial complex. According to the excerpted article from the Russian and English-language independent online newspaper The Moscow Times, the increase in funds dedicated to the military establishment is “2.3 times more than [was appropriated] in 2022.” For comparison, funds dedicated to the military represented only 17 percent of the federal budget in 2022 and 19 percent in 2023. That percentage will increase to 29.5 percent in 2024. The Russian government will also spend “another 3.338 trillion rubles under the heading ‘national security,’ which includes the budgets of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, the special services and the FSIN[i] system. Thus, in total, nearly “40 percent of the [federal] budget will be spent on law enforcement agencies.” To make this happen, Russia will have to pull funds from other parts of its economy including healthcare (which will be cut by 10 percent), aid to small businesses (which will lose 20 percent), and the “development of Infrastructure for Scientific Research,” (which will be reduced by 25 percent). Notably, “funding for state propaganda,” a line item of Russia’s federal budget and a critical part of its war in Ukraine, would remain the same as in the last budget. The signing into law of the new budget comes in conjunction with multiple other significant financial changes, including the Russian reintroduction of capital controls[ii] to stabilize the ruble against the dollar and other global currencies.[iii] Taken together, the signaling demonstrates Russia’s determination to see the war to a positive outcome—at a time when funding for Ukraine in the U.S. and among other Western powers is under scrutiny.

Sources:

“Путин утвердил рост расходов на армию до рекорда со времен СССР (Putin approved an increase in spending on the army to a record since Soviet times),” The Moscow Times (a Russian-English language online newspaper), 27 November 2023. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/11/27/putin-razreshil-rosnefti-idesyatkam-goskompanii-zasekretit-informatsiyu-osebe-a114361

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday, November 27, signed the law on the federal budget for 2024-26. According to the document, which was adopted by the State Duma on November 15 and approved by the Federation Council a week later, next year, for the first time since Soviet times, the Russian authorities intend to allocate almost a third of all expenditures on maintaining the army and the military-industrial complex.

For the year, under the item “national defense” the budget will spend 10.775 trillion rubles – 70% more than in 2023 (6.8 trillion), 2.3 times more than in 2022 (4.7 trillion), and three times higher than the pre-war 2021 indicators (3.5 trillion).

The share of military expenditures in the budget, the total size of which will be 36.66 trillion rubles, will reach 29.5%. For comparison: the current year’s budget initially included only 19% of defense spending (5 trillion rubles out of 26.1 trillion); in the first year of the war with Ukraine, this share was 17% (4.7 trillion rubles out of 27.8 trillion).

The USSR spent a third of its budget on defense in its final years. Thus, in the 1990 budget, 71 billion rubles out of 241.3 billion, or 29.4%, were allocated for “military purposes” (data published in the archive of ex-Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Yegor Gaidar).

According to the budget law, the government will spend another 3.338 trillion rubles under the heading “national security”, which includes the budgets of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, the special services and the FSIN system. Compared to the current year, these expenses will increase by 163 billion rubles. Thus, in total, almost 40% of the budget will be spent on law enforcement agencies.

To make ends meet, the government will cut costs to support the national economy: they will decrease from 4.125 to 3.889 trillion rubles. Funding for education and medicine – 1.6 trillion rubles each – will be “frozen”, and in real terms – taking into account inflation – will be reduced.

Expenses under the national Healthcare project are planned to be cut by 10%, from 321.3 to 289.9 billion rubles, and the sequestration will affect almost all of its subprograms. Expenses under the federal project “Modernization of Primary Health Care” will be reduced by 14%, to 81.64 billion rubles. The federal project “Fighting Cancer” will lose weight by 8%, to 147.4 billion rubles. Expenditures on the development of children’s healthcare will be reduced by almost half – from 19.5 to 10.2 billion rubles; for the development of primary medical care – by 20%, to 7.677 billion rubles.

