Russian Views on Finland and Sweden Joining NATO

NATO Secretary General meets with Ministers of Defense for Finland and Sweden, March 2022.

NATO Secretary General meets with Ministers of Defense for Finland and Sweden, March 2022.


Of course, this means the deterioration of our strategic position….” 


Russian reactions to the recent decision by Finland and Sweden to join NATO have ranged from mild concern to grave trepidation.  According to the excerpted article from the pro-Kremlin news outlet RIA Novosti, President Putin does not foresee any serious problems with this decision, provided that no “military infrastructure of the alliance is deployed in Finland and Sweden.”  If this were to occur, Putin stated that “Russia will be forced to respond in a similar way.”  Putin also asserted that there was no merit to “the thesis that Russia’s goal to push NATO forces away from its borders, preventing Ukraine from joining the alliance, led to the opposite, only from Sweden and Finland.”  Putin explained his rationale by claiming that “unlike Ukraine, Sweden and Finland do not persecute people who feel they are part of Russian culture.”

Other knowledgeable Russians have expressed greater concern over the further enlargement of NATO.  In an interview in the popular daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets, “Ruslan Pukhov, the Director of the Moscow Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), spoke about the military significance of NATO expansion in the northwest.”  According to Pukhov, this expansion “means the deterioration of our strategic position.”  He asserts that Russia will now “have to spend more on defense than before February this year [which will mean] that less money will be spent on infrastructure projects, healthcare, and education.”  Pukhov reviews Russia’s long history with these two countries, stating “both the Swedes and the Finns have already experienced the power of Russian weapons,” which resulted in “bad memories for them.”  He concludes that becoming members of NATO might tempt them to try to settle old scores, and that therefore Russia “can’t be weak.”


Source:

“Путин: Россия ответит в случае размещения баз НАТО в Швеции и Финляндии (Putin: Russia will respond in case of deployment of NATO bases in Sweden and Finland),” RIA Novosti (pro-Kremlin news outlet) 30 June 2022. http://RIA/Ru/20220629/Putin-1799133978.html

In Russia’s relations with Sweden and Finland, there are no such problems as with Ukraine, if they want to join NATO, let them join, but if the military infrastructure of the alliance is deployed in Finland and Sweden, Russia will be forced to respond in a similar way, Russian President Vladimir Putin said…

…He also called false and ‘having nothing to do with reality’ the thesis that Russia ‘s goal to push NATO forces away from its borders, preventing Ukraine from joining the alliance, led to the opposite, only from Sweden and Finland.  “For us, the membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO is not at all the same as the membership of Ukraine, these are completely different things.  They understand this very well.  No.  This is a completely different thing,” the Russian leader emphasized.  He noted that, unlike Ukraine, Sweden and Finland do not persecute people who feel they are part of Russian culture.

Source: Olga Bozheva, “Вступление Финляндии и Швеции в НАТО принесло России серьезные риски (The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO brought Russia serious risks),” Moskovskiy Komsomolets (popular, pro-Kremlin news organization), 5 July 2022. https://www.mk.ru/politics/2022/07/05/vstuplenie-finlyandii-i-shvecii-v-nato-prineslo-rossii-sereznye-riski.html

The process of accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO was continued.  On July 4, negotiations between these countries and the Alliance were completed in Brussels.  On July 5, the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland signed the accession protocol at NATO Headquarters.  Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), spoke about the military significance of NATO expansion in the northwest.

Now there are rather contradictory statements about the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO.  A number of political scientists say that this does not pose a serious danger to us.  Someone thinks that we need to strengthen the borders, up to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons there.  What do you think their entry into the alliance means for us?

Of course, this means the deterioration of our strategic position.  And not because these countries suddenly became anti-Russian overnight – even before that they loved us like a dog with a stick.  However, they were not at least formally integrated into NATO structures, and accordingly, they behaved cautiously and correctly towards us.

…In any case, such a move by Stockholm and Helsinki does not lead to anything good.  And the one who says that their entry into NATO means practically nothing to us, he, I think, is disingenuous.

…This will force us to invest more financially in the arms race.  We’ve already gotten into it.  And now it doesn’t matter at all whether we did it ourselves or were dragged into it.  The score is on the scoreboard.  We will have to spend more on defense than before February this year.  This means that less money will be spent on infrastructure projects, healthcare, and education. There are no illusions here.

…Both the Swedes and the Finns have already experienced the power of Russian weapons… bad memories for them.  They still remember very well how they got hit in the teeth from us.  And if you suddenly forgot, so we can remind you….  So we can’t be weak.


Image Information:

Image: NATO Secretary General meets with Ministers of Defense for Finland and Sweden, March 2022
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/nato/51942155994
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Kremlin Easing Russian Citizenship for All Ukrainians

President Vladimir Putin …signed a decree giving the right to all residents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner….


