Category Archives: Russia

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Russia.

Russian North Sea Fleet Deputy Commander Killed in Nagorno-Karabakh

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Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances as of 22 September 2023.

“This was a man who belonged to the fleet, and even though he was a political officer, what did he do down there [Nagorno Karabakh]?”

Attrition continues within Russia’s officer corps as Russian commanders die on the battlefield, even beyond Ukraine and Syria.[i] According to the Norway-based news outlet The Barents Observer, deputy commander and political officer of Russia’s Northern Fleet submarine forces, Ivan Kovgan, was killed in Nagorno-Karabakh on 20 September.[ii] The article noted that Kovgan was deployed to the disputed region as the deputy commander of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. Kovgan’s SUV reportedly was struck by Azeri artillery, killing him and four other Russian servicemembers. It is unclear whether the strike on the Russian peacekeepers’ vehicle was intentional or a mistake as a result of the fog of war. In any case, the event prompted an immediate apology from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev to Russian President Putin and the promise of an investigation. The article also noted that residents of the Kola Peninsula, where Kovgan resided, were shocked that he would have even been selected to serve in Nagorno-Karabakh. While units from the Russian Northern Fleet have been deployed to Ukraine, some with catastrophic consequences,[iii] the death of Kovgan while on a less-risky peacekeeping mission is an unexpected blow. Russia has lost many high-ranking officers in Ukraine, and losing another senior officer in far-off Nagorno-Karabakh is costly.

Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Deputy Commander of Russia’s Northern Fleed submarine forces is killed in Nagorno-Karabakh,” The Barents Observer (Norway based naval news focused news source), 22 September 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/09/deputy-commander-russias-northern-fleet-submarine-forces-killed-nagorno-karabakh

Kovgan was only days away from completing his assignment in the disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan when his car came under attack. He and four more Russian servicemen were killed.

A photo reportedly taken on the site of the attack shows a Russian military SUV type UAZ Patriot that has crashed into a rocky hillside. At least four bodies can be seen in and around the vehicle.

The lethal attack came from Azerbaijani forces and took place on the 20th of September as part of a major onslaught on Armenia-backed forces in the region. It is reported to have taken place near the settlement of Canyataq in the northeastern corner of the self-proclaimed republic.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev in a telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin the following day apologised for the killings and assured that an investigation will be initiated and the guilty troops punished.

But for many locals in Gadzhievo it appear a mystery that a top officer from the Northern Fleet’s submarine forces was on duty in the far-away Nagorno-Karabakh.

“Who sent this first rank captain to that place???” a man writes in a comment on local social media in Gadzhievo. “This was a man that belongs to the fleet, and even though he was a political officer, what did he do down there??? After all, he was our naval political officer with both body and mind!” he underlines.Ivan Kovgan had reportedly been two months in Nagorno-Karabakh when he was killed. He was serving as Deputy Commander of the so-called peacekeeping forces that have been deployed in the area since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020. Back home in the Kola Peninsula he was Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet’s submarine forces with responsibility for military-political operations.

Notes:

[i] Russia has lost several senior officers in Syria since 2016, including most recently Colonel Oleg Pechevisty, who was killed in May 2023. See: Isabel Van Brugen, “Russian Colonel Killed After Direct Strike on His Command Post – Reports,” Newsweek, 29 May 2023. https://www.newsweek.com/russian-colonel-oleg-pechevisty-killed-syria-strike-ukraine-war-1803136 and “Администрация Подпорожского района (Administration of Podporozhye district),” ВКонтакте (InKontact) Russian online social media and social networking service based in Saint Petersburg). 27 May 2023. https://vk.com/wall-167456645_21197

[ii] For additional information from the Russian perspective on the renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and presence of Russian peacekeepers, see: Kirill Strelnikov, “Прощание с Карабахом: уроки трагедии с двумя стульями (Farewell to Karabakh: lessons from the tragedy with two chairs),” RIANovosti (state-owned domestic Russian media outlet), 21 September 2023. https://ria.ru/20230921/karabakh-1897672995.html; “Messages appeared on the Internet about an attack by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces on a warehouse of Russian Peacekeepers, Top War (English language Russian military news focused media website, part of Military Review (Военное Обозрение)), 23 September 2023. https://en.topwar.ru/226714-v-seti-internet-pojavilis-soobschenija-ob-udare-vs-azerbajdzhana-po-skladu-rossijskih-mirotvorcev.html

[iii] The 200th is one of two Arctic infantry units subordinate to the Northern Military District’s 14th Army Corps, the 14th Army Corps is Ground Forces unit subordinate to the navy command, and as part of the Northern Military District it is subordinate to the Northern Fleet. For an investigative news piece on the fate of the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade in Ukraine see: “‘Wiped Out’: War in Ukraine has decimated a once feared Russian brigade,” The Washington Post, 16 December 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/

Image Information:

Image: Map of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh war showing Azerbaijan day-to-day advances as of 22 September 2023.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2023_Nagorno-Karabakh_War.svg
Attribution: CCA SA 4.0 Int

Russia Plans To Add Remote Mining UAV Platoons to Engineer Units

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A Soviet/Russian made POM-2 [R1] fragmentation anti-personnel mine on display.