The national project to support small businesses will lose almost 20% of funding (67.7 billion rubles); Expenses for the federal project “Development of Infrastructure for Scientific Research” are reduced by 25% – to 47 billion rubles. Allocations for the state program “Development of the Aviation Industry” will be cut by 28% – 37.3 billion rubles. In addition, the government plans to save on supporting the regions: transfers to them from the federal budget will be less by 4% – 1.474 trillion rubles.

Funding for state propaganda will remain at record levels: state media will receive 121.3 billion rubles from the budget compared to 122 billion this year. Expenditures under the item “culture and cinematography,” which includes budgets for the creation of war propaganda films, will increase by 11%, to 234 billion rubles.“Everything for the front, everything for victory,” said the head of the Ministry of Finance Anton Siluanov in September, commenting on the document. He urged people not to worry that there would not be enough money in the treasury. “But there will be enough for what is planned. A normal, healthy budget,” the minister emphasized.

Notes:

[i] FNIS is the Federal Penitentiary Service (ФСИН России), the federal authority for the detention of suspected and convicted persons, and the security and maintenance of prisons in Russia.

[ii] Capital Controls are measures taken by a government to limit the flow of foreign capital in and out of the domestic economy. Since the war in Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia has sought, among other regulatory actions, to stabilize the ruble by requiring that a large portion of all foreign currency profits made by Russian exporters be converted into rubles. For a recent discussion on some of the capital controls recently imposed by Russia, see: “Russia has tightened capital controls to help prop up ruble, report says,” The Guardian, 31 October 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/31/russia-capital-controls-rouble-vladimir-putin

[iii] For more on other Russian moves to reduce the dominance and dependency of the U.S dollar, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Russia Enlists Partners To Attack U.S. Dollar To Fund War In Ukraine,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-enlists-partners-to-attack-u-s-dollar-to-fund-war-in-ukraine/

Russia Details Plan To Overcome Military Drone Deficiencies

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Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a drone war.  Here, an unidentified Ukrainian Special Forces soldier with small quadcopter UAV that will be modified to carry a small explosive charge.

“The military still faces a serious shortage of drones for strategic reconnaissance and subsequent strikes over fairly long distances. Saturating the troops with them would greatly increase our ability to identify and destroy enemy equipment accumulations and other priority targets.”

The use of unmanned armed vehicles (UAVs), or drones, on the battlefields of Ukraine has increased dramatically since the conflict began in February 2022. While Ukraine may have held the initial advantage, Russia continues to prioritize its drone capabilities.[i] In a recent meeting of the Ministry of Defense regarding weapons procurement, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu detailed the state of military drone procurement. According to the excerpted article from the Russian online publication Free Press, Shoigu noted that “Russia has trained 93,000 specialists to service the latest types of weapons, a significant part [of this workforce] of which are drone operators.” Shoigu also noted that drone operators were being trained at several military training centers “at universities,” and that the number of these training centers would soon rise from only 16 in 2022 to 139, although no timeline was given as to when all 139 training centers would be operational. The Free Press article also included an interview with Igor Korotchenko, the editor-in-chief of National Defense,[ii] a magazine focused on Russian defense and security issues, who noted that although Russian front-line troops were being “saturated” with drones, “the military still faces a serious shortage of drones for strategic reconnaissance and subsequent strikes over fairly long distances.” Korotchenko also noted that drones with these capabilities are being delivered to the frontlines but “the task is to saturate our battle formations with them as much as possible.” Finally, the article notes that at the end of 2022, Putin had declared Russia would boost spending on its military drone program from 4.4 billion rubles (approximately $48 million) to 92 billion rubles (approximately $1 billion) effective immediately, increasing spending up to 200 billion rubles (approximately $2.2 billion) by 2030.