Six months before Russia reinvaded Ukraine, President Putin published a long historical article where he asserted that “Russians and Ukrainians are one people, a single whole.” (See: “Studying Putin’s History of Ukraine,” OE Watch, Sept 2021.)  Attempts to prove this assertion using force have thus far met with considerable Ukrainian resistance.  However, the Kremlin is also employing its administrative and economic prowess to make it easier for Ukrainians to become Russian citizens.  As the first excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant points out, the Kremlin has recently enacted legislation “giving the right to allresidents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner.”  The article goes on to stress that this new streamlined procedure does “not require them to renounce Ukrainian or other citizenship.”  The article concludes by quoting a high-level Kremlin official, who claims that “from 2016 to 2020, about 978,000 citizens of Ukraine received Russian citizenship.”

The second excerpt from the popular, pro-Kremlin site Versiya describes how Russian authorities have set up “bus passport tours” to transport those Ukrainians who want to obtain Russian citizenship.  The buses pick up Ukrainians in regions not taken by Russia and transport them to those occupied by Russian forces.  According to the author, Russian “passportization of the Black Sea region is gaining momentum [where, for instance], “the number of residents of Odessa who have received Russian passports goes into the thousands.”  Many pensioners participate in these tours, since once they gain Russian citizenship, they “will be able to apply for Russian pensions (before recalculation – 10,000 rubles [$185] a month.”  The article asserts that there are many other categories eligible to receive monthly payments: “war veterans and children, the disabled…fathers and single mothers…pregnant women,” and that the Russian benefits far exceed those provided by the Ukrainian government.  The article concludes by pointing out that because of the conflict in and around “the Mykolaiv and Zaporozhye regions…, up to 85 percent of local residents lost their jobs… [and] there is only one hope – for Russia.”


Source:

Elena Rozhkova, Ksenia Veretennikova, “Гражданам Украины вышло упрощение (Citizens of Ukraine received a simplification),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 11 July 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5458512

President Vladimir Putin on Monday signed a decree giving the right to all residents of Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified manner…. The expert believes that the updated decree will be relevant given the dynamically changing situation with the transition of Ukrainian territories under the control of Russian troops, as well as for Ukrainian emigrants living in Russia.

According to the new amendments, the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship in a simplified manner now applies to all residents of Ukraine, and not only to the population of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) and regions of Ukraine controlled by the Russian armed forces. The document also notes that the presence of citizens in military service cannot serve as a basis for rejecting their applications for admission to Russian citizenship….

…The deputy [Mr. Zatulin] also clarified that residents of the DPR, LPR and Ukraine who receive Russian citizenship are not required to renounce their first citizenship and can have two passports…. 

…In June 2022, TASS, citing the press center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reported that since April 2019, on the basis of this decree, more than 800 thousand people have acquired Russian citizenship. A year ago, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Dmitry Kozak… stated that not only residents of Donbass, but also residents of the “rest of Ukraine” apply for Russian citizenship. According to him, from 2016 to 2020, about 978 thousand citizens of Ukraine received Russian citizenship…

Source: Alexander Artishchenko, “Туры за паспортами (Tours for passports),” Versia (popular, pro-Kremlin site), 3 August 2022. https://versia.ru/zhiteli-nikolaeva-i-odessy-ezdyat-oformlyat-rossijskoe-grazhdanstvo-v-xersonskuyu-oblast

Passportization of the Black Sea region is gaining momentum – Russian citizenship is issued in Kherson, Skadovsk, Genichesk, Nova Kakhovka, Oleshki, Belozerka and Gola Prystan. Despite the fact that it is rather difficult to leave the settlements controlled by Ukraine, besides, they mostly let pensioners through and, less often, women, the number of residents of Odessa who have received Russian passports goes into the thousands….

…Bus passport tours are organized from Zaporozhye and Nikolaev to Kherson – the final destinations of the trip are usually not advertised, but these buses are still allowed through at checkpoints without any problems. As explained by the deputy head of the military-civilian administration of the Kherson region Ekaterina Gubareva, any citizen of Ukraine, regardless of place of residence, even from Lviv, can apply for a Russian passport. … Together with Russian citizenship, pensioners will be able to apply for Russian pensions (before recalculation – 10,000 rubles a month, but in the fall they promise to recalculate and increase pensions, and accrue “from above” what they don’t receive in the summer). Moreover, war veterans and children, the disabled and some categories of beneficiaries are entitled to an allowance of 5,000 rubles per month. The allowance can be issued in the same place as passports. Gubareva separately noted, that monthly social payments are due to fathers and single mothers – at the rate of 10,000 rubles for each child. And payments to a full family for the maintenance of a minor child will amount to 4,000 rubles. Also, pregnant women can apply for social assistance (10,000 rubles – a one-time payment for pregnancy, and another 20,000 – at the birth of a child).

Russia’s social support is especially important, since Kyiv has actually curtailed the payment of pensions and social benefits in the Mykolaiv and Zaporozhye regions. As of early August, up to 85 percent of local residents lost their jobs – able-bodied families do not have the full opportunity to support their elderly and children. In the Odessa region, 70 percent of the inhabitants have lost their jobs (although pensions are still paid there). So there was only one hope – for Russia.

