Russia Continues To Adapt Training, Incorporating Lessons From Ukraine

Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.


“The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.”


The accompanying excerpted article from the major Russian daily newspaper Izvestia, discusses how Russia continues to change soldier training based on lessons learned from its special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestiya article, the changing character of war necessitates combining both traditional combined arms warfare tactics with new skills to achieve success in modern warfare. In addition, many Russian forces in the security services, including the Ministry of Defense, and private military organizations are fighting as assault detachments/companies/groups, a method of organization that was widely practiced during the Second World War and abandoned as the Soviets/Russians fielded a fully mechanized force during the Cold War. Therefore, Russia is now using a combination of Second World War, Soviet-era combined arms, and emerging tactics from its combat experience in Ukraineto train its force. Specifically, Russia has regained its dismounted infantry culture, a marked change from the start of the war in 2022, when Russia suffered an inordinate number of casualties among troops riding to battle within their armored vehicles.[ii]


Sources:

Dmitry Astrakhan, “«Нет понятия идеального штурма, каждая операция планируется индивидуально»: Как новобранцы учатся навыкам ближнего боя на полигоне в ДНР (‘There is no such thing as an ideal assault; each operation is planned individually’: How recruits learn close combat skills at a training ground in the Donetsk People’s Republic),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 3 October 2024. https://iz.ru/1768527/dmitrii-astrakhan/net-poniatiia-idealnogo-shturma-kazhdaia-operatciia-planiruetsia-individualno

The experience of the special military operation has a significant impact on combat training. Now volunteer assault troops practice close combat in confined spaces of trenches and buildings, approaching strongpoints, clearing, evacuating the wounded and many other specific exercises. Izvestia visited at one of the training grounds and learned how recruits practice vital skills under the guidance of instructors with combat experience.

[T]raining takes place every day. On one day, recruits practice interactions with infantry fighting vehicles, on another day they focus on combating drones. In particular, they practice shooting at UAVs by shooting at clay pigeons.  Camouflaging and stealth movement are also practiced to remain invisible to enemy UAVs…

Combination of the “old” school and the “new”

The special military operation is the first war with large-scale combined arms actions and assaults on prepared positions after a long period of local wars and anti-terrorist operations led to the fact that now old tactical techniques, both the developments of the 1980s and earlier ones, are simultaneously used with new tactics.  At the same time, the latest experience is being implemented on the fly, since the character of battles is constantly changing — a combination of the “old” and the “new.”

So, from the old school we take the experience of moving on armored vehicles, moving along a trench. But in any case, “adjustments” are always necessary in tactical terms, since FVP [first person view] UAVs have appeared now.  “There is no concept of an ideal assault, it is important to act quickly, harmoniously and carefully,” says a fighter with the call sign Potap.

Each trench, each settlement has its own differences, and therefore each assault operation is planned individually, without a specific template, he clarified…

NATO learns from our fighters’ assaults

It is worth noting that NATO is also looking at the experience of fighting in small groups at equipped strong points with trenches and dugouts. Almost all exercises held in Europe and the US in the last year have included practicing scenarios for storming forest belts and trenches, both according to old instructions and taking into account the experience of the special military operation. In addition, fighting in trenches has become part of the reservist training program in the British Army.


Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Interestingly, this was the same observation made by Chechens and outside observers during the Russian assault on the Chechen capital of Grozny in December 1994. Russian armored columns attacked from multiple directions, but mechanized infantry did not dismount and were cut down in their vehicles or dismounting under ambush conditions, before they could protect themselves and the armored columns.


Image Information:

Image: Russian soldiers training ostensibly using revised tactics, lessons learned during its operations in Ukraine.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/AssaultTraining2015-01.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0


China To Cement Strategic Relationship With Peru

The site of the Chancay Port before China’s megaport project; Chancay is a small fishing hamlet north of Lima, Peru.


“We are convinced that the port will become a strong driver for Peru’s economic development and a model for economic and commercial cooperation.”


China has long held a special interest in Peru, both for its critical mineral endowments and its position in the Pacific. Peru was the first Latin American country to sign a free trade agreement with China and is one of the largest destinations for Chinese investment in Latin America.[i] To further cement its influence and commercial ties, China is constructing a megaport at Chancay, one of its largest and most comprehensive in the Americas, to increase its access to critical minerals and the bountiful harvest of soy, wheat, and other agricultural products from Latin America.[ii] State-owned Cosco Shipping will own and operate the port, giving China outsized control over port operations.[iii]

According to the first excerpted article from the digital outlet Energiminas, once operational, the Chancay port will shorten the main route to Asia by 10 days. The second article from the Peruvian outlet Gestión, notes that Xi Jinping will inaugurate the port later this year at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit and that the Chinese delegation promises to include 750 Chinese investors visiting alongside President Xi. The outlet conveys Peru’s hope that Chancay will catalyze further Chinese investments in sectors such as telecommunications and electric vehicles. Earlier in the summer, China hosted Peruvian President Dina Boluarte for a state visit, where, according to the Gestión Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged support for elevating relations with Peru to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

The strategic implications of the Chancay megaport’s inauguration as Peru hosts the APEC Summit this year are significant. Most importantly, these actions demonstrate China’s march to gain influence in Latin America, where it already maintains several dozen agreements to own, operate, or upgrade port facilities. More importantly, many of these ports are deep water and feature docks with wide berths sufficient for the People’s Liberation Army Navy to make port calls for refueling and logistics.


Sources:

“Cosco Shipping espera inaugurar megapuerto de Chancay en noviembre (Cosco Shipping expects to open Chancay megaport in November),” Energiminas (a digital platform focused on energy and mining), 27 June 2024. https://energiminas.com/2024/06/27/cosco-shipping-espera-inaugurar-megapuerto-de-chancay-en-noviembre/

The president emphasized that the Chancay megaport will be inaugurated in November, with the presence of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. She (Xi) indicated that, to strengthen this work, the implementation of the Ancón industrial zone is planned near the port. ‘Hopefully, an electric vehicle assembly plant can be installed there, it is in the interest of both Peru and China to take care of the environment. In our country we also have copper and lithium,’ she (Xi) said…For his part, Wan Min, president of Cosco Shipping, said…‘We are convinced that the port will become a strong driver for Peru’s economic development and a model for economic and commercial cooperation. Once its construction is completed, Chancay will become the most modern and intelligent port in South America.’

“Perú buscará capitalizar la llegada de inversores chinos y coreanos en la APEC 2024 (Peru will seek to capitalize on the arrival of Chinese and Korean investors at APEC 2024),” Gestión (a Peruvian daily focused on business and economics), 15 August 2024. https://gestion.pe/economia/apec-2024-peru-busca-capitalizar-la-llegada-de-empresarios-chinos-y-coreanos-al-foro-de-cooperacion-economica-asia-pacifico-voices-of-the-future-noticia/

The upcoming APEC Economic Leaders week, which will take place in November in Peru, will not only bring together heads of state and senior officials from the 21 member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. The arrival of a significant delegation of businessmen is also anticipated, with the participation of up to 750 investors from China…It should be noted that Peru has, to date, trade agreements with 14 of the 21 economies that are members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.


