Iran Spaceport To Open in 2025

The Iranian spaceport in Chabahar.


“The largest spaceport in West Asia is being built in Chabahar.”


Summary: Iran has announced that its third satellite launch facility and its second “spaceport” will become operational in Chabahar by February 2025.


The Iranian space industry is both a source of pride and a strategic asset. It is used to launch vehicles to carry satellites into space and has dual-use technology benifits that could also further Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile ambitions.[i] As per the excerpted article below, from BultanNews.com, a conservative Iranian website, Isa Zarepour, Iran’s Minister of Communications, recently announced that its new spaceport is more than half complete and will be ready to launch satellites by February 2025. This announcement reflects both an expansion of Iran’s space program, and potentially its missile program, and the growing strategic importance to the southern strategic port city of Chabahar.[ii]

Iranian authorities take great pride in satellite launches, even though they fail almost as frequently as they succeed.[iii] In 2008, Iran inaugurated its first spaceport, the Imam Khomeini Spaceport, in the northern city of Semnan, upgrading it significantly in 2017.[iv] Iran also launches satellites from the Shahroud Test Center in Dasht-e Kavir. The Ebrahim Raisi government-initiated work on the new spaceport alongside other efforts to develop the Indian Ocean port of Chabahar. The Chabahar spaceport augments Iran’s satellite launching capabilities but does not replace the spaceport in Semnan. Reports about Chabahar excerpted here and reported in conservative websites do not mention Semnan, but Iran’s original spaceport appears to remain operational. The number of satellites that Iran launches annually – six so far in 2024 – do not appear to justify the expense of a third facility, suggesting two other possibilities. First, Iran might seek to utilize its satellite launch industry to support other countries seeking to put satellites into space but suspicious or resistant to work through Western countries, Russia, or China. Second, Iran’s growing military investment in Chabahar facility might suggest the launch facility will contribute to the region’s growing military footprint.


Sources:

“زارع‌پور: پایگاه فضایی چابهار ۵۶ درصد پیشرفت داشته است”(Zarepour: Chabahar Space Base is 56 percent Complete),” BultanNews.com (an Iranian conservative website), 7 June 2024. https://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/847281

Yesterday [6 June 2024], during a video conference with Acting President Mohammad Mokhber and several ministers inaugurated three major projects in the fields of oil and gas industry, hydroelectricity, and communications in Sistan and Baluchestan province.

The communications project connected the 1,261st village with a population greater than 20 households, a 20 trillion rial [US$475 million] communication network. In the ceremony, Isa Zarepour, the minister of Communications and Information Technology, said, “The largest spaceport in West Asia is being built in Chabahar, and with the round-the-clock efforts of my colleagues, its first phase will be completed by the ‘decade of dawn’ [the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran on 1-11 February 1979].”Stating that 56 percent of the first phase of the project has been completed, Zarepour said, “The first launch from the Chabahar space port will take place this year.”


Notes:

[i] For discussion of the dual use nature of Iran’s satellite launch capability, see: Michael Rubin, “Zuljaneh: Iran’s New Solid-Fuel Rocket,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/368233/download

[ii] For previous discussions of Chabahar, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Announces Maritime Development Plan,” OE Watch, 01 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/irans-supreme-leader-announces-maritime-development-strategy/ and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Construction Begins on the Chabahar-Zahedan Railway,” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular- format/379863

[iii] For discussion of Iranian satellite launches, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran to Launch New Satellite by Year’s End,” OE Watch, August 2018, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/241432/download and Michael Rubin, “Iran: Preparing for Zafar III Satellite Launch,” OE Watch, July 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/284140/download

[iv] For discussion of the Semnan space port, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran: Launch Officially Opens Space Port,” OE Watch, September 2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/205061/download


Image Information:

Image: The Iranian spaceport in Chabahar
Source: https://newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1402/07/10/14020710092925717284705610.jpg
Attribution: Tasnimnews.com


Bahrain May Renew Ties With Iran Following Saudi Arabia’s Lead

“President’s deputy chief of staff of political affairs Mohammad Jamshidi,” ISNA, 7 June 2024.


“Bahrain directly sent this message that it wants to resume relations with Iran.”


Summary: Iran claims that Bahrain wants to restore ties with Tehran, following Saudi Arabia’s lead.


According to a state media interview with Mohammad Jamshidi, the Iranian president’s deputy chief of staff of political affairs, Bahrain “wants to resume relations with Iran.” The interview, reported by the Iranian Students’ News Agency on 7 June noted in May, Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who said Manama welcomed the recommencement of ties between the Persian Gulf neighbors.[i] A similar message was reportedly delivered during Al Khalifa’s visit to China during the same month.[ii]

If true, the resumption of Iran-Bahrain ties would end nearly a decade of separation. In 2016, Bahrain followed Saudi Arabia in ending ties with Iran after a mob stormed the Saudi missions in Tehran and Mashhad in response to the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. An example of the warming ties occurred when President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and their cohort died in a helicopter crash on 19 May, and Bahrain’s King Hamad gave his condolences to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[iii] The Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani also attended the state funeral.[iv]

For their parts, in March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia recommenced ties through a China-brokered deal which allowed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait to follow suit (both had downgraded ties due to the storming incident). Bahrain appears to be the next in line, which is noteworthy not only because it is home to the United States Fifth Fleet, but also because it normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords in 2020.[v]

Bahrain tends to follow Saudi Arabia’s thinking. With the ongoing Gaza war bringing strong criticism from the Arab streets of the region’s monarchies—Jordan, Bahrain, and the UAE—the revival of ties has the potential to keep the Persian Gulf calm (in the event of a regional escalation between Israel and Iran), and arguably balance out some of the angry sentiment towards Arab monarchies for their relations with Israel.


Sources:

“تمایل بحرین برای برقراری روابط سیاسی با ایران (Bahrain government’s desire to establish political relations with Iran),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA- semi-official news agency), 7 June 2024. http://www.isna.ir/xdRgjG

The president’s deputy chief of staff gave news of Bahrain’s desire to establish political relations with Iran. According to ISNA, Mohammad Jamshidi stated in part of a television interview: “Bahrain directly sent this message that it wants to resume relations with Iran, however, this request was made during a meeting with Russian officials.”


