Category Archives: Global Operational Environment

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Electoral Fraud in Venezuela Assists Axis of Authoritarians

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Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, which announced fabricated numbers on election night.

‘The governments of China, Russia, and Iran, close to the regime of Nicolás Maduro and with major economic and military interests in Venezuela, congratulated the Venezuelan dictator for the electoral victory that he has claimed for himself amid accusations of fraud.”

Venezuela’s recent presidential election has been the subject of significant criticism from election observers and the international community.[i] In addition to the electoral irregularities and uneven playing field before election day, the Maduro regime delayed the announcement of election results due to an alleged cyber-attack from North Macedonia. When the regime’s National Electoral Council, an institution it firmly controls, eventually announced the results, voters immediately knew the numbers were fabricated.[ii] The first excerpted article from Excelsior, Mexico’s second-oldest daily newspaper, reports that much of Latin America sees the situation similarly, and many countries have decided to withhold their recognition of the election results until the National Electoral Council shows the vote tallies proving Maduro’s win. Thus far, the outlet reports, the regime has provided incredible excuses for why it cannot provide them—first, the purported cyber-attack, followed by the claim of a hack by Elon Musk.[iii] In response, the outlet says Maduro decided to break diplomatic relations with seven Latin American countries that criticized Venezuela’s electoral process and lack of transparency.

Contrary to much of Latin America’s criticism, Venezuela’s authoritarian allies were quick to recognize Maduro’s victory. The second excerpted article from Argentine media outlet Infobae, recounts how China, Russia, and Iran immediately recognized Maduro’s “victory” given the importance of their alliance. Russia, the outlet states, went beyond recognition and pledged further military support for Caracas. Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Honduras have also recognized Maduro’s claim of victory.

Maduro’s inability to produce vote tabulations proving his victory will further isolate him from the West and send him deeper into the arms of his fellow authoritarians. This is notable given the months preceding the election featured regional diplomatic engagement to keep the elections on track. Conversely, China, Russia, and Iran have an interest in keeping Maduro in power because his regime thumbs its nose at the United States and continues to provide them with a strong foothold in Latin America.

Sources:

“Venezuela rompe relaciones diplomáticas con 7 países latinoamericanos (Venezuela breaks diplomatic relations with 7 Latin American countries),” Excelsior (Mexico’s second-oldest daily newspaper), 29 July 2024. https://www.excelsior.com.mx/global/venezuela-maduro-rompe-relaciones-diplomaticas-siete-paises-latinoamericanos/1665230 

Venezuela decided…to withdraw all its diplomatic personnel from its missions in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, hours after these countries demanded ‘a complete review of the results’ of the elections with the presence of independent observers…The result sparked a wave of protests in Venezuelan territory and condemnation, as well as calls for transparency from the international community. In response to the request of Latin American countries, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry said it decided to ‘withdraw all diplomatic personnel from the missions in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay, while demanding that those governments immediately withdraw their representatives from Venezuelan territory.’

“China, Rusia e Irán felicitaron a Nicolás Maduro tras el fraude electoral en Venezuela (China, Russia and Iran congratulate Nicolas Maduro after electoral fraud in Venezuela),” Infobae (an Argentine outlet with excellent regional coverage), 29 July 2024. https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2024/07/29/china-rusia-e-iran-felicitaron-a-nicolas-maduro-tras-el-fraude-electoral-en-venezuela/ 

The governments of China, Russia, and Iran, close to the regime of Nicolás Maduro and with major economic and military interests in Venezuela, congratulated the Venezuelan dictator for the electoral victory that he has claimed for himself amid accusations of fraud…Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said at his daily press conference that Moscow intends to continue deepening cooperation with Caracas in all areas, including ‘sensitive’ ones, such as military-technical cooperation. In Latin America, the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia, which are all sympathetic to the Chavista regime,also spoke in favor of Maduro.

Notes:

[i] For more information on the fraud and how it was committed, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

[ii] Writing in the Wall Street Journal, opposition leader Maria Corina Machado details how the opposition mobilized a volunteer network to collect electronic voting tabulations from voting machines, giving them proof of Maduro’s fraud. See: “I Can Prove Maduro Got Trounced,” Wall Street Journal, 1 August 2024. https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-can-prove-maduro-got-trounced-venezuela-election-stolen-772d66a0

[iii] After a highly public back-and-forth with Elon Musk on X (formerly Twitter), Maduro blocked access to X in Venezuela for an initial period of 10 days. See: Vivian Sequera and Mayela Armas, “Venezuela’s Maduro blocks X access in country for 10 days,” Reuters, 9 August 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelas-maduro-signs-decree-blocking-x-access-10-days-2024-08-08/

OE Insight Summary:

Fraudulent elections in VEN have been denounced by much of Latin America; after the election, the Maduro regime is leaning further into alliances with authoritarian allies CHN, RUS, and IRN. 

Image Information:

Image: Venezuela’s National Electoral Council, which announced fabricated numbers on election night.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Consejo_Nacional_Electoral_Cne_Fachada_Posterior.JPG.      
Attribution: CC BY-SA 3.0.

Nigerian Security Services Crackdown on Russian Flag Protesters

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Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.

“The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag….”

Russian influence in Francophone West African countries that have experienced military coups in the last few years is a clear trendline. One of the most notable examples of this influence has been the expansion of the Wagner Group – or Africa Corps as the company is now known – in the region. However, the excerpted punch.ng report about Russian flags being seen at anti-government protests in northern Nigeria is a new and unexpected development, and a possible indication that Russian information operations are contributing to a positive image of Russia in parts of Nigeria. This is despite Russia’s dubious counter-insurgency record in the Sahel and its support for anti-democratic military juntas in West Africa.[i] According to the article, certain northern elite politicians provided Russian flags to #EndBadGovernance protesters, who are disappointed with the government’s inability to address hunger and hardship in the country. The article further suggests that these elites seek to remove the current Nigerian president, Bola Tinubu, from power. The Russian flags served as a threat to Tinubu’s administration that what happened to leaders deposed in coups in Francophone West Africa could occur in Nigeria as well. According to the article, the response of the Nigerian military to these Russian flags could lead to an excessive reaction towards the flag holders and their alleged sponsors. The military has a history of cracking down on dissent with excessive violence.[ii] The article quotes top military officials as stating the protesters holding the Russian flags are treasonous could indicate harsh action will be taken against them, including at least 10 protesters and flag makers who have already been arrested.

