Category Archives: OE Watch

People’s Liberation Army Changing Mission of Civilian Personnel

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Emblem of People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force.

Emblem of People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force.

“Civilian personnel can not only provide support for forward combat operations but also independently undertake non-contact operational tasks. They play an irreplaceable and important role in preparing for war and are a new support for combat effectiveness.”

Civilian personnel have previously served in China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) primarily in administrative and support roles. However, the regulations on the management of civilian personnel within the Chinese military[i] were revised in January 2023 to improve recruitment, career development, incentives, and retirement. The revision is another effort to increase the quality of talent within the PLA[ii] but also indicates an expansion of the missions that civilian personnel will be tasked to conduct. A recent article in China’s official military newspaper, PLA Daily, discusses the roles civilians play in the world’s militaries and describes the importance of civilian personnel to operational support missions in China’s own Strategic Support Force.[iii] The article reiterates the need to improve talent to prepare for war and take on more mission responsibilities. Civilian personnel are a resource to increase scientific and technological innovation in the military, which the PLA currently views as insufficient. The article notes that as modern warfare becomes more intelligent, unmanned, and non-contact, the PLA should deeply integrate civilian personnel into the operational support system to play a key role in winning future wars. This indicates that within the Strategic Support Force civilian personnel will conduct non-contact combat operations possibly including intelligence, electronic warfare, and information warfare function.

Source:

“发挥文职人员在作战支援保障任务中的重要作用 (Give Full Play to the Important Role of Civilian Personnel in Operational Support Missions),” PLA Daily (Official PRC Military Newspaper), 20 January 2023. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2023-01/20/content_332257.htm

A clarion call that civilian personnel are indispensable in preparing for war. With the deepening development of the world’s new military revolution and profound changes in forms of war and combat styles, developed countries generally allocate and use civilian personnel as an important operational support force, and civilian personnel has become an important human resource for modern armies. At present, China is facing extremely severe and complex security challenges, and it is necessary to accelerate the preparation for military struggle and comprehensively improve the quality and level of preparation for war. This requires keeping up with the trend of military development, building a modern military force system, integrating civilian personnel into all aspects and the entire process of military training and preparation, allowing the vitality of all combat effectiveness elements to erupt and fully flowing the source of military modernization construction.”

Notes:

[i] PLA civilian personnel wear military-style uniforms with emblems to distinguish them from military personnel.

[ii] For additional information, see: “构建新时代中国特色军队文职人员制度体系(Building a Civilian Personnel System of Systems in the Military with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era), “PLA Daily, 7 January 2023. http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2023-01/07/content_331347.htm; also see Kevin McCauley, PLA Education Reforms: Problems Remain After More Than Twenty Years, OE Watch, 10-2022 file:///C:/Users/knpmc/OneDrive/Kevin/Pictures/a%20Twitter/OE%20Watch,%20Vol%2012,%20Issue%2010,%202022.pdf

[iii] China’s Strategic Support Force is responsible for strategic missions such as space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, and electronic countermeasures, signals intelligence, information warfare, and communications.

Image Information:

Image: Emblem of People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Strategic_Support_Force#/media/File:Emblem_of_People’s_Liberation_Army_Strategic_Support_Force.png
Attribution: Public Domain

China Celebrates Eyes Opportunity To Expand ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ With Mexico

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A Mexican state dinner for Chinese President Xi Jinping, held by former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto.

A Mexican state dinner for Chinese President Xi Jinping, held by former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto.

“This year marks the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.”

China-Mexico relations date back to 1972, when Mexico broke diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan). For much of Mexico’s recent history, however, its economic and diplomatic relations have been dominated by its neighbor to the north. While its relationship with Mexico pales in comparison to that of the United States, China’s presence in Mexico continues to grow.[i] As noted in the excerpted article from business-focused Mexican daily El Economista, 2023 marks the tenth anniversary of the China-Mexico “comprehensive strategic partnership,” the highest form of partnership China maintains with foreign countries and one of seven such relationships in the Latin America region. The “comprehensive strategic partnership” category implies the full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs. As noted in the article, China’s direct investment in Mexico grew 18 percent in 2022.[ii] Yet, the relationship goes beyond trade and investment. At a reception for Chinese Culture Day, Zhang Run, China’s Ambassador to Mexico, said China has a desire to strengthen its ties to Mexico and push together toward a multipolar world and the “democratization” of international affairs. Indeed, more recent controversies in the bilateral relationship have not managed to knock it off course. China’s role in producing chemical precursors for fentanyl, which have come to major public attention in recent years, has not damaged its ties to Mexico. President López Obrador insists that Mexico does not produce fentanyl but simply transits the finished product through the country to the United States after it arrives from China. López Obrador has sought help from the Chinese, according to Spanish daily El País. The outlet reported that China’s Foreign Ministry responded by proclaiming that there is no fentanyl trafficking between China and Mexico.[iii] While China-Mexico ties must be understood in the context of U.S.-Mexico relations, which continue to dominate Mexico’s orientation, China’s increased ties to Mexico have economic, diplomatic, and security implications for the operational environment, especially under López Obrador, who wants to build a buffer between Mexico and the United States by leveraging ties to China.

Sources: 

“China ve potencial en la relación con México (China sees potential in relations with Mexico),” El Economista (a Mexican newspaper focused on business and economics), 15 April 2023. https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/internacionales/China-ve-potencial-en-la-relacion-con-Mexico-20230415-0017.html 

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries…Mexico and China have potential in exchange and cooperation in various areas such as culture, education, and tourism. In addition, the two countries are closely linked in the global industrial and supply chains, while direct investment from the Asian country to Mexico increased 18% in 2022.

“López Obrador insiste en que México no produce fentanilo y afirma que llega de China(López Obrador insists that Mexico does not produce fentanyl and that it arrives from China),” El País (the Spanish newspaper with hemispheric coverage), 5 May 2023. https://elpais.com/mexico/2023-05-05/lopez-obrador-insiste-en-que-mexico-no-produce-fentanilo-y-afirma-que-llega-de-china-tenemos-pruebas.htmlLópez Obrador affirmed that the shipment, intercepted this week in the port of Lázaro Cárdenas, is the latest evidence that the substance [fentanyl] is not produced in the country, but that it arrives finished to be sold in the U.S. market. “We already have proof,” said the president at a press conference. López Obrador announced that he will send a new letter to request the cooperation of the Xi Jinping government in the fight against drugs to identify suspicious shipments and prevent them from leaving Asia.

