Tag Archives: Global Operational Environment

India’s UAV Development Struggles to Take Off

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India’s Rustom-II in Flight during a testing phase. Note: the Rustom UAV is now referred to as the TAPAS.

“The TAPAS underwent tests before the armed services and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) proceeded to acquire the MQ9s.”

As India has made a push to build up its defense industry, it occasionally allows the armed forces to make acquisitions of weapon systems outside of Indian production venues. This occurs when there is an urgent operational requirement and no viable alternative available from Indian companies.[i] To that end, officials in the Indian armed forces announced earlier this year they had purchased 31 MQ-9B Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from the United States under an Acceptance of Necessity acquisition.[ii]

India’s acquisition of the MQ-9B UAVs, instead of a system from India, brought to light ongoing issues with UAV development in India as reported on by the accompanying excerpted article from India’s independent think tank, the Observer Research Foundation. The article notes that Indian officials chose the MQ-9Bs over an equivalent Indian system, the TAPAS, due to numerous issues with the latter’s development and testing. The author points out that TAPAS is being revived by the Indian Air Force despite the MQ-9B purchase, but significant issues remain. One of the most notable challenges is that TAPAS is apparently reliant on Chinese parts like other Indian-developed UAVs. While importing parts for UAVs from China is more cost-effective, it could compromise security, and India’s Ministry of Defense has warned the defense industry about sourcing parts for UAVs from China.

The article concludes by stating that while India has yet to produce a UAV suitable for the military, like TAPAS, there is still potential for domestically produced UAVs if the government, the armed forces, the Defense Research Development Organization,[iii] and the Indian defense industry all continue to push for it. However, the impact of the Indian armed forces continued acquisitions from outside the country’s defense industry on this situation remains uncertain.

Sources:

Kartik Bommakanti, “Despite MQ9B purchase, the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy revive TAPAS,” Observer Research Foundation (independent think-tank in India), 13 September 2024.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/despite-mq9b-purchase-the-indian-air-force-and-indian-navy-revive-tapas

Earlier this year, the Modi government’s announcement that India will purchase 31 MQ9-B Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs), also known as Predators, developed by the United States’ General Atomics, came as a shot in the arm for the Indian armed forces. The Indian Navy (IN) will get 15 naval variants of the MQ9 UAVs dubbed the Sea Guardians for maritime missions, whereas the Indian Army (IA) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) will get eight each…The Reapers are primarily geared for ISR missions, but they can also perform strike missions, and the ones being purchased by India are multirole…even if this purchase is not consistent with the government’s flagship Atma Nirbhar Bharat (ANB) initiative…

All the factors mentioned above outweighed whatever capabilities the Tactical Airborne Platform for Air Surveillance (TAPAS), India’s native Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone, could bring to the armed forces…[TAPAS] was consumed by excessive development time and cost overruns, after its initial launch was pegged at a price of INR 1,650 crores or roughly US$ 200 million. By early January of 2024, the revised costs surged to INR 1,786 crores or US$ 215 million…

A key technical deficiency of the TAPAS drone is its engine, which is a fundamental weakness plaguing other Indian aircraft development programmes…The TAPAS underwent tests before the armed services and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) proceeded to acquire the MQ9s…

Thanks to the IAF and IN, the TAPAS is being revived despite its technological deficiencies. The IAF sees the TAPAS, notwithstanding its lack of endurance, worth improving on progressively, which it seeks to deploy along the Line of Actual Control (LaC)…

More recently, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has warned against both private sector enterprises and government-run entities like the DRDO sourcing drone parts from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) for military UAVs. Nevertheless, private industry still relies on Chinese supplied spares…The TAPAS may have the support of the IAF and IN, but more broadly the domestic drone industry is heavily compromised by its dependence on spares and components from China. India confronts a trade-off—allow spares for military drones in particular to be sourced exclusively from non-Chinese sources, especially from native industry, thereby driving up costs and prolonging development time, or in a bid to keep procurement costs low for UAV components, allow the security of its drones to be compromised in key areas such as camera functions, communications, radio transmission and software security that are vital to military operations…

Although there is not a single Indian drone that can be considered militarily worthy…there is no reason to feel completely bleak about the future of military drone development in India, provided there is sustained effort by the government, the armed services, the DRDO and industry.

Notes:

[i] The Indian government set this requirement as part of Prime Minster Modi’s Atma Nirbhar Bharat initiative, or the “Make in India” initiative, beginning in 2014. The initiative mandates that the Ministry of Defense make acquisitions from the Indian defense industry to bolster growth and development of Indian companies. In recent years, India’s Ministry of Defense has gone outside of the Indian defense industry under government allowed exceptions to the initiative for what Indians have called “fast track” acquisitions, which fulfill urgent operational requirements for items such as new assault rifles. For a recent example of this, see: Snehesh Alex Philip, “Indian Army orders fresh batch of 73K SIG SAUER 716 rifles from US under emergency procurement,” The Print, 27 August 2024. https://theprint.in/defence/indian-army-orders-fresh-batch-of-73k-sig-sauer-716-rifles-from-us-under-emergency-procurement/2240975/

[ii] The Acceptance of Necessity differs from the “fast track” acquisitions to allow for more expensive acquisitions, like the MQ9-B UAVs. For other recent examples of Acceptance of Necessity acquisitions, see: Dinakar Peri, “Defence Acquisition Council clears heavy weight torpedoes, mid-air refuelling aircraft among major deals,” The Hindu, 16 February 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/defence-acquisition-council-clears-heavy-weight-torpedoes-mid-air-refuelling-aircraft-among-major-deals/article67854256.ece  

[iii] India’s Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO) is an organization within the Ministry of Defense that has a history of working with companies in the defense industry to develop and produce various weapon systems.

OE Insight Summary:

IND continues to acquire foreign systems despite the government push to grow the country’s defense industry with IND acquisition of MQ-9B UAVs in 2024 instead of a domestic UAV serving as an example of ongoing issues in IND defense industry

Image Information:

Image: India’s Rustom-II in Flight during a testing phase. Note: the Rustom UAV is now referred to as the TAPAS
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Rustom_flight_2_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

Wrestling with Complexity: How the PLA Assesses Combat Capability (Kevin McCauley) (December 2024)

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(Click image to download brief.)

Key Takeaways:

  • New quality combat capabilities [新质战斗力], which Xi Jinping prioritized for development in 2022, feature in many recent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) articles. Changes in warfare, technologies, and production are creating new combat capabilities. This creates the need to develop new combat capability assessment methods based on informationized and intelligent technologies, analysis of new-type operational forces, the expansion of operational domains, and the interaction of civilian production and military technological requirements. While the PLA is searching for improved methods to analyze the complexity of future operations, it appears to fail to factor in important data that could improve the accuracy of current capability assessments.
  • The PLA appears to use many different assessment methods with no standard method and no uniformity of factors used to assess capabilities. Combat capability assessments are important to the PLA for supporting planning, command decisions, conducting operations, modernization, force development, and training, and the evaluation factors and missions included in capability assessments provide insight into planning, operations, and the factors the PLA considers important for successful future operations. Yet some assessments exclude important areas such as training, operational methods, officers’ professional military education level, and environmental factors. The PLA’s lack of a uniform method for assessing combat capability could lead to uneven and inaccurate assessments supporting decision-making for operations. The variation in assessment factors employed in assessments would also appear to lead to variations in accuracy between the evaluations.
  • Future warfare and technological developments are creating a more complex and dynamic battlefield. This is driving PLA researchers to examine more accurate and complex methods for evaluating combat capability. The PLA increasingly seeks data-driven and qualitative features that require accurate assessment methods compared to more traditional subjective and quantitative methods.

German Opinion Divided on Increased Multi-Domain Task Force Capabilities

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It is proposed that the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) surface-to-surface hypersonic missile be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Opponents to the deployment of such weapons suggest it will antagonize Moscow and lead to a new arms race.

“Two thirds of those surveyed are against the plans to station long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons in western Germany in 2026. A large majority fear that the stationing could lead to a new arms race and make Germany a target for attack.”

A U.S. and German pronouncement on 10 July 2024 that the United States will start deploying long-range fires units to Germany in 2026 sparked a sharp Russian rebuke. On 12 July, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, made a statement that involved some thinly veiled nuclear threats. [i] These events have spurred debate in Germany about whether increasing U.S./NATO capabilities will make Europe safer or will simply antagonize Russia and start a new arms race. 

The accompanying excerpted article from the German political think tank, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, specifically lays out the capabilities of the BGM-109 Tomahawk surface-to-surface missile, the SM-6 ballistic defense missile, and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon surface-to-surface hypersonic missile that are proposed to be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. The think tank, which also advises the German government, explains the advantages of deploying the weapon systems and argues against possible concerns. In contrast, the second accompanying excerpted article from the German media company Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, notes that the German civilian population is highly critical of the decision to deploy these weapons, with citizens expressing various concerns. Of particular note, the article mentions a recent poll that found that two-thirds of respondents opposed plans to station these weapons in Germany. The third accompanying article from the German business newspaper Handelsblatt, lays out some expert German opinions for and against this deployment. It also notes another German poll in which 50 percent of respondents feared that such a force structure increase would further escalate conflict with Russia. 

On 1 September 2024, state elections in the German states of Thuringia and Saxony saw significant gains for the right-leaning Alternative for Germany party and the left-leaning Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance party, which both oppose the deployment of these U.S. weapons and disapprove of German support for Ukraine in its current form. These results may be an indicator of the upcoming German federal elections in 2025 and could influence the German position on the stationing of additional U.S. weapon systems.

Sources:

“Große Mehrheit lehnt Stationierung von US-Raketen in Deutschland ab (Large majority rejects stationing of US missiles in Germany),” Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (German media company), 21 August 2024. https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/mdrfragt-umfrage-ergebnisse-waffen-raketen-stationieren-nato-100.html

Two thirds of those surveyed are against the plans to station long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons in western Germany in 2026. A large majority fear that the stationing could lead to a new arms race and make Germany a target for attack. These are two results of the current MDRfragt survey from Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia with almost 24,000 respondents…

Only one in three believes that the deployment of weapons provides Germany with protection and strengthens its own defense capabilities (31%). A quarter of respondents believe that the US weapons systems could serve as a deterrent (26%).

In recent weeks, several parties have called for parliament to be involved in such a far-reaching decision. More than three quarters of MDRfragt participants also believe that the deployment of the weapons systems announced by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz has not yet been sufficiently discussed in politics.

Source: “Gewichtig und richtig: weitreichende US-Mittelstreckenwaffen in Deutschland (Significant and Sound: US Medium-Range Missiles in Germany),“ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (The German Institute for International and Security Affairs), 29 July 2024. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/gewichtig-und-richtig-weitreichende-us-mittelstreckenwaffen-in-deutschland

The German-American plan envisages the deployment of three types of land-based US medium-range weapons in 2026. The first is the Tomahawk cruise missile… Second, the Standard Missile (SM) 6… Third, the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also called Dark Eagle…The three missiles will be deployed in Germany as part of the US Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Its core mission is to counter Russia’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities with new technologies and concepts: In the event of war, Moscow hopes to keep the bulk of NATO forces away from the combat zone along its border by using ballistic and cruise missile strikes to prevent the alliance’s troops from deploying and resupplying, or by forcing NATO to back down with strikes against individual member states. The Alliance could not effectively defend itself against these Russian options with air and missile defense systems alone because Europe’s territory is vast, and comprehensive protection against Russia’s missile arsenal would be too expensive. Nevertheless, with its own medium-range precision weapons, NATO can thwart this Russian plan in two complementary ways….

…Opponents of the deployment plan argue that the US weapons would become targets for Moscow’s missiles, thereby exposing Germany to an increased threat. This narrative must be countered: Although the Kremlin is likely to consider future medium-range US weapons legitimate targets, Putin sees Berlin as an adversary anyway. As a NATO logistics hub with many US bases, Germany is already a priority target for precision strikes if Moscow wants to keep NATO at a distance in the event of war. New US missiles deployed there will not significantly exacerbate this situation.

Another concern is that the deployment of US weapons will force Russia to produce even more missiles and station them in Europe. The result would be an “arms race”. Indeed, the Russian government announced vague military countermeasures during the NATO summit… Nevertheless, due to Russia’s current arms build-up and the sanctions imposed upon the country, Russia’s defense industrial sector is already reaching its limits. Production capacity, skilled labor and financial resources are limited.  Therefore, even Russian and US experts who share concerns about an arms race have serious doubts that the Kremlin could launch a missile arms race with new programs in the short or medium term….

Source: “Was für US-Raketen in Deutschland spricht – und was dagegen (What speaks for US missiles in Germany – and what speaks against it),” Handelsblatt (German business newspaper), 20 August 2024.  https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/verteidigung-was-fuer-us-raketen-in-deutschland-spricht-und-was-dagegen/100059925.html

From 2026, the USA wants to station long-range missiles and cruise missiles in Germany. Many fear that this could escalate the conflict with Russia. Military experts assess the situation.  The USA wants to station Tomahawk cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles and SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles in Germany from 2026. This was announced by the governments of both countries in July on the sidelines of the NATO summit. Many citizens view the plan with skepticism. According to a survey for the Funke media group, 50 percent of those polled feared that this could further escalate conflict with Russia…

When the planned stationing became public knowledge, former SPD party chairman Norbert Walter-Borjans was upset. The fact that “such a far-reaching decision is practically not debated, that it is more or less made and announced unilaterally” is problematic, he told Deutschlandfunk. Walter-Borjans was still in office as party leader when the US announced in March 2021 that it would locate the second of five planned Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) in Germany and opened the headquarters in Wiesbaden in September 2021…

Sahra Wagenknecht, founder of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), described the missiles planned for deployment as “offensive weapons”. The SPD [Social Democratic Party] executive committee, however, sees things differently: The planned deployment is “not a confrontational build-up of arms, but a strengthening of our country’s defense,” it says in the three-page letter in which the executive committee recently backed Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s decision…

What is the rule now, an offensive or defensive weapon? Both. Military expert Carlo Masala from the Bundeswehr University recently said in an interview with Handelsblatt that the cruise missiles and the hypersonic missiles still under development are designed to destroy command centers, bases or supply lines far behind the front in the event of a Russian attack.  This is intended to make it impossible for the enemy to expand its attack over a large area. But if it realizes that it cannot win a major war, it will probably not attack at all, argues Masala. That is why the weapons serve as a deterrent and a defense.

FDP leader Christian Lindner recently told the newspapers of the Funke media group that Germany has been within range of Russia’s nuclear-capable missiles for years. “That is why it is of paramount importance for us to establish a balance of deterrence.”  For example, Russia has stationed Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave and in Belarus, which carry nuclear warheads and can reach Berlin. But the balance called for by Lindner is not to be achieved through nuclear weapons. The weapons planned for stationing would be “equipped with conventional warheads,” says the SPD presidium paper. “There are no plans to arm the systems with nuclear weapons.”

Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) is calling for a public debate “to make the seriousness of the situation clear…On one hand, we are experiencing a new threat situation in Europe due to Russia’s aggressive behavior, and on the other hand, we have a capability gap that we can only close in the short term with the help of our US allies until we have developed these weapons ourselves,” he emphasized…

Security expert Claudia Major from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) recently wrote in a guest commentary in the Handelsblatt that the Europeans lack their own land-based missiles with which they could reach Russian territory.  From Major’s point of view, the planned stationing of the missiles could even help to make a nuclear escalation less likely. In the event of an attack, they would give NATO additional options for action short of a nuclear counterattack, writes the SWP expert…

Notes:

[i] See: “Special op experience shows Russia needs clearer nuclear doctrine — diplomat,” TASS (Russian news agency), 12 July 2024. https://tass.com/politics/1816259

Image Information:

Image: It is proposed that the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) surface-to-surface hypersonic missile be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Opponents to the deployment of such weapons suggest it will antagonize Moscow and lead to a new arms race.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c4/LRHWfirstThunderBoltStrike.jpg

Tuareg Separatist Militants Form an Alliance Against Junta-Led Governments in Mali and Niger

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Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.

“The Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to assist each other, but also to defend their interests together on the international level.”

Since 2021, West African security and political dynamics have deteriorated as a result of coups by military juntas in the region’s three central states—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In July 2024, these three juntas agreed to a new regional Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) after leaving the preexisting regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States. They replaced Western military support with that of the successor to Russia’s Wagner Group, known as the Africa Corps. Now, however, two of the Sahel’s ethnonationalist and mostly secular Tuareg rebel groups, the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) in Niger and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)[i] in Mali, have formed their own alliance.

According to the excerpted French-language article from French state-owned radio news website rfi.fr, both the FPL and CSP-DPA oppose the respective juntas that are now ruling their countries. The main function of their newly established alliance is for both rebel groups to promise to aid each other in the case of an attack by AES armies, forcing them to confront a more complex and even multi-national insurgency. The article also states that the FPL and CSP-DPA plan to defend each other’s interests on the international level, although whether that entails advocacy or operations or both is left ambiguous. However, by targeting Chinese-funded pipeline projects, the FPL insurgency has already achieved internationalized operations status. The FPL believes such projects fund the junta in Niamey at the expense of predominantly Tuareg and other minority regions of Niger.[ii] Such attacks serve as a form of leverage and pressure against the junta.

The article also highlights that the alliance-making meeting between FPL and CSP-DPA leaders occurred in the northern Malian town of Tinzaouatène. This town near the Algerian border is the CSP base, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), which is under the CSP umbrella,[iii] and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims massacred dozens of African Corps and Malian troops in separate attacks on 28 July. According to the article, the Tinzaouatène meeting sent a message that the new FPL and CSP-DPA alliance could launch similar massacres if their goals for independence or autonomy are not met. This would represent a new development in the Sahel, where Tuareg rebel groups have historically remained relatively independent of each other and have mostly focused on reacting only to their own nation’s political and military developments.

At a time when the AES military juntas have largely lost legitimacy internationally and when Africa Corps is reeling from the massacre it suffered at the hands of the CMA, the FPL and CSP-DPA are escalating their confrontation with the embattled juntas in the political, military, and international realm. Neither group is particularly antagonistic towards the United States or the West. However, even if democratic rule eventually returns, their strengthening insurgencies will make it more difficult to reunite Mali and Niger and restore sovereignty to both nations.

Sources:

“À Tinzaouatène, les rebellions du Niger et du Mali se réunissent pour renforcer leurs relations (In Tinzaouatène, rebellions from Niger and Mali meet to strengthen relations)),” Radio France Internationale (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 28 August 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240901-%C3%A0-tinzaouat%C3%A8ne-les-rebellions-du-niger-et-du-mali-se-r%C3%A9unissent-pour-renforcer-leurs-relations

The delegation of the Niger rebels of the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) was led by Barak Taher Hamit, who holds the title of “commander-in-chief” of the armed movement opposed to the Niger junta. The delegation of the Malian rebels of the Strategic Framework for Defense (CSP) was headed by Alghabass Ag Intalla, who is the leader of the militant group and opponent of the Malian junta. To begin discussions with an aim towards strengthening relations between them, the site of the meeting was quite symbolic: Tinzaouatène in northern Mali, located on the Algerian border.

During the meeting, no document was signed, or at least not made public. But the Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to aid each other, and also to defend their interests together on the international level. According to sources close to both parties, other meetings are being planned about “fighting hand in hand against the militaries in power in Mali and Niger”.

Notes:

[i] “Azawad” is the term that Tuareg ethnonationalists use to refer their homeland.

[ii] In June 2024, the FPL, for example, disabled a section of Niger’s PetroChina-funded crude oil pipeline with the intent to force China to cancel a deal between the junta and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC). See: Emmanuel Addeh, “Tensions Escalate As Armed Group Attacks Niger’s PetroChina-Funded Pipeline, Threatens More Attacks,” Arise.TV, 19 June 2024. https://www.arise.tv/tensions-escalate-as-armed-group-attacks-nigers-petrochina-funded-pipeline-threatens-more-attacks/

[iii] See: “Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors,” ICG, 13 October 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur

Image Information:

Image: Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.
Source: Magharebia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Le_Mali_confront%C3%A9_aux_sanctions_et_%C3%A0_lavanc%C3%A9e_des_rebelles_islamistes_(6904946068).jpg

India Considers Implications After the Collapse of the Bangladeshi Government

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The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Ms. Sheikh Hasina, in New York, USA on September 27, 2019.

“Referring to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine as well as Israel-Hamas conflicts and the current situation in Bangladesh, the Minister exhorted the Commanders to ‘analyze these episodes, predict the problems that the country may face in the future, and stay prepared to deal with the unexpected.”

In early August 2024, protests in Bangladesh resulted in the collapse and resignation of the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. While this did not result in an immediate threat for India, the accompanying excerpted article shows how the situation in Bangladesh will remain a security issue for India. The article from the Indian independent think tank The Centre for Land Warfare Studies examines what happened in Bangladesh and outlines what India can do to adjust. The author, a retired Indian Army general, provides some background on what led to Sheikh Hasina’s resignation.[i] As the author points out, the history between India and Bangladesh has at times been contentious, but India and Hasina had favorable relations for a number of years due to Hasina’s working closely with India on security issues. This included India and Bangladesh cooperating to resolve their border and maritime disputes and Hasina working with India to help end its conflict with the United Liberation Front of Assam.[ii] The author goes on to note how China has gained considerable influence in Bangladesh through exports of weapons. He also mentions that because the Bangladeshi Army has played a role in the regime change, India should reach out to work closely and strengthen military ties. This could set up further competition between India and China in the region. Lastly, the author states that India needs to do everything possible to protect Indian nationals and ethnic minorities in Bangladesh, with the latter group referencing the Hindu religious minority in the country. The majority Muslim population in Bangladesh has periodically attacked Hindus, but Hasina’s government has provided them with protection. Indian Prime Minister Modi and the interim government in Bangladesh appear to have established positive relations, but the status of Hindus in Bangladesh could be a point of contention and an issue for India to resolve.

Sources:

Lt Gen PS Rajeshwar, (Ret), “India – Bangladesh Relations: Navigating The Turmoil,” The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (independent think tank in India), 16 August 2024. https://www.claws.in/analysis-india-bangladesh-relations-navigating-the-turmoil/

The developments of 5 August had resulted in very short notice to Indian authorities…What appeared initially to be a student movement against the quota system for descendants of freedom fighters in government jobs finally turned into a call for the resignation of the then Prime Minister…

Under these circumstances, how does one look at the strategic dimensions of India-Bangladesh relations? The ties between the two nations were forged through the sacrifices of people in both countries during the Liberation War of 1971. The economic, cultural, and linguistic aspects were strengthened further during the last 15 years of the Sheikh Hasina rule.

Bangladesh has a special place in our policy matrix and security calculations…She shares a more than 4000 km border, much of which abuts our critical NE region. In a significant 2015 agreement, the border was simplified by exchanging enclaves trapped in each other’s territories…The two countries also settled their maritime dispute amicably. Earlier, in 2010, the Awami League government had helped India by removing all camps of Indian rebel groups, which broke the back of the ULFA, pushing it to a peace agreement.

India has been very concerned about China’s influence in Bangladesh, from participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2016 to importing 72% of its arms from China in 2019-2023…

Second is our strategic intelligence, which must be comprehensively improved to anticipate such abrupt events better…

Fifth, since the Bangladesh Army has played a defining role in this crisis and could remain a key factor, we must strengthen our military-to-military ties.

Finally, we need to do everything to secure Indian nationals while insisting on the safety and protection of minority communities in Bangladesh, lest there be a backlash back home.

Notes:

[i] For a more detailed timeline and background on the protests in Bangladesh in 2024, see: “From job quota to Sheikh Hasina’s resignation: Timeline of the Bangladesh student protests,” The Hindu, 5 August 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/from-protests-to-sheikh-hasina-resignation-timeline-of-bangladesh-student-protest/article68488361.ece

[ii] The ULFA was a militant group that had operated out of Bangladesh with a goal of establishing an independent government in India’s State of Assam (bordering Bangladesh) until Hasina’s government agreed to eliminate its safe have in Bangladeshi territory. India and the ULFA reached a peace agreement in December 2023, see: Gaurav Dwivedi, “The Path To Peace: ULFA’s Journey From Insurgency To Accord,” NDTV, 29 December 2023. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/the-path-to-peace-ulfas-journey-from-insurgency-to-accord-4763730

Image Information:

Image: The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Ms. Sheikh Hasina, in New York, USA on September 27, 2019
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Prime_Minister,_Shri_Narendra_Modi_meeting_the_Prime_Minister_of_Bangladesh,_Ms._Sheikh_Hasina,_in_New_York,_USA_on_September_27,_2019_(1).jpg

Electoral Fraud in Venezuela Assists Axis of Authoritarians

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Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, which announced fabricated numbers on election night.

‘The governments of China, Russia, and Iran, close to the regime of Nicolás Maduro and with major economic and military interests in Venezuela, congratulated the Venezuelan dictator for the electoral victory that he has claimed for himself amid accusations of fraud.”

Venezuela’s recent presidential election has been the subject of significant criticism from election observers and the international community.[i] In addition to the electoral irregularities and uneven playing field before election day, the Maduro regime delayed the announcement of election results due to an alleged cyber-attack from North Macedonia. When the regime’s National Electoral Council, an institution it firmly controls, eventually announced the results, voters immediately knew the numbers were fabricated.[ii] The first excerpted article from Excelsior, Mexico’s second-oldest daily newspaper, reports that much of Latin America sees the situation similarly, and many countries have decided to withhold their recognition of the election results until the National Electoral Council shows the vote tallies proving Maduro’s win. Thus far, the outlet reports, the regime has provided incredible excuses for why it cannot provide them—first, the purported cyber-attack, followed by the claim of a hack by Elon Musk.[iii] In response, the outlet says Maduro decided to break diplomatic relations with seven Latin American countries that criticized Venezuela’s electoral process and lack of transparency.

Contrary to much of Latin America’s criticism, Venezuela’s authoritarian allies were quick to recognize Maduro’s victory. The second excerpted article from Argentine media outlet Infobae, recounts how China, Russia, and Iran immediately recognized Maduro’s “victory” given the importance of their alliance. Russia, the outlet states, went beyond recognition and pledged further military support for Caracas. Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Honduras have also recognized Maduro’s claim of victory.

Maduro’s inability to produce vote tabulations proving his victory will further isolate him from the West and send him deeper into the arms of his fellow authoritarians. This is notable given the months preceding the election featured regional diplomatic engagement to keep the elections on track. Conversely, China, Russia, and Iran have an interest in keeping Maduro in power because his regime thumbs its nose at the United States and continues to provide them with a strong foothold in Latin America.

Sources:

“Venezuela rompe relaciones diplomáticas con 7 países latinoamericanos (Venezuela breaks diplomatic relations with 7 Latin American countries),” Excelsior (Mexico’s second-oldest daily newspaper), 29 July 2024. https://www.excelsior.com.mx/global/venezuela-maduro-rompe-relaciones-diplomaticas-siete-paises-latinoamericanos/1665230 

Venezuela decided…to withdraw all its diplomatic personnel from its missions in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, hours after these countries demanded ‘a complete review of the results’ of the elections with the presence of independent observers…The result sparked a wave of protests in Venezuelan territory and condemnation, as well as calls for transparency from the international community. In response to the request of Latin American countries, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry said it decided to ‘withdraw all diplomatic personnel from the missions in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay, while demanding that those governments immediately withdraw their representatives from Venezuelan territory.’

“China, Rusia e Irán felicitaron a Nicolás Maduro tras el fraude electoral en Venezuela (China, Russia and Iran congratulate Nicolas Maduro after electoral fraud in Venezuela),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 29 July 2024. https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/07/29/china-rusia-e-iran-felicitaron-a-nicolas-maduro-tras-el-fraude-electoral-en-venezuela/ 

The governments of China, Russia, and Iran, close to the regime of Nicolás Maduro and with major economic and military interests in Venezuela, congratulated the Venezuelan dictator for the electoral victory that he has claimed for himself amid accusations of fraud…Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said at his daily press conference that Moscow intends to continue deepening cooperation with Caracas in all areas, including ‘sensitive’ ones, such as military-technical cooperation. In Latin America, the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia, which are all sympathetic to the Chavista regime,also spoke in favor of Maduro.

Notes:

[i] For more information on the fraud and how it was committed, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

[ii] Writing in the Wall Street Journal, opposition leader Maria Corina Machado details how the opposition mobilized a volunteer network to collect electronic voting tabulations from voting machines, giving them proof of Maduro’s fraud. See: “I Can Prove Maduro Got Trounced,” Wall Street Journal, 1 August 2024. https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-can-prove-maduro-got-trounced-venezuela-election-stolen-772d66a0

[iii] After a highly public back-and-forth with Elon Musk on X (formerly Twitter), Maduro blocked access to X in Venezuela for an initial period of 10 days. See: Vivian Sequera and Mayela Armas, “Venezuela’s Maduro blocks X access in country for 10 days,” Reuters, 9 August 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-maduro-signs-decree-blocking-x-access-10-days-2024-08-08/

OE Insight Summary:

Fraudulent elections in VEN have been denounced by much of Latin America; after the election, the Maduro regime is leaning further into alliances with authoritarian allies CHN, RUS, and IRN. 

Image Information:

Image: Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, which announced fabricated numbers on election night.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Consejo_Nacional_Electoral_Cne_Fachada_Posterior.JPG.      
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0.

Nigerian Security Services Crackdown on Russian Flag Protesters

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Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.

“The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag….”

Russian influence in Francophone West African countries that have experienced military coups in the last few years is a clear trendline. One of the most notable examples of this influence has been the expansion of the Wagner Group – or Africa Corps as the company is now known – in the region. However, the excerpted punch.ng report about Russian flags being seen at anti-government protests in northern Nigeria is a new and unexpected development, and a possible indication that Russian information operations are contributing to a positive image of Russia in parts of Nigeria. This is despite Russia’s dubious counter-insurgency record in the Sahel and its support for anti-democratic military juntas in West Africa.[i] According to the article, certain northern elite politicians provided Russian flags to #EndBadGovernance protesters, who are disappointed with the government’s inability to address hunger and hardship in the country. The article further suggests that these elites seek to remove the current Nigerian president, Bola Tinubu, from power. The Russian flags served as a threat to Tinubu’s administration that what happened to leaders deposed in coups in Francophone West Africa could occur in Nigeria as well. According to the article, the response of the Nigerian military to these Russian flags could lead to an excessive reaction towards the flag holders and their alleged sponsors. The military has a history of cracking down on dissent with excessive violence.[ii] The article quotes top military officials as stating the protesters holding the Russian flags are treasonous could indicate harsh action will be taken against them, including at least 10 protesters and flag makers who have already been arrested.

Sources:

“Russian flag: FG probes four northern political bigwigs,” punch.ng (Lagos-based publication with a southern Nigerian perspective often critical of the government and northern Nigerian powerbrokers) 7 August 2024. https://punchng.com/russian-flag-fg-probes-four-northern-political-bigwigs/

The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag as they chanted “Tinubu must go.” Russia, an Eastern power currently mired in a cold war with the West, has been blamed for several unconstitutional changes of government in West African countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and among others. The Nigerian military said persons flying the Russian flag were committing treason and will, therefore, be “prosecuted”.

This act not only disrespects our national symbols but also commits treasonable felony and related offences. Hence, 10 suspects were arrested flying Russian flags,” Public Relations Officer ASP Buhari Abdullahi stated while parading the suspects.

Notes:

[i] See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Army, Wagner Group Atrocities Against Civilians,” 28 March 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/mali-army-wagner-group-atrocities-against-civilians

[ii] Just five years ago, in 2019, for example, the Nigerian military cracked down on the Shia Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and killed several dozen of its members who had been protesting in the streets and nearly killed their leader, Ibrahim al-Zakaky. He was forced to recover from his injuries while under long-term house arrest. See Faiza Mawani, “Persecution of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria,” October 19, 2020, UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog. https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2020/10/19/persecution-of-the-shia-islamic-movement-of-nigeria/

OE Watch Insight:

NGA protesters with RUS flags during anti-govt protests indicate desire to remove NGA president from office as has occurred in other Sahelian states. NGA mil officials allege northern elites sponsor the flags but risk excessively cracking down on flagholders for their “treason.”


Image Information:

Image: Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.
Source: TobiJamesCandids, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Protest_against_the_Special_Anti-Robbery_Squad_(SARS)_in_Lagos,_Nigeria.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Armenia Continuing Its Move Away From Russian Reliance

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French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.

“Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said.”

Armenia continues taking steps away from Russia by working with other partners. The majority of Armenia’s weapons inventory is made up of Russian systems, leaving the Armenian government largely reliant on Russia. However, the accompanying excerpted articles report that Armenia reached a military-technical cooperation agreement with France in June 2024. The first excerpted article from the independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyansigned a military-technical cooperation agreement with the French company KNDS during his visit to France in June. The article notes that Papikyan also met with his French counterpart during his visit, but the details of their meeting were not disclosed. It is also mentioned that Armenia purchased French armored personnel carriers and radar systems in the past year, with negotiations still underway for Armenia to acquire the Mistral 3 short-range air defense system.

The second excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports that the meeting between the defense ministers of Armenia and France resulted in an agreement for Armenia to purchase an unknown number of French CAESAR 155mm self-propelled artillery systems. The article also includes a statement from Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan that Armenia has significantly reduced its military-technical cooperation with Russia since 2020.[i] Overall, Armenia’s recent acquisition of the French CAESAR 155mm artillery provides another system of non-Russian origin for the country’s inventory in the short-term, while the military-technical agreement with France could provide additional systems over the next several years. Both will help Armenia rely less on Russia going forward.[ii]

Sources:

“Армения и Франция достигли новых договорённостей в сфере ВТС (Armenia and France reached a new agreement on military-technical cooperation),” Eurasia Daily (an independent Russian-language news website), 18 June 2024.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/06/18/armeniya-i-franciya-dostigli-novyh-dogovoryonnostey-v-sfere-vts

As part of a working visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France, an agreement on military-technical cooperation (MTC) was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Armenia and the military-industrial company KNDS on 17 June…

Before that, Suren Papikyan met with his French counterpart Sebastien Lecornu…The parties noted the importance of military-technical cooperation, around which new agreements were reached, the Armenian Defense Ministry reported, without disclosing their content…

In October 2023, in Paris, the Ministers of Defense of Armenia and France signed agreements on the supply of weapons to Armenia. France has already supplied Armenia with 24 Bastion armored personnel carriers, with another 26 combat vehicles in the production stage. Yerevan has also placed an order for three GM200 radars, and negotiations are underway on the supply of Mistral 3 portable anti-aircraft missile systems…

“Армения договорилась с Францией о поставке самоходок Caesar (Armenia reached an agreement with France on the delivery of the self-propelled Caesar),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 18 June 2024.

https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/401043

Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said. The document was signed during the visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France…

The Caesar self-propelled artillery unit is equipped with a 155-mm cannon and is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 40 kilometers…

In March, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan noted that since 2020, Russia’s share in military-technical cooperation has decreased from 96% to less than 10%…

Notes:

[i] In the years since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in November 2020, the government of Armenia stated that it will reduce the number of weapon systems it acquires from Russia, because it does not believe Russia has been a reliable partner.

[ii] Armenia has acquired a few weapon systems from India in the years since, but these were not part of a long-term agreement with India. The systems from India included counter battery radar, multiple rocket launchers, and towed 155mm artillery. For more information on Armenia’s acquisitions of new weapon systems from India, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023.
https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/armenia-takes-another-step-away-from-russia/

OE Insight Summary:

In June 2024, ARM signed a military-technical agreement with FRA, including for the purchase of CAESAR artillery systems. The move marked another example of ARM moving away from RUS as a security cooperation partner since 2023.

Image Information:

 Image: French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Caesar_self-propelled_howitzer_in_Iraq.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Rumors of Russian Military Cargo Activity Underscore Tunisia’s Eastward Turn Away From the United States

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Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.

“Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians”

Summary: Recent rumors of Russian military cargo flights into Tunisia highlight President Kais Saied’s “eastward turn”— including toward China and Iran — and the potential erosion of Tunisia’s security partnership with the United States.

On 19 May, the Italian daily La Repubblica published a report claiming that Russia may be using a Tunisian airport to transport military equipment, raising questions about Moscow’s designs in the country. Russia exerts substantial military influence in both Libya and Algeria, Tunisia’s neighboring countries.[i] Tunisia, however, is a historical Western security partner in which Russia has traditionally had little to no military influence. The rumors of Russian activities in Tunisia may not amount to much, but they should nonetheless be taken seriously in light of evident Russian attempts to deepen its influence in Libya and the Sahel,[ii] along with Tunisian President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn.”

The report suggests that entities linked to Russia’s Wagner Group had flown equipment and personnel into the international airport of Djerba, a southern Tunisian island popular with local travelers and European package tourists.[iii] There is no open-source evidence supporting claims of Russian military-related movements in Djerba, but speculation among Tunisians is nonetheless rife, as noted in the first accompanying excerpt, from the Qatari-aligned English-language daily al-Araby al-Jadeed. Theories on Russian activities in Djerba include that former Wagner personnel are vacationing in Djerba; that Russia is “transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points”; or that the planes are transporting “personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia.” The Russian embassy was quick to ridicule claims of any military connection to these flights, as shown in the second accompanying excerpt, from the Russian Embassy in Libya’s Facebook page. The week after the publication on Russian flights to Djerba, President Saied flew to Tehran to attend Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s state funeral. The last time a Tunisian head of state visited Iran was 1965. The following week, Saied flew to Beijing to attend the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. While Saied’s recent engagement with Iran and China has been more overt than any gestures toward Russia, most analysts see these developments as part of a broader eastward turn in Saied’s foreign policy. Saied’s eastward turn, particularly toward China, as largely motivated by economics explains a Tunisian political activist cited in the third accompanying excerpt, from Qatar’s al-Jazeera. However, there are also ideological affinities between members of Saied’s inner circle and Iranian political leadership.[iv] This confluence of circumstances, according to a Tunisian researcher cited in the fourth accompanying excerpt, from the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida, makes Saied’s Tunisia a “ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”

Sources:

“Tunisia: alleged Russian military activity in Djerba raises concerns,” The New Arab (Qatari-aligned daily), 24 May 2024, https://www.newarab.com/news/tunisia-alleged-russian-military-activity-raises-concerns

Theories on the suspicious events at Djerba airport have become a “culture de trottoir” in Tunisia for months. Some speculate it involves Wagner personnel, while others suggest it’s about vodka shipments. According to some Tunisian analysts, these aircraft are believed to be “cargo planes” and civilian “charters,” not the military aircraft mentioned by La Repubblica. Some sources claim that the aircraft transported Russians affiliated with the former security company Wagner (now “Africa Corps”), who came to rest on the island of Djerba. Others suggest they transported personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia. A far more speculative hypothesis suggests that some aircraft might be transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points, thereby creating a crisis. Wagner’s presence in neighbouring Libya mainly fueled all these rumours… While rumours continue circulating, one thing may seem to be agreed on: Russian aircraft have been seen on Djerba Island. President Kais Saied, known for publicly addressing rumours targeting his country, has refrained from commenting on the situation at Djerba airport.

Russian Embassy in Libya, Facebook Page, 20 May 2024, https://www.facebook.com/RussEmbLib/posts/122143879226177351

Now the Italian “La Repubblica,” having clearly decided to keep up with the task of creating and replicating horror stories about “Wagner,” scares the inexperienced reader with the idea of ​​​​Russian combat aircraft at the airport of the tourist island of Djerba in Tunisia, neighboring Libya. One can only envy their imagination. But as a reaction, we have to say: this is a lie and a fake. A complete lack of respect for the reader, whether in Italy or abroad.

توجه تونس شرقا.. خطة للانسلاخ من الغرب أم مناورة؟

“Tunisia’s eastward orientation… a plan to ditch the West or a maneuver?” al-Jazeera (Qatari news channel), 4 June 2024, https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2024/6/4/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8

Political activist Ahmed Al-Kahlawi views the Tunisian-Chinese rapprochement as an important step taken by President Saied to revive historical relations with China, stressing that the Tunisian orientation towards the East was dictated by the economic difficulties that the country is experiencing as a result of dysfunctional cooperation to benefit the interests of Western powers. Al-Kahlawi told Al-Jazeera Net that President Saied chose to lead Tunisia to establish new partnerships with the East because he was certain that Tunisia would reap many economic and investment advantages, especially with China, the rising economic power, considering that Tunisia would achieve great growth that would free it from the hegemony of Western countries.

تونس بين التوجه شرقاً أو الحفاظ على حلفها مع الغرب

“Tunisia between an eastward turn and maintaining its alliance with the West,” al-Jarida (Kuwaiti daily), 30 May 2024, https://www.aljarida.com/article/64205For his part, Tunisian researcher at the Institute for Defense and Security Studies, Jalal Harchaoui, explained that in a context characterized by Russian penetration of the Sahel region and Libya, “Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”

Notes:

[i] See: Lucas Winter, “Russia Uses Diplomacy To Increase Military Influence In Libya,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-uses-diplomacy-to-increase-military-influence-in-libya/; Lucas Winter, “Algeria Seeks Non-Alignment By Preserving Russia Ties While Welcoming NATO Overtures,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/algeria-seeks-non-alignment-by-preserving-russia-ties-while-welcoming-nato-overtures/; Lucas Winter, “Algerian Military Deepening Ties To Russia,” OE Watch, 09-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/algerian-military-deepening-ties-to-russia/

[ii] See: Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-russia-m-dime-report/;  Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-china-m-dime-report/; Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024, Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Chinee Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/mali-china-m-dime-report-2/

[iii] The La Repubblica article is unavailable without a subscription. It can be found at: https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2024/05/19/news/aerei_militari_russi_tunisia_allarme_usa_migranti_saied_timori_governo_meloni-423030975

[iv] Per Le Monde, “certain circles surrounding Saied have long-standing links with the Islamic Republic,” in particular his brother Naoufel Saied. “Tunisia: Kais Saied’s inclination to turn to Iran,” Le Monde, 25 May 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/05/25/tunisia-kais-saied-s-inclination-to-turn-to-iran_6672647_124.html

OE Insight Summary:

Recent rumors of RUS military cargo flights into TUN highlight President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn”— including toward CHN and IRN— and the potential erosion of TUN’s security relationship with USA.

Image Information:

Image: Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kaïs_Saïd_2.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Turkey Deploying Syrian Private Security Contractors to Niger

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Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.

“The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.”

Summary: Turkey is deploying Syrian militants to Niger to protect economic interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles Russia’s Wagner mercenaries in West Africa, the Syrian militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.

Russia’s Wagner Group, and its successor Africa Corps, have received significant international attention and notoriety because of their operations propping up of post-coup military regimes in West Africa. While their objectives ostensibly include combating Islamist militants and protecting mining and other extractive industries whose exports benefit Russia, they have also partaken in the excessive killing of civilians during counter-insurgency operations.[i] The excerpted French-language article in L’Orient Le Jour highlights Turkey’s recent programs to deploy militants to West Africa, whose activities can be juxtaposed against those of Wagner and Africa Corps.

According to the article, the program involves hundreds of pro-Turkish Syrians—and not Turks themselves—from the Sultan Murad brigade.[ii] This differs from Russia’s Wagner and Africa Corps, whose members are primarily Russians, despite recent evidence of an African member in Wagner ranks in Ukraine.[iii] The Syrians have been contracted by a Turkish private military company, which has paid the Syrian fighters up to $1,500 per month. This is almost ten times more than they had received when fighting in Turkish-controlled areas of Syria. Like with Wagner and Africa Corps members, remuneration is, therefore, a primary incentive for the Syrians to travel to Niger.

The exact activities of these Turkish mercenaries remain unclear. On one hand, the article asserts that their main role is to protect Turkish interests and projects in Niger, including mining operations. In this sense, they would be functioning much like private security contractors, rather than mercenaries. On the other hand, one of the Syrian contractors interviewed for the article noted that the outfit was deployed to combat Boko Haram. If true, this would likely mean that they were based in southeastern Niger near Lake Chad, where iron ore and other minerals are mined, where Boko Haram factions have pillaged villages and even taken over military outposts in the last few years. If this were the outfit’s primary role, it would appear to function more closely to Wagner, though without the regime protection efforts.

Although the interviewee states that his cohorts arrived in Niger only around one year ago, the article claims Turkey had been preparing for their deployment by sending Syrian fighters to train in Libya for several years. This provided the fighters with combat experience in Africa and a gateway for further travel to Niger. In addition, in 2020, Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement with Niger, which involved the sale of armed drones from Turkey to Niger. However, this may have since evolved into the additional deployment of these pro-Turkish Syrians to Niger as well.

The article does not indicate the Syrians in Niger will play as significant of a counter-insurgency role as Wagner or Africa Corps in West Africa, which also means their presence in the country is less likely to generate international concerns on humanitarian grounds. However, the Syrians’ primary motivation of remuneration and the challenging security environment in Niger, including with Boko Haram and other al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated fighters in their midst, raises questions about their ability to successfully defend Turkish interests, let alone enhance security in the region. Another question lingers about whether friction will develop between Turkey and Russia in West Africa through their deployment of fighters to protect their respective interests in similar areas.

Sources:

“Le Niger, nouvel Eldorado des mercenaires proturcs de Syrie (Niger, the new Eldorado of pro-Turkish mercenaries from Syria),” www.lorientlejour.com (Lebanon-based French-language publication covering Francophone international affairs, including coverage of Islamist militancy) 3 May 2024. https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1413977/le-niger-nouvel-eldorado-des-mercenaires-proturcs-de-syrie-enquete.html

A thousand Syrian fighters from areas under Turkish control have left for Niger for a year to protect Turkish interests and projects. In the areas of northern Syria controlled by Turkey, where recruitment into pro-Ankara factions is the main driver, according to Omar, his monthly salary never exceeded $46. “Here in Niger, we are paid $1,500,” added the young man, who supports his mother and brothers and sisters.

At the group’s headquarters, they signed six-month contracts with a private Turkish military consulting company that protects Turkish interests, including mines, in Niger.

The military regime of Niger, as a result of a coup d’état perpetrated on July 26, 2023, has reoriented its foreign policy and denounced military cooperation agreements with France and the United States, while Russia is advancing its interests in this country. For its part, Turkey has increased its influence in Niger over the past decade through humanitarian aid, development and trade. The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.

Notes:

[i] For an analysis of Russia’s Africa Corps, please see: (last Zenn OE Watch)

[ii] The Sultan Murad brigade in Syria was comprised primarily of ethnic Turkmen from Syria and specialized in fighting Islamic State (IS) forces, as opposed to forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The brigade was part of the Jaysh al-Fateh (“Army of Victory”) coalition, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey and reached its peak in 2015 before suffering from internal factional disputes. See: Fabrice Balanche, “The Battle of Aleppo Is the Center of the Syrian Chessboard,” WINEP, 5 February 2016.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/battle-aleppo-center-syrian-chessboard

[iii] See, for example, Jacob Zenn, “Russia’s Africa Corps Appears to Be Recruiting African Militants,” Terrorism Monitor, July 9, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russias-africa-corps-appears-to-be-recruiting-african-militants/

OE Insight Summary:

TUR is deploying militants from SYR to NER to protect econ interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles RUS Wagner mercenaries in WA, the SYR militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.


Image Information:

Image: Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.
Source: Saotura, https://commons.wikim edia.org/wiki/File:Niger_Turkey_Locator.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0