Sources:

“Russian flag: FG probes four northern political bigwigs,” punch.ng (Lagos-based publication with a southern Nigerian perspective often critical of the government and northern Nigerian powerbrokers) 7 August 2024. https://punchng.com/russian-flag-fg-probes-four-northern-political-bigwigs/

The nationwide protests against hardship and hunger took a dangerous dimension, with protesters in some Northern states waving the Russian flag as they chanted “Tinubu must go.” Russia, an Eastern power currently mired in a cold war with the West, has been blamed for several unconstitutional changes of government in West African countries such as Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and among others. The Nigerian military said persons flying the Russian flag were committing treason and will, therefore, be “prosecuted”.

This act not only disrespects our national symbols but also commits treasonable felony and related offences. Hence, 10 suspects were arrested flying Russian flags,” Public Relations Officer ASP Buhari Abdullahi stated while parading the suspects.

Notes:

[i] See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Army, Wagner Group Atrocities Against Civilians,” 28 March 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/28/mali-army-wagner-group-atrocities-against-civilians

[ii] Just five years ago, in 2019, for example, the Nigerian military cracked down on the Shia Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and killed several dozen of its members who had been protesting in the streets and nearly killed their leader, Ibrahim al-Zakaky. He was forced to recover from his injuries while under long-term house arrest. See Faiza Mawani, “Persecution of the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria,” October 19, 2020, UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog. https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2020/10/19/persecution-of-the-shia-islamic-movement-of-nigeria/

OE Watch Insight:

NGA protesters with RUS flags during anti-govt protests indicate desire to remove NGA president from office as has occurred in other Sahelian states. NGA mil officials allege northern elites sponsor the flags but risk excessively cracking down on flagholders for their “treason.”


Image Information:

Image: Protests against the corruption of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Lagos in the past resemble the current protests across Nigeria over hardship and hunger, but the sight of Russian flags as an anti-government symbol in the north is a radically new development.
Source: TobiJamesCandids, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Protest_against_the_Special_Anti-Robbery_Squad_(SARS)_in_Lagos,_Nigeria.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Armenia Continuing Its Move Away From Russian Reliance

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French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.

“Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said.”

Armenia continues taking steps away from Russia by working with other partners. The majority of Armenia’s weapons inventory is made up of Russian systems, leaving the Armenian government largely reliant on Russia. However, the accompanying excerpted articles report that Armenia reached a military-technical cooperation agreement with France in June 2024. The first excerpted article from the independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyansigned a military-technical cooperation agreement with the French company KNDS during his visit to France in June. The article notes that Papikyan also met with his French counterpart during his visit, but the details of their meeting were not disclosed. It is also mentioned that Armenia purchased French armored personnel carriers and radar systems in the past year, with negotiations still underway for Armenia to acquire the Mistral 3 short-range air defense system.

The second excerpted article from the independent news website Kavkazskiy Uzel reports that the meeting between the defense ministers of Armenia and France resulted in an agreement for Armenia to purchase an unknown number of French CAESAR 155mm self-propelled artillery systems. The article also includes a statement from Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan that Armenia has significantly reduced its military-technical cooperation with Russia since 2020.[i] Overall, Armenia’s recent acquisition of the French CAESAR 155mm artillery provides another system of non-Russian origin for the country’s inventory in the short-term, while the military-technical agreement with France could provide additional systems over the next several years. Both will help Armenia rely less on Russia going forward.[ii]

Sources:

“Армения и Франция достигли новых договорённостей в сфере ВТС (Armenia and France reached a new agreement on military-technical cooperation),” Eurasia Daily (an independent Russian-language news website), 18 June 2024.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/06/18/armeniya-i-franciya-dostigli-novyh-dogovoryonnostey-v-sfere-vts

As part of a working visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France, an agreement on military-technical cooperation (MTC) was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Armenia and the military-industrial company KNDS on 17 June…

Before that, Suren Papikyan met with his French counterpart Sebastien Lecornu…The parties noted the importance of military-technical cooperation, around which new agreements were reached, the Armenian Defense Ministry reported, without disclosing their content…

In October 2023, in Paris, the Ministers of Defense of Armenia and France signed agreements on the supply of weapons to Armenia. France has already supplied Armenia with 24 Bastion armored personnel carriers, with another 26 combat vehicles in the production stage. Yerevan has also placed an order for three GM200 radars, and negotiations are underway on the supply of Mistral 3 portable anti-aircraft missile systems…

“Армения договорилась с Францией о поставке самоходок Caesar (Armenia reached an agreement with France on the delivery of the self-propelled Caesar),” Kavkazskiy Uzel (independent news website reporting on the Caucasus), 18 June 2024.

https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/401043

Yerevan and Paris signed a contract for the supply of Caesar self-propelled artillery units, French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said. The document was signed during the visit of Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan to France…

The Caesar self-propelled artillery unit is equipped with a 155-mm cannon and is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 40 kilometers…

In March, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan noted that since 2020, Russia’s share in military-technical cooperation has decreased from 96% to less than 10%…

Notes:

[i] In the years since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in November 2020, the government of Armenia stated that it will reduce the number of weapon systems it acquires from Russia, because it does not believe Russia has been a reliable partner.

[ii] Armenia has acquired a few weapon systems from India in the years since, but these were not part of a long-term agreement with India. The systems from India included counter battery radar, multiple rocket launchers, and towed 155mm artillery. For more information on Armenia’s acquisitions of new weapon systems from India, see: Matthew Stein, “Armenia Takes Another Step Away From Russia,” OE Watch, 02-2023.
https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/armenia-takes-another-step-away-from-russia/

OE Insight Summary:

In June 2024, ARM signed a military-technical agreement with FRA, including for the purchase of CAESAR artillery systems. The move marked another example of ARM moving away from RUS as a security cooperation partner since 2023.