Notes:

[i] “King of Bahrain Says No Reason to Delay Normalizing Ties with Iran,” Asharq al-Awsat, 24 May 2024. https://english.aawsat.com/gulf/5023861-king-bahrain-says-no-reason-delay-normalizing-ties-iran

[ii] “Bahrain sent message through Russia to normalize ties with Iran: Official,” Al Jazeera, 7 June 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/7/bahrain-sent-message-through-russia-to-normalise-ties-with-iran-official

[iii] “President Sheikh Mohamed and other world leaders send condolences on death of Iran’s Raisi,” The National, 22 May 2024. https://thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2024/05/20/iran-president-raisi-condolences

[iv] “Assigned by HM King, Foreign Minister condoles with Iranian officials,” Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 May 2024. https://www.mofa.gov.bh/en/assigned-by-hm-king-foreign-minister-condoles-with-iranian-officials

[v] “The Abraham Accords,” US Department of State. https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/


Image Information:

Image: “President’s deputy chief of staff of political affairs Mohammad Jamshidi,” ISNA, 7 June 2024.
Source: http://www.isna.ir/xdRgjG
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


Iran Asserts the Strength of Its Air Defense Capabilities

“Brigadier General [Alireza] Sabahifard visiting the radar and missile positions in Tabriz,” IRIB (state media broadcaster), 11 June 2024.


“[Iran’s air defenses] have the capability to react promptly and momentously against any potential threats.”


Summary: Following Israel’s attack, Iranian Army Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard visited the northwest region to assess its air defense capabilities and has asserted that they remain very strong.


Following Israel’s recent attacks, Iranian authorities are seeking to reassert the capabilities of their air defense systems by making visits to various air defense zones in the country. On 19 April, Israel carried out a retaliatory strike in western Esfahan (Iran), which took out one of four Russian-made S-300 air defense radars.[i] The Israeli attack was in response to Tehran and its proxies launching more than 300 drones, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles, in response to the Israeli strike on the Iranian embassy compound in Syria in mid-April.[ii]

As per the first excerpted article from the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), during a visit to Iran’s northwest, Iranian Army Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard underscored the capabilities of Iran’s air defenses claiming it “has the capability to react promptly and momentously against any potential threats.” Sabahifard emphasized that “The Army’s air defense force has achieved significant and valuable accomplishments, especially in the areas of producing various types of drones and radars.” According to the second excerpted article by IRIB, Sabahifard said, “Radars, missiles, electronic warfare, and drone systems will be unveiled in the near future and integrated into the country’s air defense cycle.” These comments about the strength of the air defense systems are in line with other Iranian officials’ efforts to downplay the Israeli retaliation in Esfahan. They have claimed that the attacks were merely carried out by quadcopters or, as they described, “toy” drones. But as evident by Sabahifard’s comments, Tehran is trying to sell the notion that is air defense systems can withstand any threat. In the wake of the tit-for-tat with Israel, the Iranian military is reassessing its air defense capabilities and better preparing itself for the possibility of another attack.


Sources:

“پیشرفت‌های پدافند هوایی ایران شتابنده و جهشی است (Iran’s air defense system has developed exponentially),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 9 June 2024.

https://www.iribnews.ir/00HqxS

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Brigadier General [Alireza] Sabahifard stated on Sunday during a visit to the air defense northwest region of the country: “The army’s air defense force has achieved significant and valuable accomplishments, especially in the areas of producing various types of drones and radars. These achievements are very important and precious stones that are a source of pride for friends and a cause of concern for enemies”

The commander of the army’s air defense force emphasized that air defense is at the forefront of the country’s defense, stating: “This divine force with its various defense systems has the capability to react promptly and momentously against any potential threats…”

The commander of the army’s air defense force pointed out that though air defense is successful and anonymous has been established within the armed forces, he added: “Air defense is a manifestation of the power of Islamic Iran, which under the shadow of self-belief and self-confidence for Iran was able to reach important developments for Iran and Iranians to be proud of today…”

“رونمایی از انواع سامانه‌های راداری، موشکی، جنگالی و پهپادی در آینده نزدیک (Unveiling of various radar, missile, forestry and drone systems in the near future),” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (state broadcaster), 11 June 2024. https://www.iribnews.ir/00HrNy

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Brigadier General [Alireza] Sabahifard during his continued visit of the region’s air defense in the northwest of the country, evaluated the combat capability and operational readiness of the radar and missile positions of the “Shahid Nikandish” Tabriz group.

The commander of the Army’s Air Defense Force, referring to the effective role of air defense in improving the combat power of the armed forces, added: “Radars, missiles, electronic warfare, and drone systems will be unveiled in the near future and integrated into the country’s air defense cycle.”


Notes:

[i] Jon Gambrell, “Satellite photos suggest Iran air defense radar struck in Isfahan during apparent Israeli attack,” Associated Press, 22 April 2024. https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-s300-radar-hit-isfahan-attack-ce6719d3df8ebf5af08b035427ee215c

[ii] “Iran says Israel bombs its embassy in Syria, kills commanders,” Reuters, 1 April 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-bombs-iran-embassy-syria-iranian-commanders-among-dead-2024-04-01/; Matthew Mpoke Bigg, “What We Know About Iran’s Attack on Israel and What Happens Next,” New York Times, 14 April 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/14/world/middleeast/iran-israel-drones-attack.html


Image Information:

Image: “Brigadier General [Alireza] Sabahifard visiting the radar and missile positions in Tabriz,” IRIB (state media broadcaster), 11 June 2024.
Source: https://www.iribnews.ir/00HrNy
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


Kazakhstan Imposes New Language Requirements for Citizens

Statue of man and camels from Türkistan, Kazakistan.


“Knowledge of the language is necessary,” Interior Ministry spokesman Shyngys Alekeshev told reporters, adding that the new amendments were similar to those in countries like Germany, Canada and Turkey.”


Summary: Kazakhstan imposes stricter language requirements for naturalized citizens to reduce the role of Russia in Kazakhstani society.


Kazakhstan has made it stricter for noncitizens to become naturalized citizens by requiring applicants to pass a series of history and language tests. According to the excerpted article from state-run news outlet Kazinform, “ignorance of the state language… as well as the basics of the history and Constitution… can become grounds for refusal to admit citizenship.” The move is part of a broader push by the government to promote and preserve the Kazakh language and possibly distance itself from Russian influence. The move comes amid remarks made by Russian commentators and academics who have called into question the legitimacy and sovereignty of Kazakhstan as a country. It may be interpreted as a move to reduce the role of the Russian language in schools, business, and other aspects of Kazakhstani life. In January, a Russian historian, Mikhail Smolin, claimed on Russia’s state-owned television that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not exist as nations.[i] The charge drew widespread condemnation in the region.

