Tag Archives: INDOPACOM

Xi Urges Accelerated Development of Cutting-Edge Weaponry, Military Modernization

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GEN. Li Shangfu head of the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (Li is second from the right).

GEN. Li Shangfu head of the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (Li is second from the right).

“Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (in 2012), the state of weapons and equipment technology has been improved and accelerated the speed of development as the entire military has consistently made the development of weapons and equipment a strategic priority, guided by the requirements of combat operations, and closely following trends in international military technology. At the same time, we must also realize that China faces significant gaps in many respects when compared with the requirements for safeguarding national security and development interests…”

Speaking in October at the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) annual all-service equipment conference, which sets priorities for military modernization, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech describing China’s major efforts to catch up with other military powers, particularly since 2012.  In the accompanying excerpted article from the PLA’s official news outlet China Military Online, Xi describes China’s weapons development as having shifted from importation and imitation to indigenous development and greater self-reliance.  While Xi acknowledges continuing gaps, the Chinese military has tried to improve management of weapons and equipment development programs.  In 2016, China significantly restructured its top-level organizations guiding equipment development for the PLA, replacing the General Armaments Department with an Equipment Development Department (EDD) directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s top military body.

In a related development, the CMC and each of China’s Joint Theater Commands appear to have also established a Military Requirements Bureau under their Joint Staff departments.  The bureaus are intended to help their respective organizations more quickly address changing requirements, whether related to training or necessary equipment.  At the same time other organizations with oversight of long-term planning, particularly the Science and Technology Commission were also upgraded.  Engagement with non-traditional parts of the defense industry and expanding cooperation with scientists and institutions outside of the industry have also been prioritized to improve the PLA’s access to cutting-edge research.  Taken together, these efforts will enable the PLA to better coordinate efforts between services while also responding to technological change more swiftly.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had set several important milestones for military modernization, many of which are looming.  In the speech, Xi referred to the PLA’s centennial goal, which entails accelerating mechanization and integration of informationized and intelligent (smart) systems by 2027.  There is no guarantee that China will meet these deadlines.  For example, the goal of completing mechanization of the PLA by 2020 appears to have been revised.  Even more ambitious milestones lie ahead: the CCP wants the PLA to achieve world-class status as a military by mid-century.  Efforts set since 2012 to make the PLA a potent, modernized force, and to improve the underlying processes that drive modernization, are paying off.

Source:

“加快推进武器装备现代化——认真学习贯彻习主席在全军装备工作会议上重要指示(Accelerate the modernization of weapons and equipment——Conscientiously study and implement Chairman Xi’s important instructions at the military equipment work conference),” China Military Online (official news outlet for the People’s Liberation Army), 27 October 2021.

http://81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-10/27/content_301725.htm

OR

https://web.archive.org/web/20211031030653/http://81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-10/27/content_301725.htm

The PLA held an equipment work conference for all military services in Beijing. President Xi extended sincere greetings and important instructions to the delegates and all comrades working on the front lines of weapons and equipment and spoke highly of the leapfrog development and historic achievements of the Chinese military’s weapons and equipment development during the course of the “13th Five-Year Plan” (2016–2020), clarifying the fundamental, directional, and overall major issues of weaponry and equipment construction. This has important practical significance and far-reaching guiding significance for accelerating the implementation of the “14th Five-Year” plan (covering 2021-2025) and creating a new chapter in weaponry and equipment development.

Without adequate equipment, we cannot begin to discuss the art of war. Weapons and equipment are an important symbol of military modernization, an important foundation of the preparation for military struggle preparations, an important support for national security and national rejuvenation, and an important weight in international strategic competition. Only by possessing advanced weapons and equipment and truly improving our defensive capabilities can we offer a real deterrent. Building a People’s Army with advanced weapons and equipment is the goal of [the Chinese Communist Party]. In the course of its long-term development, our military has successively gone through the development stages of importation, imitation, and indigenous research and development. It has successively produced a large number of advanced weapons and equipment and high-precision technology as represented by the “Two Bombs and One Satellite” [China’s successful Manhattan Project-like effort to develop atomic and hydrogen bombs in the 1960s and launch an artificial satellite in 1970].

Promoting the leapfrog development of our military’s equipment construction and providing material and technical support for enhancing the country’s strategic capabilities, especially military strength, are the great mission placed on the PLA by the Party and the expectation of the PLA’s officers and enlisted. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (in 2012), the state of weapons and equipment technology has been improved and accelerated the speed of development as the entire military has consistently made the development of weapons and equipment a strategic priority, guided by the requirements of combat operations, and closely following trends in international military technology. At the same time, we must also realize that China faces significant gaps in many respects when compared with the requirements for safeguarding national security and development interests, or with the requirements for winning an informatized war, and compared with the world’s strongest military powers. At present, a new round of scientific and technological revolution, industrial revolution, and military revolution are evolving rapidly. The degree of informatization of modern warfare continues to increase, and the characteristics of intelligence are increasingly emerging. This provides a rare opportunity for advancing the modernization of weaponry and equipment and also creates tougher demands. In the face of changing times, wars, opponents, and technological changes, we can only be determined and strengthen our sense of urgency. Only by working hard, focusing more proactively on tomorrow’s war to accelerate the development of weapons and equipment, and stepping up the construction of a modern management system for weapons and equipment can we fully create a new situation in weapons and equipment construction and make positive contributions to the realization of the goal of the army’s centennial struggle.

Image Information:

Image: GEN. Li Shangfu head of the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department (Li is second from the right).
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Zhang_Youxia_%282017-12-07%29_02.jpg
Attribution: Zhang Youxia (2017-12-07) 02.jpg, CC BY 4.0

Indonesia Takes Measures Against Chinese Naval Incursions

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Singaporean Navy RSS Tenacious and RSS Justice along with Indonesian Navy KRI Diponegoro and KRI Malahayati during 2021 Eagle Indopura Joint Exercise.

Singaporean Navy RSS Tenacious and RSS Justice along with Indonesian Navy KRI Diponegoro and KRI Malahayati during 2021 Eagle Indopura Joint Exercise.

“China is showing its strength. It not only objected to Indonesia’s drilling operations on [Indonesia’s] own territory, but also sent coast guard ships to the area to pressure Indonesia.”

On 15 January, the mainly centrist leaning Indonesian-language website of Republika Merdeka, dunia.rmol.id, published the excerpted article on Indonesia’s evolving strategy towards China in the South China Sea and adjacent waters.  According to the article, China forced Indonesia into conflict due to Chinese coast guard ships’ encroachment into the Natuna Sea, and Chinese demands that Indonesia not extract resources from that sea.  The article notes that Indonesia argues the sea is part of its internationally recognized exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and is unwilling to acknowledge in the international arena that any dispute exists over its own maritime territory.

The article examines Indonesia’s strategy of outreach to navies in Southeast Asia, which are also seeing China make competing assertions to their own South China Sea territorial claims.  For example, Indonesia invited maritime security officials from five other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, including Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam, to a meeting in early 2023 to discuss responses to China’s assertiveness in the sea.  However, the article also concludes that China may take retaliatory actions against those countries if they participate in the proposed meeting.

In particular, the article focuses on Indonesia’s relationship with Vietnam.  The Vietnamese Coast Guard and Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, Baklama, signed a memorandum of understanding in January to cooperate on mutual maritime security.  In addition, the article noted that Indonesia was discussing with Russia’s state oil company to connect a pipeline from the Natuna Sea to Vietnam’s offshore network.  Indonesia already completed the drilling for this project, which, according to the article, Indonesia considered a Baklama victory over China.  It is unclear, however, what effect Russia’s increasing reliance on China because of the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine might have on Indonesia’s pipeline project with Russia.

In anticipation of any Chinese naval actions to take control of the Natuna Sea, the article notes that Indonesia is strengthening its defenses.  This includes building an additional runway to improve aerial surveillance of the sea, as well as a new submarine base.  Further, the country is expanding defense cooperation with three countries outside of Southeast Asia, including Japan, India, and Australia, to deter Chinese naval operations in the Natuna Sea.

Source:

“Indonesia Bersiap Menantang China di Laut China Selatan, Akankah Diikuti Negara ASEAN Lainnya? (Indonesia Prepares to Challenge China in the South China Sea, Will Other ASEAN Countries Follow?),” dunia.rmol.id (mainly centrist leaning Indonesian-language website of Republika Merdeka), 15 January 2022.  https://dunia.rmol.id/read/2022/01/15/519533/indonesia-bersiap-menantang-china-di-laut-china-selatan-akankah-diikuti-negara-asean-lainnya

China has officially opened another front in its hostilities in the South China Sea. China’s behavior ultimately pushed Jakarta to confront the defend its own territory because the disputed area by China was actually in the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Jakarta has gone its own way by seeking support from the Russian state oil company Zarubezhneft to construct a pipeline in the Natuna Sea to link up with Vietnam’s offshore network. Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) has claimed success in the endeavor, which some analysts have called “Indonesia’s great victory over China.” China had repeatedly reminded Indonesia to stop the project and stated it was a violation because it infringed on Chinese territory. China is showing its strength. It not only objected to Indonesia’s drilling operations on its own territory, but also sent coast guard ships to the area to pressure Indonesia

The latest initiative that Indonesia has taken is to invite officials in charge of maritime security from five other ASEAN countries to meet early next year to discuss how to respond to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Vietnam Coast Guard and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency last month also signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in strengthening maritime security and safety between the two powers. And the Indonesian military is extending the runway of an air base so that additional aircraft can be deployed, along with constructing a submarine base and developing defense cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.

Image Information:

Image: Singaporean Navy RSS Tenacious and RSS Justice along with Indonesian Navy KRI Diponegoro and KRI Malahayati during 2021 Eagle Indopura Joint Exercise.
Source: Dispen Koarmada II (II Fleet Command Information Service)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Singaporean_Navy_RSS_Tenacious_and_RSS_Justice_along_with_Indonesian_Navy_KRI_Diponegoro_and_KRI_Malahayati_during_2021_Eagle_Indopura_Joint_Exercise_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Armenia Acquires Russian Helicopters as Part of Armed Forces Modernization

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Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.

Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.

“The air force received the four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in an assault configuration…”

A few months after the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, which resulted in significant Armenian losses, the Armenian government announced it would modernize the country’s armed forces.  At the August 2021 Russian-sponsored International Military-Technical Forum “Army-2021” in Moscow, Armenian Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan stated that he was looking to acquire modern weapons and equipment from Russia and noted a need for unmanned aerial systems (UAS).  While Karapetyan did not announce any acquisitions made during the forum, the accompanying excerpted article reports on the recent delivery of Russian helicopters to Armenia and provides a look at one area where Armenian officials are modernizing the country’s armed forces.

The article from independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that the Armenian Air Force received four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in January.  The article notes this variant of the Mi-8 helicopter can conduct a variety of tasks and referenced Karapetyan’s statement from last year.  The Armenian Air Force reportedly has 11 Mi-8MTVs already in service, though they are older variants and less versatile than the Mi-8MTV-5.  Overall, the helicopters are not as significant as the Armenian acquisitions of the Iskander ballistic missile system or the Su-30SM multirole fighters before the 2020 war; however, the helicopters mark an acquisition that took place during the modernization of the Armenian Armed Forces and will play a role in this.  It also illustrates how Russia continues to be one of the main providers of military equipment for Armenia.

Source:

“Армянская армия пополнилась боевыми вертолëтами (The Armenian army is being reinforced with combat helicopters),” Eurasia Daily (independent Russian-language news website), 25 January 2022.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/01/25/armyanskaya-armiya-popolnilas-boevymi-vertoletami

The Armenian Air Force received new multipurpose helicopters on 25 January, reports the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia…

It is noted that the helicopters that entered service are designed to perform landing, fire support, transport, and medical tasks… The air force the received four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in an assault configuration…

Armenia will take practical steps to increase military-technical cooperation with Russia, then Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan said in an interview on 24 August 2021. Yerevan, as part of an ongoing modernization of the Armenian Army after the war in Karabakh, plans to purchase only modern weapons, Karapetyan said…

Image Information:

Image: Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mil_Mi-17-V5_(Mi-8MTV-5),_Russia_-_Air_Force_AN1905918.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 3.0

Iran Busts Weapons and Ammunition Smuggling Ring

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“Two heavy shipments of weapons…were discovered.”

Iran has long had difficulty controlling illicit weaponry within its borders.  At the conclusion of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, there was little if any organized demobilization or disarmament: conscripts simply returned home, often with their weapons.  Over subsequent years, successive Iranian administrations offered amnesties to enable citizens to return weapons without penalty as gun ownership and possession is, in most cases, a crime.  The fact that they have had to do so repeatedly suggests the ineffectiveness of their efforts.

Beyond the war-related and unaccounted for arms making their way into the public domain, Iran has long faced weapons smuggling from neighboring states.  The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has found it difficult to operate in southeastern and northwestern Iran, two regions populated both by ethnic and sectarian minorities and with borders drawn through inhospitable terrain.  The conflicts and drug trade in both Afghanistan and Iraq have increased arms smuggling opportunities in these border areas.  The excerpted article from Iran news media outlet Fars New Agency suggests Iran faces a problem with loose weapons in Khuzestan, the oil-producing region of Iran at the top of the Persian Gulf and adjacent to southern Iraq.  It relates successful operations against two alleged arms smuggling operations in the refinery city of Ahvaz and Karun county in Khuzestan Province, where authorities seized 87 illegal weapons.

While the excerpted article alludes to smugglers’ efforts to create “instability” in Iran, the article does not address possible motives nor possible connections to active terror cells in the area (See: “Iranian Government Details Ahvaz Terrorist Incidents,” OE Watch, November 2018).  It is unclear if the weapons stay in Khuzestan or are smuggled deeper into Iran.  If the former, it could suggest a vulnerability that unknown cells are smuggling weapons into Iran’s chief oil-producing region that is responsible for the majority of Iran’s foreign currency earnings.  The weapons in the photograph accompanying the story appear to be short-barreled shotguns commonly designated as riot, as well as breaching or tactical shotguns not designed or intended for hunting or other more pedestrian uses.

Source:

“Anhedam Do Band-e Qacheq-e Salah va Mohemat dar Khuzestan (Destruction of Two Arms and Ammunition Smuggling Gangs in Khuzestan),” Fars News Agency (media outlet close to the Islamic Republic’s security forces), 3 January 2022. https://www.farsnews.ir/khuzestan/news/14001013000043

According to the Fars News Agency in Ahvaz, the Khuzestan police commander issued a statement announcing: Police intelligence and security officers in the province, by means of superior intelligence, learned that two smuggling gangs had entered the cities of Ahvaz and Karun with the aim of creating insecurity in the country, conducted an operation, identified and destroyed them. In these comprehensive operations, two heavy shipments of weapons, including 87 weapons of war and hunting, and a significant amount of ammunition were discovered.

Iran’s Purported Counter-Hijacking Record

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The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps counter-hijacking drills, January 2017.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps counter-hijacking drills, January 2017.

“This statistic indicates a 100 percent success rate of the IRGC operations.”

Since 1984, the U.S. State Department has classified Iran as a leading state sponsor of terrorism.  Iran not only funds proxy militias aimed at destabilizing regional states, but also sponsors many terror groups that engage in bombings, assassinations, and hijackings.  In the official Iranian regime narrative, none of this is terrorism, but rather legitimate “resistance,” which Iranian diplomats argue it is their right to support.  Here, the Iranian government simply takes advantage of the absence of any international consensus definition about what constitutes terrorism.

Post-revolutionary Iran has also experienced terrorism.  In the chaotic first years of the revolution, groups such as the Mujahedin al-Khalq conducted both assassinations and bombings targeting regime officials.  These often maimed and killed innocent civilians, however.  The excerpted article from the Iranian Defense Ministry’s press outlet, Holy Defense News Agency, provides a brief history of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked Aviation Protection Corps.  It reports that the Aviation Protection Corps has foiled 128 attempted hijackings over the past 34 years, more than 20 percent of which occurred in the air.  The article lacks clarity however as hijacking and terrorism was a far greater problem in Iran in the 1980s, but the statistics reported in the excerpt did not begin until 1988.  There has been very little mention of domestic hijacking attempts in Iran since then.  If there have been 128 hijacking episodes since 1988, it suggests there may be significant discord and continued attempts at domestic terrorism, even if these go unreported.   That the Aviation Protection Corps now operates on 19 airlines and in 67 airports suggests that the fear of hijacking remains a concern.

Source:

“Khansisazi 128 Mavarad Aghdam beh Havapeymarbayi Tawset Sepah (Neutralization of 128 Attempted Air Hijackings by the Revolutionary Guards),” Holy Defense News Agency (Iranian defense ministry’s press outlet), 29 December 2021. https://defapress.ir/fa/news/496930

Western countries have dubbed it the “Iron Guard”, but in Iran it is referred to as the Aviation Protection Corps. The Aviation Protection Corps is a unit that was formed in January 1988 by the order of Imam Khomeini to the then-commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Since the IRGC took over the responsibility [for aviation security], it has foiled 128 hijacking attempts. Of these, 100 episodes were cases in which the saboteurs were identified and arrested on the ground and 28 included interference and [attempted] air piracy while flying.  This statistic indicates a 100 percent success rate of the IRGC operations in dealing with hijacking. These efforts have come to fruition while the Flight Safety Unit has not given a single martyr in connection with the assigned mission, although it has suffered 77 martyrs from other reasons, such as during the Holy Defense, plane crashes and the defense of the Shrines…. Today, the Aviation Protection Corps has reached such a position due to its 33 years of experience in protecting flight safety that some countries want to have Iran’s experience in this field; the Aviation Protection Corps provides security and safety services to 19 domestic airlines at 67 airports in the country.

Image Information:

Image: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps counter-hijacking drills, January 2017.
Source: Hamshahri Online, https://media.hamshahrionline.ir/d/2021/12/30/4/4627094.jpg
Attribution:

Iran and Syria Discuss Transportation Cooperation

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“It [is] important as well for Iran to overcome these sanctions.”

Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Syria has been Iran’s most trustworthy if not only Arab ally.  During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, Syria was the only Arab country to side with Iran.  Iran returned the favor during the Syrian civil war, dispatching the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in what the Iranian press described as train-and-assist missions, but which included combat resulting in IRGC casualties.  The IRGC also activated Lebanese Hezbollah units to fight on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Now that the Assad regime has largely regained control over Syria, Iran and Syria increasingly discuss how they might cooperate both in rebuilding Syria and post-conflict trade (See: “Iran and Syria Seek to Jumpstart Economic Ties,” OE Watch, 1 2022).  The excerpted selection from Iran’s official news outlet, Islamic Republic News Agency, reports from Syria on a meeting between the heads of Iranian companies soliciting business in Syria and the Syrian Transport Minister Zuhair Khazim.  The air link between Syria and Iran is not new.  IRGC owned airlines have long shuttled men and material between airports in Tehran or the nearby city of Karaj and both Damascus and Beirut.  However, the frankness with which Khazim and the Iranian businessmen discussed reviving the land route suggests confidence that Iraq will no longer pose an impediment to overland trade between Iran and Syria.  Also relevant is the open acknowledgment that both countries seek to bypass sanctions imposed by the United States and other Western countries.

Source:

“Iran va Suriya dar baraye Tawse’ah-e Hamkariha dar hawzeh-e hamal va Naqel Goftegu Kardand (Iran and Syria Discussed Transportation Cooperation),” Islamic Republic News Agency (Iran’s official news outlet), 23 December 2021.  https://www.irna.ir/news/84588042

…In a meeting with representatives of a number of Iranian companies, [Syrian] Minister of Transport Zuhair Khazim referred to the unilateral Western sanctions affecting the Syrian people, and called for the development of cooperation in the field of transportation between Syria and Iran. He considered it important as well for Iran to overcome these sanctions.

The meeting, held in Damascus, called on the Syrian Minister of Transport to define the framework for cooperation for both air and land sectors between Iran and Syria in accordance with the legal provisions and to have the relevant committees in each sector review them. According to Syrian media reports, the Iranian delegation also considered the possibility of establishing joint airlines and supporting road maintenance projects and investing in the construction of new roads and bridges in Syria…. At the end of March 2011, Syria became embroiled in a crisis backed by some of its neighboring Western-oriented Arab countries and the Zionist regime. The presence of more than 360,000 terrorists from 120 countries in various cities in Syria caused the widespread destruction of many important cities during the nearly nine years of war in this country.

China Strengthening Position in Central America with Recognition by Nicaragua

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Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.

“The reestablishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China is the conjunction of several circumstances: a Chinese escalation in the diplomatic battle between Beijing and Taipei; the interest of the Asian giant to consolidate in Central America; and the ‘logical’ alliance of Daniel Ortega with a single-party regime.”

At the end of 2021, Nicaragua’s dictator Daniel Ortega announced that his country would recognize China after severing over 30 years of diplomatic relations with Taiwan (See “Nicaragua’s Ortega Consolidating Dictatorship with Russian and Chinese Backing,” OE Watch, 1 2022).  One of the country’s oldest dailies, Confidencial, states that the diplomatic switch should be viewed through the lens of China’s escalating attempts to curtail Taiwan’s diplomatic relations; increasing Chinese interest in Central America; and an ideological alliance with Ortega, who also runs a single-party regime.  The move gives China momentum in terms of developing deeper relations in the region.  Panama and El Salvador have ruptured relations with Taiwan, and the election of Xiomara Castro in Honduras could see a similar maneuver in the coming months.  If Castro follows through on her campaign pledge to drop Taiwan, Guatemala and Belize would remain the only two countries in Central America to recognize Taiwan, potentially tipping the geopolitical balance decisively in favor of China.

Nicaragua now counts China, Russia, and Iran among its closest allies.  Another Confidencial article speculates that Ortega seeks to buffer against international isolation by recognizing China, something his existing relationships with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others cannot provide.  The outlet reports that Ortega will seek financing and export markets in China, especially in the face of international financial pressure and sanctions. 

Source:

“Ortega se adelanta a Ley Renacer y suspensión del CAFTA al alinearse con China (Ortega anticipates the Renacer Law and suspension of CAFTA by aligning himself with China),” Confidencial (one of the country’s oldest dailies still operating), 18 December 2021.  https://www.confidencial.com.ni/economia/ortega-se-adelanta-a-ley-renacer-y-suspension-del-cafta-al-alinearse-con-china/

In addition to challenging the United States, Ortega is also looking for options in the face of the… Renacer Law… excluding Nicaragua from the free trade agreement (CAFTA), and that Europe does the same with the Association Agreement, which would make Nicaraguan exports to both markets much more expensive.

Source:  “La “afinidad” de Ortega con China es que el gigante asiático tiene “un régimen de un solo partido” (Ortega’s “affinity” with China is that the Asian giant has “a one-party regime”),” Confidencial (one of the country’s oldest dailies still operating), 16 December 2022.  https://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/editorial/muerte-en-la-frontera-editorial-el-tiempo-643053 

The reestablishment of relations with the People’s Republic of China is the conjunction of several circumstances: a Chinese escalation in the diplomatic battle between Beijing and Taipei; the interest of the Asian giant to consolidate in Central America; and the ‘logical’ alliance of Daniel Ortega with a single-party regime.

Image Information:

Image:  Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen attends the inauguration of Daniel Ortega in 2017.
Source:  https://www.flickr.com/photos/presidentialoffice/31429913323
Attribution:  Flickr

Beyond the Glitzy Projects: China’s Far-Reaching Impact on Kenya

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China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.

China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.

“By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building [a] strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.”

In Kenya, China’s influence can be clearly seen in the high-profile Mombassa-Nairobi Railway, the Lamu deep seaport, and the towering Global Trade Centre.  However, beyond these massive projects built by Chinese companies, often with Chinese money and labor, there are numerous other means, including much smaller projects, through which China is making its mark in Kenya.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the Kenyan news agency Capital News explains, that mark is enormous, with China, and particularly Chinese technology, revolutionizing the country’s infrastructure and helping to supercharge its manufacturing base.  Chinese influence on Kenya includes charitable actions, such as delivering substantial amounts of medical supplies critical to helping Kenya deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, all the while garnering appreciation from the Kenyan population.  Chinese online education platforms also filled the gap created when 2,000 Kenyan students found themselves cut off from their university as the disease spread.

The influence of Chinese companies is vast: they have donated food, established industrial parks, held educational workshops, and are transferring technology to Kenyan factories.  However, as the article notes, perhaps the most important impact China has had on Kenya is the growing attitude among young Kenyans that through hard work and knowledge, the country can accomplish projects of all sizes important to national development.  This outlook is in large part a result of Kenyans witnessing, and learning from, successful Chinese businesspeople living and working in Kenya.

The article does not mention any of the pushback against China often discussed in other publications, such as that concerning an unsustainable debt load, poor quality of some Chinese goods, and Chinese workers doing jobs that Kenyans could fill.  However, despite this editorial omission, the article does bring to light the influence China has in Kenya beyond the “glitzy” projects, which tends to be underreported and as a result possibly underappreciated.  China’s influence in Kenya is far larger than just the high-profile projects would indicate, and as the article describes, that influence is building strong relationships, including diplomatic, between the two countries.  It behooves other countries wanting to deal with Kenya to take note of how China has grown that relationship through the breadth and depth of its business activities.

Source:

Adhere Cavince, “How Chinese firms have changed the face of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi,” Capital News (a Kenyan news agency), 22 December 2021. https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2021/12/how-chinese-firms-have-changed-the-face-of-kenyas-capital-nairobi/

The 8th Ministerial of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation held in Senegal last month resolved to support private sector partnerships between China and African countries. Given the strong record of Kenya to attract and sustain high caliber international businesses, more Chinese firms should consider investing in the country and further promote economic integration of the two countries. By going beyond the call of duty to provide auxiliary services to Kenyans, Chinese firms are building strong foundation for public diplomacy in the country.

There is increasing confidence that Kenyans too, can follow the footsteps of their Chinese counterparts and improve their socio-economic standing. As more Kenyans get a chance to interact with Chinese firms, more learning points emerge. Nairobi is for instance home to young and skilled professional in rail and road construction, capable of providing their services beyond Kenya.

In the course of implementing big-ticket infrastructure projects across the country, Chinese enterprises have also engaged in building community roads, setting up water pans and upgrading learning institutions through donation and renovation of classrooms and provision of learning materials. During the floods and landslides witnessed in West Pokot in 2019, for example, Chinese firms donated food and non-food items in a show of solidarity with the affected households.

Yet, beyond these glitzy projects, the firms have equally been engaging in small acts of charity that have equally left inedible marks in the lives of individuals and households across the country.

Image Information:

Image: China’s influence in Kenya extends far beyond large scale projects such as the railroad it financed and helped build.
Source: Macabe5387/Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nairobi_Terminus.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

China Wages Cognitive Warfare To Shape Taiwanese Public Opinion

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“…the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its “united front” strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its targets, including Taiwan.”

Amid tensions across the Taiwan Straits, Taiwan media has been reporting about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of cognitive warfare to reunite the two Chinas.  One such article was published in the Military Affairs Forum of Taipei Ch’ing-nien Jih-pao (The Youth Daily), a government-sponsored daily that reports on military, government, and general news.  According to the accompanying excerpts, the CCP is using non-military, gray zone tactics to change people’s perception of China.  The CCP uses both traditional media and various forms of internet media to carry out its war of public opinion, legal warfare, and psychological warfare. As an example, the article describes how the CCP will tell the “Chinese story” in an effort to “expand its influence, create controversies, and widen differences and conflicts.”  It transmits false information to various foreign media outlets or “infiltrate social media to disseminate specific messages abroad; and reproduce foreign media reports to shape or embellish [China’s] own image and perception both domestically and abroad.”  According to the article, behind the war of influence is the CCP’s United Front Work Department, which is in charge of propaganda; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Propaganda Department, which focuses on external propaganda and control domestic public opinion; and the Ministry of State Security, which combines both civilian hackers, who launch cyber-attacks, with false information produced on content farms.

The second article, published in Taiwan’s English-language publication Taipei Times explains, “the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its ‘united front’ strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its target, including Taiwan.”  To accomplish this, it resorts to both hard and soft power (i.e. culture, education, sports exchanges, media organizations, and economic means) “to control and manipulate Taiwanese public opinion.”  While none of this is particularly new, this recent spotlight in Taiwanese media shows that the cognitive warfare strategy that China uses to win without fighting is persistent, far-reaching, and controlled by the CCP (as opposed to spontaneous, independent media).

Source:

Shu Hsiao-huang, “反制認知作戰 抵禦灰色地帶威脅 (Countering Cognitive Warfare and Resisting Gray Zone Threats),” Taipei Ch’ing-nien Jih-pao (Youth Daily News: Published by the government of the People’s Republic of China), 9 December 2021. https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1467725&type=forum

Cognitive warfare is the use of information or various communication platforms to change the mindset of an opponent in order to change his or her behavior. The Chinese Communist Party has been waging a united war against Taiwan for many years, carrying out “The Three Warfares” of public opinion, legal, and psychological warfare.  It uses old wine in new bottles, along with both traditional print and electronic media, as well as Internet media (platforms) and other means to carry out its war of influence.

The United Front Department is in charge of propaganda.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Propaganda Department focus on external propaganda and control internal public opinion, and the Ministry of State Security combines cyber-attacks, carried out by civilian hackers, with fake information produced on content farms to carry the war of influence.

…(The CCP) shares the “China story” to expand its influence, create controversies, and widen differences and conflicts. The modus operandi includes spreading falsehoods and spreading them rapidly across platforms; it uses foreign media or infiltrates social media to disseminate specific messages abroad; and reproduce foreign media reports to shape or embellish its own image and perception both domestically and abroad.

Source: Change Yan-ting and Paul Chiou, “Resolutions to Engage with China,” Taipei Times (Taiwan based English-language publication), 11 January 2022. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/01/12/2003771189

As we embark upon a new year, tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue to heighten by the day.

However, the CCP is adept at using seemingly innocuous political tools to advance its “united front” strategy, and psychological and cognitive warfare offensives against its targets, including Taiwan.

The regime consistently uses soft and sharp power, such as culture, education and sports exchanges, as well as media organizations and economic means, to control and manipulate Taiwanese public opinion.

Chinese Army Division Independently Improves Integrated Reconnaissance System

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“After the integrated reconnaissance system was introduced to other units in the division, the intelligence and reconnaissance capability of the units was substantially enhanced.”

According to a recent article posted on the Chinese Ministry of Defense website, a Chinese division has fielded a new type of integrated reconnaissance system.  The new system is supposed to enable more rapid reconnaissance and strike capability against enemy targets.  The article explains that China had developed past reconnaissance equipment in piecemeal fashion over extended periods, often making systems incompatible and therefore inefficient at reconnoitering and strike.  Hoping to improve efficiency, the unidentified army division set up a team of experts who spent nearly half a year tackling key problems, as well as researching, developing, and testing equipment interconnections.  Their efforts reportedly streamlined levels of command and improved the interconnection and communication between the different reconnaissance systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles, reconnaissance devices at forward sentry posts, and infrared thermal imaging devices.  While this article does not indicate whether or not this sort of localized innovation is a common practice in the PLA, it is at least a demonstration of alignment with President Xi Jinping’s general directive for more innovation in PLA.

Source:

Zhang Jin and Hu Wenbo, “陆军某师紧盯战斗力建设难点问题推进科研攻关自主革新挖掘侦察装备潜能 (Army Division Focuses on Difficult Issues in Building Combat Power, Promotes Key Scientific Research, Independently Innovates and Explores Potential of Reconnaissance Equipment),” Chinese Ministry of Defense website, 17 December 2021. http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2021-12/17/content_4901281.htm.

Officers and soldiers utilized a new type of independently developed, integrated reconnaissance system to achieve rapid reconnaissance and rapid strikes against “enemy” targets.

According to information provided, due to the incompatibility of reconnaissance equipment distributed at different times in the past, the efficiency of reconnoitering and striking targets was not high. With respect to this issue, the division set up a team that sought to collect expertise and tackle key problems. Under the guidance of relevant experts, the team repeatedly tested the interconnection sequences of equipment, streamlined levels of command, researched and built new types of connecting cables and interfaces for the equipment, and achieved interconnection and communication among various kinds of reconnaissance equipment, including reconnaissance UAVs, reconnaissance devices at forward sentry posts, and infrared thermal imaging devices.

… After the integrated reconnaissance system was introduced to other units in the division, the intelligence and reconnaissance capability of the units was substantially enhanced.