“The use of UAVs for the remote laying of anti-personnel mines will ensure the element of surprise when used in both the defense and offense…”

The war in Ukraine continues to drive changes in military units and doctrine. Innovative use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been a common theme for both Russia and Ukraine since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Both countries have modified UAVs to lay mines. The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian monthly Военная мысль (Military Thought) discusses Russian plans to formalize this capability by creating a “special mining platoon” within certain engineer units. Although this is one of the first mentions of how adaptations from the so-called “special military operation”[i] are being implemented into Russia’s version of a Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E), it is unlikely to be the last. Other novel uses of UAVs, including as “suicide drones,” will likely be integrated into Russian MTO&E structures soon.

Sources:

D.F. Evmenenko and S.I. Melnik, “Дистанционное минирование местности при помощи

Малых беспилотных летательных аппаратов (The use of small unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct remote mining),” Военная мысль [Military Thought] (monthly Russian military periodical), September 2023. https://vm.ric.mil.ru/

Combat actions in the special military operation do not have the characteristics of high intensity [warfare] and rapid battlefield changes due to widescale usage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The most widespread among them are multi-rotor helicopter-type devices (multicopters). Simple, cheap and reliable, they are easy to control and very maneuverable at low speeds and low altitudes. These systems can easily change targets in the field. In addition, such systems are easy to transport, scalable in size and load capacity…

The Second World War, military conflicts of recent decades, especially in the Persian Gulf region (Operation Desert Storm), and the US Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan show that their effectiveness increases several times when used suddenly and unexpectedly…

Although remote mining by aviation and artillery troops can be carried throughout the entire operational depth of an enemy formation, the remote mining capabilities of engineer troops are substantially more limited… The UMZ [R1]  and GMZ-K [R2]  universal minelayers only have a range of up to 200 m…

The need arose to develop a system that would allow the creation of minefields under any combat conditions in compliance with the requirements for safe the use of remote mining means for our troops.  As part of solving this problem, specialists from the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School (TVVIKU) developed a device for discharging antipersonnel POM-2R mines…

The use of UAVs for the remote laying of anti-personnel mines will ensure the element of surprise when used in both the defense and offense…It is proposed to use UAV crews with mine containers in a special mining platoon (SMP) with 6 UAVs…The platoon consists of two squads, each with 6 personnel, 3 UAVs, and an all-terrain vehicle such as a UAZ ‘Wolverine’.

Characteristics of a Mine-Laying Multicopter-Type UAV (exact model unspecified in source)

Notes:

[i] Moscow insists on using the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

Image Information:

Image: A Soviet/Russian made POM-2 [R1] fragmentation anti-personnel mine on display.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/POM-2_mine#/media/File:POM-2S.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Abkhazia Pushes Back Against Russia’s Suggestion of Incorporation

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Map of Republic of Georgia featuring the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

“We tread a distinct path. We haven’t received any formal requests to join the Russian Federation, and I’m yet to identify any political faction within Abkhazia that envisions such a relationship dynamic with Russia.”

In an interview published on 22 August in the pro-Russian media outlet Arguments and Facts, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, suggested that for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the “idea of joining Russia is still popular[i] and it may well be implemented if there are good reasons.” Medvedev’s commentwas not well received by Abkhazian officials, regardless of whether it was an off-the-cuff remark or a more calculated statement. As per the excerpted article on pro-Abkhaz media source Abkhaz World, the Secretary of the Security Council of Abkhazia, Sergey Shamba, responded to Medvedev’s statement by declaring that he was unaware of any political parties or groups that preferred incorporation into Russia, insisting that Abkhazia “tread” its own path. Shamba also noted that Abkhazia “is keen on fostering close and allied relations with Russia,” but that the tiny republic remains committed to independence. A statement from the Foreign Ministry of Abkhazia published in a second excerpted article from Abkhaz World declared that “The millennia-old statehood of Abkhazia is not a subject for debate.”[ii] The same article also included comments by other Abkhaz officials, including Aslan Kabakhia, who declared that it was “very unpleasant to hear of talks of a potential change in Abkhazia’s status from the very individual who [previously] endorsed our independence,” and another official, Akhra Bzhaniya, who noted that “our sovereignty is not a toy.” Abkhazia remains defiant regarding independence, suggesting that a miscalculation by Russian or other regional leaders could reignite conflict in the breakaway republic. For example, some Ukrainian officials continue to call on Georgia to open a second front in the Caucasus by militarily invading Abkhazia, assuming Russia will be forced to divert military forces in defense of Abkhazia.

Sources:

“Abkhazia: Seeking Alliance but Standing Apart from Russian Federation,” Abkhaz World (pro-Abkhaz media outlet based in London and Istanbul), 24 August 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2484-abkhazia-seeking-alliance-but-standing-apart-from-russian-federation

The Secretary of the Security Council of Abkhazia, Sergey Shamba, emphasised that while Abkhazia is in favour of forming an alliance with Russia, the nation is open to various forms of bilateral relations.

Abkhazia is keen on fostering close and allied relations with Russia. However, Sergey Shamba highlighted that there currently aren’t any political entities within the republic expressing a desire to become part of the Russian Federation.

Shamba’s remarks were in response to the statements made by Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Head of the Russian Federation’s Security Council. In a previous article on the http://aif.ru website, Medvedev pointed out that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia still harbour sentiments of aligning with Russia, suggesting that this aspiration “might very well materialize given compelling reasons.”

Medvedev further elaborated, “South Ossetia has, on multiple occasions, held referendums on the prospect of joining Russia. This aligns naturally with the trajectory of uniting North and South Ossetia — a single people. I believe this resonates with Dmitry Medvedev’s statements. I’m optimistic that in due course, the right conditions will emerge, culminating in the unification of the North and South.”

Shamba, speaking of Abkhazia, added, “We tread a distinct path. We haven’t received any formal requests to join the Russian Federation, and I’m yet to identify any political faction within Abkhazia that envisions such a relationship dynamic with Russia.” He reiterated that while Abkhazia is eager to bolster allied relations with Russia, they remain flexible in exploring different relational frameworks.

“Невыученные уроки. Дмитрий Медведев проанализировал события 2008 года (Unlearned lessons. Dmitry Medvedev analyzed the events of 2008),” Arguments and Facts (pro-Moscow media outlet) 23 August 2023. https://aif.ru/politics/world/nevyuchennye_uroki_dmitriy_medvedev_proanaliziroval_sobytiya_2008_goda

At one time, Saakashvili became the first US proxy leader in the Caucasus with a single mission – to incite the hatred of the inhabitants of Georgia towards Russia, shake its position in the Transcaucasus, overshadow the centuries-old friendship of the two peoples. This strange creature brought the war closer with all its might. She pretended to be an “Old Testament shepherd David” – and at the same time did everything so that the Georgians would forget their common history, break ties with Russia, hate their closest neighbors – Russians, Ossetians, Abkhazians – and wish them death. The latest performances of Russophobes in Georgia show that this public is still counting on revenge. Although he constantly runs into rebuff from his fellow citizens, who do not intend to elevate hatred of Russia to the rank of a national idea and are quite warm towards our citizens. This is also obvious: the majority of Georgians are much more comfortable living with our state in peace. Russia is nearby, America is overseas. For Georgia, a country of the richest culture, connected with Russia by thousands of threads, Russophobia is nonsense, ugliness, a serious illness. Luckily, it’s completely curable.

We do not need a repetition of history-2008. We remain ready to tackle problems at the negotiating table in the spirit of the UN Charter. But if our concern has real outlines, we will not hesitate. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the idea of joining Russia is still popular. And it may well be implemented if there are good reasons for that.

“Abkhazia’s Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Medvedev’s Remarks,” Abkhaz World, 24 August 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2486-abkhazia-s-foreign-ministry-issues-statement-on-medvedev-s-remarks

“In today’s environment, the international security system is under significant strain. We note a substantial escalation in tensions between the Russian Federation and the collective West. Many statements made in the media are viewed as outcomes of the intensifying geopolitical contest.

The millennia-old statehood of Abkhazia is not a subject for debate. Our legislation provides clear insight into this. The Republic of Abkhazia stands as a steadfast ally of the Russian Federation.

Our relations are governed by an extensive legal framework, comprising over 200 agreements. In the Republic of Abkhazia, repeated statements by senior Russian officials regarding the impossibility of revising the fundamental principles of bilateral relations are highly valued.The irrevocable path towards development as a sovereign, independent legal state has been chosen by the people and is protected by the paramount law – the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia.”

Notes:

[ii] The statement by Medvedev set off a firestorm of media responses, but to put it in perspective, his comment was said at the end of a very lengthy diatribe in which he insulted, criticized, and lambasted the U.S. and the West in general, declaring western influence and intrigue as the roots of all problems Russia faces in Georgia and Ukraine. Despite the context Ukraine Pravda and Reuters for example led with the headline that Russia might “annex” Abkhazia and South Ossetia although that is not the word that Medvedev used.  see: “Russia May Annex Georgian Breakaway Regions-Medvedev,” Reuters, 22 August 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-may-annex-georgian-breakaway-regions-medvedev-2023-08-22/

Image Information:

Image: Map of Republic of Georgia featuring the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Source: Ssolbergj, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Abkhazia_and_South_Ossetia – /media/File:Georgia,_Ossetia,_Russia_and_Abkhazia_(en).svg
Attribution: CC BY SA-3.0

Russia Announces New Combined Arms Army in Arctic To Offset NATO Expansion

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Map of Russian Federation with the Kola Peninsula highlighted, a strategically important space for Russian defense in the Arctic.

“While Sweden and Finland were conditionally neutral countries, there was no need to keep any large forces in the region.  However, now that Finland has joined NATO, and Sweden is on this path, it is necessary to strengthen the northwestern direction.”

Russia will form a new Combined Arms Army (CAA) in the Arctic North as a response to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, according to a recently published article from the pro-government daily Izvestia. The Russian military expert featured in the article claims the Northern Fleet’s 14th Army Corps will likely be the nucleus of this new CAA, while the Arctic 200th and/or 80th brigades will likely be upsized to divisions. The new divisions will likely see the incorporation of a new Iskander missile brigade and air defense brigade to somewhat standardize the structure with other CAAs. Russian ground forces in the Baltic region facing Sweden and Finland, recently renamed the Leningrad Military District, will probably also expand to meet the new threat. The Northern Fleet Strategic Command covers the bulk of the Northern Sea route, but the Eastern Strategic Command controls the Chukotka Peninsula. There is currently a motorized rifle regiment stationed there, and plans exist to expand this to a division. Due to the distance involved, it is unlikely that the new CAA will expand to incorporate this other Russian Arctic ground force. The focus of the new CAA will be the defense of the Kola Peninsula.

Source:

Roman Kretcul and Aleksei Ramm, “Полярный округ: в составе Северного флота создадут общевойсковую армию (Arctic circle:  A new combined arms army will form as part of the Northern Fleet),” Izvestia (large pro-government Russian daily), 1 July 2023. https://iz.ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu.

A new combined-arms army will be formed as part of the Northern Fleet.

This decision was made by the Russian Defense Ministry.  It will cover the Russian border in the north, including the border with Finland and Norway. The defense of the Kola Peninsula is a vital task for Russia since strategic missile submarines are based there.  The creation of a new army is especially important due to the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO. The new formation will be based on the current army corps. The army will include motorized rifle brigades, regiments and divisions. Their personnel will be trained in Arctic combat.

“While Sweden and Finland were conditionally neutral countries, there was no need to keep any large forces in the region,” military historian Dmitry Boltenkov explained to Izvestia. “However, now that Finland has joined NATO, and Sweden is on this path, it is necessary to strengthen the northwestern direction.” The expert noted that the 200th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 80th Arctic Brigade, and the 61st Separate Marine Brigade are now stationed there. He did not rule out that the 200th and 80th brigades would be reorganized into divisions, and the 14th Army Corps, of which they are now a member, into an army. The most important thing is that with the creation of this army, powerful separate formations will also appear – a missile brigade, an air defense brigade and others. This will significantly increase the group’s capabilities in the region. According to Dmitry Boltenkov, the protection of the Kola Peninsula is vital, if only because strategic missile submarines are based there.

In recent years, Allies have shown an increased interest in the Arctic region. Norway hosts large-scale exercises of the Cold Response Alliance every two years. In the spring of 2022, over 30 thousand military personnel, more than 200 aircraft and 50 ships took part in them. The Russian Armed Forces regularly conduct exercises in polar latitudes. In particular, the annual maneuvers “Umka”, during which both personnel training and polar research are performed. On July 1, the press service of the Northern Fleet reported that the Arctic grouping, which includes warships of the Kola flotilla, will conduct a traditional Arctic campaign with a set of tactical exercises on the continental coast, islands and in the waters of the seas of the Arctic Ocean.

Image Information:

Image: Map of Russian Federation with the Kola Peninsula highlighted, a strategically important space for Russian defense in the Arctic.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Murmansk_in_Russia.svg
Attribution: CCA-Share Alike 3.0

Russia Seeks To Expand Military Force Creation to Its Republics

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“New legislation opens up the establishment of regional military companies that will be in charge of “guarding the state border in times of war.”  The amendments that were announced by Member of the State Duma Andrei Kartapolov on the 25th of July will allow Russian governors to build their own private military companies.”

Russia is looking for additional military forces and private military groups for use in the event of a national emergency. Draft Russian legislation may allow the formation of republic/regional armed forces that could be used to defend Russia in a time of crisis. According to the Norway-based The Barents Sea Independent Observer, the new Russian units would have the mission to “protect the state border, fight illegal armed groups, and combat foreign sabotage and intelligence formations.” Details are sparse on important details, including whether these regional armies would belong to the republics or to the seven federal regions, and how they would interact with the traditional instruments of state power, including the Armed Forces, the Federal Security Service, and the National Guard (Rosgvardia).

Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Russian governors could soon start building Regional Armies,” The Barents Sea Independent Observer (online in English and Russian), 27 July 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2023/07/russian-governors-could-soon-start-building-regional-armies

New legislation opens up the establishment of regional military companies that will be in charge of “guarding the state border in times of war.” The amendments that were announced by Member of the State Duma Andrei Kartapolov on the 25th of July will allow Russian governors to build their own private military companies.

According to Karapolov, the military formations will be “specialised state unitary companies that on the decision of the Russian President can be established to protect public order.” They will also be used to “protect state borders in times of mobilisation, as well as in times of martial law and war,” Kartapolov explained. Andrei Kartapolov chairs the State Duma Committee on Defense. He is also General in the Russian Armed Forces and was in charge of  the Army’s so-called Military-Political Department ahead of his election to parliament in 2021.

The new legislation comes as part of controversial amendments in the Russian Law on Draft Age. It is not clear how the new military formations will interact with Russia’s existing forces, among them the Armed Forces, the FSB and the National Guard (Rosgvardia). But the new regional units will be armed and allowed to use force. And they will “interact with the Interior Ministry, the FSB and Ministry of Defense to protect the state border, fight illegal armed groups and combat foreign sabotage and intelligence formations,” the Russian version of the Barents Observer reported.

In addition, they will reportedly be commissioned to take action in issues of public law and order, which could mean that they can be applied to repress protest actions. They will also engage in fighting drones, in the air, under water, as well as unmanned surface vehicles.

The formations will have extensive authorities and face little consequences for their actions. Reportedly, members of the new forces will bear no responsibility for inflicted damage of moral, physical and material character, and citizens will have no right to oppose their demands.According to Kartapolov, the law is “made for a big war, and the smell of such a big war can already be scented.”  The new legislation comes into force on the 1st of January 2024.

Former Commander Comments on Future of Russian Airborne Troops

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Colonel-General (Ret.) Vladimir Shamanov

“In our opinion, one should not experiment with one of the most combat-ready branches of the Armed Forces, destroying what at one time was saved with great difficulty.”

Almost since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,[i] there has been much speculation in Russia about the future of its mechanized Airborne Troops (VDV). By most accounts, the VDV has performed the best of all of Russia’s Armed Forces, although the VDV has taken heavy casualties.[ii] In Ukraine the VDV has filled a more conventional role than intended and rarely conducted the missions it was designed for, namely, attacks and raids behind enemy lines. The VDV is now being equipped with heavy weaponry that has traditionally not been provided to it, such as T-90 tanks and heavy thermobaric rocket launchers to facilitate this shift in mission. This has created a debate about the future force structure of the VDV. Some commentators proffer that the VDV should become permanently “heavier,” while others suggest an even lighter structure so the VDV can function as true sabotage and reconnaissance groups or assault groups.  The excerpted article from the quarterly Russian military periodical Defense and Security provides a third suggestion: stay the current course. The article’s primary author is Colonel-General (Ret.) Vladimir Shamanov, former Commander of the VDV, and current Head of the State Duma Defense Committee. Shamanov states that the VDV should be maintained in its current state as a unique light mechanized combined arms force capable of air-mobile operations. Although Shamanov does not delve into deeper reasoning, this opinion could be based on his belief that although the VDV is not currently fighting as designed, this may not always be the case, and at some point the VDV might again start executing attacks and raids behind enemy lines.

Source:

Vladimir Shamanov, Vladimir Kulakov and Olga Kashirina, “Операция Промежуточный Этап (The Operational Intermittent Phase),”  Defense and Security (Quarterly Russian Military Periodical), No. 2,(105), 2023, 15. http://ormvd-zib.ru/n2_2023/morskoe_sodruzhestvo_v_aziatsko-tihookeanskom__regione_str_17-19/

The experience of the SMO [special military operation] shows that lightly armed mobile groups are acquiring great importance. They are able to move quickly, provide cover, move to the rear, and act on the flanks. At the same time, light armored vehicles with modular weapons (machine gun, ATGM, automatic gun) will become their basis. They can become the basis of airmobile forces and form sabotage and reconnaissance and groups. Their tasks are reconnaissance and defeat of the enemy, assisting advancing troops, conducting surprise attacks on important targets, and executing organized withdrawals to [attack] in another direction.

On territory controlled by friendly forces, the use of airborne units as airmobile forces will ensure the strengthening of the strike force on the main axis of attack. This makes it possible to quickly concentrate troops as needed along the front line…

The ‘winged infantry’ is quite capable of acting not only as a combined armed force, but also form the basis of airmobile units and form sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Airmobile units, can inflict sudden blows, that will force the enemy to react, concentrate troops and expose them to attack. If successful, airmobile units can carry out raids throughout the entire tactical depth of the enemy’s defenses.

In addition, the Airborne Troops are able to significantly strengthen the Ground Forces on specified axis — in the event of enemy counterattacks, repels the attack and creates conditions for an attack of the main force.

There is an opinion that the priority way for the development of the Airborne Troops may be their transformation into just sabotage and reconnaissance groups, a “swarm”, capable of striking in several places at the same time, with subsequent evasion of a retaliatory strikes and withdrawal…In our opinion, one should not experiment with one of the most combat-ready branches of the Armed Forces, destroying what at one time was saved with great difficulty.  Only in the Airborne Troops after the well-known “reforms”, was the divisional structure of the troops preserved. On its basis, it is possible to quickly create various airmobile formations…

Notes:

[i] Moscow insists on using the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] The lightly armored Airborne Combat Vehicle (BMD) series of combat vehicles has not fared well against Western antitank guided missiles and heavier mechanized Ukrainian forces. 

Image Information:

Image: Colonel-General (Ret.) Vladimir Shamanov
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Shamanov#/media/File:Vladimir_Shamanov._Cabinet_photo.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0

Russia Possibly Courting Eritrea for Red Sea Naval Base

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Massawa harbour

“The [Russian and Eritrean] leaders plan to discuss the prospects for the development of Russian-Eritrean relations in various fields, as well as topics of regional and international concern.”

On 31 May, the Russian government-affiliated TASS news agency, published the excerpted article about Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s visit to Moscow to meet with Russian President Putin. According to the article, the leaders discussed Russia’s war in Ukraine and other issues, such as academic exchanges and trade. Russia is interested in Eritrea because of its location adjacent to the Red Sea and its demonstrations of loyalty to the Kremlin, according to a second article from the Ukrainian publication focus.ua. This article notes that Eritrea was the only African country to vote against a UN General Assembly decision for Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine in March 2022.[i] Russia had previously signed an agreement with Sudan to base four Russian ships and 300 soldiers in Port Sudan, seeking a foothold on the Red Sea, according to the focus.ua article. The article notes that Sudan has not ratified the agreement, and the country’s ongoing conflict and Western pressure may cause the country’s authorities to reverse the deal. Eritrea, which borders Sudan, would provide Russia with an alternate base location near the Red Sea should the Sudan agreement not materialize. The Red Sea has strategic importance for Russia. Not only does 10 percent of global maritime traffic pass through it, but Russia’s competitors and other major powers, such as the United States and China, have naval bases along the Red Sea in Djibouti, which borders Eritrea to the south.[ii] However, Russia’s naval presence near one of the world’s major trade arteries represents expansionist intentions from the Ukrainian perspective represented in the article.

“Путин начал переговоры с президентом Эритреи (Putin Begins Discussions with the President of Eritrea),” tass.ru (Russian government-affiliated publication), 31 May 2023. https://tass.ru/politika/17892945

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the head of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki, who is in Russia on an official visit. The leaders plan to discuss the prospects for the development of Russian-Eritrean relations in various fields, as well as topics of regional and international concern. The current talks were the first meeting between the leaders of the two countries. 

According to data for 2022, the trade turnover between Russia and Eritrea amounted to $13.5 million, while exports from Russia to Eritrea accounted for $12.7 million. Since 2015, Eritreans have been provided with scholarships to study at Russian universities.

“Завоевание Африки. Зачем Кремлю военная база в Красном море (Why a Russian Base on the Red Sea?),” focus.ua (Russian and Ukrainian language Ukrainian magazine focusing on global economics), 16 February 2023. https://focus.ua/world/550262-zavoevanie-afriki-zachem-kremlyu-voennaya-baza-v-krasnom-more

Russia does not abandon attempts to expand control over African states.

Wherever there are “Wagners”, companies associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin gain access to the natural resources of these countries and a certain political influence on them (usually they are authoritarian regimes). There is information about the presence of this group of mercenaries in Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Madagascar, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and possibly Eritrea. 

Most likely, the military authorities of Sudan intend to receive weapons from the Russian Federation for their army, and also consider Russia’s military presence as one of the factors guaranteeing the preservation of the political processes in the country after the presidential and parliamentary elections. For Russia, hosting a base carries a wide range of political benefits. First of all, it is a presence in a region that is strategically important for the entire planet. The Red Sea has played an important role in world trade since the beginning of navigation. Now 10% of all maritime trade passes through it.We are mentioning that at a hypothetical military base (most likely it will be in Port Sudan) no more than four ships and 300 soldiers can be located at the same time. Time will tell how Sudan behaves in such circumstances. However, the growing influence of Russia in Africa, especially in the area of important trade routes, should be a wake-up call for the democratic part of the world.

Notes:

[i] In March 2023, five countries, including Belarus, North Korea, Syria, Eritrea, and Russia itself, voted against the UN General Assembly resolution that “demand[ed] that Russia “immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” Sudan, in contrast, was one of 35 countries that abstained from the vote. See UNGA, “General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine,” 2 March 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152

[ii] The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) opened a “logistical support facility” in Djibouti in 2017 with the potential to support China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and protect Chinese interests and nationals in Africa and the Middle East more broadly. Chinese ambitions in Djibouti were also reflected in China’s desire to compete with Russia, which itself had strengthened its base in Tartus, Syria during the Syrian civil war. Jean-Pierre Cabestan (2020), “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity,” Journal of Contemporary China, 29:125, 731-747.

Image Information:

Image: Massawa harbour
Source: Reinhard Dietrich, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Massawa_harbour.JPG
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Russia and China Expanding Coast Guard Cooperation in Arctic

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“Cooperation on Coast Guard tasks is both a concrete action and often seen as more harmless than military cooperation. The Coast Guard’s work is about protecting sovereign rights at sea, like fishing resources and access to oil and gas. Letting China in when it comes to fisheries inspections would be a big step in practical cooperation that has a security element to it.”

A new agreement with Russia’s Coast Guard will give China greater access to the Arctic, according to the following excerpted article in Norway-based The Barents Observer.This is something China has sought as a “near Arctic” nation. China has long claimed a special status in Arctic relations since its proclamation that the “Arctic belongs to the world and China has the largest portion of the earth’s population.” Cooperation between the Russian and Chinese Coast Guards can be an important step in China’s ability to gain more access to Arctic waters. The agreement on joint coastal operations could also give China a stronger voice in dictating Arctic policy. An analyst quoted in the article sees this as a significant policy shift for Russia, concluding that “Russia is generally skeptical about letting China get too close in the Arctic, but the Ukraine war might have changed those calculations.” The article suggests the presence of Chinese Coast Guard vessels patrolling Arctic waters, should it come to that, will make Norway’s cooperation with Russia’s Coast Guard even more difficult.

Sources:

Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s Coast Guard cooperation with China is a big step, Arctic security expert says”, The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 28 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/russias-arctic-coast-guard-cooperation-china-big-step-expert

On 24 April, a groundbreaking memorandum on extensive cooperation in Artic waters was signed with FSB Coast Guard. The Chinese Coast Guard was then invited to observe the long-planned “Arctic Patrol 2023” maritime security exercise. On 27 April, Governor Andrei Chibis met Chinese diplomats and discussed a roadmap for increased business, shipbuilding and Northern Sea Route developments. Amid the Ukraine war and halt in cooperation with the other seven Arctic nations, Russia turns east for new partners. Opening the door for China is a significant geopolitical change.

“Cooperation on Coast Guard tasks is both a concrete action and often seen as more harmless than military cooperation,” explained Andreas Østhagen, an expert on Arctic security with the Firdtjof Nansen Institute. “The Coast Guard’s work is about protecting sovereign rights at sea, like fishing resources and access to oil and gas. Letting China in when it comes to fisheries inspections would be a big step in practical cooperation that has a security element to it,” Osthagen stated. Government officials in Beijing have for years said China is a “near-Arctic state,” but so far, its presence up North has been limited to participating in conferences, annual research voyages, some few investments in Russia’s natural resource developments, and a few Asia-Europe shipments along the Northern Sea Route.

“China’s Polar Silk Road project seems to be more wait-and-see,” write researchers Frédéric Lasserre and Hervé Baudu in a report  published in April about the consequences of the war in Ukraine in the Arctic. The report, however, underlines that China is readily credited with great Arctic ambitions, but for now, mainly focused on securing hydrocarbon supplies from Siberia.  China has its own projects under construction. Barges for two additional floating nuclear power plants for the north coast of Siberia and a nuclear-powered icebreaker are currently under construction at a yard in China.

The Russia-China memorandum signed in Murmansk opens the opportunity for joint efforts to combat terrorism, illegal migration, fighting smuggling of drugs and weapons, as well as stopping illegal fishing. The deal was signed by top leaders with FSB Border Guards and the Chinese Coast Guard.

“This testifies that Russia actively wants to invite China into the kind of tasks we have thought Russia would safeguard,” Andreas Østhagen states, finding this a significant shift in policy. “We have thought that Russia is generally skeptical about letting China get too close in the Arctic, but the Ukraine war might have changed those calculations,” He notes that the future of China-Russian Arctic cooperation is difficult to predict, but he makes one comparison: “This reminds me a bit of when my mother-in-law wants to stay with us for a couple of weeks “until she finds something else.”

For Russia, the exercise showcasing FSB Border Guards’ maritime capabilities for the Chinese visitors wasn’t aimed at fishery inspections in the Barents Sea. This was hard-core security, as previously instilled by strongman Ramzan Kadyrov’s special Rosgvardia forces in the Arctic, including at the nuclear icebreaker base in Murmansk.

The exercise scenario was FSB fighting terrorists that had attacked Rosatomflot’s nuclear transport ship “Rosita” in Kola Bay. “All the inputs worked out during the practical maritime exercise confirmed the readiness of interdepartmental structures to solve problems in the waters of the Northern Sea Route,” said acting director of Atomflot Leonid Irlitsa.

Rosatomflot oversees Russia’s Northern Sea Route Directorate. The state-owned company is currently boosting the number of nuclear icebreakers and support infrastructure, key to President Putin’s great Arctic ambitions.  For neighboring Norway, FSB Coast Guards’ new cooperation with China could pose a challenge.“Although I think we are far away from seeing Chinese Coast Guard or naval vessels performing tasks in the Barents Sea, for Norway that would entail a new security challenge and make cooperation with the Russian Coast Guard (FSB) even more difficult,” says Andreas Østhagen. Norwegian-Russian Coast Guard cooperation in the Barents Sea is one of very few areas of contact that has not been officially called off by Oslo after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year.

Russia Positions Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Belarus

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President Putin and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Eurasian Economic Forum, 24 May 2023

“Belarus is now becoming Russia’s “nuclear queen” on the borders with NATO and Ukraine.”

The current Russian leadership appears to be taking concrete measures to reposition non-strategic nuclear weapons into Belarus to support its military operations in Ukraine, according to the pro-Kremlin site Century. A key element of the Kremlin’s propaganda over the past decade has been its focus on its huge nuclear weapon arsenal, which it interprets to symbolize Russia’s superpower status. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric escalated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened to use these weapons to achieve their objectives in Ukraine.,

The transfer of Russian nuclear weapons into Belarus was not altogether unexpected. President Lukashenko of Belarus has increasingly become dependent upon Kremlin support over the past several years.[i] Belarus’s economic, defense, and foreign policies largely follow those of Russia. Lukashenko has permitted the Russian military to use Belarus as a staging area while  managing to prevent his soldiers from directly participating in the Ukrainian conflict.. To maintain the fiction of Belarus’ agency and independence, the article declares that “Lukashenko has long asked to place Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of his country.” While these nuclear weapons will remain under Russian control, President Putin addressed the training of Belarusian crews to deliver these bombs via Su-24 [RG1] aircraft or the Iskander-M [RG2] operational-tactical missile systems which belong to Belarus.[ii] According to the article, Putin argues that Russia is merely answering the United States in a “mirror way,” since “America stores 200 tactical nuclear weapons, mostly atomic bombs…in six European countries.” The article concludes with a quotation  from former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who claims that “the horsemen of the apocalypse are already on their way,” and that if Ukraine tries to recapture Crimea, it “would be grounds for Russia to use any weapon.”

Sources:

Alexander Pronin, “Ядерный ферзь России; Растущая милитаризация Европы и наш комплексный ответ (Nuclear Queen of Russia; The Growing Militarization of Europe and Our Comprehensive Response),” Century (pro-Kremlin site), 10 May 2023. https://www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/jadernyj_ferz_rossii_537.htm

President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has repeatedly raised the issue of deploying Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in the republic with the Russian leadership. The last time – in March of this year. His request is finally granted….

According to Putin, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has long asked to place Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of his country. He publicly announced this desire even before the start of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, in 2021…

…The next public discussion of the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus took place in June 2022 during the talks between Lukashenka and Putin.

The Russian leader noted that at that moment in six European countries – NATO members – the Americans stored 200 tactical nuclear weapons, mostly atomic bombs….

“On July 1, we are completing the construction of a special storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus,” Vladimir Putin said in March 2023 in Pavel Zarubin’s program.

…And he added that the training of Belarusian crews will begin on April 3. According to him, there are already carriers of (Russian) nuclear weapons in Belarus: these are the Su-24s, the Iskander-M operational-tactical missile systems, modified by agreement with Minsk, as well as our MiG-31s [RG1] ​​with Kinzhals, all this is covered modern air defense systems, including the transferred S-400 anti-aircraft missiles….

Thus, Belarus is now becoming Russia’s “nuclear queen” on the borders with NATO and Ukraine….

By the way, special ammunition will be stored and controlled by the Russian army…. The President of Russia made it clear that the decision of Moscow and Minsk is a response to the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, organized by the West.

“Each day of deliveries of foreign weapons to Ukraine ultimately brings this same nuclear apocalypse closer. This does not mean that it will definitely take place. But the horsemen of the apocalypse are already on their way and continue their movement, you can rest assured,” Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, commented on the decisions taken by NATO. In addition, Medvedev warned that Ukraine’s attempt to retake Crimea would be grounds to use any weapon, including those provided for by the “fundamentals of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.” He believes that an attempt to “split off part of the state” is equal to “an encroachment on the existence of the state itself.”

Notes:

[i] On paper, at least, Russia and Belarus have formed a “Union State.” The strength of this union improved after President Lukashenko appealed for Kremlin assistance in the summer of 2020. Lukashenko had falsified presidential election results, and when large protests broke out, Russia provided economic and security assistance to quell the demonstrations. Since then, Lukashenko’s room to maneuver has been limited.

[ii] Russia has repeatedly promised to move an airbase into western Belarus for the past several years. There has been some speculation that Russia will use this base as the storage site for its non-strategic nuclear weapons. For background, see: Ray Finch, “Russia Deploying Anti-NATO Air Assets in Belarus Under Guise of Training,” OE Watch, July 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Eurasian Economic Forum, 24 May 2023
Source: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71198/photos/71199
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

The Splitting of the Russian Western Military District

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Sukhoi Su-25 [RG1] of the Russian Air Force landing at Vladivostok

“A new air and air defense army will be deployed against NATO…”

Russia announced plans for a large expansion of the Russian Armed Forces at an extended session of the collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense held in December 2022.1Part of this plan involved the creation of two military districts and a new air and air defense army. The accompanying excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin daily newspaper Izvestiya discusses how Russian plans to create these two military districts and suggests how the new air and air defense army will be created. The Western Military District, which was created during the ‘New Look’ reforms, will be split into two new military districts that restore the previously abolished Moscow and Leningrad military districts.[i] The 6th Air and Air Defense Army in St. Petersburg will likely remain at its present location, and the new air and air defense army will likely be assigned to the Moscow Military District. The preponderance of the new air and air defense army’s combat power will be drawn from units currently in the 6th Air and Air Defense Army.

Sources:

Roman Kretsul Alexey Ramm, “Полетный рубеж: новая армия ВВС и ПВО прикроет западные границы России Ее развернут в Московском или Ленинградском военном округе (Flight milestone: the new army of the Air Force and Air Defense will cover the western borders of Russia It will be deployed in the Moscow or Leningrad military district),” Izvestiya (Pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 6 June 2023. https://iz.ru/1523908/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poletnyi-rubezh-novaia-armiia-vvs-i-pvo-prikroet-zapadnye-granitcy-rossii

A new air and air defense army will be deployed against NATO, sources in the Russian Defense Ministry told Izvestia. It will be formed in the Western strategic direction as part of the Moscow or Leningrad military district. It will consist of several fighter regiments, a bomber regiment, an army aviation brigade, as well as air defense units and radiotechnical troops. According to experts, the strengthening of the western borders by the Aerospace Forces is especially important against the backdrop of the entry into NATO of Finland and, in the near future, Sweden…

In early June, the head of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate (GOMU) of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Yevgeny Burdinsky, confirmed that two military districts would be created this year. He also announced plans to create two armies – combined arms and air and air defense. The direction where they will be formed, Burdinsky did not specify…

Currently, the Western Military District includes the 6th Air and Air Defense Army. It consists of one composite aviation division, several helicopter regiments, and an army aviation brigade. Also, this formation has two air defense divisions equipped with S-300 [RG1] and S-400 [RG2] anti-aircraft systems. The zone of responsibility of the 6th Army is one of the biggest. It covers the territory of Russia from Karelia to Voronezh…This is not the first time in recent memory that the Ministry of Defense has strengthened the aviation component in the western strategic direction. As Izvestia earlier reported, this year ground attack aviation units, equipped with the famous ‘Rooks’, of the Su-25 attack family, should appear here. Until recently, there was not a single strike aviation regiment in the Western Military District. The task of the “Rooks” will be the direct support of the Ground Forces on the battlefield. The attack aircraft will also coordinate with army aviation helicopters…

Notes:

[i] The ‘New Look’ reforms were a series of major Russian military reforms that occurred from 2009-2012.

Image Information:

Image: Sukhoi Su-25 [RG1] of the Russian Air Force landing at Vladivostok
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-25#/media/File:Sukhoi_Su-25_of_the_Russian_Air_Force_landing_at_Vladivostok_(8683076150).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 2.0