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Iran Capitalizing on Post-Earthquake Conditions To Deepen Influence in Syria
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Aleppo in the war (2016).
“… Local media sources also indicated that the excavation machinery of the Iranian IRGC-affiliated ‘Khatam al-Anbiya’ company began demolishing a number of residential buildings in the eastern neighborhoods of Aleppo, under the pretext that they were cracked as a result of the earthquake…”
On 6 February, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck near the Syria-Turkish border, damaging and destroying countless structures in surrounding areas and killing more than 50,000 people. The Syrian province of Aleppo was especially hard hit, with damages estimated as high as $3.2 billion, mostly in the eponymous provincial capital.[i] Iran and its allied Iraqi factions from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have provided much publicized assistance to parts of Aleppo, in ways that are likely to deepen their influence among the local population. The accompanying excerpt, from the Syrian opposition news website Enab Baladi, highlights a visit to Aleppo by Ismail Qaani, Qasim Soleimani’s successor as head of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force. Qaani was the first foreign official to visit Syria after the earthquake, and his visit to Aleppo preceded that of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad by two days. When al-Assad finally went to Aleppo, he met briefly with Abdel Aziz al-Muhammadawi (a.k.a. Abu Fadak), the head of PMF, who was there to oversee PMF post-earthquake assistance in Aleppo. Like his predecessor, who was killed in the same strike that killed Soleimani, al-Muhammadawi is considered a close Quds Force ally. According to the Enab Baladi report, al-Assad thanked al-Muhammadawi and his organization for their humanitarian assistance. Iranian-backed entities are now seeking government permits to rebuild parts of the city, as they have across the war-ravaged suburbs of the Syrian capital Damascus in recent years.[ii] The second accompanying excerpt, from the Qatari-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadeed, explains how the IRGC-linked construction company Khatam al-Anbiya had demolished some buildings in eastern Aleppo and sought to lay the foundations for a future bastion of Iranian support in the area.
Other media reports have speculated that Iran also has used post-earthquake humanitarian aid as a cover to transfer weapons to Syria. The Israeli government was quick to warn of this possibility, and in early March, it bombed Aleppo airport, targeting purported Iranian drones being stored there. As noted in the accompanying article, from the Saudi-aligned daily Independent Arabia, there are conflicting reports about what exactly was targeted, with some sources claiming it was drones transferred from a nearby, recently rehabilitated airbase that is now under Russian control (al-Jarrah), and others claiming it involved weapons brought in by land and air under the cover of humanitarian assistance. Regardless, the strikes led to a temporary halt in operations at Aleppo’s airport, forcing a diversion of humanitarian aid flights and prompting UN and government officials to warn of dire humanitarian consequences.[iii]
Sources:
“الحشد الشعبي” يضغط على النظام في حلب بشقق سكنية لمتضرري الزلزال
(PMF pressures the regime in Aleppo via apartment buildings for earthquake victims,)” Enab Baladi (Syrian opposition news website), 28 February 2023. https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/631353
On February 8, Ismail Qaani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, visited Aleppo where he inspected earthquake victims’ conditions and supervised the work of Iranian rescuers at rubble-clearing sites, according to the Iranian Mehr News Agency. He was the first foreign official to arrive in Syria after the earthquake, and appeared in Aleppo two days before the head of the regime arrived in the city…
The researcher on Iranian affairs, Mustafa al-Nuaimi, explained that Iranian activity in Syria falls within two tracks, political and military…On the military level, the cargo planes that land in Aleppo and Damascus may be loaded with precision-strike missile technology and drones, although they were not bombed by Israel… this is a major military track that can be exploited under the guise of aid.
“إيران تعزز وجودها في حلب بذريعة مساعدة منكوبي الزلزال
(Iran strengthens its presence in Aleppo on the pretext of helping earthquake victims),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 4 March 2023. https://tinyurl.com/phm3y4tk
Local media sources also indicated that the excavation machinery of the Iranian IRGC-affiliated “Khatam al-Anbiya” company began demolishing a number of residential buildings in the eastern neighborhoods of Aleppo, under the pretext that they were cracked as a result of the earthquake… the Reconstruction Office of the Khatam al-Anbiya Company offered to buy homes as-is from owners of earthquake-damaged or even undamaged homes in these eastern neighborhoods of Aleppo.
“ما السياق الإقليمي لضربات إسرائيل ضد إيران في سوريا؟
(What is the regional context for Israel’s strikes against Iran in Syria?)” Independent Arabia (Saudi-aligned daily), 10 March 2023. https://tinyurl.com/2s364yp8
Opposition media outlets reported that the bombing of Aleppo airport was due to the existence of a weapons and missile depot. The Israeli “Alma” Research Center (close to intelligence) reported that some of them had arrived by land through the Al-Qaim crossing with Iraq, in trucks transporting weapons with humanitarian aid for those affected by the earthquake that hit northern Syria and Turkey on 6 February, while some of these weapons also arrived in a plane to the airport. In another version, the opposition media outlet Orient Net indicated that the weapons were transferred from al-Jarrah Military Airport in Aleppo. The Russian army is now deployed there and allegedly asked the Iranians to transfer their equipment away from the base.
Notes:
[i] “Global Rapid Post-Disaster Damage Estimation (GRADE) Report,” World Bank, 20 February 2023. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099084502282328299/pdf/P1721710045bd103f089f109cfbcb15aa2b.pdf
[ii] For more see: Lucas Winter, “Iran Cements its Presence in Syria,” OE Watch, 05-2019.
