Tag Archives: Turkey

Turkish Military Operation in Syria Risks Clash with Iran

Posted on by
Turkish Soldiers in Syria.

Turkish Soldiers in Syria.

“Driven apart by clashing regional interests, Turkey and Iran appear headed for a face-off in Syria, with Tehran explicitly opposing Ankara’s plan for a fresh military operation against Kurdish-held areas, wary of risks to its own posture in the region.”

The Turkish Government’s plan to launch a fifth military operation into Syria is back on the table.  The stated goal is to create a 20-mile “safe zone” along Turkey’s border with Syria by targeting areas held by the mostly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).  A Turkish operation into this region and its related repercussions might jeopardize the security of U.S. troops remaining in the region to support and advise the SDF fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  Turkish President Erdoğan announced he intends to start the operation in Tel Rifaat and Manbij and gradually extend to other areas, some of which include Kurdish groups, Iranian-backed militias, Syrian regime forces, and Russian control of the airspace.  The accompanying articles analyze the complexity and risks for Turkey, including that of a face-off with Iran. 

According to the first excerpted article from pro-government Turkish daily Hürriyet, the critical issue for Turkey is access to Syrian airspace, so it will need permission from Russia and the Syrian regime.  Moreover, especially in Manbij, Russia and Syrian regime forces currently control the areas north of the M-4 highway, while Kurdish groups control the area south of the highway.  In any ground operation against Kurdish groups, Turkey would find itself facing Russian and Syrian regime forces first in this area.  Since Turkey is unlikely to risk fighting Russia, it will seek Russian consent first.

The other critical issue is Iranian opposition and the presence of Iran-backed Shia militias in the area.  The second excerpted article from security focused al-Monitor states that Iran will resist Turkey’s operation both militarily and politically, and an operation might lead to a clash between them.  Iran perceives the Turkish military presence in Syria as a threat to its interests and has taken several steps to dissuade Turkey from launching a military operation.  First, Iranian high-level officials publicly warned Turkey not to launch the military operation.  Second, Iran is bolstering its posture by deploying militias to areas with Shiite settlements, including Zahra and Nubl.  Third, Iran and the Syrian regime are mobilizing support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units that Turkey vowed to clear from the area.  Fourth, Iran-backed Shiite militias tried to deploy Grad missiles to Turkey’s potential area of operations, but Russia stopped them for now.  Iran’s increased presence because of a potential Turkish operation may also impact U.S. forces in the region.

Source:

Sedat Ergin, “Tel Rifat ve Münbiç’te Rusya ve İran faktörleri ne? (What are the Russian and Iranian factors in Tel Rifat and Manbij?),” Hürriyet (a pro-government Turkish daily),3 June 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/tel-rifat-ve-munbicte-rusya-ve-iran-faktorleri-ne-olacak-42076420

“We are entering a new phase of our decision to create a 30-kilometer-deep safe zone along our southern borders,” [President Erdoğan] said, adding: “We are clearing Tel Rifat and Manbij from terrorists. Then we will gradually do the same in other regions.”

…if the operation area is to be limited to Tel Rifat and Manbij, we must take into account that Turkey’s primary interlocutor on the ground will be Russia…

But there are other players as well. The importance of Tel Rifaat is that it is a multi-actor geography in which Russia, Iran, the Assad regime, and the YPG/PYD… have military presence…

A very critical issue to consider in a possible operation is that Russia controls Syria’s airspace west of the Euphrates. Its airspace east of the Euphrates is under the control of the USA. If [a Turkish Armed Forces operation] happens, the airspace will have to be kept open so that the radars of the Russian/Syrian air defense systems do not lock onto Turkish warplanes and unmanned aerial vehicles during the operation of the TAF [Turkish Armed Forces]…

Tel Rifaat is also a region where Shiite militia groups, which are directly under the control of Iran, also exist. This means that Turkey should also take into account the Iranian factor in any operation to be carried out in Tel Rifaat.

Source: Fehim Taştekin,“Iran, Turkey brace for face-off in Syria,” al-Monitor (globally read security news site with regionally based reporting), 10 June 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/iran-turkey-brace-face-syria

Driven apart by clashing regional interests, Turkey and Iran appear headed for a face-off in Syria, with Tehran explicitly opposing Ankara’s plan for a fresh military operation against Kurdish-held areas, wary of risks to its own posture in the region.

Turkey has failed to get a green light from the United States to press ahead with the plan, while Russia appears to be stalling. The Iranians, meanwhile, have sent militia reinforcements to two Shiite settlements northwest of Aleppo, not far from a key area in Ankara’s crosshairs, while trying to talk Turkey out from making the move — apparently with little success thus far…

The notion of rivalry has become an understatement in defining Turkish-Iranian ties. The rifts between the two neighbors have deepened amid an array of issues concerning Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, coupled with frictions over the sharing of transboundary waters and a seemingly uncontrolled stream of Afghan refugees to Turkey from Iran…

…the Iranian Foreign Ministry slammed Turkey’s intervention plan, warning that it would only exacerbate tensions and humanitarian suffering in Syria.

…Iranian media outlets have described Turkey’s presence as an “invasion” and referred to the Syrian National Army (SNA), Turkey’s rebel allies, as “Turkish-backed terrorists.” They have accused Turkey of pushing demographic changes to the detriment of the Kurds, expanding the space of “terrorists” under the guise of safe zones, seeking gains to use against Damascus in future talks or laying the ground for annexing Syrian territory.

…“The Syrian regime and its Iranian militias have mobilized and [are] sending reinforcement to the YPG” — a reference to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, which Ankara has vowed to oust from Tel Rifaat.

Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency, meanwhile, reported that Iranian-backed Shiite militia attempted to deploy Grad missiles to the area May 30, but were stopped by Russian forces…

Could Iran go even further now at the risk of a showdown with Turkey? According to the Iranian journalist, Turkey is “well aware” that Iran will defend Zahra and Nubl, even though Iran has avoided directly confronting Turkey in Syria thus far, except for Iranian participation in a 2020 offensive in Idlib that resulted in Damascus recapturing the crucial M5 highway.

Though Ankara has not mentioned Zahra and Nubl as targets, they would fall within Turkey’s range should it take control of Tel Rifaat. The two settlements and Tel Rifaat are seen as a barrier shielding Aleppo…

Today, Kurdish and government control in Tel Rifaat and its environs prevents rebels in Idlib from crossing to the Turkish-controlled Euphrates Shield pocket and accessing Aleppo. The importance of the area feeds suspicions that Ankara’s aims may go beyond weakening the Kurds. 

