Russian Defense Ministry Approves Five-Year Plan To Expand and Modernize Arctic Air Bases

In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).

In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).


“Rogachevo air base is located some 10 kilometers northeast of Belushaya Guba, the main military settlement on Novaya Zemlya.  The airport serves other facilities on the archipelago with helicopters, such as the main testing area of nuclear weapons near the Matochkin Strait.  After modernization, the airfield will be able to base all types of aircraft, including long-range bombers.”


Russia is expanding its ability to maintain and launch military aircraft within its Arctic territories, possibly due to increased NATO naval exercises in the North Sea over the past three years. According to the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the Russian military is modernizing both Rogachevo air base on Novaya Zemla and Nagurskoye air base on Franz Josef Land. As the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates, Russia’s long-range bombers are a dual threat as they also serve as cruise missile launchers. Russian cruise missiles have significant range, and recent attacks on Ukrainian targets launched from military aircraft in the Caspian Sea are a poignant indication of the strategic value Russia stands to gain from these expanded and modernized Arctic bases.


Source:

Thomas Nilsen, “Further expansion for Novaya Zemlya air base aims to serve long-range bombers,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 17 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/further-expansion-novaya-zemlya-airport-aims-serve-long-range-bombers

Rogachevo airfield is already upgraded to serve MiG-31 and Su-33 fighter jets.  Such aircraft have since 2020 served the Arctic airport on a rotational basis from their airports on the Kola Peninsula. The new plans include special buildings for basing aircraft equipment and new houses for the military servicemen and their families.

Rogachevo air base is located some 10 kilometers northeast of Belushaya Guba, the main military settlement on Novaya Zemlya. The airport serves other facilities on the archipelago with helicopters, such as the main testing area of nuclear weapons near the Matochkin Strait.  After modernization, the airfield will be able to base all types of aircraft, including long-range bombers, according to the plans reported by Izvestia. Today’s runway is 2,400 meters, likely too short for Russia’s long-range bombers like the Tu-95 [RG1] and Tu-160 [RG2] .At the Nagurskoye base on Franz Josef Land, work is underway to extend the runway to nearly 3,600 meters. The Russian Air Force has over the last years significantly stepped up its presence in the Arctic.


Image Information:

Image: In Kamchatka, MiG-31 [RG1] fighters of the Pacific Fleet worked out the interception of a mock enemy cruise missile (Author’s note: In spite of the Russian description, the MiG-31 looks to be air-to-air refueling).
Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:InterceptionOfMissile2018-11.jpg
Attribution: CCA x 4.0 International

Russian Domestic Support for Ukraine Invasion Weakens as Fighters Return Home

President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.

President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.


The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.”


According to the excerpted article from official Kremlin news outlet Parliamentskaya Gazeta, during the Victory Day celebration on 9 May, President Putin declared “all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine.” Despite some skepticism of such claims, indeed, most indicators suggest that Russian civil society support for the invasion has remained high over time.[i] Some of this robust domestic support stems from the Kremlin’s control over the country’s major media, which has over the past 15 months asserted that Russian soldiers are protecting their country against a quasi-Ukrainian/Nazi threat (supported by the US and NATO).[ii] Alongside the 24/7 propaganda, the Kremlin has also enacted legislation that severely punishes any attempt to protest Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[iii] Nevertheless, despite the Kremlin’s tight control over the narrative, there are growing indications that some Russians are beginning to question the costs behind this conflict, and possibly, their support.

The second excerpt from a regional source in Krasnodar, 93.RU, describes the brutal kidnapping and murder of two local residents by three ex-convicts. The victims’ car had broken down, and after offering to help, the criminals forced them to withdraw money from the bank and then murdered them. The source suggests that these ex-convicts may have recently gained their freedom from prison by volunteering to fight with the Wagner private military company in Ukraine. One of them had been sentenced to 16 years in prison in 2016 for a similar murder, and the article questions how he could have been released so soon. Since “discrediting” the military is now a serious offense in Russia, the author of the article couches the assertion that these ex-convicts had been released from prison by volunteering to fight in Ukraine in vague terms. However, anonymous reader comments to this article are more forthright, pointing out that once these convicts had spent six months fighting in Ukraine, they were now free to return to former criminal habits. Another reader warns that “now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.” These comments suggest that the blowback from using convicted criminals as soldiers could reduce Russian domestic support for fighting in Ukraine.


Sources:

Anton Grebennikov, “Президент: Вся страна сплотилась для поддержки участников спецоперации (President: The whole country rallied to support the participants of the special operation),” Parliamentskaya Gazeta (official Kremlin site), 9 May 2023. https://www.pnp.ru/politics/prezident-vsya-strana-splotilas-dlya-podderzhki-uchastnikov-specoperacii.html

Today, all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine. The country is proud of its heroes, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during the Victory Day Parade on Red Square…. “There is no more important thing now than your combat work. Today, the security of the country rests on you, the future of our statehood and our people depends on you, you honorably fulfill your military duty – you fight for Russia. Your families, children, friends are behind you, they are waiting for you,” RIA Novosti quotes the president….


Valeria Dulskaya, “Верили до последнего. Кто и зачем убил аниматоров на кубанской трассе (They believed until the very end. Who and why killed the animators on the Kuban highway),” 93.RU (Krasnodar News Site), 4 May 2023. https://93.ru/text/incidents/2023/05/04/72274256/

On the evening of April 28, animators Kirill Chubko and Tatyana Mostyko disappeared on the highway near the village of Berezanskaya in the Krasnodar Territory, who were driving home from work. They broke the wheel, and after some time they stopped communicating. Two days after the disappearance, Kirill’s car was found burned in the forest. More than 180,000 rubles disappeared from the accounts of the animators – they were withdrawn at night from different ATMs. Officers later arrested three suspects….

Unfortunately, that evening it became known that the animators were dead. On the morning of May 3, police reported that they had detained three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatiana. They were 31-year-old Demyan Kevorkyan from Krasnodar, 30-year-old Anatoly Dvoinikov from the Tikhoretsky district and 45-year-old Aram Tatosyan from the Apsheron district.

According to investigators, near the village of Berezanskaya, the alleged criminals noticed Kirill and Tatiana standing on the road on the road. The men decided to kill them in order to steal money and other valuables. They attacked the animators, took away their cards, “gaining access to the possibility of conducting banking operations on them.” Then the suspects withdrew more than 180 thousand rubles from several ATMs. Taking the money, the men killed Cyril and Tatyana. To hide the crime, they burned their car and hid the bodies, the press service of the regional Investigative Committee reported….

