Category Archives: Global Operational Environment

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Global Operational Environment.

Philippine Interest in Trilateral Security Pact With United States and Japan Possibly Increasing

Posted on by
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force butai 01 – 04.

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force butai 01 – 04.

“Beijing is determined to change the status quo in the South China Sea by continuing to harass neighboring ‘small’ countries.”

In March 2023, the nationalist Japan Times published the excerpted article written by Kuni Miyake, the research director for foreign and national security affairs at the Canon Institute for Global Studies in Tokyo. Miyake argues the Philippines has growing concerns about Chinese policies in the South China Sea, including the building of military outposts on atolls claimed by the Philippines.[i] Therefore, the Philippines is more likely than in previous decades to be open to a trilateral partnership with Japan and the United States.

Miyake acknowledges that Philippines leader Rodrigo Duterte has signed economic agreements with Beijing related to issues ranging from oil and gas exploration to fishing rights. However, provocative actions by the Chinese navy, including targeting a Philippine Coast Guard ship with a laser device in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and China’s harassing other smaller Southeast Asian countries, has contributed to momentum building in the Philippines government for closer security partnerships with Japan and the United States. In contrast to Beijing, Miyake argues that Japan must stress to the Philippine government the important geopolitical role of the Philippines in their bilateral relations. Miyake’s article comes after the Philippines began contemplating a visiting forces agreement (VFA) with Japan.[ii] For example, the second excerpted article in the Philippine publication Inquirer from November 2022 quoted the country’s Senate President, Juan Miguel Zubiri, who supports a VFA. Another senator stated a VFA would not only be beneficial to the Philippines because of the training Japan can provide, but also because the VFA would increase mutual preparedness between Japan and the Philippines for natural disasters and other humanitarian emergencies.

Sources:

Kuni Miyake, “The geopolitical trajectory of the Philippines is changing,” japantimes.co.jp (English-language daily with a nationalistic editorial perspective), 8 March 2023. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/03/08/commentary/world-commentary/philippine-trilateral-cooperation/

Returning to Manila this time, I was struck by a series of developments: a growing anxiety toward China among the populace, dramatic improvement in U.S.-Philippine relations and growing momentum to advance trilateral-security cooperation between Japan, the Philippines and the United States, which until a few years ago would have been only a dream.

In January of this year, Marcos was invited to China as a state guest and signed 14 agreements as the Chinese business community expressed intentions to invest $22.8 billion in the Philippines. Nevertheless, Beijing is determined to change the status quo in the South China Sea by continuing to harass neighboring “small” countries. In February this year, for example, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel blocked the path of a Philippine Coast Guard ship within the island nation’s exclusive economic zone while another Chinese vessel targeted a Philippine ship with a laser device…. What I found most fascinating in Manila was the idea that security cooperation between Japan, the U.S. and the Philippines is gaining momentum these days.

“Senators push for VFA with Japan,” inquirer.net (popular pro-democracy newspaper in the Philippines), 14 November 2022. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1692799/senators-push-for-vfa-with-japan

Senators are keen to endorse a visiting forces agreement (VFA) with erstwhile invader Japan, making it only the third nation with which the country has such an extraordinary agreement, next to the United States and Australia. “I’m sure we can muster enough support in the Senate for a visiting forces agreement with Japan. They’re good partners,” Senate President Juan Miguel Zubiri said during the Senate plenary’s marathon budget deliberations on Thursday night.

Forging a VFA with Japan would not only be helpful in joint training but also during natural disasters, said Senate President Pro Tempore Loren Legarda.“This is not just military training but it will also include disaster response and disaster risk reduction.”

China’s force buildup in the region and opportunities for trilateral coordination and cooperation will be among the key topics on the agenda.

Notes:

[i] One of the first significant South China Sea confrontations between China and the Philippines occurred with China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012. At the time, the Philippines believed an agreement existed whereby both countries would withdraw naval patrols from the shoal as typhoon season approached. However, when Philippine ships left the shoal, China placed a barrier across the entrance to the shoal and stationed coast guard boats there to chase away Philippine fishing boats. See: Mark Raymond and David A. Welch, “What’s Really Going On in the South China Sea?,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 42(2), 214-239, August 2022. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/18681034221086291

[ii] Since the rise of China in the 1990s, Philippine and Japanese political leaders and high-ranking defense officials have conducted goodwill visits and high-level dialogues, while Japan has consistently provided emergency relief assistance to the Philippines in the wake of earthquakes and typhoons. However, a VFA between the two countries would represent a significant elevation of the two countries’ bilateral ties. See: Renato Cruz De Castro, “Exploring a 21st-Century Japan-Philippine Security Relationship: Linking Two Spokes Together?,” Asian Survey Vol. 49 (4, 691-715), 2009. https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-abstract/49/4/691/24277/Exploring-a-21st-Century-Japan-Philippine-Security?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Image Information:

Image: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force butai01 – 04
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Japan_Maritime_Self-Defense_Force_butai01_-_04.jpg
Attribution: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, CC x 4.0

New Milestone in China’s Support for Egypt’s Space Program

Posted on by
Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt at Night (NASA, International Space Station Science, 10/28/2010).

Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt at Night (NASA, International Space Station Science, 10/28/2010).

“We are achieving one of the main goals of Egypt, which is the localization of the satellite industry and technology … through this cooperation with China…”

Egypt’s domestic space program is slowly taking off, thanks in part to a modest Chinese investment that is likely to pay dividends for years to come.[i] The latest milestone in Sino-Egyptian space collaboration came in late February and early March 2023, when China launched into orbit two Egyptian-assembled, remote sensing, low-earth orbit satellites, Horus-1 and Horus-2. As remote sensing tools, the Horus satellites will have various uses for the Egyptian government, including monitoring the vast desert stretches that make up approximately 95 percent of the country’s surface. In space, they join two other Egyptian-owned satellites that were launched in 2019: EgyptSat A, a Russian-made earth-observation satellite, and Tiba 1 (Thebes 1), a French-made military communications satellite.[ii]

The accompanying excerpt from Egyptian news website El Watan cites the head of the Egyptian Space Agency (EgSA), who explained on a popular morning TV show that cooperation with China had put Egypt on the road toward achieving one of its key goals in space, namely the “localization of the satellite industry and technology.” The Horus satellites were made at an assembly, integration, and testing center built with Chinese grant money. Egypt hopes to eventually have a satellite launch site and a series of control stations for indigenously produced satellites.[iii] The EgSA, which was established in 2019, has collaborative agreements with the space agencies of several countries; however, Chinese financing and know-how may be playing an outsized role in its early development. Chinese support for Egypt’s space program dovetails with investments in other information and communications technology sectors that could eventually lead to deepening bilateral cooperation on military satellite and communications technology. Last February, at the IDEX 2023 arms fair in Abu Dhabi, Egypt’s Arab Organization for Industrialization signed a deal with the China Aerospace Construction Group Company to “localize manufacturing technology in several defense industries fields, including co-producing a 3D radar to detect and track UAVs.”

