Somalia: Behind Al-Shabaab’s Success in Recruiting Children

Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.

Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.


“Over the past decade or so, Somali’s federal government has attempted to combat al-Shabaab’s child recruitment in a variety of, ultimately ineffective, ways.”


Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Somalia’s newly elected president, is facing many problems in his country, including a drought that threatens millions with famine, political divisions hampering unity, and a rise in attacks by al-Shabaab despite years of combatting the terrorist group.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the pan-African independent news platform African Arguments explains, much of al-Shabaab’s strength owes to its ability to recruit children.  The group uses boys as logistics operatives, combatants, and suicide bombers, while girls are used as cleaners, cooks, and “wives” of the fighters.  The group uses both boys and girls as spies, with their young age helping to lessen suspicion of their activities.

According to the article, al-Shabaab finds it easy to recruit youth due to a variety of factors.  Work in a country with a devastatingly high unemployment rate such as Somalia is a huge draw. Power, marriage, and for those seeking one, a religious education, albeit quite radical, are other reasons for joining al-Shabaab.  There is also widespread discontent with the government, which people perceive as being deeply corrupt.  Abuse at the hands of security forces drives young people to the terrorist organization.  Additionally, impoverished parents who receive money from the organization sometimes force their young children to join the group. 

There have been programs to persuade young recruits to leave al-Shabaab as well as dissuade those who have not yet joined from doing so.  However, as the article notes, these attempts usually have little impact because they focus on the evils of al-Shabaab as opposed to the actual needs of the children.  Meanwhile, Western powers, the African Union, and the Somali military are finding it quite difficult to eliminate al-Shabaab because even when they eliminate large numbers of its fighters, new ones soon appear.  Until the factors that draw young people into the terrorist group are significantly mitigated, the pipeline of recruits ready to take up arms will very likely remain quite full.


Source:

Liban Osiye and Liban A. Hussien, “To counter al-Shabaab, Somalia’s new govt must do something for the kids,”African Arguments (pan-African independent news platform), 24 May 2022. https://africanarguments.org/2022/05/to-counter-al-shabaab-somalias-new-govt-must-do-something-for-the-kids/

Tackling this war crime head on will be critical to saving thousands of children from myriad forms of abuse and, in some instances, death. But it will also be essential to combating the al-Shabaab threat as a whole. In almost all the groups’ acts of terrorism, young people are involved in some capacity.

Over the past decade or so, Somali’s federal government has attempted to combat al-Shabaab’s child recruitment in a variety of, ultimately ineffective, ways.

Unless President Mohamud’s administration honestly examines the reasons that many young people and their families see joining al-Shabaab as an attractive or necessary option, the Islamist militants will keep winning the radicalisation war. To truly tackle child recruitment, his new government will have to recognise that al-Shabaab’s greatest tools in turning Somalia’s future generations against its present leadership are issues such as endemic poverty, social exclusion, lack of basic public services, endemic corruption, paralysed politics, and poor governance. An effective military strategy is also essential to combatting al-Shabaab – insecurity allows militants to use brute force, torture and abductions to recruit many child soldiers – but not sufficient.

Most of al-Shabaab’s child recruits are from areas the group holds or has a significant presence in. But it is notable that its level of recruitment in big cities like the capital Mogadishu is reportedly increasing.

And it has been found to use girls as cooks, cleaners, and “wives” as well as to spy or move weaponry.


Image Information:

Image: Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.
Source: AMISOM/Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/7306922512/in/album-72157629979805598/
Attribution: Public Domain

The Philippines Gaining Upper Hand Against Abu Sayyaf

2021-12-03 T4 Delivery 005.

2021-12-03 T4 Delivery 005.


“The terror groups may try to disrupt the peace and order during the election period but our preparedness will assure that they will not succeed…”


The Philippines government may be weakening Abu Sayyaf across the region.  According to Philippine daily sunstar.com, there was concern that Abu Sayyaf would seek to disrupt the elections after Philippine forces killed the group’s leader in Basilan only weeks earlier.  The military’s strategy to protect the elections from Abu Sayyaf involved closing off access points to the group’s main area of operations in Basilan and ordering troops to avoid political partisanship.  In addition, the army boosted its coordination with the Philippine National Police, the Commission on Elections, and other agencies to secure the elections.  Ultimately, the army deployed 69,000 soldiers to protect the elections, which were held successfully on 9 May.

A separate article in the Philippines’ largest English-language newspaper, Manila Bulletin, pointed to the surrender of an Abu Sayyaf bomb-maker as evidence that Abu Sayyaf’s ranks were being further depleted through the Philippines’ rehabilitation program for former Abu Sayyaf members.  The program, which allows local governments to work with surrendered repentant militants to reintegrate them into society, has seen some success since the Philippines stepped it up in recent years. Elsewhere, according to a recent Indonesian-language article in Hong Kong-based suara.com, a number of hostages escaped Abu Sayyaf in Indonesia in April.  Collectively, the articles imply that Abu Sayyaf’s military capabilities and negative impact appears to be waning in the face of determined government effort.