On May 3, the Investigative Committee announced the arrest of three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatyana – Demyan Kevorkyan, Anatoly Dvoinikov and Aram Tatosyan. According to the Russian Investigative Committee, all three had previous convictions…. The media suggest that they participated in the SMO, but there is no official confirmation of this.

Reader Comments:

One convict, who in 2016 was sentenced to 18 years for a similar murder, teleported out of the colony in some completely unknown way and killed the victims.

The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.I don’t understand either, they gave him 18 years and he is free. Everything goes according to plan…


Notes:

[i] Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?,” Atlantic Council, 2 May 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine/#:~:text=The%20Levada%20Center%2C%20which%20is,public%20backing%20of%20over%2070%25

[ii] For additional background on how the Kremlin has used the media to generate support for its policies, see” Ray Finch, CHAPTER 6. THE MOBILIZATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 1 September 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20098.10

[iii]Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian media space had become tightly controlled, especially on matters dealing with national security. For a brief snapshot on some of these restrictive measures, see: Ray Finch, “More Restrictions on Defense Information,” OE Watch, October 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376377; “Russia Moves Forward with New Restrictions on Military Reporting,” OE Watch, November, 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/397980


Image Information:

Image: President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.
Source: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/photos/big2x/EONAWWmXRIkYHMVEZf8vmNhVq99RsGK3.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Regional Analyst Questions Effectiveness, Sustainability of Russian Missile Strikes in Ukraine

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K[RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.


“Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.”


Although the intensity of Russian missile strikes against Ukraine increased from March and April 2023 to May 2023, the somewhat limited nature of the strikes may be an indication that Russia is running into a supply problem that could have a strategic impact on its ambitions in Ukraine and its ability to sell weapons on the international arms market. According to the recent accompanying article from Republic of Georgia-based Resonance Daily, which monitors the war in Ukraine and Russian military affairs in general, Russia may be squandering its missile stockpile in a somewhat piecemeal effort to break or find a weakness in Ukraine’s missile defense that it cannot currently exploit. From the perspective of the Georgian defense analyst quoted in the article, “Russia is increas[ing] the intensity [of missile strikes] to somehow find a loophole in these [Ukraine air defense] systems and break through them.” This, the analyst points out, is due to Russia’s inability to achieve any breakthroughs in the ground war. The article, published in the wake of a barrage of Russian missile and drone strikes on Kyiv on 16 May, underscores that Russia is thought to possess only 80 Kinzhal (dagger) hypersonic missiles, and that Ukrainian missile defenses destroyed one “dagger” on 6 May and six more on 16 May. Accordingly, it asserts, Russia now likely has 73 “daggers” in its arsenal. Collectively, these developments suggest that the Kinzhal [RG1] , as well as other missiles in Russia’s arsenal, are quickly becoming a finite resource due to attrition and sanctions, the latter of which makes it much more difficult to manufacture more of these weapons.[i] If the estimations of Russia’s stockpiles are correct, and current sanctions hold, Russia will not be able to replenish its stockpiles in any meaningful way in the near future. As a result, Russia does not possess weapon systems in sufficient numbers to allow it to strike Ukraine with enough salvos to overwhelm Ukrainian missile defense. Moreover, Moscow will be severely impacted in its ability to wage war on any front, threatening its positions in Ukraine and Syria, as well as curtailing its ambitions elsewhere.


Source:

Tamta Chachanidze, “ყველაზე მასირებული სარაკეტო დარტყმა კიევზე და „სათაგური“ ბახმუტში – ბოლო ცნობები ფრონტიდან (The most massive missile attack on Kiev and the “keystone” in Bakhmut – latest news from the front),” Resonance Daily (Georgia based media outlet focused on foreign affairs)16 May 2023. http://www.resonancedaily.com/mobile/index.php?id_rub=8&id_artc=181367&fbclid=IwAR39bK06tvFq8JAzCvR9QhAJVVqUvU3uFI4iITkgHFPXru72jkKrz5f4yQQ

On May 16, Russia launched the most massive three-hour missile attack on Kiev in the history of war. Aeroballistic missiles of the “Kinjali” type were also used. According to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the air defense forces of the country neutralized all the missiles. The Russian side claims the opposite – that with one “Kinjali” the Ukrainians destroyed the air defense system “Patriot”….

From the footage spread on social networks, it can be seen that there were indeed fires in Kyiv after the May 16 rocket attack, however, according to the administration of the capital city, it was caused by the fragments of the downed rockets. According to military analysts, the Russians are already trying to force Ukraine to make some kind of concession with intense air strikes. Or is this a new strategy to “somehow look ugly” to the Western anti-aircraft systems transferred to Ukraine.

They also do not rule out that “Kinjal” was hit by “Patriot”, because there is no such thing as 100% and ideal air defense, and “one or two missiles will defeat even the best air defense”.

At dawn on May 16, the Russians launched the most massive missile attack on Kiev in the last year, which lasted more than three hours….

According to Valery Zaluzhn, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the early hours of May 16, the Russian occupation forces attacked Ukraine from the northern, southern and eastern directions with 18 missiles. According to him, the opponent used 6 aeroballistic missiles “Kinjali”, 9 missiles “Calibre [RG1] ” from naval bases and 3 ground missiles “Iskander [RG2] “. Air defense forces destroyed all 18 missiles.

Several buildings and vehicles were damaged in different districts of Kyiv. 3 people were injured. According to Kyiv Mayor Vitaly Klitschko, it was caused by debris from Russian missiles. However, the Russian side claims otherwise.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, on May 16, a “Patriot” air defense system was destroyed with a “Kinjali” missile. In addition, according to the agency, “high-precision weapons struck warehouses of Ukrainian ammunition and weapons, which the West supplied to Kyiv”.

On the same day the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that, “Russian air defense systems shot down seven Storm Shadow [GRLCUT(3] long-range cruise missiles recently handed over to Ukraine by Britain, the same number of Hymars shells, as well as three Harm-type radar-detecting missiles. In addition, 22 Ukrainian planes were destroyed in Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine responded to the deadly attack on Kiev and thanked the Air Force of Ukraine for its work and impressive results. “The next incredible success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine! Last night, our sky defenders shot down six Russian hypersonic ‘Daggers’ and 12 more missiles,” Reznikov wrote on Twitter.

