Category Archives: Global Operational Environment

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Global Operational Environment.

Georgian Separatist Republic Conducts Military Exercises

Posted on by
Map of Abkhazia.

Map of Abkhazia.

“As part of a three-day exercise, employees of the State Security Service… will practice measures to counter terrorist attacks. The exercises of the security forces began on March 12 in the Gal[i] district, where military equipment and personnel were transferred.”

In March 2023, the government of the Georgian separatist region of Abkhazia conducted a series of military exercises in response to demonstrations in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi calling for the retaking of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[i] According to the excerpted article from the independent but pro-Abkhaz media outlet Abkhaz World, Abkhazia conducted a series of military and counterterrorism exercises in the Gali sector, the de facto border between Abkhazia and Georgia. The Gali sector is defined by the Ingury River, a natural but not impenetrable barrier between Georgia and Abkhazia and the scene of periodic infiltration, insurgency, and sabotage by Georgian nationals since 1993.[ii] According to the excerpted article from Bulgaria-based Bulgaria News, Abkhazian Major General Dmitry Dbar told reporters “that the Gal[iii] exercises are as close to combat as possible and are aimed at countering subversive groups.”

The current tension between Abkhazia and Georgia is being fueled by Russia’s war in Ukraine. For months, Ukrainian officials have called on Georgia to open a second front against Russia by reclaiming Abkhazia and South Ossetia to diverting Russian forces and attention from Ukraine. Yet, while this scenario might help Ukraine, it could be a military disaster for Georgia, which has taken a more neutral position regarding Ukraine despite numerous anti-Russian and pro-West public protests and hundreds of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine. There is a common presumption that Georgia could only attack Abkhazia if a Western power, most usually said to be the United States, were to facilitate the operation. At the same time, nearly everyone in Georgia and many in the West continue to think of Abkhazia only being able to defend itself with Russian forces.[iv] The truth probably lies somewhere in between, and the recent Abkhazian military exercises are meant to demonstrate to Georgia that Abkhazia can and will take care of itself, regardless of current nationalist and regional pressures to reignite the conflict.

Sources:

“Abkhazia’s Law Enforcement Agencies Practise Measures to Combat Terrorism and Sabotage,” Abkhaz World (independent but pro-Abkhaz media outlet based in London and Turkey), 13 March 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2223-practice-measures-to-combat-terrorism-and-sabotage

The head of State Security Service under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia, Dmityr Dbar, stated that the exercises will simulate combat situations and will take place in several stages.

“We will conduct these exercises frequently to prepare for anti-terrorist threats. The fighters must know each other, interact, and be able to carry out coordinated combat missions,” he said.

Interior Minister Watler Butba added that the Ministry of Internal Affairs staff will practice measures to release hostages and neutralize attackers at the state border checkpoint.

“Абхазия следи с тревога събитията в Грузия (Abkhazia is watching events in Georgia with concern),” News Bulgaria (Bulgarian news source), 14 March 2023. https://news.bg/int-politics/abhaziya-sledi-s-trevoga-sabitiyata-v-gruziya.html

The head of Abkhazia’s State Security Service, Major General Dmitry Dbar, told reporters on Monday that “the exercises are as close to combat as possible and are aimed at countering subversive groups.”

“We used to conduct such exercises regularly once a quarter, but given the situation in Georgia and possible threats, we will conduct such events more often, to work out mechanisms to ensure anti- terrorist protection of the population,” he said.

We remind you that on March 7 and 8 thousands of people protested against the foreign agents law in Tbilisi, which led to clashes between police and demonstrators. On March 7, the draft law “On transparency of foreign influence”, developed by a group of deputies from the “People’s Power” faction, was adopted in the first reading by the Georgian parliament. On the morning of March 9, the ruling party “Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia” withdrew the bill.

Peskov: Russia is worried about what is happening in Georgia The Kremlin spokesman hinted that an outside power was trying to bring in an anti-Russian element

We recall that Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent more than a decade ago. Moscow has a significant military presence there. Georgia condemns the ongoing Russian “occupation” of the territory.

Notes:

[i] South Ossetia and Abkhazia are/were ethnic enclaves within Georgia that petitioned unsuccessfully for independence at the end of the 1980s. Georgia resisted the moves and a war between South Ossetia and Georgia was fought in 1990-1991. A year later war broke out between Abkhazia and Georgia (1992-1993). Georgia lost both conflicts and both territories became de facto independent. Georgia has always maintained that it was defeated in both ethnic enclaves by Russia. The truth is complicated and subject to debate, but the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia (South Ossetia) consolidated the de facto independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

[ii] There has been much speculation and rumor as to the nature of the Georgian paramilitary individuals and units raiding Abkhazia. While many believe the Georgian government is behind the low-grade Georgian insurgency in Abkhazia, there are many individuals and groups that appear to be operating on their own initiative—a characteristic of Georgian forces during the war for Abkhazia 1992-1993. See: Dodge Billingsley, “Georgia’s Lingering Border Security Issues,” OE Watch, 08-2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/315067

[iii] Georgian place names frequently end in “i,” whereas Abkhazian placenames omit the Georgian spelling and pronunciation.  For example, “Gali” in Georgian becomes “Gal” in Abkhazian.  Most Western scholarship and media coverage of Abkhazia refers to Abkhazian locations using the Georgian language spellings.

[iv] See: Dodge Billingsley, “Georgian Defense Minister Offers Modernization Plan in Face of Russia Threat.” OE Watch, 09-2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/395195

Image Information:

Image: Map of Abkhazia
Source: Sémhur, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abkhazia_map-fr.svg
Attribution: CC x 3.0

Georgians Consider Outcomes of War in Ukraine

Posted on by
Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.

Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.

“In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities.”

The Georgian government condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine initially but has not taken part in any sanctions against Russia out of concern of being drawn into the conflict. Additionally, Georgia’s economy remains closely tied to Russia’s, and the government continues to contend with the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have been occupied by Russia-supported forces since the end of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War.[i] While Georgia will likely maintain its neutrality on Ukraine, the accompanying excerpted article from the independent, non-profit think tank Georgian Institute of Politics offers a Georgian perspective of five possible outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war. The article is a follow up to the think tank’s initial assessment of possible outcomes, which was published just a few weeks after the war began in 2022. While the report acknowledges that Georgia will not have a direct impact on the outcome of the war, each of the scenarios shows how Georgia will be affected in some way.

In the first scenario, Ukraine wins the war, which the article’s authors believes is probable, resulting in Georgia joining NATO and having deeper integration with Europe. Conversely, the article believes that this would come with the risk that Russia will then destabilize Georgia regardless of who is in power in Moscow. The second scenario examines what could happen if Ukraine turns into a frozen conflict or returns to the status quo before the war began. The article states that a frozen conflict would allow Russia time to restore its military but also would push additional Russian migrants into Georgia. Georgia could also become the focal point of Putin’s ire as he looks to claim a quick victory to compensate domestically for losses in Ukraine. This would in turn cause Georgian officials to move away from integrating with Europe and pursue a policy more in line with Russian interests. 