The new language rules, under the leadership of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, are just one manifestation of Kazakstan’s pivot away from Russia toward other regional powers like China. Part of the Soviet legacy, particularly along its northern border with Russia, large portions of Kazakhstan’s population do not speak Kazakh. There are proposals underway to regulate the country’s media to require that a majority (55 percent) of all content on radio and television be broadcast in Kazakh by 2025. The widely heard phrase “Qazaqsha soyle” (Speak Kazakh) is now commonly heard on the street and has even emerged as an internet meme.

Tokayev has defined his “multi-vector” foreign policy as one of pragmatism defined by “national interests and strategic tasks.”[ii] Russian soft power and influence is arguably on the wane in Kazakhstan, whose youthful population – half of its population is under the age of 30 – did not grow up under the Soviet Union and have absorbed the “de-colonization” discourse ascendant among other countries in the Global South.[iii]


Sources:

“Ignorance of the state language at the elementary level can prevent admission to citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Ministry of Internal Affairs,” (Незнание госязыка на элементарном уровне может помешать в приеме в гражданство РК- МВД),” Kazinform (Kazakhstani state news agency) 20 May, 2024. https://www.inform.kz/ru/neznanie-gosyazika-na-elementarnom-urovne-mozhet-pomeshat-v-prieme-v-grazhdanstvo-rk-mvd-0aabd6

“Ignorance of the state language at the elementary level, as well as the basics of the history and Constitution of our country can become grounds for refusal to admit citizenship. The elementary level will be determined by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The purpose of the amendments is rapid adaptation and integration into society. Knowledge of the language is first of all necessary for the citizens themselves who want to obtain our citizenship in order to quickly join society and participate in the life of the state,” said Shyngys Alekeshev at a briefing in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

“To prevent dual citizenship, a new basis for registering the loss of citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan is being introduced. Citizenship of our country will be lost if the passports of another state are used after acquiring citizenship of Kazakhstan. Previously, it was planned to lose citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan only for the acquisition of citizenship of a foreign state,” added Shyngys Alekeshev.


Notes:

[i] “Russian historian Mikhail Smolin: ‘Uzbekistan did not exist at all before the revolution’,” Anhor.uz (online Uzbek newspaper), 23 January 2024. https://anhor.uz/news/there-were-no-uzbeks/

[ii] “President Tokayev: Kazakhstan Continues Constructive, Balanced Foreign Policy Considering National Interests,” The Astana Times (English-language weekly), 3 January 2024.

https://astanatimes.com/2024/01/president-tokayev-kazakhstan-continues-constructive-balanced-foreign-policy-considering-national-interests

[iii] In May 2022, months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not a single leader of Central Asia commemorated Victory Day in Moscow—a symbolic blow to the Kremlin and a demonstration of the region’s growing autonomy. See: Temur Umarov, “Kazakhstan is Breaking out of Russia’s Grip,” Foreign Policy, 22 September 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/16/kazakhstan-russia-ukraine-war/


Image Information:

Image: Statue of man and camels from Türkistan, Kazakistan
Source: Ekrem Osmanoglu, Unsplash, https://unsplash.c om/photos/statue-of-man-and-camels-during-daytime-2qbAZ7RGPNM
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License


Russia Demonstrating Power Projection Capabilities With Havana Port Call

An Admiral Gorshkov class frigate at sea was part of the five Russian warships that paid a port of call to Cuba in June 2024.


“Cuba is Russia’s most important partner in the Western Hemisphere from a purely geopolitical and geostrategic point of view.”


Summary: The Russian government has sent a flotilla of three warships and one nuclear-powered submarine to port in Havana, Cuba. Its stated intentions are both to punish Western countries for supporting Ukraine and to display its own power projection capabilities. 


Latin America holds an important place in Russia’s foreign and defense policy.[i] Most importantly, Latin America is a key battleground for pushing back against the United States’ operations in the European theater—specifically Ukraine.

According to the excerpted article in the Spanish daily El País, the recent port call of four Russian naval vessels in Havana, Cuba should be seen within this context. Prior to arriving in Cuba, the three surface warships and a nuclear-powered submarine participated in missile exercises in the Atlantic Ocean. While Russia’s Navy had been visiting the Caribbean more frequently in the past, COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have curtailed the number of these visits. El País also reports that once the Russian warships leave Cuba they will conduct exercises in the Caribbean before continuing onwards to Venezuela. The Cuban government was quick to point out that none of the vessels are nuclear armed. However, as reported in the second excerpted article by the Argentine outlet Infobae, Russians assured the media that the submarine carried hypersonic missiles. Furthermore, Infobae concluded that the timing of the visits was not mere coincidence: the visit came approximately one week after Russian President Vladimir Putin mused about placing weapons in countries close to the United States in response to  Washington’s support of Ukraine.

This development is significant because it reaffirms Russia’s close ties with Cuba and Venezuela and indicates that Russia continues to view Latin America as a central region in near-peer competition. It is also notable that regional responses to the visit have been muted. Few Latin American governments have said anything publicly—possibly a harbinger of broader Russian influence in keeping Latin American countries non-aligned on geopolitical issues.[ii]


Sources:

“Llega al puerto de La Habana una flotilla de buques de guerra rusos con un submarino nuclear (A flotilla of Russian warships arrives at the port of Havana with a nuclear submarine),” El País (a Spanish daily with excellent regional coverage), 12 June 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-06-12/llega-al-puerto-de-la-habana-una-flotilla-de-buques-de-guerra-rusos-con-un-submarino-nuclear.html

Until June 17, the ships will remain in Cuban waters…Before arriving in Havana, the Russian ships carried out exercises and maneuvers in the Atlantic. These are not the first naval maneuvers involving Cuba and Russia. In July the Russian Navy training ship Perekop spent several days in Havana. The frigate Almirante Gorshkov was there in 2019…Cuba is Russia’s most important partner in the Western Hemisphere from a purely geopolitical and geostrategic point of view and the meaning of this naval presence is not essentially different from the past: Russia wants to demonstrate that its navy is capable of crossing the oceans and reaching the coasts of Florida.

“Cuba profundiza su relación con Rusia: tres buques de guerra y un submarino llegarán a La Habana para ejercicios militares (Cuba deepens its relationship with Russia: three warships and a submarine will arrive in Havana for military exercises),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 6 June 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2024/06/06/cuba-profundiza-su-relacion-con-rusia-tres-buques-de-guerra-y-un-submarino-llegaran-a-la-habana-para-ejercicios-militares/  

Although the military maneuvers have been planned in advance, they follow the words of the President of Russia about possible retaliation due to Ukrainian attacks against Russian territory with Western weapons. The president mentioned the possibility of Moscow delivering military material to other countries to carry out ‘attacks against sensitive targets’ of Kyiv’s partners.


Notes:

[i] For more information on how Russia views Latin America, especially in the context of its war against Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “Two Years Later: LAC and Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 February 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/two-years-later-lac-and-russias-war-ukraine

[ii] To read more about Russia’s strategy and how Latin America has remained relatively silent on Russia’s recent activities, and especially its war in Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America has been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 February 27 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine


Image:

Image: An Admiral Gorshkov class frigate at sea was part of the five Russian warships that paid a port of call to Cuba in June 2024.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_frigate_Admiral_Gorshkov – /media/File:Admiral_Gorshkov_frigate_03.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0


Russian Drift Station Vital to Arctic Research Effort

Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station.


“Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea.”


Summary: Russia is using a large drift station called Severney Polyus (North Pole) in the Arctic to gather information.


The Arctic has always been important to Russia[i] and according to the excerpted article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is conducting Arctic research using a large drift station, the Severny Polyus, or North Pole.[ii] The Severney Polyus is a self-propelled platform vessel that houses 34 scientists, 15 laboratories, and crew on board and is designed to autonomously drift through Arctic sea ice for up to two years. According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources, Aleksandr Kozlov, the data collected from the Severney Polyus will form the basis for “understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.” The article notes that Russia’s new Marine Doctrine includes the use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes, including not only trawlers and icebreakers, but also platforms like the Severney Polyus. The deployment of the Severney Polyus to conduct Arctic research is yet another indication of Russia’s vision of the operational environment in the Arctic region, giving Russia a continued presence in the vital region.


Sources:

Atle Staalesen, “Russia says its North Pole platform is key to understanding climate change,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 23 May 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/05/russia-says-its-north-pole-platform-key-understanding-climate-change

Since it set out from St.Petersburg in early September 2022, the Severny Polyus (“North Pole”) has drifted more than 3,000 nautical miles through the sea-ice from the East Siberian Sea to the Greenland Sea. On board has been a crew of 16 and a research team of 34.  The ship in late April made it out of the ice north of Svalbard and in early May sailed southwards.  On the 10th of May it was located to the west of the Ice Fjord at Svalbard and shortly later made it to the waters north of the Bear Island. For unclear reasons, the vessel for several days stayed in the waters of the Bear Island before it proceeded towards Murmansk.

According to Russian Minister of Natural Resources Aleksandr Kozlov, the Severny Polyus offers Russia unique insights into the Arctic.  “With the start of the operations of the self-propelled and ice-protected platform Russia has gotten the possibility to undertake long-term scientific experiments on high latitudes,” Kozlov said in a comment delivered in connection with the arrival of the Severny Polyus in Murmansk.

“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology. The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route.”  Kozlov has been Minister of Natural Resources since 2000 and was reappointed in May 2024.  He has also been closely engaged in natural resource cooperation with several foreign countries, among them China and North Korea.

…In the course of the 20-month expedition, the geologists took a number of samples from the Arctic seabed.  The samples will be used as part of Russia’s efforts to expand its borders on the Arctic shelf, representatives of the expedition say.

The Severny Polyus is designed to be able to autonomously drift through Arctic sea-ice for up to two years.  On board are 15 labs where researchers can work year-round.  The ship is operated by Russia’s meteorological service Roshydromet…

The research platform has replaced Russia’s Arctic expeditions based on ice floes organized since the 1930s.  The quickly vanishing Arctic sea-ice made it increasingly hard to organize the expeditions and the last real ice station, the “North Pole-40”, was held in the winter of 2012.

Albeit built for research purposes, the Severny Polyus  could ultimately also be applied by the Russian military.  The country’s new Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.  That could include not only trawler and icebreakers, but also the Severniy Polus.“The researchers have access to 50 types of research work: from meteorology to geophysics, glaciology, seismology and aerology.  The data will form the basis for understanding of climate change and climate prognosis, development of climate adaptation measures, they are important for providing security to shipping on the Northern Sea Route” Kozlov explained….


Notes:

[i] Russia began exploring the Arctic in the 11th century.  Trans-Artic navigation continued into the 16th century during voyages to Spitzbergen-Gruman and Novaya Zemlya. In 1764-1776, Captain Chichagov attempted an expedition across the North Pole to the Pacific Ocean. Chichagov’s attempt failed, but much scientific knowledge on the Arctic waters were gained.

[ii] In 1902, Fritjof Nansen, a famous Norwegian Arctic explorer, proposed the idea of a scientific drifting ice station to chart the Arctic waters. In the 1930s, Soviet scientists conducted studies of the Arctic on drifting ships. In 1937, the Soviets built a drifting ice station, “North Pole 1,” on an Arctic ice floe supported by Soviet aviation, followed by “North Pole 2”and so on until “North Pole 40” was built. North Pole 40 had to be evacuated in 2013 as the ice floe was breaking up.


Image Information:

Image: Admiralty Shipyards in St Petersburg, Russia built the Severny Polyus drift station
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiralty_Shipyards – /media/File:Admiralty_Shipyard.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0


Russia Sees Need for Emphasized “React to Ambush” Training

Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.


“Counter-ambush actions in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.”


Summary: Russian military observers have called for more emphasis on “react to ambush” training, which they see as a current weakness.


While few units from any nation’s military can survive an ambush unscathed, an article in the Russian military journal Armeiskii sbornik highlights the need for additional emphasis on “react to ambush drills” in Russian military training programs. These recommendations reflect continuing training deficiencies in basic soldier tasks despite lessons learned in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Ukraine.

