“Virtual War: The Qatar-UAE Battle of Narratives” by Lucas Winter (2020-05-28)

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Over the past decade, strategic competition between Qatar and the UAE has evolved into low-level information warfare. What began as disagreements on foreign policy in the wake of the Arab Spring has escalated into a conflict to shape and control information flows in cyberspace. Although not always visible, Qatari-Emirati competition has become a persistent feature of the regional Operational Environment (OE). Their competition in the cyber-information sphere is part of a broader competition for influence involving Turkey, Qatar and their allies, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and their allies, on the other.1 One of Qatar’s main contributions to the Turkish-led axis is the employment of Arabic-language media outlets to influence local and foreign perceptions of the OE. The adversarial Qatar-UAE relationship has more recently morphed into a nascent cyber conflict to control not only the narrative but also digital data and information. Hoping to become hubs of the new digital economy, both countries are investing in cybersecurity and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in ways that will enhance their capabilities to shaper perceptions of the OE.2 Their conflict will continue to be a dynamic factor shaping the regional OE, and its evolution highlights the changing character of information war.


“Russia’s “New” Military Theory: Updating Classical and Asymmetric Techniques” by Timothy Thomas (2020-04-01)

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A new understanding of warfare appears under development in Russia. Whether it is actually “new” is open for discussion, but ideas were advanced by Russia’s top leadership indicating that is the case. In June 2019 Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu stated that modern conflict requires new approaches and that developing a new theory of warfare is the main task of the Armed Forces. Shoygu offered that “conflicts of a new generation involve a combination of classical and asymmetrical methods of conducting armed combat, where hostilities are fleeting, and there is simply no time for correcting mistakes.”[1] He added that new reconnaissance assets, along with weapons based on hypersonic and laser energy technologies, are impacting the forms and methods of troop operations.


[1] No author or title provided, Interfax, 18 June 2019.


“Russian Information and Propaganda Activities” by Timothy Thomas (2020-04-31)

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Russia has long been captivated by the power of information as a weapon, most notably in a historical sense using propaganda to influence and persuade audiences. With the onset of the information age, the concept’s development and application increased dramatically. The power of information-technologies when applied to weaponry increased the latter’s capabilities due to increased reconnaissance and precision applications. The power of social media was used to influence populations both at home and abroad. Both developments fit perfectly into Russia’s information warfare concept, whose two aspects are information-technical and information-psychological capabilities. Information’s universality, covertness, variety of software and hardware forms and implementation, efficiency of use when choosing a time and place of employment, and, finally, cost effectiveness make it a formidable commodity when assessed as weaponry.