Source:

“Troops told to ready for poll worst-case scenario,” sunstar.com (Philippine daily), 20 April 2022. https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/1926909/zamboanga/local-news/troops-told-to-ready-for-poll-worst-case-scenario

Lieutenant General Alfredo Rosario Jr., commander of the Western Mindanao Command (Westmincom), has ordered the troops in Basilan province to prepare for the worst-case scenario on election day. “The terror groups may try to disrupt the peace and order during the election period but our preparedness will assure that they will not succeed,” Rosario said. On March 25, Radzmil Jannatul alias Abu Khubayb, the leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan province, was killed in a clash with government troops in Sitio Center, Baiwas village, Sumisip, Basilan.

“Let us also sustain our good coordination with our partners from the Philippine National Police, the Commission on Elections, and other agencies to ensure an honest, orderly, and peaceful elections,” Rosario added. He reminded the JTF-Basilan troops to remain non-partisan at all times.

Source: “Sayyaf bomber surrenders in Zamboanga,” mb.com.ph (Philippines largest English language newspaper), 23 March 2022. https://mb.com.ph/2022/03/23/sayyaf-bomber-surrenders-in-zamboanga/

A suspected Abu Sayyaf member linked to several bombing and kidnapping incidents in Zamboanga and Basilan surrendered to authorities on Tuesday. Mursidin Husin, 39, a resident of Sitio Buahayan, Dita, Zamboanga City, surrendered to the police at PNP Camp General Eduardo Batalla, RT Lim Boulevard. Husin also turned over his .38 caliber revolver with ammunition. Husin, a follower of Jamiul Nasalun, an Abu Sayyaf sub-leader based in Zamboanga City, was allegedly involved in the 2013 bombing of a passenger bus in Zamboanga City and two other explosions in a Sangali cafeteria and in Basilan.

Source: “Kisah WNI 427 Hari jadi Tahanan Abu Sayyaf: Jarang Makan dan Takut Kena Bom (Story of Indonesian Citizen 427 Anniversary of Abu Sayyaf Prisoner: Rarely Eat and Fear of Bombs), suara.com (Hong Kong based Indonesian language bi-monthly newspaper), 5 April 2022. https://www.suara.com/news/2021/04/05/132923/kisah-wni-427-hari-jadi-tahanan-abu-sayyaf-jarang-makan-dan-takut-kena-bom

Arizal Caste Miran, one of the four victims of the Abu Sayyaf group hostage-takers in the Philippines, is now able to reunite with his family. Before returning to his family’s arms, Arizal and three other people were desperate to escape. They heard from a member of the Abu Sayyaf group that the hostages would be transferred to Tawi Island. While on their way in the morning, the ship they were traveling on capsized because from the waves. Instantly the four Indonesian citizens went to save themselves.


Image Information:

Image: 2021-12-03 T4 Delivery 005.
Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2021-12-03_T4_Delivery_005.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Separatist Conflict Imminent in Northern Mali

Islamist fighters in northern Mali.

Islamist fighters in northern Mali.


“He reiterated that kinetic measures alone will not end the war and therefore advised that a political solution be implemented.”  


On 10 March, the Arabic-language website imangahdien.com, which covers northern Mali, published the excerpted interview with the spokesperson for the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA).  The CMA includes Tuareg and Arab militant and political movements that seek autonomy for northern Mali.  In 2015, the CMA concluded a peace agreement with the Malian government, known as the Algiers Accords.  CMA spokesperson Mohamed Ramadan Mouloud suggests that the CMA may take up arms again against the Malian state and renounce the Algiers Accords.  The CMA views that a return to war is likely because the current Malian military rulers are unwilling to grant autonomy in parts of northern Mali to the CMA.   The CMA’s views regarding the lack of implementation of the Algiers Accords are consistent with the findings of the International Crisis Group, which argued in 2020 that the decentralization and regionalization guaranteed by the Accords had indeed not been fully implemented and that the Malian government focused almost exclusively on the jihadist threat.

Mouloud notes that the CMA welcomed the coup that brought the Malian military to power last year and ousted the democratically elected President Ibrahima Boubacar Keïta.  According to Mouloud, Keïta did not implement the Algiers Accords.  However, the CMA believes that the military leaders have also not implemented them, despite their promises to do so.  Further, the CMA resents the military rulers because they allowed Russian forces, including from the Wagner Group, on Malian soil despite Russia’s record of human rights abuses in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, and elsewhere.  Moreover, the CMA claims that Russia will not be able to compensate for the withdrawal of French troops from Mali because the security and counter-terrorism demands of the country are too severe for either foreign power to resolve.  Rather, the CMA believes its own military forces should be granted increased authority to provide security in northern Mali.