Image Information:

 Image: French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley, 2 December 2018.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_Caesar_self-propelled_howitzer_in_Iraq.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Rumors of Russian Military Cargo Activity Underscore Tunisia’s Eastward Turn Away From the United States

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Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.

“Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians”

Summary: Recent rumors of Russian military cargo flights into Tunisia highlight President Kais Saied’s “eastward turn”— including toward China and Iran — and the potential erosion of Tunisia’s security partnership with the United States.

On 19 May, the Italian daily La Repubblica published a report claiming that Russia may be using a Tunisian airport to transport military equipment, raising questions about Moscow’s designs in the country. Russia exerts substantial military influence in both Libya and Algeria, Tunisia’s neighboring countries.[i] Tunisia, however, is a historical Western security partner in which Russia has traditionally had little to no military influence. The rumors of Russian activities in Tunisia may not amount to much, but they should nonetheless be taken seriously in light of evident Russian attempts to deepen its influence in Libya and the Sahel,[ii] along with Tunisian President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn.”

The report suggests that entities linked to Russia’s Wagner Group had flown equipment and personnel into the international airport of Djerba, a southern Tunisian island popular with local travelers and European package tourists.[iii] There is no open-source evidence supporting claims of Russian military-related movements in Djerba, but speculation among Tunisians is nonetheless rife, as noted in the first accompanying excerpt, from the Qatari-aligned English-language daily al-Araby al-Jadeed. Theories on Russian activities in Djerba include that former Wagner personnel are vacationing in Djerba; that Russia is “transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points”; or that the planes are transporting “personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia.” The Russian embassy was quick to ridicule claims of any military connection to these flights, as shown in the second accompanying excerpt, from the Russian Embassy in Libya’s Facebook page. The week after the publication on Russian flights to Djerba, President Saied flew to Tehran to attend Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s state funeral. The last time a Tunisian head of state visited Iran was 1965. The following week, Saied flew to Beijing to attend the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. While Saied’s recent engagement with Iran and China has been more overt than any gestures toward Russia, most analysts see these developments as part of a broader eastward turn in Saied’s foreign policy. Saied’s eastward turn, particularly toward China, as largely motivated by economics explains a Tunisian political activist cited in the third accompanying excerpt, from Qatar’s al-Jazeera. However, there are also ideological affinities between members of Saied’s inner circle and Iranian political leadership.[iv] This confluence of circumstances, according to a Tunisian researcher cited in the fourth accompanying excerpt, from the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarida, makes Saied’s Tunisia a “ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”

Sources:

“Tunisia: alleged Russian military activity in Djerba raises concerns,” The New Arab (Qatari-aligned daily), 24 May 2024, https://www.newarab.com/news/tunisia-alleged-russian-military-activity-raises-concerns

Theories on the suspicious events at Djerba airport have become a “culture de trottoir” in Tunisia for months. Some speculate it involves Wagner personnel, while others suggest it’s about vodka shipments. According to some Tunisian analysts, these aircraft are believed to be “cargo planes” and civilian “charters,” not the military aircraft mentioned by La Repubblica. Some sources claim that the aircraft transported Russians affiliated with the former security company Wagner (now “Africa Corps”), who came to rest on the island of Djerba. Others suggest they transported personnel and crates of vodka for Russian soldiers on leave in Tunisia. A far more speculative hypothesis suggests that some aircraft might be transporting migrants to overwhelm Tunisia’s border crossing points, thereby creating a crisis. Wagner’s presence in neighbouring Libya mainly fueled all these rumours… While rumours continue circulating, one thing may seem to be agreed on: Russian aircraft have been seen on Djerba Island. President Kais Saied, known for publicly addressing rumours targeting his country, has refrained from commenting on the situation at Djerba airport.

Russian Embassy in Libya, Facebook Page, 20 May 2024, https://www.facebook.com/RussEmbLib/posts/122143879226177351

Now the Italian “La Repubblica,” having clearly decided to keep up with the task of creating and replicating horror stories about “Wagner,” scares the inexperienced reader with the idea of ​​​​Russian combat aircraft at the airport of the tourist island of Djerba in Tunisia, neighboring Libya. One can only envy their imagination. But as a reaction, we have to say: this is a lie and a fake. A complete lack of respect for the reader, whether in Italy or abroad.

توجه تونس شرقا.. خطة للانسلاخ من الغرب أم مناورة؟

“Tunisia’s eastward orientation… a plan to ditch the West or a maneuver?” al-Jazeera (Qatari news channel), 4 June 2024, https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2024/6/4/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8

Political activist Ahmed Al-Kahlawi views the Tunisian-Chinese rapprochement as an important step taken by President Saied to revive historical relations with China, stressing that the Tunisian orientation towards the East was dictated by the economic difficulties that the country is experiencing as a result of dysfunctional cooperation to benefit the interests of Western powers. Al-Kahlawi told Al-Jazeera Net that President Saied chose to lead Tunisia to establish new partnerships with the East because he was certain that Tunisia would reap many economic and investment advantages, especially with China, the rising economic power, considering that Tunisia would achieve great growth that would free it from the hegemony of Western countries.

تونس بين التوجه شرقاً أو الحفاظ على حلفها مع الغرب

“Tunisia between an eastward turn and maintaining its alliance with the West,” al-Jarida (Kuwaiti daily), 30 May 2024, https://www.aljarida.com/article/64205For his part, Tunisian researcher at the Institute for Defense and Security Studies, Jalal Harchaoui, explained that in a context characterized by Russian penetration of the Sahel region and Libya, “Kais Saied is a ripe fruit waiting to fall into the hands of the Russians.”