Source:

“وكالة الفضاء المصرية: قمر «حورس 2» يستخدم في الكشف عن الثروات المعدنية

(Egyptian Space Agency: Horus-2 used to uncover mineral resources),” El Watan (Egyptian news website), 13 March 2023. https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/6473128e The CEO of the Egyptian Space Agency continued: “We are achieving one of the main goals of Egypt, which is the localization of the satellite industry and technology. We are talking about a major goal in the national space program, one that was partially achieved through this cooperation with China”…

Notes:

[i] The Chinese investment consists of three cumulative grants: $23 million in 2016, $45 million in 2018, and $72 million in 2019. See: “Egypt Commences Implementation Phase Of China-funded MisrSat II Satellite And AIT Centre,” al-Monitor, 9 September 2019. https://africanews.space/egypt-commences-implementation-phase-of-china-funded-misrsat-ii-satellite-and-ait-centre/

[ii] Egypt’s space program is still in its infancy, but its near-term ambitions should not be dismissed. A 100-acre tract of land has been set aside for “Space City” in the yet unfinished New Administrative Capital, to the east of Cairo. Space City hosts the African Space Agency (AfSA), whose headquarters were formally opened in January 2023. See: “African Space Agency formally inaugurated,” Spacewatch Africa, 30 January 2023. https://spacewatch.global/2023/01/african-space-agency-formally-inaugurated/

[iii] “Egypt considers space program,” al-Monitor, 28 September 2020. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/09/egypt-manufacture-satellite-launch-space-technology.html

Image Information:

Image:  Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt at Night (NASA, International Space Station Science, 10/28/2010)
Source:  NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, https://www.flickr.com/photos/gsfc/12868402644       
Attribution: CC 2.0

Russia-Supported Military Rulers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea Continue To Deepen Ties

Posted on by

“Giant posters of Malian Presidents Assimi Goïta and Guinean President Mamady Doumbouya, who came to power through coups like the Burkinabè transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, were brandished by the demonstrators next to Russian flags.”

A new nexus of West African allies is emerging that bears watching. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, which are all led by military dictators generally sympathetic to Russia and antagonistic towards France, continue to deepen their ties, especially regarding military and counterterrorism affairs. As detailed in the first article from the pan-African news aggregator Africanews.com, in March 2023, the prime minister of Burkina Faso suggested on a visit to Mali that the two countries create what he called “a federation.” A similar idea had also been broadly discussed in February 2023, when leaders from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea—all of whom had faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for unconstitutional assumptions of power—also discussed the creation of a new regional organization to help them circumvent ECOWAS.[i] Of note is the inclusion of Guinea in the mix. Since Guinea faces no similar jihadist insurgency as Mali and Burkina Faso, it does not appear to have the same degree of pro-Russian sentiments as Mali[ii] and Burkina Faso,[iii] which host or are presumed to host mercenaries from the Russian private military company Wagner Group, respectively. Yet, the fact that Guinea is ruled by a military leader may be sufficient to pull Guinea into the pro-Russia orbit of the other two. As detailed in the second article from Africanews.com, this nexus of geopolitical affinities and antipathy was displayed at a January 2023 rally in Burkina Faso decrying French presence and promoting Burkinabè sovereignty. As the article articulates, “Giant posters of Malian Presidents Assimi Goïta and Guinean President Mamady Doumbouya, who seized power like the Burkinabè transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, were brandished by the demonstrators next to Russian flags.” As this alliance deepens, other francophone West African countries with pro-Russian, anti-French sentiments from civil society, namely, the Central African Republic and Chad, may well be targeted for future recruitment.

Sources:

“Le Burkina Faso aspire à créer ‘une fédération’ avec le Mali (Burkina Faso seeks to create a federation with Mali),” africanews.com (pan-African news aggregator), 2 March 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/02/02/le-burkina-faso-aspire-a-creer-une-federation-avec-le-mali/

Burkinabe Prime Minister Apollinaire Joachimson Kyelem de Tambela, visiting neighboring Mali this week, has suggested the creation of a “federation” between his country and Mali.

 The two states, faced with jihadist violence, and led by putschist soldiers who demanded the departure of French soldiers from their territories, have come closer in recent months.

In a speech during a dinner, the head of the Malian government, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, estimated that this working visit will strengthen the ties of cooperation on the security and economic levels between the Republic of Mali and Burkina Faso:

“Des milliers de Burkinabés manifestent pour la ‘souveraineté nationale’ (Thousands of Burkinabe protest for ‘national sovereignty’),” africanews.com (pan-African news aggregator), 30 January 2023. https://fr.africanews.com/2023/01/29/des-milliers-de-burkinabes-manifestent-pour-la-souverainete-nationale/

Gathered in Place de la Nation, in the center of the capital, at the call of the coordination of associations and organizations of civil society, the demonstrators held up placards on which one could read: “Imperialism, down”, ” French policy in Africa, down”, “No to Macron’s diktat”, or “Forward for the sovereignty of Burkina”.

Giant posters of Malian Presidents Assimi Goïta and Guinean President Mamady Doumbouya, who came to power through coups like the Burkinabè transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, were brandished by the demonstrators next to Russian flags.“Sovereignty, freedom of choice of its partners, obstinate defense of the interests of the Malian people. I am certain that these principles are shared by all the countries which want to take charge of themselves and our brothers and friends of Faso, I am convinced of it, must have similar requirements.”

Notes:

[i] See: Jason Warner, “West African States Ruled by Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions,” OE Watch, 03-2023. Awaiting online publication.

[ii] See: Jason Warner, “Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/437332

[iii] See: Jason Warner, “Burkina Faso Fights Terrorism with Recruits and Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/436264

Western Efforts To Isolate Russia and Iran Falter in Latin America

Posted on by
Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.

Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.

“In recent days, Russian media in Spanish, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, highlighted the rejection of the various Latin American governments to the requests of…Berlin. ‘The arms race in Ukraine does not have the support of South America,’ the outlets declared.”

Latin American countries have often spoken in terms of “neutrality” as they have tried to remain “non-aligned” regarding the Russia-Ukraine war.[i] While some countries in the region have condemned Russia’s invasion, none has joined the Western-led sanctions campaign. Nor has any of the six Latin American countries with old Soviet weaponry stepped forward to donate it to Ukraine. Underscoring these trends is the first article from the Spanish-language outlet BBC Mundo, covering German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s recent trip to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. At each stop, Scholz implored his counterparts to consider donating their Soviet weapons systems to Ukraine.[ii] All three leaders firmly declined. For his part, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva even blamed both Russia and Ukraine for the current conflict. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said he would rather see Colombia’s equipment become “junk” than send it to Ukraine where it could prolong the war. Latin American countries have been similarly reluctant to turn away from Iran. According to the second accompanying article from Argentina’s leading daily newspaper, La Nación, two Iranian warships sanctioned by the United States recently docked in Rio de Janeiro. Taken together, these developments suggest neither Russia’s war in Ukraine nor Iran’s domestic crackdowns on protestors and its provision of kamikaze drones to Russia for use in Ukraine have managed to isolate these countries in Latin America.

Sources:

“Por qué los países latinoamericanos se han negado a enviar armas a Ucrania (Why Latin American countries have refused to send weapons to Ukraine),” BBC Mundo (the Spanish-language outlet of the popular British state-owned network), 3 February 2023. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-64506590

During a meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who is visiting several Latin American countries this week, Fernández clarified that Argentina “is not thinking of sending weapons” to the conflict zone. A few days earlier, his peers in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil had made similar claims…In recent days, Russian media in Spanish such as Sputnik and Russia Today, highlighted the rejection of the various Latin American governments to the requests of Berlin.

“Brasil permite que dos buques de guerra iraníes atraquen en Río pese a las presiones de EE.UU (Brazil allows two Iranian warships to dock in Rio despite US pressure),” La Nación (Argentina’s leading daily newspaper), 28 February 2023. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/brasil-permite-que-dos-buques-de-guerra-iranies-atraquen-en-rio-pese-a-las-presiones-de-eeuu-nid28022023/

Once Lula’s trip [to the White House] ended, the docking of the ships was authorized. Vice Admiral Carlos Eduardo Horta Arentz, deputy chief of the Brazilian Navy General Staff, gave his approval for the ships to dock in Rio between February 26 and March 4, according to an announcement published on February 23…The Brazilian Navy authorizes a foreign ship to dock in Brazil, but only with prior authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which takes into account the request of the embassy in question and the logistics…Diplomacy with Iran was one of the highlights of Lula’s attempts to bolster Brazil’s international position during his previous presidential terms. In 2010, he traveled to Tehran to meet then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as he tried to broker a US-Iran nuclear deal.

Notes:

[i] For more background on Latin America’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, see: Ryan C. Berg et al., “A Hesitant Hemisphere: How Latin America Has Been Shaped by the War in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 February 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hesitant-hemisphere-how-latin-america-has-been-shaped-war-ukraine

[ii] For more information on the estimated six countries in the region that could donate Soviet-era weapons systems to Ukraine, see: Jeff Seldin, “U.S. Pushing Central, South American Countries to Give Ukraine Quick Military Boost,” Voice of America, 20 January 2023. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-pushing-central-south-american-countries-to-give-ukraine-quick-military-boost-/6927591.html

Image Information:

Image:  Naval vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy
Source:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ceremony_to_welcome_the_33rd_and_send-off_the_34th_naval_groups_of_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Navy_%2813%29.jpg 
Attribution: Wikimedia, CC-BY-4.0

Georgian Separatist Republic Conducts Military Exercises

Posted on by
Map of Abkhazia.

Map of Abkhazia.

“As part of a three-day exercise, employees of the State Security Service… will practice measures to counter terrorist attacks. The exercises of the security forces began on March 12 in the Gal[i] district, where military equipment and personnel were transferred.”

In March 2023, the government of the Georgian separatist region of Abkhazia conducted a series of military exercises in response to demonstrations in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi calling for the retaking of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[i] According to the excerpted article from the independent but pro-Abkhaz media outlet Abkhaz World, Abkhazia conducted a series of military and counterterrorism exercises in the Gali sector, the de facto border between Abkhazia and Georgia. The Gali sector is defined by the Ingury River, a natural but not impenetrable barrier between Georgia and Abkhazia and the scene of periodic infiltration, insurgency, and sabotage by Georgian nationals since 1993.[ii] According to the excerpted article from Bulgaria-based Bulgaria News, Abkhazian Major General Dmitry Dbar told reporters “that the Gal[iii] exercises are as close to combat as possible and are aimed at countering subversive groups.”

The current tension between Abkhazia and Georgia is being fueled by Russia’s war in Ukraine. For months, Ukrainian officials have called on Georgia to open a second front against Russia by reclaiming Abkhazia and South Ossetia to diverting Russian forces and attention from Ukraine. Yet, while this scenario might help Ukraine, it could be a military disaster for Georgia, which has taken a more neutral position regarding Ukraine despite numerous anti-Russian and pro-West public protests and hundreds of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine. There is a common presumption that Georgia could only attack Abkhazia if a Western power, most usually said to be the United States, were to facilitate the operation. At the same time, nearly everyone in Georgia and many in the West continue to think of Abkhazia only being able to defend itself with Russian forces.[iv] The truth probably lies somewhere in between, and the recent Abkhazian military exercises are meant to demonstrate to Georgia that Abkhazia can and will take care of itself, regardless of current nationalist and regional pressures to reignite the conflict.

Sources:

“Abkhazia’s Law Enforcement Agencies Practise Measures to Combat Terrorism and Sabotage,” Abkhaz World (independent but pro-Abkhaz media outlet based in London and Turkey), 13 March 2023. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/2223-practice-measures-to-combat-terrorism-and-sabotage

The head of State Security Service under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia, Dmityr Dbar, stated that the exercises will simulate combat situations and will take place in several stages.

“We will conduct these exercises frequently to prepare for anti-terrorist threats. The fighters must know each other, interact, and be able to carry out coordinated combat missions,” he said.

Interior Minister Watler Butba added that the Ministry of Internal Affairs staff will practice measures to release hostages and neutralize attackers at the state border checkpoint.

“Абхазия следи с тревога събитията в Грузия (Abkhazia is watching events in Georgia with concern),” News Bulgaria (Bulgarian news source), 14 March 2023. https://news.bg/int-politics/abhaziya-sledi-s-trevoga-sabitiyata-v-gruziya.html

The head of Abkhazia’s State Security Service, Major General Dmitry Dbar, told reporters on Monday that “the exercises are as close to combat as possible and are aimed at countering subversive groups.”

“We used to conduct such exercises regularly once a quarter, but given the situation in Georgia and possible threats, we will conduct such events more often, to work out mechanisms to ensure anti- terrorist protection of the population,” he said.

We remind you that on March 7 and 8 thousands of people protested against the foreign agents law in Tbilisi, which led to clashes between police and demonstrators. On March 7, the draft law “On transparency of foreign influence”, developed by a group of deputies from the “People’s Power” faction, was adopted in the first reading by the Georgian parliament. On the morning of March 9, the ruling party “Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia” withdrew the bill.

Peskov: Russia is worried about what is happening in Georgia The Kremlin spokesman hinted that an outside power was trying to bring in an anti-Russian element

We recall that Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent more than a decade ago. Moscow has a significant military presence there. Georgia condemns the ongoing Russian “occupation” of the territory.

Notes:

[i] South Ossetia and Abkhazia are/were ethnic enclaves within Georgia that petitioned unsuccessfully for independence at the end of the 1980s. Georgia resisted the moves and a war between South Ossetia and Georgia was fought in 1990-1991. A year later war broke out between Abkhazia and Georgia (1992-1993). Georgia lost both conflicts and both territories became de facto independent. Georgia has always maintained that it was defeated in both ethnic enclaves by Russia. The truth is complicated and subject to debate, but the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia (South Ossetia) consolidated the de facto independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

[ii] There has been much speculation and rumor as to the nature of the Georgian paramilitary individuals and units raiding Abkhazia. While many believe the Georgian government is behind the low-grade Georgian insurgency in Abkhazia, there are many individuals and groups that appear to be operating on their own initiative—a characteristic of Georgian forces during the war for Abkhazia 1992-1993. See: Dodge Billingsley, “Georgia’s Lingering Border Security Issues,” OE Watch, 08-2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/315067

[iii] Georgian place names frequently end in “i,” whereas Abkhazian placenames omit the Georgian spelling and pronunciation.  For example, “Gali” in Georgian becomes “Gal” in Abkhazian.  Most Western scholarship and media coverage of Abkhazia refers to Abkhazian locations using the Georgian language spellings.

[iv] See: Dodge Billingsley, “Georgian Defense Minister Offers Modernization Plan in Face of Russia Threat.” OE Watch, 09-2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/395195

Image Information:

Image: Map of Abkhazia
Source: Sémhur, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abkhazia_map-fr.svg
Attribution: CC x 3.0

Georgians Consider Outcomes of War in Ukraine

Posted on by
Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.

Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023.

“In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities.”

The Georgian government condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine initially but has not taken part in any sanctions against Russia out of concern of being drawn into the conflict. Additionally, Georgia’s economy remains closely tied to Russia’s, and the government continues to contend with the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have been occupied by Russia-supported forces since the end of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War.[i] While Georgia will likely maintain its neutrality on Ukraine, the accompanying excerpted article from the independent, non-profit think tank Georgian Institute of Politics offers a Georgian perspective of five possible outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war. The article is a follow up to the think tank’s initial assessment of possible outcomes, which was published just a few weeks after the war began in 2022. While the report acknowledges that Georgia will not have a direct impact on the outcome of the war, each of the scenarios shows how Georgia will be affected in some way.

In the first scenario, Ukraine wins the war, which the article’s authors believes is probable, resulting in Georgia joining NATO and having deeper integration with Europe. Conversely, the article believes that this would come with the risk that Russia will then destabilize Georgia regardless of who is in power in Moscow. The second scenario examines what could happen if Ukraine turns into a frozen conflict or returns to the status quo before the war began. The article states that a frozen conflict would allow Russia time to restore its military but also would push additional Russian migrants into Georgia. Georgia could also become the focal point of Putin’s ire as he looks to claim a quick victory to compensate domestically for losses in Ukraine. This would in turn cause Georgian officials to move away from integrating with Europe and pursue a policy more in line with Russian interests. 

In the third scenario, Russia achieves its strategic goals in Ukraine, and in the fourth scenario, Russia and NATO engage in full-scale war. These are unlikely according to the article. The fifth and final scenario, which the authors believe is very likely, is that a war of attrition will continue for two or more years and that this will put Georgia in a difficult position. The article notes how Georgian Dream, the ruling party in Georgia’s parliament, has been improving ties with Russia, though many in Georgia still see Russia as a threat. In early March, the Georgian government withdrew a bill requiring NGOs to register as foreign agents in Georgia after facing protest that the bill had been influenced by Russia. Lastly, the article notes that Georgia will face “major strategic dilemmas” regardless of how the war ends and recommends that Georgian officials increase civil defense capabilities and cooperation with Turkey.[ii] While the article does not claim to be an official Georgian perspective, it makes clear that Georgia will be impacted by the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

Source:

“One Year of War in Ukraine and Risk Assessment for Georgia: Five (updated) Scenarios,” Georgian Institute of Politics (an independent non-profit think tank in Georgia), 13 February 2023.

In March of 2022, just a couple of weeks after Russia launched the full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, GIP proposed four possible scenarios of future developments and their possible implications for Georgia…However, almost one year since the invasion, the conflict seems to be reaching its decisive point…

As the war continues reshaping global geopolitics, the following piece will revisit GIP’s previous assessments and offer insights into what has changed over the last 11 months since its publication. Although the war is far from over and significant battles are still ahead, five scenarios discussed in detail below offer some insights into the dilemmas and potential risks that Georgia may face considering different possible developments in Ukraine.

Scenario 1: Ukraine wins the war (Probable)

As western support for Ukraine continues to increase, leading to a successful counteroffensive operation, and eventual victory, the geopolitical paradigm in the wider Black Sea region would change drastically…If the situation is going to develop in this direction and Ukraine is going to achieve full de-occupation of its territories (including the Crimean Peninsula), it’s not excluded that the window of opportunity may appear for NATO’s further enlargement to the East…In the best-case scenario, this would also imply Georgia joining the alliance. In addition to NATO enlargement, Russia’s defeat and retreat from the region will also make Georgia’s European integration irreversible…

…This scenario implies risks for Georgia from another perspective…Defeat in Ukraine may result in regime change in Russia, leading to internal instabilities and power struggles. This could lead to a spillover of chaos in the already volatile North Caucasus, creating a range of challenges on the border of Georgia. In other words, while a strong Russia is a serious threat to Georgia, an unstable Northern neighbor is no less dangerous for its security.

Risks will increase for Georgia even if the Russian regime survives defeat in Ukraine. Since it can still act as a spoiler, the Kremlin might be keen to restore its tarnished prestige by continuing adventurous foreign policy towards Georgia…

Scenario 2: Freezing the conflict and/or returning to status quo ante (Possible)

As the war drags on causing an immense number of causalities on both sides, there is a possibility that both Russia and Ukraine could reach the point of exhaustion…

This would be either freezing the conflict or returning to the status quo in the Eastern part of Ukraine…the existence conflicts with frozen solutions will also allow Russia to restore its forces and prepare for a new assault. This scenario also implies a risk for Georgia, as preparing for a new offensive would intensify the ongoing “silent” mobilization. This, in its turn, may lead to an increase in Russian migrants to Georgia…

Moreover, with conflict intensity decreased in Eastern Ukraine, Russian Federation could apply pressure on Georgia through South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As in the first scenario, amid the upcoming presidential elections in 2024, Putin might need a quick victory on the foreign front to compensate for the damage caused by the failures in Ukraine. In the worst-case scenario, officials in Tbilisi might be forced to give up its policy of Euro-Atlantic integration and align its external policies with the Kremlin’s…

Scenario 3: The Kremlin achieves its strategic goals (Unlikely)

In this scenario, Russia achieves a successful breakthrough in the upcoming major battles. With Western support decreasing, Ukrainian resources exhausting, and a raising death toll among civilians, Ukraine might be forced to concede. Ukraine’s concession would imply the change of the government in Kyiv, recognition of occupied territories as part of Russia and the end of Euro-Atlantic presence in the region for decades to come.

As it was outlined in our scenario 2: Georgian nightmare published in March 2022, there is no doubt that in case of such developments, the Kremlin may pose an ultimatum to Tbilisi or may even establish a puppet regime in Tbilisi. Georgia could be dragged into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or even into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)…

Scenario 4: NATO-Russia Full-Scale War (Highly unlikely)

Out of all the possible scenarios outline here, this seems to be the least likely, yet still a possibility. Especially if, after a successful counteroffensive in the East, Ukraine will start military operations to free the Crimean Peninsula. Attacks on Crimea or deeper territories in Russia might further escalate the conflict and lead to the Kremlin using a tactical nuclear weapon…

In case of a war between Russia and NATO member states, the Black Sea region gains strategic importance. It includes Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, members of the alliance and most likely get involved in the conflict…In this context, Georgia’s strategic location gains vital importance for Russia and NATO allies…

Scenario 5: Attrition warfare continues for 2 or more years (Very likely)

There is also a possibility that neither Russia nor Ukraine is going to back down that might lead to the protracted attrition warfare. In this context, illicit trade and alternative imports of the western technology is going to gain even more importance for the Kremlin. This will put Georgia in a difficult position due to its transactional foreign and security policy towards Russia. And deliberately or not, by improving economic ties with Russia, Georgian Dream did end up moving Georgia closer to its erstwhile enemy…

Despite the GD’s rhetoric, existing occupied territories remain an obstacle to improving relations with the Kremlin. Opinion polls repeatedly show that the majority of Georgians perceive Russia as a threat and support the country’s pro-European foreign policy…

Conclusion…All the scenarios outlined above suggest that regardless which direction the situation is going to develop, Tbilisi will be facing major strategic dilemmas. In any case, Georgia needs to start preparing and working on increasing its civil defense capabilities. Similar to what was suggested in our last year’s scenarios, Georgia needs to intensify its cooperation with Turkey a NATO member and a large regional military power that has a potential to counterbalance Russian regional dominance…

Notes:

[i] For more information on Georgia’s security issues in Russian-occupied South Ossetia and Abhazia, see: Matthew Stein ““Borderization” Continues in Georgia,” OE Watch, 03-2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues See also Dodge Billingsley “Russia Flexes Its Muscles in Abkhazia While Citizens Recall Anniversary of War with Georgia,” OE Watch, 09-2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/268081

[ii] For more background on Georgia’s security cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan, see: Matthew Stein “Trilateral Security in the Caucasus,” OE Watch, 07-2017. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues

Image Information:

Image: Protesters in Tbilisi, 7 March 2023
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Georgia_Protest_2023_VOA.png
Attribution: Public Domain

Algeria Seeks Non-Alignment by Preserving Russia Ties While Welcoming NATO Overtures

Posted on by
Algeria hosts final planning conference for joint Russian-Algerian exercise Desert Shield 2022.

Algeria hosts final planning conference for joint Russian-Algerian exercise Desert Shield 2022.

“Algeria clings to the principle of non-alignment.”

While Russia appears to be courting Algeria in a bid to reduce its isolation, Algeria is keeping its options open by engaging with both Russia and NATO member states. In January 2023, the Algerian government announced that President Abdelmadjid Tebboune would visit Moscow and meet with President Putin in May 2023.[i] At the May 2023 presidential summit, Russia is hoping to sign a new strategic cooperation partnership document with Algeria, if for no other reason than to make the case that Russia is not fully isolated and retains key strategic partnerships. In addition, Russia seeks to finalize a major weapons deal to show that its military export industry remains viable. The deal would be centered on the Su-57 [GRLCUT(1] stealth multirole fighter aircraft, according to the second article excerpt from the Russian-language news network RT Arabic and other news stories regularly recycled by Russian Arabic language media over the past year. Indeed, Russian expectations for the presidential summit are high, and its media and officials are going out of their way to flatter Algeria: as detailed in the first excerpted article, in an early February interview with RT Arabic, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that, in trying to turn Algeria against Russia using pressure, the West was “messing with the wrong guy.”

Algerian leadership, however, seems less enthusiastic about a singular deepening of relations with Russia: quite the opposite, judging by recent Algerian diplomatic activities. A week before the January announcement that he would visit Moscow in May, President Tebboune hosted Italy’s prime minister and discussed expanding bilateral trade, of which Algerian gas supplies to Europe via Italian pipelines are a centerpiece. Concurrently, Said Chengriha, the Chief of Staff of the Algerian armed forces, led a large delegation to Paris, where he was received by President Macron, met with several high-ranking military and government officials, and signed a security cooperation “roadmap” on his government’s behalf, as reported in the second accompanying excerpt from the Algerian monthly military journal El Djeich. Shortly after returning from Paris, Chengriha hosted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander Gen. Michael E. Langley, where he reiterated Algerian non-alignment and commitment to dealing “with many friendly countries,” including the United States, as reported in the third accompanying piece, a Facebook post from the Algerian Ministry of Defense. Algeria remains an appealing security partner for Russia, given its strategic location on NATO’s southern flank and the historical links between the Algerian and Soviet militaries; however, Algeria is unlikely to sacrifice its substantial commercial relations with Europe. Indeed, except for arms deals, Russian-Algerian trade remains negligible, and Europe’s embargo on Russian natural gas may ultimately benefit Algerian gas exports. Still, the fact that Algeria continues to value its partnership with Russia will force its government to carefully balance existing relations and new entreaties from both Russia and NATO countries. If Algiers continues to successfully navigate these competing pulls, its approach may well emerge as a model for other Arab countries seeking to do the same, most notably Saudi Arabia.

Sources:

لافروف: الولايات المتحدة تحاول إملاء سياستها على الجزائر لكنها “هاجمت الشخص الخطأ”

(Lavrov: The United States is trying to impose its policy on Algeria, but it messed with the wrong guy),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language media outlet), 1 February 2023. https://tinyurl.com/yjwsfakc

In response to a question about whether Western pressures will affect the Algerian authorities’ policy towards Russia, he added, “We have a popular saying that says, ‘You messed with the wrong guy’. Algerians can’t be told what to do in this manner, you cannot expect them to comply with and implement directives that contradict their national interests based simply on a hand signal from across the ocean. Algeria, like most countries, is a country that respects itself, its history and its interests, and draws its policies on this basis.”

هل تحصل الجزائر على مقاتلة روسية تتبع 60 هدفا في وقت واحد؟

(Will Algeria obtain Russian jets that can simultaneously track 60 targets?),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language media outlet), 1 February 2023. https://tinyurl.com/2uautj98

Russian media reported that Algeria might become the first country to possess the fifth-generation Russian Su-57 fighters, as talks were held with Russia at the end of 2020. There is talk of at least 14 aircraft being involved, scheduled for delivery before 2030.

“Monsieur le général d’armée, Saïd Chanegriha, chef d’état-major de l’Armée nationale populaire, en visite officielle en France (Army General Saïd Chanegriha, Chief of Staff of the National People’s Army, on an official visit to France),” El Djeich (Algerian armed forces monthly magazine), February 2023. https://rb.gy/levz2

The talks examined ways of strengthening military and security cooperation between the two countries. Subsequently, the meeting was formalized by the signing of a joint roadmap.

No title. Algerian Ministry of Defense Facebook Page, 8 February 2023. https://www.facebook.com/mdn.gov.dz/posts/505345958434848“I would like to emphasize on this occasion that Algeria clings to the principle of non-alignment, and jealously guards its history full of glories and heroism, as well as its independence and sovereign political decision-making. It interacts in a way that serves its own interests and deals with many friendly countries with which it has military and economic relations, such as the United States of America.”

Notes:

[i] Although officially neutral vis-à-vis Ukraine, the Algerian government has been accused of aligning with Russia due to its abstention on UN votes condemning the Ukraine invasion and the extensive bilateral high-level security contacts that followed the invasion. The deepening partnership was to be bolstered by two much-anticipated late-2022 events: joint anti-terror exercises on Algerian soil in October (“Desert Shield 2022”), and the Algerian president’s Moscow visit, which was supposed to occur before the end of 2022. In the end, the exercises were unceremoniously called off at the last minute, and the 2022 presidential visit has now been rescheduled for May 2023, though a firm date has not been set. For added context see: Lucas Winter, “Algeria Caught Between Neutrality and Strategic Relations with Russia,” OE Watch, 5-2022.  https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-past-issues/415497

Image Information:

Image: Algeria hosts final planning conference for joint Russian-
Algerian exercise Desert Shield 2022.
Source: https://rb.gy/zgyvr
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

Vietnam and Indonesia Resolve Maritime Disputes

Posted on by
Vietnam People's Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting.

Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting.

“It was very important to demarcate the overlapping waters between Vietnam and Indonesia…”

Over the past 10 years, Indonesia and Vietnam have clashed in the South China Sea, which Vietnam calls “The East Sea,” and which Indonesia calls “The North Natuna Sea.”  For example, in 2021, Indonesia seized 25 Vietnamese fishing boats and then detained and extradited more than 350 Vietnamese fishermen.[i] Prior to this incident, in 2019, a Vietnamese coast guard boat and an Indonesian naval boat crashed into each other in disputed waters.[ii] Before that, in 2014, the Indonesian navy accused Vietnamese fishing boats of entering Indonesian waters and sunk three Vietnamese boats.[iii] However, the excerpted article published by the pro-government Vietnamese publication tuoitre, noted that after 12 years of negotiations, Vietnam has proposed a boundary line in the waters with Indonesia, which Indonesia has accepted. According to the article, this boundary line will allow Vietnamese fishermen to avoid disputed waters and end the maritime clashes between the two countries. According to the excerpted article from Vietnamese military newspaper quân đội nhân dân the agreement followed the “Sea of ​​Peace-Sustainable Resolution” conference. At the conference, experts recommended Vietnam cooperate with ASEAN nations based on international law to resolve disputes.[iv] This was subsequently achieved with Indonesia and will allow ASEAN nations to be more unified when confronting maritime disputes with China, either diplomatically or military.

Sources:

“Việt Nam – Indonesia hoàn tất đàm phán phân định vùng đặc quyền kinh tế trên biển” (Vietnam – Indonesia complete negotiations on demarcation of exclusive economic zones at sea”),” tuoitre.vn (pro-Communist Party newspaper covering current affairs and originally aimed at youth audiences), 12 December 2022. https://tuoitre.vn/viet-nam-indonesia-hoan-tat-dam-phan-phan-dinh-vung-dac-quyen-kinh-te-tren-bien-20221222143434761.htm

Since 2010, the two countries have had dozens of rounds of negotiations regarding overlapping EEZ claims in the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands in the East Sea. The two sides have concluded negotiations on the demarcation of the exclusive economic zone on the basis of international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982

It was very important to demarcate the overlapping waters between Vietnam and Indonesia, because this was the justification for Vietnamese fishermen being accused by Indonesia of “fishing in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone.”

“Hội thảo quốc tế về Biển Đông ‘Biển hòa bình – Phục hồi bền vững’ (International Conference on East Sea ‘Sea of ​​Peace-Sustainable Resolution’),” qdnd.vn (Russian-language daily focusing on business and politics), 16 November 2022. https://www.qdnd.vn/xa-hoi/tin-tuc/hoi-thao-quoc-te-ve-bien-dong-bien-hoa-binh-phuc-hoi-ben-vung-711217The principles in the South China Sea will help shape other principles in other seas and oceans. Maintaining an order at sea, emphasizing compliance, trust and cooperation, more than ever before, is essential to ensuring a sustainable resolution. Vietnam’s policy on the East Sea is to fully respect and comply with international law, especially the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982).

Notes:

[i] “Indonesia returns 166 detained fishermen to Vietnam,” RFA, 16 November 2014. rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/returns-11162021162820.html

[ii] “Indonesian, Vietnamese vessels clash over illegal fishing,” AFP, 29 April 2019. youtube.com/watch?v=SZh5t2y2NxY

[iii] Mathias Hariyadi, “Jakarta sinks three Vietnamese fishing boats caught in its territorial waters,” Asia News, May 12, 2014. https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Jakarta-sinks-three-Vietnamese-fishing-boats-caught-in-its-territorial-waters-32882.html

[iv] Notably, prior to 2021, there was little optimism in the academic community that Indonesia and Vietnam would reconcile their maritime claims. However, Darwis and Putra noted that Indonesian President Jokowi sought to take a less confrontational stance when dealing with ASEAN navies in disputed waters. See Darwis and Bama Andika Putra, “Construing Indonesia’s maritime diplomatic strategies against Vietnam’s illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the North Natuna Sea,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 49:4, 172-192, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00927678.2022.2089524

Image Information:

Image: Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_People%27s_Navy_honor_guard_at_ASEAN_defense_ministers_meeting_2010-10-12_1.jpg
Attribution: Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Force, CC x 2.0

West African States Ruled by Military Leaders Seek To Circumvent Future Sanctions

Posted on by
Map of the participants of the first Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961).

Map of the participants of the first Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961).

“Guinea, Burkina [Faso], and Mali want to launch an unofficial organization of non-aligned African countries and unite to be stronger in the face of sub-regional bodies.”

The Foreign Affairs Ministers of Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali—West African countries all led by military heads of state that claimed power outside of elections[i]—recently convened in early February. The meeting ultimately concluded with them all seeking to fully rejoin the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has placed various sanctions on each of the countries over the past two years.[ii] According to the accompanying excerpted article from the francophone West African news site Le Journal de L’Afrique, the meeting is being read locally as an attempt to circumvent future sanctions by creating alternative forms of sub-regional unity. As the author of the article articulates, the countries “want to launch an unofficial organization of non-aligned African countries and unite to be stronger in the face of sub-regional bodies.” Of note, Mali and Burkina Faso are the two West African countries most closely tied to Russia, whose Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, visited Mali days before the meeting. A reversion to “non-aligned” rhetoric of African international relations suggests that as competition between the United States, China, and especially Russia, deepens on the continent, West Africans increasingly view such jockeying through the lens of a new Cold War, and thus seek to maintain policy autonomy. This appears to be true in this case, even though two of the three countries—Mali and Burkina Faso—are known Russian allies. While Guinea’s inclusion in the trifecta may be read, as it is by the accompanying article’s author, as “an encounter between marginalized countries,” meaning those sanctioned because of military takeovers,it can equally be read as a meeting of West African states in the Russian orbit. While Guinea clearly falls into the first category, it is not often discussed as part of the second., Guinea looks to be high on the list of which African states Russia might next target for allyship.

Source:

Frédéric Ange Touré, “Pour le Mali, le Burkina Faso et la Guinée, l’union pourra-t-elle faire la force? (For Mail, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, can unity be strength?),” Le Journal de L’Afrique (pan-African news aggregator), 9 February 2023. https://lejournaldelafrique.com/pour-le-mali-le-burkina-faso-et-la-guinee-lunion-pourra-t-elle-faire-la-force/

While the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the various African countries are used to meeting, often under the aegis of sub-regional organizations or the African Union, the meeting between the heads of diplomacy from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea looks like an encounter between marginalized countries.

These three countries have in common to have suffered coups in recent years. But also for having tried to stand up to ECOWAS and other organizations that threatened them with sanctions – which were most of the time applied. Finally, from Bamako to Ouagadougou, via Conakry, the Russian temptation has succeeded partnerships with France.

Under the aegis of the Burkinabè government, the three foreign ministers, Abdoulaye Diop, Morissanda Kouyaté and Olivia Rouamba, wanted to meet to discuss the future of their countries. A meeting which, coincidence or not of the calendar, took place barely two days after the visit of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, to Mali. The latter, among other things, promised his aid “to the Sahelo-Saharan region and even to the countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea.”Morissanda Kouyaté, before any joint declaration, sold the wick as to the message that would be sent. “Together, we are going to make a statement to regional organizations, so that we can hear even more audibly the claims and requests of our peoples through our governments and our leaders”. In other words, Guinea, Burkina and Mali want to launch an unofficial organization of non-aligned African countries and unite to be stronger in the face of sub-regional bodies.

Notes:

[i] Mali experienced overthrows of the government in August 2020 and May 2021, Guinea in September 2021, and Burkina Faso in January 2022.

[ii] For more on ECOWAS’ sanctions against these countries, see: “ECOWAS lifts Mali sanctions, agrees on Burkina transition,” AfricaNews, 4 July 2022. https://www.africanews.com/2022/07/04/ecowas-lifts-mali-sanctions-agrees-on-burkina-transition//

Image Information:

Image: Map of the participants of the first Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961)
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1st_Summit_of_the_Non-Aligned_Movement.jpg
Attribution: Creative CommonsAttribution-Share Alike 4.0 International


Mali Defends Reliance on Russian Counterterrorism Assistance

Posted on by
Map of Mali.

Map of Mali.

“What matters…is how [Mali and Russia] work together to fight against jihadism, recalling that in certain cases, terrorism is manufactured to destabilize our countries.”

Mali and Russia’s security relationship appears to be ever-deepening. Even as both are criticized for their approaches to dealing with jihadist violence in Mali,[i] with many analysts suggesting that the Wagner presence is exacerbating the problem,[ii] Malian leadership is full-throated in its defense of its Russian partner. In the accompanying article from Le Journal du Mali, Mali’s Foreign Minister dispels any pretense that international condemnation of its partnership with Russia may change its decision. One of the most important sentiments from his statements is that Russia is willing to provide Mali with the requisite material to make effective gains against the al-Qaeda and Islamic State-aligned groups that have, since January 2023, shown a clear interest in moving toward the capital, Bamako.[iii] Implicitly, this nod is a slight directed at both France and the United States whose unwillingness, Mali and Burkina Faso have argued, to give more assistance to West African states to address their internal security challenges has forced them to turn to Russia. A second prevailing position in the Malian Foreign Minister’s remarks is that Mali views its partnership with Russia as one that is based on Bamako’s own autonomy to make sovereign security policy choices: in this instance, this is an implicit slight to the longstanding French military and counterterrorism presence that has been essentially expelled from the country, not least because of declining citizen opinion of France. Finally, a third, though more subtle line of rhetoric is the suggestion that “in certain cases, terrorism is manufactured to destabilize our countries.” This notion that external actors—again, namely France—have actually worked to support terrorist groups in the country has been a common false claim that the interim government has made, going so far as to bring the assertion to the UN Security Council in August 2022.[iv] Such vociferous defenses of military collaboration with Russia are likely to continue, not only from Mali but from other African countries as well.

Source:

Abdoulaye Diop, “La Russie est ici à la demande du Mali (Russia is here at Mali’s request),” Journal du Mali (West African news aggregator), 8 February 2023. https://www.journaldumali.com/2023/02/08/la-russie-est-ici-a-la-demande-du-mali-abdoulaye-diop/

According to the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs, this stay “is part of the new dynamic, initiated by the government, consisting in broadening and diversifying Mali’s partnerships with a view to an effective response, and in sincerity, to the challenges we face.”

For the diplomat, his country has chosen to “strengthen” its cooperation with Russia to “demonstrate” that it is free to decide with whom to walk on the basis of the essential pillars defined by the president of the transition: “respect of Mali’s sovereignty, respect for strategic choices and the choice of Mali’s partners, but also taking Mali’s interests into account in all decisions.”

Thus, the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs insisted on the fact that “Russia is here at the request of Mali.” And it “responds effectively to the needs of Mali in terms of capacity building of its defense and security forces” in the context of the fight against terrorism.

Because what matters, added Mr. Diop, is to see “how to work together to fight against jihadism” recalling that “in certain cases, terrorism is manufactured to destabilize our countries.”

In this sense, he deplored the instrumentalization and politicization of human rights for “hidden” or “barely hidden” agendas often aimed “to overthrow the regime in order to be able to achieve a certain number of objectives.”

The day before Sergei Lavrov’s visit, Mali expelled the director of the human rights division of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) who is accused of having chosen Aminata Dicko to speak on behalf of Malian civil society during the recent review of the United Nations Secretary General’s report on Mali. The latter, in her intervention by videoconference, denounced the abuses committed against Fulani civilians by the army and its Russian auxiliaries.

In his communication, the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs also wished to welcome the “interest” that Russia gives to “the regular supply of Mali with basic necessities in a particularly difficult context.”Finally, Abdoulaye Diop expressed his solidarity with Russia undergoing sanctions from Western countries in response to the war between it and Ukraine.

Notes:

[i] For instance, in January 2023, a UN human rights group called on authorities in Mali to launch an investigation surrounding the mass executions of several hundred civilians in Moura, Mali in March 2022. The executions were believed to have been carried out by the Malian military, which was operating alongside Wagner mercenaries. See “Mali: Independent rights experts call on probe into Wagner Group’s alleged crimes,” UN News, 31 January 2023. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133007

[ii] For more on how the Wagner Group’s presence is contributing to violence in the Sahel, see: Wassim Nasr, “How the Wagner Group is aggravating the Jihadi Threat in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel, 15 (11), November/December 2022. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/how-the-wagner-group-is-aggravating-the-jihadi-threat-in-the-sahel/

[iii] For more on how al-Qaeda and Islamic State groups in Mali are increasingly moving toward Bamako as of early 2023, see:  Caleb Weiss, “Al Qaeda’s JNIM pushes closer to Malian capital,” FDD’s Long War Journal, 17 January 2023. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2023/01/al-qaedas-jnim-pushes-closer-to-malian-capital.php

[iv] For more on Mali’s claims to the UN that France funded terrorists in the country, see: Jason Warner, “Mali Claims France Funded Terrorists; France Denies,” OE Watch, 10-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/428171

Image Information:

Image: Map of Mali
Source: https://southafrica-info.com/africa/africa-from-a-to-z/attachment/map-of-africa-and-mali/
Attribution: Creative Commons 4.0