[iii] According to the UN, the “closure could have severe humanitarian implications for people in Aleppo, one of the worst earthquake impacted governorates in Syria…We call on all parties to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law, including by taking all feasible precautions to spare civilians and civilian objects in the conduct of hostilities.” See: “United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim for Syria, El-Mostafa Benlamlih statement on the Aleppo International Airport strikes,” 8 March 2023. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/united-nations-resident-coordinator-and-humanitarian-coordinator-ad-interim-syria-el-mostafa-benlamlih-statement-aleppo-international-airport-strikes
Image Information:
Image: Aleppo in the war (2016)
Source: Louai Barakat, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aleppo_in_the_war_2.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0
Iran Unveils Updated Yasin Training Jet With Possible Close Combat Applications
The Yasin training jet, 11 March 2023.
“The Yasin will be able to be used… for close air support.”
In 2019 the Iranian military unveiled its new Yasin Training Jet [GRLCUT(1] to great fanfare. In March 2023, Iran announced the final prototype and Yasin production line, according to the excerpted article from the semi-official, pro-government Iranian Students’ News Agency. The latest variation of the training aircraft is said to include many upgrades, including new ejection seats, avionics, engine, and landing gear. An Iran-produced airborne weather radar has also been fitted into the Yasin. According to the article, since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, pilot training was put “on the agenda” of the Armed Forces, but Iran has continued to suffer from an aging fleet and untrained pilots.[i] The article suggests that pilot training is paramount in the development of the Yasin,[ii] but there is also speculation that Iran may fit the aircraft with weaponry, allowing it to become a low-cost, easy-to-operate, multi-role fighter with a focus on close air support. If Iran can produce the Yasin at scale, not only would it be a valuable training platform, but it could also be deployed to many of the conflict zones in which Iran has previously relied on drones for air support—namely Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The introduction of the Yasin, or any Iranian manned aircraft, into any of these conflicts would risk escalating these proxy wars further.
Source:
“Ravanma-ye az Namuneh Ma’yar Tawlid-e Jet-e Amuzesh-e ‘Yasin’ (Unveiling of the Training Jet Prototype ‘Yasin’),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (semi-official student-run news agency that promotes the Iranian government’s line), 11 March 2023. https://www.isna.ir/news/1401122013717
The Yasin’s training jet production prototype was unveiled in the presence of the Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, while the mass production line of this training jet was also inaugurated…. Pilot training is one of the most advanced and complex training regimens that any country can do. The Islamic Republic of Iran has succeeded in applying world-class education in the fields of science and technology, and training pilots is no exception.
After the end of the [Iran-Iraq] war, the necessity for pilot training was put on the agenda of the Armed Forces. From that time, with the input of veterans and professors, faculties for training pilots were created….
So, how does the Islamic Republic of Iran train pilots and what is the role of Yassin training jet?
The training of the fighter aircraft pilot is fundamentally different from the civilian pilot. For military pilots, training is done in three stages: First, basic training for learning flight basics. Second, training for flight skills, regulations and maneuver. And, third, advanced training for tactical flight ability with advanced fighters. An important feature of advanced training jets is that pilots from operational bases continue to exploit them, and pilots become familiar with air combat and ground combat tactics and techniques, and learn the use of various weapons. All of these advantages and features have been the reason for…the Ministry of Defense to design and build this aircraft.
Does the aircraft also have combat capability?
Since combat training is in many cases carried out with real weapons and in simulated battle environments, it is natural that Yasin jet has the capability to conduct combat missions as well. In the development plan, it will be able to be used as a light combat aircraft and for close air support.
Notes:
[i] For background on efforts within Iran to re-equip its air force, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran-China Air Force Cooperation on Horizon?” OE Watch, December 2015. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195975/download See also: Michael Rubin, “Iranian F-14 Crash Highlights Iran’s Need for New Fighter Contract,” OE Watch, August 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/421643/download
[ii] While a potentially positive step for the Iranian Air Force, the Yasin is not the bridge trainer required for Iran’s recent purchase of the Su-35 multi-role fighters from Russia. The Su-35 is far too complex and would necessitate a more advanced trainer. It is more likely that Russian pilots will train Iranian pilots to fly the Su-35.
Image Information:
Image: The Yasin training jet, 11 March 2023.
Source: https://cdn.isna.ir/d/2023/03/11/3/62547091.jpg?ts=1678512083735
Attribution: Iranian Students’ News Agency
Syrians Fighting for Russia in Ukraine Playing Limited Role
Logo of the Syrian Special Forces, used by the 25th Special Mission Forces Division.
“…the main task of the Syrian fighters was providing security and protection for areas managed by Wagner and other military contractors in Luhansk and Donetsk …”
There have been several reports of Syrian fighters being recruited to fight on the Kremlin’s side since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. A March 2022 report claimed that 40,000 Syrians had been recruited to fight in Ukraine, and early in the conflict Russian officials suggested there were 16,000 Middle Eastern “volunteers” ready to fight alongside Russia. However, as of late 2022, reports place the number of Syrians sent to Russia for training and eventual deployment at around only 2,000. Of those, several hundred were reportedly deployed in September, and another few hundred in November, primarily in “non-combat roles,” according to the first accompanying excerpt, from a report published in the English-language news website Middle East Eye. More specifically, the bulk of Syrian fighters in Russia appear to be associated with the Syrian military’s 25th Special Mission Forces Division, formerly known as the “Tiger Forces.”[i]
Several other Syrian regime loyalist militias have also reportedly provided Moscow with recruits, including the Syrian-Palestinian “Liwa al-Quds” (Quds Brigade), the Iran-backed Afghan-majority Shiite “Liwa al-Fatimiyun” (Fatimid Brigade), militias affiliated with operatives in Syria’s ruling Baath Party, former rebels in the Russia-controlled 5th Division, and fighters recruited by Christian militia leaders from Hama Province.[ii] On 6 November, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), an opposition NGO, reported in the second accompanying excerpt that Liwa al-Quds fighters had joined fighters from the 25th Division in deploying on the Ukrainian battlefield, without providing details.