Notes:

[i] See: Lucas Winter, “Russia Uses Diplomacy To Increase Military Influence In Libya,” OE Watch, 10-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2024/russia-uses-diplomacy-to-increase-military-influence-in-libya/; Lucas Winter, “Algeria Seeks Non-Alignment By Preserving Russia Ties While Welcoming NATO Overtures,” OE Watch, 03-2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/algeria-seeks-non-alignment-by-preserving-russia-ties-while-welcoming-nato-overtures/; Lucas Winter, “Algerian Military Deepening Ties To Russia,” OE Watch, 09-2022. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2022/algerian-military-deepening-ties-to-russia/

[ii] See: Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-russia-m-dime-report/;  Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Amelia Cheatham. “Instruments of Chinese Military Influence in Burkina Faso,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, January 2024, https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/burkina-faso-china-m-dime-report/; Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024, Lucas Winter, Jason Warner, and Christopher Betts. “Instruments of Chinee Military Influence in Mali,” Foreign Military Studies Office M-DIME Report, June 2024. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/mali-china-m-dime-report-2/

[iii] The La Repubblica article is unavailable without a subscription. It can be found at: https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2024/05/19/news/aerei_militari_russi_tunisia_allarme_usa_migranti_saied_timori_governo_meloni-423030975

[iv] Per Le Monde, “certain circles surrounding Saied have long-standing links with the Islamic Republic,” in particular his brother Naoufel Saied. “Tunisia: Kais Saied’s inclination to turn to Iran,” Le Monde, 25 May 2024. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/05/25/tunisia-kais-saied-s-inclination-to-turn-to-iran_6672647_124.html

OE Insight Summary:

Recent rumors of RUS military cargo flights into TUN highlight President Kais Saied’s seeming “eastward turn”— including toward CHN and IRN— and the potential erosion of TUN’s security relationship with USA.

Image Information:

Image: Tunisian President Kais Saied on Inauguration Day, 23 October 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kaïs_Saïd_2.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl.

Turkey Deploying Syrian Private Security Contractors to Niger

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Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.

“The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.”

Summary: Turkey is deploying Syrian militants to Niger to protect economic interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles Russia’s Wagner mercenaries in West Africa, the Syrian militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.

Russia’s Wagner Group, and its successor Africa Corps, have received significant international attention and notoriety because of their operations propping up of post-coup military regimes in West Africa. While their objectives ostensibly include combating Islamist militants and protecting mining and other extractive industries whose exports benefit Russia, they have also partaken in the excessive killing of civilians during counter-insurgency operations.[i] The excerpted French-language article in L’Orient Le Jour highlights Turkey’s recent programs to deploy militants to West Africa, whose activities can be juxtaposed against those of Wagner and Africa Corps.

According to the article, the program involves hundreds of pro-Turkish Syrians—and not Turks themselves—from the Sultan Murad brigade.[ii] This differs from Russia’s Wagner and Africa Corps, whose members are primarily Russians, despite recent evidence of an African member in Wagner ranks in Ukraine.[iii] The Syrians have been contracted by a Turkish private military company, which has paid the Syrian fighters up to $1,500 per month. This is almost ten times more than they had received when fighting in Turkish-controlled areas of Syria. Like with Wagner and Africa Corps members, remuneration is, therefore, a primary incentive for the Syrians to travel to Niger.

The exact activities of these Turkish mercenaries remain unclear. On one hand, the article asserts that their main role is to protect Turkish interests and projects in Niger, including mining operations. In this sense, they would be functioning much like private security contractors, rather than mercenaries. On the other hand, one of the Syrian contractors interviewed for the article noted that the outfit was deployed to combat Boko Haram. If true, this would likely mean that they were based in southeastern Niger near Lake Chad, where iron ore and other minerals are mined, where Boko Haram factions have pillaged villages and even taken over military outposts in the last few years. If this were the outfit’s primary role, it would appear to function more closely to Wagner, though without the regime protection efforts.

Although the interviewee states that his cohorts arrived in Niger only around one year ago, the article claims Turkey had been preparing for their deployment by sending Syrian fighters to train in Libya for several years. This provided the fighters with combat experience in Africa and a gateway for further travel to Niger. In addition, in 2020, Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement with Niger, which involved the sale of armed drones from Turkey to Niger. However, this may have since evolved into the additional deployment of these pro-Turkish Syrians to Niger as well.

The article does not indicate the Syrians in Niger will play as significant of a counter-insurgency role as Wagner or Africa Corps in West Africa, which also means their presence in the country is less likely to generate international concerns on humanitarian grounds. However, the Syrians’ primary motivation of remuneration and the challenging security environment in Niger, including with Boko Haram and other al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated fighters in their midst, raises questions about their ability to successfully defend Turkish interests, let alone enhance security in the region. Another question lingers about whether friction will develop between Turkey and Russia in West Africa through their deployment of fighters to protect their respective interests in similar areas.

Sources:

“Le Niger, nouvel Eldorado des mercenaires proturcs de Syrie (Niger, the new Eldorado of pro-Turkish mercenaries from Syria),” www.lorientlejour.com (Lebanon-based French-language publication covering Francophone international affairs, including coverage of Islamist militancy) 3 May 2024. https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1413977/le-niger-nouvel-eldorado-des-mercenaires-proturcs-de-syrie-enquete.html

A thousand Syrian fighters from areas under Turkish control have left for Niger for a year to protect Turkish interests and projects. In the areas of northern Syria controlled by Turkey, where recruitment into pro-Ankara factions is the main driver, according to Omar, his monthly salary never exceeded $46. “Here in Niger, we are paid $1,500,” added the young man, who supports his mother and brothers and sisters.

At the group’s headquarters, they signed six-month contracts with a private Turkish military consulting company that protects Turkish interests, including mines, in Niger.

The military regime of Niger, as a result of a coup d’état perpetrated on July 26, 2023, has reoriented its foreign policy and denounced military cooperation agreements with France and the United States, while Russia is advancing its interests in this country. For its part, Turkey has increased its influence in Niger over the past decade through humanitarian aid, development and trade. The defense component of the relationship between Niger and Turkey has become more prominent with the signing of a military cooperation agreement in 2020 and the sale of armed drones.

Notes:

[i] For an analysis of Russia’s Africa Corps, please see: (last Zenn OE Watch)

[ii] The Sultan Murad brigade in Syria was comprised primarily of ethnic Turkmen from Syria and specialized in fighting Islamic State (IS) forces, as opposed to forces loyal to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The brigade was part of the Jaysh al-Fateh (“Army of Victory”) coalition, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey and reached its peak in 2015 before suffering from internal factional disputes. See: Fabrice Balanche, “The Battle of Aleppo Is the Center of the Syrian Chessboard,” WINEP, 5 February 2016.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/battle-aleppo-center-syrian-chessboard

[iii] See, for example, Jacob Zenn, “Russia’s Africa Corps Appears to Be Recruiting African Militants,” Terrorism Monitor, July 9, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russias-africa-corps-appears-to-be-recruiting-african-militants/

OE Insight Summary:

TUR is deploying militants from SYR to NER to protect econ interests. While their desire for money presents challenges of commitment and resembles RUS Wagner mercenaries in WA, the SYR militants operate more like private security contractors and have a lesser counter-insurgency role.


Image Information:

Image: Turkey and Niger have increased their military cooperation since 2020, including through using Libya as a gateway.
Source: Saotura, https://commons.wikim edia.org/wiki/File:Niger_Turkey_Locator.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Sudanese Armed Forces Employ Iranian Drones in Civil Conflict

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Iranian drones have assisted Sudan SAF to gain a military advantage over the rival RSF paramilitary faction.

“Cooperation between the two countries [Sudan and Iran] increased in various fields since their recent resumption of diplomatic relations.”

Summary: The Sudanese Armed Forces received Iranian drones to gain a military advantage in urban warfare over the rival Rapid Support Forces paramilitary faction. This development deepens Sudan-Iran relations and boosts Iran’s hope for greater access to the Red Sea.

On 25 May, the Sudan News Agency published the excerpted Arabic-language article on the meeting in Tehran between Sudan’s foreign minister, Hussein Awad Ali, and Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Bagheri. The article discussed the deepening relations between the two countries amid a backdrop of Iranian attempts to expand its influence in the Red Sea[i] and to sell drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF is combatting the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary faction for control of Sudan in a civil war.[ii] According to the article, the two foreign ministers pledged they would cooperate at the highest levels since resuming diplomatic relations in October 2023.[iii]

Drones will be the most important aspects of the two countries’ cooperation. In particular, the Iranian Ababil-3 flies low to evade radar detection and is ideal for urban combat missions.[iv] The RSF is trained in and accustomed to non-conventional warfare, including urban combat, where it initially gained an advantage over the SAF. However, the SAF’s superior weaponry, such as Iranian drones, is now neutralizing the initial RSF advantage. Although the RSF’s advances exceeded those of the SAF in the first half-year after the conflict broke out in April 2023, the Battle of Omdurman in February 2024 became a turning point when the SAF captured the city and continued advancing afterwards.[v] If Iranian drones support the SAF to retake control of more Sudanese territory, especially around the capital Khartoun, the SAF will become closer, or at least more ingratiated, to Iran. This will facilitate Iranian efforts to gain access to the Sudanese Red Sea coast. This will, in turn, strengthen Iran’s geopolitical position in the region, with its Houthi proxies in Yemen on the eastern side of the RedSea and the SAF in Sudan on the western side.

Sources:

“وزير الخارجية المكلف يلتقي القائم بأعمال وزير الخارجية الإيراني(Interim Foreign Minister Meets with Acting Iranian Foreign Minister),” suna-sd.net (Arabic-language public Sudanese news agency, which commits to independent and balanced reporting), 8 May 2024. Image:https://suna-sd.net/posts/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A

Acting Foreign Minister Ambassador Hussein Awad Ali met today in Tehran with Acting Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri, where he gave him condolences from the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, the Sudanese government, and the Sudanese people on the death of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Minister Foreign Ministry Hussein Amir Abdullahian and their colleagues in a helicopter crash.   

Cooperation between the two countries increased in various domains since their recent resumption of diplomatic relations and their reopening the two embassies again. They agreed to expedite the opening of the two countries’ embassies under the leadership of their respective ambassadors and to contribute to advancing relations between the two countries at a rapid pace to the highest level.

Notes:

[i] See, for example: Mohammed Yassin, “Reports about Iran’s Bid for Naval Base in Sudan Sparks Controversy,” Asharq al-Awsat, 4 March 2024. https://english.aawsat.com/world/4891051-reports-about-iran%E2%80%99s-bid-naval-base-sudan-sparks-controversy

[ii] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are led by General Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan and are engaged in military conflict with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary faction, which is led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”). In April 2023, al-Burhan called the RSF a “rebel” movement and formally dissolved it, which led to civil war. In early 2024, the RSF still had the upper hand in the fighting, but now the SAF appears to have the military advantage. See: Andrew McGregor, “Gold, Arms, and Islam: Understanding the Conflict in Sudan,” Terrorism Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 9, April 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/gold-arms-and-islam-understanding-the-conflict-in-sudan/

[iii] Sudan severed relations with Iran in 2016 in opposition to Iranian sectarianism and under the geopolitical

influence of Saudi Arabia. However, in an effort to balance against the West, Sudan sought closer relations with Iran. Sudan and Iran’s restoration of relations only two weeks after Hamas’ massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, and despite a previous thaw in Sudanese-Israeli relations, has only put the SAF’s relations with the West further under strain. See: Mohamed Yassin, “What is Sudan’s Purpose of Diplomatic Approach with Iran?,” Asharq al-Awsat, 22 January 2024. https://english.aawsat.com/features/4805441-what-sudans-purposediplomatic-approach-iran

[iv] See: “Sudan’s small but deadly drone fleet could turn the tide of war,” Military Africa, 22 April 2023. https://www.military.africa/2023/04/sudans-small-but-deadly-drone-fleet-could-turn-the-tide-of-war/

[v] See: Ashraf Abdelaziz, “Sudan war: ‘Iranian drones played decisive role in Omdurman battle.’” Dabanga Sudan, 17 March 2024. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-war-iranian-drones-played-decisive-role-in-omdurman-battle.

OE Insight Summary:

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in SDN received IRN drones to gain a military advantage over rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  This shipment deepens SDN-IRN relations and boosts IRN hopes for Red Sea access.


Image Information:

Image: Iranian drones have assisted Sudan SAF to gain a military advantage over the rival RSF paramilitary faction
Source: Tasnim News Agency, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iranian_drone_exercise_in_2022_-_Day_2_(52).jpg
Attribution: CC x 4.0

Cracks Appear in Maduro Regime

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Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.

“Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.”

Recently, the Maduro regime has shown signs of schisms within the ruling Chavista Party,[i] now known as the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The arrest and prosecution of regime insider, former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, is a watershed moment for elites in Maduro’s inner circle. According to the first excerpted article from the centrist Colombian daily El Tiempo, Maduro accused El Aissami of being behind the assassination attempt, as well as corruption, pilfering roughly $21 billion from the state-owned oil company while serving as oil minister.[ii] According to the second excerpted article from the Spanish outlet El País, El Aissami, in addition to the assassination accusation, fell for endangering the PSUV’s electoral prospects with his large-scale theft of public resources. . The outlet notes how the arrests of El Aissami and his associates sent a chill through many circles of regime elites. They come in the context of Venezuela’s July presidential election, in which Maduro faces stiff competition from an organized opposition that continues to lead Maduro in the polls. The fact that dozens have been arrested alongside El Aissami indicates a growing crisis of trust within Chavismo’s elite ranks.[iii] Further, the money that El Aissami stole to grease his corruption networks has restricted the Maduro regime from greater social spending during the campaign, contributing to his flagging prospects of winning the election.

Sources:

Source: “Traicionado por su propio círculo? Así fue cómo un ministro cercano a Nicolás Maduro casi implosiona al chavismo (Betrayed by his own circle? This is how a minister close to Nicolás Maduro almost imploded Chavismo),” El Tiempo (a Colombian daily generally considered politically centrist), 30 April 2024. https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/venezuela/los-conspiradores-estaban-con-maduro-como-un-ministro-casi-implosiona-al-chavismo-3338641

Less than a month ago, El Aissami was seen handcuffed, quite skinny, and with an emaciated appearance…even if it were true that El Aissami had been conspiring against Maduro, his imprisonment could be more related to the accusation than to the ‘loss’ of 21 billion dollars from PDVSA, a plot that leaves more than 60 detainees, all allies of the former minister…With the drone attack story, Maduro became a victim in the face of a violent opposition that wanted to kill him. It turns out that some of his own people were behind the attack.

Source:  “Venezuela detiene al exministro del Petróleo Tareck El Aissami, hasta hace poco un político íntimo de Maduro (Venezuela detains former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami, until recently a close politician of Maduro),” El País (a Spanish outlet with excellent regional coverage), 9 April 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-04-09/venezuela-detiene-al-exministro-del-petroleo-tareck-el-aissami-hasta-hace-poco-un-politico-intimo-de-maduro.html

The tectonic plates of Chavismo have received a strong shock this Tuesday. The Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Office has announced the arrest of former minister Tareck El Aissami, a politician who until a year and a half ago belonged to Nicolás Maduro’s circle of trust…The definitive fall of El Aissami—a powerful and feared operator of Chavismo, around whom important layers of current national capital had been organized—seems to close the chapter of an expensive fraud on the nation, orchestrated under the shadow of international sanctions, in a time in which…the country’s oil production and the economy, were completely bankrupt, in the midst of a massive emigration of people. This may be the most radical and merciless purge carried out by Chavismo since it came to power…El Aissami is not taken to prison for ideological differences, but for having endangered the revolution and abusing its authority.

Notes:

[i] Chavismo is the movement of those who follow Huge Chavez, which today is encapsulated in the party formally called PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, in English). Chavistas are followers of Chavismo.

[ii] To understand more about the unfathomable scale of this theft from PDVSA, and the use of crypto currency and middlemen, see: Marianna Parraga, “Exclusive: Middlemen Have Left Venezuela’s PDVSA with $21.2 billion in Unpaid Bills,” Reuters, 21 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/middlemen-have-left-venezuelas-pdvsa-with-212-billion-unpaid-bills-2023-03-21/

[iii] For more information on the opposition’s success in pressuring Maduro despite the long electoral odds, see: Ryan C. Berg, “This Could Be the Last Shot to Restore Democracy in Venezuela,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 4 April 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-be-last-shot-restore-democracy-venezuela

Image Information:

Image: Tareck El Aissami was once one of the most powerful men in Venezuela and a top Maduro confidant.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/globovision/6336412991/
Attribution: CC BY-NC 2.0 DEED

Armenia Hints It May Withdraw From Russia-Backed Regional Security Bloc

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Monastery Valley in Armenia

“Armenia will refrain from joining the CSTO Collective Security Council resolution of November 23, 2023 on the CSTO budget for 2024 and from participating in financing the organization’s activity envisaged by this resolution. However, it will not object to adopting this resolution in a curtailed format.”

Armenia recently announced it will no longer pay its dues to the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO), a Moscow-led security organization comprised of countries from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. According to the first excerpted piece from the Russian state news agency, TASS, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told his countrymen that they can no longer rely on the CSTO and he had no answer to how Yerevan benefits from being a member. The move comes as relations between Yerevan and Moscow have cooled, particularly after a series of clashes over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, , last September with neighboring Azerbaijan resulted in the mass expulsion of the enclave’s Armenian population.

Pashinyan, who did not attend the CSTO’s last summit in Minsk in 2023, had hinted that Armenia plans to suspend its participation in the security bloc. Critics of the CSTO claim it is a tool for Moscow to wield military power over former Soviet-bloc countries. The last time CSTO forces were called in to preserve the peace came in January 2022, when roughly 2,500 CSTO peacekeepers – the bulk of them Russian – responded to anti-government rioting in Kazakhstan. But Pashinyan has criticized the alliance for not supporting Armenia during its various clashes with Azerbaijan,accusing Russian peacekeepers of abandoning their positions when Azerbaijani troops crossed into Nagorno-Karabakh.[i] According to the second excerpted article from Armenian TV and radio service Azatutyun, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Armenia is free to withdraw from the organization.[ii]  If Armenia does leave the CSTO, the move could signal a major realignment of the regional balance of power in the Caucasus, as Russia, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, looks to keep a military presence in the region. Armenia recently held joint drills with the United States, has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and has expressed interest in one day joining the European Union. If the CSTO were to lose Armenia or other members, it could weaken Russia’s military leverage in the South Caucasus. Alternatively, it could make other regional security blocs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also comprises China, more relevant and powerful.

Sources:

Source:  “Armenia to refrain from financing CSTO activity in 2024,” (“Армения воздержится от финансирования деятельности ОДКБ в 2024 году,” TASS (Russian state news agency), 8 May 2024. https://tass.com/world/1785765

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said earlier that his country cannot rely on the CSTO and he cannot answer Armenian society’s question why the country should be its member. In recent time, Yerevan has skipped numerous meeting in a range of integration formats. Thus, Pashinyan did not attend the CSTO summit in Minsk in 2023 and announced that Armenia had suspended its participation in this organization.

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov told TASS on April 22 that it was a matter of “an independent and sovereign country” to decide whether to take part in the upcoming CSTO summit or not. However, he said that he hoped that many might change for the better before the summit.

Source:  “Armenia Free To Leave Russian-Led Bloc, Says Moscow,” (Армения свободна выйти из возглавляемого Россией блока, заявила Москва), Azatutyun (Armenian TV and Radio service affiliated with U.S. funded RFE/RL) 3 May 2024. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32932373.html#

“We still do not question the sovereign right of our Armenian partners to independently determine their foreign policy course, including in the context of the further work of the organization,” the ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow.

“Let me remind you that Article 19 of the [CSTO} Charter establishes the possibility of leaving the alliance,” Zakharova said. “In that case, a member state … must send an official notification no later than six months before the withdrawal date.”

The Armenian government, she said, has taken no steps in that direction so far despite its “constantly circulated accusations against the organization.” This means that Armenia remains for now a full-fledged member of the Russian-led military alliance and must “must fulfill appropriate obligations,” added Zakharova. She did not specify those obligations.Over the past year or so, Yerevan has boycotted high-level meetings, military exercises and other activities of the CSTO in what Pashinian described in February as an effective suspension of Armenia’s CSTO membership. The premier repeatedly said afterwards that he could pull his country out of the alliance of six ex-Soviet states altogether.

Notes:

[i] “Armenian PM Attacks Russian-Led Alliance At Summit In Yerevan,” RFE/RL, 24 November 2022. https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-csto-pashinian-criticism/32145663.html

[ii] During a recent visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan struck an agreement for Russian border guards to withdraw from along the Armenia-Azerbaijani border. See: Gabriel Gavin, “Russia to withdraw troops from Armenia’s border,” Politico.eu, 9 May 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/

Image Information:

Image: Monastery Valley in Armenia
Source: Unsplash, https://unsplash.com/photos/aerial-photo-of-a-village-during-daytime-VQ07UveM3-U
Attribution: Free to use under the Unsplash License

Georgian Parliament Discusses Impacts of “Russia Law”

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Video still frame of Georgian demonstrators in front of Parliament building in Tbilisi protesting Foreign Agents law, May 2024.

“The proposed Russia law, … requires all non-governmental groups and media organizations to disclose foreign funding/influence.”

Georgia has been rocked by waves of protests and counter-protests triggered by the re-introduction of a “foreign agents law,” the so-called “Russia law” in parliament by the Georgian Dream party. The legislation, similar to a law passed in Russia and currently in debate in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia,[i] requires all non-governmental groups and media organizations to disclose foreign funding and influence, thus leading to its name of the “foreign agents law.” According to the excerpted article and interview published in Austrian-based IGlobenews, Georgian Parliamentarian Armaz Akhvlediani,[ii] addressed the history behind the controversial bill as well as how it will impact Georgia’s aspirations to be accepted into the EU. The article notes that “Georgian Dream still supports Georgia’s European Union and NATO membership, but has taken a pro-Russian attitude,” at least for the time being. “They do not want the conflict in Ukraine spreading to Georgia.” Akhvlediani notes however, that the governance style of the “Georgian Dream” administration excludes democratization and European integration and that “the victory of Ukraine in the war and its accession to the European Union are of fundamental importance to Georgians.” The foreign agents law will certainly impact the operational environment in Georgia. The United States has been involved in Georgia for decades to include military training partnerships and weapons transfers. While it isn’t yet clear what the impact will be, the foreign agents law will likely have a restraining effect on the military and security cooperation between Georgia and the United States and its western partners.

Sources:

Diana Mautner Markhof, “Exclusive iGlobenews Interview with Georgian Parliamentarian Armaz Akhvlediani,” IGlobenews (Austria-based non-profit news platform created by graduates of Diplomatische Akademie Wien), 8 May 2024. https://www.iglobenews.org/interview-with-armaz-akhvlediani/

The proposed Russia law, … requires all non-governmental groups and media organizations to disclose foreign funding/influence. Georgian Parliamentarian Armaz Akhvlediani …supports the protests, is strongly anti-Russian and believes the EU/US will fill any void once Russia pulls its considerable influence from Georgia.

Opponents of the bill, believe it will be used to crack down on those not in line with the governing party’s pro-Russian stance. This law, say its critics, will be a roadblock on Georgia’s road to EU membership.

Georgian Dream [political party] still supports Georgia’s European Union and NATO membership, but has taken a pro-Russian attitude. They do not want the conflict in Ukraine spreading to Georgia. The Georgia government gathered its own supporters in the tens of thousands to counter-protest in front of Georgia’s parliament in Tbilisi on 29 April. Georgia has learned the lessons of Ukraine’s color revolution and will likely not back down nor relinquish the streets to the opposition.

Armaz Akhvlediani: Achieving candidate member status is the result of a long-term, tireless struggle for the democratic and European values of the Georgian people. The ruling party, led by oligarch Ivanishvili, then and now fiercely opposes this process, flagrantly violating the country’s constitution, which recognizes the European integration of Georgia as a priority. The governance style of the “Georgian Dream” administration excludes democratization and European integration. Through violence and moral terror, the party led by Ivanishvili aims solely to maintain power. However, most Georgian citizens strongly oppose this and strive to protect Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice. The victory of Ukraine in the war and its accession to the European Union are of fundamental importance to Georgians.

Armaz Akhvlediani: The revival of the Putinist law on agents of foreign influence makes joining the European Union virtually impossible. This law, previously withdrawn by the ruling party under public pressure and promises not to revisit the issue, resurfaces, posing a threat to critical NGOs and media outlets akin to Putin’s methods. Despite widespread protests by hundreds of thousands of Georgian citizens and daily calls from Western partners urging the “Georgian Dream” to abandon this initiative, Ivanishvili’s party obstinately persists in obstructing the country’s path toward European integration and democratization.

Notes:

[i] Abkhazia is a de-facto independent state having broken free from Georgia by war in the Fall of 1993. It maintains its own government and armed forces while hosting Russian troops. Russia and only four other nations recognize Abkhazia’s independence. Foreign funded NGOs have been very important to Abkhazia such as The HALO Trust, a Europe based de-mining organization that has spent decades in Abkhazia clearing mines left over from the Georgia-Abkhazia War 1992-1993.

[ii] Armaz Akhvlediani is currently serving his third term in Georgia’s Parliament. He is member of Georgia’s Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security and of its Ethics Council. He is the Founder and Director of the Tbilisi School of Political Studies.

Image Information:

Image: Video still frame of Georgian demonstrators in front of Parliament building in Tbilisi protesting Foreign Agents law, May 2024.
Source: Vakhtang Maisaia
Attribution: By author’s permission

India Successfully Tests Agni-V Ballistic Missile Upgrade

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Agni-V ICBM Range Envelope centered at Integrated Test Range, Odissa. Declared range of 5500 km in pale indigo and estimated expanded range of 7000+ km in faded circumference.

“The opacity surrounding this MIRV missile is about the number of warheads it can carry, which in all likelihood would remain classified.”

India’s ability to carry out a strategic or tactical nuclear strike has been limited compared to that of its adversary, China. However, in recent years, India has made efforts to match Chinese capabilities. In early March 2024, India announced the successful test of a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) for its Agni-V [R1] ballistic missile, further strengthening India’s nuclear strike capabilities even as it maintains a “no first use” policy.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the conservative-leaning English-language newspaper The Hindu, reports on the recent MIRV test for the Agni-V and considers what it means for India. The article suggests that with a MIRV capable 3100 mile range Agni-V missile, India has now achieved more balance in its nuclear deterrence capability with China. The article acknowledges that some of its specific capabilities remain unknown, critical being how many warheads it can carry (the authors speculate that it carries three) and whether it can carry decoys. Finally, the article mentions that India’s defense industry will test a long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile, likely the latest variant of the K-series, at some point in the future.[ii] Altogether, the successful MIRV test for the Agni-V, and future testing for its submarine-launched ballistic missile, indicate that India will continue to seek nuclear parity with China.

OE Insight Summary:

In March 2024 IND successfully tested a MIRV, with a reported three-warhead capacity, for its Agni-V ICBM as part of a long-term deterrence effort to match CHN strategic nuclear strike capabilities.

Sources:

Harsh V. Pant and Kartik Bommakanti, “The MIRV leap that fires up India’s nuclear deterrence,” The Hindu (privately owned, conservative-leaning English-language newspaper in India), 19 March 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-mirv-leap-that-fires-up-indias-nuclear-deterrence/article67965762.ece

The Agni-5 ballistic missile test dubbed the “Divyastra”, that was conducted by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), is strategically consequential. With a range of over 5,000 kilometres, the Agni-5 is the longest-range missile India has tested so far. But it is not simply its range but, equally, its potency which represents a watershed moment for India’s nuclear deterrent. The potency of India’s nuclear deterrent is enhanced because this variant is integrated with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs)…

Though MIRV technology is not new, it is to India…MIRV-tipped missiles are a necessity simply because they strike multiple targets simultaneously and help evade ballistic missiles defences. China is building ballistic missile defences such as the Hongqi (HQ-19) ground-based ballistic missile interceptors, which have been tested, but their capacity to intercept Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMS) such as the Agni-5 is still suspect…

Now that India has integrated the Agni-5 with multiple warheads, greater balance has been restored in the Sino-Indian nuclear deterrent relationship. To be sure, more testing of the MIRV-capable Agni-5 will be required…

The opacity surrounding this MIRV missile is about the number of warheads it can carry, which in all likelihood would remain classified. Going by speculation, it is improbable that it can carry more than three warheads. Further, the yield of the nuclear warheads is likely to be limited due to the small number of atomic tests India has conducted. In addition, it is unclear whether the Agni-5 can carry decoys and chaff, especially during the boost and intermediate phase of the missile’s flight. Agni-5 will in all probability be launched from a road mobile platform.This is a China-specific missile. There could be more to come from the DRDO and AEC with India adding more punch to its nuclear arsenal when it tests a long-range Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), which India’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines can launch. The Agni-5 with MIRV capability bolsters India’s nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis China. It puts China on notice — that India is preparing itself to counter the advances Beijing has made with its missile and missile defence programmes…

Notes:

[i] India adopted its “no first use” policy shortly after its first successful nuclear test in the late 1990s. In August 2019, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh mentioned that India’s policy might change depending on the circumstances, but India continues to have a no first use policy when it comes to its nuclear arsenal.

[ii] In November 2018, Indian officials announced the country had joined the ranks of nuclear triad governments when the INS Arihant, a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, carried out its first deterrence deployment that month. While India reportedly only maintains the triad when one of its ballistic missile submarines are deployed, the 2018 deployment demonstrated India’s long-term goals of nuclear deterrence. For background, see: Matthew Stein, “Is India’s Nuclear Triad Complete?,” OE Watch, January 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/296884