In the third scenario, Russia achieves its strategic goals in Ukraine, and in the fourth scenario, Russia and NATO engage in full-scale war. These are unlikely according to the article. The fifth and final scenario, which the authors believe is very likely, is that a war of attrition will continue for two or more years and that this will put Georgia in a difficult position. The article notes how Georgian Dream, the ruling party in Georgia’s parliament, has been improving ties with Russia, though many in Georgia still see Russia as a threat. In early March, the Georgian government withdrew a bill requiring NGOs to register as foreign agents in Georgia after facing protest that the bill had been influenced by Russia. Lastly, the article notes that Georgia will face “major strategic dilemmas” regardless of how the war ends and recommends that Georgian officials increase civil defense capabilities and cooperation with Turkey.[ii] While the article does not claim to be an official Georgian perspective, it makes clear that Georgia will be impacted by the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

Source:

“One Year of War in Ukraine and Risk Assessment for Georgia: Five (updated) Scenarios,” Georgian Institute of Politics (an independent non-profit think tank in Georgia), 13 February 2023.

In March of 2022, just a couple of weeks after Russia launched the full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, GIP proposed four possible scenarios of future developments and their possible implications for Georgia…However, almost one year since the invasion, the conflict seems to be reaching its decisive point…

As the war continues reshaping global geopolitics, the following piece will revisit GIP’s previous assessments and offer insights into what has changed over the last 11 months since its publication. Although the war is far from over and significant battles are still ahead, five scenarios discussed in detail below offer some insights into the dilemmas and potential risks that Georgia may face considering different possible developments in Ukraine.

Scenario 1: Ukraine wins the war (Probable)

As western support for Ukraine continues to increase, leading to a successful counteroffensive operation, and eventual victory, the geopolitical paradigm in the wider Black Sea region would change drastically…If the situation is going to develop in this direction and Ukraine is going to achieve full de-occupation of its territories (including the Crimean Peninsula), it’s not excluded that the window of opportunity may appear for NATO’s further enlargement to the East…In the best-case scenario, this would also imply Georgia joining the alliance. In addition to NATO enlargement, Russia’s defeat and retreat from the region will also make Georgia’s European integration irreversible…

…This scenario implies risks for Georgia from another perspective…Defeat in Ukraine may result in regime change in Russia, leading to internal instabilities and power struggles. This could lead to a spillover of chaos in the already volatile North Caucasus, creating a range of challenges on the border of Georgia. In other words, while a strong Russia is a serious threat to Georgia, an unstable Northern neighbor is no less dangerous for its security.

Risks will increase for Georgia even if the Russian regime survives defeat in Ukraine. Since it can still act as a spoiler, the Kremlin might be keen to restore its tarnished prestige by continuing adventurous foreign policy towards Georgia…

Scenario 2: Freezing the conflict and/or returning to status quo ante (Possible)

As the war drags on causing an immense number of causalities on both sides, there is a possibility that both Russia and Ukraine could reach the point of exhaustion…

This would be either freezing the conflict or returning to the status quo in the Eastern part of Ukraine…the existence conflicts with frozen solutions will also allow Russia to restore its forces and prepare for a new assault. This scenario also implies a risk for Georgia, as preparing for a new offensive would intensify the ongoing “silent” mobilization. This, in its turn, may lead to an increase in Russian migrants to Georgia…

Moreover, with conflict intensity decreased in Eastern Ukraine, Russian Federation could apply pressure on Georgia through South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As in the first scenario, amid the upcoming presidential elections in 2024, Putin might need a quick victory on the foreign front to compensate for the damage caused by the failures in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, officials in Tbilisi might be forced to give up its policy of Euro-Atlantic integration and align its external policies with the Kremlin’s…

Scenario 3: The Kremlin achieves its strategic goals (Unlikely)

In this scenario, Russia achieves a successful breakthrough in the upcoming major battles. With Western support decreasing, Ukrainian resources exhausting, and a raising death toll among civilians, Ukraine might be forced to concede. Ukraine’s concession would imply the change of the government in Kyiv, recognition of occupied territories as part of Russia and the end of Euro-Atlantic presence in the region for decades to come.

As it was outlined in our scenario 2: Georgian nightmare published in March 2022, there is no doubt that in case of such developments, the Kremlin may pose an ultimatum to Tbilisi or may even establish a puppet regime in Tbilisi. Georgia could be dragged into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or even into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)…

Scenario 4: NATO-Russia Full-Scale War (Highly unlikely)

Out of all the possible scenarios outline here, this seems to be the least likely, yet still a possibility. Especially if, after a successful counteroffensive in the East, Ukraine will start military operations to free the Crimean Peninsula. Attacks on Crimea or deeper territories in Russia might further escalate the conflict and lead to the Kremlin using a tactical nuclear weapon…

In case of a war between Russia and NATO member states, the Black Sea region gains strategic importance. It includes Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, members of the alliance and most likely get involved in the conflict…In this context, Georgia’s strategic location gains vital importance for Russia and NATO allies…

Scenario 5: Attrition warfare continues for 2 or more years (Very likely)

There is also a possibility that neither Russia nor Ukraine is going to back down that might lead to the protracted attrition warfare. In this context, illicit trade and alternative imports of the western technology is going to gain even more importance for the Kremlin. This will put Georgia in a difficult position due to its transactional foreign and security policy towards Russia. And deliberately or not, by improving economic ties with Russia, Georgian Dream did end up moving Georgia closer to its erstwhile enemy…

Despite the GD’s rhetoric, existing occupied territories remain an obstacle to improving relations with the Kremlin. Opinion polls repeatedly show that the majority of Georgians perceive Russia as a threat and support the country’s pro-European foreign policy…

Conclusion…All the scenarios outlined above suggest that regardless which direction the situation is going to develop, Tbilisi will be facing major strategic dilemmas. In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities. Similar to what was suggested in our last year’s scenarios, Georgia needs to intensify its cooperation with Turkey a NATO member and a large regional military power that has a potential to counterbalance Russian regional dominance…

Notes:

[i] For more information on Georgia’s security issues in Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Abhazia, see: Matthew Stein ““Borderization” Continues in Georgia,” OE Watch, 03-2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues See also Dodge Billingsley “Russia Flexes Its Muscles in Abkhazia While Citizens Recall Anniversary of War with Georgia,” OE Watch, 09-2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/268081

[ii] For more background on Georgia’s security cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan, see: Matthew Stein “Trilateral Security in the Caucasus,” OE Watch, 07-2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Georgia_Protest_2023_VOA.png
Attribution: Public Domain

Algeria Seeks Non-Alignment by Preserving Russia Ties While Welcoming NATO Overtures

Posted on by
Algeria hosts final planning conference for joint Russian-Algerian exercise Desert Shield 2022.

Algeria hosts final planning conference for joint Russian-Algerian exercise Desert Shield 2022.

“Algeria clings to the principle of non-alignment.”

While Russia appears to be courting Algeria in a bid to reduce its isolation, Algeria is keeping its options open by engaging with both Russia and NATO member states. In January 2023, the Algerian government announced that President Abdelmadjid Tebboune would visit Moscow and meet with President Putin in May 2023.[i] At the May 2023 presidential summit, Russia is hoping to sign a new strategic cooperation partnership document with Algeria, if for no other reason than to make the case that Russia is not fully isolated and retains key strategic partnerships. In addition, Russia seeks to finalize a major weapons deal to show that its military export industry remains viable. The deal would be centered on the Su-57 [GRLCUT(1] stealth multirole fighter aircraft, according to the second article excerpt from the Russian-language news network RT Arabic and other news stories regularly recycled by Russian Arabic language media over the past year. Indeed, Russian expectations for the presidential summit are high, and its media and officials are going out of their way to flatter Algeria: as detailed in the first excerpted article, in an early February interview with RT Arabic, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that, in trying to turn Algeria against Russia using pressure, the West was “messing with the wrong guy.”

Algerian leadership, however, seems less enthusiastic about a singular deepening of relations with Russia: quite the opposite, judging by recent Algerian diplomatic activities. A week before the January announcement that he would visit Moscow in May, President Tebboune hosted Italy’s prime minister and discussed expanding bilateral trade, of which Algerian gas supplies to Europe via Italian pipelines are a centerpiece. Concurrently, Said Chengriha, the Chief of Staff of the Algerian armed forces, led a large delegation to Paris, where he was received by President Macron, met with several high-ranking military and government officials, and signed a security cooperation “roadmap” on his government’s behalf, as reported in the second accompanying excerpt from the Algerian monthly military journal El Djeich. Shortly after returning from Paris, Chengriha hosted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander Gen. Michael E. Langley, where he reiterated Algerian non-alignment and commitment to dealing “with many friendly countries,” including the United States, as reported in the third accompanying piece, a Facebook post from the Algerian Ministry of Defense. Algeria remains an appealing security partner for Russia, given its strategic location on NATO’s southern flank and the historical links between the Algerian and Soviet militaries; however, Algeria is unlikely to sacrifice its substantial commercial relations with Europe. Indeed, except for arms deals, Russian-Algerian trade remains negligible, and Europe’s embargo on Russian natural gas may ultimately benefit Algerian gas exports. Still, the fact that Algeria continues to value its partnership with Russia will force its government to carefully balance existing relations and new entreaties from both Russia and NATO countries. If Algiers continues to successfully navigate these competing pulls, its approach may well emerge as a model for other Arab countries seeking to do the same, most notably Saudi Arabia.

Sources:

لافروف: الولايات المتحدة تحاول إملاء سياستها على الجزائر لكنها “هاجمت الشخص الخطأ”

(Lavrov: The United States is trying to impose its policy on Algeria, but it messed with the wrong guy),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language media outlet), 1 February 2023. https://tinyurl.com/yjwsfakc

In response to a question about whether Western pressures will affect the Algerian authorities’ policy towards Russia, he added, “We have a popular saying that says, ‘You messed with the wrong guy’. Algerians can’t be told what to do in this manner, you cannot expect them to comply with and implement directives that contradict their national interests based simply on a hand signal from across the ocean. Algeria, like most countries, is a country that respects itself, its history and its interests, and draws its policies on this basis.”

هل تحصل الجزائر على مقاتلة روسية تتبع 60 هدفا في وقت واحد؟

(Will Algeria obtain Russian jets that can simultaneously track 60 targets?),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language media outlet), 1 February 2023. https://tinyurl.com/2uautj98

Russian media reported that Algeria might become the first country to possess the fifth-generation Russian Su-57 fighters, as talks were held with Russia at the end of 2020. There is talk of at least 14 aircraft being involved, scheduled for delivery before 2030.

“Monsieur le général d’armée, Saïd Chanegriha, chef d’état-major de l’Armée nationale populaire, en visite officielle en France (Army General Saïd Chanegriha, Chief of Staff of the National People’s Army, on an official visit to France),” El Djeich (Algerian armed forces monthly magazine), February 2023. https://rb.gy/levz2

The talks examined ways of strengthening military and security cooperation between the two countries. Subsequently, the meeting was formalized by the signing of a joint roadmap.

No title. Algerian Ministry of Defense Facebook Page, 8 February 2023. https://www.facebook.com/mdn.gov.dz/posts/505345958434848“I would like to emphasize on this occasion that Algeria clings to the principle of non-alignment, and jealously guards its history full of glories and heroism, as well as its independence and sovereign political decision-making. It interacts in a way that serves its own interests and deals with many friendly countries with which it has military and economic relations, such as the United States of America.”

Notes:

[i] Although officially neutral vis-à-vis Ukraine, the Algerian government has been accused of aligning with Russia due to its abstention on UN votes condemning the Ukraine invasion and the extensive bilateral high-level security contacts that followed the invasion. The deepening partnership was to be bolstered by two much-anticipated late-2022 events: joint anti-terror exercises on Algerian soil in October (“Desert Shield 2022”), and the Algerian president’s Moscow visit, which was supposed to occur before the end of 2022. In the end, the exercises were unceremoniously called off at the last minute, and the 2022 presidential visit has now been rescheduled for May 2023, though a firm date has not been set. For added context see: Lucas Winter, “Algeria Caught Between Neutrality and Strategic Relations with Russia,” OE Watch, 5-2022.  https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/415497

Image Information:

Image: Algeria hosts final planning conference for joint Russian-
Algerian exercise Desert Shield 2022.
Source: https://rb.gy/zgyvr
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Vietnam and Indonesia Resolve Maritime Disputes

Posted on by
Vietnam People's Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting.

Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting.

“It was very important to demarcate the overlapping waters between Vietnam and Indonesia…”

Over the past 10 years, Indonesia and Vietnam have clashed in the South China Sea, which Vietnam calls “The East Sea,” and which Indonesia calls “The North Natuna Sea.”  For example, in 2021, Indonesia seized 25 Vietnamese fishing boats and then detained and extradited more than 350 Vietnamese fishermen.[i] Prior to this incident, in 2019, a Vietnamese coast guard boat and an Indonesian naval boat crashed into each other in disputed waters.[ii] Before that, in 2014, the Indonesian navy accused Vietnamese fishing boats of entering Indonesian waters and sunk three Vietnamese boats.[iii] However, the excerpted article published by the pro-government Vietnamese publication tuoitre, noted that after 12 years of negotiations, Vietnam has proposed a boundary line in the waters with Indonesia, which Indonesia has accepted. According to the article, this boundary line will allow Vietnamese fishermen to avoid disputed waters and end the maritime clashes between the two countries. According to the excerpted article from Vietnamese military newspaper quân đội nhân dân the agreement followed the “Sea of ​​Peace-Sustainable Resolution” conference. At the conference, experts recommended Vietnam cooperate with ASEAN nations based on international law to resolve disputes.[iv] This was subsequently achieved with Indonesia and will allow ASEAN nations to be more unified when confronting maritime disputes with China, either diplomatically or military.

Sources:

“Việt Nam – Indonesia hoàn tất đàm phán phân định vùng đặc quyền kinh tế trên biển” (Vietnam – Indonesia complete negotiations on demarcation of exclusive economic zones at sea”),” tuoitre.vn (pro-Communist Party newspaper covering current affairs and originally aimed at youth audiences), 12 December 2022. https://tuoitre.vn/viet-nam-indonesia-hoan-tat-dam-phan-phan-dinh-vung-dac-quyen-kinh-te-tren-bien-20221222143434761.htm

Since 2010, the two countries have had dozens of rounds of negotiations regarding overlapping EEZ claims in the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands in the East Sea. The two sides have concluded negotiations on the demarcation of the exclusive economic zone on the basis of international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982

It was very important to demarcate the overlapping waters between Vietnam and Indonesia, because this was the justification for Vietnamese fishermen being accused by Indonesia of “fishing in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone.”

“Hội thảo quốc tế về Biển Đông ‘Biển hòa bình – Phục hồi bền vững’ (International Conference on East Sea ‘Sea of ​​Peace-Sustainable Resolution’),” qdnd.vn (Russian-language daily focusing on business and politics), 16 November 2022. https://www.qdnd.vn/xa-hoi/tin-tuc/hoi-thao-quoc-te-ve-bien-dong-bien-hoa-binh-phuc-hoi-ben-vung-711217The principles in the South China Sea will help shape other principles in other seas and oceans. Maintaining an order at sea, emphasizing compliance, trust and cooperation, more than ever before, is essential to ensuring a sustainable resolution. Vietnam’s policy on the East Sea is to fully respect and comply with international law, especially the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982).

Notes:

[i] “Indonesia returns 166 detained fishermen to Vietnam,” RFA, 16 November 2014. rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/returns-11162021162820.html

[ii] “Indonesian, Vietnamese vessels clash over illegal fishing,” AFP, 29 April 2019. youtube.com/watch?v=SZh5t2y2NxY

[iii] Mathias Hariyadi, “Jakarta sinks three Vietnamese fishing boats caught in its territorial waters,” Asia News, May 12, 2014. https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Jakarta-sinks-three-Vietnamese-fishing-boats-caught-in-its-territorial-waters-32882.html

[iv] Notably, prior to 2021, there was little optimism in the academic community that Indonesia and Vietnam would reconcile their maritime claims. However, Darwis and Putra noted that Indonesian President Jokowi sought to take a less confrontational stance when dealing with ASEAN navies in disputed waters. See Darwis and Bama Andika Putra, “Construing Indonesia’s maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam’s illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the North Natuna Sea,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 49:4, 172-192, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00927678.2022.2089524

Image Information:

Image: Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_People%27s_Navy_honor_guard_at_ASEAN_defense_ministers_meeting_2010-10-12_1.jpg
Attribution: Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Force, CC x 2.0

West African States Ruled by Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions

Posted on by
Map of the participants of the first Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961).

Map of the participants of the first Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961).

“Guinea, Burkina [Faso], and Mali want to launch an unofficial organization of non-aligned African countries and unite to be stronger in the face of sub-regional bodies.”

The Foreign Affairs Ministers of Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali—West African countries all led by military heads of state that claimed power outside of elections[i]—recently convened in early February. The meeting ultimately concluded with them all seeking to fully rejoin the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has placed various sanctions on each of the countries over the past two years.[ii] According to the accompanying excerpted article from the francophone West African news site Le Journal de L’Afrique, the meeting is being read locally as an attempt to circumvent future sanctions by creating alternative forms of sub-regional unity. As the author of the article articulates, the countries “want to launch an unofficial organization of non-aligned African countries and unite to be stronger in the face of sub-regional bodies.” Of note, Mali and Burkina Faso are the two West African countries most closely tied to Russia, whose Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, visited Mali days before the meeting. A reversion to “non-aligned” rhetoric of African international relations suggests that as competition between the United States, China, and especially Russia, deepens on the continent, West Africans increasingly view such jockeying through the lens of a new Cold War, and thus seek to maintain policy autonomy. This appears to be true in this case, even though two of the three countries—Mali and Burkina Faso—are known Russian allies. While Guinea’s inclusion in the trifecta may be read, as it is by the accompanying article’s author, as “an encounter between marginalized countries,” meaning those sanctioned because of military takeovers,it can equally be read as a meeting of West African states in the Russian orbit. While Guinea clearly falls into the first category, it is not often discussed as part of the second., Guinea looks to be high on the list of which African states Russia might next target for allyship.

Source:

Frédéric Ange Touré, “Pour le Mali, le Burkina Faso et la Guinée, l’union pourra-t-elle faire la force? (For Mail, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, can unity be strength?),” Le Journal de L’Afrique (pan-African news aggregator), 9 February 2023. https://lejournaldelafrique.com/pour-le-mali-le-burkina-faso-et-la-guinee-lunion-pourra-t-elle-faire-la-force/

While the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the various African countries are used to meeting, often under the aegis of sub-regional organizations or the African Union, the meeting between the heads of diplomacy from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea looks like an encounter between marginalized countries.

These three countries have in common to have suffered coups in recent years. But also for having tried to stand up to ECOWAS and other organizations that threatened them with sanctions – which were most of the time applied. Finally, from Bamako to Ouagadougou, via Conakry, the Russian temptation has succeeded partnerships with France.

Under the aegis of the Burkinabè government, the three foreign ministers, Abdoulaye Diop, Morissanda Kouyaté and Olivia Rouamba, wanted to meet to discuss the future of their countries. A meeting which, coincidence or not of the calendar, took place barely two days after the visit of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, to Mali. The latter, among other things, promised his aid “to the Sahelo-Saharan region and even to the countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea.”Morissanda Kouyaté, before any joint declaration, sold the wick as to the message that would be sent. “Together, we are going to make a statement to regional organizations, so that we can hear even more audibly the claims and requests of our peoples through our governments and our leaders”. In other words, Guinea, Burkina and Mali want to launch an unofficial organization of non-aligned African countries and unite to be stronger in the face of sub-regional bodies.

Notes:

[i] Mali experienced overthrows of the government in August 2020 and May 2021, Guinea in September 2021, and Burkina Faso in January 2022.

[ii] For more on ECOWAS’ sanctions against these countries, see: “ECOWAS lifts Mali sanctions, agrees on Burkina transition,” AfricaNews, 4 July 2022. https://www.africanews.com/2022/07/04/ecowas-lifts-mali-sanctions-agrees-on-burkina-transition//

Image Information:

Image: Map of the participants of the first Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961)
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1st_Summit_of_the_Non-Aligned_Movement.jpg
Attribution: Creative CommonsAttribution-Share Alike 4.0 International


Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance

Posted on by
Map of Mali.

Map of Mali.

“What matters…is how [Mali and Russia] work together to fight against jihadism, recalling that in certain cases, terrorism is manufactured to destabilize our countries.”

Mali and Russia’s security relationship appears to be ever-deepening. Even as both are criticized for their approaches to dealing with jihadist violence in Mali,[i] with many analysts suggesting that the Wagner presence is exacerbating the problem,[ii] Malian leadership is full-throated in its defense of its Russian partner. In the accompanying article from Le Journal du Mali, Mali’s Foreign Minister dispels any pretense that international condemnation of its partnership with Russia may change its decision. One of the most important sentiments from his statements is that Russia is willing to provide Mali with the requisite material to make effective gains against the al-Qaeda and Islamic State-aligned groups that have, since January 2023, shown a clear interest in moving toward the capital, Bamako.[iii] Implicitly, this nod is a slight directed at both France and the United States whose unwillingness, Mali and Burkina Faso have argued, to give more assistance to West African states to address their internal security challenges has forced them to turn to Russia. A second prevailing position in the Malian Foreign Minister’s remarks is that Mali views its partnership with Russia as one that is based on Bamako’s own autonomy to make sovereign security policy choices: in this instance, this is an implicit slight to the longstanding French military and counterterrorism presence that has been essentially expelled from the country, not least because of declining citizen opinion of France. Finally, a third, though more subtle line of rhetoric is the suggestion that “in certain cases, terrorism is manufactured to destabilize our countries.” This notion that external actors—again, namely France—have actually worked to support terrorist groups in the country has been a common false claim that the interim government has made, going so far as to bring the assertion to the UN Security Council in August 2022.[iv] Such vociferous defenses of military collaboration with Russia are likely to continue, not only from Mali but from other African countries as well.

Source:

Abdoulaye Diop, “La Russie est ici à la demande du Mali (Russia is here at Mali’s request),” Journal du Mali (West African news aggregator), 8 February 2023. https://www.journaldumali.com/2023/02/08/la-russie-est-ici-a-la-demande-du-mali-abdoulaye-diop/

According to the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs, this stay “is part of the new dynamic, initiated by the government, consisting in broadening and diversifying Mali’s partnerships with a view to an effective response, and in sincerity, to the challenges we face.”

For the diplomat, his country has chosen to “strengthen” its cooperation with Russia to “demonstrate” that it is free to decide with whom to walk on the basis of the essential pillars defined by the president of the transition: “respect of Mali’s sovereignty, respect for strategic choices and the choice of Mali’s partners, but also taking Mali’s interests into account in all decisions.”

Thus, the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs insisted on the fact that “Russia is here at the request of Mali.” And it “responds effectively to the needs of Mali in terms of capacity building of its defense and security forces” in the context of the fight against terrorism.

Because what matters, added Mr. Diop, is to see “how to work together to fight against jihadism” recalling that “in certain cases, terrorism is manufactured to destabilize our countries.”

In this sense, he deplored the instrumentalization and politicization of human rights for “hidden” or “barely hidden” agendas often aimed “to overthrow the regime in order to be able to achieve a certain number of objectives.”

The day before Sergei Lavrov’s visit, Mali expelled the director of the human rights division of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) who is accused of having chosen Aminata Dicko to speak on behalf of Malian civil society during the recent review of the United Nations Secretary General’s report on Mali. The latter, in her intervention by videoconference, denounced the abuses committed against Fulani civilians by the army and its Russian auxiliaries.

In his communication, the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs also wished to welcome the “interest” that Russia gives to “the regular supply of Mali with basic necessities in a particularly difficult context.”Finally, Abdoulaye Diop expressed his solidarity with Russia undergoing sanctions from Western countries in response to the war between it and Ukraine.

Notes:

[i] For instance, in January 2023, a UN human rights group called on authorities in Mali to launch an investigation surrounding the mass executions of several hundred civilians in Moura, Mali in March 2022. The executions were believed to have been carried out by the Malian military, which was operating alongside Wagner mercenaries. See “Mali: Independent rights experts call on probe into Wagner Group’s alleged crimes,” UN News, 31 January 2023. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133007

[ii] For more on how the Wagner Group’s presence is contributing to violence in the Sahel, see: Wassim Nasr, “How the Wagner Group is aggravating the Jihadi Threat in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel, 15 (11), November/December 2022. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/how-the-wagner-group-is-aggravating-the-jihadi-threat-in-the-sahel/

[iii] For more on how al-Qaeda and Islamic State groups in Mali are increasingly moving toward Bamako as of early 2023, see:  Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda’s JNIM pushes closer to Malian capital,” FDD’s Long War Journal, 17 January 2023. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/01/al-qaedas-jnim-pushes-closer-to-malian-capital.php

[iv] For more on Mali’s claims to the UN that France funded terrorists in the country, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171

Image Information:

Image: Map of Mali
Source: https://southafrica-info.com/africa/africa-from-a-to-z/attachment/map-of-africa-and-mali/
Attribution: Creative Commons 4.0

Russia’s Role in India’s Bids for New Carbines and Medium Transport Aircraft

Posted on by
An-32 in Leh Airbase, India.

An-32 in Leh Airbase, India.

“The Indian Air Force (IAF) has initiated the process to find a replacement for the AN-32 transport aircraft in service.”

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the government of India has walked away from several agreements with Russia to acquire or upgrade weapon systems. Indian officials have stated that they do not believe the Russian defense industry could deliver the systems that had previously been agreed to because of the logistical challenges Russia now faces. While the canceled agreements have signaled a decline in bilateral security cooperation, some India-Russia joint ventures continue to operate and produce various systems for the Indian armed forces. Indian officials have noted that security cooperation with Russia will continue, though in a different capacity, as India has been pushing its armed forces to buy more domestically under the Make in India initiative.[i] The accompanying excerpted articles report on several developments within the Indian defense industry, particularly as they pertain to India-Russia security cooperation.

The first excerpted article from the independent English-language newspaper The Hindu, reports that the Indian Air Force recently opened a bid for a medium transport aircraft to replace its Russian AN-32s. The article notes that Indian officials previously stated that the Spanish-made C-295MW has been considered as a potential replacement and that India already ordered 56 C-295s. However, the recently opened bid specifies a heavier transport capacity than the C-295 can hold. India’s current inventory of strategic airlifters consists of around 20 Il-76[GRLCUT(1] s from Russia and a dozen C-17s from the United States, demonstrating how India has looked to multiple partners for heavier transport aircraft in the past. The article also notes that a previous joint India-Russia project to develop and produce a replacement for the AN-32 did not move beyond an initial design. The article does not mention if Russia is putting in a bid for the replacement. The result of the bid may not come out for several months, but it does not appear that Russia has an edge if it submits a bid. The second excerpted article from the English-language magazine Force reports that India’s Defense Ministry held a meeting with potential bidders for an order of 400,000 carbines chambered for 5.56×45 mm rounds and that the Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL) joint venture “was not invited to this meeting.”[ii] The article states how IRRPL started production on the order of 700,000 AK-203[GRLCUT(2]  rifles and that Prime Minister Narendra Modi described the joint venture as “one of the brightest examples of cooperation within Make in India.” The article goes on to note how Kalashnikov produces a wide range of small arms and could fulfill the bid for the carbines, leading the author to question why a Russian firm was left out of the meeting even as the Indian and Russian defense ministers discussed strengthening cooperation. In any case, the bids illustrate how India is reliant on Russia to fulfill a requirement for its armed forces.

Sources:

Dinakar Peri, “IAF to procure new transport aircraft to replace AN-32,” The Hindu (independent English-language newspaper), 3 February 2023.

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/iaf-issues-tender-to-procure-a-medium-transport-aircraft-to-replace-an-32s/article66467760.ece

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has initiated the process to find a replacement for the AN-32 transport aircraft in service. It has issued a Request For Information (RFI) for the procurement of a Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA) with a carrying capacity of 18 to 30 tonnes.

The RFI was issued on December 9, 2022, and the earlier bid submission date of February 3 has now been extended till March 31…

In the past, several IAF officials had stated that the just C-295MW, 56 of which have been just contracted, which falls in similar category as the AN-32 in terms of cargo carrying capacity would be considered as a potential replacement for the AN-32 given that a running assembly line would be available once the 56 aircraft are delivered. However, based on load carrying capacity specified in the RFI, 18 to 30 tonnes, the C-295 no longer fits the bracket as it is in the 5-10 tonnes category…

An earlier project to jointly co-develop and produce a MTA of 20 tonnes with Russia to replace the AN-32s was scrapped few years back after initial design discussions.

In September last year, the Defence Ministry signed a 21.935 Crore contract with Airbus and Space S.A., Spain for procurement of 56 C-295MW transport aircraft to replace the Avro aircraft in service with the IAF which it is executing in partnership with Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL)…

Vinit Shah, “By Invitation – Whither Kalashnikov,” Force (English-language magazine reporting on defense topics in India), 25 January 2023. https://forceindia.net/feature-report/whither-kalashnikov/

Apparently, the ministry of defence held a pre-bid meeting on January 10 with potential bidders for the purchase of 400,000 CQB carbines chambered for 5.56×45 mm. Surprisingly, the Amethi-based India-Russia joint venture, Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL), in which India holds the controlling stake, was not invited to this meeting.

This is doubly strange. One, because the production lines of IRRPL are running with 700,000 AK-203 assault rifles on order; and two, in March 2019, when the JV was announced, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had said, ‘the joint venture will contribute to the development of the capacity of the country’s armed forces and strengthen national security… (IRRPL is) one of the brightest examples of cooperation within Make in India…’

It is well-known that the Russian concern Kalashnikov, a partner in IRRPL, produces the widest range of small arms. It will not be difficult for the company with such a diverse portfolio to produce another model of a modern carbine at its state-of-the-art facility in Korva of the Amethi district…It is strange that the MoD gives preference to large-scale production in India of the AK-203 assault rifle chambered for 7.62×39 mm, and then suddenly decides to purchase a large batch of weapons for NATO ammunition 5.56×45 mm. Makes one wonder about the motivation for this, given that foreign minister S. Jaishankar in a recent meeting with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov discussed the details of strengthening Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation…

Notes:

[i] For more information on the development of India’s defense industry and the cancelled agreements with Russia, see: Matthew Stein “India Cancels Plans to Purchase Russian Equipment,” OE Watch, 6-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

[ii] The 5.56×45 mm are the standard round in service rifles in NATO, while some/most/many Russian Kalashnikov variants use the 5.56×39 mm round.

Image Information:

Image: An-32 in Leh Airbase, India
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonov_An-32#/media/File:An32roh.JPG
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0


Chinese-Arab Summit Signals Growing Saudi-Chinese Defense Alignment

Posted on by
Flag of Saudi Arabia.

Flag of Saudi Arabia.

“… Saudi Arabia spent $1.4 billion (5.1 billion riyals) in incentives to boost its local military sector over the last two years …”

Much of the Saudi reporting and commentary on Xi Jinping’s December 2022 visit to Riyadh highlighted the visit as a turning point in the birth of a new, multipolar world order. Commentators in Saudi media consider the kingdom a key player in this new world order, one that can maintain good relations and effectively balance between competing poles of global power to safeguard its own national interests. In this view, as articulated in the first accompanying excerpt from the influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, expressions of deepening Saudi-Chinese relations do not by definition threaten the Saudi-U.S. security partnership, but rather are signals of engagement “based on common interests.” 

Statements and agreements from the Saudi-organized Chinese-Arab summit revealed a growing alignment of Saudi and Chinese defense priorities that could put pressure on a key pillar of the Saudi-U.S. strategic partnership—arms sales. For now, China seems in no position to surpass the United States as a Saudi weapons supplier: between 2000-2019, the United States accounted for 60 percent of Saudi arms imports by value, while Chinese arms constituted less than 1 percent.[i] The fact that no weapons deals were signed or even publicly discussed during Xi’s visit to Riyadh indicates that arms trade is not yet a priority in the Saudi-Chinese relationship, although this may also be because the two sides had reportedly signed a blockbuster arms deal at the Zuhai Air Show only one month before the summit.[ii]

From the Saudi perspective, reducing its arms imports has become a key priority. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has begun shifting its defense priorities to better align with the kingdom’s “Vision 2030,” which includes localizing weapons manufacturing and developing an indigenous, high-tech national defense industrial base.[iii] As noted in the second accompanying excerpt, from the Saudi news channel al-Arabiya, the director of the Saudi military industry’s regulatory body explained that the kingdom has in the past two years channeled $1.4 billion toward “incentives to boost its local military sector.” Speaking at the Saudi 2023 Budget Forum last December, he added that more than half of that money has gone into research and development, mostly in Saudi Arabia’s priority defense production sectors, which include “unmanned systems, radars and cybersecurity.” Thus, it seems likely that licensing agreements and technology sharing, rather than weapons sales, will emerge as a centerpiece in future Saudi Arabian defense partnerships.

Many of the deals signed at the Chinese-Arab summit were memorandums of understanding and other documents of intent expressing a shared vision and approach, rather than contractual agreements. Notable domains where a bilateral shared vision and intent to deepen cooperation were expressed include space, information technology, telecommunications, and artificial intelligence. The two countries also signed a wide-ranging “digital economic partnership,” which covers a vast array of new technologies, detailed in the third accompanying excerpt, from the official Saudi news agency’s press release on the agreement. These various agreements and statements of intent, although not essentially military in nature, will likely bolster a growing partnership in high-tech weaponry such as unmanned systems, and are likely to feed into the kingdom’s broader defense and security efforts over the next decade.

Sources:

“العلاقات السعودية ـ الصينية وحسابات المصالح

Hoda al-Husseini. (Saudi-Chinese relations and the calculation of interests),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 8 December 2022. https://tinyurl.com/k342vwkd

… Saudi Arabia does not seek to replace the U.S.’s role in the Middle East and stop considering it the main guarantor of regional security; rather, it seeks to find a balance through which it safeguards its own interests. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States is deeper and greater than a crisis with a transient American administration. At the summit, Prince Mohammed bin Salman will prove to the Chinese president that the Kingdom cannot be infiltrated by benefiting from tensions, but rather must be engaged through equal interaction based on common interests.

“Saudi Arabia spent $1.4 bln in incentives to boost local military sector in 2021-22,” al-Arabiya English (influential Saudi news media channel), 12 December 2022. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2022/12/12/Saudi-Arabia-spent-1-4-bln-in-incentives-to-boost-local-military-sector-in-2021-22

Saudi Arabia spent $1.4 billion (5.1 billion riyals) in incentives to boost its local military sector over the last two years, the governor of the sector’s general authority Ahmed al-Ohali said on Monday…

SAMI’s chief executive officer Walid Abukhaled said the company will focus on unmanned systems, radars and cybersecurity in coming years. Both were speaking at a forum in Riyadh on Monday, in the wake of Saudi Arabia’s 2023 budget announcements.

“Saudi Arabia and China Strengthen Strategic Partnership in Digital Economy,” SPA – Saudi Press Agency (official Saudi news agency), 9 December 2022. https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2407961

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has signed a strategic partnership for cooperation in the fields of digital economy with the People’s Republic of China, as part of the framework of the current official visit of President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China to the Kingdom…The partnership develops a framework for cooperation between the two friendly countries, covering the fields of digital economy, communications and information technology, and promoting research and innovation in the field of emerging technologies, in addition to improving aspects of communications infrastructure, and enabling the growth of digital entrepreneurship through emerging business models such as financial technology and e-commerce. It also covers cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence, advanced computing and quantum information technology, in addition to robots and smart equipment, and work to develop their technologies and applications for industrial and commercial purposes. Moreover, this partnership memorandum aims at enhancing the two friendly countries’ cooperation in the fields of the modern generation of mobile communications technology and emerging technologies. Within the framework of this partnership, the two sides will also cooperate in the field of digital technology applications and radio frequency spectrum management, in addition to their cooperation in developing and building local capabilities in communication and data centers, developing digital platforms and cloud computing services, and expanding submarine cable projects.

Notes:

[i] “Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy,” U.S. Congressional Research Service, Updated 23 November 2020, p. 23.https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf

[ii] Several media outlets reported that Saudi Arabia and China signed a stack of weapons sales agreements worth around $4 billion at the November 2022 Zhuhai Air Show in China, a few weeks before the Saudi-organized Arab-Chinese summit. The deal reportedly included TB001 UAVs, YJ-21 anti-ship missiles, carrier-based hypersonic missile systems, and an anti-drone laser system known as the “Silent Hunter.” A Chinese military analyst cited by the English-language South China Morning Post is bullish on the prospects of growing Saudi-Chinese arms trade.  He considers Saudi Arabia to be potentially interested in several Chinese land systems, including tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery—to include long-range rocket artillery.  See: “Why is Saudi Arabia looking to China to buy weapons after years of arms deals with the US?” South China Morning Post, 8 December 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3202245/why-saudi-arabia-looking-china-buy-weapons-after-years-arms-deals-us;For more on the “Silent Hunter,” see: Lucas Winter, “Saudi Arabia Turns to China for Low-Altitude Air Defense,” OE Watch, Issue 4, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/415161

[iii] For background on Vision 2030’s impact on Saudi military industry and Saudi-Chinese defense industry relations, see: Lucas Winter “Saudi Arabia and the UAE Streamline Military Industry,” OE Watch, January 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/353022; “Radars and UAVs: Saudi Arabia Taking Steps to Localize Military Industries,” OE Watch, November 2020. https://community.apan.org/search?q=Radars and UAVs%3A Saudi Arabia Taking Steps to Localize Military Industries; “Continued Growth and Development in Domestic High-Tech Military Industries of Saudi Arabia and the UAE,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/382665;  “Will Saudi Arabia’s Domestic UAV Program Slow Get Off the Ground?,” OE Watch, Issue 1, 2022 https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/405136; “UAV Technologies Proliferating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia,” OE Watch, Issue 7, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/420430; and “Saudi Arabia Continues Buying Missiles and UAVs From China as Part of Broader Foreign Policy Rebalancing,” OE Watch, Issue 11, 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429585

Image Information:

Image:  Flag of Saudi Arabia
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia_%28type_1%29.svg      
Attribution: Public Domain

Tajikistan and China Deepen Security Cooperation

Posted on by
Gorno-Badakhshan map

Gorno-Badakhshan map.

“A temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises.”

The government of Tajikistan has, in recent years, only rarely released information about its security cooperation activities with China.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from Tajikistan’s independent news website Asia Plus reports on a recent agreement signed by the governments of Tajikistan and China to carry out a series of joint biennial exercises focusing on counterterrorism. While the Tajik government again provided few details about the agreement, there is enough information to gauge how it fits within broader expectations of Tajik-Chinese security cooperation going forward. The article reports that the agreement calls for joint counterterrorism exercises between Tajikistan and China to take place “at least once every two years” and that their purpose is “to strengthen and develop a comprehensive strategic partnership.” The article also mentions that both sides are looking to increase coordination between special forces units as well as tactical skills for counterterrorism. Special purpose units from Tajikistan and China have carried out a handful of joint exercises over the past seven years, all focusing on a counterterrorism scenario, though none of them had been part of a series of exercises.[ii] 

The article goes on to note that a “temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises” and that both sides will “not disclose details about the timing, location, scale, and leadership of the exercises before the start of the exercise.” It is likely that each side will release some information about future exercises after they take place, but this aspect of the agreement demonstrates how Tajikistan continues to develop a deeper partnership with China. Lastly, the article provides a reminder that China provided 55 million Chinese yuan (around $8 million) last year for a facility for Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. This new facility appears to be for Tajikistan and is not another Chinese base. Ultimately, Tajikistan’s agreement with China to carry out joint counterterrorism exercises may not appear as significant as Tajikistan’s partnership with Russia, but it does signal a more consistent effort from both sides to develop the partnership.

Source:

Mazhab Juma, “Не реже одного раза в два года. Таджикистан и Китай договариваются, как проводить антитеррористические учения (‘No fewer than one time every two years’. Tajikistan and China agreed to carry out counterterrorism exercises),” Asia-Plus (independent news website in Tajikistan), 21 November 2022. 

https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20221121/ne-rezhe-odnogo-raza-v-dva-goda-tadzhikistan-i-kitai-dogovarivayutsya-kak-provodit-antiterroristicheskie-ucheniya

Tajikistan intends to carry out counterterrorism exercises with China at least once every two years. The text of the agreement between the governments of Tajikistan and China, published on the information and legal portal of the (Tajik) Ministry of Justice), states that the purpose of the exercise is to strengthen and develop a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Another goal is to increase the level of coordination between the special counterterrorism units, the level of interaction between the units, and the training and tactical skills of the two countries…

… It is also noted that a temporary exercise control department is being created to prepare and conduct the exercises… the parties will take strict secrecy measures and will not disclose details about the timing, location, scale, and leadership of the exercises before the start of the exercise.

…in October last year, the Parliament of Tajikistan approved an agreement in which China is building a special base in the Wakhan Gorge of the Gorno Badakhsahn Autonomous Oblast… The base will be built in accordance with an agreement between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan and the Ministry of Public Security of China. “As part of the cooperation agreement between the two countries, China will provide grant assistance for the construction of the base for the rapid response team of the Organized Crime Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan…

The cost of building the base is 55 million Chinese yuan (approximately 100 million somoni)…

Notes:

[i] For instance, the 2019 revelation that China had established a base in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakshan region near the Tajik-Afghan border only came out after a Western journalist had traveled to the remote region.

[ii] For more information on joint Tajik-China exercises, see: Matthew Stein, “Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity,” 20 January 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/360801

Image Information:

Image: Gorno-Badakhshan map
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gorno_badakhshan_map.png
Attribution: Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication

Syrians Fighting for Russia in Ukraine Playing Limited Role

Posted on by
Logo of the Syrian Special Forces, used by the 25th Special Mission Forces Division.

Logo of the Syrian Special Forces, used by the 25th Special Mission Forces Division.

“…the main task of the Syrian fighters was providing security and protection for areas managed by Wagner and other military contractors in Luhansk and Donetsk …”

There have been several reports of Syrian fighters being recruited to fight on the Kremlin’s side since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. A March 2022 report claimed that 40,000 Syrians had been recruited to fight in Ukraine, and early in the conflict Russian officials suggested there were 16,000 Middle Eastern “volunteers” ready to fight alongside Russia. However, as of late 2022, reports place the number of Syrians sent to Russia for training and eventual deployment at around only 2,000. Of those, several hundred were reportedly deployed in September, and another few hundred in November, primarily in “non-combat roles,” according to the first accompanying excerpt, from a report published in the English-language news website Middle East Eye. More specifically, the bulk of Syrian fighters in Russia appear to be associated with the Syrian military’s 25th Special Mission Forces Division, formerly known as the “Tiger Forces.”[i]

Several other Syrian regime loyalist militias have also reportedly provided Moscow with recruits, including the Syrian-Palestinian “Liwa al-Quds” (Quds Brigade), the Iran-backed Afghan-majority Shiite “Liwa al-Fatimiyun” (Fatimid Brigade), militias affiliated with operatives in Syria’s ruling Baath Party, former rebels in the Russia-controlled 5th Division, and fighters recruited by Christian militia leaders from Hama Province.[ii] On 6 November, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), an opposition NGO, reported in the second accompanying excerpt that Liwa al-Quds fighters had joined fighters from the 25th Division in deploying on the Ukrainian battlefield, without providing details.

The third accompanying excerpt, a December 2022 report from an opposition NGO called Syrians for Truth and Justice, claims that recruitment and transfer of Syrians to fight on behalf of Russia continued through the second half of 2022. Among others, the report details three distinct routes taken by flights suspected of ferrying Syrian fighters to Russia for training. The report also identifies a series of Russian sites where Syrian fighters either train or are stationed, as well as several Ukrainian locations to which they are ultimately deployed, including Kherson, Melitopol, and Donetsk. Per the first referenced entry, the Middle East Eye report, Syrian fighters appear to be mostly providing “security and protection for areas managed by Wagner and other military contractors in Luhansk and Donetsk,” though they may be called to the frontlines if need be. The report mentions a Russian military contractor called “Shchit” (“Shield”) and a Wagner subsidiary known as “Task Force Rusich” as the key Russian entities employing the services of Syrian fighters. As Russia appears to gear up for a new offensive, it seems likely that additional Syrian fighters could be deployed, though based on current trends, their impact will likely remain marginal.

Sources:

“Ukraine war: Russia deploys Syrian fighters to shore up its defences,”Middle East Eye (Qatari-aligned English-language news website), 9 November 2022. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ukraine-war-russia-deploys-syrian-fighters

Russia has deployed more than 500 Syrian fighters in Ukraine for primarily non-combatant roles, tasking them generally with safeguarding facilities in Luhansk and Donetsk in the past few months, regional intelligence sources told Middle East Eye…

The official said the main task of the Syrian fighters was providing security and protection for areas managed by Wagner and other military contractors in Luhansk and Donetsk, but they could be called to the front for combat if an emergency or pressing need presented itself…

Those sources told MEE that the Syrians might be serving under the Russian military contractor Shchit (“Shield”) and a Wagner subsidiary group called Task Force Rusich, which earned a reputation for its self-declared neo-Nazi ideology during its deployment to eastern Ukraine in 2014…

However, the Syrian government official said the number of Syrian fatalities was much higher than reported, with at least 50 killed in the Ukrainian bombardment so far. “The Syrians aren’t partaking in the actual fighting, they are mainly functioning as logistics near the front lines. However, there is a small number of them that work as part of the artillery,” the official told MEE.

“Nine Syrian mercenaries killed and Liwaa Al-Quds brigade join war alongside Russians,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (opposition Syrian NGO), 6 November 2022. https://www.syriahr.com/en/274960/

Reliable sources have informed SOHR that Liwaa Al-Quds brigade has engaged in fighting alongside the Russians in the Russian war on Ukraine, while the 25th Division has been fighting since mid-September 2022.

“New Testimonies: Russia Continues to Deploy Syrian Mercenaries to Ukraine,” Syrians for Truth and Justice,(opposition Syrian NGO), 20 December 2022. https://stj-sy.org/en/new-testimonies-russia-continues-to-deploy-syrian-mercenaries-to-ukraine/

In this report, Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) presents an update on the Syrian mercenary activities in the context of the Ukrainian conflict, revealing new information obtained in December and the second half of November 2022. The information corroborates that Syrian security companies continue to transfer fighters to Ukraine, operating as proxies for the Russian Wagner Group…

Notes:

[i] For background, see: Lucas Winter, “Suheil al-Hassan and the Syrian Army’s Tiger Forces.” Small Wars Journal, Jul 22.9 (2016). https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/docpreview-s/00-00-00-97-25/20160906-Winter-_2D00_-Suheil-al_2D00_Hassan-and-the-Syrian-Army_2700_s-Tiger.pdf

[ii] For background on Syrian militia recruitment and transfers abroad, see: Lucas Winter, “Oil, Fighters, Mercenaries, and Diplomats: Increasing Flows Between Libya and Syria,” OE Watch, April 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/359091 and Lucas Winter, “Mercenary Recruitment and PMC Growth in Syria,” OE Watch, January 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/380367; For background on the Quds Brigade, see: Lucas Winter, “The Quds Brigade: Palestinian Militia Emerges as Key Russian Partner in Syria,” OE Watch, November 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/377063; For background on Syria’s pro-Russian Christian militias in Hama Province, see: Lucas Winter, “Russia Strengthens Ties with Loyalist Christian Militias in Syria’s Hama Province,” OE Watch, March 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/382766  

Image Information:

Image:  Logo of the Syrian Special Forces, used by the 25th Special Mission Forces Division
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Syrian_commando.png
Attribution: Jakednb, CC BY-SA 3.0