North Korean State Media Quickly Censors Its Own Photos

A before and after image from the same PRK state media article reporting on the contents of a balloon launched from South Korea. The first image was downloaded before the PRK decided to censor and pixelate the image, while the second one obscures the contents (Oct 15, 2024).


“The security forces organs in the areas where the report of discovery was made have blocked the relevant districts and are conducting the work for searching, gathering and disposal.”


For more than a decade, South Korean NGOs have routinely launched balloons into North Korea containing anti-regime leaflets, USB drives, and CD/DVDs containing foreign media and news reporting, food, medicine, and other items. North Korea considers these launches to be a serious threat to regime stability because the items provide information outside the control of its oppressive and all-consuming censorship apparatus. The balloon launches occur along or near the demilitarized zone when winds are favorable to carry them into the North. North Korea has threatened to attack balloon launch sites or military targets, as Pyongyang claims Seoul is responsible for not stopping the NGOs.

North Korean state-controlled general circulation major daily newspaper Rodong Sinmun recently released several photos of items contained in a probable South Korean NGO-launched balloon into North Korea. However, within 24 hours of releasing the photos, North Korea redacted them by pixelating the balloon’s contents. This appears to be an act of narrative damage control by Pyongyang. North Korean state media at all levels has been criticizing these balloon launches for months, with increasingly frustrated commentaries and threats by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong, who is vice chair of the central committee of ruling Korean Workers Party.[i]

In an unusual move, Rodong Sinmun attached the images to another warning commentary by Kim Yo Jong. North Korea characterizes the contents of the balloons as a provocation and sanitizes the areas where they land like a hazardous materials spill site. North Korean state media had not discussed the contents of the balloons before, rather referring to them as “dirty rubbish” that “even a mutt dislikes to touch.” By not providing too much information, it allowed the readers, both domestic and international, to infer the contents. By explicitly showing the contents of the balloon, North Korea removed the mystery. The balloon in this image contains choco-pies (a South Korean favorite) and other snacks, possibly some sanitary napkins or baby wipes, and medicine, among other things. It is probable, but again unclear because of the image quality, that it also contained media or anti-regime materials.

North Korea would likely be reacting similarly even if the balloons contained only food, hygiene, and personal items. The quality of these items, information about the outside world, the hint of a better life in South Korea, and the opportunity it holds anger the North Korean regime more than the items themselves. North Korea has consistently demonstrated in its actions that it considers external information to be a critical threat to the Kim Jong Un regime.


Sources:

“김여정 조선로동당 중앙위원회 부부장 담화 (Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the C.C., WPK),” Rodong Sinmun (main party newspaper for general audiences), 18 November 2024. http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?MTVAMjAyNC0xMS0xOC1OMDA1QA

Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued the following statement on November 17:

On November 16, various kinds of political agitation leaflets and dirty things sent by the ROK scum were dropped in many areas near the southern border and even in the depth area of the DPRK.

A continuous report of this was made from various parts all day long yesterday.

The security forces organs in the areas where the report of discovery was made have blocked the relevant districts and are conducting the work for searching, gathering and disposal.

We strongly denounce the shameful and dirty acts of the ROK scum who committed the provocation of scattering anti-DPRK political and conspiratorial agitation things once again in disregard of our repeated warnings.

There will be no house owner who hardly gets enraged at such dirty rubbish scattered in the clean yard, which even a mutt dislikes to touch.

The inviolable territory of the DPRK is being polluted, and much labor had to be used in disposing of these wastes.

There is a limit to patience. The DPRK people’s anger at the most disgusting curs has reached the extremes. The scum will have to pay a dear price.

“조선민주주의인민공화국 사회안전성 대변인발표 (Spokesman for DPRK Ministry of Public Security Releases Statement),” Korean Central News Agency (state-controlled news service), 18 October 2024. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/31281702f661bf24e69b10aab3345c6e.kcmsf

Pyongyang, October 18 (KCNA) — On Friday morning, rubbish scattered by a large balloon sent by the ROK scum was found again in Hwaam-ri and Munbong-ri of Phyonggang County in Kangwon Province and in Ryonghak-ri of Cholwon County of the province near the southern border of the DPRK.

The security organs in those areas blockaded and searched the areas and forensically examined and disposed of the collected rubbish.

The Ministry of Public Security informed the KPA General Staff of the results of the examination.

“김여정 조선로동당 중앙위원회 부부장 담화 발표 (Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong),” Korean Central News Agency (state-controlled news service), 10 June 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/8ec19906a01596bdfc2ca10bf9f8d555.kcmsf

Pyongyang, June 10 (KCNA) — Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued the following press statement on Sunday.

The ROK connived at the provocative act of scattering the political agitation rubbish across the border of the DPRK again on June 6 and 7 despite our repeated warning against the intemperate psychological warfare of the scum who defected from the DPRK, thus aggravating the situation.

In the period between June 6 and 8, the despicable political agitation rubbish was discovered in Singye and Thosan counties of North Hwanghae Province, Jangphung County and Phanmun District of Kaesong Municipality, Kosan, Phyonggang and Cholwon counties of Kangwon Province and other areas of the DPRK near the border.

This is a prelude to a very dangerous situation.

Politicians of Seoul are trying hard to justify their stand with the only and strange deformed logic in the world that regulates and judges the “freedom of expression” and “provocation” in the windward direction. And they formalized their behavior just like a guilty filing the suit first that they have resumed the loudspeaker broadcasting smear campaign again against the DPRK’s counteraction against their challengeable act, thus creating a new crisis.

We strongly denounce the despicable and childish behavior of the ROK and clarify our stand responding to it.


Notes:

[i] Kim Yo Jong comments are likely intended to convey authoritative messages from the PRK government without restraining leader Kim Jong Un’s options. Her messages are undoubtedly authoritative, but not final.


OE Insight Summary:

PRK state media released raw images of items recovered from the debris of a balloon recently launched from a South Korean NGO, only to quickly censor the images to obscure the food, medicine, and other items contained therein.


Image Information:

Image: A before and after image from the same PRK state media article reporting on the contents of a balloon launched from South Korea. The first image was downloaded before the PRK decided to censor and pixelate the image, while the second one obscures the contents (Oct 15, 2024).
Source: http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTJAMjAyNC0xMS0xOC1IMDAzQDE1QDFAQDBAMTA==
Attribution: Public Domain under Art. XII of the Copyright Act of North Korea, aka PD-KPGov, which is “government or other works in the public domain”


North Korea Tacitly Acknowledges Its Troops Are in Ukraine

“If there is such a thing…I think it will be an act conforming with the regulations of international law.”


The official state-controlled broadcaster, the Korean Central News Agency, carried a North Korean vice foreign minister’s statement on 25 October,  marking the first known response by the regime to Western evidence of North Korean troops deploying to the conflict in Ukraine. In response, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister for Russia Affairs Kim Jong Gyu provided a nebulous answer that amounted to admitting that while Kim cannot answer the question of North Korean troops in Ukraine authoritatively, there would be no legal reason prohibiting North Korea from doing so. Importantly, Kim did not deny the story.

North Korea had several options for addressing this growing question. First, it could have stayed silent on the matter. Alternatively, it could have announced its troops in Ukraine in its trademark aggressive media style as a concrete example of growing North Korea-Russia cooperation and North Korean military power. It instead chose a third option, whereby it acknowledged people were asking questions while framing its justification as hypothetical. North Korea’s savvy media operators were doubtless aware of how such a statement would rock the global media environment—and it did.

The regime’s response is intriguing as it does not appear to solve any existing problem in the information domain. It is possible that North Korea was compelled to make a statement on the matter because, for example, party officials had begun asking questions, the regime was preparing additional soldiers to deploy, and/or the regime’s censors wanted to say something about the story before everyday North Koreans heard about it from unauthorized, and therefore illegal, sources. It is also plausible that Russia resisted North Korea’s acknowledgment in order to avoid portraying President Vladimir Putin as weak.

North Korea watchers should be on the lookout for supplementary statements from authoritative sources within the regime, such as (in increasing order of authority) the foreign or defense ministers, the cabinet or state affairs commission, Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong, and Kim Jong Un himself. As North Korea decides to selectively reveal more information about its operations, they are likely to do so according to this assessed media authoritativeness ladder.


Sources:

“조선민주주의인민공화국 외무성 김정규 로씨야담당 부상 최근 여론화되고있는 대로씨야파병설과 관련한 립장 발표 (Vice Foreign Minister for Russia Affairs of DPRK clarifies stand on rumor of troop dispatch to Russia),” KCNA (central state-owned broadcaster), 25 Oct 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/1b5206685a5dd88f86da517afd511712.kcmsf

Kim Jong Gyu, vice foreign minister of the DPRK in charge of Russian affairs, gave the following answer to a question raised by KCNA on Friday as regards a rumor that the troops of the Korean People’s Army are dispatched to Russia which is recently drawing public attention in the world: “I heeded the rumor of the dispatch of KPA troops to Russia, which the world media is building up public opinion.”

The DPRK Foreign Ministry does not directly engage in the things of the Ministry of National Defence, and does not feel the need to confirm it separately.

If there is such a thing that the world media is talking about, I think it will be an act conforming with the regulations of international law.

There will evidently exist forces which want to describe it as illegal one, I think.


OE Insight Summary:

PRK Foreign Ministry’s non-denial that it has troops in UKR is a curious response from a state-controlled media known for its bombast. The regime likely believed it had no choice but to say something given the growing evidence. It is the first known statement made by the PRK, and it would not have done so with Kim Jong Un’s approval.


Kim Jong Un Speech Previews Military Action To Change Relationship With South Korea

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un gives a speech to the Kim Jong Un National Defense University (Oct 8, 2024).


“For the Republic of Korea, all that it needs to do in order to guarantee its security is not provoking us into using our military strength.”


North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s recent policy speech to the Kim Jong Un National Defense University, published by the Korean Central News Agency, is likely intended to preview a military action by Pyongyang over the coming year. In the 8 October speech, Kim laid out his view of relations with South Korea, claiming that his regime no longer intended to reunify the south by military force but also had no interest in peaceful reunification. Kim’s speech emphasized that North and South Korea are now separate and distinct countries, and any familial bond that may have once connected them is gone.

Practically, Kim’s speech recognizes that North-South relations are at a diplomatic nadir. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s policy has been to treat North Korea as a military threat first and foremost, managed by a strong alliance with the United States and good relations with Japan. Moreover, North Korea likely realizes that it is incapable of reunifying South Korea by force of conventional arms and does not need to maintain the fiction.

Kim’s speech probably has several concurrent objectives. First, it is meant to both galvanize and alarm the mainstream political left in South Korea, who are more likely than others to perceive the two countries as unnaturally divided and express a sense of shared history and kinship. Second, if a more accommodating leader were to assume power in Seoul or Washington, Kim would be positioned to demand unilateral, upfront concessions. Third, it sets the stage for a dramatic event over the next year to change the status quo of enduring disputes. Speeches by and quotes attributed to Kim Jong Un in state media are the most authoritative the regime can issue. Such an abrupt policy change announced at a military venue is likely designed to preview some kind of military action over the next year when it will “react” to South Korean aggression in order to achieve by military force what it has not been able to achieve through diplomacy: such as monetary tribute, sanctions relief, and redrawing the de facto maritime borders. Kim’s speech implies that as its enemy, South Korea only continues to exist due to Kim Jong Un’s magnanimity.


Sources:

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), “경애하는 김정은동지께서 김정은국방종합대학을 축하방문하시여 하신 연설 (Speech at Congratulatory Visit to Kim Jong Un University of National Defence),” KCNA (central state-owned broadcaster), 8 Oct 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/aa579c643101bb7eb1a0e7e21f43d9a1.kcmsf

The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un made a speech at the congratulatory visit to Kim Jong Un University of National Defence…

It is a matter of course that the more fearfully they become aware of their doomsday coming closer, the more frantic the ringleader of aggression and its lackeys, dependent on anti-communism and war for their existence, will go and rush to war till they collapse with sheer exhaustion…

I am saying this as you need to have a clear understanding of our enemy.

As you have learned through newspapers and broadcasts, some days ago I made clear my view of and stand towards this matter.

A wise statesman would not act so rashly as to endanger the security of his country and its population; in dealing with a nuclear-armed rival, rather than opt for a confrontation or face-off with it, he would put emphasis on, and concern himself about, how to handle the situation and avoid military conflict.

Even if there appeared a matchless commander unheard-of in the time-honoured history, he would not be able to come up with a realistic method of overcoming the distinctions between the capabilities of nukes and conventional weapons.

For the Republic of Korea, all that it needs to do in order to guarantee its security is not provoking us into using our military strength.

This is so simple a method.

It would find itself safe if it refrained from provoking us or flexing its muscles before us at times, but it seems that Seoul has no one capable of doing such a simple thing.

To be honest, we have no intention of attacking the Republic of Korea.

Thinking of it is abominable, and we hate dealing with those in it.

Formerly, we often spoke about liberating the south and reunification by force of arms, but now we are not interested in it. And since our statement about two separate states, we have been all the more unwilling to be conscious of the state in the south…


OE Insight Summary:

Kim Jong Un’s recent policy speech disclaims any desire to reunify with the South, classified the relationship as being between enemy states, sets the stage for a future military operation to change the status quo, and threatens Seoul with a reminder that KOR exists owing to the restraint and mercy of Kim Jong Un.


Image Information:

Image: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un gives a speech to the Kim Jong Un National Defense University (Oct 8, 2024).
Source: http://kcna.kp/siteFiles/photo/202410/PIC0084398.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain under Art. XII of the Copyright Act of North Korea, aka PD-KPGov which is “government or other works in the public domain,”


North Korea Reveals Previously Undisclosed Uranium Enrichment Site

“Noting that anti-DPRK nuclear threat moves of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces have become more undisguised and crossed the red-line…require the DPRK to steadily expand and bolster up its military capability for self-defense and the capability for preemptive attack with the nuclear force as the backbone.”


North Korean state media is releasing stories at a steady pace highlighting its advancements and intent regarding its illicit nuclear weapons program and associated delivery systems. According to a 13 September article in state-controlled broadcaster Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim Jong Un visited a previously undisclosed uranium enrichment facility designed to produce material for nuclear weapons. Notably, North Korea emphasized that the facility was for development of nuclear weapons targeted against the United States, not for the productions of civilian nuclear fuel, as the regime routinely claims.

This disclosure comes as part of a weeks-long celebration of the 76th anniversary of the founding of North Korea, during which state media has issued a steady drumbeat of articles about the party’s military plans and goals. During the same period, North Korea also released an image of a new 12-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL) for a possible new type of ICBM, the test firing of a new 600mm MRLS,[i] and Kim inspecting special operations forces training.[ii]

Over the last decade, North Korea has sought to portray its nuclear weapons and missile program as what a “normal nation” would do. However, North Korean media historically fluctuated between two extremes. On one hand, it would aggressively hype the program, threaten the United States and our allies, promise first strikes, and publicly identify its intended nuclear targets on the U.S. mainland. Then, depending on the political environment, it would shift to a message of simple deterrence, disclaiming any first use, and promising to be a responsible nuclear power.

North Korea is portraying its nuclear weapons development targeted at the United States as the new normal, similar to its uncharacteristic restraint in unveiling its new 12-axle TEL. The Regime probably does not feel the need to use its trademark over-the-top, anti-U.S. rhetoric to justify the program when matter-of-fact statements will do. The Regime’s message is clearly that this is the way things are now.


Sources:

“경애하는 김정은동지께서 핵무기연구소와 무기급핵물질생산기지를 현지지도하시였다 (Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Nuclear Weapons Institute and Production Base of Weapons-grade Nuclear Materials),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 13 Sepetember 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/8bc7076c7ecb6af9065c66977903f00c.kcmsf

Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, inspected the Nuclear Weapons Institute and the production base of weapons-grade nuclear materials, acquainted himself with the production of nuclear warheads and the current production of nuclear materials and set forth important tasks concerning a long-term plan for increasing the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.

He highly praised the scientists, technicians and officials in the field of nuclear weapons production for carrying out without fail the plan for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials needed for manufacturing nuclear warheads, cherishing the firm and steadfast revolutionary spirit and faith to firmly defend the victorious advance of the revolutionary cause of Juche with the strongest nuclear force.

He expressed great satisfaction after being briefed on the fact that the base is dynamically producing nuclear materials by studying, developing and introducing all the system elements including centrifugal separators and various kinds of sensors and controllers with its own efforts and technology.

Personally looking round the production site, he said that it is invigorating to see the place, and continued: In order to exponentially multiply the nuclear weapons for self-defence true to the Party’s line of building the nuclear force, it is necessary to further increase the number of centrifuges, not content with the successes achieved, and, at the same time, to enhance the individual separation ability of the centrifuge and push forward with the introduction of a new-type centrifuge, which has already reached the completion stage, as planned, so as to consolidate the foundation for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials.

Going round the construction site for expanding the capacity for the current production of nuclear weapons, he learned in detail about the daily plan for the assembly of equipment.

Noting that anti-DPRK nuclear threat moves of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces have become more undisguised and crossed the red-line, he said the security environment facing the DPRK, the peculiarity of the Korean revolution compelling the country to constantly confront the U.S. and contain it and prospective threats require the DPRK to steadily expand and bolster up its military capability for self-defence and the capability for preemptive attack with the nuclear force as the backbone. He stressed again that a more rapid and sure advance should be made in the struggle to always maintain the thoroughgoing counteraction posture of the nuclear force and improve the posture to a high level.

The combatants in the field of nuclear weapons production, assuming the most important responsibility, that is, the historic mission to bolster up the nuclear war deterrent of the country in quality and quantity and in a sustained and accelerated way, should keep exerting themselves in production and thus more creditably fulfil the sacred duty they took on for the Party and the revolution, he instructed.

He stressed the need to set a higher long-term goal in producing nuclear materials necessary for the manufacture of tactical nuclear weapons and concentrate all efforts on making a fresh leap forward, and set forth important tasks and orientation.


Notes:

[i] See: “경애하는 김정은동지께서 새형의 600㎜방사포차성능검증을 위한 시험사격을 보시였다 (Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Test-fire for Verifying Performance of New-type 600mm Multiple Rocket Launcher),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 13 September 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/d5a6198af96d278695d7978c6d8bd74f.kcmsf

[ii] See: “경애하는 김정은동지께서 조선인민군 특수작전무력훈련기지를 현지시찰하시였다  (Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Training Base of Special Operation Forces of KPA),” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 13 September 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/b9243d11f2d74891bab7867dcaf965f0.kcmsf


North Korea Unveils New 12-Axle ICBM Launcher

“Kim Jong Un acquainted himself with the production of military hardware in the second half of the year.”


North Korea publicly revealed a new, larger ICBM transporter erector launcher (TEL) system, potentially for a new ICBM class. The communist Workers’ Party of Korea newspaper Rodong Sinmun, released a picture of Kim Jong Un inspecting a new 12-axle TEL. The disclosure happened as Kim Jong Un visited a defense industrial enterprise site on 8 September as part of events commemorating the 76th anniversary of the founding of the state.

Since North Korea’s first ICBM test launch on 4 July 2017, the PRK has been testing progressively larger ICBM missile systems and associated TELs. The Hwaseong-17, North Korea’s known largest ICBM, tested in 2023, already has an associated 11-axle TEL.1

The 12-axle TEL’s unveiling was uncharacteristically subdued by North Korean standards, presented almost as an afterthought buried in a technical piece about the PRK’s defense manufacturing goals. Apart from the associated image, the Rodong Sinmun article makes no reference to the TEL, instead highlighting Kim Jong Un’s visit to the site and his speech about the important work of the national defense industrial enterprise.

However, the photo release could not have been an accident and most likely had a messaging purpose.2 These could have included promoting a new, even larger missile system under development which the regime might reveal or test closer to the U.S. presidential election. Possibly, but less likely, it could represent a new and more survivable design for the existing Hwaseong systems. The subdued nature of the unveiling could likewise represent North Korea’s attempt to influence the narrative in Western, Japanese, and South Korean media, a sort of “we are still here” message that carries an implied threat to the next U.S. administration.


Sources:

Rodong Sinmun, “경애하는 김정은동지께서 국방공업기업소를 현지지도하시였다 (Dear Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Defense Industrial Enterprises),” Rodong Sinmun (communist Workers’ Party of Korea daily newspaper), 8 Sep 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/8bc7076c7ecb6af9065c66977903f00c.kcmsf

Pyongyang, September 8 (KCNA) — Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, visited a defence industrial enterprise under the Second Economy Commission to learn about the production of military hardware…

Highly appreciating the indomitable fighting spirit and extraordinary ideological and spiritual world of its officials and workers, he expressed thanks to them for carrying out the huge munitions production tasks in a responsible and correct way and making a great contribution to the development of our armed forces, true to the Party’s policy on munitions industry.

Learning about the structural characteristics, performance and tactical and technical specifications of military hardware under development and production, he stressed the need to put the munitions production on a more scientific and modern basis and thoroughly guarantee the combat performance of military hardware.

Repeatedly expressing his satisfaction over the fact that the prospect for confidently attaining the goal of military hardware production within the five-year period decided and assigned by the Eighth Party Congress is guaranteed thanks to the dynamic struggle of the munitions industry workers, he clarified the principles and ways for the defence industrial enterprise to hold fast to in the munitions production permanently.


Notes:

1 For more information on North Korean Hwaseong tests over the last three years, see: https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/weapons/north-korea-reveals-12-axle-tel

2 North Korea has a pattern in engaging new U.S. administrations in order to achieve its diplomatic and military goals. For further discussion on Pyongyang’s assessed course of action, see: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/How-North-Korea-will-seek-to-play-the-next-U.S.-president


Report Highlights North Korea’s Fixation on Information Control

North Korean students receive classroom instruction under the watchful eye of a camera and portrait of Kim Jong Un (2018).


“The Kim Jong-un regime has in earnest executed those who were caught after watching South Korean dramas, calling them traitors.”


Reports from inside North Korea of increasingly harsh prison sentences and mass executions for viewing foreign language materials underscore that the Regime assesses information control as vital to the continued existence of the North Korean state. According to a 27 June report from South Korea’s semi-official news agency Yonhap News, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, responsible for managing Seoul’s relations with the North, issued its second human rights report highlighting defector accounts of public executions carried out in the country.1 Defectors testified that many of these executions were in response to convictions for sharing South Korea dramas or music, wearing sunglasses, or for wearing white at a wedding, among other violations.2 This is the second such human rights report and is based on interviews with 141 defectors since 2023.3 According to a 27 June press release by the Unification Ministry announcing the report, “North Korean authorities actively enforce laws including the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture (2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Law (2021) and the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language (2023) aimed at suppressing its residents.”

The report underscores that the North Korean government views information control as critical to its survival. North Korean state media routinely characterizes South Korea as a feral wasteland of dystopian anarcho-capitalism. The upbeat messages and spectacle of K-pop and the fictionalized daily life of wildly popular Korean dramas strike at the very heart of a message North Korea’s state propagandists have taken great pains to create. This also explains why North Korea reacts so angrily, and sometimes violently, to the balloons that South Korea-based NGOs release into the North that carry thumb drives and other media. In the author’s own interviews and conversations with North Korean defectors, some report that the North Korean authorities respond as if to a chemical spill by cordoning off the area and thoroughly searching the homes of anyone nearby.4


Sources:

KIM Soo-yeon, “N. Korea ramps up public executions of people distributing S. Korean movies: unification ministry,” Yonhap (semiofficial South Korean news agency), 27 June 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240627002651315?section=search

The ministry made public a report on the North’s human rights situation for the second straight year in 2024, with this year’s documents mainly based on additional testimonies from 141 North Korean defectors in 2023.

For the first time, the report included an example of a public execution for violating the law adopted in 2020 on the rejection of “the reactionary ideology and culture.”

“The Kim Jong-un regime has in earnest executed those who were caught after watching South Korean dramas, calling them traitors,” she told reporters.

The law calls for a sentence of up to 10 years of hard labor for people who bring and spread outside culture and information. Punishment is known to be tougher in the case of those watching and disseminating South Korean dramas, movies and music. The North views such behaviors as anti-socialist acts that could threaten the very existence of the regime.

A defector who fled North Korea last year said he witnessed the public execution of a 22-year-old in South Hwanghae Province in 2022 for listening to 70 South Korean songs, watching three South Korean movies, and distributing them to seven people.

“Since the law took effect, a person could be sent to a prison camp just because of watching (South Korean movies). The person who initially brought them in will face the most severe punishment — being shot by a firing squad,” the defector was quoted as saying in the report.

Wearing a white wedding dress as a bride, a groom carrying the bride on his back, and wearing sunglasses are also stated as examples of violating the anti-reactionary ideology law, it said.

Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, “Ministry of Unification releases the 2024 Report on North Korean Human Rights,” Ministry of Unification (official government site), 27 June 2024. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&mode=view&cntId=54305

On June 27, 2024, the Ministry of Unification released the 2024 Report on North Korean Human Rights, featuring a case involving a 22-year-old man from South Hwanghae Province who was publicly executed for listening to 70 South Korean songs, watching three movies and distributing them to others.

The report draws on various testimonies from North Korean defectors, underscoring how North Korean authorities actively enforce laws including the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture (2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Law (2021) and the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language (2023) aimed at suppressing its residents.

Furthermore, North Korea has intensified its social education and punishments under these three laws, which were designed to restrict residents’ access to outside information, particularly targeting the youth.

Authorities frequently inspect residents’ mobile phones, checking for contacts and any usage of South Korean language styles or expressions, such as nicknames or abbreviations.

In particular, any non-socialist style is deemed “reactionary ideology,” leading to severe punishments, including brides wearing white dresses, grooms carrying brides at weddings, and the wearing of sunglasses.


Notes:

1 Official South Korean government reports on North Korean human rights were apparently discouraged during the presidency of Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) because they interfered with Moon’s focus on improving diplomatic and economic ties with the North. That likely explains why this Unification Ministry report, which has been required by law since 2018, is only the second one to be made public.

2 It is possible that the North Korean authorities’ standard for punishment is any North Korean who does something they more likely than not learned from a Korean drama specifically or outside information generally. North Korea likely views wearing white at weddings as an imported Western, and therefore counter-revolutionary, concept.  Formal white attire has a strong association with death or mourning in China, Japan, and the Koreas, so would be suspect if worn at a wedding. Another associated concept is bride carrying, which is a common tradition in South Korea that is apparently less so in the north.

3 See Lee Minji, “S. Korea publishes hard copies of English report on N. Korea’s human rights,” Yonhap (semiofficial South Korean news agency), 7 July 2023. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230707003500325

4 Defector reports must be carefully evaluated because defectors from North Korea are, by their very nature, a self-selecting group. Moreover, they may be motivated to embellish the scale and scope of the atrocities they have witnessed because the defectors may believe it is what South Korean authorities and the media want to hear. In coverage of North Korea-related issues, salaciousness is often as important as fact for foreign media sources.


OE Insight Summary:

Recent PRK defectors to ROK report Pyongyang’s increased and violent response to its citizens viewing foreign media.


Image Information:

Image: North Korean students receive classroom instruction under the watchful eye of a camera and portrait of Kim Jong Un (2018).
Source: http://ellsworth.ca/dprk/2018-08/608.jpg
Attribution: David Clayton Ellsworth, CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


North Korea Previews Hypothetical Negotiating Strategy

North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un meets U.S. President Trump in the Joint Security Area of the Demilitarized Zone (2019).


“The foreign policy of a state and personal feelings must be strictly distinguished.”


North Korea previewed its negotiating strategy in a hypothetical future Trump Administration via a recent high-level commentary in its main state-run party newspaper. The commentary both dismissed Pyongyang’s interest in negotiating with the United States and refuted former U.S. President Trump’s statement that his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un would make future negotiations easier. North Korea’s Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) on 23 July addressed statements made by former U.S. President Donald Trump in his speech accepting the nomination for president.1 After recounting the litany of grievances the North attaches to the United States, the commentary briefly acknowledges the “special personal relations” between former President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un before dismissing it with the phrase “we do not care about [Kim Jong Un’s personal relationship or affinity to former President Trump].” The KCNA piece argues that “personal feelings” between leaders and the affairs of state must be separate. The commentary goes on to make veiled threats against the United States and states the U.S. is responsible for correcting the relationship through action.

This commentary offers clues as to how it will approach negotiations with a potential future Trump Administration. A common North Korean negotiating tactic is to portray itself as indifferent to talks and resigned to potential conflict. Pyongyang wants to be seen as “doing you a favor” by agreeing to talk and subsequently rewarded for its magnanimity. This tactic encourages the other party to negotiate with itself over concessions to get North Korea to the bargaining table and keep it there. This tactic is tried-and-true, and the referenced commentary should be interpreted in light of that pattern.

As the U.S. election approaches, North Korea is likely to issue messages from increasingly authoritative sources within the party’s hierarchy, such as Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jung or ultimately Kim Jong Un himself.  As a rule, the more authoritative the source, the less ambiguity in the North’s course of action and the more likely that the statement represents Pyongyang’s preferences or plans. Although it will be somewhat flexible on the scale, before agreeing to even sit down with the United States, Pyongyang, at minimum, is likely to demand unilateral sanctions relief and cessation of military exercises. North Korea’s ultimate negotiating position is U.S. acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state toward the ultimate objective of ending Washington’s alliance with South Korea.


Sources:

“조미대결의 초침이 멎는가는 미국의 행동여하에 달려있다 조선중앙통신사 론평 (Whether Second Hand of DPRK-U.S. Confrontation Stops or Not Depends on U.S. Act: KCNA Commentary),” Korea Central News Agency (official North Korean propaganda agency), 23 July 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/389b4b6d4d92a66d210125543c87c1d6502d45160a9c295724db5424054b5cfc.kcmsf

Amid the full-dress presidential election race in the U.S., Trump, who has been officially confirmed as a candidate for the Republican Party, said in his speech of acceptance for candidate that “I got along with them and it is nice to get along with someone who has a lot of nuclear weapons and otherwise”, thus buoying a lingering desire for the prospects of the DPRK-U.S. relations. Even if any administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this.

It is true that Trump, when he was president, tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of states in the relations between states, but he did not bring about any substantial positive change.

He that puts on a public gown must put off a private person. The foreign policy of a state and personal feelings must be strictly distinguished.

For nearly 80 years since the founding of the DPRK, the U.S. has pursued the most vicious and persistent hostile policy toward it.

The DPRK has bolstered up its self-defensive capabilities to safeguard its ideology, social system, dignity and life and is fully ready for all-out confrontation with the U.S.

Due to the serious strategic mistakes of the successive administrations, the era has come when the U.S. should really worry about its security.


Notes:

1 An unsigned KCNA commentary is the lowest level of authoritative statement made in DPRK propaganda. It is designed to show an external audience that North Korea is aware of and discussing a particular issue, but either has not yet decided upon a course of action or is not yet ready to reveal it.


OE Insight Summary:

The recent official DRK commentary addressing the USA presidential election is designed to preview Pyongyang’s negotiating position and demands for unilateral, upfront concessions before engaging with a new USA administration.


Image Information:

Image: North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un meets U.S. President Trump in the Joint Security Area of the Demilitarized Zone (2019).
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Trump_Meets_with_Chairman_Kim_Jong_Un_(48162628746).jpg
Attribution: Executive Office of the President of the United States, Public Domain


Russia Continues To Enhance Its Arctic Infrastructure

Map of the Yenisei River showing national borders


“The 5.8 km long pipeline is a key component of Vostok Oil, the biggest industrial project currently unfolding in the Russian Arctic. According to Russian state oil company Rosneft and its subsidiary RN-Vankor, as many as 25 ships have taken part in dredging operations in the Yenisei during summer 2023. As winter approached, the company started laying the pipeline on the riverbed. The new pipeline will cross the Yenisei River near Tochina.”


Amid sanctions, Russia continues to develop the infrastructure necessary to exploit and export its vast natural resources, especially in the Arctic. The Yenisei River is a major river flowing northward that originates in Mongolia and bisects Russia. It is a key economic transport route of vital energy and metals from the industrial city and extraction centers of Norilsk. According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, products move by rail from Norilsk to the river port of Dudinka, where they are shipped to the Arctic Ocean and then to ports east and west on the Northern Sea Route. Russia is investing heavily in increasing the carrying capacity of the Northern Sea route,[i] already moving energy to its Pacific customers on ice-class LNG carriers and oil tankers. The Dudinka port is at capacity and the riverside village of Tochina is being rapidly expanded. Reportedly, 21 riverside terminals are under construction to handle petroleum exports. Russia’s focus on new routes to its Asian markets, China and North Korea, will help it circumvent the sanctions and survive a protracted war in Ukraine.


Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Oilmen start building of underwater pipeline across the Yenisei,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 19 December 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2023/12/oilmen-start-building-underwater-pipeline-across-yenisey

The 5.8 km long pipeline is a key component of Vostok Oil, the biggest industrial project currently unfolding in the Russian Arctic. According to Russian state oil company Rosneft and its subsidiary RN-Vankor, as many as 25 ships have in taken part in dredging operations in the Yenisei during summer 2023. As winter approached, the company started laying the pipeline on the riverbed. The new pipeline will cross the Yenisey River near Tochina.

The pipes have a 820 mm diameter and wall thickness of 22 mm. The 5,8 km long installation will connect the eastern and western shores of the major Arctic river. Its starting point is in the village of Tochina, about 60 km north of Dudinka.

Rosneft is under great time pressure to build this part of the Vostok Oil project. On a number of occasions, company CEO Igor Sechin has reiterated that the project will produce more than 30 million tons already in 2024. By 2030, the Vostok Oil will produce more than 100 million tons per year, most of it to be exported through the Northern Sea Route to Asian buyers.

A significant number of wells are drilled in the Taymyr Peninsula and several hundred km of pipeline are under construction. The oil will be exported from the Sever Terminal on the coast of the Yenisei Bay.

In the course of summer 2023, more than one million tons of goods have reportedly been shipped to the construction sites along the Yenisei, including 120,000 tons of oil pipes.

Rosneft have developed 21 mooring point for ship deliveries in the area and as many as 402 ships have reportedly been involved in project shipments this year.


Notes:

[i] For additional reporting on Russian activity in the Arctic see: Les Grau, “Russian Arctic Seaports Expand Activity Despite War In Ukraine,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russian-arctic-seaports-expand-activity-despite-war-in-ukraine/


Image Information:

Image: Map of the Yenisei River showing national borders
Source: Kmusser, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yeniseirivermap.png
Attribution: CCA-Share Alike 3.0 Unported


Russia Denies that North Korea Is Supplying It With Weapons for Use in Ukraine

Meeting of Russian and North Korean Defense Ministers at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang on 25 July 2023.


“The accusations made by the ‘collective West’ of ‘illegal’ military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea are unfounded and unsubstantiated.”


Relations between Russia and North Korea are drawing concern as new evidence emerges that Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with conventional munitions and missiles for use in Ukraine. Satellite activity from October 2022 revealed that North Korea supplied an arsenal of weapons – including short-range ballistic missiles, anti-tank missiles, and portable anti-air missiles as well as rifles, rocket launchers, mortars and shells.[i] If confirmed, North Korean sales of weapons to Russia would violate several UN Security Council resolutions  (1718, 2270, and 2321) going back to 2006, which ban the sales of all arms, ballistics systems, and related materials to and from Pyongyang. 

It is estimated Russia received some 350,000 artillery shells from North Korea. At a rate of fire of 10,000 per day at its high at the time of this writing (down from an estimated peak of 60,000 per day in 2022[ii]), that gives Russia just short of a two months’ supply. To put that figure in comparison, given American production levels of 24,000 artillery shells per month, that is more than the US produces in an entire year. The slower pace of Russian missiles fired (based on the 10,0000 per shells per day statistic) on Ukrainian cities could reflect its lack of supply, or it could be a sign of stockpiling in anticipation of a winter offensive, as some analysts suspect.[iii]  

For its part, Russia’s foreign ministry has vehemently denied any violations. According to the excerpted article in the pro-Kremlin news site Sputnik News, Russia denies any “illegal” weapons transfers. Yet satellite imagery starting in August 2023 captures some 1,000 containers leaving North Korea’s Rajin port bound for an ammunition dump near Ukraine’s border.[iv] Indeed, as of October 2023, research from CSIS indicates that cross-border activity at North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility has spiked to its highest levels since before the pandemic.

In exchange, Russia has reportedly provided technical support to North Korea’s nascent space program, as well as ICBM technology. Such assistance is likely needed given Pyongyang’s two previous attempts to launch reconnaissance satellites failed due to booster malfunctions. Theodore Postol of MIT has suggested that Russia also supplied North Korea with the Topol-M [R1] ICBM, the basis for its solid-fuel Hwasong-18 [RG2] missile.[v] Though these reported arms transfers are notable, the Russia-North Korean nexus is not new. After the Cold War, observers raised fears that out-of-work Russian nuclear scientists were assisting Pyongyang to develop nuclear weapons. Today, fears of an arms race are rising in Seoul.[vi] That has prompted South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. to begin sharing real-time missile warning data emanating from North Korea.[vii] Experts disagree whether the Russia-North Korea nexus is a sign of Russian weakness (Russia is badly in need of arms) or strength (Moscow has allies and an arsenal it can call on rapidly for arms). Whatever the assessment, this nexus bears attention from the U.S. Army.


Sources:

“МИД РФ отрицает нарушение резолюций СБ ООН по Северной Корее (Russian Foreign Ministry Denies Violating UNSC Resolutions on North Korea),” Sputnik News (pro-Kremlin news outlet directed at foreigners), 11 November 2023. https://sputnikglobe.com/20231111/russian-foreign-ministry-denies-violating-unsc-resolutions-on-north-korea-1114884101.html  

“The accusations made by the ‘collective West’ of ‘illegal’ military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea are unfounded and unsubstantiated … Russia is responsible in fulfilling its international obligations, including Security Council resolutions. This does not prevent us from deepening traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with our neighbors, including North Korea,” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova was quoted as saying by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador at Large Oleg Burmistrov told Sputnik that Russia thoroughly abides by its international obligations towards Pyongyang within the Security Council’s resolutions.

Earlier in the day North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a statement distributed by the Korean media that friendship between Russia and North Korea will only strengthen in the future, and the United States will face a “powerful and coordinated response” if it attempts to disrupt stability in the region.“Relations of friendship and cooperation between two countries – Korea and Russia, striving for independence, peace and friendship, will unshakably strengthen and develop, and any attempts by the United States and its satellites aimed at disrupting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region will face a powerful and coordinated response from independent sovereign states,” the statement said. It said the US administration should get used to the “new realities of Korean-Russian relations.”


Notes:

[i] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun, “Ongoing Arms Transfer Activity at Najin Port,” Beyond Parellel, CSIS, 17 October 2023. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/ongoing-arms-transfer-activity-at-najin-port/

 [ii] Jeff Schogol, “Russia is hammering Ukraine with up to 60,000 artillery shells and rockets every day,” Taks and Purpose. 13 June 2022. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russia-artillery-rocket-strikes-east-ukraine/

[iii] Dara Massicot, “Putin’s Cannon Fodder: Foreign Affairs Interview,” Foreign Affairs, 2 November 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D2sUEB_rRhA

[iv] The shipment came shortly before the leaders of Russia and North Korea met for five hours at Russia’s Vostochny Spaceport, according to TASS, the Russian News Agency. See: Five hours at Vostochny Spaceport: Putin, Kim Jong Un meet again four years later,” TASS (Russia’s main state news agency), 13 September 2023. https://tass.com/politics/1674459: The satellite imagery is further backed up by recent analysis by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) that found that two Russian vessels made at least five round trips between North Korea and Russia, believed to be arms transfers. See: Song Sang-Ho, “2 Russian ships made 5 trips between N. Korea, Russia since mid-Aug. in suspected arms transfers,” YonHap News Agency (South Korea’s leading news agency) 17 October 2023. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20231017000351315

 [v] Theodore Postol of MIT suggests that Russia also had supplied North Korea with the Topol-M ICBM, the basis for its solid-fuel Hwasong-18 missile. See: Theodore Postol, “The Transfer of a Russian ICBM to North Korea?” Beyond Parallel, 17 August 2023. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/the-transfer-of-a-russian-icbm-to-north-korea/

[vi] Simon Hutagalung, “Russia and North Korea relations in transition,” Korea Times (English-language newspaper in Seoul), 5 November, 2023. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2023/11/137_362456.html

[vii] Anastasia Kostina, “Учения обстоятельств: США и Южная Корея отработают оборону от КНДР (Exercises of circumstances: the United States and South Korea will practice defense against the DPRK: How Pyongyang and Beijing react to the maneuvers of Washington and Seoul),” Izvestia (Russian news outlet), 30 October 2023. https://iz.ru/1596255/anastasiia-kostina/ucheniia-obstoiatelstv-ssha-i-iuzhnaia-koreia-otrabotaiut-oboronu-ot-kndr


Image Information:

Image: Meeting of Russian and North Korean Defense Ministers at Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang on 25 July 2023.
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Meeting_of_Russian_and_North_Korean_Defense_Ministers_(2023)_01.png
Attribution: CCA 4.0


Iran’s Increased Defense Budget Leading to More Arms Exports

Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi Farahi.

Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi Farahi.


“This year, the [Defense Industries] Organization has grown by 200 percent.”


Iran has steadily increased its defense budget following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the lifting of many United Nations sanctions.[i] According to the excerpted article from the Ministry of Defense’s Holy Defense News Agency, that windfall has now come to Iran’s Defense Industry Organization (DIO), the state-owned conglomerate meant to bolster the Iran’s indigenous military technology development and manufacturing base. In the excerpted article, Deputy Defense Minister Seyyed Mahdi Farahi, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) general who previously headed Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization and served as DIO managing director, reported that the DIO budget tripled from the previous year. DIO exports have reportedly more than doubled, suggesting that Iran has recouped some of the investment it made to develop the same weapons it deploys itself. Iran’s exports of drones to Russia likely comprises a large portion of these export revenues.[ii]

Iranian arms exports might also be bolstering IRGC coffers given that Farahi may funnel the proceeds of Iranian weapon sales to the IRGC. IRGC-run businesses seldom if ever return their profits to the central treasury, and the IRGC’s official budget allocation accounts for perhaps only a quarter of its actual funding. Farahi’s celebration of DIO may also reflect renewed investment in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs given that such public spotlight often coincides with an organization’s growing centrality to Iranian strategy. The DIO would be the paramount organization coordinating domestic manufacture of military hardware for these programs as Iran is loath to rely on external manufacturing for such high-profile hardware because of Iran’s vulnerability to sanctions. Both the European Union and the U.S. Treasury Department have sanctioned Farahi for his role in proliferating weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, work which often saw Farahi travel to and negotiate with North Korea.[iii]


Source:

“Rashad 200 dar sadi sazman-e sanaya’-e defah nesbat beh sal gerefteh (Two Hundred Percent Growth in Defense Industry Organizations Over Past Year),” Holy Defense News Agency (official news agency of Iran’s Defense Ministry), 13 March 2023. https://defapress.ir/fa/news/578644

Explaining the favorable performance of the Defense Industries Organization in 2022-23, General Farahi said. “This year the Organization has grown by 200 percent over the previous year and has seen a 2.5 times growth in exports.”

The deputy minister of defense and support of the armed forces continued: “The organization also produced 57 new products from its research this year and after production, delivered these to the armed forces and even exported some of these products, which is very gratifying for the country’s defense industry….

Farahi said that behind these successes was the employment of some great intellects. “Maintaining and attracting efficient, committed and expert human resources is the beating heart of the organization and is one of the most important issues that should be considered by the managers of armed forces industries in order to advance the supreme goals of the organization.”


Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of the Iranian defense budget, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Budget Increases for Missiles, Qods Force,” OE Watch, 08-2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/201732/download and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Military Budget Increased 145%,” OE Watch, 06-2017, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/197269/download

[ii] Iran-Russia conversations regarding drone exports predate the current Ukraine war. See: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Russia Desperate for our UAV Technology,” OE Watch, 11-2016. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/195245/download

[iii] For discussion of U.S. sanctions against Farahi, see: “Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic Missile Procurement for Iran,” U.S. Department of Treasury, 17 January 2016. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl0322


Image Information:

Image: Brigadier-General Seyyed Mahdi Farahi
Source: https://image.alkawthartv.ir/imagema//original/2021/12/31/637765384943630275.jpg
Attribution: Al-Kawthar Television