Russia’s Newest Nuclear Submarine Joins Northern Fleet

“The ‘Belgorod’ special purpose submarine, carrier of the so-called doomsday Poseidon drones, will be in experimental operation with the Northern Fleet before later to serve in the Pacific Fleet.”


According to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia recently announced that its newest nuclear-capable research submarine, the Belgorod, will begin “experimental operation” with the Northern Fleet in Arctic waters.  Many of Russia’s research submarines begin their work with the Arctic portion of the Russian Navy’s specialized submarine and surface fleet designed for espionage, deep-sea rescue, and special operations.  However, according to the article, the Belgorod’s real mission is to carry up to six Poseidon autonomous nuclear-powered underwater attack drones.  The Belgorod is likely to join the Pacific Fleet as part of Russia’s nuclear triad when the Poseidon drone system is deployable.


Source:

Thomas Nilsen, “World’s longest nuclear submarine handed over to the ‘Russian Navy’,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian internet news service in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 8 July 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/climate-crisis/2021/06/looming-arctic-collapse-more-40-north-russian-buildings-are-starting-crumble

An official press release posted by the Sevmash submarine yard on 8 July says the “Belgorod” (K-239) is a “research submarine”.  In fact, the vessel is built to carry one of the craziest weapons of mass destruction mankind ever has seen:  The Poseidon is an autonomous, nuclear-powered underwater drone that can deliver its nuclear payloads from deep under water after crossing distances like the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean.

Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Nikolai Evmenov, stated: “… this is a significant day for us” as … advanced achievements of science and the latest construction technologies were applied….  “The submarine “Belgorod” opens up new opportunities for Russia in conducting various studies, allows conducting diverse scientific expeditions and rescue operations in the most remote areas of the World Ocean.”  … The statement also adds that the submarine can conduct search and rescue operations in deep waters as it carries autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles. There is no mention of the Poseidon drone weapon armament.

With the U.S. developing an anti-ballistic missile defense system, Russia started to develop a deep-diving response capability.  The Poseidon is a 24-meter-long torpedo-shaped vehicle with an estimated range of 10,000 km and can travel at speeds of 100 knots down to a maximum depth of 1,000 meters.  Powered by a small nuclear reactor, it could be armed with a megaton nuclear warhead.

The submarine likely carries six Poseidon drones.  The submarine also serves as a mother vessel for a deep-diving midget nuclear-powered submarine, like the infamous Losharik, a mini-submarine that got the world’s attention in July 2019 when its batteries caught fire and all 14 officers on board died. 

The “Belgorod” has an elongated hull of what was originally meant to be an Oscar-II class multi-purpose submarine, a sister vessel to the ill-fated “Kursk” submarine that sank in the Barents Sea during a naval exercise in August 2000.   The hull of the submarine was laid down in 1992, but only twenty years later, in 2012, the Defense Ministry decided to use the hull to construct this giant special purpose vessel.  With a hull elongated by 29 meters to 184-meters, the one-of-a-kind vessel is longer than the world’s largest submarine, the Soviet-built Typhoon-class. 

The “Belgorod” launched in April 2019, the “Belgorod” started sea trials in the White Sea last summer.  The Russian Navy has not announced where the “Belgorod” will be based for the period it will be in experimental operation with the Northern Fleet.  It could be Severodvinsk where the Poseidon drone development will be conducted or at Olenya Bay on the Kola Peninsula where the other special-purpose submarines of GUGI, Russia’s Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research, are based.  Indications are that the long-term assignment of the Belgorod will be with the Pacific Fleet.

Russia To Provide Belarus a Potential Nuclear Delivery Capability

Russian Air Force Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft.

Russian Air Force Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft.


Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with 9M723K5 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and Transloader of the Iskander-M.

Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with 9M723K5 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and Transloader of the Iskander-M.


“Lukashenko has asked Putin to help convert Belarusian military aircraft to carry nuclear warheads.”


“The strengthening of the “missile fist” of the Union State can deter the deployment of critical, but vulnerable stationary objects of NATO military infrastructure near the borders of both Belarus and Russia.”


The accompanying excerpted article from pro-Kremlin daily Izvestiya describes Russian plans to provide Belarus with the Iskander missile system.  Russia exports the Iskander-E limited capability export variant to Armenia and Algeria.  However, according to Izvestiya, due to changing “geopolitical realities,” Russia will provide Belarus with the same version of the Iskander that the Russian Armed Forces field.  In a related development, Russian government news service Interfax describes President Putin’s proposal to modernize Belarus’s aging fleet of Su-25 ground attack aircraft and President Lukashenko’s request to modify Belarussian aircraft so they may employ nuclear weapons.  In February, Belarus removed verbiage from the constitution regarding its status as a “nuclear-free zone.”  This prompted speculation that Russia may be planning to deploy nuclear weapons on Belarussian territory.  There have been no announcements from Moscow or Minsk on what, if any, arrangements they have made for such a contingency, but the announcement about the Iskander, which is capable of nuclear delivery, and Lukashenko’s request for nuclear delivery capable aircraft is notable.