Notes:

[i] For more information on investment flows from China to Latin America, see: Inter-American Dialogue, “China-Latin America Finance Databases,” accessed 13 October 2024. https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/

[ii] For additional coverage of the various phases of Chancay’s development, see: Ryan Berg, “China Nears Completion of Large Port in Peru with Dual-use Capabilities,” OE Watch, 01-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/china-nears-completion-of-large-port-in-peru-with-dual-use-capabilities/

[iii] For more information on the state of Chancay and the concerns about this megaport project, see: Henry Ziemer, “The Geopolitics of Port Security in the Americas,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 September 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-port-security-americas


Image Information:

Image: The site of the Chancay Port before China’s megaport project; Chancay is a small fishing hamlet north of Lima, Peru.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/marirc19/8284806040.
Attribution: CC BY-NA-SA 2.0


Taiwan’s Plan To Deter China With Submarines Faces Scrutiny

Launch Ceremony of the ROCS Hai Kun, 28 September 2023. The Hai Kun is Taiwan’s first and only submarine and the prototype of seven more proposed submarines to be built between 2025 and 2038.


“The threat the submarines are intended to guard against was highlighted anew this week, as Beijing on Monday held a day of large-scale military drills surrounding Taiwan.”


Last year Taiwan unveiled its first attack submarine, the Hai Kun. Taiwan’s ruling party and defense officials have pitched the Hai Kun as a critical deterrent to China’s ever-expanding naval capability. However, according to the excerpted article from Japan-based Nikkei Asia, plans to build seven more submarines based on the Hai Kun prototype from 2025 to 2038 are facing stiff opposition in Taiwan from political rivals and analysts asking questions about the cost of and viability of the submarines themselves.[i]

According to the article, there are calls within Taiwan and from the United States to urgently “develop asymmetric weapons in large quantities and learn how to use them effectively.” Some experts doubt whether the submarines are an appropriate response to counter China’s far more extensive firepower. According to the Nikkei Asia article, Ivan Kanapathy, a former U.S. National Security Council director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, stated that Taiwan’s new submarines are not up to par to operate in “this threat environment” and that to launch them from Taiwan makes no sense. But not all agree. Head of Taiwan’s National Submarine Task Force and former defense chief, Adm. Huang Shu-kuang,[ii] had previously claimed that submarines would help to “counter China’s efforts to encircle Taiwan for an invasion, attack, or a blockade.” The article does note that Taiwan is serious about acquiring large numbers of relatively inexpensive sea drones, taking a page out of Ukraine’s playbook, which “deployed mobile coastal defense cruise missiles and ‘kamikaze’ sea drones, which acted as smart mines.”However, another Taiwanese defense analyst noted that the submarine program could be valuable in creating “a defense economy in Taiwan.”

Taiwan’s success in thwarting a potential Chinese invasion may depend on Taipei’s ability to correctly determine whether submarines or drones, or a combination of both, will give it the best chance of winning a war with China.


Sources:

“Taiwan submarine program faces mounting questions over tactical merits,” Nikkei Asia (Japan based news service that specifically covers the Indo-Pacific region), 15 October 2024. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Taiwan-submarine-program-faces-mounting-questions-over-tactical-merits

Taiwan faces fresh questions over its most ambitious defense program — a government plan to build seven more submarines — as opposition parties push back and some experts call for complementary reforms.

President Lai Ching-te and his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, have pushed the submarine program as a means to deter an aggressive Communist China, which claims Taiwan as its own. Political divisions over the subs reflect broader disagreements over Taiwan’s security and defense reforms that could have global consequences as Beijing ratchets up coercive measures while refusing to rule out an invasion….

Some experts doubt whether the submarines fit into this strategy for countering China’s far more extensive firepower. Ivan Kanapathy, a former U.S. National Security Council director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, said at a recent Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club briefing… questioned the wisdom of the submarine endeavor if it comes at the expense of smaller weapons such as sea drones. “The technology in Taiwan’s new submarine isn’t up to par to operate in this threat environment. Basing submarines here in the heart of the contested area is not smart. Submarines are going to be very useful if they’re coming from a thousand miles away but Taiwan doesn’t have an overseas base, so it begs the question,” he said. “Sending out large numbers of expendable sea drones would make a lot more sense…”

The defense ministry has indeed announced plans to acquire defense drones. Experts say Taiwan could consider establishing a vast drone operation based on lessons from the Ukraine war…

Adm. Huang Shu-kuang, then-head of the National Submarine Task Force and former defense chief, told Nikkei Asia last year that submarines would help to “counter China’s efforts to encircle Taiwan for an invasion, attack or a blockade.”

But one diplomat involved in Taiwan affairs argued that Lai’s administration may need to reconsider its submarine-centric approach… “The problem is that Taiwan’s government has now framed this as their most important reform against Chinese threats.”

Others disagree, seeing broad benefits. Su Tzu-yun, a defense expert at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research think tank, emphasized the importance of submarines not only in fending off China’s blockade attempts, but also in driving Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry and strategic development.

“A submarine can create a counter or balance force to stop or reduce a blockade or quarantine operation by the PLA,” Su said during another TFCC briefing. “But there are additional benefits to the project. … Building a fleet can create a defense economy. Taiwan can build submarines with a permanent shipyard and it can create an economic motor.”


Notes:

[i] “Taiwan earmarks billions to build 7 more Submarines in bid to deter possible PLA attacks.” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong-based media outlet), 24 August 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3275605/taiwan-earmarks-billions-build-7-more-submarines-bid-deter-possible-pla-attacks?share=cnt17jZj5x2IHbTcgP1CgdsGujXmS1xu8Cd5o4Kyc5t3kKRdk3KmSsGYcdjokCp9+rof+rs4CNVI9dikc5HG%2FWDLPW2KQ9cqIjDI0iJnb80InWHGNkf8Z1txcJ9f33PsihBnLZXWcX%2F4gdgwywk6Pw==&utm_campaign=social_share

[ii] Admiral Huang Shu-kuang had offered his resignation in April 2024 due to, in his words, “unfounded accusations and slander targeting the IDS program.” His resignation was refused, and he currently heads up the submarine program. See: “Retired Navy Admiral to Stay on Sub Program,” Taipei Times (Taiwan English language news service), 16 May 2024.https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/05/16/2003817950


Image Information:

Image: Launch Ceremony of the ROCS Hai Kun, 28 September 2023. The Hai Kun is Taiwan’s first and only submarine and the prototype of seven more proposed submarines to be built between 2025 and 2038.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/09.28_總統主持「潛艦國造原型艦命名暨下水典禮」_-_Flickr_id_53219332200.jpg
Attribution: CCA BY-2.0


China Blurs Lines Between Military Drills and War

PLAAF Sukhoi Su-30s like this one participated in Joint-Sword-2024B in October 2024.


