Category Archives: OE Watch

Chadian President Threatens Withdrawal From Multinational Joint Task Force

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Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.

“The MNJTF is today hampered by the “lack of mutualization of efforts” needed to confront this common enemy [Boko Haram].”

On 28 October 2024, Boko Haram carried out a significant attack against Chadian soldiers in Barakaram on Lake Chad, killing at least 40.[i] Chadian President Mahamat Idris Deby Itno reacted to the Barakaram attack not by requesting greater collaboration with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF),[ii] which Nigeria has done in response to Boko Haram attacks. Rather, according to the excerpted article from the French-language website airinfoagadez.com, Deby Itno is considering withdrawing Chad from the MNJTF altogether, which could add further stress to the 20-year-old organization. Niger, which itself withdrew from the MNJTF in June after alleging the Economic Community of West African States was interfering in its internal affairs, had in late August reported to Nigeria that it would renew cooperation with the MNJTF. But now a Chadian withdrawal could undermine the force.

According to the accompanying article, Deby Itno sees insufficient “mutual” contributions to the MNJTF, perhaps implying that Niger’s wavering about staying in the organization contributed to the inability to stop Boko Haram from augmenting its ranks on the lake or that Chad is shouldering an excessive burden in the force. More specifically, the president’s office alleged that the MNJTF had become “lethargic,” which hindered Chad’s ability to engage in counterterrorism operations. The article suggested that if Chad operated outside the MNJTF, it could operate more autonomously and secure the country’s borders. The article did, however, claim that a Chadian withdrawal from the MNJTF would exacerbate the security vulnerabilities of other Lake Chad countries, including Niger, even though the Chadian president hinted that withdrawing from the MNJTF would not cause Chad to abandon its commitment to the regional fight against terrorism.

It is possible that Chad simply no longer needs the MNJTF for counterterrorism against Boko Haram, or at least that Deby Itno is confident in relying on his own army, despite tactical defeats such as that in Barakaram. Alternatively, Deby Into may be using the threat to withdraw from the MNJTF to solicit more international support for the force, a demand he has also made.[iii] Indeed, given that the MNJTF is based in N’Djamena, Chad, Deby Itno’s comments represent an existential threat for the MNJTF if they become reality.

Sources:

“Le Tchad envisage un retrait de la Force Multinationale Mixte (FMM) (Chad Considers Withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force),” airinfoagadez.com (media group combining Aïr-Info Agadez, RADIO Sahara FM, Agadez Web TV in Agadez, Niger and covering Sahelian political and security affairs), 3 November 2024. https://airinfoagadez.com/2024/11/03/le-tchad-envisage-un-retrait-de-la-force-multinationale-mixte-fmm/

Chad announced it is considering a possible withdrawal of its troops from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), citing a “lack of mutualization of efforts” in this regional coalition against Boko Haram. This decision, announced on November 3, comes after a recent deadly attack by the Boko Haram sect against Chadian forces in Barkaram, in Lake Chad province. On the ground, [President Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno] oversaw security reinforcement measures and ordered the launch of Operation Haskanite to track down the attackers.

The MNJTF “seems to be falling into lethargy,” which undermines the effectiveness of the joint fight. If the withdrawal were confirmed, Chad could opt for autonomous operations and concentrate resources on securing its borders. Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno reaffirmed the duty to protect Chadian citizens first and foremost, while emphasizing that the country would continue to uphold its commitments in the regional fight against terrorism.

Notes:

[i] The recent Boko Haram attack on Barakaram is the deadliest since a raid on the Chadian base in Bohoma along Lake Chad in 2020. Nearly 80 soldiers were killed in the Bohoma raid, showcased in a Boko Haram video revealing beheadings, soldiers fleeing the base, and a helicopter flying overhead to assess the situation in the aftermath of the attack.

[ii] The MNJTF was founded in 1994 to curb banditry. In 2015, the force, which by then comprised Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin, expanded its scope to ending the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin region. Its headquarters was also in the Chadian capital of N’Djamena, but the force was largely Nigeria-centric, given that it collaborated alongside multiple Nigerian counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram.

[iii] “Chad urges international community to boost support after Boko Haram attack,” france24.com. 30 October 2024. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20241030-chad-urges-international-community-to-boost-support-after-boko-haram-attack

Image Information:

Image: Chadian president Mahamat Idris Deby Itno is threatening to withdraw from the MNJTF and conduct counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram autonomously in response to the group’s latest massacre of Chadian troops in Barakaram.
Source: André Kodmadjingar (VOA), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mahamat_Idriss_Deby_(en_boubou_blanc).png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Nigerian Senator Proposes Employment of Private Military Companies Against Boko Haram

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Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.

“These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”

Nigeria is a country that has historically shied away from employing private military companies (PMCs) as a matter of national sovereignty. When the country has employed PMCs, including a South African-led contingent[i] that combatted Boko Haram in 2015, it has not yielded success beyond short-term gains. However, the excerpted Daily Trust article indicates that an influential politician in Boko Haram’s heartland, Borno State, is now calling for Nigeria to again employ PMCs. According to the article, Borno South Senator Mohammed Ali Ndume[ii] is urging Nigerian President Bola Tinubu to temporarily hire PMCs because the Nigerian military and Civilian Joint Task Force are making progress against Boko Haram but are unable to secure victory. However, the claims that progress is being made against Boko Haram is debatable. For example, the article notes that, among other larger attacks, Boko Haram (likely the faction of the late Abubakar Shekau[iii]) had just raided Ngoshe in the Gwoza local government area and abducted numerous civilians and killed six farmers.

In addition, Ndume’s suggestion that the PMCs would only operate “temporarily” raises questions about whether they could secure victory, given the late Shekau faction and the stronger Islamic State in West Africa Province faction and their predecessors have been fighting since 2009. Since then, neither the Nigerian military nor the Multinational Joint Task Force, comprising Nigeria and its four land neighbors and previous PMCs, has come close to defeating[iv] these factions. Furthermore, Ndume has hinted that the PMCs would not only finish Boko Haram in this “temporary” time frame but also combat the possibly even more widespread problem of banditry in northwestern Nigeria. Defeating either Boko Haram or the bandits, let alone both, would be an insurmountable task for Nigeria’s military even if several thousand PMC personnel were operating alongside them.

Ndume did not mention the company or origin of the PMCs whom he is advising Tinubu to employ. Nevertheless, the main option in the region would seem to be Russia’s Africa Corps, the successor of the Wagner Group. The recent pro-Russian sentiment exhibited during anti-corruption protests in northern Nigeria, as well as the Russian efforts to displace the West, including France in the Sahel and potentially the United States in Nigeria, could represent the beginning of Russian efforts to pull Nigeria closer into its orbit for the first time since the end of the Soviet era. If Ndume’s proposal gains traction, it could herald new geopolitical contestation in Nigeria, but few favorable outcomes for counterinsurgency or counter-banditry in the country.

Sources:

“Ndume asks Tinubu to hire military contractors to flush out Boko Haram,” Daily Trust (most widely circulated newspaper in northern Nigeria, which covers the region’s affairs from a critical perspective), 2 October 2024. https://dailytrust.com/ndume-asks-tinubu-to-hire-military-contractors-to-flush-out-boko-haram/

Senator representing Borno South, Mohammed Ali Ndume, has called on President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to temporarily hire the services of “military contractors” to wipe out the remnants of Boko Haram terrorists in Borno State. Ndume, who hailed the gallant performance of the military and Civilian JTF, said they are ill-equipped to carry out the task of eliminating the remaining insurgents who operate within. “All across the world, governments hire the services of military contractors to engage in certain places. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu can consider this as a short measure. These contractors will work with our military and Civilian JTF, who understand the terrain.”

“These contractors will come with their equipment and military hardware. In a very short time, they’ll eliminate those Boko Haram terrorists. The contractors can also be used to eliminate those bandits operating in the North West. His comment comes after Boko Haram terrorists launched a fresh attack in Ngoshe, Gwoza Local Government Area of Borno, where they  slaughtered six farmers and  abducted five others including women.

Notes:

[i] In 2015, ISWAP lost territory after the armies of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and South African PMCs led by a former apartheid-era South African Defence Force officer supported the Nigerian army to expel ISWAP from towns it had controlled in northeastern Nigeria. Nevertheless, disputes over payments of the PMCs, ISWAP’s retreat into rural areas, and ISWAP’s retaliatory attacks against Niger, Chad, and Cameroon undermined the counter-ISWAP offensive’s momentum. The PMCs and Nigeria’s three neighboring countries all eventually left Nigeria and ISWAP and the Shekau faction both renewed operations in 2017 to recapture territories and overrun Nigerian military outposts and bases.

[ii] Ndume himself was suspected of supporting Boko Haram and even jailed early in the insurgency in 2012 when he reportedly contacted Boko Haram leadership 73 times in one month. It later surfaced that he was, however, attempting to negotiate.

[iii] Since the Shekau faction split from ISWAP in 2016, Gwoza has remained one of its strongholds. In addition, mass abductions and killings of civilian farmers is typical of the Shekau faction’s brutality, whereas ISWAP has generally avoided tactics that alienate and brutalize the local population.

[iv] The Nigerian president from 2015 to 2023, Muhammadu Buhari, notoriously claimed that Boko Haram was “technically defeated” after coming into office only to see the two main factions resurface stronger than before by 2017.

Image Information:

Image: Despite being pushed from its core territories in northeastern Nigeria in 2015 by the Nigerian and neighboring armies and South African PMCs, Boko Haram reemerged by 2017, causing mass displacement of civilians and retaking many territories it had lost.
Source: VOA, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:R%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9sMaiduguri2016.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Arabic-Language Media Divided on Hezbollah’s Future

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Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah during a discussion with officials from supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei’s office, circa 2019. Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli strike in late September 2024.

“If [Nasrallah’s] lasting lesson for us is to turn a threat into an opportunity, then the resistance today has an opportunity to reorganize its affairs in a way that opens the door to a qualitative renewal on several levels in its mentality, management, programs, and work tools…”

Hezbollah’s future has become a subject of intense speculation in Arabic-language media following the group’s loss of its top leadership in Israeli strikes earlier this year, including that of Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024. [i] Hezbollah’s friends and foes alike agree that the leadership decapitation was a painful blow, but they disagree on the degree to which the group will be able to adapt and reconstitute in the aftermath. Ultimately, predictions of Hezbollah’s future hinge largely on whether Hezbollah is seen primarily as a hierarchically organized Iranian proxy or as a grassroots Lebanese political movement. Those who view Hezbollah as a hierarchically organized Iranian proxy are more likely to see the leadership decapitation as a critical blow, while those who emphasize its grassroots Lebanese identity tend to view the losses as difficult but surmountable.

The first two accompanying excerpts, from the UAE think tank Emirates Policy Center and the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida, illustrate the type of analysis that emphasizes Iranian influence and hierarchical organization as central components to Hezbollah’s strength. The first excerpt warns that the loss of old-guard leadership and the transition to a younger generation beholden to Iran is unlikely to be seamless and risks creating fissures that will fracture the group into smaller—arguably more dangerous—territorial-based factions. The second excerpt, meanwhile, suggests that Tehran may seek greater direct control over Hezbollah to prevent fragmentation and ensure organizational cohesion.

On the other hand, however, supporters and sympathizers of Hezbollah argue that the movement is resilient enough to reconstitute internally in the aftermath of the losses. Although the loss of Nasrallah and other top leaders is significant, they view it as a setback rather than a death blow for an organization designed to be adaptable. Writing in the wake of Nasrallah’s death, the editor-in-chief of the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar explains how the group can be expected to restructure and rebuild in a way that addresses the vulnerabilities that allowed Israel to decimate its leadership.

Ultimately, despite varied predictions—whether of fragmentation, increased Iranian control, or adaptive transformation—all analyses seem to agree on one point: Hezbollah, even after these substantial leadership losses, will continue to exert a powerful influence on the regional strategic landscape.

Sources:

تداعيات تغييب الجيل المؤسس لـ «حزب الله» اللبناني: إعادة التشكيل، أم التشظّي والانفراط؟

“The repercussions of the absence of the founding generation of the Lebanese Hezbollah: Restructuring, or fragmentation and disintegration?” Emirates Policy Center (UAE think tank), 9 October 2024. https://www.epc.ae/ar/details/brief/tadaeiat-taghyib-aljil-almuasis-li-hezbollah

In the case of Hezbollah, the absence of the “charismatic leader” is accompanied by strategic shocks and numerous major absences, which have put the fate of the entire party in question…

The new leadership of the party is likely to be formed from the generation of youth who were educated and trained in Iran, a generation that speaks Persian fluently no less than Arabic. These sons grew up in a time of prosperity, when the party had abundant resources, its revenues were abundant from various sources, and its weapons were advanced and plentiful…

But the sudden absence of the older generation, and the rise of the new generation of sons will create a huge void. It is a generation that does not enjoy the same historical ties that their fathers enjoyed; its decisions are controlled by Shiite doctrine and Iranian directives without any significant influence from Lebanese motives…