According to various sources, local groups trained and equipped by Hezbollah, Iranian-sponsored Shiite groups such as Fatemiyoun, Hashemiyoon and Zainabiyoun and the Syrian government’s militia the National Defense Forces are all present in Zahra and Nubl. They are reportedly coordinated by the IRGC, which has a headquarters in the area.

Image Information:

Image: Turkish Soldiers in Syria.
Source: Voice of America, via Wikimedia,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:T%C3%BCrk_Askeri_Suriye%27de.jpg
Attribution: CC-PD-Mark | PD VOA

Turkish-Made Bayraktar TB2 Drones Play Important Role in Ukraine

Posted on by
Bayraktar TB2.

Bayraktar TB2.

“The achievements of the TB2 drones are the first signs of the impact of unmanned systems in naval warfare… drone warfare will be an integral part of naval warfare in the near future.”

Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones are playing a force multiplier role for Ukraine in its war with Russia.  According to several Turkish defense experts, the way Ukrainian forces have used these drones in the current conflict are marking new chapters in the use of drones in naval warfare and possibly in anti-submarine warfare.  While it is too early to tell if TB2s are changing the trajectory of the conflict, they have given Ukrainian forces a significant advantage and have had at least a psychological effect on both sides so far.

Turkey’s TB2 drones came under the spotlight early in the conflict when the Ukrainian military released video footage of them destroying Russian tanks.  More recently, the TB2 emerged as a key tool in the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva, although it is not exactly clear what role it played.  As the first accompanying passage from Nikkei Asia notes, one theory claims that Ukrained used TB2s to distract the Moskva when it launched anti-ship missiles.  Another theory claims Ukraine used TB2s to pinpoint the exact location of the cruiser in the Black Sea, enabling precision strikes against it.

In early May, the Ukrainian Air Force staged a raid on the Russian force occupying Ukraine’s strategic Snake Island.  TB2 drones played an important role by waging a defense-suppression campaign over the island, knocking out at least three air defense systems, two Russian patrol boats, and a landing craft along the shore.  As the second passage by Turkish naval expert Tayfun Özberk notes, the attack on Russian patrol boats and a landing craft marked the first successful neutralization of naval vessels by an uncrewed system.  Özberk claims this is the start of a new era in the use of drones in naval warfare.  During this same raid, the TB2 drones also destroyed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter.  As the final passage from an interview with Turkish defense expert Özgür Ekşi notes, this may also suggest a new chapter in military doctrine.  Ekşi claims that if the Mi-8 helicopter was hovering in the air when it was hit, this would indicate that the TB2 drone can also calculate the height/altitude of targets, adding a third dimension to its usage.  He also claimed this would be a game changer in anti-submarine warfare, since anti-submarine helicopters working to detect and track submarines would be at risk of an attack by a smart munition from a drone while hovering in air.

Sources:

Sinan Tavşan, “Turkish-made drones likely involved in Moskva sinking,” Nikkei Asia, 18 April 2022. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Ukraine-war/Turkish-made-drones-likely-involved-in-Moskva-sinking

“Reports that Turkish TB2 drones were involved in the attack either as a distraction for Moskva or as location spotter of Moskva are both quite possible,” said Can Kasapoglu, director of the security and defense studies program at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), Turkish think tank.

Source: Tayfun Özberk, “Russian Serna-Class LCU Becomes the New Victim of TB2 Drone,” Naval News, 8 May 2022. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/russian-serna-class-lcu-becomes-the-new-victim-of-tb2-drone/

TB2s’ recent attack on the Raptor-class patrol boats on 02 May 2022 marked the first successful neutralization of naval vessels by an uncrewed system. The assault on the Serna class landing craft marks the second one. In both attacks, TB2s used MAM-L smart munitions manufactured by the Turkish Roketsan company.

…

The achievements of the TB2 drones are the first signs of the impact of unmanned systems in naval warfare.  Unmanned systems that provide not only ISR support but also strike operations will provide tactical flexibility to decision-makers on the naval battlefield.  Because such systems can conduct missions without risking human lives, and thanks to their capabilities that are growing daily, drones will become a suitable replacement for manned systems.  As a result, drone warfare will be an integral part of naval warfare in the near future.

Source:  Tolga Özbek chats with Özgür Ekşi, “TB2 Ukrayna’da gemi ve helikopter vurdu, sirada ne var? (TB2 struck ship and helicopter in Ukraine, what next?),” TolgaOzbek.com via YouTube, 9 May 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qo-eKSL0A7A&list=WL&index=39&t=12s

On 8 May, images appeared on the internet of a Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 Drone blowing up a Russian Mi-8 helicopter as troops landed on Snake Island… If this helicopter was in the hovering position, [this means that] a TB2 hit a flying platform, which is a success and a new page in military doctrine…  This means that these drones can also calculate the height of targets.  Until now, we talked about two dimensions, land and water.  But now, it can calculate height/altitude, which means it can also hit a flying target.  This is a new thing for air platforms.

Image Information:

Image: Bayraktar TB2.
Source: Bayhaluk via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bayraktar_TB2_Runway.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Turkey Tightens Grip on Black Sea amid War in Ukraine

Posted on by
TCG Yavuz, the lead ship of Yavuz-class frigate of the Turkish Navy.

TCG Yavuz, the lead ship of Yavuz-class frigate of the Turkish Navy.

“We want the balance [in the Black Sea] not to be disturbed… If the balance is disturbed here, the probability of events getting out of control is very high.” -Hulusi Akar, Turkish Defense Minister

Turkey has seized on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to increase its control of the Black Sea by closing it to foreign warships, stepping up natural gas exploration efforts, and holding naval exercises.  The three accompanying articles from Turkish sources discuss Turkey’s actions regarding the Black Sea in these areas. 

First, Turkey has closed off the Black Sea to Ukrainian and Russian warships by invoking the Montreux Convention of 1936, which gives Turkey the right to prevent warships of warring sides (other than those returning to their bases) from using the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits during war.  Accordingly, after Ukrainian forces in mid-April sunk the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, Russia was unable to sail its two other ships of the same class into the Black Sea to replace it.  As noted in the first excerpted article from pro-government Turkish publication Hürriyet, in addition to blocking Russia and Ukraine from bringing warships into the Black Sea, Turkey has also warned its NATO Allies not to enter the Black Sea during the war in Ukraine to prevent the conflict from expanding.  Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar noted that this would mitigate the possibility of any rivalry and maintain the peaceful status quo in the Black Sea. 