“As China’s military drills around Taiwan increase, it is becoming harder to discern when Beijing might be transitioning from a training exercise to war.”


China’s military exercises, which include many incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ), have begun to blur the lines between military exercises and actual war, according to the first article excerpt, published in the online newspaper Taiwan News. In May 2024, after Taiwan’s newly elected president, Lai Ching-te delivered a pro-independence speech, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched Joint-Sword-2024A, a series of exercises surrounding Taiwan and its outer island territories. China referred to these exercises as a “powerful punishment for separatist forces seeking independence.”[i] Five months later, while Taiwan celebrated National Day of the Republic of China (Taiwan Independence Day),[ii] the PLA launched Joint-Sword-2024B, during which they sent planes across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. This was another stern warning against Taiwan’s independence. The second excerpt published on Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense website noted the exercises lasted multiple days, with the biggest incursion taking place on 14 October. On that day, as many as 153 PLA aircraft, 14 PLAN vessels, and 12 official ships operating around Taiwan were detected, with 111 of the aircraft crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s western, southwestern, and eastern ADIZ.

According to the Taiwan News article, Defense Minister Wellington Koo believes China is testing its ability to attack in various ways, including through gray zone tactics and cognitive operations, joint sea and air training, and targeted military exercises. Its gray zone tactics and cognitive operations can be seen in the ongoing military exercises, which could instill a sense of complacency within Taiwan and among its allies as Chinese military exercises surrounding Taiwan become more normalized. However, one day, a training scenario could unexpectedly escalate into all-out war.[iii] Koo warns that as the scale of China’s exercises grows, it will be increasingly difficult to discern when the PLA is transitioning from “training to a large exercise, and from a large exercise to war.”


Sources:

Lily LaMattina, “Taiwan Says China’s Growing Military Activity Makes Exercise and War Harder to Differentiate,” Taiwan News (Taiwan-based English language news service), 19 September 2024. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5938651

As China’s military drills around Taiwan increase, it is becoming harder to discern when Beijing might be transitioning from a training exercise to war, said Defense Minister Wellington Koo (顧立雄).

Koo stressed, “We must consider how we differentiate between peacetime and wartime.” He said that as the scale of China’s exercises grows, it will be more difficult to discern when Chinese troops are transitioning from “training to a large exercise, and from a large exercise to war.”

Taiwan has counted 2,076 incursions this year by China’s People’s Liberation Army into its air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Beijing has also sent non-military government ships such as coastguard, marine research, and maritime safety vessels.

“Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan),” Ministry of National Defense website (official website of the Ministry of National Defense), accessed 17 October 2024. https://x.com/mondefense?lang=en

October 10: Taiwan celebrates its National Day of the Republic of China.

14 October (up until 0600): 153 PLA aircraft, 14 PLAN vessels, and 12 official ships operating around Taiwan detected. 111 of the aircraft crossed the median line and entered Taiwan’s western, southwestern, and eastern ADIZ.


Notes:

[i] For more information, see Cindy Hurst, “Taiwan President’s Inaugural Speech Prompts Chinese Military Drills,” OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/taiwan-presidents-inaugural-speech-prompts-chinese-military-drills/

[ii] National Day of the Republic of China commemorates the start of the Wuchang Uprising, overthrowing the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Shortly after, on 1 January 1920, they established the Republic of China. In 1949, pushed out of power by Mao Zedong’s Communists, the Republic of China relocated to Taiwan.

[iii] There are similarities between the recent Chinese exercises and events that led up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine when Russian forces began massing troops near the borders of Ukraine, calling it military exercises, right before the invasion. “Timeline: The Events Leading Up to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Reuters, 1 March 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russias-invasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/


Image Information:

Image: PLAAF Sukhoi Su-30s like this one participated in Joint-Sword-2024B in October 2024.
Source: Dmitriy Pichugin, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Air_Force#/media/File:PLAAF_Sukhoi_Su-30_at_Lipetsk-2_(modified).jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0


China Concludes Military Drills Near Taiwan

The China Coast Guard posted a heart-shaped patrol route around Taiwan on their official Weibo account during the exercise, accompanied by the message, “The coast guard’s patrol is in the shape of loving you.”


“Every time separatist forces provoke, the PLA will push forward. The closer the separatist forces align with external forces, the tighter our ‘chain’ around Taiwan will be.”


On 14 October, China conducted large-scale military drills, Joint Sword-2024B, around Taiwan and its surrounding islands. These drills expand upon the previous Joint Sword-2024A drills from late May 2024 and serve as a direct response to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech in Taipei.[i]

The  Beijing Daily, the official newspaper of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, published the first excerpted article featuring Senior Colonel Zhang Chi, a professor from the National Defense University, and Senior Captain Zhang Junshe, a researcher from the Naval Military Academic Research Institute. According to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers, the Liaoning carrier group conducted joint exercises east of the Bashi Channel with the aim of enhancing joint combat capabilities between the army, navy, air force, and rocket force. A bomber formation accompanied the carrier group to enforce a maritime barrier, practicing the prevention of intervention and interference by external forces.[ii] Senior Colonel Zhang Junshe stated that in the event of mainland military strikes against Taiwan, the Liaoning carrier group would also be capable of targeting the island’s eastern cave bases, such as those in Hualien and Taitung, which are designed to preserve Taiwan’s military combat power. The exercise also highlighted organized blockade drills on key major ports, which account for the majority of Taiwan’s imports, potentially causing significant disruptions to Taiwan’s energy supply, economy, and society during wartime.[iii] Lastly, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) emphasized the use of ships 1305, 1303, and 2102 for conducting law enforcement inspections around Taiwan to “control the island” and to practice preventing Taiwan independence elements from evading sanctions or escaping using civilian vessels. Notably, this marked the first time they patrolled around the entire island of Taiwan and the islands of Dongyin and Matsu, including the first use of the 2901 Zhoutou-class ship for this type of patrol, the largest armed coast guard cutter in the world. Senior Colonel Zhang Chi reaffirms China’s official statements made during Joint Sword-2024A, asserting that the PLA will deploy additional assets, improve joint operational capabilities, and progressively tighten Taiwan’s defense perimeter with each successive exercise.[iv]

The significance of the CCG patrols is further elaborated in the second excerpted article, published by Yuyuan Tantian, a news outlet under the direct control of the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP. First, the CCG deployed six fleets, twice as many as the previous exercise. Second, diagrams released by the CCG indicate that not only did patrol ships encircle Taiwan for the first time, but they also suggest that the CCG will adopt a flexible and unpredictable approach to future patrols to enhance operational effectiveness and maintain strategic ambiguity. Lastly, the CCG entered restricted waters around the Matsu Islands, setting a precedent for future law enforcement patrols.[v] Joint Sword-2024B ultimately establishes a precedent of the PLA edging closer to Taiwan’s periphery, employing salami-slicing tactics to normalize the increasing displays of military force. This gradual increase in military deployments and restricted geographic scope aims to shorten Taiwan’s response time while minimizing international pushback.[vi]


Sources:

Bai Bo, “辽宁舰航母编队位台岛以东演练,让“台独”势力无处可藏!(The Liaoning aircraft carrier group is conducting exercises east of Taiwan, “Taiwan independence” forces has nowhere to hide!),” Beijing Daily (the official newspaper of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CCP), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/8jt4jbye

On 14 October 2024, the Eastern Theater Command released a statement announcing that the PLA organized its army, navy, air force, rocket force, and other units to execute the ‘Joint Sword-2024B’ exercise in the Taiwan Strait and in areas to the north, south, and east of Taiwan. Later that evening, the Command issued another statement concluding the exercise, which was deemed successful in testing the joint capabilities of theater forces. This exercise came just days after Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech in Taipei on 10 October 2024, where he promoted separatist rhetoric and inflamed tensions between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. According to military expert Zhang Junshe, who spoke to the Beijing Daily, the PLA’s exercise directly targeted the “Taiwan Independence” remarks in Lai’s speech.

During the exercise, the Eastern Theater Command conducted drills on blockading key ports, seizing regional power, sea assaults, and land strikes around Taiwan. These drills tested multi-domain coordination and precision strike capabilities. Professor Zhang Chi of the National Defense University emphasized that each time separatist forces provoke, the PLA will respond by advancing. He added that the closer separatist forces align with external actors, the tighter the PLA will draw the “chain” encircling Taiwan.

The Liaoning aircraft carrier group was also deployed east of Taiwan to conduct joint exercises with the army, navy, air force, and rocket force, focusing on integrating the capabilities of all services. The carrier group was accompanied by bomber formations to establish a maritime barrier, simulating the blocking of external intervention and interference. Zhang Junshe further noted that Taiwan’s military has built large cave bases in Hualien and Taitung in eastern Taiwan to preserve combat power in the event of a mainland strike. However, the Liaoning carrier group will enable the PLA to target these cave bases.

Additionally, the Chinese Coast Guard carried out patrols around Taiwan, inspecting the waters surrounding the island. Notably, this marked the first time the Coast Guard’s 2901 Zhoutou-class ship was used in such patrols, as well as the first complete patrol of Taiwan’s entire island. The Coast Guard aims to prevent “Taiwan independence” elements from evading sanctions or escaping the island using civilian ships or other means during wartime.

Yuyuan Tantian, “环台岛巡航管控的三个突破 (The three breakthroughs in the patrol and control around Taiwan island),” China Media Group (a news media under the direct control of the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/y3xyrmfp

On 14 October 2024, the Fujian Coast Guard organized a fleet of ships to conduct law enforcement inspections in the waters near Taiwan Island, Dongyin Island, and Matsu Island. According to exclusive information provided to this news source, this coast guard operation marked three significant breakthroughs.

Firstly, a total of six fleets were deployed, twice as many as in previous operations. Notably, this marked the first time the coast guard’s largest 10,000-ton vessel, No. 2901, was used for a mission targeting Taiwan. This ship is equipped with a 76mm caliber rapid-fire naval gun and can reach speeds of up to 25 knots. The 2901 ship has considerable advantages over other law enforcement vessels in the region.

Secondly, a diagram released by the coast guard illustrated the fleets sailing around the waters near Taiwan, expanding from the eastern region to encompass the entire island. However, the diagram did not provide a specific navigation route or detailed latitude and longitude for each point. Instead, arrows were used to broadly indicate the direction of the operation, implying that there would be no fixed route and that the fleets would operate in multiple areas.

Lastly, during this operation, the coast guard entered the waters near Matsu Island and penetrated restricted areas established by Taiwan authorities. This indicates that the coast guard has successfully completed law enforcement patrols around all of Taiwan’s outer islands and may implement regular patrols around Matsu Island in the future.


Notes:

[i] To watch the PRC’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) official response to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech and to the Eastern Theater Command exercise, see the MOD’s video post, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/yy3dervp

[ii] Li Chun, “What signal does the Liaoning aircraft carrier formation’s participation in ‘Joint Sword’ exercise send?” China News Network (China state news agency), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/rkfzbw4n

[iii] Zhao Xi, “东部战区演习演练封控台湾主要港口 (Eastern Theater Command exercises to seal off Taiwan’s main ports),” Beijing News (Newspaper for the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CCP), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/24r82nhw

[iv] To watch Senior Colonel Zhang Chi discuss and analyze ‘Joint Sword-2024B,’ see his CCTV7 interview, CCTV7 Military Report, 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/nukx75wk

[v] Sean Lin, “4 Chinese coast guard ships expelled as PLA conducts drills near Taiwan,” Focus Taiwan (National news agency of the Republic of China), 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/ypkcywaf

[vi] Helen Regan and Wayne Chang, “Taiwan condemns Chinese military drills around island as ‘unreasonable provocation’,” CNN, 14 October 2024. https://tinyurl.com/3a83zshc


Image Information:

Image: The China Coast Guard posted a heart-shaped patrol route around Taiwan on their official Weibo account during the exercise, accompanied by the message, “The coast guard’s patrol is in the shape of loving you.”
Source: https://tinyurl.com/mwdk2ru7
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.


German Opinion Divided on Increased Multi-Domain Task Force Capabilities

It is proposed that the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) surface-to-surface hypersonic missile be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Opponents to the deployment of such weapons suggest it will antagonize Moscow and lead to a new arms race.


“Two thirds of those surveyed are against the plans to station long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons in western Germany in 2026. A large majority fear that the stationing could lead to a new arms race and make Germany a target for attack.”


A U.S. and German pronouncement on 10 July 2024 that the United States will start deploying long-range fires units to Germany in 2026 sparked a sharp Russian rebuke. On 12 July, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, made a statement that involved some thinly veiled nuclear threats. [i] These events have spurred debate in Germany about whether increasing U.S./NATO capabilities will make Europe safer or will simply antagonize Russia and start a new arms race. 

The accompanying excerpted article from the German political think tank, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, specifically lays out the capabilities of the BGM-109 Tomahawk surface-to-surface missile, the SM-6 ballistic defense missile, and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon surface-to-surface hypersonic missile that are proposed to be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. The think tank, which also advises the German government, explains the advantages of deploying the weapon systems and argues against possible concerns. In contrast, the second accompanying excerpted article from the German media company Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, notes that the German civilian population is highly critical of the decision to deploy these weapons, with citizens expressing various concerns. Of particular note, the article mentions a recent poll that found that two-thirds of respondents opposed plans to station these weapons in Germany. The third accompanying article from the German business newspaper Handelsblatt, lays out some expert German opinions for and against this deployment. It also notes another German poll in which 50 percent of respondents feared that such a force structure increase would further escalate conflict with Russia. 

On 1 September 2024, state elections in the German states of Thuringia and Saxony saw significant gains for the right-leaning Alternative for Germany party and the left-leaning Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance party, which both oppose the deployment of these U.S. weapons and disapprove of German support for Ukraine in its current form. These results may be an indicator of the upcoming German federal elections in 2025 and could influence the German position on the stationing of additional U.S. weapon systems.


Sources:

“Große Mehrheit lehnt Stationierung von US-Raketen in Deutschland ab (Large majority rejects stationing of US missiles in Germany),” Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (German media company), 21 August 2024. https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/mdrfragt-umfrage-ergebnisse-waffen-raketen-stationieren-nato-100.html

Two thirds of those surveyed are against the plans to station long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons in western Germany in 2026. A large majority fear that the stationing could lead to a new arms race and make Germany a target for attack. These are two results of the current MDRfragt survey from Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia with almost 24,000 respondents…

Only one in three believes that the deployment of weapons provides Germany with protection and strengthens its own defense capabilities (31%). A quarter of respondents believe that the US weapons systems could serve as a deterrent (26%).

In recent weeks, several parties have called for parliament to be involved in such a far-reaching decision. More than three quarters of MDRfragt participants also believe that the deployment of the weapons systems announced by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz has not yet been sufficiently discussed in politics.

Source: “Gewichtig und richtig: weitreichende US-Mittelstreckenwaffen in Deutschland (Significant and Sound: US Medium-Range Missiles in Germany),“ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (The German Institute for International and Security Affairs), 29 July 2024. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/gewichtig-und-richtig-weitreichende-us-mittelstreckenwaffen-in-deutschland

The German-American plan envisages the deployment of three types of land-based US medium-range weapons in 2026. The first is the Tomahawk cruise missile… Second, the Standard Missile (SM) 6… Third, the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also called Dark Eagle…The three missiles will be deployed in Germany as part of the US Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Its core mission is to counter Russia’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities with new technologies and concepts: In the event of war, Moscow hopes to keep the bulk of NATO forces away from the combat zone along its border by using ballistic and cruise missile strikes to prevent the alliance’s troops from deploying and resupplying, or by forcing NATO to back down with strikes against individual member states. The Alliance could not effectively defend itself against these Russian options with air and missile defense systems alone because Europe’s territory is vast, and comprehensive protection against Russia’s missile arsenal would be too expensive. Nevertheless, with its own medium-range precision weapons, NATO can thwart this Russian plan in two complementary ways….

…Opponents of the deployment plan argue that the US weapons would become targets for Moscow’s missiles, thereby exposing Germany to an increased threat. This narrative must be countered: Although the Kremlin is likely to consider future medium-range US weapons legitimate targets, Putin sees Berlin as an adversary anyway. As a NATO logistics hub with many US bases, Germany is already a priority target for precision strikes if Moscow wants to keep NATO at a distance in the event of war. New US missiles deployed there will not significantly exacerbate this situation.

Another concern is that the deployment of US weapons will force Russia to produce even more missiles and station them in Europe. The result would be an “arms race”. Indeed, the Russian government announced vague military countermeasures during the NATO summit… Nevertheless, due to Russia’s current arms build-up and the sanctions imposed upon the country, Russia’s defense industrial sector is already reaching its limits. Production capacity, skilled labor and financial resources are limited.  Therefore, even Russian and US experts who share concerns about an arms race have serious doubts that the Kremlin could launch a missile arms race with new programs in the short or medium term….

Source: “Was für US-Raketen in Deutschland spricht – und was dagegen (What speaks for US missiles in Germany – and what speaks against it),” Handelsblatt (German business newspaper), 20 August 2024.  https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/verteidigung-was-fuer-us-raketen-in-deutschland-spricht-und-was-dagegen/100059925.html

From 2026, the USA wants to station long-range missiles and cruise missiles in Germany. Many fear that this could escalate the conflict with Russia. Military experts assess the situation.  The USA wants to station Tomahawk cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles and SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles in Germany from 2026. This was announced by the governments of both countries in July on the sidelines of the NATO summit. Many citizens view the plan with skepticism. According to a survey for the Funke media group, 50 percent of those polled feared that this could further escalate conflict with Russia…

When the planned stationing became public knowledge, former SPD party chairman Norbert Walter-Borjans was upset. The fact that “such a far-reaching decision is practically not debated, that it is more or less made and announced unilaterally” is problematic, he told Deutschlandfunk. Walter-Borjans was still in office as party leader when the US announced in March 2021 that it would locate the second of five planned Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) in Germany and opened the headquarters in Wiesbaden in September 2021…

Sahra Wagenknecht, founder of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), described the missiles planned for deployment as “offensive weapons”. The SPD [Social Democratic Party] executive committee, however, sees things differently: The planned deployment is “not a confrontational build-up of arms, but a strengthening of our country’s defense,” it says in the three-page letter in which the executive committee recently backed Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s decision…

What is the rule now, an offensive or defensive weapon? Both. Military expert Carlo Masala from the Bundeswehr University recently said in an interview with Handelsblatt that the cruise missiles and the hypersonic missiles still under development are designed to destroy command centers, bases or supply lines far behind the front in the event of a Russian attack.  This is intended to make it impossible for the enemy to expand its attack over a large area. But if it realizes that it cannot win a major war, it will probably not attack at all, argues Masala. That is why the weapons serve as a deterrent and a defense.

FDP leader Christian Lindner recently told the newspapers of the Funke media group that Germany has been within range of Russia’s nuclear-capable missiles for years. “That is why it is of paramount importance for us to establish a balance of deterrence.”  For example, Russia has stationed Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave and in Belarus, which carry nuclear warheads and can reach Berlin. But the balance called for by Lindner is not to be achieved through nuclear weapons. The weapons planned for stationing would be “equipped with conventional warheads,” says the SPD presidium paper. “There are no plans to arm the systems with nuclear weapons.”

Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) is calling for a public debate “to make the seriousness of the situation clear…On one hand, we are experiencing a new threat situation in Europe due to Russia’s aggressive behavior, and on the other hand, we have a capability gap that we can only close in the short term with the help of our US allies until we have developed these weapons ourselves,” he emphasized…

Security expert Claudia Major from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) recently wrote in a guest commentary in the Handelsblatt that the Europeans lack their own land-based missiles with which they could reach Russian territory.  From Major’s point of view, the planned stationing of the missiles could even help to make a nuclear escalation less likely. In the event of an attack, they would give NATO additional options for action short of a nuclear counterattack, writes the SWP expert…


Notes:

[i] See: “Special op experience shows Russia needs clearer nuclear doctrine — diplomat,” TASS (Russian news agency), 12 July 2024. https://tass.com/politics/1816259


Image Information:

Image: It is proposed that the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) surface-to-surface hypersonic missile be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Opponents to the deployment of such weapons suggest it will antagonize Moscow and lead to a new arms race.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c4/LRHWfirstThunderBoltStrike.jpg


Tuareg Separatist Militants Form an Alliance Against Junta-Led Governments in Mali and Niger

Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.


“The Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to assist each other, but also to defend their interests together on the international level.”


Since 2021, West African security and political dynamics have deteriorated as a result of coups by military juntas in the region’s three central states—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In July 2024, these three juntas agreed to a new regional Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) after leaving the preexisting regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States. They replaced Western military support with that of the successor to Russia’s Wagner Group, known as the Africa Corps. Now, however, two of the Sahel’s ethnonationalist and mostly secular Tuareg rebel groups, the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) in Niger and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)[i] in Mali, have formed their own alliance.

According to the excerpted French-language article from French state-owned radio news website rfi.fr, both the FPL and CSP-DPA oppose the respective juntas that are now ruling their countries. The main function of their newly established alliance is for both rebel groups to promise to aid each other in the case of an attack by AES armies, forcing them to confront a more complex and even multi-national insurgency. The article also states that the FPL and CSP-DPA plan to defend each other’s interests on the international level, although whether that entails advocacy or operations or both is left ambiguous. However, by targeting Chinese-funded pipeline projects, the FPL insurgency has already achieved internationalized operations status. The FPL believes such projects fund the junta in Niamey at the expense of predominantly Tuareg and other minority regions of Niger.[ii] Such attacks serve as a form of leverage and pressure against the junta.

The article also highlights that the alliance-making meeting between FPL and CSP-DPA leaders occurred in the northern Malian town of Tinzaouatène. This town near the Algerian border is the CSP base, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), which is under the CSP umbrella,[iii] and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims massacred dozens of African Corps and Malian troops in separate attacks on 28 July. According to the article, the Tinzaouatène meeting sent a message that the new FPL and CSP-DPA alliance could launch similar massacres if their goals for independence or autonomy are not met. This would represent a new development in the Sahel, where Tuareg rebel groups have historically remained relatively independent of each other and have mostly focused on reacting only to their own nation’s political and military developments.

At a time when the AES military juntas have largely lost legitimacy internationally and when Africa Corps is reeling from the massacre it suffered at the hands of the CMA, the FPL and CSP-DPA are escalating their confrontation with the embattled juntas in the political, military, and international realm. Neither group is particularly antagonistic towards the United States or the West. However, even if democratic rule eventually returns, their strengthening insurgencies will make it more difficult to reunite Mali and Niger and restore sovereignty to both nations.


Sources:

“À Tinzaouatène, les rebellions du Niger et du Mali se réunissent pour renforcer leurs relations (In Tinzaouatène, rebellions from Niger and Mali meet to strengthen relations)),” Radio France Internationale (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 28 August 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240901-%C3%A0-tinzaouat%C3%A8ne-les-rebellions-du-niger-et-du-mali-se-r%C3%A9unissent-pour-renforcer-leurs-relations

The delegation of the Niger rebels of the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) was led by Barak Taher Hamit, who holds the title of “commander-in-chief” of the armed movement opposed to the Niger junta. The delegation of the Malian rebels of the Strategic Framework for Defense (CSP) was headed by Alghabass Ag Intalla, who is the leader of the militant group and opponent of the Malian junta. To begin discussions with an aim towards strengthening relations between them, the site of the meeting was quite symbolic: Tinzaouatène in northern Mali, located on the Algerian border.

During the meeting, no document was signed, or at least not made public. But the Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to aid each other, and also to defend their interests together on the international level. According to sources close to both parties, other meetings are being planned about “fighting hand in hand against the militaries in power in Mali and Niger”.


Notes:

[i] “Azawad” is the term that Tuareg ethnonationalists use to refer their homeland.

[ii] In June 2024, the FPL, for example, disabled a section of Niger’s PetroChina-funded crude oil pipeline with the intent to force China to cancel a deal between the junta and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC). See: Emmanuel Addeh, “Tensions Escalate As Armed Group Attacks Niger’s PetroChina-Funded Pipeline, Threatens More Attacks,” Arise.TV, 19 June 2024. https://www.arise.tv/tensions-escalate-as-armed-group-attacks-nigers-petrochina-funded-pipeline-threatens-more-attacks/

[iii] See: “Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors,” ICG, 13 October 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur


Image Information:

Image: Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.
Source: Magharebia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Le_Mali_confront%C3%A9_aux_sanctions_et_%C3%A0_lavanc%C3%A9e_des_rebelles_islamistes_(6904946068).jpg


India Considers Implications After the Collapse of the Bangladeshi Government

The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Ms. Sheikh Hasina, in New York, USA on September 27, 2019.


“Referring to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine as well as Israel-Hamas conflicts and the current situation in Bangladesh, the Minister exhorted the Commanders to ‘analyze these episodes, predict the problems that the country may face in the future, and stay prepared to deal with the unexpected.”


In early August 2024, protests in Bangladesh resulted in the collapse and resignation of the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. While this did not result in an immediate threat for India, the accompanying excerpted article shows how the situation in Bangladesh will remain a security issue for India. The article from the Indian independent think tank The Centre for Land Warfare Studies examines what happened in Bangladesh and outlines what India can do to adjust. The author, a retired Indian Army general, provides some background on what led to Sheikh Hasina’s resignation.[i] As the author points out, the history between India and Bangladesh has at times been contentious, but India and Hasina had favorable relations for a number of years due to Hasina’s working closely with India on security issues. This included India and Bangladesh cooperating to resolve their border and maritime disputes and Hasina working with India to help end its conflict with the United Liberation Front of Assam.[ii] The author goes on to note how China has gained considerable influence in Bangladesh through exports of weapons. He also mentions that because the Bangladeshi Army has played a role in the regime change, India should reach out to work closely and strengthen military ties. This could set up further competition between India and China in the region. Lastly, the author states that India needs to do everything possible to protect Indian nationals and ethnic minorities in Bangladesh, with the latter group referencing the Hindu religious minority in the country. The majority Muslim population in Bangladesh has periodically attacked Hindus, but Hasina’s government has provided them with protection. Indian Prime Minister Modi and the interim government in Bangladesh appear to have established positive relations, but the status of Hindus in Bangladesh could be a point of contention and an issue for India to resolve.


Sources:

Lt Gen PS Rajeshwar, (Ret), “India – Bangladesh Relations: Navigating The Turmoil,” The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (independent think tank in India), 16 August 2024. https://www.claws.in/analysis-india-bangladesh-relations-navigating-the-turmoil/

The developments of 5 August had resulted in very short notice to Indian authorities…What appeared initially to be a student movement against the quota system for descendants of freedom fighters in government jobs finally turned into a call for the resignation of the then Prime Minister…

Under these circumstances, how does one look at the strategic dimensions of India-Bangladesh relations? The ties between the two nations were forged through the sacrifices of people in both countries during the Liberation War of 1971. The economic, cultural, and linguistic aspects were strengthened further during the last 15 years of the Sheikh Hasina rule.

Bangladesh has a special place in our policy matrix and security calculations…She shares a more than 4000 km border, much of which abuts our critical NE region. In a significant 2015 agreement, the border was simplified by exchanging enclaves trapped in each other’s territories…The two countries also settled their maritime dispute amicably. Earlier, in 2010, the Awami League government had helped India by removing all camps of Indian rebel groups, which broke the back of the ULFA, pushing it to a peace agreement.

India has been very concerned about China’s influence in Bangladesh, from participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2016 to importing 72% of its arms from China in 2019-2023…

Second is our strategic intelligence, which must be comprehensively improved to anticipate such abrupt events better…

Fifth, since the Bangladesh Army has played a defining role in this crisis and could remain a key factor, we must strengthen our military-to-military ties.

Finally, we need to do everything to secure Indian nationals while insisting on the safety and protection of minority communities in Bangladesh, lest there be a backlash back home.


Notes:

[i] For a more detailed timeline and background on the protests in Bangladesh in 2024, see: “From job quota to Sheikh Hasina’s resignation: Timeline of the Bangladesh student protests,” The Hindu, 5 August 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/from-protests-to-sheikh-hasina-resignation-timeline-of-bangladesh-student-protest/article68488361.ece

[ii] The ULFA was a militant group that had operated out of Bangladesh with a goal of establishing an independent government in India’s State of Assam (bordering Bangladesh) until Hasina’s government agreed to eliminate its safe have in Bangladeshi territory. India and the ULFA reached a peace agreement in December 2023, see: Gaurav Dwivedi, “The Path To Peace: ULFA’s Journey From Insurgency To Accord,” NDTV, 29 December 2023. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/the-path-to-peace-ulfas-journey-from-insurgency-to-accord-4763730


Image Information:

Image: The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Ms. Sheikh Hasina, in New York, USA on September 27, 2019
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Prime_Minister,_Shri_Narendra_Modi_meeting_the_Prime_Minister_of_Bangladesh,_Ms._Sheikh_Hasina,_in_New_York,_USA_on_September_27,_2019_(1).jpg


Cartel Internecine Warfare Erupts in the State of Sinaloa

Mugshot of Sinaloa Cartel leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, one of the most wanted men in the world, extradited to the United States in 2016.


“President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called on the criminal groups—Mayos and Chapitos—that are facing the attack to act “with a minimum of responsibility.”


The state of Sinaloa, along Mexico’s Pacific coast, is synonymous with cartels and home to one of the most notorious transnational criminal groups in the country.[i] Following the arrest of longtime cartel kingpin, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada García, at the U.S. southern border, violence has broken out between two opposing factions of the Sinaloa Cartel.[ii] Anticipating further violence between the two major factions, one controlled by the children of former Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera and the other by those loyal to El Chapo’s former business associate, El Mayo, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador pleaded with the cartel to “act with a minimum of responsibility,” according to the excerpted article from right-leaning Mexican daily El Universal. The newspaper reports that the Mexican government is downplaying the number of deaths in Sinaloa; however, the violence has escalated rapidly, triggering the cancellation of Mexico’s Independence Day celebrations in the state of Sinaloa.

Argentine news outlet Infobae reports that at least 18 people have reportedly died in a wave of violence that includes roadblocks, the destruction of public infrastructure, and the closure of businesses. The escalating turf war between the two factions of the Sinaloa Cartel has significant ramifications for the operational environment. First, incoming president Claudia Sheinbaum will likely start her term on 1 October with an escalating security crisis in the Sinaloa state. Second, whichever faction emerges victorious in this internecine battle will have more consolidated control over Mexico’s criminal landscape and lucrative routes to traffic, among other things, fentanyl to the United States.


Sources:

“AMLO llama a grupos criminales que se enfrentan en Sinaloa a actuar ‘con un mínimo de responsabilidad’ (AMLO calls on criminal groups fighting in Sinaloa to act ‘with a minimum of responsibility’),” El Universal (right-leaning Mexican daily), 13 September 2024. https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/amlo-llama-a-grupos-criminales-que-se-enfrentan-en-sinaloa-a-actuar-con-un-minimo-de-responsabilidad/

After four days of violence in Culiacán, Sinaloa, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called on the criminal groups—Mayos and Chapitos—that are facing the attack to act ‘with a minimum of responsibility.’ He said, ‘With the presence of the Armed Forces to ensure that there is no confrontation, to protect the population, they must also act with a minimum of responsibility. It is their family, their fellow countrymen, their municipality, their state and their country.’ At a press conference, the President considered that the violence in Culiacán so far ‘is not a major issue.’…Out of prudence, the Independence Day celebrations in Culiacán were cancelled.

Source: “Al menos 18 muertes en una nueva ola de violencia en Sinaloa (México) (At least 18 dead in a new wave of violence in Sinaloa (Mexico)),” Infobae (Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 15 September 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2024/09/15/al-menos-18-muertes-en-una-nueva-ola-de-violencia-en-sinaloa-mexico/   

During the second week of September, 18 homicides, 36 carjackings and 28 reports of deprivation of liberty have been recorded, in an escalation of violence carried out by criminal groups in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, according to authorities…Sinaloa Governor Rubén Rocha Moya has acknowledged the seriousness of the situation and has attributed these clashes to disputes between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel, specifically between Los Chapitos and Los Mayos.


Notes:

[i] For an updated profile of the Sinaloa Cartel and its activities, see: Insight Crime, “Sinaloa Cartel,” last updated 15 March 2024. https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/

[ii] The story of El Mayo’s arrival at the U.S. southern border is long and still not fully known, but for a comprehensive background on what may have transpired, see: José de Córdoba, “Betrayal and Capture of Sinaloa Cartel Leaders Spark Fears of Turf War,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 August 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/betrayal-and-capture-of-sinaloa-cartel-leaders-spark-fears-of-turf-war-d1a805f8


Image Information:

Image: Mugshot of Sinaloa Cartel leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, one of the most wanted men in the world, extradited to the United States in 2016.
Source: https://picryl.com/media/booking-photo-of-joaquin-el-chapo-guzman-front-873b60


Drone Warfare Is Becoming a Common Tactic in Mali

A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.


“The use of drones by the CSP rebels, if it were to increase, could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels.”


Recent reporting indicates that both the Malian military and Tuareg separatist groups are utilizing drone warfare.[i] According to the first excerpted article from the Africa-focused UK-based news publication Qiraat Africa,rebel forces reported 21 civilian deaths, including 11 children, following Malian military air strikes on the village of Tinzaouatine.[ii] The strike was part of intensified fighting following the recent defeat of Malian Army and Africa Corps mercenaries by rebel fighters who allied with militants from the Al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) is a coalition of Malian separatist groups fighting against government forces in northern Mali and is the latest evolution of the Tuareg rebellion. The Tuareg people, who inhabit the areas of northern Mali, Niger, and parts of western Libya, have been fighting with the Malian government for autonomy on and off since the 1990s. While these separatist groups have been geographically close to radical Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, also based in northern Mali, their motivation has consistently been about independence as opposed to an Islamic caliphate. According to the rebels, the airstrikes allegedly targeted a pharmacy and groups of gathered people in the village. The Malian Armed Forces confirmed the attack but stated that the strikes were precise and specifically targeted terrorists. These strikes and associated civilian casualties are likely to continue as fighting persists, and government forces cannot conduct a persistent ground campaign in the Kidal region of the country.