Sources:

“СВО: Российской армии срочно нужны дроны для наступления. По мере изменений тактики будут видоизменяться и модели боевых БПЛА (SVO: The Russian army urgently needs drones for the offensive. As tactics change, combat UAV models will also change),” Free Press (Russian socio-political online publication specializing in political, socio-economic and cultural news), 21 November 2023. https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/395461/ 

Supplies of unmanned aerial vehicles to the army have increased 16 times compared to the beginning of last year. Sergei Shoigu announced this at a meeting of the Ministry of Defense dedicated to state defense procurement. The head of the military department also cited other figures: the number of basic types of missile and artillery weapons in the troops increased by 4.9 times, high-precision long-range missiles by 5 times, and armored weapons by more than 3 times. In total, the supply of the army with various means of defeating the enemy has been increased 12 times. At the same time, the state defense order for the needs of the Northern Military District is clarified and adjusted 2-3 times a month depending on the needs of the front. The breakthrough in the field of unmanned aircraft can be considered a special achievement because before the SVO, we paid practically no attention to this type of weapons, and in the first months of the operation, the superiority of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in this component looked deafening. Our soldiers had to make do mainly with Chinese quadcopters, which caring citizens bought for the front in regular stores. Sergei Shoigu also said that in 2023, Russia has trained 93 thousand specialists to service the latest types of weapons, a significant part of which are drone operators. A certain percentage of them are now serving in the Northern Military District zone. Students at military training centers at universities are also learning to control combat drones. The number of such centers will soon reach 139, although the first 16 were created only last year. Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of the National Defense magazine, told Free Press about which drones are currently being used by our military in the Northern Military District zone, and which ones are in greatest need. Thus, the time when soldiers and officers had to master the control of quadcopters directly in combat conditions is over. And the drones that are now going into the army are no longer a mishmash of different Chinese toys. They are collected in Russia and are sufficiently standardized. — The Northern Military District zone is being massively saturated, first of all, with tactical-class drones, which are used for reconnaissance and attack operations against the enemy on the line of contact and the front line. These are mainly quadcopters. They can conduct surveillance and then be used like kamikazes. Such UAVs are most intensively used by the troops today,” says a military analyst. “The military still faces a serious shortage of drones for strategic reconnaissance and subsequent strikes over fairly long distances. Saturating the troops with them would greatly increase our ability to identify and destroy enemy equipment accumulations and other priority targets. The most important task is to hit vehicles with weapons and ammunition in a timely manner. And if we consider that our enemies are now preparing to redeploy F-16 [R1] fighters and ATACMS missiles with a range of more than 300 km to Ukraine, which can be launched from HIMARS[R2]  installations, then our strategic drones must be able to identify and destroy such targets. This task is now No. 1 for our engineers and designers. Until the end of 2022, drones remained in short supply in our troops. In December, Vladimir Putin instructed the government to prepare a national project for the development of unmanned aircraft. And in April, the president visited the capital’s Rudnevo technology park, which became a cluster for the production of UAVs. A meeting was also held there with the government and drone manufacturers. The talk in the open part was about unmanned civil aviation, but it is clear that any aircraft or copter initially has a dual use. During the meeting, the president gave a number of instructions. Among them is to increase the portfolio of government orders for unmanned aerial vehicles from 4.4 billion rubles to 92 billion, and by 2030 to 200 billion.

Technoparks for the production of UAVs, similar to the Moscow one, should be organized in all federal districts, and better yet, in all regions. Begin organized training and retraining of specialized specialists in the production and operation of UAVs.

Notes:

[i] For additional reading on Russia’s increasing use of drones on the battlefield, see: Charles Bartles, “Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons To Engineer Units,” OE Watch, 09-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-plans-to-add-remote-mining-uav-platoons-to-engineer-units/

[ii] National Defense magazine is tied to Russia’s military industry complex and bills itself as covering a “wide spectrum of problems related to safeguarding Russia’s National Security.” For more information about National Defense, see its website: https://oborona.ru/

Image Information:

Image: Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a drone war.  Here, an unidentified Ukrainian Special Forces soldier with small quadcopter UAV that will be modified to carry a small explosive charge.
Source: Combat Films and Research
Attribution: By permission of Combat Films and Research

Russian Military Working To Respond to U.S. “Multi-Domain Operations”

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“The main difficulty in conducting defense in the context of the enemy’s implementation of the “multi-domain battle” concept is that units, occupying strong points, positions and areas, are not able to quickly and effectively respond to enemy actions, especially when changing the direction of action and carrying out flanking maneuvers.”

