“Noting that anti-DPRK nuclear threat moves of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces have become more undisguised and crossed the red-line…require the DPRK to steadily expand and bolster up its military capability for self-defense and the capability for preemptive attack with the nuclear force as the backbone.”

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North Korean state media is releasing stories at a steady pace highlighting its advancements and intent regarding its illicit nuclear weapons program and associated delivery systems. According to a 13 September article in state-controlled broadcaster Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim Jong Un visited a previously undisclosed uranium enrichment facility designed to produce material for nuclear weapons. Notably, North Korea emphasized that the facility was for development of nuclear weapons targeted against the United States, not for the productions of civilian nuclear fuel, as the regime routinely claims.

This disclosure comes as part of a weeks-long celebration of the 76th anniversary of the founding of North Korea, during which state media has issued a steady drumbeat of articles about the party’s military plans and goals. During the same period, North Korea also released an image of a new 12-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL) for a possible new type of ICBM, the test firing of a new 600mm MRLS,[i] and Kim inspecting special operations forces training.[ii]

Over the last decade, North Korea has sought to portray its nuclear weapons and missile program as what a “normal nation” would do. However, North Korean media historically fluctuated between two extremes. On one hand, it would aggressively hype the program, threaten the United States and our allies, promise first strikes, and publicly identify its intended nuclear targets on the U.S. mainland. Then, depending on the political environment, it would shift to a message of simple deterrence, disclaiming any first use, and promising to be a responsible nuclear power.

North Korea is portraying its nuclear weapons development targeted at the United States as the new normal, similar to its uncharacteristic restraint in unveiling its new 12-axle TEL. The Regime probably does not feel the need to use its trademark over-the-top, anti-U.S. rhetoric to justify the program when matter-of-fact statements will do. The Regime’s message is clearly that this is the way things are now.

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Sources:

“경애하는 김정은동지께서 핵무기연구소와 무기급핵물질생산기지를 현지지도하시였다 (Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Nuclear Weapons Institute and Production Base of Weapons-grade Nuclear Materials),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 13 Sepetember 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/8bc7076c7ecb6af9065c66977903f00c.kcmsf

Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, inspected the Nuclear Weapons Institute and the production base of weapons-grade nuclear materials, acquainted himself with the production of nuclear warheads and the current production of nuclear materials and set forth important tasks concerning a long-term plan for increasing the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.

He highly praised the scientists, technicians and officials in the field of nuclear weapons production for carrying out without fail the plan for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials needed for manufacturing nuclear warheads, cherishing the firm and steadfast revolutionary spirit and faith to firmly defend the victorious advance of the revolutionary cause of Juche with the strongest nuclear force.

He expressed great satisfaction after being briefed on the fact that the base is dynamically producing nuclear materials by studying, developing and introducing all the system elements including centrifugal separators and various kinds of sensors and controllers with its own efforts and technology.

Personally looking round the production site, he said that it is invigorating to see the place, and continued: In order to exponentially multiply the nuclear weapons for self-defence true to the Party’s line of building the nuclear force, it is necessary to further increase the number of centrifuges, not content with the successes achieved, and, at the same time, to enhance the individual separation ability of the centrifuge and push forward with the introduction of a new-type centrifuge, which has already reached the completion stage, as planned, so as to consolidate the foundation for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials.

Going round the construction site for expanding the capacity for the current production of nuclear weapons, he learned in detail about the daily plan for the assembly of equipment.

Noting that anti-DPRK nuclear threat moves of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces have become more undisguised and crossed the red-line, he said the security environment facing the DPRK, the peculiarity of the Korean revolution compelling the country to constantly confront the U.S. and contain it and prospective threats require the DPRK to steadily expand and bolster up its military capability for self-defence and the capability for preemptive attack with the nuclear force as the backbone. He stressed again that a more rapid and sure advance should be made in the struggle to always maintain the thoroughgoing counteraction posture of the nuclear force and improve the posture to a high level.

The combatants in the field of nuclear weapons production, assuming the most important responsibility, that is, the historic mission to bolster up the nuclear war deterrent of the country in quality and quantity and in a sustained and accelerated way, should keep exerting themselves in production and thus more creditably fulfil the sacred duty they took on for the Party and the revolution, he instructed.

He stressed the need to set a higher long-term goal in producing nuclear materials necessary for the manufacture of tactical nuclear weapons and concentrate all efforts on making a fresh leap forward, and set forth important tasks and orientation.