Source:

Anton Lavrov, “Идите под ‘зонтик’ (Go Under the ‘Umbrella’),” Izvestiya (large circulation pro-Kremlin daily newspaper), 28 June 2022.  https://iz.ru/1356221/anton-lavrov/idite-pod-zontik

On June 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Iskander [missile systems] would be transferred to our closest.  According to him, Belarus will receive a variant with both ballistic and cruise missiles.

This means that we are talking about transferring to a partner in the Union State not a limited and simplified export version of the Iskander, but a full-fledged formidable system that is not inferior in capabilities to those that are in service with our country and are now being successfully used in a special operation in Ukraine.

Due to international agreements, the export Iskander-E is limited to a range of 280 km.  The deployment of such in Belarus would not bring a serious increase in NATO territory controlled by them compared to the Iskanders already in the Kaliningrad region…

Such a radical discrepancy in the capabilities of the export and “home” version has long encouraged the leadership of Belarus to strive to obtain the Russian version.  But the issue of its acquisition, as well as price, for various reasons, remained the subject of bargaining between Minsk and Moscow for years.  Dramatically changed geopolitical realities, it seems, will allow Alexander Lukashenko to get a variant in the “top configuration”.  It is clear that in the event of a real conflict, it will be possible to use it jointly with the Russian Federation and according to a single plan.

The strengthening of the “missile fist” of the Union State can deter the deployment of critical, but vulnerable stationary objects of NATO military infrastructure near the borders of both Belarus and Russia.  The Alliance will have to reckon with the prospect of receiving a highly accurate and irresistible retaliatory strike against them in the event of a military confrontation…

Iskander missiles have already been deployed in the Russian Kaliningrad region.  But their additional deployment in Belarus will give a significant increase in the reach zone, it will shift another 300 km to the south.

…the Kaliningrad bridgehead has serious shortcomings.  Its limited territory is completely visible from all sides by means of NATO reconnaissance, and the Iskander has limited maneuverability there. Issues of ammunition storage and protection are also not easy.  Belarus is much better protected from outside surveillance.  The complexes on its territory will have better survivability not only due to the air defense “umbrella”, but also due to their ability to maneuver around the country and even beyond its borders.  It is much more difficult to hunt for ground launchers in the wide open area of Belarus than the small area of Kaliningrad.  The experience of the special operation has shown that mobile long-range weapons systems are still a very difficult target to counter…

“Президент РФ предложил дооборудовать Су-25 для Белоруссии на российских заводах (President of the Russian Federation proposed to retrofit Belarussian Su-25s at Russian factories),” Interfax (Russian government news service), 25 June 2022.  https://www.interfax.ru/russia/847889

President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin proposed to retrofit the Su-25 aircraft in service with the Belarusian army in Russia.

“The Belarusian army is armed with a fairly large group of Su-25 aircraft.  They could be appropriately equipped and training of flight personnel could be started accordingly,” Putin said during Russian-Belarusian summit talks on Saturday.  “This modernization should be carried out at aircraft factories in Russia.  We will agree on how to do this,” he stressed.Meanwhile, Lukashenko has asked Putin to help convert Belarusian military aircraft to carry nuclear warheads.  He acknowledged that he was “very concerned about the training flights of US and NATO aircraft, which are preparing to carry nuclear warheads and nuclear charges.”… “It’s very stressful for us,” he said.


Image Information:

Image: Russian Air Force Su-25 Ground Attack Aircraft
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/MAKS-2007/i-kphcXRn/0/e220a607/X2/maks-2007-003-X2.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with 9M723K5 Short Range Ballistic Missiles and Transloader of the Iskander-M
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/ARMY-2016-Demonstration/i-bSmJnCF/0/ac0d8313/X2/Army2016demo-076-X2.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russia Revising Marine Doctrine To Use Civilian Ships for Military Purposes

“The country’s revised Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.”


According to an article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is revising its marine doctrine to easily integrate civilian ships for military tasks when necessary.  Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov noted that the revisions are necessary in the current “geopolitical and military-strategical world situation.”  Borisov blames the “hybrid war of the Collective West” for unprecedented actions against Russia and considers the Russian navy and an update to the marine doctrine as essential for Russia’s survival.

According to the revisions, the navy will include civilian ships and crews and provide functionality of maritime infrastructure in times of war.  As the article points out, the use of civilian ships during war is not unusual or unique to Russia, although Russia has a long history of calling civilian ships into military service when necessary.  The current revisions will make it easier for Russia’s navy to appropriate Russia’s civilian nuclear powered icebreakers, likely giving the Russian navy an advantage in Arctic waters.


Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Russia outlines militarization of fishing fleet and icebreakers,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian internet news service in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia, 24 May 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/05/russia-militarizes-its-fishing-fleet-and-icebreakers

The country’s revised Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.  “The revisions of the Marine Doctrine take into account changes in the geopolitical and military-strategical world situation,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov underlined in a meeting in the government Marine Board late May.  The update of the strategic planning document comes in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine and its unprecedented isolation in international affairs.