Russia is working to understand the U.S. Army’s “multi-domain operations” (MDO) concept,[i] Which can roughly be described as the coordinated employment of the domains of war (land, air, sea, space, cyber, etc.) to achieve an operational-level objective.  The accompanying excerpted article from the monthly Russian military periodical, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the Russian Armed Forces’ understanding of the U.S. MDO concept, the potential effects of MDO if employed against the Russian Ground Forces, and what course of action a Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) should execute to best overcome it.[ii] The authors believe that a successful first strike on a Russian BTG by a U.S. Army MDO Brigade could be decisive due to the attrition of the BTG’s command and control and combat capabilities. The authors posit that the best defense for a BTG against an attacking MDO Brigade is the use of positional defense (as opposed to maneuver defense), and a preemptive attack. To achieve this, up to one-third of the combined arms subunits in the BTG should act as flanking or raiding detachments and conduct preemptive actions to hinder the enemy. These actions might include defeating artillery, air defense systems, and command posts, and disrupting command and control and logistics, thereby disrupting the MDO Brigade’s ability to conduct a decisive counter-attack. It is important to note that the authors, and many other Russian commentators, see the so-called “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine as not only a testing ground for new Russian military technologies and tactics, but also as a testing ground for new U.S./NATO technologies and tactics by way of Ukrainian proxies. As such, this article will likely be the first of many analyses discussing the best ways for the Russian Armed Forces to counter  U.S. military technology and tactics based on the lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Sources:

R. Shaykhutdinov, I. Starodubtsev, “Оборона батальонной тактической группы в условиях «многосферного сражения» (The conduct of a defense by a battalion tactical group under conditions of «multi-domain battle»),” Armeisky Sbornik (monthly Russian military periodical), October 2023. https://army.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/521356/

Against the background of strengthening the military power of Russia and China, the United States began to develop new approaches that would ensure the superiority of its troops in military conflicts with an enemy of comparable combat capabilities. The basic principles and procedures for conducting combat operations as part of interservice and coalition groupings of troops in various operational environments at the strategic, operational and tactical levels were formulated…

Military experts F.I. Ladygin, S.V. Afanasyev and A.V. Khomutov argue that such a model provides for the creation in the US ground forces of “a new type of formations deployed in advance in forward areas – “ multi-domain brigade tactical groups”, which will be able to operate in all environments, in isolation from the main grouping of troops, in conditions of constant contact with the enemy to identify his vulnerabilities and ensure the involvement of the main forces in them”…

The main difficulty in conducting defense in the context of the enemy’s implementation of the “multi-domain battle” concept is that units, occupying strong points, positions and areas, are not able to quickly and effectively respond to enemy actions, especially when changing the direction of action and carrying out flanking maneuvers. Also significant is the inevitable disunity of battalion defensive strong points during defense — when on a wide front these strong points cannot provide mutual fire support to one another, which can allow the enemy to employ flanking and raid actions to infiltrate the battalion’s combat formation….

The analysis of the views of the US and NATO command on the offensive and the experience of conducting a special military operation in Ukraine raises the need to search for new ways of conducting combat actions at the tactical level. The enemy’s use of modern weapons supplied by the united West, especially during shelling of Donetsk, Lugansk and other liberated areas, requires improved methods of action of combined arms formations when defeating the enemy.

The extreme saturation of modern armies with guided anti-tank weapons, air defense and missile defense systems has sharply increased the importance of the positional defense. The combat formation of a battalion tactical group in positional defense is built primarily in one echelon and includes: the first echelon, combined arms reserve, artillery units, air defense units, anti-tank reserve, as well as regular and attached units and fire assets that remain directly subordinate to the commander of the battalion tactical group…

An analysis of the possible distribution of forces and means of a battalion tactical group shows that with a “typical distribution” of forces and means of a battalion, taking into account the fact that before an attack the enemy will inevitably lay indirect and direct fires, shows that most of the fire will fall on strong points of the first echelon companies (on 50–60% of the battalion’s forces). Losses of the battalion tactical group can reach up to 70%.  Consequently, the existing methods of conducting the defense of a battalion tactical group raise questions regarding the capabilities of successfully completing a combat mission.  To increase the effectiveness of the defense of a battalion tactical group, it must conduct “preemptive actions”.