The article’s authors recommend adding a sixth task to Chapter 5 of the Russian combat manual “Actions in Armed Conflict, Part 3: Platoon, Squad, Tank.”[i] Titling the task “Educating Personnel on Counter-ambush Activities,” the authors first highlight the need to practice counter-ambush tactics more frequently in individual and collective training. The article further outlines in detail the steps in reacting to an ambush. To begin, commanders must identify likely ambush points and plan accordingly. These points will likely be main avenues of approach containing terrain restricting movement, funneling targets, alongside cover and concealment.

The training recommendations mirror U.S. Army battle drills. Near ambushes are defined by an enemy being within hand grenade range up to 35m. Those caught within the ambush must immediately return fire with all possible weapons, directing fire against enemy positions. Smoke and fragmentation grenades are used to further suppress adversaries and conceal Russian forces in the “fire zone,” enabling assaults on the ambusher’s positions. Russian forces outside the fire zone provide supporting fire. Far ambushes are those outside of 35m. Actions of troops within the fire zone are similar to those in the near-side ambush, except the elements outside the fire zone maneuver to attack the ambusher’s flanks or rear. Those in the fire zone adjust fire as necessary to avoid fratricide. The authors acknowledge the need to train these skills is due to obvious failures and losses in both the initial steps of the Ukrainian invasion in 2022 and the First Chechen War,[ii] both of which were consequences of lack of training. Similar issues also appear in accounts from the Soviet-Afghanistan War,[iii] where Russian forces failed to recognize likely ambush points and hesitated in reacting to ambushes, costing them in men and equipment. Reacting to ambush is the antithesis to the calculated, fires-heavy tactics frequently used by Russian forces and could be a challenge to the Russian largely conscripted ground force.


Sources:

A. Levchenko, “Засада – не приговор (The Ambush is not a Sentence),” Army Review (monthly Russian military periodical), Vol. 6, June 2024. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/publication/470

Pg. 30-31:The practice of military operations in recent military conflicts showed that any movement of a unit, be it large or small, not to mention single machines, is always associated with maximum risk of being attacked by the enemy from ambush. This was especially true for the first stage of the SVO in Ukraine. So, we need to talk about it, especially since counter-ambush training developments in combat training practice, in our opinion, is not given due importance.

…The word “ambush” has become something like an objective obstacle, “an irresistible force”. Meanwhile, in the overwhelming majority of the analyzed facts of being ambushed and the destruction of columns, commanders’ errors are visible in organizing and conducting a march. Although, according to all governing documents, the responsibility of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act when ambushed.

In our opinion, there is a need to add to Chapter 5 of the Manual for Training for Combined Armed Combat ‘Actions During Armed Conflict’ (Part 3 ‘Platoon, squad, tank’) one more point number 6, entitled ‘Personnel Training in counter-ambush action events.’”

Pg. 31: “The effectiveness of the actions of a unit marching through its territory and ambushed by enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups, directly depends on the degree of training of personnel to fight in data conditions. The response is usually heavy fire on ambush positions,

from all types of weapons, protection of the unit caught in the affected area, and setting up smokescreens and attacking enemy positions… To immediately attack ambush positions from the front, flank or rear, all personnel must be previously trained… Attacking the ambush’s flanks is preferable, as it is easier to organize contact… Responsibilities of the unit commander is to train officers and soldiers to act upon contact with an ambush even without his participation.”

Pg. 80: “Every officer, sergeant and soldiers are trained to act in two situations (regardless of

type of travel). First, the enemy opened fire from a grenade throwing distance (up to 35 m). In this case part of the unit is under strong, concentrated fire from the attackers. Without additional command, this part of the unit responds with maximum fire in the direction of the ambush, throws smoke and fragmentation grenades and attacks enemy positions. Those who are outside affected areas, open fire in the direction of the ambush positions, covering the attack.Second – the enemy opened fire from a distance exceeding the above distance (more than 35 m). Part of the unit that fell into the affected area lies down, puts up a smoke screen and returns fire in the direction of the ambush. The second part of the unit, which does not fall into the affected area, can and must attack the ambush positions from the flank or from rear by fire and maneuver.”


Notes:

[i] The other five tasks within Chapter 5 are “Common Actions (ex. conduct counterterrorism operations, maintain border integrity), Blocking (more similar in definition to the US Army ‘isolating’ tactical task), Searching and Reconnaissance, Serving in a Checkpoint, and Convoys.”

[ii]  For case studies on Chechen ambush tactics during the first and second Chechen wars, see; Dodge Billingsley, “Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian Chechen Wars 1994-2009,” Foreign Military Studies Office and United States Marine Corp’s Studies and Analysis Division. 2012. 

[iii] These include “The Other Side of the Mountain” by LTC(R) Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali which provide insights on mujahadin activities against Soviet and Afghan government forces during the Soviet-Afghan War. Vignettes 1-16, particularly Vignettes 6 and 16, detail mujahadin ambush tactics and Soviet responses. Chapter 5 of “The Bear Went over the Mountain” by LTC(R) Grau discusses from the Soviet perspective reactions to ambushes.


Image Information:

Image: Reacting to Ambushes Inside and Outside of 35m, Illustrated. Fig. 1 – 2x BTR Platoons travel along a road; 100m spacing is maintained. Fig. 2 – An enemy initiates an ambush on the rear of the formation. Fig 3 – Within 35m, those in the fire zone immediately return fire and deploy smoke and fragmentation grenades; front and rear elements provide covering fire, allowing those in the fire zone to assault the ambushers position. Fig. 4 – Outside of 35m, those in the fire zone return fire and deploy smoke; the front or rear element assaults a flank or the rear of the ambusher’s position while the other provides covering fire.
Source: Andrew Fisher
Attribution: Author grants permission to use


Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service

Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.


“The unit [GROM “Kaskad”] is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war.”


Summary: Russia volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, provide Russia additional avenues of generating combat power.


Russia’s volunteer formations, such as the GROM Kaskad unmanned aircraft brigade, are increasingly providing Russia with additional avenues of generating combat power during its war in Ukraine. However, the ways that such formations are portrayed and understood in Russia and Ukraine vary significantly.

The first accompanying article excerpted from the website of United Russia (Putin’s political party), extols the values of the GROM “Kaskad”unmanned aircraft brigade and features information about a memorial (monument) to its servicemen.[i] GROM “Kaskad” has its roots in October 2022, when Dmitrii Sablin (a retired Colonel, prominent businessman, ‘United Russia’ party member, and Duma deputy) signed a contract with the Russian Armed Forces and created the BARS “Kaskad” UAV unit, a volunteer formation.[ii] In October 2023, the unit was upgraded to a brigade and subordinated to the Russian Aerospace Forces. By March 2024, GROM “Kaskad” reportedly consisted of two reconnaissance-strike UAV battalions, two reconnaissance-strike UAV squadrons, and supporting units—in total, 54 UAV crews, with 10 different types of UAVs. GROM “Kaskad” crews have reportedly destroyed over 7,000 targets and flown 18,000 combat missions.

The second accompanying article excerpted from the pro-Ukrainian Center of Journalistic Investigations, gives a more negative take on GROM “Kaskad,” purporting that the brigade “is for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line.” Although GROM “Kaskad” almost certainly has a lower casualty rate than Russia’s assault detachments, both Ukrainian and Russian UAV operators are often targeted, and are very much “on the front line.” Service in GROM “Kaskad” is likely far safer than other forms of Russia service in Ukraine, but the likely real benefit is that GROM “Kaskad,” and other volunteer formations offer fixed contracts for terms of service that cannot be involuntarily extended or “stop lossed,” unlike contract servicemen, including the involuntarily mobilized, with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

GROM “Kaskad” and other such volunteer formations are showing the innovative ways that Russia is creating and projecting combat power. Aggressive contract service recruitment and partial mobilization have filled Russian ranks showing that centrally managed, top-down control is still needed. But volunteer formations also appear to be important, as they offer more flexibility and provide a more palatable form of service for elites and those with vital technical skills that might otherwise shirk from military service.


Sources:

Alexey Mikhailov, Roman Kretsul, and Vladimir Matveev, “В Москве открыт мемориал бойцам бригады беспилотной авиации ГРОМ «Каскад» (A memorial to the fighters of the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aircraft brigade has been opened in Moscow),” Yedinaya Rossiya (website of the ‘United Russia’ political party), 31 May 2024.

https://er.ru/activity/news/v-moskve-otkryt-memorial-bojcam-brigady-bespilotnoj-aviacii-grom-kaskad

In Moscow, on the territory of the central headquarters of the “Combat Brotherhood”, a military memorial was opened to the “Stuntmen” – fallen and alive.” It is dedicated to the fighters of the separate GROM “Kaskad” [ГРОМ «Каскад»] unmanned aircraft brigade. The idea of opening the monument was proposed by a colonel, State Duma deputy from United Russia, first brigade commander Dmitry Sablin.

“This monument is not just a perpetuation of the memory of heroes, it is a memorial of true love for one’s Motherland, dedication, and courage. The BARS “Kaskad” detachment, today the GROM “Kaskad” brigade, is first and foremost a symbol of volunteerism. Not only for people with military experience, but also people of civilian professionals.  And, most importantly, those who did not have the obligation to do this by order,” said the First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko, who took part in the opening ceremony of the memorial.

He noted that Kaskad had seven thousand destroyed targets, behind which stood thousands of saved lives of Russian military personnel and civilians.  “Thank you very much, guys, you are an example of colossal courage and real heroism for us,” said Sergei Kiriyenko…

In turn, Dmitry Sablin noted that the “stuntmen” conducted more than 18 thousand combat missions.  “I want to say words of gratitude to all military personnel, volunteers, who are currently serving in the brigade, and who served in it. Thank you for your courage and fearlessness. We will always remember the fallen and continue our work. Our motto: a “stuntman” is someone who can do what others won’t do. And may this always accompany you in life. Victory will be ours!” – he said…

On October 1, 2023, the GROM “Kaskad” unmanned aviation brigade was created as part of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the commander of which was Colonel, State Duma deputy Dmitry Sablin. The GROM “Kaskad” brigade has at its disposal all currently available UAVs in service with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The unit’s crews are concentrated along the entire front line and destroy enemy equipment, including Western equipment. Many GROM “Kaskad” fighters were awarded state awards, some of them posthumously.

Valentyna Samar and Vladyslav Marchenko “«GROM Kaskad». Who Fights against Ukraine in the First Russian Drone Brigade,” Center of Journalistic Investigations (Pro-Ukrainian website), 18 May 2024. https://investigator.org.ua/en/investigations/266753/

In December 2022, Vladimir Putin awarded Dmitrii Sablin as commander of BARS «Kaskad» with the Order of Courage. The first official report about «Kaskad» by the Russian Ministry of Defence appeared on March 22, 2024, i.e. half a year after its creation. Minister Sergei Shoigu sent greeting telegrams to five Russian military units for their achievements in so-called «special military operation».[i]

Russian telegram channel «ВЧК-ОГПУ» treats BARS «Kaskad» as the unit for Russian parliamentarians who would like to receive «the status of participant of special military operation». The unit is «for parliamentarians and children of public officials who would like to participate in the war but far away from the front line. It is easier to send other children to the war».

«Kaskad» is full of politicians and high rank officials. Besides Sablin, five members of the Russian State Dume voluntary joined «Kaskad»: Yevgenii Pervyshov, Oleg Golikov, Sergei Sokol, Dmitrii Khubezov and Oleg Kolesnikov. There are also members of legislative assemblies of Russian regions, two «parliamentarians of «Donetsk People’s Republic» and a lot of public officials.

Some of them have served minimum term of three months. Other people served several terms. Many politicians made short visits to «Kaskad». It is interesting that Russian media «The Insider» found that commander of «Kaskad» Dmitrii Sablin relaxed in Turkish resort areas.Major Oleg Alekseevich Kolesnikov is the commander of the 2nd reconnaissance attack battalion of brigade «GROM «Kaskad». He is the member of the Russian State Duma (for the fourth time in a row) and millionaire from Chelyabinsk region of Russia…


[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.


Notes:

[i] (ГРОМ «Каскад»): The term “Kaskad” is likely in reference to the KGB’s “Kaskad” special operations task force in Afghanistan. “Grom” is the Russian word for thunder, but the term is likely used in reference to the well-regarded General Boris Gromov, the commander of the Soviet 40th Army.  General Gromov was the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan.

[ii] The Special Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Специальный (БАРС)], in some sources the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS) [Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны (БАРС)] began as an operational reserve program of record for the Russian Armed Forces around 2021.  Since the start of the special military operation, many of Russia’s newly formed units are designated as “BARS” formations.


Image Information:

Image: Former army colonel and current commander of GROM Kaskad, Dmitrii Sablin.
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Саблин,_Дмитрий_Вадимович#/media/Файл:Дмитрий_Саблин_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: Aleksey Klimov, CC BY-SA 4.0


Taiwan President’s Inaugural Speech Prompts Chinese Military Drills

A schematic representation of Joint Sword-2024A exercises.


“Lai-style Taiwan independence” will only exacerbate the confrontation and instability across the Straits, inevitably leading to self-overestimation and self-destruction.


Summary: The inauguration of Taiwan’s new pro-independence president prompted Chinese outrage, leading Beijing to conduct large-scale military exercises which represented a “powerful punishment for the separatist forces seeking ‘independence.


During his inaugural speech on 20 May, Taiwan’s eighth president, Lai Ching-te, reaffirmed that Taiwan is a “sovereign, independent nation” and not subordinate to the People’s Republic of China, infuriating Beijing. The first article excerpt, published by Chinese Communist Party flagship newspaper Global Times, blasted Lai’s speech, calling it “a declaration of harm to Taiwan,” and “extremely dangerous.” It warned that China “will inevitably be unified… regardless of changes in the situation on the island or who holds power.”

Three days after Lai’s speech, China’s Eastern Theater Command[i] launched “Joint Sword-2024A,” a series of military exercises surrounding Taiwan and its outer island territories. The second article excerpt, from the Communist Youth League of China’s official newspaper Beijing Youth Daily, describes the exercise as a “powerful punishment for separatist forces seeking ‘independence,’” and a serious warning to external forces against “interfering and provoking” Taiwan. The article noted that “Joint Sword-2024A” focused on joint sea and air combat readiness patrols, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision attacks on key targets surrounding Taiwan as well as around the four outlying islands. The goals of the exercise varied. Operations south of Taiwan were to strike a heavy blow to the Tainan region[ii] politically and economically: they aimed to attack Taiwan’s largest port and navy base, Kaohsiung Port, and designed to impact Taiwan’s foreign trade. Operations east of Taiwan were intended to block the country’s lifeline to energy imports, an escape route for “Taiwan independence” forces, and a support line for the United States and its allies attempting to provide assistance. At the same time, the Fujian Coast Guard conducted a comprehensive law enforcement exercise to test their joint patrol, rapid response, and emergency handling capabilities around Taiwan-controlled Wuqiu and Dongyin islands, each located within 10 nautical miles of mainland China. These islands are the main transportation routes to the Taiwan Strait and the “most advanced outposts of Taiwan Strait defense operations.” The goal of these exercises was to constrain Taiwan’s military operational capacity. While not the first time Taiwan’s actions have prompted China to launch aggressive military exercises,[iii] according to Beijing Youth Daily, this is the first time the Eastern Theater Command (publicly) mentioned the mission of “Jointly seizing comprehensive control of the battlefield.”


Sources:

“‘Lai-Style Taiwan Independence’ Agenda is a Dead-End: Global Times Editorial,” Global Times, 21 May 2024. https://tinyurl.com/259ntad3

On May 20, Lai Ching-te assumed the role of Taiwan region’s new leader and delivered his inaugural speech. Lai shamelessly stated in his speech that “the Republic of China Taiwan is a sovereign, independent nation” and “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” spewing various “Taiwan independence” fallacies and hostile provocations against the Chinese mainland, once again exposing his stubborn nature as “a worker for Taiwan independence.” This speech can be described as a blatant “Taiwan independence manifesto” and “a declaration of harm to Taiwan.” It is extremely dangerous, and the Taiwan compatriots should be particularly vigilant and united in opposition.

“Lai-style Taiwan independence” will only exacerbate the confrontation and instability across the Straits, inevitably leading to self-overestimation and self-destruction.

“东部战区位台岛周边演习,三个罕见表述透露重要信号!(The Eastern Theater Command Conducts Exercises Around Taiwan; Three Rare Statements Revealed Important Signals),” Beijing Youth Daily (Official newspaper of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Youth League of China), 23 May 2024.
https://tinyurl.com/t8c4rsfa

On May 23, Li Xi, a Navy colonel and spokesperson for the Eastern Theater Command, disclosed:

From May 23 to 24, the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army of China organized the theater army, navy, air force, rocket force and other forces to carry out the “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise around Taiwan Island, focusing on joint sea and air combat readiness patrols, joint seizure of comprehensive battlefield control, and joint precision attacks on key targets. Ships and aircraft approached the periphery of Taiwan Island for combat patrols… This is also a powerful punishment for the separatist forces seeking “independence” and a serious warning to external forces for interference and provocation.

On May 23, the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army continued to carry out training in subjects such as sea assault, land strike, air defense and anti-submarine in the sea and air areas north and south of Taiwan Island, to test the theater troops’ actual combat capabilities in multi-domain coordination and joint strike.

On the same day, Gan Yu, spokesperson for the China Coast Guard, disclosed:… the Fujian Coast Guard organized a fleet of ships to conduct a comprehensive law enforcement exercise in the waters near Wuqiu Island and Dongyin Island to test its joint patrol, rapid response and emergency handling capabilities.

This exercise reflects the integrated design of Taiwan’s main island and outlying islands.

The outer islands cover Kinmen, Matsu Island, Wuqiu Island, and Dongyin Island…

In addition, Zhang Chi from the National Defense University also explained in an interview with CCTV that Wuqiu Island and Dongyin Island are outlying islands of Taiwan Province. Their geographical location is very important. They are the main transportation routes to the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan military regards them as the most advanced outposts of the Taiwan Strait defense operations. ……In recent years, it has become normal practice for the Eastern Theater Command to organize military forces to conduct exercises around Taiwan Island. However, Zhengzhijun sorted out previous public reports and found that several new statements appeared in the Eastern Theater Command’s announcement. Regarding the key exercise subjects, the Eastern Theater Command’s report mentioned for the first time “Jointly seize comprehensive control of the battlefield”… In addition, CCTV News reports on the specific subjects of the first day of the exercise, which was rare as they mentioned “intelligence” many times…


Notes:

[i] China has five theater commands. The Eastern Theater Command is responsible for Taiwan and the East China Sea. For more information on the Eastern Theater Command, see “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021,” Annual Report to Congress: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2021, p. 98. https://tinyurl.com/jdredmwb

[ii] The article refers to Tainan as “The political base of Taiwan Independence.”

[iii] Previously China launched two separate rounds of exercises around Taiwan. First after former U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan and again after former Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen visited former U.S. Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy in April 2023.


Image Information:

Image: A schematic representation of Joint Sword-2024A exercises
Source: Data derived from https://tinyurl.com/yc55e7wd
Attribution: Cindy Hurst


China Creating Undersea Cable Network in Response to United States Isolation Efforts

Close up section of historical map showing Islands under Taiwan’s control including the Matsu Islands (upper left), the location of a severed undersea cable in early 2023. Taiwan suspected China of cutting the cable as part of its hybrid war against Taiwan.


“The U.S.’s undersea network is its tool to keep its hegemony,” said Wu, the FiberHome executive.


Summary: China will create its own independent network of undersea cables to assert its independence as the United States seeks to isolate China from the current global network.


A battle has recently been playing out between China and the United States in a bid to secure information, particularly in regard to the role of undersea cable networks. According to the excerpted article from the Japan-based Nikkei Asia news agency, Beijing is working around U.S. efforts to isolate China from the global undersea cable network, which carries 95% of the world’s data.[i] According to the article, China is striking deals and building its own network of cables with regional neighbors, recognizing the U.S. is using its political power to pressure the mostly U.S.-based data companies that develop the undersea cable network, to exclude China from access to future undersea cables. A Chinese executive interviewed by Nikkei Asia asserted that “we don’t care about the U.S. blacklisting” and claimed that the United States’ undersea network is its “tool to keep its [U.S.] hegemony.” He concluded that the undersea cable race is really a diplomatic one, noting that China only needs other governments’ consent to link with China. As per the article, there are least three major China-led projects under construction in the Asia-Pacific region, linking China and Hong Kong to multiple Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Part of China’s ability to develop its own undersea cable network in the region is that they do not require any new or emerging technology. China currently has all the necessary fiber optic technology necessary to lay its own cables and maintain its own network. That ability is one reason the U.S. sees the global undersea cable network as vulnerable to both sabotage[ii] and eavesdropping by China. Last February, Taiwan suspected Chinese vessels of cutting two undersea cables linking Taiwan to its Matsu Islands.[iii] In response, in October, Taiwan announced it was working to back up its communications network to protect itself in the event of a cross-strait conflict.[iv] It is likely that as tensions continue in the region  two independent networks of undersea cables will emerge and require the necessary security attention by each side to ensure against compromise.


Sources:

Cheng Ting-Fang, Lauly Li, Tsubasa Suruga and Shunsuke Tabeta, “China’s undersea cable drive defies U.S. sanctions,” Nikkei Asia (Japanese global and regional business news source), 26 June 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/China-s-undersea-cable-drive-defies-U.S.-sanctions?utm_campaign=IC_editor_in_chief_picks_free&utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_link&del_type=2&pub_date=20240628153000&seq_num=9&si=91811959-21c4-44f4-9028-13136a8d0104

Stretching 1.4 million kilometers – long enough to wrap around the Earth more than thirty times – the world’s undersea cable network is the backbone of global communications. These cables lie hundreds or even thousands of meters below the waves, carry over 95% of the world’s data and cost billions of dollars each to install. Using companies like FiberHome, China is determined to break America’s grip on the industry.

The U.S. and a handful of its allies have dominated the undersea cable market for decades, and Washington is pushing hard for “clean” communications networks free of Chinese involvement, citing national security risks. But the quiet rise of companies like FiberHome underscores how hard it is for the U.S. to contain China’s progress in an industry that it has become proficient in.

Unlike cutting-edge semiconductors, where U.S. export controls on production tools have set China’s chip industry back by years, experts agree with Wu’s assessment: China has no need for foreign technology in fiber-optic cables. Instead, success in this industry has come to rely more on state-level diplomatic ties, with politics largely determining who has access to crucial markets and who does not.

“The U.S.’s undersea network is its tool to keep its hegemony,” said Wu, the FiberHome executive. “The subsea cable industry is like a membership club, we all need other governments’ consent to link with their countries. … This is a diplomatic race.”

Arguably the most important market is in China’s own backyard. The Asia-Pacific region is the global leader in subsea cable investment, recording more projected spending from 2024 to 2026 than anywhere else in the world, according to data from Washington-based research company TeleGeography. At least three major China-led projects are under construction in the Asia-Pacific region, linking China and Hong Kong with multiple Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.


Notes:

[i] For more information, see: Dodge Billingsley, “Limiting China to Undersea Data Cable Network Threatens To Be a Flashpoint,” OE Watch, 06-2024. (URL when available)

[ii] U.S. officials have warned about potential national-security risks from SBSS, a Chinese undersea cable maintenance company that helps repair broken internet lines, see: “U.S. Fears Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Espionage From Chinese Repair Ships,” Wall Street Journal, 19 May 2024. https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-internet-cables-repair-ships-93fd6320

[iii] The Matsu Islands, officially Lienchiang County, are an archipelago of 36 islands and islets in the East China Sea governed by the Republic of China (Taiwan), situated alongside the southeastern coast of mainland China. In early 2023, an undersea cable linking Taiwan to its Matsu Islands was cut effectively disrupting internet connectivity to the Matsu Islands’ 14,000 residents. A Chinese freighter and fishing vessel were suspected of cutting the cable but Taiwan made no formal protest. See: Joe Brock, “U.S. and China wage war beneath the waves – over internet cables,” Reuters, 24 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/us-china-tech-cables/

[iv] See, Lawrence Chung, “Taiwan ramps up backup satellite network plans in island defence strategy.” South China Morning Post, 7 October 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3237034/taiwan-ramps-backup-satellite-network-plans-island-defence-strategy


Image Information:

Image: Close up section of historical map showing Islands under Taiwan’s control including the Matsu Islands (upper left), the location of a severed undersea cable in early 2023. Taiwan suspected China of cutting the cable as part of its hybrid war against Taiwan.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matsu_Islands – /media/File:Nationalist_China_-_administrative_divisons._LOC_2007633622.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain