Tag Archives: Global Operational Environment

India Draws Lessons on Cyber and Electronic Effects From the War in Ukraine 

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GSLV-Mk III-D1 being moved from Vehicle Assembly Building to second launch pad.

GSLV-Mk III-D1 being moved from Vehicle Assembly Building to second launch pad.

While national R&D is focused in this field, the Indian Army is closely watching the advancements made by our adversaries, to ensure that these vital capabilities are inducted into our armed forces well ahead of times. 

The Indian Army has been focused on a possible conflict with China since the border incidents on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2017 and 2020.  While Indian officials have been improving the army’s combat and logistic capabilities on the LAC, the accompanying excerpted article reports on an Indian Army exercise involving satellite communications that drew lessons from the war in Ukraine and that officials are hoping will guide further development of army capabilities.  The article from the independent English-language newspaper The Hindu reports on the scenario of the exercise, which involved using all satellite communications in the Indian Army in different technical and operational situations.  The article notes that the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) also took part in the exercise and that it included the eastern regions and northern border areas of India, which includes the LAC.  The articles go on to mention how the Indian Army has been studying electronic warfare in the war in Ukraine at multiple levels and that India believes this further established the importance of satellite communications.  The article notes that the army is currently using ISRO satellites but is set to have its own by December 2025 as India’s Acquisition Council approved the new satellite back in March during the early weeks of the war in Ukraine.  It is also points out that the Indian Army is closely watching the advancements made by its adversaries and that this is an effort to stay ahead of them.  Overall, the exercise and satellite acquisition show how India continues to respond to China and that it is closely watching what is happening in Ukraine.  

Source:

Dinakar Peri, “Indian Army conducts Exercise Skylight to test resilience of its satellite communications,” The Hindu (independent English-language newspaper), 6 August 2022. 

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-army-conducts-exercise-skylight-to-testresilience-of-itssatellite-communications/article65733174.ece

To test the operational readiness of satellite systems and personnel manning them, the Indian Army last week carried out Exercise Skylight validating and showcasing the resilience of its communication capabilities in case terrestrial connectivity is disrupted in future conflicts, officials in the security establishment said. 

“During the two-week long exercise, all satellite communication assets in the Army were activated and various technical and operational scenarios in space domain were simulated.  Various agencies responsible for space and ground segments, as also the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) participated in the exercise,” a source in the security establishment said.  This includes over 200 static platforms and over 80 vehicle based and man portable systems that were incorporated… 

“…the exercise covered the eastern part of the country, northern borders and the island territories. “This will be done regularly,” the source said. 

The Army has carried out detailed studies of cyber and electromagnetic effects in the war in Ukraine. Electronic warfare has played a major role in Ukraine, sources said, “We had multiple iterations on how this conflict has panned out, at various levels.”  

The studies established efficacy of reliable satellite communication like the one afforded by ‘Starlink’, officials said…(the) Indian Army is utilizing the services of a number of ISRO satellites as it does not have a dedicated satellite.  In March, The Defence Acquisition Council cleared a proposal for a GSAT-7B communications satellite.  The army is on course to get its own satellite by December 2025. 

…To train its personnel on all aspects of satellite communication, the Army recently published Request for Information for its own student satellite, for training engineering students in Military College of Telecommunication Engineering on satellite technology. 

…While national R&D is focused in this field, the Indian Army is closely watching the advancements made by our adversaries, to ensure that these vital capabilities are inducted into our armed forces well ahead of times, officials added. 

Image Information:

Image: GSLV-Mk III-D1 being moved from Vehicle Assembly Building to second launch pad 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:GSLV-Mk_III-D1_being_moved_from_Vehicle_Assembly_Building_to_second_launch_pad.jpg 
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Russia and China Look To Corner Bolivia’s Lithium Industry

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“China controls 80 to 90 percent of global capacity.  This is an extremely dominant position for a country at a time when everyone is trying to expand.”

Bolivia has some of the largest deposits of lithium in the world, a mineral with civilian and military applications.  As reported by the UK-based news outlet BBC Spanish, Russia, which possesses deep experience in mining strategic minerals, is one of the major contenders to win a globally strategic contract to extract much of Bolivia’s lithium. China is another contender. According to U.S. Government international broadcaster Voz de America, China already controls 80 to 90 percent of global lithium mining capacity.  Voz de America reports that there is international concern that China will consolidate its position as the most important lithium mining power, given China’s past use of economic interdependence as a weapon.  Russian or Chinese dominance over the lithium industry risks producing another raw material dependence on authoritarian competitors.

Source:

“La carrera por los codiciados ‘minerales del future’ que pueden crear gigantescas fortunas e influir en la seguridad nacional de los países (The race for the coveted ‘minerals of the future’ that can create gigantic fortunes and influence the national security of countries),” BBC Spanish (Spanish-language version of the popular British news outlet), 21 April 2022.  https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-61144362

Russia, one of the major exporters of gas and oil, demonstrated that due to the dependence of many countries on its exports, especially European ones, fuels are a weapon of war amid the harsh economic pressures that the U.S. and its allies have pursued in order to get the Kremlin to end the invasion of Ukraine… However, in the race for the metals that will play a crucial role in future economic development, Russia has its advantages: it is the world’s second largest exporter of cobalt, the second of platinum, and the third of nickel.

Source:  “Fuerte competencia por el litio de Latinoamérica para reducir dependencia de China (Strong competition for lithium from Latin America to reduce dependence on China),” Voz de America (U.S.-based, state-owned international broadcaster), 24 June 2022. https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/fuerte-competencia-por-el-litio-de-latinoamerica-para-reducir-dependencia-de-china/6628644.html 

The race for lithium has led manufacturers of electric vehicles to enter into contracts directly with mining companies to ensure the supply of lithium… China not only exploits lithium but also exercises a dominant position in the entire supply chain for the manufacture of electric car batteries.  Most of the battery manufacturing is in China.  China controls 80 to 90 percent of global capacity.  This is an extremely dominant position for a country at a time when everyone is trying to expand.

DRC Conflicts Reveal Difficulties in Deploying Regional Forces

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M23 rebels in the DRC.

M23 rebels in the DRC.

“But however noble President Kenyatta’s deployment proposal, not everyone in the DRC agrees with the regional leaders’ decision of a military solution to stabilise the restive eastern DRC provinces.”

Kenya’s influential President, Uhuru Kenyatta, recently proposed deploying the East African Standby Force (EASF) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  Regional leaders at the East African Community Heads of State Conclave even endorsed Kenyatta’s proposal, but still no troops have been sent to help combat M23 rebels as well as the multiple militias who have ramped up attacks on civilians.  As the excerpted article from the Africa-based media company The East African notes, there are several reasons for this delay.  Many politicians in the DRC, as well as a significant segment of the population, view a potential EASF deployment with distrust.  They are especially wary of having Rwandan troops in the DRC given the long history of hostility between the two nations.  Troops from Uganda and Burundi, as well as Rwanda, are also unwelcomed as they all have rebel groups in the country.  There is fear their divergent goals might further complicate an already complicated situation.  There is also concern that EASF will be comprised of countries that have formerly plundered DRC’s mineral riches.  Finally, there are traditional obstacles to deployment including logistics, communications, rules of engagement, budgets, and agreements on the status of forces.  As the article explains, no timeline exists regarding when these issues would be resolved.   Meanwhile, violence in eastern DRC is increasing, portending further destabilization and the potential interruption of the importation of critical minerals, including those for defense industries.  The recent military intervention in The Gambia by several West African countries under the auspices of ECOWAS gives some hope that East African countries can also come together and find that delicate balance whereby all parties can agree on the terms of a deployment.  Additionally, any solutions to the struggle of launching the EASF could be valuable in helping the African Union’s African Standby Force finally stand up.  Both forces have the potential to help provide the security and stability desperately needed in the DRC and elsewhere in Africa.

Source:

Patrick Ilunga and Luke Anami, “Why the EAC regional force is yet to be deployed to DR Congo,” The East African (African-based media company), 27 June 2022. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/why-the-eac-regional-force-is-yet-deployed-to-dr-congo-3861010

“All the armies from the East African Community states are already present in the east of our country in one form or another.  The Rwandan army is associated with the M23 in North Kivu and supports the Red-Tabara [Burundian rebellion based in Congo].  The Ugandan army, which you invited, has been operating openly in North Kivu and Ituri since November 2021.  The Burundian army operates regularly in South Kivu, and the South Sudanese army in the province of Haut-Uele [northeast of DRC].  The Tanzanian and Kenyan armies are already present in North Kivu and Ituri as part of the UN intervention brigade,” the letter reads.

“At least three out of seven member states of the East African Community have been involved for more than two decades in the aggression and destabilisation of our country through direct interventions of their armies or by proxy, through armed groups.  Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi accuse each other of destabilisation.  They compete for influence, even control of part of our country for security as well as economic and geopolitical reasons, so much so that more than once they have had to confront each other on our territory, directly or through armed groups,” Lucha writes.President Tshisekedi has to make tough decisions.  His main political opponent Martin Fayulu accuses him of “subcontracting the security of the country to Rwanda and Uganda and unnecessarily creating a competition of East African countries over the Congo”” He has called on the president to reveal “his secret deal.”

Image Information:

Image: M23 rebels in the DRC
Source: Al Jazeera/Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:M23_troops_Bunagana_4.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0

India Strengthens Security Cooperation With Vietnam

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Defense Minister Shri Rajnath Singh

“The Indian military has the advantage of operating similar platforms to Vietnam’s.”

India has taken several measures to counter China in the past several years, particularly after violent clashes on the Indian – Chinese border in 2017 and 2020.  In addition to strengthening the capabilities of its armed forces along the border, the accompanying excerpted article from the Indian independent think-tank Observer Research Foundation reveals how India is trying to improve security cooperation with Vietnam.  Following the 2020 border skirmishes, Indian officials believe future conflict with China will not likely be limited to one domain.  The article reports on Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Vietnam in early June, noting that he signed two security cooperation agreements.  One remains unpublished in the public domain, but the other agreement involved mutual logistics support and allows both to use the other’s military facilities for repairs and replenishment.  According to the article “this arrangement will mainly benefit the Indian Navy as it ramps up its profile in the Indo-Pacific.” Finally, the article addresses the impact of the war in Ukraine on Vietnam’s ability to procure weapons and equipment from Russia, noting that India has the potential to offer Vietnam various weapons and equipment.  India operates “similar platforms to Vietnam’s and…has leveraged this by assisting Hanoi in training and capacity building.”  Ultimately, India’s agreements with Vietnam mark another step to counter China and offer a potential market for the Indian defense industry.

Source:

Sameer Patil, “The importance of India’s defence partnership with Vietnam,” Observer Research Foundation (independent think tank in India), 28 June 2022.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-importance-of-indias-defence-partnership-with-vietnam/

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently paid a three-day visit (8-10 June 2022) to Hanoi to strengthen defence and security ties with Vietnam…  India has also activated a satellite imaging and tracking station in Hanoi, enabling it to track Chinese naval activities in the region…

During Minister Singh’s recent visit, India and Vietnam signed two key agreements:

The first agreement, ‘Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030’, casts a long-term perspective on the mutual ties.  While contents of the agreement are not available in the public domain, according to officials, it aims to “enhance the scope and scale of existing defence cooperation.”

The second agreement, an MoU, focused on mutual logistics support to enable the two countries to use each other’s military bases to repair and replenish supplies.  According to the official statement, this agreement is “the first such major agreement which Vietnam has signed with any country.”  This arrangement will mainly benefit the Indian Navy as it ramps up its profile in the Indo-Pacific.

Besides, the two countries also agreed to expedite the extension of a US$500-million Line of Credit (LoC) to Hanoi… As part of the US$ 500 million LoC, India has offered Vietnam Brahmos cruise missiles, Akash missile air defence system, Varunastra anti-submarine torpedoes, and coastal radars…

Notwithstanding the pro-China orientation of the current political leadership, a key driver of Vietnam’s military build-up is the security rivalry with China.  Beijing’s stepped-up aggression to press its territorial claims in the South China Sea dispute has been a significant irritant for Hanoi…

Vietnam has traditionally relied on Russia for its weapons.  However, given its renewed proximity with the US and the US sanctions against the Russian defence industry, Hanoi has sought to diversify its recent arms purchases…

Since the South China Sea clashes, Vietnam has boosted its defence spending, averaging US $4.8 billion between 2014 and 2018.  But, compared to the threat posed by China and its military requirements, this spending is inadequate.  Therefore, Hanoi is looking for more affordable defence suppliers with this moderate defence spending.

India can potentially be one such source.  The Indian military has the advantage of operating similar platforms to Vietnam’s.  It has leveraged this by assisting Hanoi in training and capacity building in Kilo-class submarine operations and Sukhoi-30 fighter jet training.

The unrelenting Chinese hostility in the region will ensure that India and Vietnam will continue on the path of cooperation…  However, to optimise the gains of their collaboration and contribute to regional stability, New Delhi and Hanoi will have to show tangible progress…

Image Information:

Image: Defense Minister Shri Rajnath Singh
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Defence_Minister_Shri_Rajnath_Singh.jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Vietnam Trains Cambodian Navy Amid Chinese Competition

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Vietnam People's Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting 2010-10-12.

Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting 2010-10-12.

“The cooperation program in education and training between Cambodian military schools and the [Vietnamese] Naval Academy will continue to expand and develop to improve its effectiveness…”

Vietnam’s Naval Academy has trained Cambodian naval officers for years.  Recently, the Vietnamese government-affiliated People’s Army Newspaper reported that the Cambodian navy sent senior officials to Vietnam to discuss how to improve the effectiveness of the program from which thousands of Cambodians have graduated.  The article notes the Cambodian cadets receive instruction in history, tradition and naval tasks and functions, while fostering friendship and solidarity between the two neighboring countries’ navies.  The continuation of the training program comes amid greater competition from China for influence on the Cambodian navy. 

A separate article posted on the Chinese Ministry of Defense website noted that U.S. media outlets and government officials have claimed that China’s development of the Cambodian Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville lacked transparency and was part of Chinese military strategy to create a global network of naval bases.  The Chinese Ministry of Defense, however, claims its naval cooperation with Cambodia is a normal function of international relations and consistent with international law.  The ministry also condemned any suggestion that Chinese naval activities in Cambodia pose a threat.  Rather, the Chinese claim that Ream Naval Base will improve Cambodia’s ability to protect its maritime territorial integrity and combat piracy and other maritime crimes.

Vietnam is an historical ally of Cambodia and competitor of China with maritime territorial disputes with China over islands in the South China Sea.  Therefore, Chinese presence at the Ream Naval Base, near Vietnam’s own naval base in Phú Quốc, draws Vietnam’s attention.  Given Vietnamese perception of naval competition with China, continuing to train Cambodian naval cadets is important to Vietnam as it seeks to maintain military influence in Cambodia.

Source:

“Đoàn cán bộ cấp cao Hải quân Hoàng gia Campuchia trao đổi kinh nghiệm tại Học viện Hải quân (A senior official delegation from the Royal Cambodian Navy exchanged experiences at the Naval Academy),” People’s Army Newspaper (government-affiliated media source), 27 June 2022. https://www.qdnd.vn/quoc-phong-an-ninh/tin-tuc/doan-can-bo-cap-cao-hai-quan-hoang-gia-campuchia-trao-doi-kinh-nghiem-tai-hoc-vien-hai-quan-698277

On June 27, a high-ranking delegation of the Royal Cambodian Navy led by Vice Admiral Non Sophat visited and exchanged experiences at the Naval Academy. Dr. Nguyen Van Lam, Director of the Naval Academy, introduced briefly the history, traditions, functions, tasks, achievements and development trajectory of the Naval Academy.  Simultaneously, he discussed with the delegation the situation and results of training Cambodian military cadets at the academy.  Over the years, the Naval Academy has trained and cultivated thousands of Royal Cambodian Navy officers.  Recently, despite the complicated situation of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Academy still organizes trainings for Cambodian students.

The cooperation program in education and training between Cambodian military schools and the Naval Academy will continue to expand and develop to improve its effectiveness further and contribute to fostering more friendship and solidarity between the armies, navies, and peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia to ensure peace, stability, and development of each country in the region and in the world.

Source: “国防部回应美炒作中柬合作：戴着有色眼镜 看什么都“不透明 (The Ministry of Defense responded to the United States exaggeration about China-Cambodia cooperation: Like wearing colored glasses to makes everything “blurry”),” mod.gov.cn (Chinese Ministry of Defence website), 22 June 2022. http://www.mod.gov.cn/jzhzt/2022-06/30/content_4914396.htm

Some media continue to exaggerate the normal exchanges and cooperation between China and Cambodia, which is entirely devoid of ulterior motives.  On June 8, the upgrading and reconstruction project of the Yunyang Naval Base assisted by China officially commenced.  It conforms to the domestic laws of the two countries and relevant international laws and international practices and is not targeted at a third party.  The construction of the Yunyang base is aimed at strengthening the Cambodian Navy’s ability to maintain maritime territorial integrity and combat maritime crimes.

Image Information:

Image: Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting 2010-10-12
Source: Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Force,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_People%27s_Navy_honor_guard_at_ASEAN_defense_ministers_meeting_2010-10-12_1.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Venezuela’s Mystery Plane Shows Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America

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A Venezuelan plane from the state-owned airline Conviasa at Simón Bolivar Airport in Caracas.

A Venezuelan plane from the state-owned airline Conviasa at Simón Bolivar Airport in Caracas.

“Argentina’s Justice Ministry is trying to establish why Iranians came among the crew of the Venezuelan airline that was officially supposed to transport auto parts from Mexico to Argentina, and to see if there are elements that support the hypothesis that the Iranian pilot is indeed linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard.”

On 8 June, a large Boeing 747 of suspicious origin was grounded in Buenos Aires, where Argentine authorities seized the crew’s passports.  The plane belongs to Venezuela’s state-owned Emtrasur Cargo airline, a subsidiary of Conviasa, which Iran’s sanctioned Mahan Air sold to Venezuela one year ago.  The mystery surrounding the cargo plane hints at Iran’s strategic penetration of Latin America through a mix of commercial and military activities.  According to one of Argentina’s leading media outlets Infobae, the aircraft stopped in Mexico to load auto parts, then made several trips throughout South America, including Venezuela, Paraguay, and eventually Argentina before authorities grounded it.  Cordoba’s leading newspaper, Diario Cordoba, posits that the passenger manifest, which was exceptionally large, holds clues as to the plane’s true purpose.  The paperwork shows that the pilot of the plane was a known member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qud’s Force, Captain Gholamreza Ghasemi.  Further, speculation is rife that at least one passenger departed the plane before it arrived in Argentina, when the plane was forced to make an emergency landing in Cordoba after bad weather in Buenos Aires caused it to avert its landing there. If Iran is ferrying security operatives and sanctioned individuals from its elite security forces to Latin America by cargo and civilian airliners, posing as either passengers or crew members, this represents a grave security threat. In 1992 and 1994, Argentina suffered devastating terrorist attacks on a Jewish community center and the Israeli Embassy. In Argentina, it has been suspected for years that Iran and Hezbollah have a connection to these attacks.

Source:

“El avión con tripulantes iraníes encendió las alarmas de toda la región hace cuatro semanas (The plane with Iranian crew set off alarms throughout the region four weeks ago),” Diario Cordoba (Cordoba’s leading daily newspaper), 14 June 2022.  https://titulares.ar/el-avion-con-tripulantes-iranies-encendio-las-alarmas-de-toda-la-region-hace-cuatro-semanas/ 

The international alarms over the flights of a plane manned by Iranians and Venezuelans in the Southern Cone began to ignite four weeks ago throughout the region…[Argentina] received a notice that it is a company and therefore an aircraft that was sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury and that its crew members were members of the Al-Quds Force, the revolutionary force of Iran, whom the United States has been on a terrorism list.

Source:  “EMTRASUR: la empresa fantasma venezolana que vuela con un solo avión bajo la sombra iraní (EMTRASUR: the Venezuelan ghost company that flies with a single plane under the Iranian shadow),” Infobae (one of Argentina’s leading outlets, generally viewed as center-left politically), 19 June 2022.  https://www.infobae.com/politica/2022/06/19/emtrasur-la-empresa-fantasma-venezolana-que-vuela-con-un-solo-avion-bajo-la-sombra-irani/ 

Paraguayan Intelligence Minister Esteban Aquino assured this Friday that Gholamreza Ghasemi, the pilot of the plane held in Buenos Aires, has ties to the Quds Force.  Argentina’s Justice Ministry is trying to establish why Iranians came among the crew of the Venezuelan airline that was officially supposed to transport auto parts from Mexico to Argentina, and to see if there are elements that support the hypothesis that the Iranian pilot is indeed linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard.

Image Information:

Image: A Venezuelan plane from the state-owned airline Conviasa at Simón Bolivar Airport in Caracas.
Source: Wilfredor via Wikimedia https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Conviasa_plane_in_Maiquetia_Airport.jpg
Attribution:  Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication

Regional Coalitions Supersede the AU’s African Standby Force

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Should the African Standby Force become fully operational, soldiers such as these from Burundi would play a key role in peacekeeping for the organization.

Should the African Standby Force become fully operational, soldiers such as these from Burundi would play a key role in peacekeeping for the organization.

“The ASF has never seen action, with ad hoc troop coalitions instead becoming the norm in Africa.”

It has been nearly two decades since the African Union (AU) created the African Standby Force (ASF), a proposed multinational and multidisciplinary peacekeeping military organization.  However, despite numerous conflicts across the continent, the ASF has yet to respond.  Instead, as the accompanying excerpted article from South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies explains, various African regions have created their own ad hoc coalitions of troops to deal with security issues in their associated territories.  For example, seven East African Community countries established a regional military force in April 2022 that helped restore stability in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where militia groups were conducting violent attacks.  Likewise, in 2021 Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community sent forces to northern Mozambique to fight Islamic militants.

These regional coalitions of militaries have not followed the ASF’s concepts regarding how and when forces should be deployed and have called into question the ASF’s relevance.  The coalitions believe they are doing the work the ASF was designed to do but has not done.  According to the article, there are several reasons why the ASF has failed to launch.  First, there have been numerous political problems in addition to security concerns between African nations.  There have also been difficulties between the AU and the five regional economic blocs that are supposed to coordinate the ASF.  Some African countries have been slow to commit necessary resources to the ASF.  However, as the article notes, the ASFs biggest problem is that violent extremism was not originally addressed in the organization’s framework, forcing regional coalitions to fill this gap.

Efforts are underway to resolve some of the issues constraining the ASF.  These include forming mechanisms to improve decision-making, facilitating a better understanding of when to deploy the ASF, and expediting the formation of an ASF counterterrorism unit.  While these may sound promising, this is not the first time that the ASF has seen such attempts.  This inability of the AU to have a large, ready, and unified force means Western powers seeking to support peacekeeping operations must deal with several different regional forces instead of one.  Meanwhile, with regional coalitions providing forces to deal with their regional problems, the pressure is off a bit for the AU to stand up the ASF quickly.  However, the inability of the AU to do so reflects the many difficulties it faces trying to unite Africa even in the face of conflicts and terrorism. 

Source:

Meressa K. Dessu and Dawit Yohannes, “Can the African Standby Force Match Up to Current Security Threats?” Institute for Security Studies (South African think tank), 2 June 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-african-standby-force-match-up-to-current-security-threats

The ASF has never seen action, with ad hoc troop coalitions instead becoming the norm in Africa.

The ASF originated in 2003 as a multidisciplinary standby mechanism comprising soldiers, civilians and police in their countries of origin. It is coordinated by the five regional economic communities with the aim of being ready for rapid deployment at short notice. The intention is to help the AU Peace and Security Council discharge its responsibilities relating to peace support missions.

Analysts attribute this problem to the power that regional blocs have over peace and security decisions due to a lack of clarity on the subsidiarity principle between regions and the AU. This ambiguity of roles and responsibilities enables countries to opt for ad hoc security arrangements over the ASF.

Some analysts believe these ad hoc security coalitions complement the ASF and are best suited to tackling Africa’s deadliest transnational armed groups. The coalitions are seen as filling a gap in the AU’s peace and security arsenal by providing immediate responses to violent extremism and other complex threats – which the ASF’s framework doesn’t address.

Image Information:

Image: Should the African Standby Force become fully operational, soldiers such as these from Burundi would play a key role in peacekeeping for the organization.
Source: U.S. Army Africa/Wikimedia Commons/Flickr, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Burundi_peacekeepers_prepare_for_next_rotation_to_Somalia,_Bjumbura,_Burundi_012210_%284324781393%29.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

UAV Technologies Proliferating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia

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Wing Loong II side view, Dubai Air Show 2017.

Wing Loong II side view, Dubai Air Show 2017.

“…The plane belonged to the Saudi Air Force and was violating the armistice and carrying out hostile acts in the airspace of the capital, Sana’a…”

Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and counter-UAV technologies appear poised to continue proliferating and evolving in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.  The accompanying articles shed light on their use in this corner of the Arabian Peninsula.  In a span of four days in late May, Yemeni military sources claimed Houthi-led military forces in Yemen used “locally made” surface-to-air missiles to shoot down three UAVs belonging to the Saudi military.  The three UAVs were a Vestel Karayel [RG1] surveillance drone, a CAIG Wing Loong II [RG2] UCAV, and a CASC Rainbow CH-4 [RG3] UCAV.  The claims appear credible, although the only evidence presented were wreckage videos.  Yemeni forces did not specify how the drones were shot down beyond speaking vaguely of domestically manufactured systems.  Yemeni forces possess Russian/Soviet air-to-air missiles that they inherited from the Yemeni military stockpiles and modified to function as surface-to-air missiles.  They also operate Iranian air defense missiles smuggled into Yemen, most notably the “358” loitering air defense missile.  Saudi Arabia is seeking to produce UAVs and other advanced military equipment domestically and has signed co-production agreements with the makers of Turkish Karayels and Chinese CH-4s. 

Saudi Arabia has also recently entered into a joint venture with the China Electronics Technology Group to develop drones and counter-drone systems.  The latest incidents add to a growing list of over two dozen UAVs that Saudi Arabia has lost on the Yemeni battlefield, including over a dozen CH-4s and a handful of Karayels.  According to the accompanying excerpt from the Turkish daily Hurriyet, Saudi Arabia is thought to be in the process of purchasing Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs, perhaps in response to the underperformance of these other platforms.

Source:

@army21ye (Yemeni military spokesman Twitter account), 21 May 2022. https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1527936740874498049

By God’s grace, this morning our air defenses were able to shoot down an armed spy plane, of the Turkish-made Karayel type, belonging to the Saudi Air Force. The plane was violating the armistice and carrying out hostile missions in the airspace of the Hiran region of Hajjah governorate. It was targeted by a homemade surface-to-air missile, which has not been made public yet.

Source: @army21ye (Yemeni military spokesman Twitter account), 23 May 2022.
https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1528799226255253510

Moments ago, our air defenses were able, thanks to God, to shoot down a Chinese-made armed CH4 spy plane using a locally made surface-to-air missile. The plane belonged to the Saudi Air Force and was violating the armistice and carrying out hostile acts in the airspace of the capital, Sana’a.

Source:  @army21ye (Yemeni military spokesman Twitter account), 24 May 2022, https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1529119242221649922

The armed spy plane shot down by our air defenses at dawn today on the border front was a Chinese-made Wing Loong 2. It was targeted while violating the armistice and carrying out hostile actions in the skies of the Kitaf Directorate, along the border.

Source:  “Saudi Arabia to buy Bayraktar drones: Report,” Hurriyet (Turkish daily), 23 May 2022. https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/saudi-arabia-to-buy-bayraktar-drones-report-174012

“The Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) has expressed interest in Turkish drones and is ready for talks with the producing company, Baykar,” Lebanon-based Tactical Report wrote on May 22.

Image Information:

Image:  Wing Loong II side view, Dubai Air Show 2017.
Source: Photo by Mztourist via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wing_Loong_II_side_view.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en)

Algeria Inches Closer to Russia Amid Frosty Relations with Morocco and Spain

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Ville de Tindouf مدينة تندوف.

Ville de Tindouf مدينة تندوف.

“…Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that relations between Russia and Algeria are reaching a new level…”

In need of allies and with deteriorating relations with neighbors, Algeria’s relations with Russia are firm and potentially deepening following multiple military-diplomatic visits from Russia.  Russia-Algeria links “are reaching a new level,” according to statements Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently made to the Russian media outlet RT Arabic.  A new strategic cooperation document is being drafted to replace the 2001 agreement that currently guides bilateral relations.  According to the excerpted article from influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, Algeria plans to hold joint military exercises with Russia in November.  In early June, the new director of Algeria’s Advanced Warfighting School led a group of officers on a tour of General Staff colleges in Russia.  Deepening Russian-Algerian relations may reflect an emerging strategic alignment that could turn the western Mediterranean into a new flashpoint in the brewing conflict between Russia and NATO.

This is all against the backdrop of Algeria’s perceived threats from Morocco and Spain.  Both Algeria and Morocco have taken steps to reinforce military presence along their shared border in recent months.  Earlier this year, the Moroccan military established a new “eastern military zone” along its border with Algeria.  More recently, as reported in the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadid, the Algerian military conducted nighttime joint maneuvers and set up a new base near the oasis town of Tindouf, where the borders of Algeria, Morocco and the disputed Western Sahara converge.  Tindouf is home to the largest concentration of Western Saharan (Sahrawi) refugees, and a key center of gravity for the Polisario Front, Western Sahara’s pro-independence movement. 

In early June, Algeria downgraded its political relations with Spain in response to Spanish recognition of Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara earlier this year.  The Algerian government is threatening a near-total trade embargo with Spain, from which only natural gas exports would be excepted.  It has also threatened to shut off the remaining pipeline that carries Algerian gas to Spain.  Stopping the flow of Algerian gas to Spain would leave Italy as the only European country with pipelines bringing in Algerian natural gas.  Algeria’s diplomatic rupture with Spain also includes suspending cooperation on migration.  Given the Ukraine-related pressures on the EU’s eastern borders, increased immigration and decreased gas flows along Europe’s southern borders would undoubtedly put substantial strain on the European Union’s social and political order.

Source:

“لافروف: علاقاتنا مع الجزائر تصل إلى مستوى جديد

(Lavrov: Our relations with Algeria have reached a new level),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language news site), 26 May 2022. https://tinyurl.com/228xnr4b

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that relations between Russia and Algeria are reaching a new level. He also emphasized the need to formalize them in a new document, the preparation of which is underway.

Source:

“الجيش الجزائري ينفذ مناورات تحاكي قتالاً ليلياً قرب الحدود مع المغرب

(The Algerian army carries out maneuvers simulating night combat near the border with Morocc”),” al-Araby al-Jadid (Qatari-aligned daily), 7 June 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2cukk683

The Algerian army conduct nighttime military maneuvers with live ammunition. The exercises included various units and weapons, and the intensive use of missiles, rocket launchers and aircraft. They took place in the Tindouf region, which lies directly on the border with Morocco, not far from the disputed Sahara region between Rabat and t“e “Polisario Fro”t,” and coincided with the opening of a military base in the area.

Source:

“مسؤول روسي رفيع يبحث بالجزائر التعاون العسكري

(High-level Russian official discusses military cooperation in Algeri”),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 17 May 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2s3jt5ms

A senior official in the Russian Federation Council held discussion with Algerian officials yesterday regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine, the development of military cooperation between the two countries, and the previously announced joint military exercises, scheduled for next November in the Algerian desert.

Source:“”Students of Algerian Armed Forces Advanced Warfighting School visit Defence Universi”y,” Republic of Serbia Ministry of Defense, 6 June 2022. https://www.mod.gov.rs/eng/18878/poseta-polaznika-visoke-ratne-skole-oruzanih-snaga-alzira-univerzitetu-odbrane-18878

Students attending the Algerian Peo’le’s National Armed Forces Advanced Warfighting School have visited the Defence University in Belgrade today, thus starting their study tour of the Republic of Serbia which will last for several days.

Image Information:

Image:  Ville de Tindouf مدينة تندوف
Source: Photo by Habib kaki via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tindouf_تندوف.jpg
Attribution: CC 1.0., https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/deed.en

Azerbaijan Balances Security Cooperation Between Turkey and Russia

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Unmanned combat aerial vehicle Akıncı of Bayraktar at Teknofest 2019.

Unmanned combat aerial vehicle Akıncı of Bayraktar at Teknofest 2019.

“Within its framework, it is planned to sign a number of agreements, and also announced the intention to establish the production of Bayraktar-Akinchy heavy drones in Azerbaijan.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the independent Russian-language website Kavkazskiy Uzel provides a regional analysis of how Azerbaijan balances its security cooperation with Turkey and Russia.  It also discusses Azerbaijan’s recent purchase of the Turkish-made Akinci drone.  The article reports on Teknofest being hosted in Azerbaijan, noting that this was the first time the festival took place outside of Turkey.  It points out that Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a number of agreements there.  It also notes the delivery of the Bayraktar Akinci drone to Azerbaijan and that Turkey “will transfer production technologies” to Azerbaijan.  The Akinci has better capabilities than the Bayraktar TB2, which Azerbaijan currently has in its inventory. 

The comments from analysts in the region provide more context for what Azerbaijan is looking for from Russia versus Turkey.  Regional security analyst Shair Ramaldanov notes that security cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia is mostly for the “repair of military equipment of Soviet and Russian production” and that “spare parts for this are supplied from Russia.”  Political scientist Ilgar Velizade points out one key difference in Azerbaijan’s security cooperation with Turkey and Russia, specifically “in relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan aims at the joint production of new weapons; [whereas] in relations with Russia, Baku buys arms in the Russian Federation.”  Political scientist Arastun Orujlu noted another difference between Turkey and Russia: that “Turkey does not yet produce tanks and military aircraft, so Baku will purchase this equipment from the Russian Federation.  But in the field of high-tech, missile, helicopter weapons, Turkey is ahead of the Russian Federation.” 

Overall, the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan have had various systems serviced by Russia in the past, even if relations between the two had been strained.  While the article does not mention this, the war in Ukraine is having an impact on logistics for the Russian defense industry.  Azerbaijan’s acquisition of the Bayraktar Akinci shows what it continues to look for in its security partnership with Turkey, which gave the country a specific capability that Russia could not.

Source:

“Аналитики сравнили военно-техническое сотрудничество Баку с Анкарой и Москвой (Analysts compared military-technical cooperation of Baku with Ankara and Moscow),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent Russian-language website with news from the Caucasus), 28 May 2022. https://kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/377597/

Azerbaijan is hosting the Teknofest aviation, cosmonautics and technology festival, which is held outside of Turkey for the first time. Within its framework, it is planned to sign a number of agreements, and also announced the intention to establish the production of Bayraktar-Akinchi heavy drones in Azerbaijan. Military cooperation between Baku and Ankara is unlikely to interfere with cooperation with Moscow, since it is about the supply of various types of weapons, analysts interviewed by the “Kavkazskiy Uzel” noted…

The organizers of the festival are the Turkish Technology Team Foundation (T3), the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Industry and Technology of Turkey…Within the framework of the festival, Turkey and Azerbaijan are planning to sign a number of agreements, Turkish Minister of Industry and Technology Mustafa Varank told the Anadolu Agency.

The most significant achievement of the festival in Baku is the flight of the new Turkish heavy strike-reconnaissance U“V “Bayraktar-Akin”hi” from Turkey through the airspace of Georgia to Baku without an intermediate landing. The UAV covered 3200 km. This aircraft is much larger, better armed, flies longer and higher, and is capable of carrying more weapons than its predecessor, Bayraktar-TB2, which Azerbaijan used in the 2020 Autumn War…Ankara will transfer production technologies to the Azerbaijani side.

…On February 22, 2022, the Declaration on Allied Cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation was signed in Moscow. The document says that the parties are developing bilateral military-political cooperation that meets national interests and is not directed against third countries…They cooperate on issues of equipping with modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest…Military expert Shair Ramaldanov told t“e “Caucasian K”ot” correspondent that the military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation did not stop. It consists, according to him, primarily in the repair of military equipment of Soviet and Russian production and the restoration of weapons damaged during the hostilities. Spare parts for this are supplied from Russia…

…Political scientist Ilgar Velizade told t“e “Caucasian K”ot” correspondent that the Azerbaijani-Turkish and Azerbaijani-Russian military-technical cooperation differs in at least one fundamental poin“. “If in relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan aims at the joint production of new weapons, then in relations with Russia, Baku buys arms in the Russian Federati”n,” he said.

…Political scientist Arastun Orujlu compared the expected arms supplies to Azerbaijan from Turkey and Russi“. “Turkey does not yet produce tanks and military aircraft, so Baku will purchase this equipment from the Russian Federation. But in the field of high-tech, missile, helicopter weapons, Turkey is ahead of the Russian Federation, he told t“e “Caucasian K”ot” correspondent…

Image Information:

Image: Unmanned combat aerial vehicle Akıncı of Bayraktar at Teknofest 2019.
Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BayraktarAk%C4%B1nc%C4%B1_Teknofest2019_(3).jpg
Attribution: CC BY YA 4.0