The method is based on active use of offensive actions when conducting defense, going beyond the front line. At the same time, up to 1/3 of combined arms subunits, acting as flanking and raiding detachments, carry out preemptive actions against the enemy, such as defeating artillery, air defense systems, command posts, and disrupting command and control and logistics.The essence of preemptive attack is to defeat enemy targets by flanking and raid groups of combat vehicles operating forward of the front line of defense in order to prevent further enemy offensive actions…

Notes:

[i] “The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 concept proposes a series of solutions to solve the problem of layered standoff. The central idea in solving this problem is the rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter and prevail as we compete short of armed conflict. If deterrence fails, Army formations, operating as part of the Joint Force, penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems; exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy systems, formations and objectives and to achieve our own strategic objectives; and consolidate gains to force a return to competition on terms more favorable to the U.S., our allies and partners.” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations – 2028 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2018), iii. https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf

[ii] For an in-depth analysis of the Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG), see: Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “Getting to Know the Russian Battalion Tactical Group,” Royal United Service Institute, 14 April 2022. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/getting-know-russian-battalion-tactical-group

China Nears Completion of Large Port in Peru With Dual-Use Capabilities

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A worker stands in front of a map depicting the massive Port of Chancay in Peru.

“Cosco Shipping seeks to improve China’s access to minerals from the mountains to the coast, and from there execute shipments through the port of Chancay.”

Weeks after the tenth anniversary of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is on schedule to inaugurate one of its biggest port development projects to date: the $3 billion Port of Chancay, just north of Lima, Peru. In recent years, Chinese-owned and operated deep-water ports around the world have captured the attention of many analysts for their dual-use potential, for both commercial and military purposes.[i] In the past, China has used its owned and operated ports as logistical points and ports of call for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).[ii] Chinese-owned and operated ports also offer the potential for China to track data on trade flows, which could open the door to economic coercion against the host countries as well as other third-party countries.

In response to rising questions about the Port of Chancay project, Peruvian media conglomerate RPP reports the Peruvian government maintains that the port is purely economic in nature and that the local population will be compensated for displacement and any environmental damage to the surrounding areas. The second excerpted article in the Peruvian energy and mining-focused news outlet Energiminas, says that the port will play an important role in helping China to solidify its dominant position in Latin America’s critical minerals supply chains.[iii] Peru also maintains that the port, built by Chinese state-owned enterprise Cosco Shipping, will save an average of 10 to 12 days on goods traveling to Asia from Latin America. Further, the Peruvian government has confirmed its commitment to the project and stated its goal is to leverage its role as host of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in 2024 to officially inaugurate the Port of Chancay. China has dozens of contracts to upgrade, build, and/or operate deep-water ports in the Western Hemisphere, an economic reality with implications for the region’s operational environment. Given China’s past use of deep-water ports for naval port calls, the Western Hemisphere may soon witness an uptick in the PLAN presence.

Sources:

“Puerto de Chancay estaría listo para iniciar funcionamiento a fines de noviembre de 2024 (Port of Chancay would be ready to start operations at the end of November 2024),” RPP (Peruvian radio, television, and print media company located in Lima), 23 October 2023. https://rpp.pe/economia/economia/puerto-de-chancay-estaria-listo-para-iniciar-funcionamiento-a-fines-de-noviembre-del-2024-noticia-1512135?ref=rpp

The port of Chancay would finally be inaugurated in November 2024 with cutting-edge technology…‘we hope to finish the port at the end of November 2024 and inaugurate it on that date taking advantage of the APEC Summit’…‘We have more than 3,000 families registered with a baseline of the conditions of their house and with a commitment letter from Cosco, responsible for solving any environmental damage,’ said an official with the company.