The third accompanying excerpt, a December 2022 report from an opposition NGO called Syrians for Truth and Justice, claims that recruitment and transfer of Syrians to fight on behalf of Russia continued through the second half of 2022. Among others, the report details three distinct routes taken by flights suspected of ferrying Syrian fighters to Russia for training. The report also identifies a series of Russian sites where Syrian fighters either train or are stationed, as well as several Ukrainian locations to which they are ultimately deployed, including Kherson, Melitopol, and Donetsk. Per the first referenced entry, the Middle East Eye report, Syrian fighters appear to be mostly providing “security and protection for areas managed by Wagner and other military contractors in Luhansk and Donetsk,” though they may be called to the frontlines if need be. The report mentions a Russian military contractor called “Shchit” (“Shield”) and a Wagner subsidiary known as “Task Force Rusich” as the key Russian entities employing the services of Syrian fighters. As Russia appears to gear up for a new offensive, it seems likely that additional Syrian fighters could be deployed, though based on current trends, their impact will likely remain marginal.
Sources:
“Ukraine war: Russia deploys Syrian fighters to shore up its defences,”Middle East Eye (Qatari-aligned English-language news website), 9 November 2022. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ukraine-war-russia-deploys-syrian-fighters
Russia has deployed more than 500 Syrian fighters in Ukraine for primarily non-combatant roles, tasking them generally with safeguarding facilities in Luhansk and Donetsk in the past few months, regional intelligence sources told Middle East Eye…
The official said the main task of the Syrian fighters was providing security and protection for areas managed by Wagner and other military contractors in Luhansk and Donetsk, but they could be called to the front for combat if an emergency or pressing need presented itself…
Those sources told MEE that the Syrians might be serving under the Russian military contractor Shchit (“Shield”) and a Wagner subsidiary group called Task Force Rusich, which earned a reputation for its self-declared neo-Nazi ideology during its deployment to eastern Ukraine in 2014…
However, the Syrian government official said the number of Syrian fatalities was much higher than reported, with at least 50 killed in the Ukrainian bombardment so far. “The Syrians aren’t partaking in the actual fighting, they are mainly functioning as logistics near the front lines. However, there is a small number of them that work as part of the artillery,” the official told MEE.
“Nine Syrian mercenaries killed and Liwaa Al-Quds brigade join war alongside Russians,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (opposition Syrian NGO), 6 November 2022. https://www.syriahr.com/en/274960/
Reliable sources have informed SOHR that Liwaa Al-Quds brigade has engaged in fighting alongside the Russians in the Russian war on Ukraine, while the 25th Division has been fighting since mid-September 2022.
“New Testimonies: Russia Continues to Deploy Syrian Mercenaries to Ukraine,” Syrians for Truth and Justice,(opposition Syrian NGO), 20 December 2022. https://stj-sy.org/en/new-testimonies-russia-continues-to-deploy-syrian-mercenaries-to-ukraine/
In this report, Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) presents an update on the Syrian mercenary activities in the context of the Ukrainian conflict, revealing new information obtained in December and the second half of November 2022. The information corroborates that Syrian security companies continue to transfer fighters to Ukraine, operating as proxies for the Russian Wagner Group…
Notes:
[i] For background, see: Lucas Winter, “Suheil al-Hassan and the Syrian Army’s Tiger Forces.” Small Wars Journal, Jul 22.9 (2016). https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/docpreview-s/00-00-00-97-25/20160906-Winter-_2D00_-Suheil-al_2D00_Hassan-and-the-Syrian-Army_2700_s-Tiger.pdf
[ii] For background on Syrian militia recruitment and transfers abroad, see: Lucas Winter, “Oil, Fighters, Mercenaries, and Diplomats: Increasing Flows Between Libya and Syria,” OE Watch, April 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/359091 and Lucas Winter, “Mercenary Recruitment and PMC Growth in Syria,” OE Watch, January 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/380367; For background on the Quds Brigade, see: Lucas Winter, “The Quds Brigade: Palestinian Militia Emerges as Key Russian Partner in Syria,” OE Watch, November 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/377063; For background on Syria’s pro-Russian Christian militias in Hama Province, see: Lucas Winter, “Russia Strengthens Ties with Loyalist Christian Militias in Syria’s Hama Province,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/382766
Image Information:
Image: Logo of the Syrian Special Forces, used by the 25th Special Mission Forces Division
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Syrian_commando.png
Attribution: Jakednb, CC BY-SA 3.0
Iran’s Proposal To Build Railroads and Housing in Syria Could Enrich IRGC
Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Rostam Ghasemi meets with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, October 7, 2022 in Damascus, Syria.
“Iran stands by the people and government of Syria.”