Source:

“المتحدث باسم CMA: العودة إلى الكفاح المسلح ليست مستبعدة في ظل تنصل مالي من اتفاقية السلام (CMA Spokesperson: A return to armed struggle is not excluded because of Mali’s rejection of the peace agreement),” imangahdien.com (Arab language news website), 10 March 2022. https://imangahdien.com/en/2022/03/10/porte-parole-de-la-cma-un-retour-a-la-lutte-armee-nest-pas-exclu-a-la-lumiere-de-la-repudiation-par-le-mali-de-laccord-de-paix/

The spokesperson for the Coordination of Azawad Movements, which signed the peace agreement with the Malian government, stated that a return to armed struggle cannot be discounted because of the Malian government’s disavowal of the agreement concluded between the two parties.

Mohamed Ramadan Mouloud: In fact, we welcomed with anticipation the departure of the regime of former President Ibrahima Boubacar Keïta, who had no will to implement the agreement concluded between the Malian government and the Azawad movements, signed six years ago, all of which was scheduled to be implemented within two years of its signing…. The precedent that has been procrastinating and manipulating the Azawadi issue.

Our position on the Russian presence is very clear and specific. From the first day, we issued a statement rejecting the Russian presence on the territory of Mali, and we said that this presence would represent a danger to the region, and that Wagner’s history is linked to crimes and massacres in Syria, Libya and Central Africa…. Of course, they will not be able to fill the vacuum of the French and European forces, and in fact, the security vacuum in Mali can only be filled by the re-arranged national army, to include the national forces of the Azawad movement.

Source: “Mali’s Algiers Peace Agreement, Five Years On: An Uneasy Calm,” The International Crisis Group (international research organization), 24 June 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire

The agreement seeks to restore peace in Mali principally through a process of decentralisation or regionalisation, reconstituting a national army from the members of the former armed groups that were signatories, and boosting the economy (particularly in the north), based on dialogue, justice and national reconciliation…. So far, the measures have been temporary or too limited to make any real impact on the ground.


Image Information:

Image: Islamist fighters in northern Mali.
Source: Idrissa Fall
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Islamist_fighters_in_northern_Mali.PNG
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Al Shabaab Takes Advantage of Somalia’s Disjointed Election Process To Ramp Up Attacks

A female soldier belonging to the Somali National Army.

A female soldier belonging to the Somali National Army.


“Security analysts said the brazen attacks were a fresh demonstration of al-Shabab’s goal of destabilizing the government in Mogadishu.”


As the accompanying excerpted article from Somali independent news outlet Shabelle Media Network explains, al Shabaab is involved in two aspects of the country’s dragged out elections.  First, it is delaying the voting process by targeting politicians and the means to conduct an election.  As the article notes, the election was originally scheduled for July 2021.  At that time, 329 seats in parliament were to be filled.  Second, it is taking advantage of the confusion caused by the delay to launch additional terrorist attacks, including two bombings in the city of Beledweyne, which claimed at least 48 lives.  Among the dead is Amina Mohamed Abdi, a young lawmaker who had been a strong critic of the government.  She is the fifth parliamentary candidate killed in two months.

Political disputes between President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, as well as  disagreements between the central and provincial governments, have had a significant role in knocking the election process off kilter.  All of this has played into the hands of al Shabaab, which has found the disarray an opportune time to strike at targets that compound the government’s inability to keep a firm election date.  Additionally, al Shabaab’s attacks have created concern among the civilian populace about their safety, likely suppressing the actual number who will go to the polls.  On the same day as the Beledweyne bombings, two al Shabaab militants breached Mogadishu’s heavily fortified airport, which was the designated location for the presidential elections.  It is also the location of the UN, AMISOM, and several Western embassies.  Western powers have been pushing Somalia to conduct elections, hoping they might help unify the divided nation and strengthen its ability to combat al Shabaab.  Al Shabaab’s recent attacks are a strong reminder that despite repeated pronouncements of the terrorist organization being weakened, it is still a potent force capable of frustrating both the Somali government and Western powers.


Source:

“Al-Shabaab Increases Attacks as Elections Drag in Somalia,” Shabelle Media Network (independent news outlet), 26 March 2022. https://shabellemedia.com/al-shabaab-increases-attacks-as-elections-drag-in-somalia/

 Security analysts said the brazen attacks were a fresh demonstration of al-Shabab’s goal of destabilizing the government in Mogadishu.

 Among the dead was a firebrand woman member of parliament, Amina Mohamed, who was on the campaign trail when she was targeted and killed by a suicide bomber.