Perhaps the greatest danger to Lebanon and the region is the possibility of Hezbollah splitting and fragmenting into a group of competing terrorist organizations and gangs spread across the Lebanese arena… Such a dangerous scenario should never be allowed to be repeated in Lebanon…

In short, the series of Israeli assassinations against Hezbollah leaders has a tactical effect that Israel wants on the battlefield; it will reduce the party’s ability to manage and fight the battle, but it will open the doors of Lebanon and the region to the unknown, and put Hezbollah on the brink of fragmentation, sliding into more extremism, chaos, and the rise of warlords…

إيران تعيّن «وصياً» على «حزب الله»

“Iran appoints Hezbollah ‘guardian’,” al-Jarid (Kuwaiti daily), 10 November, 2024. https://www.aljarida.com/article/77625

A source in the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps revealed to al-Jarida that Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, the assistant commander of the force, has been appointed as a “supervisor” of the Lebanese Hezbollah, pending the appointment of the party’s new secretary-general after the assassination of its secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah…

The source indicated that Fallahzadeh, who was the shadow of the former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, and who has extensive experience in managing wars and field battles, will temporarily supervise the party, and his appointment will not require any organizational procedures within the party, nor will it result in any change in the party’s political structure. He stressed that the party’s political decision will remain in the hands of its “Lebanese leaders,” who will remain in their positions and communicate with other Lebanese forces and with the Lebanese authorities, explaining that Fallahzadeh’s mission lies only in helping to manage the current war with Israel, and securing communication and logistical support for the party.

المقاومة أطلقت ورشة ترميم هيكليتها وقدراتها

“The resistance launched a workshop to restore its structure and capabilities,” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 10 October 2024. https://www.al-akhbar.com/Politics/385253/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87

First, the blow that the resistance received at the level of its central leadership was very harsh, very large, and very broad, and left a direct impact on everything…

Until now, it can be said that the hierarchy and mechanism for issuing essential and urgent decisions, and the sequence of work and implementation orders, are being organized in a way that provides the best organizational environment for the work of the resistance military units, whether those present in the field or those awaiting orders to join…

[Nasrallah’s] role had grown after the martyrdom of leaders from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran during the past two decades, which forced him to distribute their tasks to others, but he had his share of every issue, which was reflected in the past ten years in an extreme centralization in the leadership structure and decision-making in the party. This is what made the enemy bet that the assassination of the Sayyed constitutes a blow to the backbone not only of Hezbollah, but of an entire axis.

Therefore, we must all adapt to the new situation, and not place the burden on whoever takes over the matter after him as was the case before, and not ask anyone, not even God, to bring us an identical copy of the martyred Sayyed. If his lasting lesson for us is to turn a threat into an opportunity, then the resistance today has an opportunity to reorganize its affairs in a way that opens the door to a qualitative renewal on several levels in its mentality, management, programs, and work tools…

Notes:

[i] The speculation is hardly confined to Arabic-language media. For a sample of the debate within the U.S. think tank community, see for instance: Sarah E. Parkinson and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl. “Targeted Killings Won’t Destroy Hezbollah,” Foreign Affairs, 11 November 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/targeted-killings-wont-destroy-hezbollah; Bruce Hoffman. “The Nasrallah Killing Is a Crushing Blow to Hezbollah,” Council on Foreign Relations, 28 September 2024. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/nasrallah-killing-crushing-blow-hezbollah; “Experts react: Hassan Nasrallah is dead. What’s next for Hezbollah, Israel, and Iran?” Atlantic Council, 28 September 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-hassan-nasrallah-is-dead-whats-next-for-hezbollah-israel-and-iran/

Image Information:

Image: Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah during a discussion with officials from supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei’s office, circa 2019. Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli strike in late September 2024.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sayyid_Nasrallah.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

North Korean State Media Quickly Censors Its Own Photos

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A before and after image from the same PRK state media article reporting on the contents of a balloon launched from South Korea. The first image was downloaded before the PRK decided to censor and pixelate the image, while the second one obscures the contents (Oct 15, 2024).

“The security forces organs in the areas where the report of discovery was made have blocked the relevant districts and are conducting the work for searching, gathering and disposal.”

For more than a decade, South Korean NGOs have routinely launched balloons into North Korea containing anti-regime leaflets, USB drives, and CD/DVDs containing foreign media and news reporting, food, medicine, and other items. North Korea considers these launches to be a serious threat to regime stability because the items provide information outside the control of its oppressive and all-consuming censorship apparatus. The balloon launches occur along or near the demilitarized zone when winds are favorable to carry them into the North. North Korea has threatened to attack balloon launch sites or military targets, as Pyongyang claims Seoul is responsible for not stopping the NGOs.

North Korean state-controlled general circulation major daily newspaper Rodong Sinmun recently released several photos of items contained in a probable South Korean NGO-launched balloon into North Korea. However, within 24 hours of releasing the photos, North Korea redacted them by pixelating the balloon’s contents. This appears to be an act of narrative damage control by Pyongyang. North Korean state media at all levels has been criticizing these balloon launches for months, with increasingly frustrated commentaries and threats by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong, who is vice chair of the central committee of ruling Korean Workers Party.[i]

In an unusual move, Rodong Sinmun attached the images to another warning commentary by Kim Yo Jong. North Korea characterizes the contents of the balloons as a provocation and sanitizes the areas where they land like a hazardous materials spill site. North Korean state media had not discussed the contents of the balloons before, rather referring to them as “dirty rubbish” that “even a mutt dislikes to touch.” By not providing too much information, it allowed the readers, both domestic and international, to infer the contents. By explicitly showing the contents of the balloon, North Korea removed the mystery. The balloon in this image contains choco-pies (a South Korean favorite) and other snacks, possibly some sanitary napkins or baby wipes, and medicine, among other things. It is probable, but again unclear because of the image quality, that it also contained media or anti-regime materials.

North Korea would likely be reacting similarly even if the balloons contained only food, hygiene, and personal items. The quality of these items, information about the outside world, the hint of a better life in South Korea, and the opportunity it holds anger the North Korean regime more than the items themselves. North Korea has consistently demonstrated in its actions that it considers external information to be a critical threat to the Kim Jong Un regime.

Sources:

“김여정 조선로동당 중앙위원회 부부장 담화 (Press Statement of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the C.C., WPK),” Rodong Sinmun (main party newspaper for general audiences), 18 November 2024. http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?MTVAMjAyNC0xMS0xOC1OMDA1QA

Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued the following statement on November 17:

On November 16, various kinds of political agitation leaflets and dirty things sent by the ROK scum were dropped in many areas near the southern border and even in the depth area of the DPRK.

A continuous report of this was made from various parts all day long yesterday.

The security forces organs in the areas where the report of discovery was made have blocked the relevant districts and are conducting the work for searching, gathering and disposal.

We strongly denounce the shameful and dirty acts of the ROK scum who committed the provocation of scattering anti-DPRK political and conspiratorial agitation things once again in disregard of our repeated warnings.

There will be no house owner who hardly gets enraged at such dirty rubbish scattered in the clean yard, which even a mutt dislikes to touch.

The inviolable territory of the DPRK is being polluted, and much labor had to be used in disposing of these wastes.

There is a limit to patience. The DPRK people’s anger at the most disgusting curs has reached the extremes. The scum will have to pay a dear price.

“조선민주주의인민공화국 사회안전성 대변인발표 (Spokesman for DPRK Ministry of Public Security Releases Statement),” Korean Central News Agency (state-controlled news service), 18 October 2024. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/31281702f661bf24e69b10aab3345c6e.kcmsf

Pyongyang, October 18 (KCNA) — On Friday morning, rubbish scattered by a large balloon sent by the ROK scum was found again in Hwaam-ri and Munbong-ri of Phyonggang County in Kangwon Province and in Ryonghak-ri of Cholwon County of the province near the southern border of the DPRK.

The security organs in those areas blockaded and searched the areas and forensically examined and disposed of the collected rubbish.

The Ministry of Public Security informed the KPA General Staff of the results of the examination.

“김여정 조선로동당 중앙위원회 부부장 담화 발표 (Press Statement of Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Kim Yo Jong),” Korean Central News Agency (state-controlled news service), 10 June 2024. http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/8ec19906a01596bdfc2ca10bf9f8d555.kcmsf

Pyongyang, June 10 (KCNA) — Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued the following press statement on Sunday.

The ROK connived at the provocative act of scattering the political agitation rubbish across the border of the DPRK again on June 6 and 7 despite our repeated warning against the intemperate psychological warfare of the scum who defected from the DPRK, thus aggravating the situation.

In the period between June 6 and 8, the despicable political agitation rubbish was discovered in Singye and Thosan counties of North Hwanghae Province, Jangphung County and Phanmun District of Kaesong Municipality, Kosan, Phyonggang and Cholwon counties of Kangwon Province and other areas of the DPRK near the border.

This is a prelude to a very dangerous situation.

Politicians of Seoul are trying hard to justify their stand with the only and strange deformed logic in the world that regulates and judges the “freedom of expression” and “provocation” in the windward direction. And they formalized their behavior just like a guilty filing the suit first that they have resumed the loudspeaker broadcasting smear campaign again against the DPRK’s counteraction against their challengeable act, thus creating a new crisis.

We strongly denounce the despicable and childish behavior of the ROK and clarify our stand responding to it.

Notes:

[i] Kim Yo Jong comments are likely intended to convey authoritative messages from the PRK government without restraining leader Kim Jong Un’s options. Her messages are undoubtedly authoritative, but not final.

Image Information:

Image: A before and after image from the same PRK state media article reporting on the contents of a balloon launched from South Korea. The first image was downloaded before the PRK decided to censor and pixelate the image, while the second one obscures the contents (Oct 15, 2024).
Source: http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTJAMjAyNC0xMS0xOC1IMDAzQDE1QDFAQDBAMTA==
Attribution: Public Domain under Art. XII of the Copyright Act of North Korea, aka PD-KPGov, which is “government or other works in the public domain”

Iran Struggles to Supply Its Electric Grid

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The Tehran headquarters of Tavanir, a subsidiary electricity company of Iran’s Ministry of Electricity.

“There will be electricity cuts in the domestic and commercial sectors.”

While Iran boasts the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves after Russia, it is increasingly difficult for it to provide enough supply to its electrical generating stations to power its electric grid. The problem is especially severe in the winter as consumption increases. Iran’s failure to provide electricity has ramifications for domestic stability and could affect the larger regional operational environment.[i]

The excerpted notice, first posted on the Iranian Ministry of Electricity’s website, noted that there will be forthcoming power disruptions, partially due to the decision not to use mazut. This heavy, low-quality fuel oil is a byproduct of refining but degrades electrical generating plants and causes heavy air pollution. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s decision to shutter mazut-burning plants suggests regime fear of popular backlash to air pollution trumps the discord of suffering power cuts.[ii] He is right to worry; Iran has experienced nationwide protests over poor stewardship of the environment.[iii]

While Iranian analysts place responsibility for the energy shortfall on growing consumption, especially during the cold winter months, such an explanation may be too straightforward and exculpatory toward the regime: Iran’s population growth rate is only 0.8 percent. More likely is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which dominates the power industry, is diverting resources for its own aims and agendas. It is unclear if the pending energy cuts will spare the IRGC’s manufacturing base, but, if so, it will likely spark popular antagonism against the elite military force and its domination of Iran’s industrial sector.

Because Iran’s refinery network is decrepit, Iran cannot adequately refine gasoline domestically. This forces the regime to export gas for refining and then reimport it for use in power generation and to inject into oil fields to enable further oil extraction. This creates a lose-lose situation for the Iranian leadership: either it reverts to burning highly polluting substances and risks public protest, or it suffers more frequent power shortfalls and risks public unrest and industrial shortfalls. The danger of either scenario for those outside Iran is similar: When Iran faces domestic unrest, it often lashes out militarily to distract its own public around the nationalist flag.

Sources:

 “اطلاعیه شماره ۱ شرکت توانیر درباره برنامه قطع برق”(Announcement No. 1 of Tavanir Company about the power cut program),” Donya-e-Eqtesad.com (nominally independent center-right financial newspaper), 9 November 2024. https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/بخش-سایت-خوان-62/4121436-فوری-اطلاعیه-شماره-شرکت-توانیر-درباره-برنامه-قطع-برق  

“We would like to inform our dear compatriots that due to the onset of the cold season and the increase in gas consumption in the domestic sector and the restriction of the supply of gas fuel to power plants, and in accordance with the decisions taken not to consume mazut in some power plants, there will be electricity cuts in the domestic and commercial sectors. Respected subscribers can be informed about the time schedule for imposing electricity restrictions from the relevant electricity distribution companies on the My Electricity System website.”

Notes:

[i] For previous discussion of Iranian blackouts, see: Michael Rubin, “Blackouts in Bushehr Province Risk Unrest,” OE Watch, August 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/387127/download/

[ii] For previous discussion of Iranian air pollution, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Pollution Problems Peak,” OE Watch, September 2021. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-21393-00-00-00-39-51-99/2021_2D00_09_2D00_01-Iran_1920_s-Pollution-Problems-Peak-_2800_Rubin_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true&_=465e6ac6175646f29c3498916f3fcd2f

[iii] For discussion of Iran’s arrests of environmental activists, see: Michael Rubin, “Iranian Environmentalists Arrested as Spies,” OE Watch, April 2018. https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/13-17883-00-00-00-28-50-74/2018_2D00_04_2D00_01-Iranian-Environmentalists-Arrested-as-Spies-_2800_Rubin_2900_.pdf?forcedownload=true&_=401ef985fd9b4fb89199f41137332cb3

Image Information:

Image: The Tehran headquarters of Tavanir, a subsidiary electricity company of Iran’s Ministry of Electricity.
Source: https://static.neshanmap.ir/places/images/dca/1043877_3901745–شرکت-توانیر.jpeg
Attribution: Nashan.ir

Iranian Navy Closely Monitors U.S. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf

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“Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shahram Irani,” published on 3 November 2024.

“The U.S. aircraft carrier, as well as sixteen destroyers and frigates present in the region, are monitored by our reconnaissance drones, and we are surveilling them from above.”

As tensions stemming from the Gaza war continue, Iran claims that it is sending a message through its monitoring of U.S. naval vessels in regional waters, which it believes do not belong there. As per the excerpted article published by the semi-official Iranian news outlet Mehr News Agency, on 3 November, marking the anniversary of the 444-day hostage crisis, the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, said, “The U.S. aircraft carrier, as well as sixteen destroyers and frigates present in the region, are monitored by our reconnaissance drones, and we are surveilling them from above.” Irani noted that Iranian reconnaissance drones could be seen with the naked eye, and their presence was intended to send a clear message to the United States that its presence is not welcomed in the Middle East and that its naval movements in the region are being monitored. He added, “This is a very important point that we have the ability to monitor the enemy at sea, and it’s become a concern for the Americans.”

Previously, the rear admiral made a reference to the Marshall Islands-flagged Suez Rajan oil tanker (renamed St. Nikolas), which the United States confiscated in 2023 for carrying Iranian oil as it headed to the Bahamas. The rear admiral stated Tehran was able to seize it back from the Gulf of Oman.[i] Irani also said that Iran is capable of escorting oil and commercial shipments   point of strength.”

Although Irani made his comments prior to the U.S. presidential election, it is worth noting that the previous Trump administration’s oil embargo—as part of its maximum pressure strategy—escalated U.S.-Iran tensions to a historic high with the regular seizing and sabotaging of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Tehran has always threatened to shut down the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil passes.[ii] As these comments were made on the anniversary of the Iran hostage crisis, Irani appears to have wanted to emphasize Tehran has command of the waters in the region regardless of tensions and whatever the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.

Sources:

“ناو هواپیمابر، ۱۶ ناوشکن و ناوچه آمریکا را در منطقه رصد می کنیم (We monitor US aircraft carrier, 16 destroyers and frigates in the region)” Mehr News Agency (Iranian state media outlet), 3 November 2024. http://mehrnews.com/x36nJL

According to Mehr News Agency, Shahram Irani, the commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, met with Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Saeedi, custodian of the holy shrine of Fatima Masuma, stated in reference to the National Day of the Fight Against Global Arrogance: “The US aircraft carrier, as well as sixteen destroyers and frigates present in the region, are monitored by our reconnaissance drones, and we are surveilling them from above.”

He stated that our reconnaissance drones can be seen with the naked eye to tell the Americans that their place isn’t in the region and that we are always monitoring their movements. He added: “This is a very important point that we have the ability to monitor the enemy at seas, and it’s become a concern for the Americans.”

The commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that our navy was able to escort the ships of the countries… the navy escorts oil and commercial shipments from the shores of Venezuela to America, Europe, and Africa, and if any aggression is made against our ships, we will respond to it.

He added, “One of the recent actions we carried out was recapture an oil shipment that had been seized by the United States, along with the vessel that was transporting it, despite the US having renamed it.”

Irani added: “We are going after showing system authority in the depths of the oceans, and our actions will be a point of strength for the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Notes:

[i] Kathryn Armstrong, “Iran seizes oil tanker St Nikolas near Oman,” BBC News, 11 January 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67948119

[ii] Mark Landler, Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, “US Puts Iran on Notice and Weighs Response to Attack on Oil Tankers,” New York Times, 14 June 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/us/politics/trump-iran-tanker-hormuz.html

Image Information:

Image: “Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shahram Irani,” published on 3 November 2024.
Source: Mehr News Agency, http://mehrnews.com/x36nJL
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran and Saudi Arabia Deepen Defense and Bilateral Ties

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General chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, and his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, in Tehran.

“We are interested in having the Saudi navy in the coming year participate in a naval exercise with Iran, either with its naval units or as an observer.”

Iran and Saudi Arabia’s defense ties grow despite Donald Trump winning the 2024 U.S. presidential election—known for his maximum pressure strategy on Tehran. According to the semi-official media outlet Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA), on 10 November, the general chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, met with his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, in Tehran, where they discussed “the development of defense diplomacy and the expansion of bilateral cooperation.”

According to the excerpted article from the semi-official news outlet Mehr News Agency, during the meeting, Major General Bagheri also invited the Saudi defense minister to visit Iran and said Tehran is “interested in having the Saudi Navy participate in a naval exercise with Iran in the coming year, either with its naval units or as an observer.” The countries recently participated in a joint naval exercise with Russia and Oman, as well as five other observer countries—among those Saudi Arabia—in the Sea of Oman.[i] General Bagheri is the second high-ranking Saudi official to visit Iran after Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan visited in June 2023.[ii]

The storming of the Saudi missions in Tehran and Mashhad following the execution of prominent Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in January 2016 prompted Saudi Arabia to sever ties with Iran.[iii] In the years since, particularly under the Trump administration, Riyadh had taken a harder stance against Tehran. After the 2019 Aramco attacks, Saudi Arabia felt vulnerable due to Iran-backed attacks, which the administration failed to address. This led to a reassessment of its approach to Tehran and a de-escalation of tensions. It was not until a China-brokered deal in March 2023 that the two neighbors recommenced relations with the reopening of embassies in their respective countries.[iv] According to the Mehr News Agency article, Ruwaili called the Beijing deal “a good basis for increasing bilateral work together between the two countries,” noting that Riyadh considers “this agreement as a strategic opportunity.”

The rare Saudi visit to Iran demonstrates that rapprochement will continue despite a new U.S. administration that is expected to resume its maximum pressure strategy on Tehran. Iran’s “neighborly policy” of improving ties with its Arab neighbors appears to be paying off for now.

Sources:

“رئیس ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح عربستان با سرلشکر باقری دیدار کرد (Saudi Arabia’s chief of staff of the armed forces met with Major General Bagheri),” Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA; semi-official news agency), 13 November 2024. isna.ir/xdSfrg

General Fayyadh bin Hamed al-Ruwaili met with the chief of staff of the armed forces. According to ISNA, quoting the public relations office of the general staff of the armed forces, General Fayyadh bin Hamed al-Ruwaili, [Saudi] chief of staff of the armed forces, met and talked with Major General Mohammad Bagheri, the[ Iranian] chief of staff of the armed forces.

The development of defense diplomacy and the expansion of bilateral cooperation are among the main topics of this meeting.

Today at noon, the Saudi chief of staff of the armed forces arrived in Tehran as the head of a high-ranking military delegation.

“همکاری‌های دوجانبه دفاعی و نظامی ایران و عربستان بررسی شد (The bilateral defense and military cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia was reviewed),” Mehr News Agency (semi-official news outlet), 13 November 2024. mehrnews.com/x36rn3

Major General Mohammad Bagheri, after greeting and welcoming, said: “We believe that cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, given numerous commonalities and abundant potential, can increase.”

The chief of staff of the armed forces of Iran emphasized improving cooperation in the fields of defense and exchanging experiences in the education and sports sectors, adding: “We are interested in having the Saudi navy in the coming year participate in a naval exercise with Iran, either with its naval units or as an observer.”

Examining the improvement of bilateral defense and military cooperation and the Palestine issue was among the topics that were part of the parties’ discussion.

Army General Fayyadh bin Hamed al-Ruwaili, at the time of thanking for the hospitality of the chief of staff of the armed forces, highlighted and emphasized the improvement of the level of cooperation in various fields in the armed forces of the two countries and stated: “The Bejing agreement was a good basis for increasing bilateral work together between the two countries and we consider this agreement as a strategic opportunity.”

He also emphasized the importance of the two countries’ role-playing and influence in uniting the Islamic and regional countries and the continuation of political and defense relations between the two countries.

At the end, Major General Mohammad Bagheri invited the Saudi defense minister to visit Iran.

Notes:

[i] “Iran and Saudi Arabia hold joint naval exercise in Sea of Oman,” Times of Israel, 24 October 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-and-saudi-arabia-hold-joint-naval-exercise-in-sea-of-oman/

[ii] Amir Vahdat, “Saudi foreign minister in Iran as part of restoration of diplomatic ties after a 7-year rift,” Associated Press, 17 June 2024. https://apnews.com/article/saudi-arabia-iran-c04f4483f660c65229535ae80083dbd6

[iii] “Saudi Arabia breaks off ties with Iran after al-Nimr execution,” BBC News, 4 January 2016.  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35217328

[iv] “What You Need to Know About China’s Saudi-Iran Deal,” United States Institute of Peace, 16 March 2023. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal

Image Information:

Image: General chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, General Fayyadh al-Ruwaili, and his Iranian counterpart, Major General Mohammad Baqeri, in Tehran,”.
Source: mehrnews Mehr News Agency (semi-official news outlet), 13 November 2024, com/x36rn3
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Hints at His Own Succession

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Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks to the Assembly of Experts in Tehran, 7 November 2024.

“There will be no pause or interruption in the system….”

On 7 November 2024, Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is 85 years old,[i] appeared before the 88-member Assembly of Experts, a clerical body charged with selecting the new supreme leader, to discuss—obliquely but still more directly than ever before—his own succession. Published on his official website, Khamenei.ir,Khamenei’s speech discussed the possibility of his own “absence” and the need for a rapid transition. While his comments were oblique, they nevertheless represented the bluntest discussion of an increasingly sensitive subject. To hint at his own mortality and the looming succession risks not only transforming Khamenei himself into a lame duck but can also be destabilizing as regime officials begin to maneuver for the post-Khamenei scramble.

Whenever it occurs, the leadership transition in Iran will have an important impact on the operational environment, because, constitutionally, the supreme leader is also the commander-in-chief with authority to hire and fire military commanders in both the Revolutionary Guard and the regular Iranian Army. The speed of succession could also affect both domestic and regional stability. Quick acceptance of a new leader lessens the chance of domestic unrest. However, there is the risk a new leader may resort to military action, terrorism, or through proxies, to establish his revolutionary bona fides. One major question is whether Khamenei’s successor will launch a cultural revolution to try to tamp down dissent in a way that could lead to a public backlash and exacerbate unrest.

Beyond nods to his succession, Khamenei’s speech included other notable takeaways. While Khamenei has previously voiced concern about declining revolutionary fervor among Iranian youth, the speech was also the first time that Khamenei raised the possibility that the gains that resulted from the 1979 Islamic Revolution could be reversible.[ii] Khamenei also criticized former Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin for allowing the Soviet experiment to descend into dictatorship at the expense of “communist democracy,” but does not appear self-aware that many within Iranian society see him as a dictator and that Iran as a regime has betrayed its promised values: chants of “death to the dictator” during last year’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” are one example of this public sentiment.

Sources:

“بیانات در دیدار اعضای مجلس خبرگان رهبری”(Statements in the Meeting of the Assembly of Experts),” Khamenei.ir (official website of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), 7 November 2024. https://tinyurl.com/48rfb7rj

Within the structure and general framework of the Islamic system, the primary role of the Leader is to ensure that the system’s orientation is directed toward the goals of the Revolution. This is the main responsibility of the Leader. The Revolution took place for a purpose. Of course, all revolutions have goals. They have fundamental goals that lead them to reshape and transform the order of life… [Those opposed to revolution] were able to prevent [previous] revolutions from achieving their goals and reverse their course. For instance, in the great French Revolution, which was one of the most significant revolutions in our contemporary history, barely 15 years had passed since the start of that revolution when the previous authoritarian monarchy and dictatorship were reestablished. All the efforts of the people, the endeavors of renowned French intellectuals, the efforts and struggles of the masses, the casualties, the massacres, the conflicts — all of these were essentially nullified and destroyed in less than 15 years!

A similar but worse case was what happened to the Soviet Revolution, which was also another major revolution. There too within less than a decade, the claims, the rhetoric, the professed justice and so-called “communist democracy” all vanished. A dictator, a ruthless tyrant like Stalin, seized power and that was the end of it. So this is a risk that all revolutions face.

The Quran repeatedly emphasizes and warns about this matter, not just once or twice, but perhaps tens of times. The holy verses of the Quran repeatedly speak about regression and returning to the previous state from which people had been liberated and saved. This warning is directed toward both the believers and the unbelievers.

An element is necessary to prevent this [regression]. In the Islamic system, this element is the position of the Leader. Such a deviation must be prevented by a leader. This is very important. It is very important…! The establishment and creation of the Assembly of Experts signifies the uninterrupted progress of the Islamic system. This means that there will be no pause or interruption in the system. The Assembly of Experts exists to be able to designate a successor. Therefore, this succession will continue with full strength, power, and ability. This readiness and presence of the Assembly of Experts has such a meaning. If the current Leader were to be absent, the Assembly of Experts would immediately take action to select a successor. It is like this.

Notes:

[i] Ali Khamenei’s health struggles are not entirely secret: a 1981 assassination attempt left him partially paralyzed, and the regime photographed him in the hospital five years ago as he received treatment for prostate cancer.

[ii] For discussion of Khamenei’s concern about declining revolutionary fervor, see: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Warns of Declining Fervor of New Generation,” OE Watch, 08 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/irans-supreme-leader-warns-of-declining-fervor-of-new-generation/ . See also: Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Supreme Leader Speaks on Martyrdom” OE Watch, December 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/399678/download and Michael Rubin, “Khamenei Warns Veterans of Declining Revolutionary Fervor” OE Watch, February 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/310925/download

Image Information:

Image: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks to the Assembly of Experts in Tehran, 7 November 2024.
Source: https://idc0-cdn0.khamenei.ir/ndata/news/58257/C/14030817_0758257.jpg
Attribution: Khamenei.ir

Russian Volunteer Force Highlights the Evolution of UAV Missions in Ukraine

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Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV.

“Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind.”

The accompanying excerpted article from the Russian daily newspaper Izvestia discusses the activities of the Volunteer Corps of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Española Brigade. The Española Brigade—currently numbering no more than 100 individuals, according to the founder—began as a volunteer formation of soccer enthusiasts, which now provides trained UAV operators and UAVs to support Russia’s conventional force in the special military operation in Ukraine.[i] According to the Izvestia article, the Española Brigade operates its own UAV training center and is developing its own UAVs for use in Ukraine. Although state UAV development programs are entrenched in both Russia and Ukraine, the development of UAV technologies by volunteer units and their personnel in the field also appears to be increasingly common on both sides of the front. It would now seem that the traditional model of governments procuring defense articles from private industry and then supplying these materials to the military is simply no longer effective given UAVs’ rapidly evolving technology and newfound tactical uses. Indeed, both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries are now collaborating closely with industry to quickly deliver new capabilities to the battlefield as the requirements are recognized.

The article also mentions the importance of the Baba Yaga class of large UAVs. The primary mission of the Baba Yaga-class of UAVs is not reconnaissance or bomb dropping, but logistics support. This development illustrates the expanding role of UAVs on the modern battlefield—UAVs are no longer being used just as a means of reconnaissance (intelligence) and/or fires. UAVs are now becoming key capabilities to enable success for other war-fighting functions.

Overall, although volunteer formations like Russia’s Española Brigade are relatively small, they help fill critical shortages of UAV expertise that the conventional force would be hard-pressed to stand up on its own.[ii]

Sources:

Dmitry Korneev, “«Птичья» школа: как в бригаде «Эспаньола» готовят операторов дронов

БПЛА (“Bird” school: how the “Espanola” brigade trains drone operators),” Izvestiya (major Russian daily newspaper), 7 November 2024.  https://iz.ru/1786422/dmitrii-korneev/ptica-skola-kak-v-brigade-espanola-gotovat-operatorov-dronov

The volunteer “Española Brigade”, the backbone of which is football fans, has a unique UAV combat training center…the commander and founder of the UAV Combat Training Center is respectfully called Petrovich…“With the start of the special operation, the idea came to organize a UAV combat training center. But it didn’t work out right away. It only opened in May 2023.  He notes that a wide variety of people came to the center.  “We invited those who had experience working with UAVs, even if it was minimal,” he recalls…They started training and preparing people on “commercial” UAVs. Gradually training switched to FPV [first-person-view] UAVs. The trainees first master the theory, and then go to the training grounds. The final stage of the program involves training on a relatively calm section of the front…There, people receive their first combat experience.  The center itself is relatively small. Its resources are designed mainly for the Española Brigade, Petrovich emphasizes…“We have been operating for only a year and a half. However, during this time, we have trained more than 100 qualified UAV operators in various areas” says Petrovich…

“Española”, like many other volunteer units, received special weapons manufactured by the so-called people’s defense industry, that is, developed and released outside the framework of the defense order…Now everything that concerns combat UAVs is developing rapidly, if you stop, you fall behind…, – Petrovich points out, moving on to the scientific and practical activities of the center’s employees.  At Española, they work with the entire spectrum of UAVs…In cooperation with a young design bureau, we are currently developing and conducting experimental tests on two types of d UAVs: a night reconnaissance UAV and a high-speed Baba Yaga UAV.  Due to the abundance of FPV [first-person-view] UAVs, the enemy has problems supplying units on the front line.  “Five, seven, ten kilometers is a dead zone”, he explains.  The fact is that people who sit directly at the front, paradoxically, are sometimes safer than those who are trying to resupply them from the rear. And so the first request for such a Baba Yaga [class UAV] came from such rear detachments.

Petrovich says that the troops needed a fast “bird” that could carry a good load and do it quickly.  The primary mission is supplying provisions, ammunition, and medicine.  The secondary mission is to carry powerful munitions.  A load capacity of, for example, 10 kg allows you to transport an anti-tank mine. Moreover, ammunition can be varied. Now there is a whole line [of UAV munitions]. We call this project “Kikimora”. The active testing phase is underway…The center is also working on countering enemy electronic warfare…The second UAV currently being developed at the center is a night reconnaissance UAV. “It can stay in the air for up to an hour and a half…in terms of range, it’s at least 12 km, we want to increase it to 15-17 km”

Notes:

[i] Moscow uses the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine.

[ii] Additional Russian volunteer units have filled critical positions in Russia’s war in Ukraine, especially in the field of UAVs. See Charles Bartles, “Russia Gains Combat Power From Volunteer Service,” OE Watch, 07-2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-gains-combat-power-from-volunteer-service/

Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian Soldiers handling a Baba Yaga UAV
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Yaga_(aircraft)#/media/File:UA_Vampire_UCAV_01.jpg 
Attribution: АрміяІнформCC BY-SA 4.0

Russia Expands Its Arctic Research Capabilities

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Russian President Vladimir Putin at Admiralty Shipyards to inspect the Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky submarine, the Ivan Papanin icebreaker patrol ship, and the Viktor Chernomyrdin icebreaker in 2019. Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg is the sight of construction of the newly announced Ivan Frolov Arctic capable research vessel.

“Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Patrushev underlined that the new vessel is aimed at strengthening Russia’s positions in the polar regions.”

In October, Russia announced the construction of its latest Arctic-capable research vessel, the Ivan Frolov. According to the first excerpted article from the Norway-based The Barents Observer, the Ivan Frolov, set for completion in 2028, will be the largest Arctic research vessel of its kind in the world and “the new flagship of Russia polar science.”[i] Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev noted the Ivan Frolov will collect data “for the development of navigation on the Northern Sea Route and to clarify the boundaries of the continental shelf of Russia.”

According to the second excerpted article from The Barents Observer, Russia’s research platform, the Severny Polyus, commissioned in 2022, recently began its second polar expedition.[ii] The expedition, “North Pole-42,” is expected to continue until 2026. This article also notes that while the Severny Polyus is a scientific research vessel,[iii] it could also serve Russian military purposes, as Russia’s new marine doctrine “includes a high stress on the use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.” This doctrinal emphasis not only affects the Severny Polus and the forthcoming Ivan Frolov but also all other nations with Arctic exposure.

Together, these developments underscore Russia’s continued focus on the Arctic region at a time when all nations with an Arctic foothold are also dedicating resources to the area.

Sources:

Elizaveta Vereykina, “Construction begins on a “new flagship of Russian polar research,”The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 30 October 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/construction-begins-on-a-new-flagship-of-russian-polar-research/419705

On 29 October, the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute reported on an official ceremony held at the Admiralty shipyards in St Petersburg to start the construction of a new scientific vessel named the Ivan Frolov.   The vessel – with a length of 165 meters and displacement about 25,000 tons – is planned to be able to accommodate up to 240 people. In addition to the announced 20 scientific laboratories on board, it will also have a helicopter platform.

“In 2028, the vessel will join the fleet of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute and become the new flagship of Russian polar science,” the news report says. At the ceremony, the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Patrushev underlined, that the new vessel is aimed at strengthening Russia’s positions in the polar regions:

“The vessel will have powerful scientific equipment that will allow conducting research even in the harshest conditions, including research on the ocean floor, in the atmosphere and space,” – “The study of the Arctic and Antarctic is one of the key areas of activity of the Russian Environmental Monitoring Service. More than 20 expeditions are already carried out annually.  They allow tracking climate change, collecting data for the development of navigation of the Northern Sea Route and clarifying the boundaries of the continental shelf of Russia”.

The Governor of St Petersburg, Alexander Beglov, called the new ship “the largest scientific research vessel in the world”. The two well-known large scientific -the RV Kronprins Haakon (Norway) or RRS Sir David Attenborough (UK), are smaller than the new Russian vessel. The technology used in the construction has previously been tested at the floating Arctic research station “North Pole” [“Severny Polyus”], according to the head of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute Alexander Makarov.

Atle Staalesen, “With the North Pole platform, Russia has returned to the Arctic for good,” The Baltic Observer,(independent Norwegian news site in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia), 17 September 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/arctic/with-the-north-pole-platform-russia-has-returned-to-the-arctic-for-good/142846

Russia’s North Pole (Severny Polyus) research platform has started its second comprehensive Arctic expedition.  The 83-meter-long vessel this week set out from Murmansk with course for the high Arctic.  It will sail into the polar sea-ice north of the New Siberian Islands and drift with the currents for the next two years.  Experts at the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute are now scanning satellite images for the most suitable icefloe for the drift. The search will continue as the vessel approaches the area.

“With the expeditions of the ice-protected self-propelled platform Severny Polyus Russia has returned to the Arctic for good,” says Aleksandr Kozlov, the Russian Minister of Natural Resources.  According to the minister, who is also known for his key role in Russia’s cooperation with North Korea, the researchers will gather materials of great importance for the protection of Arctic ecology, understanding of climate change, as well as safe sailing on the Northern Sea Route.  The expedition is named “the North Pole-42” and is expected to continue until 2026.

The Severny Polyus has the shape of a bathtub and is often referred to as a platform. It has a ship crew of 16 and a research team of up to 34 people. Ship operator is Roshydromet, the Russian state meteorological service.  The Severny Polyus is capable of geological, acoustic, geophysical and marine research under the harshest Arctic conditions.  In temperatures down to minus 50°C it is reportedly able to provide comfortable living and working conditions for researchers and crew.

On board are 15 labs where researchers can work year-round.  The research platform has replaced Russia’s Arctic expeditions based on ice floes organized since the 1930s. The quickly vanishing Arctic sea-ice has made it increasingly hard to organize the expeditions and last real ice station, the “North Pole-40”, was held in the winter of 2012.  Albeit built for research purposes, the vessel could ultimately also be applied by the Russian military. The country’s new Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes. That could include not only trawlers and icebreakers, but also the Severniy Polus.

Notes:

[i] The Soviet Union and its successor state, Russia, have conducted a sustained Arctic maritime research effort since the 1930s and a sustained Antarctic research effort since 1955. The Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute (Арктический и антарктический научно-исследовательский институт) was founded in 1920 and still heads the country’s polar exploration with close to a thousand land and sea expeditions to its credit.

[ii] For additional reporting on the Severny Polyus, see: Les Grau, “Russian Drift Station Vital To Arctic Research Effort,” OE Watch, 07-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russian-drift-station-vital-to-arctic-research-effort/

[iii] For additional reporting on Russian research efforts in the Arctic, see: Les Grau, “China and Russia Expand Agreement For Arctic Strategic Resource Development,” OE Watch, 08-2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/china-and-russia-expand-agreement-for-arctic-strategic-resource-development/

Image Information:

Image: Russian President Vladimir Putin at Admiralty Shipyards to inspect the Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky submarine, the Ivan Papanin icebreaker patrol ship, and the Viktor Chernomyrdin icebreaker in 2019. Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg is the sight of construction of the newly announced Ivan Frolov Arctic capable research vessel.
Source: Office of the Russian President, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62143
Attribution: Public Domain