Tag Archives: Infrastructure

Russia To Provide Belarus a Potential Nuclear Delivery Capability

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Russian Air Force Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft.

Russian Air Force Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft.

Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with 9M723K5 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and Transloader of the Iskander-M.

Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with 9M723K5 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and Transloader of the Iskander-M.

“Lukashenko has asked Putin to help convert Belarusian military aircraft to carry nuclear warheads.”

“The strengthening of the “missile fist” of the Union State can deter the deployment of critical, but vulnerable stationary objects of NATO military infrastructure near the borders of both Belarus and Russia.”

The accompanying excerpted article from pro-Kremlin daily Izvestiya describes Russian plans to provide Belarus with the Iskander missile system.  Russia exports the Iskander-E limited capability export variant to Armenia and Algeria.  However, according to Izvestiya, due to changing “geopolitical realities,” Russia will provide Belarus with the same version of the Iskander that the Russian Armed Forces field.  In a related development, Russian government news service Interfax describes President Putin’s proposal to modernize Belarus’s aging fleet of Su-25 ground attack aircraft and President Lukashenko’s request to modify Belarussian aircraft so they may employ nuclear weapons.  In February, Belarus removed verbiage from the constitution regarding its status as a “nuclear-free zone.”  This prompted speculation that Russia may be planning to deploy nuclear weapons on Belarussian territory.  There have been no announcements from Moscow or Minsk on what, if any, arrangements they have made for such a contingency, but the announcement about the Iskander, which is capable of nuclear delivery, and Lukashenko’s request for nuclear delivery capable aircraft is notable.

Source:

Anton Lavrov, “Идите под ‘зонтик’ (Go Under the ‘Umbrella’),” Izvestiya (large circulation pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 28 June 2022.  https://iz.ru/1356221/anton-lavrov/idite-pod-zontik

On June 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Iskander [missile systems] would be transferred to our closest.  According to him, Belarus will receive a variant with both ballistic and cruise missiles.

This means that we are talking about transferring to a partner in the Union State not a limited and simplified export version of the Iskander, but a full-fledged formidable system that is not inferior in capabilities to those that are in service with our country and are now being successfully used in a special operation in Ukraine.

Due to international agreements, the export Iskander-E is limited to a range of 280 km.  The deployment of such in Belarus would not bring a serious increase in NATO territory controlled by them compared to the Iskanders already in the Kaliningrad region…

Such a radical discrepancy in the capabilities of the export and “home” version has long encouraged the leadership of Belarus to strive to obtain the Russian version.  But the issue of its acquisition, as well as price, for various reasons, remained the subject of bargaining between Minsk and Moscow for years.  Dramatically changed geopolitical realities, it seems, will allow Alexander Lukashenko to get a variant in the “top configuration”.  It is clear that in the event of a real conflict, it will be possible to use it jointly with the Russian Federation and according to a single plan.

The strengthening of the “missile fist” of the Union State can deter the deployment of critical, but vulnerable stationary objects of NATO military infrastructure near the borders of both Belarus and Russia.  The Alliance will have to reckon with the prospect of receiving a highly accurate and irresistible retaliatory strike against them in the event of a military confrontation…

Iskander missiles have already been deployed in the Russian Kaliningrad region.  But their additional deployment in Belarus will give a significant increase in the reach zone, it will shift another 300 km to the south.

…the Kaliningrad bridgehead has serious shortcomings.  Its limited territory is completely visible from all sides by means of NATO reconnaissance, and the Iskander has limited maneuverability there. Issues of ammunition storage and protection are also not easy.  Belarus is much better protected from outside surveillance.  The complexes on its territory will have better survivability not only due to the air defense “umbrella”, but also due to their ability to maneuver around the country and even beyond its borders.  It is much more difficult to hunt for ground launchers in the wide open area of Belarus than the small area of Kaliningrad.  The experience of the special operation has shown that mobile long-range weapons systems are still a very difficult target to counter…

“Президент РФ предложил дооборудовать Су-25 для Белоруссии на российских заводах (President of the Russian Federation proposed to retrofit Belarussian Su-25s at Russian factories),” Interfax (Russian government news service), 25 June 2022.  https://www.interfax.ru/russia/847889

President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin proposed to retrofit the Su-25 aircraft in service with the Belarusian army in Russia.

“The Belarusian army is armed with a fairly large group of Su-25 aircraft.  They could be appropriately equipped and training of flight personnel could be started accordingly,” Putin said during Russian-Belarusian summit talks on Saturday.  “This modernization should be carried out at aircraft factories in Russia.  We will agree on how to do this,” he stressed.Meanwhile, Lukashenko has asked Putin to help convert Belarusian military aircraft to carry nuclear warheads.  He acknowledged that he was “very concerned about the training flights of US and NATO aircraft, which are preparing to carry nuclear warheads and nuclear charges.”… “It’s very stressful for us,” he said.

Image Information:

Image: Russian Air Force Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/MAKS-2007/i-kphcXRn/0/e220a607/X2/maks-2007-003-X2.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with 9M723K5 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and Transloader of the Iskander-M
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/ARMY-2016-Demonstration/i-bSmJnCF/0/ac0d8313/X2/Army2016demo-076-X2.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russia Revising Marine Doctrine To Use Civilian Ships for Military Purposes

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“The country’s revised Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.”

According to an article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is revising its marine doctrine to easily integrate civilian ships for military tasks when necessary.  Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov noted that the revisions are necessary in the current “geopolitical and military-strategical world situation.”  Borisov blames the “hybrid war of the Collective West” for unprecedented actions against Russia and considers the Russian navy and an update to the marine doctrine as essential for Russia’s survival.

According to the revisions, the navy will include civilian ships and crews and provide functionality of maritime infrastructure in times of war.  As the article points out, the use of civilian ships during war is not unusual or unique to Russia, although Russia has a long history of calling civilian ships into military service when necessary.  The current revisions will make it easier for Russia’s navy to appropriate Russia’s civilian nuclear powered icebreakers, likely giving the Russian navy an advantage in Arctic waters.

Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Russia outlines militarization of fishing fleet and icebreakers,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian internet news service in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia, 24 May 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/05/russia-militarizes-its-fishing-fleet-and-icebreakers

The country’s revised Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.  “The revisions of the Marine Doctrine take into account changes in the geopolitical and military-strategical world situation,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov underlined in a meeting in the government Marine Board late May.  The update of the strategic planning document comes in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine and its unprecedented isolation in international affairs.

According to Borisov, the Navy is now becoming even more important for Russia.  “Considering the total hybrid war of the Collective West against our country, the unprecedented sanctions and the special operation in Ukraine, the strengthening of national security is relevant as never before,” the Deputy Prime Minister stated as he opened the meeting.  The body includes top government officials from several ministries and federal agencies, as well as military representatives.

According to the high-ranking government official with special responsibilities for the military-industrial complex, the new and updated document “to the full extent meets current challenges and threats.  It is aimed not on confrontation, but on enhanced national security in the area of maritime operations [and] a significantly reduced dependency on external influence and markets in all fields of maritime activities.”  Among the revisions highlighted in the updated doctrine is a higher level of engagement of civilian ships in military activities.  According to the government, several “principally new aspects of the doctrine concerns mobilization preparations and preparedness.  This will allow for the inclusion in the Navy of civilian ships and crews and provide functionality of maritime infrastructure in times of war.”

It is hardly a new phenomenon that civilian ships have a role in national security preparedness, as well as military conflicts, and Russia has a long experience in applying non-military ships for military purposes.  But the new federal document clearly prepares the ground for a more systematic approach.  Potentially, Russia can choose to apply a large number of trawlers and fishing vessels for military purposes.  Many of them are active in international waters, including along the Norwegian coast.  Russia can also choose to militarize its powerful nuclear-powered icebreakers, the vessels that autonomously are capably of breaking through the thickest sea-ice of the Arctic.  Ultimately, it could also designate a stronger military role to its research vessels. That could include also the brand new “Severny Polyus[RG1] ,” the ship that is designed for autonomous drifting in Arctic sea-ice for up to two years.

Russia’s current Marine Doctrine was adopted in 2017 and covers the period until 2030. The document highlights the need for a technological modernization of Russian ships and development of transport corridors like the Northern Sea Route.  According to Yuri Borisov, the Russian Navy will in the course of 2022 get a total of 20 new military ships, as well as five motorboats and 21 support vessels.

Indian Forces Work on Airlift Capabilities in Ladakh

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Indian Air Force C-17.

Indian Air Force C-17.

“The effort was a real-time demonstration of the inherent heavy-lift capability of the Indian Air Force.”

Indian defense officials continue to make improvements to roads and other infrastructure in areas near the Indian-Chinese border to facilitate operations in the event of a war with China.  The accompanying excerpted articles provide a look at how Indian forces are training for additional scenarios outside of the improvements in the border areas.  

The article from independent news magazine India Today reports on a recent airlift exercise by the Indian Air Force and Army.  The exercise took place to assess India’s logistics supply chain as the “Indian armed forces are preparing for another winter of enhanced deployment of over 50,000 troops in Ladakh.”  According to the article, the exercise involved C-17, IL-76, and An-32 transport aircraft operating out of the country’s Western Air Command. 

The article from India-based independent English-language news website The Print reports on an exercise carried out by the “Shatrujeet (airborne) brigade” in early November.  The exercise took place in the north of the Union Territory of Ladakh and involved members of the brigade being “inserted to a drop zone at an altitude of more than 14,000 feet.”  The article notes that the soldiers had been acclimated to the change in elevation in Ladakh prior to the exercise and that the exercise took place in order to “validate rapid response capabilities and seamless integration.”  This is important because ground travel is relatively slow up to the Tibetan Plateau where the terrain is vulnerable to rock slides and other obstacles.  Future flashpoints or confrontations with China may require a rapid response capability that only airlift can provide until follow-on forces arrive.

Source:

Abhishek Bhalla, “Operation Hercules: Army, IAF prepare for winter deployment amid Ladakh standoff,” India Today (an independent news magazine), 17 November 2021.

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ladakh-standoff-china-indian-army-air-force-operation-hercules-1877909-2021-11-17

The Indian Army and Air Force carried out a joint exercise to assess their logistics supply chain. This exercise was held at a time when the Indian armed forces are preparing for another winter of enhanced deployment of over 50,000 troops in Ladakh amid continuing tensions with China…

Temperatures have begun to drop and will fall to minus 30-40 degrees during peak winter. The Indian forces are geared up for enhanced deployment in the harsh winter for a second successive year.

The exercise named ‘Operation Hercules’ was undertaken by the Indian Air Force and Indian Army on November 15 with transport aircraft of the IAF being pressed into action.

The platforms utilised for the airlift were C-17, IL-76 and An-32 aircraft, which took off from one of the forward bases of Western Air Command…

Source: “Army conducts airborne exercise in eastern Ladakh to check rapid response along LAC,” The Print (independent English-language news website from India), 1 November 2021. https://theprint.in/defence/army-conducts-airborne-exercise-in-eastern-ladakh-to-check-rapid-response-along-lac/760296/

The Indian Army’s Shatrujeet brigade is conducting an airborne exercise along the northern borders in eastern Ladakh to validate its rapid response capabilities, sources said on Monday…airborne troops of the Army’s Shatrujeet brigade were inserted to a drop zone at an altitude of more than 14,000 feet as part of the exercise, the sources mentioned.

These pre-acclimatised troops along with specialist vehicles and missile detachments were transported through C-130 and AN-32 aircraft from five different mounting bases to validate inter-theatre move, precision stand-off drops, rapid grouping and the capture of designated objectives with speed and surprise, they said.

…The exercise also involved combat free fall jumps and integrated battle drills by airborne forces, mechanised columns and attack helicopters, to validate rapid response capabilities and seamless integration…

Image Information:

Image: Indian Air Force C-17.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IAF-C-17.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

China Continues To Beef Up Border and Coastal Defense

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“…the international situation is complex and changeable. Border and coastal defenses face security threats and challenges from all quarters and in various forms.”

In October a group of Chinese experts met to discuss their views on China’s progress and efforts to build up the border and coastal defense infrastructure.  The following article, published in the official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army Jiefangjun Bao, offers an interesting overview of their thoughts regarding future expectations.  China first launched its border and coastal defense infrastructure project in 1996.  According to the article, the country has since gone from “having nothing to having something.”  It went from “not being centralized and complete to being scalable and systematic.” 

There are reportedly 18,639 miles of border and coastal defense duty routes.  Blockades and video monitoring cover key areas.  China has stationed hundreds of thousands of militia forces along the border and coastal defense frontlines.  They have added transportation support facilities including duty roads, bridges, and docks, focused on connecting border villages to the larger border security infrastructure.   

Part of the infrastructure buildup of China’s border and coastal defense includes an increased capacity to conduct information-driven operations (informationization).  China has built several thousand monitoring and control stations and centers along key areas in border and coastal defense.  It has also laid nearly 6,213 miles of transmission lines.  A portion of the border and coastal areas now also includes video monitoring and a “control network for ‘vertical connection and horizontal cohesion.’”

In coming years, China will likely push to automate its border and coastal defense capability, through the “intelligentization” of its processes.  A senior engineer, cited in the article, explained that he hopes to shape a “smart chain” that will use new-generation information technologies, such as big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things, to discover, report, make decisions, handle, and evaluate border and coastal defense situations to enhance the three-dimensional smart management and control capabilities.

Source:

Pan Di, “筑起坚不可摧的钢铁防线 ——军地共话合力推进边海防基础设施建设 (Building an Indestructible Steel Defensive Line- Joint Military-Civil Promotion of Border, Coastal Defense Infrastructure Building),” Jiefangjun Bao (official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army), 13 October 2021, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-10/13/content_300707.htm

China is a major border and coastal defense country. Chairman Xi profoundly pointed out that order and coastal defense work is a major matter for national security and is related to the overall national security and developmental situation.

… since the launch of border and coastal defense infrastructure building in 1996 with unified planning on land and at sea, we have built a large number of duty transport, physical barrier, and informationized management and control facilities.

Liu Jun explained that China has now built more than 30,000 kilometers of border and coastal defense duty routes, with blockades and video monitoring essentially covering key management and control segments. It has taken the first steps in constructing a “three-in-one” management and control system including human, material, and technical defense. It has built a solid defensive line along its vast land and maritime borders.

In recent years, on border and coastal defense frontlines, hundreds of thousands of militia forces are stationed all year round, and their reconnaissance and monitoring, rapid response, and emergency handling capabilities have steadily improved. With the completion of a large number of transportation support facilities such as duty roads, bridges, and docks, many border villages have been connected to roads and offshore islands connected to navigation routes, thus further consolidating the foundation for the development of industries with special advantages such as border trade, cross-border tourism, and island development.

“The continuous advancement of border and coastal defense infrastructure building is the result of joint efforts by the Party, government, military, and police. According to an arrangement made by the Third National Border Defense Work Conference in 1994, a border and coastal defense infrastructure building system was launched in 1996 on the basis of organizing pilot projects.

…a “five-in-one” border management structure with the Party committee providing direction, the government running overall coordination, the military serving as a backbone, the police taking charge of administration, and the people as a foundation, making the iron wall of border and coastal defense even more impenetrable.

In recent years, China’s border and coastal defense infrastructure has intensified its informatization efforts, building several thousand monitoring and control stations and centers along important sections for border and coastal defense and laying nearly 10,000 kilometers of transmission lines. A portion of border and coastal areas have formed a video monitoring and control network for “vertical connection and horizontal cohesion.” Li Guangwei, senior engineer at the Air Force Research Academy, is full of hope for the prospects of smart border and coastal defense. He hopes to shape a “smart chain” in which the whole process of discovering, reporting, making decisions, handling, and evaluating border and coastal defense situations through the application of new-generation information technologies such as big data, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence, breaks through data barriers between the military and civilian sectors to enhance three-dimensional smart management and control capabilities for border and coastal defense.”