 “If the election is being delayed then they must have got time, so that at least they can easily target the elders, who select the candidates,” Abdisamad said. “They can easily kill candidates vying for the seats. They can easily interrupt the entire election process, so that they see failed outcome at the end of the day.”

 Safiina said security has been tightened at all polling stations and is provided by national police as well as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Safiina said anyone who wants to undermine the election by acts of terrorism or disruption will fail.


Image Information:

Image: A female soldier belonging to the Somali National Army.
Source: AMISOM/Flickr, https://flickr.com/photos/61765479@N08/27519432255
Attribution: Public Domain

Kyrgyzstan Conducts Exercise with Its New Bayraktars

Bayraktar TB2 S-IHA of the Turkish Army in Teknofest2021at Istanbul Atatürk Airport, Turkey.

Bayraktar TB2 S-IHA of the Turkish Army in Teknofest2021at Istanbul Atatürk Airport, Turkey.


“The Bayraktars entered service with the Border Guards in mid-December last year…”


Kyrgyzstan rarely acquires new weapons and equipment, so when the Kyrgyz government recently announced it had received a set of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), it marked an upgrade in the capabilities of Kyrgyz forces.  The accompanying excerpted articles report on a recent field exercise with the new drones as well as additional new equipment.

The article from the independent news website Kloop reports on an exercise involving Kyrgyzstan’s new Bayraktars.  The article notes that the scenario of the exercise involved eliminating a group of criminals with fire support from the UAVs.  Kyrgyz units in the Ministry of Defense, not the Border Guards, typically carry out this type of exercise.  The article mentions that it is unknown how many Bayraktars Kyrgyzstan purchased, but the UAVs and new vehicles are a notable upgrade specifically for the Border Guards.  There have been a number of clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border over the past 10 years, including clashes in April-May 2021 that resulted in a few dozen people killed (border guards and civilians) and clashes on 12 April 2022.

The excerpted article from the Kyrgyz semi-independent newspaper Vecherniy Bishkek reports on the delivery of “50 new KAMAZ vehicles and 55 Tigr armored personnel carriers to the Border Guards Service of the National Security Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic” and notes that it is “the largest acquisition of equipment for Kyrgyzstan since its independence.”  The article also mentions that the Kyrgyz government purchased the new military equipment with state funds, which one political scientist believed was possible partly because of the government’s takeover of the Kumtor gold mine last year.  In May 2021, the Kyrgyz government took steps to take ownership of Kumtor a Canadian company that had operated and held majority ownership of the mine.  As of April 2022, Kyrgyz authorities now have ownership and control operation of the mine, which makes up a significant percentage of the country’s GDP.


Source:

Munduzbek Kalykov, “Одним видео: «Байрактар», бронетехника и президент в полевой кухне (One video: “Bayraktar”, armored personnel carriers and the president in a field kitchen),” Kloop (independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 31 March 2022. https://kloop.kg/blog/2022/03/31/odnim-video-bajraktar-bronetehnika-i-prezident-v-polevoj-kuhne/

The special tactical exercise “Kalkan-2022” has started at the “Edelweiss” training center in the city of Balykchy…

According to the exercise scenario, an “international criminal group” infiltrated Kyrgyzstan from a neighboring state, having already seized weapons, mortars, a tank and other equipment.

During the exercise, special units of the Border Guards blocked off and eliminated the mock enemy. Their captured armored vehicles were destroyed with the use of the Bayraktar…

The Bayraktars entered service with the Border Guards in mid-December last year. They were bought within the budget, but it is unknown how much was spent on them. Also, the number of drones was not specified.

Source: Bakyt Basarbek, “Благодаря правильной экономической политике мы закупили военную технику (We purchased military equipment thanks to the right economic policies),” Vecherniy Bishkek (semi-independent, Russian-language newspaper in Kyrgyzstan), 25 March 2022. https://www.vb.kg/doc/416032_blagodaria_pravilnoy_ekonomicheskoy_politike_my_zakypili_voennyu_tehniky.html

Today, on 25 March, in Bishkek, a ceremony was held to present 55 modern fire engines to the Ministry of Emergency Situations and 50 new KAMAZ vehicles and 55 Tigr armored personnel carriers to the Border Guards Service of the National Security Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic…this is the largest acquisition of equipment for Kyrgyzstan since its independence.

…the KAMAZ trucks and the armored personnel carriers were purchased with funds from the state budget…

“Now we can buy equipment ourselves. The privatization of Kumtor and general economic policy played a role in this,” said political scientist Mars Sariev…he recalled that Kyrgyzstan previously purchased the strike-capable unmanned aerial vehicle Bayraktar from Turkey…


Image Information:

Image: Bayraktar TB2 S-IHA of the Turkish Army in Teknofest2021at Istanbul Atatürk Airport, Turkey
Source: CeeGee via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bayraktar_TB2_S-IHA_TurkishArmy_Teknofest2021_(3).jpg
Attribution: CC by 4.0

Algeria Caught Between Neutrality and Strategic Relations with Russia

“… the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war are strongly present in these diplomatic moves, by virtue of Algeria’s strong strategic relationship with Russia and its stable relations with Western countries…”


Algeria has sought to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but historical strategic relations with Russia and growing security concerns on its borders may draw it closer to Russia.  As noted in the excerpts from the Saudi-funded Independent Arabia and the influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, these relations were on display during a late March visit to Algiers by a high-level Russian military delegation, during which the two sides agreed to hold joint anti-terror military exercises in southern Algeria in November.  Algeria is a key buyer of advanced Russian weaponry and an attractive strategic partner for Russia in the current geopolitical climate due to its location on NATO’s underbelly and its abundant natural gas resources.  Russia can help Algeria with two of its vital concerns: securing its southern border, particularly with Mali, and militarily balancing Morocco.  Relations with Morocco have soured over the past year, and Morocco’s blossoming military partnership with Israel threatens to tilt the balance in its favor.  Although the Algerian military has recently turned to China for some advanced weaponry, Russia remains its main security partner and possibly the only country willing to help Algeria maintain a favorable military balance with Morocco.

On 4 April, the speaker of the People’s National Assembly, Algeria’s lower house of parliament, hosted the Russian ambassador and reaffirmed Algeria’s commitment to its deep strategic relationship with Russia, in comments that were reported by the country’s official news agency Algeria Press Service.  However, Algerian in-depth cooperation with Russia does not equate to enthusiastic support for Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.  Like other countries of the region, Algeria hopes to stay out of a Russia-NATO conflict.  Algeria has been explicit in endorsing a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and its foreign minister has been active in an “Arab Contact Group” that seeks to mediate between Russia and Ukraine.  Still, Algeria’s relations with Russia run deeper than those of many other Arab countries, particularly when it comes to defense cooperation.  Algeria joined Syria in the vote against expelling Russia from the UN Human Rights Commission, making them the only two Arab countries to do so.  Most other Arab countries either abstained or refused to vote.  Mali’s government, which is increasingly close to Russia and a strategically important partner of Algeria’s, also voted against the resolution. 


Source:

“روسيا تسبق بلينكن إلى ‘حلبة الجزائر’

(Russia beats Blinken to ‘the Algerian Arena’),” Independent Arabia (Saudi-funded news website), 27 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/mr2czhan

The Algerian Ministry of Defense announced that the Chief of Staff of the Army, Said Chengriha and other high-ranking officers met with members of a Russian delegation at the conclusion of their visit to Algeria. The Russian delegation was led by the Director of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation of Russia, Dmitry Shuvaev, and also included the Russian ambassador to Algeria. The meeting came at the end of the Russian delegation’s visit, from March 23 to 25, to attend the regular meeting of the Algerian-Russian Intergovernmental Committee in charge of military and technical cooperation…

Said Hadef, a researcher in Maghreb affairs, told The Independent… “It is difficult to predict what Russia was expecting from its allies, but it seems that the visit of the director of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation came under the weight of one month of war for Russia, and the consequent sanctions and Moscow’s fear of losing its allies.” He noted that the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war are strongly present in these diplomatic moves, by virtue of Algeria’s strong strategic relationship with Russia and its stable relations with Western countries.  This is making it move cautiously, as it seeks to preserve its positions and its allies, and at the same time avoids “angering” the West, led by Washington.

Source:

“مناورات عسكرية جزائرية ـ روسية تحاكي محاربة الإرهاب 

(Algeria-Russia anti-terror military maneuvers),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 6 April 2022. https://tinyurl.com/3k8r9fuc

Yesterday, the Russian TASS news agency quoted the Russian Southern Military District as saying that joint anti-terror exercises of the Russian and Algerian ground forces will take place next November in Algeria. The upcoming maneuvers were discussed, according to the press office of the Southern Military District in the Russian city of Vladikavkaz, during the “first planning conference to prepare for joint Russian-Algerian ground forces anti-terror maneuvers.” The same source also announced that the military exercises will take place at a base located in the Adrar Governorate, in the far south of Algeria. According to the Russian Agency, during the conference, “the exercise’s scenario and the organization of logistics, including accommodation procedures, were coordinated.” It added that the maneuvers “will consist of tactical moves to search, detect and destroy illegal armed groups. On the Russian side, about 80 soldiers from the Southern Military District are scheduled to participate in the exercises.”

Source:

“رئيس المجلس الشعبي الوطني يستقبل السفير الروسي لدى الجزائر

(People’s National Assembly Speaker welcomes the Russian ambassador to Algeria),” Algeria Press Service (official Algerian news service), 4 April 2022. https://www.aps.dz/ar/algerie/124089-2022-04-04-14-29-34

On Monday, the Speaker of the People’s National Assembly, Mr. Ibrahim Bougali, received the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Algeria, Mr. Igor Belyaev, in a meeting centered on the “outstanding bilateral relations” that unite the two countries, according to a statement from the parliament.… In addition, Mr. Bougali affirmed “Algeria’s commitment to its in-depth strategic partnership with Russia” and called for “exploiting all available possibilities to diversify the areas of cooperation.”

Nigerian Governor Assures Counterterrorism Success Against Boko Haram

7 Div NA - Camp Zairo, 2017.

7 Div NA – Camp Zairo, 2017.


“He reiterated that kinetic measures alone will not end the war and therefore advised that a political solution be applied.”  


Babaguna Zulum, the governor of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State, is assuring Nigerians that a multi-pronged counterterrorism approach is leading to success against Boko Haram.  According to the excerpted 18 February article from Nigerian current events-focused Vanguard News, Zulum met with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari and reported that 30,000 Boko Haram members had surrendered voluntarily to the Borno authorities.  He further underscored that defections from Boko Haram substantiate that dialogue with the insurgents, including guarantees of assistance for insurgents who lay down their arms, must accompany the army’s use of force.

Zulum noted that the heavy presence of Nigerian troops in southern Borno coincided with the defections and called for a similar deployment in northern Borno.  This indicates that military pressure on the insurgents led to demoralization and caused some of the insurgents to surrender.  Further, Zulum advised that once the government cleared insurgents from local areas, then it should immediately return displaced people to their homes with military protection.

Zulum distinguished between those Boko Haram members who the government captured and those who surrendered, with only the latter granted a chance for rehabilitation.  Given the success of such efforts, Zulum urged the Nigerian government to provide increased funding to repatriation, resettlement, and reconciliation programs.  More broadly, Zulum claims that Boko Haram will not be defeated completely on the battlefield and, therefore, the government must seek some form of political settlement through negotiations.


Source:

“Boko Haram insurgency’ll end by 2023 — Zulum,” vanguardngr.com (Nigerian news source), 18 February 2022. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/02/boko-haram-insurgencyll-end-by-2023-zulum//

The governor further said that the Borno state government does not offer any incentive to the fighters to come out of the forests; rather, they have done so voluntarily.

Zulum disclosed that he discussed the continuing surrender of the insurgents and the case of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with the president even as he said that the security situation in Borno state has improved considerably, hoping that things will continue in that direction. He reiterated that kinetic measures alone will not end the war and therefore advised that a political solution be applied.

“… I’m pleased to inform you that there was a very heavy military deployment into the southern Borno. And I hope such a deployment will also take place in northern Borno, with a view to clearing the ISWAP insurgents in the Lake Chad.”

Source: “More than 8,000 Boko Haram terrorists have surrendered,” premiumtimesng.com (Nigerian news source), 21 September 2021. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/486107-more-than-8000-boko-haram-terrorists-have-surrendered-goc.html

The Acting General Officer Commanding (GOC), 7 Division, Abdulwahab Eyitayo, says more than 8,000 Boko Haram terrorists have so far surrendered to troops.… He said the surrender by the repentant terrorists was a welcome development, adding that the overwhelming fire power of the troops was responsible.


Image Information:

Image: 7 Div NA – Camp Zairo, 2017
Source: Hussaina Muhammad, VOA
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:7_Div_NA_-_Camp_Zairo,_2017.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Somalia: How Al Shabaab’s Arsenal Grows

Weapons captured by AMISOM forces from al Shabaab.

Weapons captured by AMISOM forces from al Shabaab.


“The acquisition of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other lethal capacity remains a priority for [al Shabaab] but is poorly understood as a system essential to the effectiveness of the insurgency.”


The Somali government and AMISOM have been unable to defeat al Shabaab in large part due to the terrorist group’s ability to procure weapons.  According to the accompanying excerpted report from a Somali organization that studies security issues, the Hiraal Institute, al Shabaab annually spends approximately $24 million acquiring weapons through several sources.  These sources include arms directly purchased by the group, including from corrupt government officials; those bought from dealers who frequently sell lethal wares from Yemen; and various small arms obtained in Somali black markets. Al Shabaab spends an additional $1.8 million per year on its in-house explosives and weapons manufacturing activities, with much of that money used to obtain chemical precursors to explosives.

Though al Shabaab is sometimes depicted as having internal divisions and problems, acquisition of these weapons as described by the report hardly appears haphazard.  Instead, consultative bodies and so-called ministries play a large role in properly arming the terrorist organization’s members.  Most important for regular arms procurement is the organization’s defense ministry, which receives a substantial monthly allotment of funds. 

Al Shabaab’s security committee, which draws from both the military command and executive leadership, makes the decisions for acquiring large amounts of equipment in preparation for an increased operational tempo, or for purchasing very expensive individual items.  Al Shabaab’s finance ministry is responsible for acquiring the funds necessary for these weapons purchases mainly through illicit taxation.  The report notes that the farmers, merchants, and others who are barely eking out a living are being extorted so that the terrorists can purchase more weapons which can be used to extort and hurt these people further.  Though the finance ministry’s methods can be quite brutal, they are also quite profitable, enabling continued weapons proliferation in a country already awash in arms from decades of inter-clan warfare.   The ready availability of so many weapons, especially in the hands of al Shabaab, has made the pursuit of peace, security, and stability by the Somali National Army and AMISOM, and the Western powers backing such efforts, extremely difficult.


Source:

“Al Shabaab’s Arsenal; From Taxes to Terror,” Hiraal Institute (Somali organization that studies security issues), February 2022. https://hiraalinstitute.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Al-Shabaabs-Arsenal-From-Taxes-to-Terror-Web.pdf

The situation in Somalia is increasingly one of stalemate, with little prospect of either the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) with AMISOM and international support, or al Shabaab (AS) delivering a decisive military victory. However, AS remains adaptive and in control of large parts of Somalia, in particular in the south, with partial control over other areas. It is clear that AS has access to several sources to acquire weapons. The acquisition of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other lethal capacity remains a priority for AS but is poorly understood as a system essential to the effectiveness of the insurgency. In October 2021, the Hiraal Institute undertook a four-month project to research the scope, scale, system, and use of AS resources to obtain lethal materiel, both in Somalia and from outside.

… It needs to be emphasised that all of AS’s actions within the security field – including arms procurement, capability acquisition, and distribution – are enabled by the extensive finance operations that the group undertakes, notably its illicit taxation collection and revenue gathering. In essence, the money that AS gathers illegally from those it forces to pay tax in Somalia funds the ability of the group to purchase weapons, arms, and ammunition that it then uses in its operations and attacks in the country.

Within Somalia, AS operates a hierarchical financial administrative structure. A central Finance Maktab headquarters oversees a financial centre under which provincial financial centres (one per AS designated province) operate. Funds are moved through regular AS financial channels, utilising a number of methods and in a corresponding variety of forms – cash, bank accounts and mobile money transfer, and hawala – to channel funds to where they are intended.

While Somalia and Yemen are largely excluded from the international banking system, the use of banks for transfers of illicit payments within Somalia is commonplace; again, reporting states that transactions are made via accounts in the name of friendly legitimate businesses or individuals.

Image Information:

Image: Weapons captured by AMISOM forces from al Shabaab
Source: Omar Abdisalan/AMISOM/flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/49590723103
Attribution: Public Domain

Senegal and Algeria Opposed to Their Citizens Fighting in Ukraine

Ukrainian aviation unit. DR Congo.

Ukrainian aviation unit. DR Congo.


“Like their Algerian counterparts, the Senegalese authorities requested the Ukrainian embassy to immediately withdraw the call to recruitment without delay.”


Ukrainian soldiers have taken part in peacekeeping operations in Africa in recent years, and now Ukraine is urging African nationals to travel to Ukraine to fight Russian.  The excerpted French-language article in tsa-algerie.dz, which covers affairs in Francophone countries from an Algerian perspective, discussed the Algerian and Senegalese governments’ negative reactions to the prospects of their citizens fighting in Ukraine.  According to the article, the Ukrainian Embassies in Algeria and Senegal issued statements on Facebook calling on these countries’ citizens to join the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces to resist Russian aggression.  In response, the Algerian government demanded that Ukraine remove the post on grounds that it violates the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.  Senegal relayed the same message to Ukraine, while acknowledging that 36 Senegalese citizens had registered to fight.  Senegal is wary of foreign fighters given the experience of its nationals as foreign fighters with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  France24.com, for example, reported in the excerpted passage from 2016 that Senegalese had become influential in ISIS in both Libya and Syria.  Although the circumstances and threats are different with the situation in Ukraine, Senegal, like Algeria, remains steadfastly against allowing the participation of its nationals in foreign conflicts.


Source:

“Le grave dérapage de l’ambassade ukrainienne en Algérie (The serious mistake of the Ukrainian embassy in Algeria),” tsa-algerie.dz, 4 March 2022. https://www.tsa-algerie.dz/le-grave-derapage-de-lambassade-ukrainienne-en-algerie/

To all foreigners “who wish to join the resistance to the Russian occupiers and protect world security,” Ukrainian leaders offer you “to come to our country and join the ranks of the Territorial Defense Forces…,” the appeal read. The message was taken down after the Algerian foreign ministry ordered the Ukrainian embassy to delete it.

This message was also relayed by the Ukrainian Embassy in Senegal. The Ukrainian ambassador in Dakar confirmed the existence of the call while confirming the registration of 36 volunteer candidates. Like their Algerian counterparts, the Senegalese authorities requested the Ukrainian embassy to immediately withdraw the call to recruitment without delay.

Source: “Who are the Senegalese men joining the Islamic State group?,” france24.com, 1 February 2016. https://observers.france24.com/en/20160201-senegal-jihadist-islamic-state

Senegal is on edge after jihadist attacks have swept West Africa in the past few months, striking Mali in December 2015 and previously quiet Burkina Faso in January 2015. Senegal is worried that it might be the jihadists’ next target. In a sweep aimed at cracking down on insecurity, Senegal arrested 900 people in the cities of Dakar and Thies last month. Although most of these arrests were not on terror-related suspicions, the police said that the raids were carried out because of the terrorist threat.


Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian aviation unit. DR Congo.
Source: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ukrainian_aviation_unit._DR_Congo_(26858301702).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

African Leaders Take Cautious Approach to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Putin with Faustin Archange Touadera, President of the Central African Republic, whose nation has used Russia’s Wagner Group on several occasions, including to prevent an overthrow of the government.

Putin with Faustin Archange Touadera, President of the Central African Republic, whose nation has used Russia’s Wagner Group on several occasions, including to prevent an overthrow of the government.


“African countries are treading carefully in the Russia-Ukraine war to protect their national interests even as they defend the rights of Africans trapped in war zones.”


Many African leaders are choosing their words carefully when discussing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the East African explains, these leaders’ cautious approach is based on the close relationships their countries have with Russia.  This is especially evident in the area of arms sales.  Many African nations purchase their military hardware from Russian arms dealers.  For example, Ethiopia’s entire fleet of jetfighters, 20 Sukhoi-27s and nine Mig-23s, are from Russia.  Russia supplies three quarters of Uganda’s combat helicopters.  Across Africa it is not just aircraft, but rather a wide range of military materiel, including small arms such as the ubiquitous AK-47.

As the article explains, Russia has also fostered military alliances with Mali, the Sudan, Mozambique and other countries facing insurgencies or political instability, which has tempered still more African leaders’ reactions to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  The Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked paramilitary force, helped quash an attempt to overthrow the government in the Central African Republic.  The appreciation for these Russian interventions, combined with a sense among many Africans that their nations should remain neutral with regard to European problems, contributes to the lack of enthusiasm some African leaders have for denouncing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  Reports of African students fleeing Ukraine only to be subjected to extreme racism in Europe may have exacerbated these concerns.

Some African leaders are not only refusing to condemn Russia but are actually praising it.  The most prominent example of such behavior comes from LTG Kainerugaba, Commander of Ugandan Land Forces, who is also President Musevini’s son.  While Uganda abstained from a UN vote condemning Russian aggression, citing the African country’s nonaligned status, Kainerugaba claimed Putin was right and that a majority of non-whites support Russia.  Even Senegal, which has a long history of receiving military assistance from the West, abstained from the UN vote to condemn Russian aggression.


Source: Aggrey Mutambo, “National interests prevail as African leaders tread carefully on Ukraine crisis,” The East African (African-based media company), 6 March 2022. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/national-interests-african-leaders-careful-ukraine-crisis-3738398

African countries are treading carefully in the Russia-Ukraine war to protect their national interests even as they defend the rights of Africans trapped in war zones.

Senegalese President Macky Sall, chair of the African Union and the African Union Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat said they were “particularly disturbed” by reports that some Africans had been turned away at European borders while trying to leave the war-wracked country.

Save for Kenya, Eastern African states have stayed away from vigorously commenting on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but the racism in its wake has angered Africans.

The United Nations, which operates a huge fleet of Russian fixed-wing and helicopter transports, will not be spared the sanctions. Also, hard-hit will be a helicopter overhaul and maintenance repair facility that Uganda jointly owns with Russia’s Pro-heli International Services, that was launched by President Museveni in late January. The facility was among others targeting the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan’s Darfur region, in which a substantial number of UN transport helicopters operate.

“Outside of the Central African Republic, which openly sympathises with Moscow, other countries have largely chosen a middle plan in this conflict, even as they share (Kenya’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Dr Martin) Kimani’s sentiments on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. They are, however, united on the plight of Africans in Ukraine,” he said.


Image Information:

Image: Putin with Faustin Archange Touadera, President of the Central African Republic, whose nation has used Russia’s Wagner Group on several occasions, including to prevent an overthrow of the government.
Source: Mikhail Metzel/Kremlin Pool/Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_%26_Faustin_Touadera_-_2019.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0