In May 2022, the UN hosted a conference in Brussels to seek $10.5 billion in donor commitments to rebuild Syria. While pledges fell short, the money that the international community will spend on reconstruction in Syria is significant. The excerpted article from the Mehr News Agency, an outlet sponsored by Iran’s Islamic Ideology Dissemination Organization, reports on a visit by Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Rostam Ghasemi, to Damascus to meet with top Syrian officials including President Bashar Al-Assad. During his visit, Ghasemi floated the possibility of a railroad from Iran through Iraq to Syria. This seems farfetched given both insecurity in regions of Iraq and Syria, which the railroad would transect, as well as the length of time it would take to complete the project. Ghasemi also promised that Iran would help support the construction of housing projects in Syria—an offer that the Syrian government appeared to welcome. Construction projects of this sort have military implications given that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) economic wing, Khatam al-Anbiya,dominates Iran’s construction sector. Should the Syrian government contract with Iranian firms to aid Syria’s reconstruction, this could essentially provide the IRGC with funds at a time when both sanctions and the expense of countering internal protests drain Iran’s treasury.
Source:
“Amadegi Iran baraye Sakht-e Peruzheh-ha-ye Bozorg Moskan dar Suriya (Iran is Ready to Build Large Housing Projects in Syria),” Mehr News Agency (media outlet sponsored by Iran’s Islamic Ideology Dissemination Organization), 7 October 2022. https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5603757
According to Mehr News Agency, Rostam Ghasemi, the minister of Roads and Urban Development, during his trip to Damascus and in a meeting with Syrian Prime Minister Hossein Arnous, emphasized Tehran’s support for Syria and stated: Iran stands by the people and government of Syria. We are with Syria in various fields, especially economic, and we can have good cooperation and participate in the fields of trade, commerce and large housing construction projects.
In this meeting, Arnous also mentioned the all-round support of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the people and the country of Syria and stated, “I thank and appreciate the leader, people and government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the all-round and continuous support to Syria.”
He added, “In the difficult situation we are facing to supply oil and its derivatives, we thank Iran for helping us to supply oil. We are under an unfair siege and we welcome Iranian investors who want to be in Syria.”
Referring to the process of rebuilding Syria after the war and the devastation caused by the 11-year war, Arnous stated: Opening wider horizons of cooperation between the two countries is for the benefit of the two nations and the two countries, and positive results are created from joint cooperation.
Image Information:
Image: Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Rostam Ghasemi meets with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, October 7, 2022 in Damascus, Syria
Source: Tasnim News Agency
https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1401/07/15/1401071513335913426208374.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain
China Sharpens Tone Against U.S. Policy, Deepening Ties in Syria
Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister at the Supporting Syria conference (2016).
“…The United States has not stopped looting Syrian local resources…”
Chinese rhetoric toward the U.S. presence in Syria has recently sharpened, signaling a further convergence of narratives with Russia criticizing U.S. involvement in Syria while possibly hinting at greater Chinese involvement in the Levant. Until recently, China’s criticism had largely been muted and vaguely worded, in contrast to the more direct accusations made by Syrian and Russian government officials and media outlets. The excerpted article from the Arabic-language version of the Chinese state-run publication The People’s Daily is illustrative, alluding to a U.S. policy of “frantic piracy and resource looting” in Syria and beyond. The article reinforces statements made by Chinese diplomats and is one of several pieces published in Arabic-language Chinese media highlighting the U.S.-facilitated transfer of oil from Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria across the border into Iraq. The Chinese emphasis on “looting” echoes a narrative that has been pursued by Russian and Syrian officials for several months, partially in response to the Western emphasis on Russia’s control over Ukrainian resources. Thus, China’s new approach reflects a narrative convergence with Russia, one that may portend greater coordination between these countries in the Levant.
Meanwhile, China is working on telecommunications development that would further enable its rhetoric and influence with Syria. In early 2022, Syria officially signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative, potentially setting the stage for greater Chinese economic involvement in the country. In late July, the two countries signed a letter of intent for China to furnish $30 million dollars of telecommunications equipment and software for Syria to rebuild its tattered network in war-torn areas of the country. As portrayed in an article from the pro-regime Syrian daily al-Watan, the agreement is a further landmark of deepening bilateral ties. An analyst cited by the Qatar-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadeedascribes security significance to the deal, arguing that it is for “listening and jamming devices,” though no evidence is presented to back this claim. The deal could indeed be the start of greater Chinese involvement in Syria’s technological sector, though the modest sums involved belie the idea that it is of great consequence. Nonetheless, media coverage of the deal highlights a growing pattern of magnification of the significance of any Chinese aid or assistance. A good example of this comes from a recent report by the Center for Operational Analysis and Research, a Syria-focused research consultancy group. The report notes that even though Syria received more than triple the number of COVID-19 vaccines from the World Health Organization’s COVAX initiative than it did from China, Syria’s official news agency published at least 38 articles praising Chinese assistance, and only one reference to the COVAX aid.
Source:
“تعليق: سرقة النفط والقمح من سوريا .. حقيقة سيناريو الديمقراطية وحقوق الانسان الامريكي في الشرق الأوسط
(Theft of oil and wheat from Syria .. The reality of the American democracy and human rights scenario in the Middle East),” China People’s Daily – Arabic (Chinese daily), 8 August 2022. http://arabic.people.com.cn/n3/2022/0808/c31662-10132765.html
In recent years, the United States has engaged in frantic piracy and looting of resources in the Middle East… The United States has not stopped looting Syrian local resources since it stationed itself by force in the name of “fighting terrorism” in 2015.
Source:
“سورية والصين توقعان على مشروع لتوريد تجهيزات خاصة بالاتصالات والبرمجيات بقيمة 30 مليون دولار …
(China and Syria agree on project to supply communications and software equipment worth $30 million…),” al-Watan (pro-regime Syrian daily), 21 July 2022. https://alwatan.sy/archives/311198
The Chinese ambassador also revealed that China’s $30 million grant for the supply of telecommunications technology equipment — which was preceded about a month ago by the grant of 100 Chinese buses — will be followed in the coming days by the arrival of a new batch of Chinese food aid, including wheat and rice… In turn, the head of the Planning and International Cooperation Authority, Fadi Salti Al-Khalil… referred to the memorandum of understanding that was signed with the Chinese side at the beginning of this year for Syria’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative…
Source:
“الصين تزود النظام السوري بمعدات وبرمجيات اتصالات
(China supplies Syrian regime with software and telecommunications equipment),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari aligned daily), 20 July 2022. https://tinyurl.com/utsk4cym
Meanwhile, economic researcher Younes al-Karim said in an interview with al-Araby al-Jadeed that the Chinese communication equipment announced today is likely to be “military, not civilian.” Al-Karim said that “the agreement is not new, it was revealed a while ago, and it is related to bringing in military listening and jamming devices.
Source: “China in Syria: Aid and Trade Now, Influence and Industry Later?,” Center for Operational Analysis and Research – COAR (Syria-focused research consultancy), 11 July 2022. https://coar-global.org/2022/07/11/china-in-syria-aid-and-trade-now-influence-and-industry-later/
As of February 2022, Syria has received more than 8.3 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines through the WHO-supported COVAX facility, while China has committed an estimated 2.6 million vaccine doses. As of early May 2022, SANA had published no fewer than 38 articles referencing Chinese bilateral support for COVID-related measures, noting that it “has spared no effort” to support Syria throughout the pandemic. By comparison, SANA had referenced the (largely Western) WHO-supported COVAX facility only once.
Image Information:
Image: Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister at the Supporting Syria conference (2016).
Source: DFID – UK Department for International Development, Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/dfid/24789378436
Attribution: CC BY 2.0
Turkish Military Operation in Syria Risks Clash with Iran
Turkish Soldiers in Syria.
“Driven apart by clashing regional interests, Turkey and Iran appear headed for a face-off in Syria, with Tehran explicitly opposing Ankara’s plan for a fresh military operation against Kurdish-held areas, wary of risks to its own posture in the region.”
The Turkish Government’s plan to launch a fifth military operation into Syria is back on the table. The stated goal is to create a 20-mile “safe zone” along Turkey’s border with Syria by targeting areas held by the mostly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A Turkish operation into this region and its related repercussions might jeopardize the security of U.S. troops remaining in the region to support and advise the SDF fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Turkish President Erdoğan announced he intends to start the operation in Tel Rifaat and Manbij and gradually extend to other areas, some of which include Kurdish groups, Iranian-backed militias, Syrian regime forces, and Russian control of the airspace. The accompanying articles analyze the complexity and risks for Turkey, including that of a face-off with Iran.
According to the first excerpted article from pro-government Turkish daily Hürriyet, the critical issue for Turkey is access to Syrian airspace, so it will need permission from Russia and the Syrian regime. Moreover, especially in Manbij, Russia and Syrian regime forces currently control the areas north of the M-4 highway, while Kurdish groups control the area south of the highway. In any ground operation against Kurdish groups, Turkey would find itself facing Russian and Syrian regime forces first in this area. Since Turkey is unlikely to risk fighting Russia, it will seek Russian consent first.
The other critical issue is Iranian opposition and the presence of Iran-backed Shia militias in the area. The second excerpted article from security focused al-Monitor states that Iran will resist Turkey’s operation both militarily and politically, and an operation might lead to a clash between them. Iran perceives the Turkish military presence in Syria as a threat to its interests and has taken several steps to dissuade Turkey from launching a military operation. First, Iranian high-level officials publicly warned Turkey not to launch the military operation. Second, Iran is bolstering its posture by deploying militias to areas with Shiite settlements, including Zahra and Nubl. Third, Iran and the Syrian regime are mobilizing support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units that Turkey vowed to clear from the area. Fourth, Iran-backed Shiite militias tried to deploy Grad missiles to Turkey’s potential area of operations, but Russia stopped them for now. Iran’s increased presence because of a potential Turkish operation may also impact U.S. forces in the region.
Source:
Sedat Ergin, “Tel Rifat ve Münbiç’te Rusya ve İran faktörleri ne? (What are the Russian and Iranian factors in Tel Rifat and Manbij?),” Hürriyet (a pro-government Turkish daily),3 June 2022. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/sedat-ergin/tel-rifat-ve-munbicte-rusya-ve-iran-faktorleri-ne-olacak-42076420
“We are entering a new phase of our decision to create a 30-kilometer-deep safe zone along our southern borders,” [President Erdoğan] said, adding: “We are clearing Tel Rifat and Manbij from terrorists. Then we will gradually do the same in other regions.”
…if the operation area is to be limited to Tel Rifat and Manbij, we must take into account that Turkey’s primary interlocutor on the ground will be Russia…
But there are other players as well. The importance of Tel Rifaat is that it is a multi-actor geography in which Russia, Iran, the Assad regime, and the YPG/PYD… have military presence…
A very critical issue to consider in a possible operation is that Russia controls Syria’s airspace west of the Euphrates. Its airspace east of the Euphrates is under the control of the USA. If [a Turkish Armed Forces operation] happens, the airspace will have to be kept open so that the radars of the Russian/Syrian air defense systems do not lock onto Turkish warplanes and unmanned aerial vehicles during the operation of the TAF [Turkish Armed Forces]…
Tel Rifaat is also a region where Shiite militia groups, which are directly under the control of Iran, also exist. This means that Turkey should also take into account the Iranian factor in any operation to be carried out in Tel Rifaat.
Source: Fehim Taştekin,“Iran, Turkey brace for face-off in Syria,” al-Monitor (globally read security news site with regionally based reporting), 10 June 2022. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/iran-turkey-brace-face-syria
Driven apart by clashing regional interests, Turkey and Iran appear headed for a face-off in Syria, with Tehran explicitly opposing Ankara’s plan for a fresh military operation against Kurdish-held areas, wary of risks to its own posture in the region.
Turkey has failed to get a green light from the United States to press ahead with the plan, while Russia appears to be stalling. The Iranians, meanwhile, have sent militia reinforcements to two Shiite settlements northwest of Aleppo, not far from a key area in Ankara’s crosshairs, while trying to talk Turkey out from making the move — apparently with little success thus far…
The notion of rivalry has become an understatement in defining Turkish-Iranian ties. The rifts between the two neighbors have deepened amid an array of issues concerning Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, coupled with frictions over the sharing of transboundary waters and a seemingly uncontrolled stream of Afghan refugees to Turkey from Iran…
…the Iranian Foreign Ministry slammed Turkey’s intervention plan, warning that it would only exacerbate tensions and humanitarian suffering in Syria.
…Iranian media outlets have described Turkey’s presence as an “invasion” and referred to the Syrian National Army (SNA), Turkey’s rebel allies, as “Turkish-backed terrorists.” They have accused Turkey of pushing demographic changes to the detriment of the Kurds, expanding the space of “terrorists” under the guise of safe zones, seeking gains to use against Damascus in future talks or laying the ground for annexing Syrian territory.
…“The Syrian regime and its Iranian militias have mobilized and [are] sending reinforcement to the YPG” — a reference to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, which Ankara has vowed to oust from Tel Rifaat.
Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency, meanwhile, reported that Iranian-backed Shiite militia attempted to deploy Grad missiles to the area May 30, but were stopped by Russian forces…
Could Iran go even further now at the risk of a showdown with Turkey? According to the Iranian journalist, Turkey is “well aware” that Iran will defend Zahra and Nubl, even though Iran has avoided directly confronting Turkey in Syria thus far, except for Iranian participation in a 2020 offensive in Idlib that resulted in Damascus recapturing the crucial M5 highway.
Though Ankara has not mentioned Zahra and Nubl as targets, they would fall within Turkey’s range should it take control of Tel Rifaat. The two settlements and Tel Rifaat are seen as a barrier shielding Aleppo…
Today, Kurdish and government control in Tel Rifaat and its environs prevents rebels in Idlib from crossing to the Turkish-controlled Euphrates Shield pocket and accessing Aleppo. The importance of the area feeds suspicions that Ankara’s aims may go beyond weakening the Kurds.
According to various sources, local groups trained and equipped by Hezbollah, Iranian-sponsored Shiite groups such as Fatemiyoun, Hashemiyoon and Zainabiyoun and the Syrian government’s militia the National Defense Forces are all present in Zahra and Nubl. They are reportedly coordinated by the IRGC, which has a headquarters in the area.
Image Information:
Image: Turkish Soldiers in Syria.
Source: Voice of America, via Wikimedia,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:T%C3%BCrk_Askeri_Suriye%27de.jpg
Attribution: CC-PD-Mark | PD VOA
Iran Digs into Central Syria, Filling Vacuum Left by Russia
“…the spread of pro-Iranian militias and the Fourth Division coincided with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the beginning of the withdrawal of Russian forces from some military sites in eastern Homs…”
Iran and its allies are fortifying their positions in the central Syrian desert. The accompanying article from the influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat delves into the recent repositioning of Iranian proxies and allies in central Syria. The article cites an early 2022 deal between the Syrian military’s 4th Division and Iran, in which they agreed to establish nearly a dozen bases throughout central Syria. These moves coincided with Russia turning its focus to Ukraine and Iran’s recent escalation with Israel, which likely added urgency to Iranian efforts to strengthen its military position in Syria. To that end, Iran and its allies have focused on supplying and fortifying weapons depots across central Syria. According to the report from al-Sharq al-Awsat, Iran has provided its Syrian proxies and allies with vehicles, communications devices, and anti-tank missiles. Russia has also given Iran and its allies control of the massive weapons depot in Mheen, in the Homs desert. Iran recently established a new militia in Syria, drawing from its various local proxy forces, in order to guard all these weapons depots. Pro-Iranian forces in central Syria are likely to employ unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to secure their positions. Local outlets have reported on recent drone transfers, and in late March, Iranian forces held a UAV training session for some of their Syrian proxies. In early April, the Iranian Arabic-language news channel al-Alam aired footage showing Iran’s proxy forces in Iraq employing Iranian Shahed-129 drones against ISIS targets, suggesting Iranian proxies in Syria would be similarly capable.
Source:
“إيران توسع انتشار ميليشياتها وسلاحها في سوريا
(Iran expands the reach of its militias and weapons in Syria),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 7 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yp83a5pu
In a new Iranian military tactic aimed at extending Iran’s influence over the largest area of Syrian territory, the Revolutionary Guards have recently strengthened… their presence in about 120 sites and military headquarters in the eastern countryside of Homs, Hama desert, Raqqa desert, and Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo governorates. They have reinforced these sites with about 4,500 members of the militias loyal to them, and a number of missile launchers, heavy weapons, drones and communications devices. They recently took control of the strategic Mheen warehouses east of Homs, after expanding their influence in the Nairab military airport in Aleppo governorate, at the expense of the Russian and regime forces. They have also established training camps for Syrian volunteers to join militias loyal to Iran.
In the desert of Homs and eastern Hama, sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that “an agreement was reached at the beginning of 2022. Military leaders in the Fourth Division, led by Maher al-Assad, brother of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, established about 11 headquarters, headed by officers and military experts from both sides, in the areas of Hasya, Palmyra, Mahin, Al-Qaryatayn, Al-Sukhnah, Al-Kum and Al-Taybeh, east of Homs, and the Salamiyah, Al-Saan, Athria and Sheikh Hilal areas, east of Hama.
… “the spread of pro-Iranian militias and the Fourth Division coincided with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the beginning of the withdrawal of Russian forces from some military sites in eastern Homs. This includes their recent withdrawal from the Mheen warehouses, which were handed over to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Lebanese Hezbollah”…
On March 27, Iran moved 10 Iranian Muhajir drones from its warehouses in the city of Palmyra, east of Homs, to a camp for drones that was recently established in the al-Tabani area, southwest of Deir ez-Zor. There, they established a UAV training project, imposing a security cordon around the area.
… Syrian activists said that “the IRGC recently formed a new militia called Fajr al-Islam. It is led by Iranian officers and made up of elite elements from the Afghan Fatimiyoun Brigade, the Iraqi Harakat al-Nujaba, and Lebanese Hezbollah, in addition to groups of Alawites loyal to Iran and young Syrian Shiites.” Its mission is to guard Iranian military depots in Hama, Homs, Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, Palmyra, and Sukhnah, east of Homs
Source:
“بالفيديو..مسيرة شاهد ١٢٩ تستهدف اوكار الدواعش في العراق
(Video… Shahed-129 drone targets ISIS hideouts in Iraq),” al-Alama (Iranian Arabic-language news channel), 9 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/376pba2u
Video footage emerged showing members of the Popular Mobilization Forces using the Iranian Shahed-129 drone to target the hideouts of ISIS terrorist gangs in Iraq.
Iran Repositions Its Proxies in Syria as Russia Turns Focus to Ukraine
Syrian Democratic Force soldiers conduct a patrol during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers in Syria on May 8, 2021.
“…Iran will not miss this opportunity to consolidate and expand its influence in various sectors, taking advantage of the regime’s need for assistance and support…”
Local media reports indicate that Iran is “repositioning” in Syria, perhaps seeking to take advantage of the Russian military’s focus on Ukraine. A late February report by Syria-focused Turkish think tank Jusoor Center for Studies speculates that Russia’s focus on Ukraine may detract from its involvement in Syria, “and Iran will not miss this opportunity to consolidate and expand its influence in various sectors.” The report mentions several signs of Iran’s repositioning in Syria, including increased activities and weapons transfers by Iran-backed militias in regime-controlled areas of the Syrian desert and the Middle Euphrates River Valley, near the border with Iraq. Tensions were rising between Russian and Iranian proxies in Deir Ezzor Province during the build up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the accompanying excerpt from the Syrian opposition media source Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Russian airstrikes on ISIS positions in the desert have declined substantially since the start of the war in Ukraine, even as the group has ramped up its attacks in the Syrian desert, according to a report from the pro-Syrian opposition Lebanese news website al-Modon. The Quds Brigade, Russia’s key ally in anti-ISIS efforts in the Syrian desert, withdrew precipitously to Damascus. Meanwhile, local media reports claim several Iraqi militias have returned to Iraq and Iranian proxies in the Fatemiyoun Brigade have redeployed in the area. The logic behind these movements remains murky, but the accompanying excerpt from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat speculates that they relate to strengthening supply lines and transit corridors between Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Syria.
Source:
“6 مؤشرات على إعادة تموضع إيران في سورية
(Six indicators that Iran is repositioning in Syria),” Jusoor Center for Studies (Turkey-based think tank focused on Syria), 4 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8tnvv4
Since the beginning of 2022, Iran has begun to undertake a series of political, military, economic and security activities in coordination with the Syrian regime, which indicates its repositioning in Syria…
… the continuation of conflict in Ukraine may lead to a decline in Russia’s interest in Syria. Iran will not miss this opportunity to consolidate and expand its influence in various sectors, taking advantage of the regime’s need for assistance and support…
Source:
“تصاعد ملحوظ في الحرب الباردة بين الجانبين الروسي والإيراني في محاولة لكسب ود أهالي القرى السبع شرقي الفرات
(Notable Escalation in the Cold War between Russia and Iran in an attempt to gain allegiance from the ‘Seven Villages’ east of the Euphrates),” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (Syrian opposition media source), https://tinyurl.com/2p85pm2x, 16 February 2022.
Recently, the competition between Russia and Iran has escalated in the countryside of Deir Ezzor governorate, specifically in the so-called “seven villages” under the influence of the Iranians and the regime east of the Euphrates, and the corresponding areas on the western bank of the river…
Source:
“إيران تتمدد في سوريا..إثر تراجع النشاط الروسي
(Iran expands in Syria… following decline in Russian activities),” al-Modon (pro-Syrian Lebanese news website), 12 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8v8v9y
Russian military activities throughout the Syrian territory have declined as the Russian attack on Ukraine enters its third week. At the same time, Iranian militias are sending military reinforcements to the city of Palmyra and its surroundings.
…“the Russian aerial bombardment on the Syrian desert is half of what it was before the war on Ukraine”…
On Friday, the Palestinian “Quds Brigade” militia withdrew from the city of Palmyra, located in the eastern countryside of Homs. Militia members left the city heading towards the governorate of Damascus. The motives for this withdrawal remain unknown and it is unclear whether they will return later. According to the sources of the Syrian Observatory, the Quds Brigade’s withdrawal came without prior warning or coordination with the regime’s security services located in Palmyra and its surroundings.
Source:
“مئات من ميليشيات إيران يغادرون سوريا إلى العراق
(Hundreds of Iranian miliitas leave Syria for Iraq),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 7 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/mrdd5r2m
Syrian activists reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard began withdrawing a large number of militia members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade (Afghani) and Iraqi (Shiite) militias from military sites in the areas of Palmyra and Sukhna, east of Homs, into Iraqi territory, through unauthorized crossings. Other fighters from the (Afghan Fatemiyoun) Brigade were deployed to new camps east of Palmyra. The sites in Homs countryside and a number of military vehicles and equipment were handed over to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The development was described by activists in the region as “remarkable,” at a time when (ISIS) launched repeated attacks against regime forces and Iranian militias in the Homs desert and Deir Ezzor, incurring losses in life and equipment.
Image Information:
Image: Syrian Democratic Force soldiers conduct a patrol during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers in Syria on May 8, 2021.
Source: Spc. Isaiah J Scott, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6705061/sdf-conducts-patrol-syria
Attribution: Public Domain
Russia Highlighting Use of “Cube” and “Lancet” Loitering Munitions in Syria
ZALA Lancet loitering munition.
“…government tests of the KYB loitering munition have been completed, and the results of the tests are considered positive… it was recommended that the Russian army be armed with this new type of strike attack drone…”
As reported in the accompanying December 2021 article from Russia’s Arabic-language media outlet RT Arabic, the KYB-UAV “kamikaze drone” (also referred to as KUB-BLA or “Cube”) has passed government field tests and is now ready for procurement by Russian forces, which is expected to begin this year. The KYB-UAV is made by ZALA AERO, a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov Concern, itself a subsidiary of Rostec. The KYB-UAV was first made public at Abu Dhabi’s 2019 weapons expo (IDEX-2019). In December 2020, Rostec’s CEO explained that the KYB, along with a more advanced ZALA AERO loitering munitions platform called the Lancet, distinguishable by its double x-shaped tail, had both been tested in Syria that year. A documentary that aired last December on the state-owned Russian-language news channel Russia 24 includes an interview with a purported Russian Lancet operator who oversaw more than 40 strikes in Syria, including a pair of targeted assassinations in Hama Province in April 2020. Recently, Russian state television networksfeatured several clips of Lancets being used in Syria to target rebel positions and infrastructure. As the article from the Syrian opposition news network Shaam News Network notes, a recent clip shows a Lancet targeting a small oil refinery in rural Hama Province. However, the accuracy of Syrian opposition media reports on these platforms is limited, given the difficulty in distinguishing them from other weapons, and because Iranian and Syrian government forces operate similar, though more rudimentary, kamikaze drones.
Source:
“مصدر روسي يعلن إنجاز اختبارات الدرون الانتحاري كوب
(Russian Source Announces Success of ‘Cube’ Suicide Drone Tests),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language news network), 16 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/2p86e54n
A source close to the Russian Ministry of Defense said that government tests of the KYB loitering munition have been completed, and the results of the tests are considered positive. The source added: “As a result of these tests, it was recommended that the Russian army be armed with this new type of strike attack drone.” The source indicated that the delivery of these drones to the armed forces will most likely start in 2022.
Source:
“الدفاع الروسية تستعرض مسيرات لانسيت الانتحارية بمقاطع تظهر استخدامها بسوريا
(Russian Defense Ministry Displays Use of ‘Lancet’ Suicide UAV in Video Clip from Syria),” Shaam News Network (Syrian opposition news network), 26 December 2021. https://tinyurl.com/bddd8f9p
The Russian Ministry of Defense published a video clip showing the use of “Lancet” Russian suicide drones, which it said shows the destruction of a small oil refinery factory belonging to the rebel factions in the countryside of Hama. Sham News Network was unable to determine the target location. Video clips were also posted on the telegram channel of Russia-1 journalist Alexander Rogatkin. The full version will be shown on Saturday on the Russia 24 TV channel. The journalist explained on his channel: “A small oil refinery belonging to Syrian militants was destroyed in the Hama countryside with the help of two munitions by the special operations forces of the Russian Armed Forces. It is assumed that Lancet drones were used.”
Source: “Война Дронов – 2021 (Drone Wars – 2021),” Russia 24 (State-owned Russian-language news channel), 25 December 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Me7shKOc0c
Image Information:
Image: ZALA Lancet loitering munition.
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin Military Blog, https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Military/ARMY-2019-Exhibition-pavilions/i-HwGLLZC/A
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. https://www.vitalykuzmin.net/Copyright-policy