According to the excerpted article from Turkey’s Daily Sabah, as of April 2022, Turkey had dispatched its three drilling ships to the Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea to harness 540 billion cubic meters of natural gas it discovered in 2020.  Russia supplies about 45 percent of Turkey’s natural gas imports, so this effort would reduce Turkey’s reliance on Russian natural gas by about a quarter when it reaches peak production.  Turkey plans to start pumping gas from this field in 2023 and to increase production in the five years after that.  However, this will depend on Turkey first building an offshore pipeline network and processing facilities.  Turkish officials have regarded natural gas discovery in the Black Sea as an important step toward Turkey’s energy independence.

In April, Turkey also showcased its naval power during the “Blue Homeland” exercises  in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas.  The article quotes President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s televised address the last day of exercises saying, “We will continue to work until we become the strongest army in the region with our ships, submarines and weapon systems.”

Sources:

Sedat Ergin, “Savunma Bakanı Akar’dan NATO’ya hassas Karadeniz mesajları: “Karadeniz’in dışında kalınırsa isabet olur” (Sensitive Black Sea messages from Defense Minister Akar to NATO: “It will be better to stay out of the Black Sea”),” Hürriyet (a pro-government Turkish daily),25 Nisan 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/savunma-bakani-akardan-natoya-hassas-karadeniz-mesajlari-karadenizin-disinda-kalinirsa-isabet-olur-42050416

[Defense Minister Hulusi Akar] reveals that Turkey made a series of suggestions to its NATO allies not to enter the Black Sea with warships during the war [in Ukraine]. The Minister does not hide the fact that Turkey’s expectation was conveyed to the NATO allies… and says:

…We want the balance [in the Black Sea] not to be disturbed… If the balance is disturbed here, the probability of events getting out of control is very high. Let’s not turn the Black Sea into a competitive environment.

Source: “Turkey to extend incentives for $10B Black Sea gas field development),” Daily Sabah (a pro-government Turkish daily), 20 April 2022. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/turkey-to-extend-incentives-for-10b-black-sea-gas-field-development  

Turkey will be extending government support for the massive project to develop the natural gas field it discovered in the Black Sea…

Turkey is building an industrial complex that will process the gas the country discovered in the Sakarya gas field, located some 150 kilometers (93 miles) off the coast of Turkey in the Black Sea. The facility is expected to be operational in the first quarter of 2023.

The country’s first drilling vessel, Fatih, has discovered 540 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in the Sakarya gas field since August 2020.

Turkey is fully dependent on gas imports, mainly from Russia, but the Sakarya field is expected to reduce those imports by about a quarter once it reaches peak production.

Ankara plans to begin pumping gas from the southwest Black Sea field in 2023 but must first build an offshore pipeline network and processing facilities.

…Expansion of the project over the next 10 years is expected to eventually lift annual production capacity to 14 bcm.

…The gas extracted from the gas field will be brought onshore through a pipeline that will be laid beneath the Black Sea.

…Scheduled to be constructed this year, the 170-kilometer pipeline will connect the wells in the region to the main grid.

The first phase of construction of the Western Black Sea Natural Gas Pipeline section will be carried out in two stages…

Source: “Mavi Vatan 2022 tatbikatı tamamlandı (Blue Homeland 2022 exercises completed),” NTV (a pro-government Turkish news channel),21 April 2022. https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/mavi-vatan-2022-tatbikati-tamamlandi,9-YP3y3e4EWPSlU1jcnlng

…Participating in the Blue Homeland exercises through a live broadcast, President Erdoğan said: “We will continue to work until we become the strongest army in the region with our ships, submarines and weapon systems.”

Blue Homeland exercises… in coordination with the personnel in the Black Sea, Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, concluded successfully. Airplanes, ships and our personnel have shown that they are always ready for the exercise.

It is imperative for Turkey to have a strong naval force. We attach special importance to developing our naval forces in terms of equipment and personnel and to make the highest contribution to the defense of the homeland.

We will continue to work until we become the strongest army in the region with our ships, submarines and weapon systems.

Image Information:

Image: TCG Yavuz, the lead ship of Yavuz-class frigate of the Turkish Navy.
Source: Nevit Dilmen, Own Work, via Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Istanbul_1000146_Nevit.jpg
Attribution: CC-BY-SA-3.0 | GFDL | Self-published work

Turkey Central To Reducing Europe’s Dependence on Russian Natural Gas

Posted on by
Map of the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (the central part of the Southern Gas Corridor, which connects the giant Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe through the South Caucasus Pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.

Map of the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (the central part of the Southern Gas Corridor, which connects the giant Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe through the South Caucasus Pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.

The two excerpted articles suggest that Europe could reduce or eliminate its dependence on Russian natural gas by using possible alternatives from the Middle East via Turkey.  The first article from Turkey’s state-owned news agency, Anadolu Ajansı, looks at a potential Turkey-Israeli natural gas pipeline that would pump Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves to Europe.  Israeli President Isaac Herzog revived this idea during his visit to Ankara in early March 2022.  Accordingly, the article states that the issue was on both Turkey’s and Israel’s agenda.  Turkish President Erdoğan reportedly signaled that the sides would continue to work to determine concrete steps on proposed routes.

The excerpted article from security news site al-Monitor explores the option of Europe importing natural gas from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq via Turkey.  It warns that this will likely increase the rivalry between Turkey and Iran, as Iran would perceive it as a threat to its energy market.  On 13 March, Iranian missiles struck Erbil and one target was the villa of a Kurdish businessman involved in the Kurdish region’s energy sector.  The article notes that a key trigger for the strikes was a plan to pump Kurdish natural gas into Turkey and Europe with the help of Israel.  The article refers to several statements made by both Kurdish and Turkish officials indicating such plans.  For example, President of the Kurdistan Region Masrour Barzani said on 28 March that the region would “become a net exporter of gas to the rest of Iraq, Turkey, and Europe in the near future and help meet their energy security needs.”  President Erdoğan also stated that Turkey was gearing up for new energy projects.

Source:

Haydar Oruç, “Türkiye-İsrail normalleşmesinin enerji boyutu (Energy Dimension of Turkey-Israel Normalization),” Anadolu Ajansı (Turkey’s state-owned news agency), 11 March 2021.https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/turkiye-israil-normallesmesinin-enerji-boyutu/2531776

Undoubtedly, the issue that comes to the fore at first glance is energy cooperation…

…after the Russian invasion of Ukraine the issues experienced in energy supply, Europe feels the need to reduce its dependence on Russian energy supply. And this reality puts Eastern Mediterranean gas one step ahead of other alternatives.

When the [EastMed Pipeline] project is implemented, first of all, Turkey’s energy supply will be diversified… Iran, which has supplied most of Turkey’s energy needs previously, being subjected to international sanctions complicates the sustainability of the gas its gas supplies… In addition, Iran’s desire to use gas as a political tool from time to time also harms relations.

Similarly, recent international sanctions on Russia makes its [energy] source unsustainable. Therefore, the emergence of Eastern Mediterranean gas as an alternative source is extremely important in terms of energy security. This will increase the importance and value of Turkey in the energy market.

…if Turkey and Israel reach an agreement for the delivery of Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe via Turkey, energy supplies will be diversified, energy routes will be secured…

Source: “Erdoğan: Turkey-Israel Gas pipeline on the agenda,” Yetkin Report (blog of veteran Turkish Journalist Murat Yetkin),31 March 2022. https://yetkinreport.com/en/2022/03/31/erdogan-turkey-israel-gas-pipeline-on-the-agenda/ 

Is Turkey-Israel gas pipeline project on the agenda as an alternative to Russian streams? Erdoğan answered Turkish journalist’s questions on March 33… stating that a gas pipeline crossing through Turkey is on the agenda.

“We discussed many issues in detail with Mr. Herzog, especially the energy issue. In the past, there were some relations, contacts between Israel and Turkey regarding energy… Laying pipes under the sea from Israel to Greece, to Europe, is not a feasible thing to do. As a result of the cost calculations, it is seen that the most suitable way for this is [the passage] of this natural gas [pipeline] through Turkey. Of course, they are already making assessment on the issue…”

Erdoğan added that he proposed a bilateral meeting between Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and Energy and Natural Resources to discuss the energy issue in detail, and said that Israeli President’s response was positive on this proposal…

“…the cooperation between Israel and Turkey here will accelerate the process related to Eastern Mediterranean oil and natural gas. I am very hopeful about this,” [Erdoğan] said.

Source: Fehim Taştekin,“Ukraine war shakes up Turkey’s ties with both Russia and NATO,” al-Monitor (globally read security news site with regionally based reporting),08 April 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/will-renewed-interest-iraqi-kurdish-gas-fuel-turkey-iran-rivalry

Potential projects to carry Iraqi Kurdistan natural gas to Europe via Turkey, in order to reduce dependency on Russia, might also increase rivalry between Turkey and Iran.

…a potential plan to carry Iraqi Kurdish gas through Turkey with the help of Israel was one reason for Iran’s missile attack on Erbil on March 13.  

…Under an energy cooperation deal between Ankara and Iraqi Kurdistan in 2013, Turkey has already finished the pipeline linking its border with northern Iraq to a conduit which carries Azeri gas to Europe.

…

Erbil has amped up its efforts to boost its energy ties with regional actors amid escalating tensions between Russia and the Western capitals over Ukraine. Iraqi Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani met with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara on Feb. 2. Ali Hama Salih, the head of the energy commission in Kurdistan’s parliament, said Feb. 9 that the gas link to Turkey would become operational in 2025. …Most recently, [KRG Prime Minister] Masrour Barzani announced Mar 28 that Iraqi Kurdistan would “become a net exporter of gas to the rest of Iraq, Turkey and Europe in the near future and help meet their energy security needs…”

While echoing previous assertions that Israel has no involvement in the plans, Barzani also admitted that Iraqi Kurdistan’s expanding energy ties were not in line with Iranian interests…

In a similar vein, Erdogan said Turkey was gearing up for new energy projects. On his way back from Brussels, where he met with various NATO leaders, he told reporters, “God willing, through our meetings new avenues will be opened for Turkey in the energy field.” That hints at possible markets for Iraqi Kurdish and Eastern Mediterranean gas following normalization of ties with Israel. 

…But Ankara still has to find a middle ground between Erbil and Baghdad to advance its gas and oil cooperation with Iraqi Kurdistan.

Image Information:

Image: Map of the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (the central part of the Southern Gas Corridor, which connects the giant Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe through the South Caucasus Pipeline and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.
Source: Golden, Own Work, via Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trans-Anatolian_gas_pipeline.png,
Attribution: CC-BY-SA-4.0 | Self-published work | Maps by Golden

Turkey Tries To Mitigate Economic Impact of Sanctions on Russia

Posted on by
Erdoğan and Putin at the Kremlin, 23 September 2015.

Erdoğan and Putin at the Kremlin, 23 September 2015.

“Us three countries, Russia, China and Turkey can trade among ourselves with our national currencies; with the ruble, yuan, the Turkish lira and gold.”                                                                                                                                                -Turkish President Erdoğan

The sanctions on Russia will cost the Turkish economy at least $30-35 billion, according to Turkish economists quoted in the pro-government newspaper Yenicag.com.  There will be a significant hit to Turkey’s tourism industry, an increase in energy prices and agricultural products, as well as further decline in the Turkish lira.  In an effort to mitigate this impact, Turkey appears to be trying to position itself as a safe haven from Russian sanctions.

As the accompanying passage from pro-government newspaper Hürriyet reports, in early March, Turkish President Erdoğan suggested to Putin, “Us three countries, Russia, China and Turkey can trade among ourselves with our national currencies; with the ruble, yuan, the Turkish lira and gold.”  Pro-government outlets interpreted Erdoğan’s offer as a “historic hand [being extended] to Russia, whose ties with the international system are being cut and who is being isolated.”  Others criticized this as ridiculous, claiming that the world would not accept Turkey’s effort to turn the Russian sanctions into an advantage while it endures the costs.  Regardless of the reactions to the idea, business leaders said Turkey should actively work to develop a mechanism to facilitate trade with Russia in rubles, as the passage from pro-government Daily Sabah reports. 

Economically, Russia is an important trading partner to Turkey, with over 3000 Turkish companies operating in Russia and a trading volume of over $32.5 billion annually.  Russia provides 34% of Turkey’s natural gas, is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, and sends the greatest number of tourists to Turkey.  Russia and its banks’ exclusion from the international payment system will create challenges in Russia making its payments to Turkish contractors in Russia and to Turkish travel agents that organize tours for Russian tourists to visit Turkey. 