Notes:

[i] For a more comprehensive history of Mexico’s ties to China, see: “The Evolution of PRC Engagement in Mexico,” Global Americans, 24 August 2022. https://theglobalamericans.org/2022/08/the-evolution-of-prc-engagement-in-mexico/

[ii] For more information on China’s expansion of investment in Mexico, see: “Why Chinese Companies are Investing Billions in Mexico,” New York Times, 3 February 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/03/business/china-mexico-trade.html

[iii] For information on how cartels use social media to market and sell their product, see: Ryan Berg, “Latin America’s Cartels Embrace Social Media to Sell Drugs and Narco Culture,” OE Watch, 01-2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/380363

Image Information:

Image: A Mexican state dinner for Chinese President Xi Jinping, held by former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cena_de_Estado_que_en_honor_del_Excmo.Sr._Xi_Jinping,_Presidente_de_la_Rep%C3%BAblica_Popular_China,_y_de_su_esposa,_Sra._Peng_Liyuan%288959188433%29.jpg
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 2.0

UAE Seeking Greater Cooperation With Egyptian Defense Sector

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H.E. Mr. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt emplanes for Egypt (State Visit of President of Egypt to India (January 24-26, 2023)

H.E. Mr. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt emplanes for Egypt (State Visit of President of Egypt to India (January 24-26, 2023).

“…The United Arab Emirates has expressed great interest in investing in Egypt’s defense industry…”

In April 2023, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed made a state visit to Egypt. Although the visit took place in the shadow of conflict in Sudan, where Egypt and the UAE support opposing factions, it was primarily focused on expanding economic cooperation in various sectors, according to the first accompanying excerpt from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat. One sector where deeper cooperation would be highly consequential is military production. On paper, the Egyptian and Emirati defense industries are complementary. Egypt has a relatively strong industrial base and a history of military production but lacks funding and investment in new technologies.[i] The UAE, meanwhile, has invested heavily in new military technologies but lacks a large national industrial base or history of military production. According to the second accompanying article, from the Arabic-language Defense Arabia website, “the United Arab Emirates has expressed great interest in investing in Egypt’s defense.” The article highlights a Memorandum of Understanding on defense cooperation signed at the IDEX defense expo in February 2023 between Egypt’s Defense Ministry and the UAE’s Tawazun Council, a key Emirati defense industry government entity. In 2020, the Egyptian government launched an initiative to bolster weapons export production, with a view to making inroads in the African market and helping its moribund economy rebound.[ii] The initiative remains stalled in part due to financial constraints, but it could receive an important boost from Gulf countries seeking regional influence via economic investments.[iii] While Emirati entities have shown interest in investing in Egypt’s state-owned enterprises, they have also grown increasingly frustrated by the Egyptian government’s lack of transparency and market reforms. Thus, potential Emirati investment in Egypt’s defense sector remains a theoretical win-win scenario that is unlikely to move forward unless the Egyptian government is willing to accept at least some of its creditors’ conditions.

Sources:

“هل تعزز زيارة محمد بن زايد القاهرة الاستثمارات الإماراتية في مصر؟

Will Mohamed bin Zayed’s visit to Cairo strengthen Emirati investments in Egypt?” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 13 April 2023. https://tinyurl.com/2p8nuwpm

Egyptian economist Dr. Rashad Abdo told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the Emirati president’s visit to Cairo and his talks with the Egyptian president are economic talks par excellence. Whatever the political files for discussion, the context in which the visit comes confirms that economic issues will prevail.” According to Abdo, “the talks contribute to strengthening and increasing Emirati investments in Egypt in various sectors, and it is likely that the meeting focused on consolidating economic cooperation mechanisms and discussing specific Egyptian proposals for investment opportunities.”

“الإمارات تستثمر في الصناعات العسكرية المصرية.. ماذا وراء تعزيز التعاون الدفاعي بين البلدين؟

The UAE is investing in Egyptian military industries.. What is behind the strengthening of defense cooperation between the two countries?” Defense Arabia (military news website), 29 April 2023. https://tinyurl.com/47yzpj82

The United Arab Emirates has expressed great interest in investing in Egypt’s defense industry, seeking to take advantage of the country’s strategic location and its growing defense sector…In an important step towards enhancing defense cooperation between the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, in February 2023 at IDEX the Tawazun Council signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. The memorandum aims to enhance cooperation in the defense and security industries and to strengthen the strategic partnership between the two countries.

Notes:

[i] “Mapping the Formal Military Economy Part 1: A ‘Citadel’ of Egyptian Industry,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 18 November 2019. https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/11/18/mapping-formal-military-economy-part-1-citadel-of-egyptian-industry-pub-80334

[ii] “Egypt boosts local weapons production,” al-Monitor, 2 March 2020. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/03/egypt-plan-local-weapons-industry-africa-export-army.html

[iii] Since 2013, Gulf countries—primarily Saudi Arabia and the UAE—have provided the government of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi with as much as $100 billion in assistance, often with no strings attached; it is believed, however, that they are no longer willing to do so without getting guaranteed returns on their capital. See: “Gulf Investment in Egypt: A Balance of Mutual Need,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 8 May 2023. https://carnegie-mec.org/2023/05/08/gulf-investment-in-egypt-balance-of-mutual-need-pub-89641

Image Information:

Image:  H.E. Mr. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt emplanes for Egypt (State Visit of President of Egypt to India (January 24-26, 2023)
Source: India Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/meaindia/52651633276  
Attribution: CC 2.0

South African Army Chief Visits Russia To Discuss Arms Amid U.S. Tensions

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Vladimir Putin arrives in South Africa for the 10th BRICS Summit in 2018.

Vladimir Putin arrives in South Africa for the 10th BRICS Summit in 2018.

“The timing, if not the mission of Mbatha’s visit, seems likely to blow another hole in Pretoria’s claim to be non-aligned in the stand-off between Russia and the West over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”

Calling into question its self-proclaimed non-aligned status in the Russia-Ukraine war, South Africa’s army chief recently took a trip to Russia to discuss arms trade, following a diplomatic row with the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa. According to the Johannesburg-based The Daily Maverick, the head of the South African army, Lieutenant General Lawrence Mbatha, traveled to Russia in mid-May to discuss “issues relating to military cooperation and interaction aimed at the implementation of projects aimed at improving the combat readiness of the armed forces of both countries.” The visit is being read by many, including the author of the accompanying article, as coming in response to recent accusations by the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa that South Africa had loaded weapons and ammunition onto the Russian ship Lady R, when it docked in the country in December 2022. South Africa has denied the allegations. However, further reporting shows that South Africa’s National Conventional Arms Control Committee , the overseeing authority for such transfers, had indeed approved exports from South Africa to Russia prior to the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, some of which may have been delivered many years late. For its part, the South African National Defense Forces emphasized that Lt. Gen. Mbatha’s visit to Moscow had previously been scheduled before the U.S. Ambassador’s accusations. The opposition Democratic Alliance party has described the visit undertaken by members of the ruling African National Congress party to Russia as “shameful” and decried that “this unsolicited visit is the latest incident in a string where the South African government clearly and unashamedly demonstrates its support for Russia.” Long a reliable partner of the United States, South Africa has been taking the approach of many African states to the war in Ukraine.[i] It officially has a policy of non-alignment, which in practical terms, means active engagement with both Russia, on the one hand, and Ukraine and its NATO allies on the other. For its part, Russia is waging an all-out charm offensive in much of Africa, [ii] which is broadly proving to be successful.[iii] Just how sustainable this sort of status quo is for any of the parties—South Africa, the United States, or Russia—remains to be seen.

Source:

“SA army chief visits Moscow for talks about military cooperation,” The Daily Maverick (centrist newspaper from Johannesburg, South Africa), 15 May 2023. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-05-15-sa-army-chief-visits-moscow-for-talks-about-military-cooperation/

Lieutenant-General Lawrence Mbatha is meeting, among others, his Russian counterpart Colonel-General Oleg Salyukov. The timing, if not the mission of Mbatha’s visit, seems likely to blow another hole in Pretoria’s claim to be non-aligned in the stand-off between Russia and the West over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The two military chiefs discussed “issues relating to military cooperation and interaction aimed at the implementation of projects aimed at improving the combat readiness of the armed forces of both countries,” TASS quoted Russia’s Defence Ministry as saying.

The Russians appeared to be maximising the strategic character of the visit, possibly to embarrass the US and the West. The SANDF, by contrast, tried to play down the significance – and the timing – of what it called a “goodwill” visit, saying it was a “long standing arrangement… planned well in advance.”

It said Mbatha would visit the “higher combined Army Academy and the Artillery Military Academy” and would have staff talks with military officials. “It must be noted that South Africa has Military to Military bilateral relations with various countries in the continent and beyond,” the SANDF said….

The visit comes just days after a major diplomatic row erupted between South Africa and the US when US ambassador to SA, Reuben Brigety, told journalists he was confident South Africa had loaded weapons and ammunition bound for Russia on to a US-sanctioned Russian cargo ship, the Lady R, in Simon’s Town naval base in December 2022….

DA defence spokesperson Kobus Marais said Mbatha’s mission to Moscow “once again demonstrates the ANC government’s callousness and insensitivity to our diplomatic and trade dilemma. This unsolicited visit is the latest incident in a string where the South African government clearly and unashamedly demonstrates its support for Russia.

“Even after the collapse of the rand and the call from the United States to honour relationships they still went ahead and conducted this visit. It is shameful,” he said in a statement….

The government has insisted that it did not authorise any arms sales to Russia, meaning that the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) had not approved any exports. This appeared to leave open the possibility that arms might have been loaded on to the Lady R in a rogue operation.

However, the records of the NCACC do in fact indicate that some exports of arms to Russia have been approved by the NCACC.

Replying to questions in Parliament from DA leader John Steenhuisen in November last year, Mondli Gungubele, the minister in the presidency who also chairs the NCACC said:“The National Conventional Arms Control Committee has not received any request from any South African arms manufacturers for permission to export to the Russian Federation and/or Belarus arms, munitions, propellants and/or technology that may be used in the manufacture of the specified products since 24 February 2022.”

Notes:

[i] For more on African diplomatic approaches to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, see: Jason Warner, “African Stances on the Russia-Ukraine War Demonstrate Reliance on, Antipathy Toward West,” OE Watch, 09-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/425767

[ii] For more on Russia’s long-term attempts to garner African allies, see: Jason Warner, “Russia Laying Groundwork Ahead of July 2023 Russia-Africa Summit,” OE Watch, 01-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/434265

[iii] For more on Russian and the Wagner Group’s successful attempts to garner African allies, see: Jason Warner, “Top Ugandan General Adds to List of Growing Pro-Russian African Military Personnel” OE Watch,05-2023; Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264; Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Leaders in Mali, Burkina, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/russia-supported-military-rulers-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-guinea-continue-to-deepen-ties/

Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin arrives in South Africa for the 10th BRICS Summit in 2018.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_arrived_in_South_Africa_(2).jpg
Attribution: BY-SA 4.0

Key Arab Countries Join Chinese-Led Regional Body as Dialogue Partners

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Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat (2022).

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat (2022).

“… The group’s expansion, however, should not be interpreted as meant to pose a challenge to the West, but rather as a means to provide an alternative…”

A growing number of Arab countries are joining the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as “dialogue partners.” The SCO was established in the early 2000s as a mechanism for deepening political, economic, and security cooperation between countries of Central and South Asia. It has eight member nations (China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and over a dozen “observer” and “dialogue partner” nations, which may send delegates to SCO meetings and negotiate with the bloc on particular issues but do not have voting rights or official sway within the organization.

In the past year, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have all been officially granted “dialogue partner” status, with Bahrain expected to follow suit. With this, roughly two-thirds of countries in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility have joined the SCO in some capacity.[i] While these developments bear watching, SCO partnership is—at least for now—not necessarily at odds with existing security commitments and arrangements.[ii] Instead, engagement with the SCO is seen as part of a strategic diversification approach being pursued by Arab countries in response to emerging multipolarity. Arabic-language media largely sees these moves through an economic lens and as part of what the first accompanying excerpt, published in the Qatari-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadeed, considers China’s “efforts to consolidate a new multipolar world economic order.” Arab countries’ interest in the SCO, however, should not be dismissed as a purely economic phenomenon bereft of potential strategic implications. According to a former Egyptian diplomat cited in the second accompanying article, published last September in the prominent Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, Russia will seek to use the SCO “as an additional point in its confrontations with the West.” Russian attempts to use the SCO for strategic leverage against NATO would likely cause friction within the organization, clashing not only with China’s more regional and economic focus but also with the strategic interests of other SCO members. Nonetheless, growing Russo-Chinese geostrategic alignment may eventually enable the SCO’s orientation to gradually shift toward global geopolitics, particularly if its membership begins extending beyond Central and South Asia. Especially noteworthy in this regard is Iran’s interest in full SCO membership (it is currently an observer country). This interest, combined with the recent China-mediated Saudi-Iranian détente, makes the SCO a potential venue through which Iran may seek to compete with the United States. Last April, Iran was for the first time invited to participate in the SCO defense ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. As reported in the third accompanying excerpt, from the pro-Iranian Lebanese media outlet al-Mayadeen, Iran’s Defense Minister called for the establishing of a “Shanghai Maritime Security Belt” and more broadly using the SCO to promote a “balance of power.” Iranian ambitions notwithstanding, the SCO remains an “alternative” rather than a “challenge” to the West, as articulated by an Indian journalist cited in the fourth accompanying excerpt, from the Saudi English-language daily Arab News. Still, in a competitive world, today’s alternatives may become tomorrow’s challenges. Present Arab involvement in the SCO remains limited and largely economic in nature, but the potential for this involvement to morph in a way that that erodes U.S.-Arab security partnerships, while not imminent, is worthy of consideration.

Sources:

“منظمة شنغهاي.. ترسيخ الصين لاقتصاد التعددية القطبية يتمدّد عربياً

(Shanghai Organization.. China’s consolidation of the multipolar economy is expanding in the Arab world),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 16 April 2023. https://tinyurl.com/muamystt

China is seeking to attract a larger number of economically active countries to membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as part of its efforts to consolidate a new multipolar world economic order.

“ماذا يعني انضمام 5 دول عربية إلى منظمة «شنغهاي»؟

(What does the accession of 5 Arab countries to the ‘Shanghai Organization’ mean?).” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 17 September 2022. https://tinyurl.com/bdf9f2v8


Ambassador Raouf Saad, the former Egyptian assistant foreign minister and former Egyptian ambassador to Moscow, acknowledged that Russia will work to exploit the matter as an additional point in its confrontations with the West. However, he stressed the constants of Egyptian foreign policy, which refuses to “enter into alliances directed at the expense of its interests.”

“وزير الدفاع الإيراني: يجب تفعيل حزام الأمن البحري لمنظمة “شنغهاي

(Iranian Defense Minister: The ‘Shanghai Organization’ maritime security belt must be activated,)” al-Mayadeen (pro-Iran Lebanese media outlet), 29 April 2023. https://tinyurl.com/35dfp45z

Today, Saturday, the Iranian Minister of Defense, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, proposed adopting the “Shanghai Maritime Security Belt” mechanism with the aim of maintaining the security of communication lines and collectively guaranteeing global trade with the participation of the armed forces of member states…

During his remarks at the meeting of defense ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states in New Delhi, India, Ashtiani said that the achievements of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization “should promote global multilateralism and balance of power.”

“Middle Eastern participation grows in China-led security bloc as new countries join,” Arab News (English-language Saudi daily), 5 May 2023. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2298341/world
“It is a question of moving the weight or the center of gravity from the Western world — the US and EU combined — to the Eastern world, the place where the population of the world actually now exists overwhelmingly, the place where the fastest-growing economies are also present,” Suhashini Haidar, diplomatic editor at the English-language daily the Hindu, told Arab News. The group’s expansion, however, should not be interpreted as meant to pose a challenge to the West, but rather as a means to provide an alternative, she said.

Notes:

[i] Of the 21 countries in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility, only eight (Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Yemen) do not have any status in the SCO. However, Iraq, Israel, and Syria have all applied for dialogue partner status, while Turkmenistan has attended SCO summits as a guest attendee. That leaves Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, and Yemen as the only countries with no relationship to the SCO.

[ii] SCO partnership alone means little in terms of defense commitments: Turkey, a NATO member, is an SCO dialogue partner.  Full membership in the SCO should also not be equated to membership in a defense alliance, such as NATO, given that both India and Pakistan are full members. Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have an adversarial relationship with one another, are both dialogue partners.

Image Information:

Image: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat (2022).
Source: N509FZ, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shanghai_Cooperation_Organization_Secretariat_%2820220909162501%29.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

India’s Perspective on Negotiations With China Over Line of Actual Control

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S. Jaishankar and Wang Yi - 25 March 2022.

S. Jaishankar and Wang Yi – 25 March 2022.

“Despite several rounds of talks at the military and foreign office levels, only four of the disputed points have been ‘de-escalated’ by creating buffer zone.”

India and China have been negotiating to resolve disputes along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto India-China border, since a series of clashes in May 2020 resulted in dozens of deaths and numerous injuries. While both Indian and Chinese officials have stated that progress has been made to resolve the disputed border, the accompanying excerpted articles from India provide a look at how Indian officials differ in their assessment of the situation compared to China.

The first excerpted article from the independent English-language news website The Wire reports on the foreign ministers of India and China, who met in India in early May on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) ministerial meeting. The article notes that while Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang stated the situation at the border is “generally stable,” Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar believes there continues to be an “abnormal position” on the border. Jaishankar noted that both sides need to move forward on resolving the dispute but stated that India-China relations cannot be normal if there is no peace in the border areas. The article also notes that the border stand-off at the LAC has been going on for three years and that despite negotiations, “only four of the disputed points have been ‘de-escalated’ by creating buffer zones.” The article points out how Chinese officials have been hesitant to acknowledge that the two remaining disputed border points are a part of the ongoing situation and that since last September they believe the dispute “has largely been resolved.”  The second excerpted article from the independent English-language news website The Print reports on the signing of over 100 contracts by India’s army, navy, and air force under the emergency procurement power that the government set up for the armed forces several years ago. The government established the acquisition powers in response to the 2016 Uri terrorist attack but has allowed them to continue in the wake of the 2020 LAC border dispute with China. The powers allow the armed forces to make acquisitions outside of the requirements of the Make in India initiative if there is an operational requirement for them.[i] The article notes that a few of the acquisitions are with Indian and not foreign companies, including air defense systems, radar, and coastal missile batteries. Ultimately, the articles show that India continues to have a different perspective than China on how well the negotiations over the LAC are going and will allow emergency acquisitions for the armed forces to continue in support of its own position in this dispute.

Sources:

“Jaishankar Reiterates Abnormal Position at Border Standoff Despite China’s Claims of Stability,” The Wire (an independent English-language news website), 5 May 2023. https://thewire.in/diplomacy/jaishankar-reiterates-abnormal-position-at-border-standoff-despite-chinas-claims-of-stability

After Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang reiterated that border situation is “generally stable”, Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar on Friday, May 5, reiterated that the boundary stand-off continues to show that there is an “abnormal position” along the boundary.

…Speaking at the post-SCO meeting media briefing, Jaishankar disagreed with his Chinese counterpart’s assessment. “I think the issue is that there is an abnormal position in border areas. We had a frank discussion about it”.

The Indian minister added, “We have to take the disengagement process forward. I have made it very clear, publicly as well, that India-China relations are not normal and cannot be normal if peace and tranquility in the border areas are disturbed”.

Qin and Jaishankar engaged in talks for almost 70 minutes at the Taj Exotica in Goa before the commencement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s ministerial meeting on Thursday…

The stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in eastern Ladakh has lasted for almost three years, leading to the first deaths at the border in four decades.

Despite several rounds of talks at the military and foreign office levels, only four of the disputed points have been ‘de-escalated’ by creating buffer zones. The Chinese authorities have been hesitant to acknowledge that the remaining two points, Demchok and Depsang, are also part of the current border crisis, causing a stalemate in negotiations.

China have been stressing since September 2022 that the border crisis has largely been resolved, and they have been advocating for a “normalisation” of border management. This message was reiterated by Qin Gang during his first meeting with Jaishankar in March…

Snehesh Alex Philip, “Army, Navy, IAF get 6 more months for emergency procurement, MoD rushes to wrap up contracts,” The Print (an independent English-language news website from India), 7 April 2023. https://theprint.in/defence/army-navy-iaf-get-6-more-months-for-emergency-procurement-mod-rushes-to-wrap-up-contracts/1503627/

The Indian Army, Navy and Air Force are in the process of signing over 100 contracts under the emergency procurement powers given to them.

These powers were first given to the armed forces after the 2016 Uri attack to help them circumvent the slow bureaucratic system of procurement, and under these, the services can ink contracts worth Rs 300 crore each on their own.

Since 2016, these emergency procurement powers have been renewed multiple times, and have now been extended for an additional six months…

According to sources, these procurements, which will be indigenous with at least 60 per cent localisation, will cater to a large number of niche technology, drones and ammunition…

“The March rush is always there, including in the defence ministry, just like other ministries. The capital budget has also increased every year and hence the spending powers increase,” Laxman Kumar Behera, chairperson, Special Centre for National Security Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, told The Print.

“Also, the fact is that they are not signing many contracts with foreign companies but with Indian companies. It might take time initially because of the various trials, but it is good in the long term,” he added.

…On 30 March, the ministry signed contracts for the procurement of an improved Akash air defence system and 12 Weapon Locating Radars Swathi (Plains) for the Army at an overall cost of over Rs 9,100 crore.

While the Akash systems are manufactured by Bharat Dynamics Limited, Swathi is manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL).On the same day, the ministry inked a contract with BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited (BAPL) for procurement of Next Generation Maritime Mobile Coastal Batteries (Long range) weapon system and BrahMos [RG1]missiles at an approximate cost of over Rs 1,700 crore…

Notes:

[i] For more background on India’s emergency procurements amid the Make in India initiative, see: Matthew Stein “Emergency Spending for the Indian Armed Forces,” OE Watch, August 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: S. Jaishankar and Wang Yi – 25 March 2022
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:S.Jaishankar_and_Wang_Yi-_25_March_2022.jpg
Attribution: Government Open Data License – India (GODL)

Sudanese Conflict Harms Russian Military and Mining Interests

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Darfur report - Page 3 Image 1

Darfur report – Page 3 Image 1.

“The war that two Sudanese generals are currently waging for the seizure of power is not necessarily good news for Vladimir Putin, whose interests are very important there.”

On 18 April, the French-language website francetvinfo.frfrancetvinfo.fr published the excerpted article, which covers a French think-tank’s perspectives on Russian interests in Sudan amid that country’s conflict between two warring factions loyal to two different generals. The article notes that, according to the deputy director of the Franco-Russian Observatory think-tank, the conflict harms Russia’s interests in Sudan because Sudan has long allied with Russia in return for supplies of Russian grain and arms.[i] However, the instability and uncertain result of the war in Sudan could put the alliance in jeopardy, while undermining Russian military and economic objectives in the country. According to the article, beyond Sudan’s diplomatic support to Russia, Russia also engages in mining in Sudan, such as for gold, which helps Russia mitigate the impact of international sanctions. In addition, Russia has aspirations to use Port Sudan as a naval base.[ii] According to the second excerpted Russian-language article from gazeta.ru, the port would be significant for Russian geopolitical power projection by extending Russian influence to the Red Sea and, more broadly, the Indian Ocean. As a result, Russia’s concerns about these negative outcomes of the war in Sudan explains why Russia has been vocal in calling for ceasefire between the warring parties in Sudan.

Sources:

“Pourquoi la guerre des généraux “n’est pas un scénario très favorable aux intérêts russes”, selon un expert (Why the War of the Generals ‘is Not a Very Favorable Situation for Russian Interests”, according to an expert),” francetvinfo.fr (French public service radio network), 18 April 2023. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/soudan/soudan-pourquoi-la-guerre-des-generaux-n-est-pas-un-scenario-tres-favorable-aux-interets-russes-selon-un-expert_5777636.html

By consistently opposing UN resolutions condemning Russia and its war on Ukraine, Sudan has proven itself a staunch ally of Moscow. This is no surprise when one knows that Russia is its main supplier of arms and grain. And the war that two Sudanese generals are currently waging to seize power is not necessarily good news for Vladimir Putin, whose interests are very important there.

Sudan has become one of the main entry points for Russian influence on the African continent, explains Igor Delanoë, deputy director of the Franco-Russian Observatory in Moscow: “Russian companies in the field of extraction, mining, and more have actually been working there for years… It gives a window for Russia to the heart of the African continent”. 

A Russian naval base project in Port Sudan in the Red Sea is even on the table. But the current crisis is not helping Moscow’s affairs… Hence Russia is making repeated calls for ceasefires to end the Sudanese generals’ war as soon as possible.

Source:

“Зачем России база на Красном море? (Why a Russian Base on the Red Sea?),” 14 February 2023, gazeta.ru (pro-government Russian publication focusing on socio-political affairs) https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2023/02/14/16251997.shtml

The diplomats of modern Russia should proceed exclusively from long-term national interests. Russia repeatedly tried to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean in both the 19th and 20th centuries. In the recent past, aspirations to create naval bases in the Indian Ocean did not end in success either.There is hope that in the 21st century the country will finally establish itself both in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean, as well as in other critical points of the world oceans that are important from the geopolitical and geostrategic points of view.

Notes:

[i] After the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi, Russia in October 2019, Moscow began to show growing importance to the continent. However, Russia developed particularly close cooperation with Sudan, which raised hopes in Moscow that it had acquired a foothold on the continent to access other countries of the continent, such as being able to increase its influence politically and economically in the Central African Republic. Even when Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was removed from power by the Sudanese military in 2019, Moscow, which had supported al-Bashir, was still able to maintain close ties with Sudan. See: Sergey Kostelyanets, “Russia-Sudan Relations in the Early 21st Century: A Lost Opportunity or the Foundation for a New Beginning?” Asia and Africa Today 9 (2019): 56-62.

[ii] Sudanese General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (a.k.a. Hemedti) visited Russia for one week just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The reasons for the meeting remain unclear, but Russia reportedly smuggled hundreds of tons of illegal gold from Sudan as part of efforts to protect itself from expected international sanctions over the war in Ukraine. More broadly, attempting to mitigate the impact of international sanctions is an important feature of Russia’s policy in Africa, including in Sudan as well as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. Since the military’s overthrow of the civilian-led transitional government in 2021, Sudan had also been suffering an economic crisis, which was at least partly a result of the West halting financial aid to Sudan. This brought Russian and Sudan closer together ahead of the Russian war in Ukraine. Hamdi Abdel Rahman, “Uncovering the reasons behind Sudan’s Hemedti visit to Moscow amid the war in Ukraine,” futureuae.com, 10 March 2022. https://futureuae.com/ar-AE/Mainpage/Item/7191/a-silovik-as-the-best-choice-uncovering-the-reasons-behind-sudans-hemedti-visit-to-moscow-amid-the-war-in-uk

Image Information:

Image: Darfur report – Page 3 Image 1
Source: Sean Woo https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Darfur_report_-_Page_3_Image_1.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Vast Majority of Malians Express Confidence in Russia’s Ability To Address Jihadist Violence

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Map of Mali

Map of Mali.

“More than nine of out of ten Malians have confidence in Russia to help their country in the face of jihadist insecurity.”

In its annual report gauging public interest on various topics in Mali, the German foundation Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) has revealed deep—and sometimes counterintuitive—insights about how Malians think about the security situation in their country.[i] According to the accompanying news article from pan-African news aggregator AfricaNews.com,which summarized the FES report, one of the key takeaways of the poll is the deep trust that a vast majority of Malians appear to place in Russia’s ability to help the country address violence caused by its various jihadist insurgencies. As the article relays, “More than nine out of ten Malians have confidence in Russia to help their country in the face of jihadist insecurity,” with 69 percent of respondents “very confident” and 22 percent “rather confident.” Also, four out of five Malians viewed there to be no negative impact from the withdrawal of the French Operation Barkhane, while 48 percent of respondents instead noted that the security situation had improved with the French counterterrorism force’s departure.[ii] Another notable finding relates to Malian perspectives about their own defense and security forces: the most common sentiment expressed (by 58 percent of respondents) was the Malian defense and security forces represented a source of pride for the respondent. The next most common perception was that “I see them as my protectors,” a view offered by 36 percent of respondents. Only 1 percent said that “I have no confidence in defense and security forces,” and no respondent agreed with the sentiment that “I am afraid of the defense and security forces.” Given that Mali and its neighbor Burkina Faso are now the new epicenters of global jihadist terrorism-linked deaths,[iii] and both have engaged the Wagner Group,[iv] the findings of the FES report are perhaps counterintuitive for outside observers. Malians see security improving, their lots in life getting better, and they are generally satisfied with the military regime of Assimi Goïta and the way he is managing military and security affairs. The Wagner Group’s presence appears to be welcomed, and France is not missed. Such perspectives should be taken seriously as the United States and its allies seek to engage Mali and the broader region.

Sources:

“Les Maliens majoritairement confiants dans la Russie, selon un sondage, (A majority of Malians are confident in Russia, according to a poll),” AfricaNews (pan-African news aggregator), 4 May 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/05/04/les-maliens-majoritairement-confiants-dans-la-russie-selon-un-sondage/

More than nine out of ten Malians have confidence in Russia to help their country in the face of insecurity and jihadism, indicates an opinion poll carried out by the German foundation Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and published on Wednesday.

Malians are also satisfied in the same proportions with the leader of the junta, Colonel Assimi Goïta, who took power by force in August 2020, this survey shows.

The junta severed a longstanding alliance with France and turned militarily and politically to Russia from 2021.

The Malian army has received several deliveries of Russian military equipment as well as the reinforcement of hundreds of men, Russian army instructors according to it, mercenaries from the private company Wagner, whose actions are decried, according to France and its western partners.

The survey indicates that 69% of respondents are very confident and 22% rather confident in Russian aid in the fight against insecurity.

The general situation of the country has improved for more than four out of five Malians (82%), a result in clear increase compared to previous years, says the survey.

Nine out of ten Malians say they are satisfied with the management of the so-called transition period pending a return of civilians to power scheduled for March 2024.

Three out of five believe that keeping to the schedule [of the transition of power] is not important, the study notes. The first stage of this calendar, a constitutional referendum scheduled for March 19, has been postponed to an unspecified date.

Notes:

 [i] For a full copy of the FES report, in French, see: “Mali-Mètre 2023 – Enquête d’opinion, Fevrier 2023,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, May 2023. https://mali.fes.de/e/mali-metre-2023

[ii] For an example of the often-contentious relationship between Mali and France, especially regarding counterterrorism, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171

[iii] For more on the Sahel as a new epicenter for jihadist terrorism-linked deaths, see: Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, ith the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch,05-2023.; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429303

[iv] For more on how Mali and Burkina Faso have each approached their relationships with the Wagner Group, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Image Information:

Image: Map of Mali
Source: https://southafrica-info.com/africa/africa-from-a-to-z/attachment/map-of-africa-and-mali/
Attribution: Creative Commons 4.0

Burkina Faso Claims Disguised Jihadists, Not Military, Responsible for Civilian Killings

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Map of Burkina Faso.

Map of Burkina Faso.

“A lot of people think it’s the Russians who are guiding us,” said Coulibaly. “But the Burkinabe aren’t children.”

Burkina Faso’s ruling military regime has denied claims that its soldiers were responsible for the massacre of an estimated 136 people in the northern village of Karma in late April. According to the accompanying article from the pan-African news aggregator AfricaNews.com, Burkinabe Defense Minister Colonel Kassoum Coulibaly claimed that the mass killings, which took the lives of an estimated 45 children on 20 April 2023, were instead carried out by jihadists dressed as Burkinabe soldiers. In many reports, however, villagers have asserted that the attackers were wearing patches indicating they belonged to the 3rd Battalion of Burkina Faso’s Rapid Intervention Brigade. According to Amnesty International, villagers have attested that the mass raids likely came as a result of their assumed complicity in allowing some members of jihadist groups to “pass through their village,” before jihadists launched a deadly attack killing 40 members of Burkina Faso’s Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) forces in the village of Aourema.[i] For several years, Burkina Faso has been overtaken by violence from armed groups associated with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. Along with neighboring Mali, it is now one of the most active sites of jihadist violence in the world.[ii] As the United Nations and human rights groups have urged an investigation of the so-called Karma massacres, leaders in Burkina Faso have also claimed that these calls are being led by an “international coalition”[iii] of unnamed enemies of Burkina Faso, which are angry about its closer ties to Russia.[iv] Many reports have suggested that the Wagner Group is operating inside Burkina Faso, although the Defense Minister denies it. As he articulated: “A lot of people think it’s the Russians who are guiding us… But the Burkinabe aren’t children.” Though not necessarily implicating Wagner Group personnel, the massacre of civilians in Karma, Burkina Faso, looks and feels like another massacre of civilians in Moura, Mali, which killed an estimated 500-plus civilians under the guise of counterterrorism operations in March 2022. In that massacre, still under investigation, the culprits were not only members of the Malian army but also foreigners, widely believed to be part of the Wagner Group, which operates in support of Mali’s fight against jihadist elements.[v] Indeed, a notable trend in West Africa is the ever-deepening alliance between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, all led by military rulers, with the former two having likely welcomed Wagner mercenaries to address their destabilizing jihadist insurgencies.[vi] Collectively, these events indicate that civilians continue to bear the brunt of often-unrestrained counterterrorism efforts by African militaries. Where the Wagner Group seems to be in play, such widespread human rights abuses appear to be more severe than in other spaces where they are not.

Source:

“Coulibaly dénonce ‘une coalition international’ contre le Burkina Faso (Coulibaly denounces an ;international coalition’ against Burkina Faso),” AfricaNews.com (pan-African news aggregator, 4 May 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/05/04/coulibaly-denonce-une-coalition-internationale-contre-le-burkina-faso/

Burkina Faso’s defence minister on Wednesday denounced what he said was an “international coalition” lined up against his country and alleged there had been violations of the country’s air space.

And the country’s intelligence agency said an April massacre of civilians — which some rights groups have blamed on the army — was carried out by jihadist fighters dressed as soldiers.

Colonel Kassoum Coulibaly, appointed by the military junta running the country, also echoed the denials by the new regime’s leader, Captain Ibrahim Traore, that the Russian mercenary force Wagner was operating there.

“A lot of people think it’s the Russians who are guiding us,” said Coulibaly. “But the Burkinabe aren’t children.”

Russia, he insisted, was not setting the rules, and “gives us nothing”. It was the people of Burkina Faso who were contributing to the war effort against the jihadist insurgency in the country, he said.

“There is no Wagner here.”

Coulibaly was speaking in Ouagadougou at a meeting with union representatives and leaders of other civil society groups.

He suggested that the international coalition aligned against the country — the members of which he did not identify — was responding to the country’s closer ties with Russia since the coup last September that brought the military to power.

But the country only asked for what it needed, he insisted.“We don’t need anyone to send us a single foreign soldier,” he insisted. “We have our VDP,” he added, referring to the Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland (VDP), an auxiliary force.

Notes:

[i] “Burkina Faso: Responsibility of the army indicated in Karma massacre,” Amnesty International, 3 May 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/burkina-faso-la-responsabilite-des-forces-speciales-de-larmee-pointee-dans-le-massacre-de-karma/

[ii] For more on the Sahel’s rise as the deadliest global region for jihadist-linked terrorism, see: Jason Warner, “Coastal West African States Brace for Wave of Terrorism From the Sahel,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428040; Jason Warner, “African Leaders, UN See Terrorism in the Sahel as Dire,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429303; Jason Warner, “Global Terrorism Declined Slightly in 2022, With the Sahel as the New Epicenter,” OE Watch, 05-2023.

[iii] The trend of certain francophone African states decrying French, Western, or international forces targeting them or supporting violence within them has been on the rise. For examples, see: Jason Warner, “CAR Joins Mali in Accusing France of Funding Terrorists,” OE Watch, 04-2023.; Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171

 [iv] As Burkina Faso has become one of the epicenters for jihadist violence globally, it has undertaken a shift away from historical reliance on France, and toward Russia. For more, see: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism With Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264; Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso: A Bellwether on Russian and French Presence,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429302

 [v] “Mali: Massacre by the Army, Foreign Soldiers,” Human Rights Watch, 5 April 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/05/mali-massacre-army-foreign-soldiers

[vi] For more on the deepening diplomatic and security links between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, see: Jason Warner, “Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties,” OE Watch, 04-2023.; Jason Warner, “”West African States Ruled By Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Sanctions,” OE Watch, 03-2023.

Image Information:

Image: Map of Burkina Faso.
Source: https://www.publicdomainpictures.net/en/view-image.php?image=441923&picture=burkina-faso-transportation
Attribution: CCO Public Domain

Organized Crime Engulfing Ecuador

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Ecuador’s Police patrol streets of the capital, Quito, after civilian unrest.

Ecuador’s Police patrol streets of the capital, Quito, after civilian unrest.

“If the State Public Security Council declares these groups as terrorists, the Armed Forces of Ecuador may intervene in security matters without the need to amend the country’s Constitution.”

For several years, violent crime has risen rapidly in Ecuador. Guayaquil, the country’s second largest city and its main port, now contends with a homicide rate of 46 per 100,000 citizens, making it one of the most dangerous cities in Latin America. A host of unsavory criminal organizations have established an operational presence in Ecuador, from Colombian criminal organizations operating over the border, to Mexican cartels, and even the Albanian mafia.[i]

Criminal organizations take advantage of Ecuador’s weak governance, convenient ports, and dollar economy. First, Ecuador’s weak governance translates into safe havens for many groups. Second, the country’s Pacific coastline provides a multitude of options for shipping illicit products out of Ecuador. Lastly, the country’s dollarization means the proceeds from the sales of illicit products can be easily laundered. The excerpted article from Argentina-based Infobae, reports that Ecuadorian President Guillermo Lasso, under significant pressure to improve security, plans to declare criminal organizations “terrorist groups.” By doing so, Lasso intends to use Ecuador’s military to combat criminal organizations and bypass what would otherwise require constitutional changes.[ii] Meanwhile, as the Spanish daily El País reports, Lasso’s approval ratings have not only slipped dramatically, but he now faces impeachment charges in Congress. Lasso has lost significant support because of the country’s public insecurity, and the impeachment charges involve a claim that his government has been penetrated by criminal organizations.[iii] Ecuador’s slide into insecurity illustrates what is at stake when weak institutions, weak state capacity, and transnational criminal organizations converge.

Sources: 

“El gobierno de Ecuador busca declarar a las bandas criminales como terroristas (The Ecuadorian government seeks to declare criminal gangs as terrorists),” Infobae (the Argentina-based outlet with some of the best regional coverage of any Latin American outlet), 20 April 2023. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/04/20/el-gobierno-de-ecuador-busca-declarar-a-los-grupos-criminales-como-terroristas/

The Ecuadorian government wants the State Public Security Council to declare criminal groups as terrorists. The purpose of the measure is for the Armed Forces to be able to participate permanently in what the Minister of Government, Henry Cucalón, has called a war due to the “unprecedented terrorist wave” that the country is facing. If the State Public Security Council declares these groups as terrorists, the Armed Forces of Ecuador may intervene in security matters without the need to amend the country’s Constitution. Currently, Ecuador’s Congress is processing partial constitutional reforms so that the military can support the police in internal control and in the fight against organized crime.

“Las claves del juicio político del presidente de Ecuador Guillermo Lasso (The keys to the political trial of Ecuadorian President Guillermo Lasso),” El País (the Spanish newspaper with hemispheric coverage), 24 April 2023. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2023-04-24/las-claves-del-juicio-politico-del-presidente-de-ecuador-guillermo-lasso.htmlThis is the first time that a president has been subjected to impeachment since the approval of the Ecuadorian Constitution in 2008…In the end, the political trial will be determined in a complex social situation with a high level of insecurity affected by organized crime that keeps the population in anguish with extortion and violent deaths.

Notes:

[i] For more information on Ecuador’s descent into criminal insecurity and the role of Albanian organized crime, see: “Ecuador’s Crime Wave and Its Albanian Connection,” Americas Quarterly, 12 April 2023. https://americasquarterly.org/article/ecuadors-crime-wave-and-its-albanian-connection/; for more information on the Mexican connection, see: Ryan Berg, “Mexican Criminal Organizations Consolidate Their Positions in South America,” OE Watch, 05-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/416680

[ii] Ecuador’s president has called for Ecuador to receive military and police assistance like the U.S. aid program Plan Colombia. For more information, see: Ryan Berg, “President Lasso Calls for ‘Plan Ecuador’ Amid Growing Security Concerns,” OE Watch, December 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/400849

[iii] For more information on Ecuador’s complex impeachment process, see: “Crisis in Quito: President Guillermo Lasso Heads to Impeachment Vote,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9 May 2023. https://www.cfr.org/blog/crisis-quito-president-guillermo-lasso-heads-impeachment-vote-0

Image Information:

Image: Ecuador’s Police patrol streets of the capital, Quito, after civilian unrest.
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Police_Ecuador_Riot.jpg 
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY 2.0