Seemingly in retaliation for the Tinzaouatine attack, the rebels conducted a drone strike against a Malian Army camp. According to the second excerpted article from French news radio RFI, rebel forces struck a Malian Army camp approximately 60 miles from Timbuktu, though no casualties were reported. The strike marked an evolution in the conflict, with both sides now utilizing drone warfare. Although the rebel forces indicated they did not acquire the drones through Ukraine or JNIM, there are few open-source details on the type or quantity of drones they use. The leadership of the rebel faction did acknowledge that they have had access to the drones for ten months to train with and manufacture grenades. While still an effective tool, rebel forces are likely not using as technologically advanced drones as the Malian Army, who, alongside their Africa Corps counterparts, have been using Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones with significant effect.[ii]

Drone warfare in Mali and possibly other non-state actors could signal a fundamental shift in the conduct of battles and the power balance in the region. The only other time rebel forces utilized drones was in July 2024, when they defeated Africa Corps and the Malian armed forces. Though the CSP currently denies drone use in conjunction with terrorist organizations like JNIM, their successful use in the region has the potential to also expand the usage by jihadist groups. Drone warfare on both sides will also likely impact civilian casualties and cause problems for the Malian armed forces, similar to what the Russian military is currently facing in Ukraine.


Sources:

“Au moins 21 civils tués par un drone dans le nord du Mali, selon un groupe dirigé par des Touaregs (At least 21 civilians killed by drone strike in northern Mali, Tuareg-leg group says),” Qiraata Africa (independent UK-based magazine focused on sub-Saharan Africa), 26 August 2024.
https://qiraatafrican.com/fr/12604/au-moins-21-civils-tues-par-un-drone-dans-le-nord-du-mali-selon-un-groupe-dirige-par-des-touaregs/

Airstrikes on a village in northern Mali near the Algerian border killed 21 civilians on Sunday, including 11 children, a spokesman for a coalition of predominantly Tuareg pro-independence groups said. The attack on the village of Tinzaouatine marks the highest number of civilians killed by drones since the breakdown of a peace deal between the country’s ruling military junta and pro-independence armed groups in northern Mali last year.

The Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad is a coalition of predominantly Tuareg groups fighting for the independence of northern Mali, which they call Azawad. Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy, followed by additional strikes targeting people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “The provisional toll of these criminal strikes stands at 21 civilians killed, including 11 children and the head of the pharmacy, dozens of injured and enormous material damage,” said the statement signed by Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, spokesman for the rebel coalition present in the village.

In a statement broadcast on national television, the Malian armed forces confirmed these strikes. “The army general staff confirms the airstrikes in the Tinzaouatine sector on the morning of August 25, 2024. These precision strikes targeted terrorists,” the press release states. The strikes come weeks after the Malian army and mercenaries from the Russia-based Wagner Group were defeated by Tuareg rebels and fighters from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, a group linked to al-Qaeda.

Sunday’s strikes targeted a pharmacy; then others targeted people gathered near the initial damage, the coalition said in a statement. “Both Malian forces and Russian mercenaries lack a strong ground presence in the Kidal region, so using air assets, including drones, is the only way for them to engage armed groups in the region,” said Rida Lyammouri, a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, a Moroccan think tank. “Therefore, airstrikes, including on civilians, are likely to increase as revenge for the recent major setback suffered by Wagner mercenaries in northern Mali”

Source: “Mali: les rebelles du CSP combattent désormais avec des drones (Mali: CSP rebels now fight with drones),” RFI (French-based radio station and part of the France Medias Monde group), 12 September 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240912-mali-les-rebelles-du-csp-combattent-d%C3%A9sormais-avec-des-drones

In Mali, the rebels of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) are now fighting with drones. They used them on September 11, 2024, against a Malian army camp about a hundred kilometers from Timbuktu. No casualties were reported. But it was on this occasion that the rebels revealed that they had drones and that it was the second time they had used them. A new addition to their arsenal could change the shape of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the rebels in the North.

The rebels claim to have used it [drones] for the first time at the end of July in Tinzaouatène, during their only but important victory against the Malian soldiers and the Wagner group, who had lost several dozen men and were forced to turn back. Where do these drones come from? How many do the rebels have? What model exactly? No details have been released. CSP spokesman Mohamed el Maouloud Ramadane says only that they were “purchased,” and assures that they were not supplied by Ukraine – nor by the al-Qaeda-linked Jnim (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims). The jihadists, who are also fighting the Malian army in northern Mali , use drones to film their propaganda videos. To date, JNIM has not claimed responsibility for any drone attacks.

According to several CSP fighters contacted by RFI, the rebels have had these drones for about ten months now. “We had to train people and make the grenades; it’s dangerous, and it takes time,” explains one of them. Regarding their use in Tinzaouatène at the end of July, the rebels assure that it was ” decisive “, particularly ” against the armored vehicles”. At the time, the CSP rebels had not communicated on the unprecedented use of these drones. Nor had the Malian army, which had exceptionally acknowledged ” a significant number of losses in human and material life ” (press release of July 29).

The Fama (Malian Armed Forces) and their Wagner auxiliaries themselves use armed drones. The first Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s, acquired by the Malian army, were received in December 2022. Other deliveries followed, always relayed on state media to illustrate the army’s “rise in power”. These drones actually proved decisive during the capture of Kidal, a rebel stronghold, last November. The strikes forced the CSP men to withdraw, without even attempting ground combat. If the use of drones by the CSP rebels were to increase, it could change the contours of the war between the Malian army, its Wagner auxiliaries, and the CSP rebels. It could help to rebalance the forces because, until now, the Malian army and Wagner dominate the terrain. Since the use of armed drones requires particularly reliable intelligence and careful targeting, it could also increase the risk for civilians, whom the CSP rebels have made it their mission to protect.


Notes:

[i] The linked article by Le Monde goes in-depth on the Tuareg rebellion that has been going on in Mali since the 1990s. For more information, see: Philippe Baqué, “For the Tuaregs, unite or disappear (Mali’s Tuaregs: ‘For us, this war is existential’),” Le Monde, April 2024. https://mondediplo.com/2024/04/13mali

[ii] The Bayraktar TB2 is described as a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE), Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, capable of a 27-hour maximum flight time and a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet. For additional information see: “Bayraktar TB2,” Bayraktar, n.d. https://baykartech.com/en/uav/bayraktar-tb2/


Image Information:

Image: A Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar TB2 UAV on the runway.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bayraktar_TB2_Runway.jpg