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Notes:

[i] See: “경애하는 김정은동지께서 새형의 600㎜방사포차성능검증을 위한 시험사격을 보시였다 (Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Test-fire for Verifying Performance of New-type 600mm Multiple Rocket Launcher),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 13 September 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/d5a6198af96d278695d7978c6d8bd74f.kcmsf

[ii] See: “경애하는 김정은동지께서 조선인민군 특수작전무력훈련기지를 현지시찰하시였다  (Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Training Base of Special Operation Forces of KPA),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 13 September 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/b9243d11f2d74891bab7867dcaf965f0.kcmsf

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“Kim Jong Un acquainted himself with the production of military hardware in the second half of the year.”

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North Korea publicly revealed a new, larger ICBM transporter erector launcher (TEL) system, potentially for a new ICBM class. The communist Workers’ Party of Korea newspaper Rodong Sinmun, released a picture of Kim Jong Un inspecting a new 12-axle TEL. The disclosure happened as Kim Jong Un visited a defense industrial enterprise site on 8 September as part of events commemorating the 76th anniversary of the founding of the state.

Since North Korea’s first ICBM test launch on 4 July 2017, the PRK has been testing progressively larger ICBM missile systems and associated TELs. The Hwaseong-17, North Korea’s known largest ICBM, tested in 2023, already has an associated 11-axle TEL.¹

The 12-axle TEL’s unveiling was uncharacteristically subdued by North Korean standards, presented almost as an afterthought buried in a technical piece about the PRK’s defense manufacturing goals. Apart from the associated image, the Rodong Sinmun article makes no reference to the TEL, instead highlighting Kim Jong Un’s visit to the site and his speech about the important work of the national defense industrial enterprise.

However, the photo release could not have been an accident and most likely had a messaging purpose.² These could have included promoting a new, even larger missile system under development which the regime might reveal or test closer to the U.S. presidential election. Possibly, but less likely, it could represent a new and more survivable design for the existing Hwaseong systems. The subdued nature of the unveiling could likewise represent North Korea’s attempt to influence the narrative in Western, Japanese, and South Korean media, a sort of “we are still here” message that carries an implied threat to the next U.S. administration.

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Sources:

Rodong Sinmun, “경애하는 김정은동지께서 국방공업기업소를 현지지도하시였다 (Dear Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Defense Industrial Enterprises),” Rodong Sinmun (communist Workers’ Party of Korea daily newspaper), 8 Sep 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/8bc7076c7ecb6af9065c66977903f00c.kcmsf

Pyongyang, September 8 (KCNA) — Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, visited a defence industrial enterprise under the Second Economy Commission to learn about the production of military hardware…

Highly appreciating the indomitable fighting spirit and extraordinary ideological and spiritual world of its officials and workers, he expressed thanks to them for carrying out the huge munitions production tasks in a responsible and correct way and making a great contribution to the development of our armed forces, true to the Party’s policy on munitions industry.

Learning about the structural characteristics, performance and tactical and technical specifications of military hardware under development and production, he stressed the need to put the munitions production on a more scientific and modern basis and thoroughly guarantee the combat performance of military hardware.

Repeatedly expressing his satisfaction over the fact that the prospect for confidently attaining the goal of military hardware production within the five-year period decided and assigned by the Eighth Party Congress is guaranteed thanks to the dynamic struggle of the munitions industry workers, he clarified the principles and ways for the defence industrial enterprise to hold fast to in the munitions production permanently.

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Notes:

¹ For more information on North Korean Hwaseong tests over the last three years, see: https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/weapons/north-korea-reveals-12-axle-tel

² North Korea has a pattern in engaging new U.S. administrations in order to achieve its diplomatic and military goals. For further discussion on Pyongyang’s assessed course of action, see: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/How-North-Korea-will-seek-to-play-the-next-U.S.-president

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North Korean students receive classroom instruction under the watchful eye of a camera and portrait of Kim Jong Un (2018).

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“The Kim Jong-un regime has in earnest executed those who were caught after watching South Korean dramas, calling them traitors.”

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Reports from inside North Korea of increasingly harsh prison sentences and mass executions for viewing foreign language materials underscore that the Regime assesses information control as vital to the continued existence of the North Korean state. According to a 27 June report from South Korea’s semi-official news agency Yonhap News, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, responsible for managing Seoul’s relations with the North, issued its second human rights report highlighting defector accounts of public executions carried out in the country.¹ Defectors testified that many of these executions were in response to convictions for sharing South Korea dramas or music, wearing sunglasses, or for wearing white at a wedding, among other violations.² This is the second such human rights report and is based on interviews with 141 defectors since 2023.³ According to a 27 June press release by the Unification Ministry announcing the report, “North Korean authorities actively enforce laws including the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture (2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Law (2021) and the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language (2023) aimed at suppressing its residents.”

The report underscores that the North Korean government views information control as critical to its survival. North Korean state media routinely characterizes South Korea as a feral wasteland of dystopian anarcho-capitalism. The upbeat messages and spectacle of K-pop and the fictionalized daily life of wildly popular Korean dramas strike at the very heart of a message North Korea’s state propagandists have taken great pains to create. This also explains why North Korea reacts so angrily, and sometimes violently, to the balloons that South Korea-based NGOs release into the North that carry thumb drives and other media. In the author’s own interviews and conversations with North Korean defectors, some report that the North Korean authorities respond as if to a chemical spill by cordoning off the area and thoroughly searching the homes of anyone nearby.⁴

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Sources:

KIM Soo-yeon, “N. Korea ramps up public executions of people distributing S. Korean movies: unification ministry,” Yonhap (semiofficial South Korean news agency), 27 June 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240627002651315?section=search

The ministry made public a report on the North’s human rights situation for the second straight year in 2024, with this year’s documents mainly based on additional testimonies from 141 North Korean defectors in 2023.

For the first time, the report included an example of a public execution for violating the law adopted in 2020 on the rejection of “the reactionary ideology and culture.”

“The Kim Jong-un regime has in earnest executed those who were caught after watching South Korean dramas, calling them traitors,” she told reporters.

The law calls for a sentence of up to 10 years of hard labor for people who bring and spread outside culture and information. Punishment is known to be tougher in the case of those watching and disseminating South Korean dramas, movies and music. The North views such behaviors as anti-socialist acts that could threaten the very existence of the regime.

A defector who fled North Korea last year said he witnessed the public execution of a 22-year-old in South Hwanghae Province in 2022 for listening to 70 South Korean songs, watching three South Korean movies, and distributing them to seven people.

“Since the law took effect, a person could be sent to a prison camp just because of watching (South Korean movies). The person who initially brought them in will face the most severe punishment — being shot by a firing squad,” the defector was quoted as saying in the report.

Wearing a white wedding dress as a bride, a groom carrying the bride on his back, and wearing sunglasses are also stated as examples of violating the anti-reactionary ideology law, it said.

Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, “Ministry of Unification releases the 2024 Report on North Korean Human Rights,” Ministry of Unification (official government site), 27 June 2024. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54305

On June 27, 2024, the Ministry of Unification released the 2024 Report on North Korean Human Rights, featuring a case involving a 22-year-old man from South Hwanghae Province who was publicly executed for listening to 70 South Korean songs, watching three movies and distributing them to others.

The report draws on various testimonies from North Korean defectors, underscoring how North Korean authorities actively enforce laws including the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture (2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Law (2021) and the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language (2023) aimed at suppressing its residents.

Furthermore, North Korea has intensified its social education and punishments under these three laws, which were designed to restrict residents’ access to outside information, particularly targeting the youth.

Authorities frequently inspect residents’ mobile phones, checking for contacts and any usage of South Korean language styles or expressions, such as nicknames or abbreviations.

In particular, any non-socialist style is deemed “reactionary ideology,” leading to severe punishments, including brides wearing white dresses, grooms carrying brides at weddings, and the wearing of sunglasses.

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Notes:

¹ Official South Korean government reports on North Korean human rights were apparently discouraged during the presidency of Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) because they interfered with Moon’s focus on improving diplomatic and economic ties with the North. That likely explains why this Unification Ministry report, which has been required by law since 2018, is only the second one to be made public.

² It is possible that the North Korean authorities’ standard for punishment is any North Korean who does something they more likely than not learned from a Korean drama specifically or outside information generally. North Korea likely views wearing white at weddings as an imported Western, and therefore counter-revolutionary, concept.  Formal white attire has a strong association with death or mourning in China, Japan, and the Koreas, so would be suspect if worn at a wedding. Another associated concept is bride carrying, which is a common tradition in South Korea that is apparently less so in the north.

³ See Lee Minji, “S. Korea publishes hard copies of English report on N. Korea’s human rights,” Yonhap (semiofficial South Korean news agency), 7 July 2023. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230707003500325

⁴ Defector reports must be carefully evaluated because defectors from North Korea are, by their very nature, a self-selecting group. Moreover, they may be motivated to embellish the scale and scope of the atrocities they have witnessed because the defectors may believe it is what South Korean authorities and the media want to hear. In coverage of North Korea-related issues, salaciousness is often as important as fact for foreign media sources.

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OE Insight Summary:

Recent PRK defectors to ROK report Pyongyang’s increased and violent response to its citizens viewing foreign media.

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Image Information:

Image: North Korean students receive classroom instruction under the watchful eye of a camera and portrait of Kim Jong Un (2018).
Source: http://ellsworth.ca/dprk/2018-08/608.jpg
Attribution: David Clayton Ellsworth, CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

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North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un meets U.S. President Trump in the Joint Security Area of the Demilitarized Zone (2019).

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“The foreign policy of a state and personal feelings must be strictly distinguished.”

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North Korea previewed its negotiating strategy in a hypothetical future Trump Administration via a recent high-level commentary in its main state-run party newspaper. The commentary both dismissed Pyongyang’s interest in negotiating with the United States and refuted former U.S. President Trump’s statement that his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un would make future negotiations easier. North Korea’s Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) on 23 July addressed statements made by former U.S. President Donald Trump in his speech accepting the nomination for president.¹ After recounting the litany of grievances the North attaches to the United States, the commentary briefly acknowledges the “special personal relations” between former President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un before dismissing it with the phrase “we do not care about [Kim Jong Un’s personal relationship or affinity to former President Trump].” The KCNA piece argues that “personal feelings” between leaders and the affairs of state must be separate. The commentary goes on to make veiled threats against the United States and states the U.S. is responsible for correcting the relationship through action.

This commentary offers clues as to how it will approach negotiations with a potential future Trump Administration. A common North Korean negotiating tactic is to portray itself as indifferent to talks and resigned to potential conflict. Pyongyang wants to be seen as “doing you a favor” by agreeing to talk and subsequently rewarded for its magnanimity. This tactic encourages the other party to negotiate with itself over concessions to get North Korea to the bargaining table and keep it there. This tactic is tried-and-true, and the referenced commentary should be interpreted in light of that pattern.

As the U.S. election approaches, North Korea is likely to issue messages from increasingly authoritative sources within the party’s hierarchy, such as Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jung or ultimately Kim Jong Un himself.  As a rule, the more authoritative the source, the less ambiguity in the North’s course of action and the more likely that the statement represents Pyongyang’s preferences or plans. Although it will be somewhat flexible on the scale, before agreeing to even sit down with the United States, Pyongyang, at minimum, is likely to demand unilateral sanctions relief and cessation of military exercises. North Korea’s ultimate negotiating position is U.S. acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state toward the ultimate objective of ending Washington’s alliance with South Korea.

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Sources:

“조미대결의 초침이 멎는가는 미국의 행동여하에 달려있다 조선중앙통신사 론평 (Whether Second Hand of DPRK-U.S. Confrontation Stops or Not Depends on U.S. Act: KCNA Commentary),” Korea Central News Agency (official North Korean propaganda agency), 23 July 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/389b4b6d4d92a66d210125543c87c1d6502d45160a9c295724db5424054b5cfc.kcmsf

Amid the full-dress presidential election race in the U.S., Trump, who has been officially confirmed as a candidate for the Republican Party, said in his speech of acceptance for candidate that “I got along with them and it is nice to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons and otherwise”, thus buoying a lingering desire for the prospects of the DPRK-U.S. relations. Even if any administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this.

It is true that Trump, when he was president, tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of states in the relations between states, but he did not bring about any substantial positive change.

He that puts on a public gown must put off a private person. The foreign policy of a state and personal feelings must be strictly distinguished.

For nearly 80 years since the founding of the DPRK, the U.S. has pursued the most vicious and persistent hostile policy toward it.

The DPRK has bolstered up its self-defensive capabilities to safeguard its ideology, social system, dignity and life and is fully ready for all-out confrontation with the U.S.

Due to the serious strategic mistakes of the successive administrations, the era has come when the U.S. should really worry about its security.

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Notes:

¹ An unsigned KCNA commentary is the lowest level of authoritative statement made in DPRK propaganda. It is designed to show an external audience that North Korea is aware of and discussing a particular issue, but either has not yet decided upon a course of action or is not yet ready to reveal it.

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OE Insight Summary:

The recent official DRK commentary addressing the USA presidential election is designed to preview Pyongyang’s negotiating position and demands for unilateral, upfront concessions before engaging with a new USA administration.

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Image Information:

Image: North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un meets U.S. President Trump in the Joint Security Area of the Demilitarized Zone (2019).
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Trump_Meets_with_Chairman_Kim_Jong_Un_(48162628746).jpg
Attribution: Executive Office of the President of the United States, Public Domain

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