In addition, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine wrote an arithmetic equation: “80-1-6=X”, implying the total number of “Kinjali” missiles possessed by Russia to be only 80. On May 6, the Ukrainians destroyed 1 and 6 additional “daggers” on May 16. Accordingly, the Russians now likely have 73 “daggers” in their arsenal.

Colonel Lasha Beridze states to Resonance Daily that the Russians no longer have the resources of a ground attack and are now trying to compensate for this with air strikes.

“Russia no longer has options for a ground attack. They understand very well that they will not be able to defend themselves for a long time, and that is why they are already trying to take Ukraine to some kind of favorable concession with such airstrikes, or it is simply a punitive operation.

“Ukraine already has “Patriot” systems that can fight with “Kinjals” and quite successfully. It has been neglected many times already. Even the best air defense will be hit by one or two missiles, there is no such thing as perfect. Many developed countries could not withstand airstrikes like Ukraine.

“The Ukrainians are successfully repelling the attacks, and as time goes by, these air defense capabilities will increase.

“At the end of the day, Russian armaments with Western technologies have no chance to win and turn the battlefield in their favor. It seems they will increase their airstrikes if they have the chance. However, no matter how they increase missile strikes, there are all indications that they will not be able to increase its effectiveness. Don’t get angry and the “daggers” will come out”, said Lasha Beridze to “Resonance”.

Caucasus International University professor and military analyst Vakhtang Maisaya told “Resonance” that massed strikes have become a common strategy of the Russians, which may be aimed at disrupting the existing anti-aircraft systems in Ukraine.“It seems that this is already a kind of strategy of the Russians, when they try to break through the anti-missile defense, which is very effective, and they increase the intensity to somehow find a loophole in these systems and break through them. When the Ukrainians started intercepting missiles, the Russians now switched to intensive strikes,” Maisaya said.


Notes:

[i] Missiles are not the only Russian weapon system to be in short supply. The number of Russian aircraft are also being diminished. For insight regarding the limited number of Su-35 fighter bombers, see: “Russia’s Su-35: Are Its Military Aircraft Exports Headed for a Fall?,” The Rand Blog, 20 October 2022. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/10/russias-su-35-are-its-military-aircraft-exports-headed.html


Image Information:

Image: Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on a MiG-31K [RG1]  Victory Day Parade 2018 Moscow.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2018_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_66.jpg
Attribution: Kremlin.ru, CCA 4.0 International

Retired SHAPE Vice Chief of Staff Shares His Thoughts on Russia’s War in Ukraine

Ukrainian first responders clear debris from location of Russian missile strike_Uman Ukraine_29 April 2023

Ukrainian first responders clear debris from location of Russian missile strike_Uman Ukraine_29 April 2023.


“I think this war has gone too far and exposed too much of the incompetence and the basic inhumanity of the current regime, and all the signs, for me, of the unravelling of the Russian Federation are there. I think it’s a disaster in the making, a trainwreck in the making and we’ll have to sort it out.”


Former Vice Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Lt. Gen. Michel Yakovleff (France) believes that Russia’s stalled invasion of Ukraine cannot be won by any decisive Russian military campaign. He also believes Ukraine’s military is incapable of “winning” in its current condition. According to an 11 April interview published in the Krakow-based New Eastern Europe[i] foreign affairs journal, Yakovleff believes Russia is already engaged in an offensive of its own but that its forces are “so diluted all along the line in Donbas” that “it will not collapse the Ukraine line” and thus be inconsequential. He also believes Ukraine is unlikely to have any meaningful offensive and should instead wait for Russia to make an operational blunder of which it can take advantage.

In the interview, Yakovleff, a descendent of Russian emigrants, discussed critical issues surrounding the conflict, including the conditional transfer of arms from the West to Ukraine. He recognized that high-end weapon systems like fighter aircraft and longer-range artillery and rocket systems would likely continue to be given only with promises that Ukraine would not use the systems to attack Russian territory. Yet Yakovleff noted that Belarus posed an interesting dilemma possible for exploitation: “If you allow a force on your territory to launch an attack from your territory, to launch missiles, with aircraft flying in your airspace, have artillery deployed on your soil firing barrages into your neighbour’s territory – you are a participant to the war.” According to Yakovleff, while Russia is off limits. Belarus, may be a different story Yakovleff also expects, and favors, regime change in Russia. According to Yakavleff, “it will happen. Will it happen in months or years, I don’t know… But I think this war has gone too far and exposed too much of the incompetence and the basic inhumanity of the current regime.” His sentiment cuts to the heart of conflicting views of the war in Ukraine and the desirable outcomes. Ukraine views its conflict with Russia as total war, a fight for its very existence and thus the demise of Russia is the most favorable outcome. As the piecemeal and slower than requested weapons transfers might suggest, the West prefers to manage the war, to keep the war limited. Removing Putin may or may not be an objective of the conflict as a highly destabilized Russia and unknown leadership may be considered too high a cost for total Ukrainian victory.[ii]


Source:

“Russia has already taken “Ukrainium” and its fatal,” New Eastern Europe (Krakow based foreign affairs journal focused on Eastern Europe), 11 April 2023. https://neweasterneurope.eu/2023/04/11/russia-has-already-taken-ukrainium-and-its-fatal/

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: We recently marked the anniversary of the infamous Russian attempt –

or rather the failure – called “Take Kyiv in three days”. We are witnessing a new Russian

offensive gaining traction, as we speak. How do you rate their chances this time?

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, pretty dismal. It looks like the Russians have been engaged in an offensive for three or four weeks now. But it is diluted all along the line in Donbas with a focal point around Bakhmut. Even if they achieve success in Bakhmut, beyond symbolic value it doesn’t take them much further than the next town of middling importance. So I don’t believe they will collapse the Ukrainian lines. So okay, they may conquer a few square kilometres of real estate at tremendous cost. I have a suspicion they are wasting their resources, both human and ammunition. It’s not a very pointed thrust.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: If that blunder does not come to pass, is the Ukrainian counter-offensive still a foregone conclusion? Must they attack?

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, I wouldn’t advise them to attack if they don’t have the necessary mass to do so. And the necessary reserves and ammunition and so on. They’ve been very good at this war without taking any advice of mine. So I’ve got to be humble about that. You know, and they know better in what situation they are.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: On the warplanes, French President Emmanuel Macron said that if France did send warplanes, he would not want any to be used to “touch Russian soil”. Do you see that becoming a pre-condition for the rest of the would-be donors as well?

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, I suspect so. And I do think that the Ukrainians get the message, that they’re reasonable themselves, they understand. In essence, we are in a limited war, as Russian doctrine written in the times of Putin calls it – a limited regional war. It’s not limited in terms of violence and assets involved and numbers. It’s limited in the geographical sense. So, the guarantee that warplanes wouldn’t be used to attack targets on Russian territory – I can understand why strategically it’s sound, because Russia is essentially sanctuary-ised in reality. It’s immoral and it’s not legally sound by the way – you have every right to strike an aggressor, including on his territory. And all nations have done that routinely, if I dare say so. But in this case, okay – it may be right, it may be legal, it may be moral – but it is not politically expedient. And it is not even politically expedient for the Ukrainians. So, of course, there would be guarantees. And I don’t doubt the Ukrainians would abide by them.

I must say there’s an interesting side story, which is Belarus. Because Belarus, legally speaking, is an aggressor to the same degree as Russia. If you allow a force on your territory to launch an attack from your territory, to launch missiles, with aircraft flying in your airspace, have artillery deployed on your soil firing barrages into your neighbour’s territory – you are a participant to the war. It’s not complicit, it’s a participant. And in that respect, technically speaking – and it would be amusing to see how politically expedient this would be, you know maybe Russia is off limits. Belarus, may be a different story. I think it’s an interesting discussion.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: To go back to the earlier argument that you made that the West is providing Ukraine with enough weaponry and just in time for it to save itself from being crushed. – every now and then we have distinctions being made between Ukraine winning this war and Ukraine not losing this war. And I would like to ask what this “not losing” stands for, what it might look like.

MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: Well, not losing means Ukraine is still alive and kicking, not necessarily in control of all this territory.

So it’s the situation now. Victory for me – the only measure of victory for Ukraine is that the bear

has been defanged, and that the fear of Russia coming back recedes seriously. I have a suspicion

that that does imply Ukraine recovering all its territory, if only so the Russian body politic

understands that there was no reward in aggression, starting from 2014. That is a very extreme

measure of victory, to be honest, and I don’t think it is achievable right now, much to my regret.

…I don’t think liberating all its territory is within reach now of the Ukrainian army in the foreseeable future. And that is months, not years. The only real chance for Ukraine to recover its territory is the demise of the Putin regime, and bitter infighting inside Russia and the crumbling of Russia, and that will reopen the discussion. That is, that’s not something I call for, advocate or desire. But I think it is the logic of this war. That’s what I call Ukrainium. Ukrainium is the same as polonium. You know, it’s Russian, and it’s fatal. And it’s tearing through the fabric of Russia now. Even if they win the war, by the way, the Russians, I think society has been too much stressed. So ultimately, I believe that the desirable outcome for Ukraine will he a change of regime in Moscow.

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: How far-fetched a future are we talking about here?MICHEL YAKOVLEFF: I think it’s the logic of what’s happening now – it will happen. Will it happen in months or years, I don’t know. And I am not very good at predicting. But I think this war has gone too far and exposed too much of the incompetence and the basic inhumanity of the current regime, and all the signs, for me, of the unravelling of the Russian Federation are there. I think it’s a disaster in the making, a trainwreck in the making and we’ll have to sort it out. And then, part of the sorting out will be Georgia, Transnistria, maybe Chechnya, Dagestan and other places, and of course, Ukraine [would] include Crimea.


Notes:

[i] New Eastern Europe (NEE) foreign affairs journal is based in Krakow, Poland. While relatively unknown, it’s readership has expanded greatly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is also subscribed to by significant research and academic institutions in the West. Most of the experts and authors featured in the journal are from Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, giving the NEE an Eastern European perspective, counterbalancing the Western European and U.S. publications that look at the conflict from further afar.

[ii] Yakovleff has not been spared Russian criticism for his outspokenness regarding how the war in Ukraine should be fought and the future of Russia. His comments and publications have earned him a spot on the Russia-run Foreign Combatants website, which tracks foreigners fighting in Ukraine. According to Foreign Combatants, Yakovleff “became famous for a number of public statements fueling conflict,” including statements in August 2022 suggesting the French government should “introduce French armed forces into Ukraine.” For additional information from a pro-Russian perspective see: Michel Yakovleff, Foreign Combatants, https://foreigncombatants.ru/en//index.php?title=Michel_Yakovleff


Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian first responders clear debris from location of Russian missile strike_Uman Ukraine_29 April 2023
Source: Author’s own and given by permission
Attribution: Dodge Billingsley, Combat Films and Research

Facing European Sanctions, Russian Redirects Grain and Coal to Asian Customers

“As Europe no longer buys Russian coal and new markets in Asia take over, the export hub in Murmansk manifest itself as the world’s longest detour.”


In the face of sanctions and economic isolation from Europe, Russia’s longtime export hub in Murmansk has become, at least for now, an unnecessary and out-of-the-way detour for Russian commodities being shipped abroad, especially to Asia. According to the excerpted article in the Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is increasing its exports to Asia on the northbound Siberian rivers to the Northern Sea Route. Grain barges have successfully shipped north on the Lena River to the Northern Sea Route to China at substantial savings over rail. Coal will now move by rail from the Siberian coal fields to the river port of Krasnoyarsk and by barge on the north flowing Yenesei River to the Arctic Circle port region and then be loaded onto bulk carriers for China and India. Exploiting these additional routes will be more cost effective, quicker, and sanction-free, while providing Russia access to friendly markets and much needed export revenue.


Source:

Thomas Nilsen, “Asia-bound coal finds Siberian shortcut route, avoiding Murmansk,”

The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 3 April 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2023/04/asia-bound-coal-finds-siberia-shortcut-route-avoiding-murmansk

As Europe no longer buys Russian coal and new markets in Asia take over, the export hub in Murmansk manifest itself as the world’s longest detour. The first test batch with 30,000 tons of coal from Kuzbass will be shipped via the Yenisei River and Northern Sea Route when ice is gone and the waterways open for navigation later this year.

“It is planned to organize an experimental shipping in 2023 […] from Kuzbass with transshipment in Krasnoyarsk and Lesosibirsk. In Ust-Port region, the coal will be reloaded to ships and sent to China,” stated head of the Yenisey inland waterways, Leonid Fedorov.

The coal will be sent by rail to Lososibirsk and Krasnoyarsk where it will be loaded on barges and shipped north the Yenisey River to Ust-Port inside the Arctic Circle. A larger bulk carrier will take over the cargo and sail to the outlet of the river and further east along the Northern Sea Route towards Asia. About half of all Russian coal comes from the Kuzbass region southeast of Krasnoyarsk.Over the last decade, export via Murmansk has increased from about 9,5 million tons in 2010 to 16,2 million tons in 2019. After Putin’s full-scale military attack on Ukraine last year, the European Union decided to ban Russian coal, and export from the ice-free port on the coast to the Barents Sea is now shipped via the Suez channel to Asia, for the most part to India and China. If increasing to large volume, export via the Yenisey River and the Northern Sea Route will be substantially shorter than the route via Murmansk.

Russia Tries To Appeal to New Contract Soldiers in Moscow

Russian advertisement for contract military service.

Russian advertisement for contract military service.


“The general atmosphere in the Center is strikingly different from the environment of the draft board familiar to every male Russian.”


Over the past 15 months, polls in Russia have indicated significant public support (ranging from around 70 to 80 percent) for its invasion of Ukraine. Given the government’s control over the media (and most polling agencies), the genuine level of support could be considerably lower. The Kremlin’s ongoing challenge in attracting sufficient contract-military manpower may better reflect the actual public mood regarding this conflict. Few young Russian men appear willing to enlist as contract soldiers. As the accompanying excerpt from the popular Russian site Moskovskiy Komsomolets points out, Russian officials in Moscow are now pulling out all stops to attract sufficient contract military personnel for the so-called “special military operation” (SMO) in Ukraine.

Until recently, processing centers for Russian contract soldiers were bureaucratic, bare-boned operations with minimal staffing and infrastructure. As the article describes, this has all changed (at least in Moscow) with the recent inauguration of the new “five-story Unified Selection Point for military service under contract.” Instead of long lines amid grim surroundings, this new induction center boasts of “electronic queues, comfortable waiting rooms, with trained and competent specialists.” All the administrative and medical facilities are co-located, allowing potential contract soldiers to “comfortably and quickly go through a full cycle of events related to admission to the army.” The center is open all week and has the capacity to process 300 new contract soldiers daily. The article also describes some of the terms and benefits of becoming a contract soldier. Quoting a Moscow military commissar, “each candidate has the right to choose his specialty,” and the ages of admission for contractors is between 18 and 60. Candidates can come from anywhere in Russia, as well as from any other neighboring country. According to the article, the pay and benefits package for new contract soldiers is quite impressive. Besides their regular contract pay, soldiers from Moscow will receive a one-time payment of 195,000 rubles ($2,500) as well as similar monthly payments while participating in the SMO. There are also schooling benefits for eligible children and retired parents of contract soldiers. As the Kremlin continues to wrestle with manpower challenges, contract military service may become a more attractive option for Russians living in Moscow.[i]


Source:

Yury Sukhanov, “В столице открылся сверхсовременный Единый пункт отбора на контрактную службу (An ultra-modern unified selection point for contract service was opened in the capital),” Moskovskiy Komsomolets (popular Russian site), 3 April 2023.  https://www.mk.ru/moscow/2023/04/03/v-stolice-otkrylsya-sverkhsovremennyy-edinyy-punkt-otbora-na-kontraktnuyu-sluzhbu.html

In Moscow, the modernization of all contours of the urban environment and public services continues. Following health care, education, housing and communal services, transport, the sphere of manning the Armed Forces, which is vital for the country, is brought to the standards of the 21st century. Within the framework of this program, a five-story Unified Selection Point for military service under a contract was opened …where volunteers can comfortably and quickly go through a full cycle of events related to admission to the army….

“What I would like to note: with all candidates, events will be held for selection for a contract on the principle of one window, without leaving the territory of this building, – says the military commissar of the city of Moscow Maxim Loktev. – All logistics are thought out taking into account the wishes of those who have already been on the contract. All the services participating in the selection procedure are located in one building, and all the logistics of those wishing to enter the contract are organized along the lines of multifunctional centers that are well known to Muscovites. Electronic queues, comfortable waiting rooms, trained and competent specialists are just the tip of the iceberg: the basis is a competent division of the functionality of employees, verified routes and procedures….

… “Each candidate has the right to choose his specialty,” Loktev added. According to him, people from 18 to 60 years old can become contractors… After the interview and clarification of the capabilities and intentions of the applicant entering the Armed Forces, it is the turn of doctors…

…according to the military commissar of Moscow, candidates from all regions of the country are accepted. “We are faced with the fact that guys who want to serve under a contract work in Moscow and often represent different regions….  This option is also provided for those who are not citizens of the Russian Federation, from neighboring countries, we will also consider these candidates and offer them military service under the contract,” said Maxim Loktev.

…The center in its current configuration with specialists is designed to receive a hundred people per day, but it is possible to expand its capacity to 300 people daily…. The general atmosphere in the Center is strikingly different from the environment of the draft board familiar to every male Russian.

…Before leaving for the special operation zone, all contract soldiers… will undergo special professional training at the best training grounds in the Moscow region.

As for material support for military personnel and their families, in Moscow it includes regular monthly payments, as well as lump sum payments upon signing a contract and sending them to the SMO zone. When signing a contract for a year or more, a person entering the Armed Forces will receive a lump sum of 195,000 rubles from the city. Further, the system guarantees regular additional payments depending on rank and military position.Moscow currently has one of the most extensive packages of social support and benefits for military personnel, primarily for participants in the special operation. These benefits apply not only to the soldiers themselves, but also to their families. Thus, the children of combatants have the right to extraordinary admission to the kindergarten closest to their home, the school of their choice (regardless of the place of permanent registration). And social workers will help elderly relatives of Muscovite soldiers in everyday life.


Notes:

[i] For additional background on recent incentives to attract new soldiers, see: Ray Finch, “Added Incentives for Those who Fight in Ukraine,” OE Watch, 3-2023.


Image Information:

Image: Russian advertisement for contract military service.
Source: https://www.n-vartovsk.ru/news/citywide_news/bvk/381142.html
Attribution: CCA-SA 3.0 Public Domain

Russian Companies Using Central Asian Migrant Workers in Occupied Ukraine

Migrant workers in Moscow, Russia.

Migrant workers in Moscow, Russia.


But, digging trenches for money and being citizens of another country, they violate the laws and customs of war and become criminals.


Russia has stated that it will not draft migrant workers in the country and send them to fight in Ukraine. While this has been largely true, the accompanying excerpted article from the Russian-language independent news website Kloop reports that Central Asians are doing non-lethal work on Russia’s behalf within the zone of conflict in Ukraine.[i] According to the article, Russia has contracted workers from Central Asia to construct fortifications in occupied areas of Ukraine. The article notes that private military contractor the Wagner Group, which is one of the Russian companies involved in building defensive structures in Ukraine for use by the Russian military, has recruited migrant workers to work there with promises of a good salary and other benefits. The article also mentions how “the work did not require documents,” an incentive for Central Asians looking to work for Russian entities without needing to officially register to do so.

Such contracted work in Ukraine carries many risks. The article confirms the deaths of 84 workers in Luhansk who had been building such defensive structures, though it is unknown if this number included any Central Asian citizens. Other non-combat hazards of working in occupied Ukraine include poor working conditions, less pay than promised, and possible prosecution if they are captured by Ukraine. Such migrant workers could also face charges in their home countries, including possible loss of citizenship in Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have repeatedly warned their citizens that they can face prosecution in their home countries for serving as combatants in the war in Ukraine, with exceptions for those who hold Russian citizenship and are required to serve in the Russian armed forces. While the article is concerned about the fate of these migrant workers, there have been only a few examples of the Kyrgyzstani and Uzbekistani governments opening a case against an individual for fighting in Ukraine, and in each case these individuals fought for Ukraine against Russian forces. The article concludes that migrants are likely to continue working in Ukraine and that authorities in Central Asia will not interfere as the work provides an economic benefit Because of the importance of remittances to the economies in the region.


Source:

“Тюрьма и смерть за копейки. Мигрантов зовут рыть окопы для российской армии (Jail and death for a kopek. Migrant workers are being called to dig trenches for the Russia army),” Kloop (independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 2 March 2023. https://kloop.kg/blog/2023/03/02/tyurma-i-smert-za-kopejki-migrantov-zovut-ryt-okopy-dlya-rossijskoj-armii/

Migrant workers from Central Asia are being called to construct trenches for the Russian military, including in the occupied territories of Ukraine. They are offered up to 6,000 rubles a day for this work. But the real working conditions do not justify this money: dozens of workers are killed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, employers are deceptive, and in their home countries, migrants are threatened with jail time and loss of citizenship.

…It was announced in October 2022 by the founder of the Wagner Group, businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, that Russia will build defensive structures along the front line. And since November, Russian websites and Telegram groups of migrant workers from Central Asian countries started publishing announcements about the recruitment of workers to dig trenches, dugouts, anti-tank ditches, and strengthen structures for the military… Announcements about the recruitment of workers for the “arrangement of defensive lines” appeared on the Russian websites Headhunter, Avito, and at least two regional-scale announcement sites…

Employers are willing to pay from 45,000 to 180,000 rubles a month for the risk, or from 300 rubles ($4) per hour. In addition, they promised a lot of free things: travel, medical examination, accommodation, three meals a day. The requirements are to be in good health and between 20 and 50 years of age…A feature of some of the announcements in these groups was that the work did not require documents…The authors of ads in telegram groups for migrants also offered help from the employer in obtaining Russian citizenship if the employee worked on the “trenches” for at least four months.

…84 workers recruited from Novosibirsk, who responded to these vacancies, died from the strike of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the occupied territory of the Luhansk region…Whether among them came from Central Asia or not, is still unknown…President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with the government, confirmed that workers who were building “defensive structures” in the occupied territories had died.

In addition to the danger of dying from shelling from Ukraine, other troubles await the workers: unsanitary conditions, unheated living quarters and “the attitude is worse than for cattle.” This was told by “Present Time”…The Baza telegram channel also writes about this, citing one of the Tajiks, Aminjon. According to him, they were paid three times less than the promised amount. Other workers were even less fortunate: one had an attack of appendicitis, and another lost a hand, but they did not receive any adequate medical care. After Aminjon went to the police, they began to call him with threats, now he is afraid to leave the house.

Migrants can be prosecuted for at least four criminal offenses for digging trenches for the Russian military, especially in the occupied territories of Ukraine, human rights activist and migrant rights specialist Valentina Chupyk warns.

According to her, if such migrants are caught by the Ukrainian military, they will be tried for illegally crossing the border of Ukraine, as they dig trenches in the occupied territories – for this they face two to five years in prison…If Ukrainians find out that a migrant works for PMC Wagner or contributes to the illegal activities of the occupying authorities (for example, if the migrant was hired by the state), he will be sentenced in Ukraine for up to 20 years for complicity in the activities of a terrorist organization.

According to the Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, migrants who dig trenches are not equated with combatants (combatants). But, digging trenches for money and being citizens of another country, they violate the laws and customs of war and become criminals. Therefore, they cannot surrender as prisoners of war, but can only turn themselves in to the legal authorities of Ukraine – and after that receive a life sentence.

It is difficult to say whether the construction of facilities for a clearly military purpose abroad will be interpreted in the homeland of migrants as participation in the conflict. However, the Embassy of Kyrgyzstan in Russia warned that, according to the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, the participation of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic in hostilities on the territory of foreign states is punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years with confiscation of property.

In addition, for participation in armed conflicts or hostilities on the territory of a foreign state, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan can be deprived of citizenship.

Now the danger of punishment at home may seem insignificant to diggers, because Kyrgyzstan is critically dependent on Russia. In 2022, the transfers of individuals from there to the republic set a historical record, exceeding $2.7 billion…The authorities of Kyrgyzstan clearly do not want to quarrel with Moscow and are selective about the participation of their citizens in hostilities. Those who fight for Ukraine or simply support it, the authorities tend to punish, but those who fight for Russia do not. Thus, nothing is heard about investigations into the deaths of Kyrgyz citizens who fought with Ukraine on the side of the Russian Federation…However, the foreign policy environment can change quickly. If at some point it becomes profitable for the authorities of Kyrgyzstan to demonstrate neutrality or a critical attitude towards Russian aggression, the citizens of the country, who today are digging trenches in the occupied Ukrainian lands, may end up in prison. Or lose citizenship.


Notes:

[i] A few resources have become available for Central Asians who are illegally drafted or not allowed to leave Russia, including contact information for organizations in Russia that help migrant workers. These have been distributed through media in the region amid reports that Central Asians have been drafted or denied permission to leave Russia. See: “Что делать, если вас пытаются мобилизовать или не выпускают из России? (What to do if you are possibly mobilized or not allowed to leave Russia),” Asia-Plus, 9 March 2023. https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20230309/chto-delat-esli-vas-pitayutsya-mobilizovat-ili-ne-vipuskayut-iz-strani



Image Information:

Image: Migrant workers in Moscow, Russia.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Moscow,_Vozdvizhenka_Street,_destroying_solid_pavement_with_spades_(30645492273).jpg
Attribution: CCA 2.0

Russia Effectively Leaves Arctic Council

“On 21 February, the Kremlin announced that Russia revised its Arctic policy by removing mentions of the Arctic Council, stressing the need to prioritize Russian Arctic interests, and striving for greater self-reliance for its Arctic industrial projects.”


The Arctic Council, founded in 1996, lists its members as Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. The position of Arctic Council president rotates between member states, and though the Council currently has a Russian president, other members of the Council have refused to meet in his presence in response to the war in Ukraine. Underscoring the schism, the Council also recently met without its current president presiding and accepted a Canadian counterclaim to Arctic territory that is also claimed by Russia.[i] As the excerpted article from independent Norwegian news source High North News indicates, Russia has effectively pulled out of the Arctic Council as a result of the Council’s actions and will now pursue its interests in the Arctic through bilateral relations and self-reliance. Russia’s decision increases the chance of further political conflict in the Arctic that could lead to a physical confrontation between Russia and Arctic Council member states.


Source:

Malte Humpert, “Russia Amends Arctic Policy Prioritizing ‘National Interest’ and Removing Cooperation Within Arctic Council,” High North News (independent newspaper published by the High North Center at Nord University, Bodo, Norway). 23 February 2023. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-amends-arctic-policy-prioritizing-national-interest-and-removing-cooperation-within-arctic

On 21 February, the Kremlin announced that Russia revised its Arctic policy by removing mentions of the Arctic Council, stressing the need to prioritize Russian Arctic interests, and striving for greater self-reliance for its Arctic industrial projects. The hopes for cooperation with Russia in the Arctic continue to cool. Days after a U.S. diplomat stated that cooperation with Russia in the Arctic was now virtually impossible, the Kremlin published amendments to its Arctic policy. President Putin signed the decree on 21 February. The updated document places greater emphasis on Russian national interests in the region and removes specific mentions for cooperation within the Arctic Council.

While the original policy, published in March 2020, called for the “strengthening of good neighborly relations with the Arctic states” in the fields of economic, scientific, cultural and cross-border cooperation the amended version removes the above section and instead calls for the “development of relations with foreign states on a bilateral basis, “taking into account the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.”

The amended text also removes mentions of “the framework of multilateral regional cooperation formats, including the Arctic Council, the coastal Arctic “five” and the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.” 

In the original policy the section on international cooperation, placed significant emphasis on work within “multilateral regional cooperation formats” for the purpose of building up economic, scientific and technological, as well as cultural cooperation. It did not make any mention of prioritizing Russian national interests. In contrast, the wording of the revised document now places the country’s national interests in the Arctic ahead of work towards economic, scientific and technological, and cultural cooperation. Just last week, U.S. military leaders emphasized that the Arctic was now Russia’s number one priorityThe updated version also places a greater emphasis on Russian self-reliance in the region. It calls for ensuring “import independence of the shipbuilding complex,” clearly a response to western sanctions which have affected Russia’s ability to order and purchase ice-capable gas and oil tankers at foreign shipyards.The amended version of the policy calls for the” development and modernization of shipbuilding and ship repair facilities for the construction and maintenance of ships navigating in the waters of the Northern Sea Route. “In terms of energy supply for population centers and industrial facilities along the NSR the policy now calls for the use of domestically built “low-power nuclear power plants.” The first such facility, the floating nuclear power plant Akademik Lomonosov was towed through the Baltics and up the Norwegian coastline in 2018 to the Arctic town of Pevek to supply electrical power and residential heat.


Notes:

[i] For more additional information about the Canadian claim on the Lomonosov Ridge see: Les Grau, “Canada Makes Additional Claims to Arctic Territory Claimed by Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023.

Russia Cutting Back on Nuclear Icebreaker Production

“An updated version of Russia’s Arctic Strategy states that Russia will only build one “Lider,” not three as originally planned. The amended document signed by President Putin on the 27th of February reads that only the lead ship of the new class will be built before 2035.”


As reported in the excerpted article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia will only build one of the three nuclear icebreakers it had previously planned but will compensate by increasing conventional icebreaker production. Although the cutback in production could be a response to the latest rounds of EU sanctions against Russia, the decision may have already been in process. In the past, Russia has cut back on expensive projects only to introduce improved projects later. The change in direction may indicate Russia believes it already has enough atomic-powered icebreakers in an era of thinning polar icecaps.


Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Moscow lowers ambitions in nuclear icebreaker program, will not build fleet of new super-powerful vessels after all,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 1 March 2023.  https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2023/03/moscow-lowers-ambitions-nuclear-icebreaker-program-will-not-build-fleet-new-super-powerful

Only two days after the EU imposed sanctions against Russia’s state nuclear icebreaker operator, the country announces that it will not build a fleet of Lider-class vessels. An updated version of Russia’s Arctic Strategy states that Russia will only build one “Lider,” not three as originally planned. The amended document signed by President Putin on the 27th of February reads that only the lead ship of the new class will be built before 2035.

The lead ship carries the name “Rossiya” and is currently under construction at the Zvezda yard in the Russian Far East. It is due to be ready for sailing in 2027. The Lider (project 20510) will be equipped with two RITM-400 type nuclear reactors and have a total capacity of 120 MW, twice the power of the currently most powerful icebreakers. It will be able to crush through ice thicker than four meters.

The vessel is very complicated to build, and it comes at an extraordinarily high price. The Russian government in January 2020 allocated 127 billion rubles (€1,85 billion) for the construction of the lead ship. The reduction of the number of Liders is compensated by the construction of more LK-60 icebreakers[GRLCUT(1] . While the original strategy document from 2020 includes the construction of “no less than five” icebreakers of the 22220 class, the updated documents reads “no less than seven” vessels of the kind.

Russia already has three ships of the class in operation: the Arktika, Sibir and Ural. By year 2035, also the Yakutia, Chukotka, Kamchatka and Primorie will be completed. The Arctic Strategy also outlines the construction of 30 rescue and support ships, as well as three hydrographic survey ships and two piloting ships by 2030.

The updated document comes only two days after the European Commission adopted its 10th package of sanctions against Russia, a part of which is aimed at nuclear icebreaker operator Atomflot. According to the Commission, the sanctions against Atomflot will reduce Russia’s ability to take use of the Northern Sea Route to exploit its vast Arctic oil and gas reserves.

“With oil and gas exports shifting from Europe to Asia as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and subsequent Westerns sanctions, Russia’s icebreaker fleet is key to the country’s Arctic hydrocarbon strategy. In order to escort oil and gas tankers on the much longer and more challenging voyage from the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas to Asia, rather than the much shorter and less ice infested route to Europe, Russia relies on Atomflot’s fleet of nuclear icebreakers,” an explanation from the Commission reads.Vladimir Putin has since 2018 had the development of the Northern Sea Route as one of his key priorities and federal agencies have been commissioned to reach 80 million tons of goods per year on the route by 2024. The lion’s share of the projected goods traffic is oil, liquified natural gas and coal.

Russia Widens and Tightens Conscription Policies

Andrey Kartapolov (General-Ret), chairman of the Duma Defense Committee.

Andrey Kartapolov (General-Ret), chairman of the Duma Defense Committee.


“The information space is filled with aggressive advertising of the services of commercial structures to evade military duty…”


The Kremlin continues to struggle to attract adequate military manpower to participate in its so-called special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine. The partial mobilization of 300,000 soldiers announced in September 2022 helped to stabilize Russian lines but so far has been insufficient to launch a counteroffensive or consolidate control of the four recently annexed provinces.[i] Similarly, Russian private military companies (PMCs) like the Wagner Group and other local militias have also proven inadequate to consolidate gains. The Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) increasingly may be forced to rely upon conscript soldiers to fill Russia’s manpower needs.

Russia is considering a proposal to change the age for draft-eligible Russians. In December 2022, the MoD announced that the age for draft-eligible Russian men would be changed from 18-27 to 21-30 years of age, which would supposedly provide for more mature and experienced conscripts. However, according to the first excerpt from the pro-business site Vedomosti, “the transition to a new draft age in 2023 is unlikely.” There is simply insufficient time for local draft boards to prepare and carry out this change. However, the article quotes another expert who claims that the “law on raising the draft age could come into force in the fall of 2023.” At first, the draft will be of a mixed type, that is, men aged 18 to 30 will be subject to it.” Expanding the age limits from 18-30 for military manpower could help the MoD to fill the military’s ranks. The Kremlin is also cracking down on ways to evade military service. To avoid the draft, many young Russian men employ the services of various legal agencies to find legal or medical reasons to remain out of the military.[ii] Not surprisingly, as the second excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes, legislation has been proposed that would “ban advertising of legal and consulting companies that provide services to conscripts.” The article quotes a Russian legislator who asserts that “the information space is filled with aggressive advertising of the services of commercial structures to evade military duty.” According to the Kremlin’s narrative, military duty is a sacred honor, and as the SMO continues, more young Russian men will be forced to carry out this obligation if the conscript age eligibility is expanded and legal recourse for potential conscripts is curtailed.


Sources:

Anna Vergazova, “В Госдуме оценили сроки перехода к новому призывному возрасту (The State Duma estimated the timing of the transition to a new draft age),” Vedomosti (Russian pro-business news outlet), 3 March 2023. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/03/03/965182-perehoda-novomu-prizivnomu-vozrastu

The transition to a new draft age in 2023 is unlikely, Yury Shvytkin, deputy head of the State Duma Defense Committee, told Vedomosti…. Viktor Bondarev, Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Federation Council, said on March 3 that the draft law on raising the draft age could come into force in the fall of 2023. He added that the introduction of the document is planned in the spring, and suggested that in this case it would come into force by the beginning of the autumn draft…

…A proposal to gradually increase the draft age was made by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on December 21, 2022 at an expanded meeting of the collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense. According to his proposal, the draft age can be increased from 18 to 21 years, and the maximum – from 27 to 30 years. In addition, Shoigu called for an increase in the number of military personnel to 1.5 million people.

Earlier, Andrey Kartapolov, chairman of the Duma Defense Committee , told Parliamentary Gazeta that from April 1, conscription could take place according to the new rules. At first, the draft will be of a mixed type, that is, men aged 18 to 30 will be subject to it.


Bulat Bashirov, “Призывников оградят от юристов (Conscripts to be shielded from lawyers),” Kommersant (Russian pro-business news outlet), 7 February 2023. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5811945

…Deputies of the Parliament of Bashkiria took the initiative to ban advertising of legal and consulting companies that provide services to conscripts. The legislators propose to amend the federal legislation accordingly, since “aggressive advertising of services for evading military duty” provokes citizens to commit acts punishable in criminal and administrative order….“The information space is filled with aggressive advertising of the services of commercial structures to evade military duty,” the explanatory note to the document says…. “Advertising ways to avoid conscription is widespread: cars with similar banners are literally parked near recruiting stations,” Vladimir Nagorny, head of the Bashkirian Kurultai Committee on State Construction, told Kommersant. “Their services are to find, they believe, a legal way to avoid conscription. The first way can be characterized as abuse of the right. On the advice of such lawyers, the recruit will appeal the decision of the draft commission in court, and even if he loses, by that time the draft campaign will already be over. The second method is friendly independent medical commissions, which find a disease in the conscript that exempts him from service. Lawyers do not hesitate to talk about this method.”


Notes:

[i]Russia annexed the four Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia in 2022, although the Kremlin does not fully control them.

[ii] For additional information regarding how young Russian men avoid being conscripted see: Ray Finch, “Dodging the Draft” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/377105


Image Information:

Image: Andrey Kartapolov (General-Ret), chairman of the Duma Defense Committee
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Andrey_Kartapolov,_2018.jpg
Attribution: Mil.ru. CCA 4.0 Intl