“Puerto de Chancay evalúa mejoras en acceso de inerals de sierra de Oyón a la costa, señala Gobierno Regional de Lima (Port of Chancay evaluates improvements in access of minerals from the Sierra de Oyón to the coast, says Regional Government of Lima),” Energiminas (Peruvian news outlet focused on the country’s energy and mining sectors) 18 October 2023. https://energiminas.com/puerto-de-chancay-evalua-mejoras-en-acceso-de-minerales-de-sierra-de-oyon-a-la-costa-senala-gobierno-regional-de-lima/

The Regional Government of Lima indicated that the operator Cosco Shipping seeks to improve China’s access to minerals from the mountains to the coast, and from there execute shipments through the port of Chancay…For the Peruvian Ministry of Transport and Communications, this megaproject, led by the Chinese company Cosco Shipping, is key for international trade and will be a hub that will redistribute cargo from the countries of Chile, Ecuador and Colombia as well.

Notes:

[i] For a useful dashboard of Chinese-owned and operated ports around the world, see: “Tracking China’s Control of Overseas Ports,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6 November 2023. https://www.cfr.org/tracker/china-overseas-ports

[ii] Researchers tracking Chinese port calls have found that the PLA Navy has called at about one-third of the nearly 100 Chinese owned and operated ports overseas. See: Jennifer Rice and Erik Robb, “The Origins of Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection,” CMSI China Maritime Report, no. 13 (February 2021).

[iii] For more information on China’s role in Latin America’s minerals exploration and production, see: Ryan C. Berg, “China Deepening Cooperation in Latin America’s Sizeable Lithium Sector,” OE Watch, 01-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/434262

Image Information:

Image: A worker stands in front of a map depicting the massive Port of Chancay in Peru.
Source : https ://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File :Puerto_Chancay_2.jpg
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED

Chinese Media Defends PLA Navy in Maritime Dispute With the Philippines

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People’s Liberation Army (Navy) frigate PLA(N) Yueyang (FF 575) [R1] steams in formation with 42 other ships and submarines during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014.

“The Chinese Coast Guard will continue to protect its rights and conduct law enforcement activities in waters under China’s jurisdiction and strongly defend national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”

China has multiple maritime disputes with neighboring countries in the South China Sea, but tensions have risen primarily with the Philippines since September. Chinese media, however, has defended and downplayed China’s actions, while placing blame for the increased tensions on the Philippines and its “external” allies, such as the U.S. For example, on 28 September, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) website, huanqiu.mil, published the excerpted Chinese-language article, which acknowledges rising tensions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. The article notes a Chinese Coast Guard ship intercepted a Philippine Naval ship that, according to the article, illegally entered the area around Scarborough Shoal, which the CCP refers to as Huangyan Island.[i] In addition, according to the article, a Philippine diver removed a “floating barrier” placed by China southeast of the shoal. However, the article did not mention that the barrier’s purpose was to prevent Philippine fishermen from fishing in those waters. The Philippines claims the shoal is within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) while China seeks to access its fishing waters and other natural resources, such as petroleum and gas.

The article claimed the international media reported that regular military exercises the Philippines announced it would hold with the United States, Japan, and other partner navies, were in response to the increased tensions. Yet, the article held the CCP line that rejects any role for countries from outside the South China Sea region in resolving local maritime territorial disputes or defending the claims of adjacent South China Sea countries.[ii] The article further portrayed the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) actions as legal and reasonable and the Philippine Navy’s actions as selfish and based on psychological manipulation or deceit (niēzào shìshí).

Two weeks after the article’s publication, the second excerpted Chinese-language article on the popular social media news website, qq.com suggested that China would only engage in naval conflict with the Philippines if all other options had been exhausted. Further, it claimed any such conflict would only please the United States. Both articles, therefore, portrayed China as defensive and the Philippines or its external allies’ actions as contributing to the rise of tensions. These tensions rose to the fore on 22 October when Chinese and Philippine naval ships clashed.[iii] After the clash, the Chinese media continued to justify the PLAN as being in the right and the Philippines and its backers as the aggressors.

Sources:

“菲律宾宣布将与美日等国举行军演，外媒借机炒作南海紧张局势 (The Philippines announced that with the United States, Japan and other countries it will hold military exercises, foreign media exaggerated tensions in the South China Sea),” Huanqui.Mil.com (Chinese Communist Party online news website presenting pro-government perspectives), 28 September 2023. https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/4EivRbNVa0W

The Philippine navy issued a statement that it would conduct annual military exercises with the United States and other countries south of Luzon in the Philippines. Reports suggested this action came at a time when tensions between the Philippines and China are rising due to disputes in the South China Sea. The Chinese Coast Guard intercepted a Philippine official ship that illegally entered Huangyan Island.

Previously, the Philippine Coast Guard claimed to have dismantled the “floating barrier” placed by China in the southeastern waters of Scarborough Shoal. This action led to a warning from the Chinese government and required the Philippines not to cause provocations and cause trouble.

The Chinese Coast Guard will continue to protect its rights and conduct law enforcement activities in waters under China’s jurisdiction and strongly defend national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. In addition, China has asserted many times previously that the South China Sea is the common homeland for regional countries and should not become a hunting ground for external powers.

“美国盼着菲律宾与中国开战？中菲不会在南海发生冲突原因有四 (Is the United States looking forward to a war between the Philippines and China? There are four reasons why China and the Philippines will not conflict in the South China Sea.)” QQ.com (Chinese social media platform run by the Tencent technology company), 5 October 2023. https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20231005A07M3600

Will the Philippines conflict with China in the South China Sea? I believe that this is a topic that everyone is very concerned about…. My country’s Coast Guard took restrained and rational measures such as warnings and monitoring, but did not take action to remove the illegal beachside vessel from the Philippines that was stationed on Renai Reef. Therefore, China will not easily use force against the Philippines until the last minute.When the time comes, China will definitely seize the opportunity to teach the Philippines a lesson…. However, judging from the actual situation, it seems that we are not ready for a conflict with the Philippines. Therefore, China’s best choice at the moment is to exercise restraint and calm down and avoid conflict with the Philippines.

Notes:

[i] The Philippines asserts claims to Scarborough Shoal as well as around 50 other features in the Spratly Islands, which are known in the Philippines as the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). According to a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) report, the evidence in favor of the Philippine claims compared to the Chinese claims “is hardly a legal ‘slam dunk,’ but the evidence supporting Philippine sovereignty appears stronger. The fact that [Scarborough Shoal] is 400 nautical miles closer to the Philippines than to China and well within the Philippine EEZ weighs in on this determination.” See: Mark E. Rosen, “A CNA Occasional Paper Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis,” August 2014. https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/iop-2014-u-008435.pdf

[ii] For more on China-Philippine tension in the South China Sea, see: Dodge Billingsley, “China and Philippines Spar Over Grounded Ship In Spratly Islands, OE Watch, 08-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/china-and-philippines-spar-over-grounded-ship-in-spratly-islands/

[iii] On 22 October, a Philippines boat sending supplies to forces at the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands was disrupted by a Chinese “blocking maneuver,” which the Chinese Coast Guard claimed was a “slight collision” from a Chinese ship into a Philippine boat that was transporting “illegal construction materials” to a Philippine warship. See: Nikkei Asia, “China and Philippines trade accusations over latest clash at sea,” 22 October 2023,https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-Sea/China-and-Philippines-trade-accusations-over-latest-clash-at-sea. See also ANI News, “Deadly collision caught on cam! China coast guard hits Philippines supply boat in South China Sea,” 24 October 2023. youtube.com/watch?v=EDXzs7To7Xc

Image Information:

Image: People’s Liberation Army (Navy) frigate PLA(N) Yueyang (FF 575) [R1] steams in formation with 42 other ships and submarines during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise 2014.
Source: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Shannon Renfroe https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:People%27s_Liberation_Army_(Navy)_frigate_PLA(N)_Yueyang_(FF_575)_steams_in_formation_with_42_other_ships_and_submarines_during_Rim_of_the_Pacific_(RIMPAC)_Exercise_2014.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0