According to Borisov, the Navy is now becoming even more important for Russia.  “Considering the total hybrid war of the Collective West against our country, the unprecedented sanctions and the special operation in Ukraine, the strengthening of national security is relevant as never before,” the Deputy Prime Minister stated as he opened the meeting.  The body includes top government officials from several ministries and federal agencies, as well as military representatives.

According to the high-ranking government official with special responsibilities for the military-industrial complex, the new and updated document “to the full extent meets current challenges and threats.  It is aimed not on confrontation, but on enhanced national security in the area of maritime operations [and] a significantly reduced dependency on external influence and markets in all fields of maritime activities.”  Among the revisions highlighted in the updated doctrine is a higher level of engagement of civilian ships in military activities.  According to the government, several “principally new aspects of the doctrine concerns mobilization preparations and preparedness.  This will allow for the inclusion in the Navy of civilian ships and crews and provide functionality of maritime infrastructure in times of war.”

It is hardly a new phenomenon that civilian ships have a role in national security preparedness, as well as military conflicts, and Russia has a long experience in applying non-military ships for military purposes.  But the new federal document clearly prepares the ground for a more systematic approach.  Potentially, Russia can choose to apply a large number of trawlers and fishing vessels for military purposes.  Many of them are active in international waters, including along the Norwegian coast.  Russia can also choose to militarize its powerful nuclear-powered icebreakers, the vessels that autonomously are capably of breaking through the thickest sea-ice of the Arctic.  Ultimately, it could also designate a stronger military role to its research vessels. That could include also the brand new “Severny Polyus[RG1] ,” the ship that is designed for autonomous drifting in Arctic sea-ice for up to two years.

Russia’s current Marine Doctrine was adopted in 2017 and covers the period until 2030. The document highlights the need for a technological modernization of Russian ships and development of transport corridors like the Northern Sea Route.  According to Yuri Borisov, the Russian Navy will in the course of 2022 get a total of 20 new military ships, as well as five motorboats and 21 support vessels.


Russia Building Literal and Figurative Bridges to China

…The first road bridge was opened between Russia and China….”


Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western censure, the pro-Kremlin media has reassured its audience that Russia could not be isolated, and that the country would find other trading partners.  China is often cited as an example of an alternate, trustworthy trading partner with which Russia can expand commerce.  The first excerpt from the pro-business source Kommersant describes the recent construction of two bridges in the Far East that will link China and Russia and facilitate trade. 

According to the article this was “the first road bridge opened between Russia and China,” linking Blagoveshchensk (Russia) to Heihe (China) across the Amur River.  Construction began in 2016, and although it was completed two years ago, “the opening had to be postponed due to the pandemic.”  The article also points that back in April, “the first cross-border railway bridge across the Amur River from the Russian village of Nizhneleninskoye to China’s Tongjiang was opened.”  Citing a logistics’ expert, the article also reinforces the notion “that we [Russia] are experiencing a global drop in foreign trade volumes with the European Union, [so] we need any options for the delivery of goods from the Middle Kingdom in order to somehow compensate for the drop in import flows.”

The second article from the pro-Kremlin source National News Service describes additional economic measures intended to further strengthen Russia-China trade.  It cites a Russian economist who asserts that “China can increase the volume of trade and investment cooperation.  Secondly, it is necessary to develop cross-border cooperationelectronic commercescientific and technical cooperation.”  To increase trade opportunities, the expert recommends that it is necessary to move away from dollars in relations with China in the interbank sphere – to the ruble-yuan regime.”  The article concludes by quoting the Chinese Ambassador to Russia who recently said, “that the world is now at an important turning point, promising that the Russian-Chinese relationship will only get stronger regardless of changes in the international situation.”


Source:

Sabina Adleiba, “Россия и Китай навели мосты (Russia and China build bridges),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 10 June 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5405772

…The first road bridge was opened between Russia and China…. Russia and China signed an agreement on the construction of the bridge back in 2015, work on it began in 2016. For three years, it was erected in parallel from two banks. The facility was ready two and a half years ago, but the opening had to be postponed due to the pandemic.

…The new bridge is two-lane, its length is about a kilometer, plus access roads – 6 km in China, twice as much in Russia. It is expected that more than 600 trucks, about 160 buses and about 70 cars will be able to pass on the new road every day.

In addition, at the end of April, the first cross-border railway bridge from the village of Nizhneleninskoye to China’s Tongjiang was opened. It also passes over the Amur River.  The new route can significantly change this situation, Georgy Vlastopulo, director of Optimal Logistics, believes…. “Taking into account the fact that we are experiencing a global drop in foreign trade volumes with the European Union, we need any options for the delivery of goods from the Middle Kingdom in order to somehow compensate for the drop in import flows.”

Source: Evgenia Zheludkova, “Военные маневры и уход от доллара: Как Китай поддержит Россию в обход санкций (Military maneuvers and the withdrawal from the dollar: How China will support Russia bypassing sanctions),” National News Service (pro-Kremlin site), 3 June 2022. https://nsn.fm/policy/voennye-manevry-i-uhod-ot-dollara-kak-kitai-podderzhit-rossiu-v-obhod-sanktsii

…China will significantly help Russia in economic terms if it decides to switch to rubles and yuan, said Andrey Ostrovsky, head of the Center for Economic and Social Research of China at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences…

“It will be more difficult to provide proper economic support, but there are a number of areas in which cooperation can be further developed,” he added…. “Here, firstly, China can increase the volume of trade and investment cooperation. Secondly, it is necessary to develop cross-border cooperationelectronic commercescientific and technical cooperation, there are many points here…”

“The most important problem today is that it is necessary to move away from dollars in relations with China in the interbank sphere – to the ruble-yuan regime….”

…The day before, Chinese Ambassador to Moscow Zhang Hanhui said that “the world is now at an important turning point, promising that the Russian-Chinese relationship will only get stronger regardless of changes in the international situation.”

Russian Orthodox Church Strengthening Support for Ukraine Invasion

Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces.

Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces.


“…It is worth recalling that shortly before the start of the special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, Hilarion said: “I am personally afraid of war. And I think that we must do everything to ensure that there is no war, no big war, no small war, no world war, no local war.”


Given its close alignment with the Kremlin, it is not surprising that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has adopted a “you are either with us or against us” philosophy and has openly endorsed the so-called “special military operation” (SMO) in Ukraine.  (For additional background, see “Religious Blessing for the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine,” OE Watch, May 2022). The accompanying excerpt from the semi-independent Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta describes some recent changes in the ROC’s hierarchy and organization, which reflects its growing militancy.  The article begins by recounting the recent transfer of high-level ROC cleric Metropolitan Hilarion, who had spoken out against the conflict in Ukraine.  Drawing an analogy to the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, Hilarion reminded his flock about “Rasputin [who] was an ardent opponent of Russia’s entry into the war.  He warned the tsar that if Russia entered the war, it would threaten the whole country with catastrophic consequences.” 

The article also provides an update regarding Orthodox believers in Ukraine who, up until last month, pledged allegiance to the Russian patriarch.  They now have announced their intention to split from the ROC, which has caused consternation in Moscow.  In the past, the clerics of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy (UOC-MP) enjoyed some level of independence from the church leadership in Moscow, but they will now fall under the “direct canonical and administrative subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.”  The article also discusses the restoration “of protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy,” who will serve as the chief liaison between the ROC and the military.  In the past, “this chief military priest was equated with a general.” 

The growing proximity of the ROC and the military, according to the excerpt, “is not surprising.  After the start of the invasion of Ukraine, the patriarch visited the main military church in Kubinka several times and delivered sermons there on the importance of military service.”  These religious developments, whereby the ROC is losing influence in Ukraine, may provide additional incentives for the Kremlin to gain control over the entire country. 


Source:

Andrei Melnikov, “РПЦ переходит на военное положение (The Russian Orthodox Church moves into martial law),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent Russian media outlet), 7 June 2022.  https://www.ng.ru/faith/2022-06-07/1_8455_general.html

The synod of the Russian Orthodox Church at a meeting on Tuesday put an end to the ambiguous position of the church against the backdrop of a military special operation in Ukraine. No longer bound by obligations to its Ukrainian believers, the Moscow Patriarchate is bringing its own configuration into line with the limits of influence of the Russian state. The synodals made revolutionary decisions: they removed Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev), who was responsible for “pacifism” in the Russian Orthodox Church, from the post of chairman of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR), and at the same time strengthened the spiritual and patriotic component of church policy….

…It is worth recalling that shortly before the start of the special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, Hilarion said: “I am personally afraid of war. And I think that we must do everything to ensure that there is no war, no big war, no small war, no world war, no local war. There are a lot of forces that want to drag us into some kind of war, and they are not only outside our country, but also inside it. There are those who want to rattle weapons, who say: they say, we are invincible, invincible, we will repulse any enemy. In March, he suddenly began to justify Grigory Rasputin. “Rasputin was an ardent opponent of Russia’s entry into the war. And he warned the tsar that if Russia entered the war, it would threaten the whole country with catastrophic consequences….”

The rejection of soft church power was also reflected in other decisions of the Synod of June 7. The ROC responded in a peculiar way to the recent declaration of independence by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – mainly with the votes of those participants in the Council of the UOC on May 27, who are located on the territory of the country controlled by the Kyiv authorities. For a long time, starting from the Russian spring of 2014, the Moscow Patriarchate maintained demonstrative independence from the political situation and left the three eparchies of Crimea under the jurisdiction of the UOC.

In response to the appeals of His Grace Metropolitan Platon of Theodosius and Kerch, Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea, Bishop Alexy of Dzhankoy and Razdolnensky, proceeding from the need to maintain an effective canonical and administrative connection with the central church authorities for the successful flow of church life in the dioceses served by the aforementioned bishops, taking into account the practical the impossibility of regular communication of these dioceses with the Kievan Metropolia, to accept the Dzhankoy, Simferopol and Feodosiya eparchies into direct canonical and administrative subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, – says in synodal journals…. 

…Finally, the Synod, in a sense, turned history back: it restored the position of protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy, which had been abolished in 1918….  The chief military priest was equated with a general. ….

The attention of the Synod to the military theme is not surprising. After the start of the special operation in Ukraine, the patriarch visited the main military church in Kubinka several times and delivered sermons there on the importance of military service. It was these sermons that became the basis for calls for sanctions against the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, because he allegedly “blessed” the special operation in Ukraine. 


Image Information:

Image: Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Cathedral_of_the_Russian_Armed_Forces
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

Russia’s “Terminator” System in Ukraine To Inform Tactics

Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT).

Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT).

Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT).

Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT).


“In terms of firepower, according to experts, one “Terminator”, armed with cannons, rockets and machine guns, surpasses two motorized rifle platoons.”


The accompanying excerpted article from Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta  describes the capabilities of Russia’s Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT[RG1] ) and how it has been employed during Russia’s 2022 invasion of the Ukraine.  Also known as the ‘Terminator’ for its intent to destroy infantryman wielding antitank weapons, the BMPT concept has been in development since Soviet times.  Despite Russia’s reportedly successful use of the system during the Syrian campaign and the fact that a few foreign militaries (Kazakhstan and Algeria) have adopted it, there is currently only one BMPT company in the Russian Ground Forces.  According to the article, there is a debate about possibly rebranding the system by changing the name from ‘Tank Support Combat Vehicle’ to ‘Fire Support Combat Vehicle’ because the system can also support mounted and dismounted infantry formations.  The perceived success or failure of the BMPT in the Donbas will likely cause Russia to more widely field the BMPT, or abandon the program entirely.  If successful, the heavy combat conditions that BMPT is encountering will allow Russian tacticians and planners to determine the best tactics and force structure for the BMPTs integration with the Russian Ground Forces.


Source:

Sergey Ptichkin, “ВС РФ впервые применили в ходе спецоперации БМПТ ‘Терминатор’ (The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation used the BMPT ‘Terminator’ for the first time during the special operation),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official Russian government newspaper), 18 May 2022. https://rg.ru/2022/05/18/vs-rf-vpervye-primenili-v-hode-specoperacii-bmpt-terminator.html

…BMPTs, together with tank platoons, are involved in the destruction of Ukrainian positions, armored vehicles, and crews of anti-tank missile systems. It is also said that the participation of the BMPT in the course of the special operation will make it possible to finally form the tactics for the use of these vehicles and determine their place in the armored groups…

In terms of firepower, according to experts, one “Terminator”, armed with cannons, rockets and machine guns, surpasses two motorized rifle platoons.  Based on the Afghan experience, the first BMPT was developed, which received the name “Terminator” at the beginning of the 21st century. It was actively promoted by the head of the Main Armored Directorate, Colonel General Sergei Maev. But even his authority was not enough for the accelerated delivery of a machine to the troops, which really has no analogues in the world.

Perhaps the situation will now change, and the BMPT will go into mass production. By the way, an idea to slightly change the name of the system was put forward, to designate the “Terminators” as fire support combat vehicles.  Because the “Terminator” is capable of supporting not only tanks, but also infantry, especially those fighting in cities.

Here are just the main features and benefits of this machine. Since the BMPT was created on the basis of the T-72[RG1] , it has a tank’s armored protection — it is difficult to knock it out. It has optical, television and thermal imaging sites for observation and aiming. It sees at night as well as during the day…The BMPT is armed with two quick-firing 30 mm 2A42 cannons and four Ataka missiles. The 45-degree elevation angle of the missile armament and cannons makes it possible to conduct effective combat operations in mountainous terrain and in urban areas…


Image Information:

Image: Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT)
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/Rehearsal-in-Alabino-17-April-2019/i-chgNPrQ/0/5070c462/X2/Rehearsal17April2019-0071-X2.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT)
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/Rehearsal-in-Alabino-17-April-2019/i-MHbnq66/0/ce5af375/X2/Rehearsal17April2019-0072-X2.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russia Tests Palantin Electronic Warfare System in Ukraine

Palantin Electronic Warfare System.

Palantin Electronic Warfare System.


The accompanying excerpted article from Russia’s official government newspaper, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, describes some of the capabilities of the Palantin electronic warfare (EW) system and how it has been employed during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—the first reported use of the system in combat.  According to the article, its most important advantage “lies in the ability to combine the electronic warfare systems such as [of] the “Moskva”, “Zhitel,” and “Judoist” into a “single working network.”  The Russian military personnel featured in the article claim that the Palantin EW system “disables reconnaissance drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” and “jams cellular communication and Internet sources at Ukrainian command posts,” but other, more objective open sources have not confirmed how effective the system has proven on the Ukrainian battlefield.

The Russian Ground Forces have a three-tiered system for EW.  At the maneuver brigade and division level, each has an EW company that focuses on tactical tasks.  At the combined arms Army level, each has an EW battalion that focuses on operational-tactical tasks.  At the Military District level, each has an EW brigade that focuses on strategic-level tasks.  At the tactical level, the Borisoglebsk-2. EW system is the primary and latest EW system for maneuver brigade/division level EW companies, while the Palantin EW system is the primary and latest system for combined arms Army level EW battalions.


Source:

Yuri Gavrilov, “Видео: Как работает в боевой обстановке комплекс РЭБ “Палантин” (Video: How the Palantin electronic warfare system works in a combat situation),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official Russian government newspaper), 4 June 2022.  https://rb.gy/4fjl6

The Palantin electronic warfare system disables reconnaissance drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, jams cellular communication and Internet sources at Ukrainian command posts, without disturbing the civilian communications infrastructure…The electronic warfare system independently detects enemy drones, intercepts their control signal, and interferes with them. As a result, the UAV loses contact with the operator on the ground.

The commander of the jamming company, Sergei, says that the specialists of his unit have mastered modern radio-electronic equipment without any problems. “Palantin” is the newest system, it is extremely easy to operate and maintain. The electronic warfare system provides automatic detection and suppression of radio communication lines…

A few words about what the Palantin-K electronic warfare system consists of.  It is mounted on four-axle KamAZ vehicles, and is designed to suppress existing and future radio communication systems, as well as to conduct signals intelligence. The capabilities of the system make it possible to “dazzle” enemy electronic systems in the ultrashort-wave [very high frequency (VHF)] and short-wave [high frequency (HF)] bands.

In addition, the “Palantin” can interfere with navigation systems and disable an air defense radars or a command and control systems…this system can deprive the enemy of cellular and trunking communications. Its most important advantage lies in the ability to combine the electronic warfare systems such as the “Moskva”, “Zhitel” and “Judoist” into a single working network… Experts say that “Palantin” is 2-3 times superior to Russian EW systems of the previous generation and currently has no analogues in combat capabilities in any army of leading foreign states.


Image Information:

Image: Palantin Electronic Warfare System
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://rb.gy/4fjl6
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russian Media Source Blames United States for Russian “Brain Drain”

“Will the United States be able to weaken Russia by poaching its best specialists?”


An increasing number of Russians, often among the country’s best and brightest, have emigrated in recent years as the Kremlin’s domestic policies have become more repressive.  These self-exiled Russians believe they can better realize their potential in countries with a more transparent political system, better legal guarantees, and greater opportunities to exercise personal freedom.  This “brain drain” has become an even more acute problem for the Kremlin since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  According to the opposition media source Meduza, nearly 150,000 peoplehave emigrated from Russia since 24 February.  Rather than examining the domestic reasons for leaving Russia, some pro-Kremlin media blame the United States for this exodus.  Citing a recent Chinese article, the second excerpt from the semi-independentsite Nezavisimaya Gazeta claims that the United States has “created a brain drain trend using it as a tool to weaken Russia.”  According to the author, “Washington is trying to facilitate the transfer to the United States of the best Russian specialists with experience in semiconductors, space technology, cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, artificial intelligence, and other specialized scientific fields.”  Given this trend, the Kremlin may soon develop policies to restrict its most qualified citizens from leaving Russia.


Sources:

Kristina Safonova, “Сколько людей уехало из России из-за войны? (How many people left Russia because of the war?),” Meduza (opposition news source), 7 May 2022. https://meduza.io/feature/2022/05/07/skolko-lyudey-uehalo-iz-rossii-iz-za-voyny-oni-uzhe-nikogda-ne-vernutsya-mozhno-li-eto-schitat-ocherednoy-volnoy-emigratsii

Is it possible to estimate how many people left Russia after February 24?

Julia Florinskaya: I don’t have any estimates – neither accurate nor inaccurate. It’s more of an order of numbers. My order of numbers is about 150 thousand people.

Source: Tatyana Popova, “Организация «утечки мозгов» как новое глобальное оружие США (Organization of brain drain as a new global weapon of the United States),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent), 5 May 2022. https://www.ng.ru/world/2022-05-05/100_usa050522.html

Will the United States be able to weaken Russia by poaching its best specialists?

The United States of America intends to prevent the development of high technologies in Russia and in parallel to improve its economy, using special tactics, say the authors of the Chinese daily newspaper Global Times. …Washington is trying to facilitate the transfer to the United States of the best Russian specialists with experience in semiconductors, space technology, cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, artificial intelligence, space technology and other specialized scientific fields…. …According to the newspaper, the statement that the United States “wants to see Russia weakened” reveals the true intentions of the United States…. The US creates a brain drain trend using it as a tool to weaken Russia. The consequences of the mass exodus of specialists (scientists and engineers) from the country are obvious – this process undermines the foundation of national economic and military development. …However, it is clear that the US is determined to weaken Russia.