Politically, Turkey is a neighboring country to both Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea and has good relations with both, including a developing partnership with Ukraine, whereby Turkey sells it armed drones.  As such, Turkey has been trying to play a balancing act between Ukraine and Russia regarding Russia’s invasion.  On the one hand, Turkey acted with its NATO allies and strongly condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine, openly calls Russia’s invasion a “war,” and voted to condemn Russia in the United Nations.  President Erdoğan said that Turkey would continue to sell armed drones to Ukraine.  On the other hand, Turkey abstained from a vote to suspend Russia’s membership rights within the European Council, and announced it was not planning to impose sanctions on Russia.

Source:

“Atilla Yeşilada Türk ekonomisine düşen bombayı duyurdu (Atilla Yeşilada explains the bomb that is about to explode on the Turkish economy),” Yenicag.com.tr (pro-government newspaper), 25 February 2022. https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/atilla-yesilada-rusyaukrayna-savasi-sonrasi-turk-ekonomisine-dusen-bombayi-acikladi-514360h.htm         

Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association Chief Economist Gizem Öztok Altınsaç says that the geopolitical tension can have an initial cost to Turkey of about $30-35 billion.

Source: Abdülkadir Selvi, “Erdoğan, Putin’e ne önerdi? (What did Erdoğan suggest to Putin?),” Hurriyet.com (pro-government newspaper), 8 March 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/abdulkadir-selvi/erdogan-putine-ne-onerdi-42017962

At the AK Party Central Executive Council, President Erdoğan made important statements about the meeting he had with Putin.  He said he suggested to Putin, that “Us three countries, Russia, China and Turkey can trade among ourselves with our national currencies; with the ruble, yuan, the Turkish lira and gold.” 

…With this suggestion, Erdoğan is extending a historic hand to Russia, whose ties with the international system are being cut and who is being isolated. At the same time, he is taking steps to turn the crisis into an opportunity for Turkey.  Would Russia, who is being isolated in the world, consider the Turkey and China option?  Why not? 

Source: “Uslu: İnsanlar ayçiçek yağı ile güçlü lider arasında tercih yapabilir (Uslu: People can decide between sunflower oil and a strong leader),” Karar.com.tr (independent Turkish newspaper), 8 March 2022. https://www.karar.com/karar-tv/bikarar-ver-bugun-karar-tvde-12-1655020

Political communications expert İbrahim Uslu [said about Erdoğan’s offer to Putin]: “This is unbelievable, even if you convince Putin, once the world feels that you are intensely piercing their sanctions, they will sanction us…  As the world imposes sanctions and endures significant economic costs, they will not look favorably upon Turkey’s attempt to turn this into an opportunity, attempt to feed the entire Russian market by itself and comfortably make money from this.  Such suggestions can seem appealing trade-wise, but they should be reconsidered in light of political international relations and the alliances that Turkey belongs to.” 

Source: “Turkish businesses expect progress on using rubles in trade with Russia,” Daily Sabah (pro-government newspaper), 11 March 2022. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkish-businesses-expect-progress-on-using-rubles-in-trade-with-russia

Since the currency dispute with shipping companies is causing problems in the delivery of goods passing through customs, Turkey should actively work to develop a mechanism to facilitate trade with Russia in rubles, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) head Şekib Avdagiç said Friday.

Avdagiç stated that the companies working with Russia see the withdrawal of Western countries from Moscow as a new opportunity and emphasized that it is important to enable the use of the national currency of Russia.

Image Information:

Image: Erdoğan and Putin at the Kremlin, 23 September 2015.
Source: Kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Erdo%C4%9Fan_and_Putin.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

U.S. CAATSA Sanctions Hurt Turkey’s Defense Agreements with Third Parties

Posted on by
Turkey’s T-129 ATAK Helicopter.

Turkey’s T-129 ATAK Helicopter.

“The US’s military embargo against Turkey has resulted in the loss of an important contract.  Pakistan decided against the ATAK helicopters it was waiting to buy from TUSAŞ [Turkish Aerospace Industries]…”

In April 2021, the U.S. government started imposing the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) on Turkey because of Turkey’s purchase of S-400 missile systems from Russia, making Turkey the first NATO member to be subject to these sanctions.  The accompanying article from the pro-government Trhaber.com examines the first example of a Turkish defense contract with a third country, in this case Pakistan, falling through due to the CAATSA sanctions.  The excerpt reports that Pakistan has cancelled a $1.5 billion contract to buy 30 of the type T-129 ATAK combat helicopters from Turkish Aerospace Industries.  As the passage reports, American Honeywell made the helicopters’ turboshaft engine, so permission was needed from the United States for an export license, which could not be granted becaue of the CAATSA sanctions.  The passage also notes Pakistan has now turned to China to buy their Z-10ME combat helicopters.

In addition to the defense deals with third parties falling through, like this example with Pakistan, the CAATSA sanctions also have other, less quantifiable negative impacts on the Turkish defense industry.  As the second excerpt from an interview with a Turkish defense expert featured on Medyaskopetv.com via YouTube points out, the Turkish defense industry has effectively become “contaminated” or “blacklisted.”  He predicts that any Western country, or any “non-Western country wanting to have good relations with the U.S.” will have major reservations about doing business with the Turkish defense industry.  He notes this is not a technical issue, but a diplomatic one.

Source:

“ABD taş koydu, Pakistan ATAK helikopterinden vazgeçti! 1,5 milyar dolarlık anlaşma iptal (The USA prevented it, Pakistan [changed its mind] on the ATAK helicopter! The $1.5-billion-dollar deal is cancelled),” Trhaber.com (Turkish pro-government news site), 5 January 2022. https://www.trhaber.com/savunma/abd-tas-koydu-pakistan-atak-helikopterinden-vazgecti-15-milyar-dolarlik-h27804.html

The US’s military embargo against Turkey has resulted in the loss of an important contract.  Pakistan decided against the ATAK helicopters it was waiting to buy from TUSAŞ [Turkish Aerospace Industries] for three years.  The 1.5 billion dollar contract, which was the biggest export deal [in a single contract] for the Turkish defense industry, foresaw the sale of 30 combat helicopters to Pakistan. 

But the T129 ATAK helicopters’ LHTEC CTW800-4A turboshaft engine is made by the American company Honeywell, so permission was needed from the US for an export license.  Despite Ankara’s communication efforts, no official response was received from Washington.  The attitude of the White House and Congress resulted in Turkey losing this 1.5 billion dollar contract. 

The T-129 ATAK helicopters had been tested by the Pakistani Army multiple times in difficult terrains, and had successfully proven that it was the most effective combat helicopter in its class.  The ATAK helicopter had garnered great admiration from Pakistani pilots, but are unable to reach [those pilots] due to the U.S. preventing the process. 

…The sad development for the Turkish defense industry, was announced by Pakistani military spokesperson Babar Iftikar in a press briefing.  Iftikhar said, in response to a question, that they have decided against the T-129 ATAK purchase from Turkey due to the delays, and have instead started talks with China to buy their Z-10ME combat helicopter.  The U.S.’s blockage of Turkey enabled China to export more products.

Source: Işın Eliçin with Mevlütoğlu, “Trump yönetiminden Ankara’ya S-400 yaptırımları – Konuk: Arda Mevlütoğlu (S-400 sanctions to Ankara by the Trump Administration – Guest: Arda Mevlütoğlu),” Medyaskopetv.com via YouTube (reputable, independent Turkish media platform), 15 December 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPzR50sc6Fs

In a way, the Turkish Defense Industry Directorate (SSB) has been contaminated / blacklisted.  In this case, other Western countries or companies, or any non-Western country that has or wants to have good relations with the U.S. and their institutions, may have reservations regarding doing business with Turkeys Defense Industry Directorate… This is not a directly technical issue, it’s more of a diplomatic issue.

Image Information:

Image: Turkey’s T-129 ATAK Helicopter.
Source: wiltshirespostter, via Wikimedia Common
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BG12-1001  (14662033896).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

The Future of Turkish-Russian Relations

Posted on by

Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

“…as long as Turkey keeps its relations with the West strong, it will find a more comfortable space for itself against Russia.”

Turkey’s recent purchase of S-400 systems from Russia has led to questions about Turkey’s “western-ness” and trustworthiness as a NATO ally.  Traditionally a pro-Western country, Turkey’s increasing shift towards Russia despite their complex relationship is one of the biggest geopolitical shifts since the Cold War.  As such, the evolution of Turkish-Russian relations will have implications for the United States, NATO, and great power competition.  The accompanying articles from Turkish sources provide an outlook on Turkish-Russian relations, discussing both issues of contention and cooperation.

The articles, one from pro-government Turkish newspaper Hürriyet and another from the Istanbul-based independent think tank Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), note that the points of friction between Turkey and Russia are the implementation of the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh; developments in Libya; tensions in Syria’s Idlib Province; and changes in eastern Ukraine.  The Syrian conflict has the potential to impact Turkish-Russian relations the most because, as the Hürriyet article highlights, Russia continues to strike Turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces around Idlib and Turkey’s areas of operation.  The tensions between Russia and Turkey will likely increase once the Russia-backed Syrian regime launches an operation on Idlib.  Both articles note the Ukrainian conflict will be another high-level point of friction between Turkey and Russia because of Turkey’s drone sale to Ukraine.  However, according to the EDAM publication, despite these frictions, Turkey and Russia cooperate in the energy sector, including Russia supplying natural gas to, and building a nuclear power plant in, Turkey.  Russia also maintains strong trade relations with Turkey, investing in its tourism and defense industry.  The Hürriyet article also refers to President Erdoğan’s statement from September 2021 that Turkey will deepen its defense cooperation with Russia and is considering purchasing other weapons systems in addition to the recently purchased S-400s.

The EDAM article states that the foundation of Turkish-Russian relations is built on a personal dialogue between their presidents rather than on an institutional foundation, and Presidents Erdoğan and Putin have managed to de-escalate tensions so far when they rise.  However, considering the points of friction, Turkish-Russian relations remain fragile.  Finally, the Hürriyet article notes Turkish-Russian relations are asymmetrical and the scale will further tilt in Russia’s favor if Turkey continues to drift away from its Western allies.  Therefore, the article suggests that Turkey should ensure its relations with its Western allies remain strong to counterbalance Russia.

Source:

Sedat Ergin,“2021’den 2022’ye Türk Dış Politikası (5)-Rusya ile çatışarak işbirliği modeli ilerlemeye devam ediyor (Turkish Foreign Policy from 2021 to 2022 (5)- Adversarial Cooperation model with Russia continues),” Hürriyet (a pro-government Turkish newspaper),04 January 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/2021den-2022ye-turk-dis-politikasi-5-rusya-ile-catisarak-isbirligi-modeli-ilerlemeye-devam-ediyor-41974354

The Russians see no harm in continuing their air operations in a region where TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] units are present. We can guess that with these attacks, Russia wants to maintain a certain pressure on Turkey, which prevented the regime’s army from entering Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in Syria…

The previous day also witnessed the first telephone conversation of the New Year between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Brief statements with largely similar content were made from both sides. In the Kremlin’s statement, there was an indirect reference to the Ukraine-linked NATO-Russia tension. Apart from this, it was stated that the topics of the Caucasus, Libya, and Syria were on the agenda in both of statements. Intention and determination to further the cooperation between the two countries were also emphasized as an important common theme in the texts.

…

Meanwhile, the importance of 2021 was that it was a year…[of] cooperation in Turkish-Russian relations that would extend to the coming years… President Erdoğan went to Sochi at the end of September and during the meeting he held with Putin, he proposed to his counterpart the construction of two new nuclear power plants in Turkey, in addition to Akkuyu… Putin also offered to cooperate with Turkey on launching rockets into space by establishing platforms at sea and on land.

A more critical development was that Erdoğan also suggested to Putin “deepening cooperation” in the defense industry during this meeting. In this context, the President announced that they discussed the further development of the S-400 project, and listed aircraft engines, warplanes, warship, and submarine construction as new potential areas of cooperation.

In this respect, Erdoğan is also trying to intimidate the USA and European countries by stating that the weapon systems that Turkey cannot obtain or have difficulty in obtaining from the West can very well be obtained from Russia. Although the second chapter of the S-400 project has not been signed, it remains on the table…

President Erdoğan keeps cooperation with Russia as a bargaining card in his hand against the West…

… Erdoğan followed a delicate balance between the USA and Russia throughout 2021… In any case, the continuation of cracks, conflicts, and tensions within the Western alliance, as well as the realization of new potential arms sales to Turkey, will be developments that will please the Kremlin.

This asymmetry will be widened further [in Russia’s favor] as Turkey’s relations with the West deteriorate… It should not be forgotten that as long as Turkey keeps its relations with the West strong, it will find itself in a more comfortable space against Russia. The decline in Turkey’s foreign relations with the west will also weaken Turkey’s hand against Russia.

Source: Doç. Dr. Çiğdem Üstün,“2022’de Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri: İşbirliği-Rekabet İkileminin Devamı Beklenirken… (Turkey-Russia Relations in 2022: Expecting the Continuation of Cooperation-Competition Dilemma…),” Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) (Istanbul-based an independent think tank), 13 January 2022. https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022ye-Bakis.pdf

Although relations with Russia have been handled on the axis of cooperation, especially in the energy and defense sectors in recent years, it is not a relationship model free from crises and problems… Because Turkey’s relations with Russia are based on bilateral relations between leaders rather than on institutional foundations, it has a relationship model that is difficult to be called sustainable…

​​The ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh, the possible developments in Libya, the tensions in and around Idlib, Ukraine and Belarus are noticeable issues that have the potential to affect relations.

…

Of course, it should not be ignored that as much as their problems [need a resolution], there are areas where Turkey and Russia are trying to develop cooperation. After the Blue Stream, the Turkish Stream project is a step taken to strengthen the energy ties between Russia and Turkey. Energy takes first place in Turkey’s imports from Russia.

…

Considering the problems experienced in its relations with the West, both the EU and the USA, it is expected that Turkey’s relations with Russia will continue to be economically important. However, every step taken towards Russia has risks to further wear down Turkey’s relations with its Western allies… the issues that occupied the agenda in 2021 also occupy the agenda in 2022, and that it is more important to benefit economically and geopolitically for Russia in the framework of possible tensions, than to provide a permanent peace environment in the region…

Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Source: Russian Presidential Executive Office, kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62936, via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_and_Recep_Tayyip_Erdogan_(2020-03-05)_04.jpg, Files from Kremlin.ru | CC-BY-4.0 | Russia photographs taken on 2020-03-05

A Turkish Perspective on Great Power Competition in 2022 and Beyond

Posted on by
Map showing the US, Russia, China.

Map showing the US, Russia, China.

“In the new international environment… the existing separation between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes will become more acute over time… In such an environment, stopping the regression of democracy, which has also been felt in Western countries in recent years, and eliminating the deficiencies [of Western democracies] is becoming paramount.” 

The accompanying passages from the Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research, a reputable and independent Turkish think tank, provide a foreign and balanced perspective on how great power competition may evolve in 2022 and beyond.  The passages also include astute observations about the current strategic competition among what they call “the prominent players”—the United States, Russia, and China.

First, the authors note that each of these actors is trying to expand its partnership network.  For the United States, this includes the G7, NATO, the U.S.-EU Summits, the Democracy Summit, and the security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the United States (AUKUS).  They note that the United States and its partnerships revolve around common values based on democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law.  In contrast, they note China is focused on expanding its partnership network by providing economic opportunities to certain countries, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative.  Meanwhile Russia is trying to “transform the rules-based international order into an order where its desired behavior [is achieved], especially in areas where it sees the rules-based international order as a “red line” for itself.”  The Ukraine crisis is a case in point.  Second, they note the world is becoming polarized between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes.  In this context, they warn that democracy is regressing in some Western democracies and claim it is critical to reverse this trend. 

Third, they note that the United States is trying to protect its technological superiority over the others.  On this point, they suggest that even though China is investing more and allocating more resources to gain superiority, “the return on this investment…will not turn the current balance in its favor in the short run.”  They write that each player is investing in groundbreaking technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, autonomous capabilities, space, cloud technologies, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum, and biotechnology to achieve technological superiority and become more resilient, especially in their supply chains.  They note that the use of these technologies and the hybrid warfare they enable is eroding the distinction between peacetime and conflict. 

Finally, they claim that the deciding factor for the future of the international system will be whether, or to what extent, competing countries can cooperate on global challenges such as climate change or pandemics; as well as on contentious issues that are zero-sum games.

Source:

Sinan Ülgen and Tacan Ildem, “2022’ye Bakış (A Look at 2022),” EDAM.org.tr [Turkish] Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Research (a reputable, independent Turkish think tank based in Istanbul), January 2022. https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022ye-Bakis.pdf

…Today’s international environment is witnessing a systemic and strategic competition. The USA, China and to some extent Russia are the prominent players in this strategic competition. …Each of these players is trying to expand their partnerships to gain superiority over the other. For the USA, this means keeping its partnership network (such as the G7, NATO, USA-EU Summits, Democracy Summit and finally AUKUS) strong, which brings together the countries that share common values based on democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law. For China, this means developing its partnership network by providing economic opportunities, especially [via] the Belt and Road Initiative.  Russia… is trying to transform the rules-based international order into an order where its desired behavior [is achieved], especially in areas where it sees the rules-based international order as a “red line” for itself… The Ukraine crisis should be read in this context.

…

In the new international environment where strategic competition is felt more… the existing separation between democratic countries and countries governed by authoritarian regimes will become more acute over time.  Global polarization is taking place between groups of democratic countries and authoritarian systems.  In such an environment, stopping the regression of democracy, which has also been felt in Western countries in recent years, and eliminating the deficiencies [of Western democracies] is becoming paramount. 

Meanwhile… emerging and groundbreaking technologies create game-changing challenges and opportunities in an increasingly complex security environment where strategic competition is increasing.  In fact, we are witnessing that the USA, together with its allies and global partners, focusing more on protecting its technological superiority against its rivals.  Although China invests more and allocates more resources to gain superiority in technology against its competitors, the return on this investment, at least for the moment, is not in a size that will turn the current balance in its favor in the short run.  … Competing countries are trying to gain technological superiority and strengthen their resistance and resilience capacities, especially in the supply chain… In this context, access to emerging and groundbreaking technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, autonomous capabilities, space, cloud technologies, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum, and bio technologies is a priority.

By making use of these technologies… hybrid warfare methods are increasingly being used to achieve strategic goals without the need to resort to conventional power by using tactics in military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, information and other fields… This makes the distinction between peacetime and conflict, where the use of kinetic force used to be decisive, less clear. Increasing social resilience and resilience against hybrid activities is gaining importance. Cyber ​​attacks and disinformation campaigns are a threat and test for every society. As such, the protection of critical infrastructure emerges as a vital issue.

What will be decisive for the future of the international system is to what extent competing countries can develop cooperation in other fields, as well as the contentious areas that are seen as a zero-sum game in this strategic competitive environment. For example, will the USA and China, which seem to be facing an increasingly fierce competition in technology, be able to set common goals in the fight against climate change? Likewise, will it be possible to include China in the negotiation of international agreements … in the field of arms control and disarmament? …

Image Information:

Image: Map showing the US, Russia, China.
Source: Keith via Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Second_Cold_War_locator.png
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

A Turkish Perspective on the Geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Posted on by

“The U.S. focus on prioritizing the Far East– particularly the defense pact between the U.S.-U.K.-Australia (AUKUS) coupled with the trauma created by the withdrawal from Afghanistan– have rattled the Euro-Atlantic security community.  The Russia-Ukraine crisis erupted right in the aftermath of these developments…”

“We are looking at a long-term challenge and diplomatically exhausting marathon in the region and beyond.” 

While critical reporting of the conflict in Ukraine is updated hourly, the accompanying passage from independent Turkish-language news and analysis site Perspektif takes a step back and puts the crisis into the greater context of global geopolitics and great power competition, including analysis of the possible long-term repercussions of the crisis.

The authors highlight the timing of the crisis, which is significant in two ways.  First, the crisis erupted in the immediate aftermath of several developments that they claim had already “rattled” the Euro-Atlantic security community.  In particular, the “defense pact between the U.S.-U.K.-Australia (AUKUS),” which they note reflects the “U.S.’s focus on prioritizing the Far East in recent years”; and “the trauma created by the withdrawal from Afghanistan.”  They suggest the crisis erupted at a time when Euro-Atlantic relations were not at their peak.  Timing is also important because the crisis is taking place when both the European Union (EU) and NATO are forming their future strategies.  As the authors point out, the EU is in the process of finalizing its five-year Strategic Compass document, while NATO is preparing to ratify its new Strategic Concept for the next 10 years at the 2022 Madrid Summit.  The authors note that the crisis will “leave deep marks” in these documents, which will inform these two organizations’ future strategies. 

The authors also point out that NATO will likely come to the aid of Ukraine, even militarily; while also warning that Ukraine contains certain unique “sensitivities” and should not be the stage for the next proxy war among great powers.  Here they are likely alluding to the fact that Russia views eastern Ukraine as an extension of itself, making this an  existential issue for Russia unlike the southern Caucasus or Syria.  Finally, they point out that European countries have so far shown solidarity against Russia; however, they have differing levels of threat perceptions from Russia.  In particular, “the Germany-France-Italy-Spain quad” does not perceive Russia as high a threat compared to East/Southeast Europe and the Baltic countries, which does not bode well for a long-term European unified front against Russia.

Source:

Mithat Çelikpala and Fatih Ceylan, “Dinyeper’de Kabaran Sular Ukrayna ve Rusya’yı Nereye Sürükler? (Where will the Rising Waters in the Dnieper [River] Lead Ukraine and Russia?),” Perspektif Online (independent Turkish-language news and analysis site), 10 December 2021. https://www.perspektif.online/dinyeperde-kabaran-sular-ukrayna-ve-rusyayi-nereye-surukler/

The Ukraine crisis, re-ignited as of November 2021, is taking place within the big picture in ways that can be summarized below:

1. In light of the U.S.’s recently adopted global strategy; the U.S. is in an open wrist fight with China in the Far East.  Throughout 2021, the U.S. did not refrain from maintaining a military presence in the Taiwan Strait and the South/East China Seas to deter China; even though Biden had expressed that they do not intend to start a “Cold War” with China.  The contention between the U.S.-China is among the top challenges on the international agenda.

2. The competition between these two countries is starting to expand into a greater geographic area, from the Middle East to the Mediterranean, from the Balkans to East/Southeast Europe, to include the greater Black Sea basin, within the framework of China’s BRI project.

3. Due to the Ukraine crisis, relations between the U.S./West/NATO and Russia have entered a period of spiraling tension.  The situation has triggered an increased U.S. military build-up in the region and created circumstances that directly impact Black Sea security.  Tension in the region will ebb and flow until a sustainable middle ground (modus vivendi) regarding Ukraine can be achieved within the strategic contention between great powers.

4. The U.S. focus on prioritizing the Far East– particularly the defense pact between the U.S.-U.K.-Australia (AUKUS) coupled with the trauma created by the withdrawal from Afghanistan– have rattled the Euro-Atlantic security community.  The Russia-Ukraine crisis erupted right in the aftermath of these developments and resulted in both sides pulling their swords while also trying to establish dialogue.

5. Ukraine is not a member of NATO; it is a partner.  Therefore, when Ukraine is attacked, NATO’s article 5 does not apply.  On the other hand, it can be predicted that, in such a scenario, NATO and its members will provide all kinds of support, including military support, to Ukraine.  However, it should be remembered that Ukraine has sensitivities that make it impossible for it to be the stage of a proxy war.

6. In the face of the Ukraine crisis, European countries have so far shown solidarity; but this does not mean that there is total agreement among them regarding the threat they perceive from Russia.  In this context, for example, the Germany-France-Italy-Spain quad’s threat perception from Russia is different than that of East/Southeast Europe-Baltic countries.  This is the main obstacle to [European countries] having a united stance.

7. The Ukraine crisis, which has been ignited in two separate time periods within the year, has erupted at a critical time.  The European Union is at the late stages of preparing its five-year Strategic Compass document.  NATO’s Strategic Concept for the next 10 years will be accepted at the 2022 Madrid Summit.  If the crisis with Russia deepens at a time when these two important documents are being prepared, there is no doubt that its repercussions will leave deep marks in their future strategies. 

8.  In reality, Russia has lost Western Ukraine, but directly/indirectly gained control of the Crimea peninsula and the Donbass region. It will continue its efforts to legitimize the control it has established in these regions.  It would be realistic to say the problems related to each of these areas are “frozen” and call them “hot disputes” which are difficult to solve; and to establish positions based on this view.  However, this does not mean the recognition of illegitimate/illegal Russian domination in these areas.  We are looking at a long-term challenge and diplomatically exhausting marathon in the region and beyond.  The shadow of the geopolitical/geostrategic competition that impacts the entire world and that has become inflamed this year is poised to create new challenges and disputes from Ukraine to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean via the Aegean.

Image Information:

Image: Portrait of Count Alexander Suvorov.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Suvorov#/media/File:Suvorov_Alex_V.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain