Category Archives: Perspectives

“The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense” by Les Grau and Charles Bartles (May 2021)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

In the practice and application of historical analysis, the Russian General Staff closely examines details of past conflicts – noting what they learned and even unlearned – to keep their military science and training forward-looking. Maneuver defense is one of those lessons. Russia’s strategic defense Russia and the Soviet Union fought successful major wars using strategic defense and withdrawal. Russia defeated Napoleon by initially conducting a strategic defense and multiple withdrawals, followed by decisive counterstrokes.1 Up to his invasion of Russia, Napoleon’s strategy proved superior to that of his enemies and his operations were primarily offensive. Napoleon was often successful in surrounding an enemy army or defeating it in one decisive battle and then occupying its capital city and taking charge of the country.2 Russia defeated Napoleon’s invasion by losing battles, yet maintaining and rebuilding its army throughout successive retreats. As the army retreated, the Russians set fire to their own crops and villages, leaving scorched earth behind. Napoleon seized Moscow, yet Russia still refused to surrender and soon flames consumed Moscow. Napoleon had reached his culminating point, and his supply lines stretched to breaking. Russia was fighting a strategy of “war of attrition,” whereas Napoleon was fighting a strategy of “destruction.”

“Russian Planning Visions for Large-Scale Warfare: “Planetary, Theater, and Territorial” Considerations” By Timothy Thomas (May 2021)

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Due primarily to geographic and threat variances, Russia’s military conducts geostrategic
planning differently from the United States. Russia is faced with a set of threats, real and
imagined, from several vectors across a huge expanse of territory with a rather small population, factors which the U.S. does not confront. This directly impacts the style of planning for the Russian military, as US and NATO planning models do not directly apply. Those seeking to understand Russia ignore these differences at their own peril.

This paper examines numerous aspects of Russia’s planning concepts that indicate how the
nation’s Defense Ministry has chosen to confront perceived Western and other territorial
challenges. U.S. planning is contrasted against Russian planning in some areas. For Russia,
primary planning concepts and organizations include the following:
* Theater of war (TV)
* Theater of military operations (TVD)
* Theater strategic operation
* Military districts
* Strategic region
* Strategic direction/axis
* Operational design
* Territorial defense forces.

After analyzing the Russian model, the conclusion reached is that Russia’s geostrategic planning for the initial period of war is underway and, if conflict erupts, the nation will be better prepared to gain the initiative than it has been in the past. Historically Russia has been caught unprepared for future conflicts, and President Vladimir Putin and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov want to bypass that potential fate.

“Russia’s Conduct of War: How and with What Assets” by Timothy Thomas (2021-04-13)

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In 2019, during a presentation at the Russian Academy of Military Science, General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov summarized his presentation on strategy with the following statement:

The main thing for military science today is the cutting-edge, continuous, goal-oriented research to determine the possible nature of military conflicts, develop a system of forms and methods of operation of both a military and nonmilitary nature, and determine trends for the development of weapons and military equipment systems.

“Russian Electronic, Information, Navigation, And Reconnaissance-Strike And -Fire Operations: Definitions And Use” by Timothy Thomas (2021-03-18)

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Russia has been investigating a host of strike and fire concepts for at least a few decades, with one of the first reconnaissance-strike discussions documented in 1984. The quotation above indicates that reconnaissance-strike is not the only strike means under consideration in Russia, and that the number has increased over the years. In terms of terminology and context, Russia’s strike and fire forms are different from those of other nations. The forms under discussion in Russia are radio-electronic-strikes (REU) and radio-electronic-fire strikes (REOU), information-strike and – fire operations (IUO for strike operations, no abbreviation offered for -fire operations), remotely controlled cyber operations (RCW, which appear to be part of information-strikes), navigation strikes, and reconnaissance-strike1 F2 and -fire complexes (RUK and ROK, respectively).

“The Chekinov-Bogdanov Commentaries Of 2010-2017: What Did They Teach Us About Russia’s New Way Of War?” by Timothy Thomas (2021-03-18)

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From 2010 to 2017 Russian Colonel (reserves) S. G. Chekinov and Lieutenant-General (retired) S. A. Bogdanov wrote 13 interesting articles in the journal Military Thought (nine of them are summarized below) that had a major impact on how Western analysts understood Russian military affairs and way of war. Though the authors have not written publicly since 2017, their impact continues to be felt as the West grapples with how to confront Russian activities across all domains. Asymmetric and indirect actions, the initial period of war, deterrence, military art, forecasting, strategy, new generation warfare, and other topics were discussed, ending with an article in 2017 discussing war in the 21st century. Numerous aspects of these themes remain under discussion in Russia.

“Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity v8” by Matthew Stein (2021-01-20)

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Since Central Asian states gained independence in 1991, new regional military and security alliances have been created (some of which are Russian-led), new military partnerships with non-NATO countries have been established, a number of joint military exercises have been conducted, dozens of high-profile incidents of violence and civil unrest have taken place, and military installations have been used by foreign militaries. While this activity gained attention, it has not been collectively compiled. A compilation of this activity can serve as a guide for current and future military and security involvement in Central Asia.

The first section of the compendium is organized alphabetically and includes entries on Central Asian military facilities and installations (bases, air fields, etc.), and military and security organizations past and present. The second section is also organized alphabetically and includes joint exercises of regional militaries and security forces (Note: the exercises are organized alphabetically by the title of exercise and then chronologically if the exercise was part of a series or conducted annually; the names of some exercises are transliterated from Russian, ex. Tsentr, Grom, Poisk, etc., and these are also listed alphabetically with names of the exercises in English; the untitled joint exercises are listed last and are organized chronologically). The third section is a list of Central Asian military and security structures and other (non-joint exercises) security cooperation activity organized by country. The fourth section is a list of major incidents of violence and civil unrest in Central Asia organized by country and then chronologically.

“A Survey of Russia Security Topics for 2020 and Just Beyond” by BG (Ret.) Peter B. Zwack (2020-10-15)

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Although US security concerns have recently focused to a large degree on China, it is Russia that is the unpredictable wildcard. The country has stumbled in more ways than one during the past several months. In March 2020, it overplayed its hand in a game of oil supply-price brinksmanship with Saudi Arabia. The ruble is under inflation pressure. And the Kremlin’s initial fumbling of the coronavirus outbreak only added to its impact. In late May, Russian state press reported that Moscow could face a 7.5 percent drop in GDP following the pandemic.1 One of the most telling signs of pressure on the Kremlin was the decision—no doubt a reluctant one—to postpone the grand 75th anniversary events linked to VE-Day on 9 May and reschedule a more modest celebration for 24 June. During this tumultuous period, a Levada poll saw a slide in President Vladimir Putin’s popularity to 59 percent, a six-year low.

“A Russian Military Framework for Understanding Influence in the Competition Period” by Tom Wilhelm (2020-10-05)

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To the U.S. Army, a competition period is described as actions over time that exploit the operational environment conditions in order to gain a position of advantage below the threshold of armed conflict. At the crux of competition is the ability to create a strategic and operational standoff to gain freedom of action in any domain. This is done through the integration of political and economic actions, unconventional and information warfare, and the actual or threatened employment of conventional forces. “Russia exploits the conditions of the operational environment to achieve its objectives by fracturing alliances, partnerships, and resolve, particularly through the effective use of information in undermining friendly will.” In various forms, this description of Russian influence is prolific throughout Western security analysis. The prevailing views often include the notion that much of Russian influence over events is planned and orchestrated. This is certainly true in many instances; however, identifying the wiring of Russian influence can be difficult as it can not only come from planned operations but also from standard geopolitical practice, spontaneous civic activities, and many other actions and events that contribute to achieving Russian objectives.

“People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition” by Kevin McCauley (2020-09-01)

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This monograph examines current People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army campaign doctrine, with a discussion of PLA theorists’ vision of the evolutionary development of warfare to provide context for current doctrine as well as potential future direction. The PLA develops doctrinal joint and service campaign scenarios for possible offensive and defensive operations. PLA campaigns represent the operational level of war between strategic operations and tactical combat. The PLA’s current focus on specific campaigns provides insight into Beijing’s perception of potential conflict scenarios. The campaign scenarios provide commanders and staff data on command and control, coordination, combat actions, support, and other critical campaign elements for specific operational environments. The description of each campaign’s operational environment and combat actions provides valuable support to operational planning and a context for staff and unit training for their specific operational mission. The Army campaigns are executed as components of a joint campaign, or as a primarily independent Army campaign with support from other services.

“Virtual War: The Qatar-UAE Battle of Narratives” by Lucas Winter (2020-05-28)

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Over the past decade, strategic competition between Qatar and the UAE has evolved into low-level information warfare. What began as disagreements on foreign policy in the wake of the Arab Spring has escalated into a conflict to shape and control information flows in cyberspace. Although not always visible, Qatari-Emirati competition has become a persistent feature of the regional Operational Environment (OE). Their competition in the cyber-information sphere is part of a broader competition for influence involving Turkey, Qatar and their allies, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and their allies, on the other.1 One of Qatar’s main contributions to the Turkish-led axis is the employment of Arabic-language media outlets to influence local and foreign perceptions of the OE. The adversarial Qatar-UAE relationship has more recently morphed into a nascent cyber conflict to control not only the narrative but also digital data and information. Hoping to become hubs of the new digital economy, both countries are investing in cybersecurity and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in ways that will enhance their capabilities to shaper perceptions of the OE.2 Their conflict will continue to be a dynamic factor shaping the regional OE, and its evolution highlights the changing character of information war.