Category Archives: Global Operational Environment

Articles whose main focus is topics pertaining to Global Operational Environment.

Colombia Signals Intent To Join China’s Belt and Road Initiative

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United Nations Secretary General António Guterres attends the annual Belt and Road Forum in China.

“Colombia intends to be part of the Belt and Road initiative…the mega infrastructure program with which China seeks to connect to the world and strengthen its geostrategic position…This is an unexpected diplomatic turn that has gone almost unnoticed.”

Despite headwinds in its domestic economy, China’s strategic advance in Latin America continues.[i] In 2023, Chinese foreign direct investment levels in the region remained high at more than $9 billion, which is equivalent to six percent of China’s total foreign direct investment.[ii] Now more than ten years old, China’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive foreign infrastructure investment program, has proven popular throughout Latin America. In a major announcement, Spain’s top daily news outlet, El País, reports that Colombia recently signaled its intent to join BRI. The outlet reports that this was an unexpected development. While over 20 countries in the region have joined BRI, Colombia—and the region’s other largest countries, Brazil and Mexico—are currently holdouts. In a recent visit to Colombia, El País reports, President Petro praised China and raised the level of relations to “strategic partner.” Colombia’s accession to the BRI will not be immediate, according to Argentine outlet, Infobae. The country will form a working group to study how to accede to the BRI and maintain a “balanced” relationship with China.

Colombia’s accession to the BRI is an important development. Not only does it signal China’s advance with one of the United States’ oldest allies, but it also is indicative of the increasing phenomenon of hedging that medium-sized powers are undertaking in a world characterized by great power rivalry.[iii] China, Russia, Iran, and other revisionist powers have positioned themselves to be the beneficiaries of hedging strategies in Latin America.

Sources:

“Colombia anuncia que se sumará al gran plan estratégico de China, la Franja y la Ruta (Colombia announces that it will join China’s grand strategic plan, the Belt and Road),” El País (Spain’s top daily with some of Latin America’s best coverage), 3 October 2024. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2024-10-04/colombia-anuncia-que-se-sumara-al-gran-plan-estrategico-de-china-la-nueva-ruta-de-la-seda.html

Colombia intends to be part of the Belt and Road initiative…the mega infrastructure program with which China seeks to connect to the world and strengthen its geostrategic position. This was announced by surprise by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Rojas, an official very close to President Gustavo Petro, on the occasion of the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China…Ambassador Zhu Jingyang immediately thanked the gesture, and assured that Beijing is willing to ‘accelerate the relevant negotiation, respecting and collaborating with the priorities and needs of Colombia.’ This is an unexpected diplomatic turn that has gone almost unnoticed.

“Colombia estrecha vínculos con China y busca sumarse a iniciativa comercial estratégica (Colombia strengthens ties with China and seeks to join strategic trade initiative),” Infobae (Argentine outlet with wide-ranging regional coverage), 13 October 2024. https://www.infobae.com/movant/2024/10/13/colombia-estrecha-vinculos-con-china-y-busca-sumarse-a-iniciativa-comercial-estrategica/    

Colombia has formed a working group with China to negotiate its incorporation into the Belt and Road Initiative, the ambitious infrastructure and trade project promoted by the Asian giant. The announcement was made during the visit of the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis Gilberto Murillo, to Beijing, who stressed that Colombia’s accession will take place ‘in a reasonable time.’…The Colombian minister stressed that his country is seeking balanced cooperation with China at a time when Bogotá is seeking to strengthen its independence in foreign policy and diversify its international relations…Murillo’s visit is part of a broader strategy that began with President Gustavo Petro’s trip to China in October 2023, when both countries agreed to elevate their relations to a strategic partnership, signing a series of agreements to deepen cooperation in key sectors such as the economy, science, and education…Although Colombia’s official accession to the BRI is still in process, Chinese investments already play a relevant role in the development of the country’s infrastructure.

Notes:

[i] The Council on Foreign Relations think tank maintains an updated document on major developments in the relationship between Latin America and China. See: “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated 10 January 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri

[ii] For more information on China’s foreign direct investment activities, see the work of Enrique Dussel Peters: “Monitor of Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 2024,” 13 May 2024. https://docs.redalc-china.org/monitor/images/pdfs/menuprincipal/DusselPeters_MonitorOFDI_2024_Eng.pdf

[iii] Matias Spektor has an excellent article on the phenomenon of hedging among medium-sized powers. See: Matias Spektor, “In Defense of Fence Sitters,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/global-south-defense-fence-sitters

Image Information:

Image: United Nations Secretary General António Guterres attends the annual Belt and Road Forum in China.
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/35138985312.    
Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Venezuela’s Maduro Completes Election Theft and Installs Himself for Another Term

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In an earlier photo, Maduro swears in for his second six-year term in office, which began in 2019.

“Among the only leaders who accompanied Maduro on his day were Commander Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and the heir to Castroism, Miguel Díaz-Canel of Cuba…Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Duma, was the one Putin asked to travel to Caracas.”

In early January 2025, President Nicolás Maduro took the oath of office for another six-year term, setting him up to govern Venezuela for longer than his political mentor, Hugo Chávez. The inauguration, occurring in a tense climate of military deployments throughout major cities, was a product of what many experts consider the regime’s most brazen election theft. Unlike previous elections, Venezuela’s opposition possesses vote tallies from electronic voting machines proving Maduro lost by a ratio of more than 2:1.[i] Spain’s top daily, El País, reports that the inauguration was a poorly attended affair. Presidents Díaz-Canel from Cuba and Daniel Ortega from Nicaragua, leftist allies of Maduro, were the only heads of state from Latin America to attend. In a show of support, Russian President Vladimir Putin did send the head of the lower house, Vyacheslav Volodin.[ii]

Maduro’s inauguration for a third term is important for the region’s operational environment for several reasons.[iii] First, despite Maduro’s highly authoritarian regime, the brazen nature of the electoral theft, against transparent proof that he lost the election, indicates the regime may no longer care to have a semblance of democracy undergirding claims of legitimacy. Second, after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Russia’s authoritarian allies have been nervous about continued support from Moscow. The attendance of lower house speaker Vyacheslav Volodin was notable for Putin to demonstrate support for Maduro in the wake of letting Syria fall. Maintaining the Maduro regime in Venezuela is key for Putin in a region where Russia has few natural allies.

Sources:

“Solo los presidentes latinoamericanos de Cuba y de Nicaragua asisten a la toma de posesión de Maduro (Only the Latin American presidents of Cuba and Nicaragua attend Maduro’s inauguration), El País (Spain’s top daily with some of Latin America’s best coverage), 10 January 2025. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2025-01-10/solo-los-presidentes-latinoamericanos-de-cuba-y-de-nicaragua-asisten-a-la-toma-de-posesion-de-maduro.html 

Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro is said to be increasingly isolated, but the country’s president did not seem worried about it on Friday during his inauguration in the National Assembly…The number of 125 was somewhat misleading, because not all those present at Maduro’s proclamation were diplomatic officials, and very few were heads of state or foreign ministers. Among the only leaders who accompanied Maduro on his day were Commander Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and the heir to Castroism, Miguel Díaz-Canel of Cuba…Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Duma, was the one Putin asked to travel to Caracas…Much of Latin America’s democratic left, however, was absent.

Notes:

[i] For more on the Maduro regime’s election theft, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

[ii] For more information on the opposition’s claims to victory and their plans to inaugurate Edmundo González, see: Stefano Pozzebon, “Fear on the streets of Caracas as Maduro’s inauguration looms,” CNN.com, 9 January 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/09/americas/venezuela-protests-maduro-inauguration-intl-latam/index.html

[iii] For more information on regional insecurity generated by the Maduro regime, see: Ryan C. Berg, “Maduro’s Venezuela Continues Its Campaign of Regional Destabilization,” OE Watch, April 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/383027

Image Information:

Image: In an earlier photo, Maduro swears in for his second six-year term in office, which began in 2019.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maduro_with_supportes_at_Jan_2019_inauguration.jpg.   
Attribution: CC0 1.0 Universal

Turkish Defense Industry Celebrates Record Year

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Alongside Baykar, Turkish Aerospace Industries has developed unmanned aerial systems like the Aksungur (pictured) for reconnaissance and strike missions.

“Europe emerged as the top market for Turkish exports, with demand focusing on UAVs, smart missiles, land vehicles, military vessels, and radar systems.”

The Turkish defense industry is experiencing significant growth and has recently announced a record-breaking year. The accompanying excerpted article from Turkey’s state-run news agency Anadolu Ajansi reports on the Turkish defense industry’s record year of exports in 2024. The article notes several statistics on the defense exports, including the different types of weapon systems Turkey exported and the large number of countries that received Turkish systems. Notably, Turkey exported several hundred unmanned aerial systems to various countries, though the article does not mention specific models. Indeed, the Turkish defense industry has gained a reputation for providing effective weapon systems at a lower cost than other Western weapon systems. This is specifically due to the use of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAVs by Azerbaijan (in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020) and Ukraine.[i] The article also mentions that Europe emerged as the top market for Turkish exports with a demand for UAVs, among other items.[ii] The article ends by stating that the Turkish defense industry is made up of over 3,500 companies working on over 1,100 projects and that the industry continues to be heavily involved with NATO member states. As NATO increases its defense spending over the next few years and beyond, the Turkish defense industry could be primed for additional growth.

Sources:

Zeynep Duyar, “Turkish defense products empower, protect world armies,” Anadolu Ajansi (Turkey’s state-run news agency), 24 January 2025.

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkish-defense-products-empower-protect-world-armies/3461489

Türkiye’s domestically produced defense products achieved global prominence in 2024, reaching a record export value of nearly $7.2 billion…Ranked 11th among global defense exporters, Türkiye’s advancements in mass production, research and development, and technological innovation significantly boosted its global footprint…

Turkish defense products were exported to over 180 countries, with major contributions to land, naval, aerial, and advanced weaponry sectors. Over 4,500 land vehicles were delivered to 40 countries, and 140 naval platforms reached more than 10 nations.

Additionally, 770 UAVs and UCAVs were sent to over 50 countries, while three nations received Turkish-built corvettes.

Other highlights included exports of 1,200 electro-optical and stabilized weapons systems, radar systems to 10 countries, and 1,500 loitering munitions to 11 nations…

Haluk Gorgun, president of Türkiye’s Defense Industry Agency (SSB), emphasized the breadth of the country’s defense production. Türkiye achieved over 80% indigenous technology utilization in its defense products, supported by a research and development budget nearing $3 billion

…Europe emerged as the top market for Turkish exports, with demand focusing on UAVs, smart missiles, land vehicles, military vessels, and radar systems. A key milestone was the export of Aselsan’s ASELFLIR-500 electro-optical reconnaissance system to 16 countries…

The country’s defense sector comprises over 3,500 firms and more than 1,100 active projects, demonstrating its robust position in global markets. Last year, Türkiye applied for the highest number of NATO projects, solidifying its role as a major contributor to allied defense capabilities.

Notes:

[i] For more background on the medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) Bayraktar TB2 and its use in recent conflicts, see: Karen Kaya, “Turkey as a Drone Superpower: A Case Study of a Mid-Size Power Driving the Operational Environment,” FMSO Foreign Perspectives Briefs, 28 March 2023. https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil/2023/2023-03-28-turkey-as-a-drone-superpower-a-case-study-of-a-mid-size-power-driving-the-operational-environment-karen-kaya-update/ 

[ii] Turkey not only exported a number of weapon systems to Europe in 2024, the Turkish company Baykar, which produces the Bayraktar TB2, bought Italy’s Piaggio Aerospace in December 2024. While it remains to be seen what Baykar will do with its newfound subsidiary, it marked increased involvement of the Turkish defense industry’s involvement in Europe, see: Ezgi Akin, “Buoyed by drones, NATO deals, Turkey defense exports hit record $7.1B,” Al-Monitor (English-language independent news website focusing on Turkey and the Middle East), 3 January 2025. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/01/buoyed-drones-nato-deals-turkey-defense-exports-hit-record-71b

Image Information:

Image: Alongside Baykar, Turkish Aerospace Industries has developed unmanned aerial systems like the Aksungur (pictured) for reconnaissance and strike missions.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TAI_Aksungur_(3).jpg
Attribution: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.

The Radical Transformation of Syria’s Military Leadership

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Mugshot of Syrian militant Abu Mohammad al-Jolani after his 2006 capture by U.S. forces in Iraq. In December 2024, al-Jolani became the de facto leader of Syria. 

“[O]f the nearly fifty officers who were promoted on Sunday to be supervisors of the establishment of the new army, more than ten of them do not have Syrian nationality.”

After decades of Ba’athist, secular ideology, and Alawite leadership, the Syrian military’s upper echelons are undergoing a radical transformation steered by the one-time Sunni rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).[i] As widely reported in Arabic-language media and discussed in the first accompanying article, from the Lebanese daily al-Nahar, these moves have “raised widespread doubts and fears.” HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) is now the de facto leader of the Syrian armed forces, by virtue of his command over the HTS-led “Military Operations Department” that seized power in Damascus in December 2024. In late December, al-Sharaa issued a decree promoting several HTS and allied commanders to top ranks in the new Syrian military. The list of promotions was headlined by two HTS military leaders who were given the rank of Major General, one of whom—Murhaf abu Qasra—was appointed as defense minister and the other—Ali Nur al-Din al-Naasan—as armed forces chief of staff. Both hail from Tabyat al-Imam, a Sunni town on the outskirts of the city of Hama.[ii] In addition, five leaders were promoted to Brigadier General, three of whom are non-Syrian nationals who were part of foreign jihadist groups that supported the 2010s Syrian armed uprising.[iii]

The promotion of foreign one-time jihadists to top leadership posts in the Syrian Army has “shocked the Syrian street,” according to the al-Nahar piece. Notably absent from the promotions list are former Assad regime officers who defected to form the Free Syrian Army in 2012, as well as leaders from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, the Kurdish-led, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, and armed factions from southern Syria. The dominance of HTS cadres within the new military establishment, as noted in the second accompanying article from the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, seems likely to create a rift between HTS and other opposition armed groups, perhaps most importantly the southern militias. Although al-Sharaa has voiced his intention to create a unified national army, his initial actions suggest an effort to consolidate power within HTS and its allies before other factions are incorporated into the armed forces.

Sources:

الجولاني يشكّل قيادة جيشه… خليط من أنصاره بينهم عرب وتركستان في رتب رفيعة”


(Al-Jolani sets up his military leadership…a mixture of his supporters, including Arabs and Turkestanis in high ranks),” al-Nahar (Lebanese daily), 31 December 2024. https://www.annahar.com/arab-world/arabian-levant/183813/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A9


While the commander of the military operations department in Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa (al-Jolani), seemed to be in no hurry to draft a new constitution for the country and hold elections, he is, on the contrary, moving at a rapid pace to restructure the security services and the Syrian military institution. This has raised widespread doubts and fears about his priorities and the reality of their goals, and whether they are related to actually imposing security and safety or point to the desire to impose the pillars of the new rule through newly established security and military institutions that will not change after the elections, which al-Sharaa said may not be held for four years. What reinforced the fears is that out of the nearly fifty officers who were promoted on Sunday to be supervisors of the establishment of the new army, more than ten of them do not have Syrian nationality…


Speaking to Al Arabiya on Sunday, Al Sharaa confirmed that the upcoming Syrian National Conference will witness several measures, including the dissolution of armed factions and the cancellation of the current constitution. This raised many constitutional questions about the extent to which Sharaa has the authority to make such a decision, given that some argue that promoting officers under the current constitution requires the issuance of a presidential decree…


In terms of regionalism, it was noted that Sharaa relied on officers from Hama to assume the highest ranks (Major General), as well as the Minister of Defense, Marhaf Abu Qasra, and the Chief of the General Staff, Ali Nour al-Din al-Naasan. As for the Brigadier General ranks, which are five, there were only two Syrians among them… The remaining brigadiers are of different nationalities: Abdul Aziz Daoud Khodaberdi, known as Abu Muhammad al-Turkistani, is the leader of the “Turkistani Islamic Party” wing that pledged allegiance to al-Jolani in the past. The second wing is “Foreigners of Turkistan.” Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib is Jordanian and was known in Syria as Abu Hussein al-Urduni. The third brigadier is Omar Muhammad Jaftshi, one of the most prominent military leaders close to Ahmad al-Sharaa. He worked in complete secrecy without revealing his identity and was known by the nickname Mukhtar al-Turki. 42 officers were promoted to the rank of colonel, including several names belonging to non-Syrian nationalities such as Albanian (Abdul Samriz Yashari), Egyptian (Alaa Muhammad Abdul Baqi), Jordanian (Abnian Ahmad al-Hariri), and Tajik (Molan Tarson Abdul Samad). Among these names are a large number who have no military background, but were ordinary civilians before they participated in the fighting against the former regime…


The Syrian street was overwhelmed by feelings of real shock when this formation was issued due to the reliance on different nationalities in building an army that is supposed to be national. However, the supporters of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” justified this by saying that the decision to naturalize these people with Syrian nationality will be issued soon, as al-Sharaa promised in previous statements.

دمج الفصائل السورية متعثّر: الشرع يسير في حقل ألغام”

(The Integration of Syrian faction falters: Sharaa treading in a minefield),” al-Akhbar (pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 11 January 2025. https://www.al-akhbar.com/arab/819090/%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AB%D8%B1–%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85

The commander of the Military Operations Department, which currently runs Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is walking through a minefield that was planted and nurtured over the past 14 years of war…
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the arrival of the factions to Damascus, the signs of a rift have clearly emerged between the faction that entered Damascus first (the Eighth Brigade and the coalition of opposition factions in southern Syria led by Ahmed al-Awda), and the man who rose to the top of the political and military scene in Syria, namely al-Sharaa…

Notes:

[i] For the approximately five decades of Assad family rule starting in the 1970s, the Syrian Armed Forces were ideologically linked to the Baath Party, which espoused Arab nationalism and secularism. The military’s top leadership posts were filled by members of the minority Alawite sect, to which the Assad family belongs.

[ii] The city of Hama has deep historical significance to the struggle between the Assad-era armed forces and Sunni rebels, as the site of a major uprising that was violently suppressed in the early 1980s. See: “Why the rebel capture of Syria’s Hama, a city with a dark history, matters,” AP, 5 December 2024. https://apnews.com/article/syria-aleppo-hama-massacre-assad-799f37fd2608532a253cccb48df4e613

[iii] Of the three foreigners, one is Jordanian, one Turkish and the other a member of the Turkistan Islamic Party, which advocates for Uyghur independence from China. Based on statements made by al-Sharaa, it seems likely they and other foreign fighters will be granted Syrian nationality in the future. For more see: Lucas Winter, “The Knotted Future of the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria,” OE Watch, January 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/302489

Image Information:

Image: Mugshot of Syrian militant Abu Mohammad al-Jolani after his 2006 capture by U.S. forces in Iraq. In December 2024, al-Jolani became the de facto leader of Syria. 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mugshot_of_Abu_Mohammad_al-Jolani.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Maduro Shakes Up Top Security Posts in Venezuela Following Disputed Election

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Nicolas Maduro casts his vote in the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election.

“These adjustments occur amid repeated attempts by the opposition to force the Armed Forces to ‘respect’ the results of the elections of July 28, after which the Chavista leader was proclaimed reelected amid allegations of fraud.”

In the aftermath of a deeply contested election, the Maduro regime in Venezuela has undertaken a major reorganization of security positions to consolidate control around the dictator.  

The Maduro regime in Venezuela confronted its toughest challenge yet in July 2024 as it faced a united opposition and a singular candidate in Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia. By most accounts, Maduro did not count the actual votes—which he likely lost by a ratio of more than 2:1—and declared himself the winner through his control of the country’s National Electoral Council.[i] Following the disputed election, the Maduro regime has engaged in a massive campaign of repression, imprisoning thousands.[ii] As reported in the excerpted article from major Spanish daily El País, Maduro has also fired several high-level regime insiders, part of his effort to solidify control. The article reports that Maduro has selected a new head of civilian and military intelligence and that he also fired several high-level generals considered close to the ruling elite.

The excerpted article from Colombian digital outlet NTN24 reports that Alexis Rodriguez Cabello, nephew of regime insider and recently promoted Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, has assumed the role of intelligence chief. The NTN24 article also reports that among other firings and personnel shuffling, the regime reconfirmed Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez to his current position. Lopez has been a loyal regime insider for more than a decade.

The shuffle within the upper ranks of the security forces is an important development for Venezuela’s operational environment. Following the election, which the opposition challenged by uploading to an online platform the polling place tally sheets showing Maduro’s electoral drubbing, Maduro is closing ranks around his regime. In these efforts, we are likely to see further purges and infighting as Maduro seeks to prevent Venezuela’s opposition from exacerbating fractures within the regime. It is highly noteworthy that Maduro has confirmed faith in the current defense minister.

Sources:

“Maduro cambia a sus altos cargos de inteligencia acusados de violaciones a los derechos humanos (Maduro replaces top intelligence officials accused of human rights violations),” El País (the Spanish newspaper of record with excellent regional coverage), 15 October 2024. https://elpais.com/america/2024-10-15/maduro-cambia-a-sus-altos-cargos-de-inteligencia-acusados-de-violaciones-a-los-derechos-humanos.html 

‘I ordered changes to be made to the Higher General Staff of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces,’ Maduro said in a message on Telegram that he accompanied with a video during a visit to the Military Academy where he reported on the appointments. ‘These changes serve to strengthen cohesion, organization, discipline, and Venezuela’s ability to defend itself.’…These adjustments occur amid repeated attempts by the opposition to force the Armed Forces to ‘respect’ the results of the elections of July 28, after which the Chavista leader was proclaimed reelected amid allegations of fraud… Maduro’s government lacks legitimacy after the presidential elections in July and its stability is fundamentally supported by its ironclad control of the military forces.

“Maduro hizo cambios en la Fuerza Armada, ratificó a Padrino y designó a nuevos jefes de la DGCIM y el Sebin (Maduro made changes in the Armed Forces, ratified Padrino and appointed new heads of the DGCIM and the Sebin),” NTN24 (a Colombian digital news outlet with excellent regional coverage), 14 October 2024. https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-politica/maduro-hizo-cambios-en-la-fuerza-armada-ratifico-a-padrino-y-designo-a-nuevos-jefes-de-la-dgcim-y-el-sebin-518953   

On Monday, October 14, Nicolás Maduro ordered changes in the Higher General Staff of the National Armed Forces, however he kept his Minister of Defense, Vladimir Padrino López. General Domingo Antonio Hernández Larez will also remain in his current position as head of the Strategic Operational Command. The brother of the head of CEOFANB, Johan Alexander Hernández Larez, is appointed General Command of the Army…At the head of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) and the Presidential Honor Guard (GHP), Major General Javier Marcano Tábata has been appointed. Major General Alexis Rodríguez Cabello heads the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN).

Notes:

[i] For more information on the brazen election theft that occurred in Venezuela in July 2024, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

[ii] For more information on the post-electoral crackdown, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “A Question of Staying Power: Is the Maduro Regime’s Repression Sustainable?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 21 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/question-staying-power-maduro-regimes-repression-sustainable

Image Information:

Image: Nicolas Maduro casts his vote in the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election.
Source: https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicol%C3%A1s_Maduro_casting_his_vote_%282024%29.png?uselang=de%7Chttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicol%C3%A1s_Maduro_casting_his_vote_%282024%29.png.   
Attribution: CC BY 3.0

Latin America’s Dictators Scramble To Join BRICS

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The principal members of the BRICS grouping pose for a photo at the 2018 BRICS Summit.

“Venezuela was left out of the final list of countries that aspired to be partners, at the request of Brazil…Venezuela has not commented on Brazil’s refusal to allow it to join the bloc.”

In recent years, the BRICS grouping—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has emerged as a major challenger to the Western-supported international order.[i] Led by major emerging market economies on five continents, BRICS has increased its influence over matters of global financial governance, reform of multilateral institutions, and support of a Global South agenda. The group has also pushed to expand its ranks and influence, with five countries from the Middle East and the Horn of Africa joining in 2023. At least three Latin American countries, Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia, sought entrance to the organization at the 2024 BRICS Summit, held in Kazan, Russia.[ii]

As CNN en Español notes, the regional outlet of the U.S. media company, the Maduro regime in Venezuela has pushed the hardest to gain entry. The outlet reports that Maduro traveled to Kazan, Russia, to press his country’s case and meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. As the Colombian digital news outlet NTN24 relays, this was Maduro’s first international trip after elections widely considered to be fraudulent and stolen in Venezuela.[iii] Maduro’s intention, the outlet states, is to establish diplomatic partnerships to reduce his international isolation and secure economic lifelines to avoid increasing sanctions. Both outlets report that Brazil vetoed Venezuela’s membership over concerns related to its election conduct in July 2024. For their parts, Bolivia and Cuba, two other autocratic regimes in Latin America, secured “partner status” on their way to membership in the BRICS.

This development signals that dictatorships in Latin America see the BRICS grouping as an economic and political lifeline amid difficult economic and diplomatic moments. Relatedly, the inclusion of a greater number of Latin American countries in BRICS will bring China and Russia further into the Western Hemisphere, where both have been increasing their influence of late.

Sources:

“Maduro se reúne con Putin durante cumbre de los BRICS en Rusia (Maduro meets Putin during BRICS summit in Russia), CNN en Español (the regional outlet of the US network), 23 October 2024. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/10/23/reunion-maduro-putin-cumbre-brics-orix

Putin, who is chairing the meeting, said he supported Venezuela’s aspiration to join the group of emerging economies. The Russian president also highlighted that both nations have several projects to cooperate in economics, politics, science and culture, among other issues. The group, which began with Russia, Brazil, China, India and South Africa, recently included Iran, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Venezuela was left out of the final list of countries that aspired to be partners, at the request of Brazil…Venezuela has not commented on Brazil’s refusal to allow it to join the bloc.

“Maduro llega a Rusia para solicitar sumarse al BRICS en su primer viaje después de las elecciones (Maduro arrives in Russia to request to join BRICS on his first trip after the elections),” NTN24 (a Colombian digital news outlet with excellent regional coverage), 22 October 2024. https://www.ntn24.com/noticias-politica/maduro-llega-a-rusia-para-solicitar-sumarse-al-brics-en-su-primer-viaje-despues-de-las-elecciones-520339  

Maduro’s visit is for the BRICS meeting, in which around twenty countries, including Venezuela, are asking to join the bloc in order to boost their economies. Maduro is traveling on the same day that marks one year since the primary elections that sparked an unprecedented citizen movement to elect the opposition candidate to face Maduro in the presidential election…One of the countries that has demanded that Maduro show the minutes and respect the will of the people [after another fraudulent election] is the president of Brazil, Luis Inacio Lula Da Silva, who is part of the BRICS and said a day earlier that he would refuse to include Venezuela in the BRICS due to what happened in the elections.

Notes:

[i] For more information about the BRICS grouping and its recent efforts at expansion, see: Mariel Ferragamo, “What is the BRICS Group and Why is it Expanding?,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 October 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding

[ii] For more analysis on Latin America’s dictatorships seeking entrance into the BRICS, see: Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Rubi Bledsoe, and Henry Ziemer, “Why Are Latin American Dictators Seeking Membership in BRICS+?,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 28 October 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-are-latin-american-dictators-seeking-membership-brics

[iii] For more information on Venezuela’s July 2024 elections, see: Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Can Maduro Pull Off the Mother of All Electoral Frauds?,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1 August 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-maduro-pull-mother-all-electoral-frauds

Image Information:

Image: The principal members of the BRICS grouping pose for a photo at the 2018 BRICS Summit.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brics_Leaders_2016.jpg.  
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Kazakhstan Expands Opportunities for Volunteers To Join the Armed Forces

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A U.S.-produced HMMWV of Kazakhstan’s Ground Forces equipped with a Russian-produced Konkurs anti-tank ground missile on parade.

“Deputies of the Majilis (the lower house of parliament) of Kazakhstan have adopted a bill that allows citizens to volunteer for the army during periods of mobilization, martial law, and also in wartime.”

Kazakhstan’s armed forces began to draw operational and tactical lessons from the war in Ukraine not long after Russia invaded in February 2022.[i] The accompanying excerpted article from the independent news website Fergana Agency reports that Kazakhstan is again using the example of the war in Ukraine to introduce a new law that allows citizens to volunteer for the military in the event of a war. The new law envisions volunteers joining units serving on the front lines or units operating in rear areas.[ii] In addition to the proposed law on volunteers, the article goes on to note that Kazakhstan will potentially set up a reserve force in 2025. The law stipulates that potential reservists will come from a wide age range (18-50 years old for enlisted and NCOs, and up to 60 years old for officers) and that they can serve in their home region. The article points out—as the war in Ukraine has revealed—that solving mobilization issues and having a trained reserve is important in modern armed conflict. In response, the new plan has the potential to draw in significant numbers of volunteers.

Remember, Kazakhstan has been concerned about Russia annexing its northern regions since it became independent in 1991. Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a group of Russian officials amplified this concern by suggesting Kazakhstan’s northern regions belong to Russia.[iii] Despite these comments, Kazakhstan and Russia have maintained good overall relations. However, the war in Ukraine and the need to have a force available for a potential conflict are pushing Kazakhstan to adapt and expand opportunities for volunteers to join the armed forces.

Sources:

“В Казахстане появятся «добровольцы» для обороны в военное время (In Kazakhstan there will be “volunteers” for defense in the event of a war),” Fergana Agency (independent Russian-language news website focusing on Central Asia), 30 October 2024.

https://fergana.agency/news/135448

Deputies of the Majilis (the lower house of parliament) of Kazakhstan have adopted a bill that allows citizens to volunteer for the army during periods of mobilization, martial law, and also in wartime…

The document, in particular, introduces the concept of “volunteer” into legislation. “Self-defense formations, which will include volunteers, will be formed on the basis of local military command units and will be directly subordinate to them. In peacetime, a number of activities have already been planned during the preparation process, including the training of volunteers,” — Deputy Minister of Defense Sultan Kamaletdinov reported…

He added that if volunteers carry out combat missions, they will be led by military command units. If they are engaged in “provision” in the rear, they will be subordinate to local executive bodies…

It was previously reported that in 2025 in Kazakhstan a new type of military service could emerge – service in the reserve. Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan from 18 to 50 years of age (this applies to soldiers and sergeants) and up to 60 years of age for the officer corps will be voluntarily accepted. Only those who have passed the medical examination and special check will be included in the reserve. It is assumed that these will be people who have already completed military service or short-term military training courses, and also studied at military departments at universities.

Reservists will be trained in military units, weapons and military equipment will be assigned to them. They will serve only in their region.

The Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan has begun to propose changes to the concept of service against the backdrop of events in Ukraine. Several years ago, the department noted that modern armed conflicts have revealed a number of problematic issues related to the mobilization of armed forces, the preparation and availability of military-trained reserves, as well as the timely arrival of military personnel from the reserve to replenish losses or rotate personnel.

Notes:

[i] Kazakhstan’s army trained on defending against unmanned aerial systems after observing how Ukraine and Russia utilized them in the first year of the war, while Kazakhstan’s armed forces incorporated several operational and tactical lessons from the war into its annual joint, large-scale exercise in 2023, see: Aygerim Ummat, “Токаеву показали, как проходят военные учения ‘Батыл тойтарыс – 2023’” (Tokayev was shown how the armed forces carried out the exercise “Batyl toytarys – 2023”),” Informburo (a semi-independent Russian-language news website in Kazakhstan), 5 September 2023. https://informburo.kz/novosti/tokaevu-pokazali-kak-proxodyat-voennye-uceniya-batyl-toitarys-2023

[ii] Even as this new legislation takes effect, Kazakhstan has been working to reduce the number of conscripts in the armed forces by enticing those conscripted, through offers of good wages and other benefits, to sign contracts after their one-year conscription period ends. This is part of a long-term effort that began in 2013 to have an all-volunteer force, though no timetable has been set for when this transition will be completed. It is estimated that Kazakhstan’s armed forces are now made up of 70 percent contract soldiers with the rest made up of conscripts.

[iii] A few months after the invasion of Ukraine, several members of Russia’s State Duma (lower house of parliament) questioned whether Kazakhstan’s northern territories belong to Russia, causing concerns in Kazakhstan that the comments could be a pretext to the territory being annexed or invaded, even though nothing further came of it, see: “Токаев выразил недоумение неуместными высказываниями российских деятелей в адрес Казахстана (Toqaev expressed surprise at the inappropriate statements of Russian officials directed at Kazakhstan),” Vlast (an independent Russian-language news website in Kazakhstan, 17 June 2022. https://vlast.kz/novosti/50438-tokaev-vyrazil-nedoumenie-neumestnymi-vyskazyvaniami-rossijskih-deatelej-v-adres-kazahstana.html

Image Information:

Image: A U.S.-produced HMMWV of Kazakhstan’s Ground Forces equipped with a Russian-produced Konkurs anti-tank ground missile on parade.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HMMWV_Казахстанской_армии_с_установленным_ПТРК_Фагот.JPG
Attribution: CCO 1.0

India’s UAV Development Struggles to Take Off

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India’s Rustom-II in Flight during a testing phase. Note: the Rustom UAV is now referred to as the TAPAS.

“The TAPAS underwent tests before the armed services and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) proceeded to acquire the MQ9s.”

As India has made a push to build up its defense industry, it occasionally allows the armed forces to make acquisitions of weapon systems outside of Indian production venues. This occurs when there is an urgent operational requirement and no viable alternative available from Indian companies.[i] To that end, officials in the Indian armed forces announced earlier this year they had purchased 31 MQ-9B Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from the United States under an Acceptance of Necessity acquisition.[ii]

India’s acquisition of the MQ-9B UAVs, instead of a system from India, brought to light ongoing issues with UAV development in India as reported on by the accompanying excerpted article from India’s independent think tank, the Observer Research Foundation. The article notes that Indian officials chose the MQ-9Bs over an equivalent Indian system, the TAPAS, due to numerous issues with the latter’s development and testing. The author points out that TAPAS is being revived by the Indian Air Force despite the MQ-9B purchase, but significant issues remain. One of the most notable challenges is that TAPAS is apparently reliant on Chinese parts like other Indian-developed UAVs. While importing parts for UAVs from China is more cost-effective, it could compromise security, and India’s Ministry of Defense has warned the defense industry about sourcing parts for UAVs from China.

The article concludes by stating that while India has yet to produce a UAV suitable for the military, like TAPAS, there is still potential for domestically produced UAVs if the government, the armed forces, the Defense Research Development Organization,[iii] and the Indian defense industry all continue to push for it. However, the impact of the Indian armed forces continued acquisitions from outside the country’s defense industry on this situation remains uncertain.

Sources:

Kartik Bommakanti, “Despite MQ9B purchase, the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy revive TAPAS,” Observer Research Foundation (independent think-tank in India), 13 September 2024.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/despite-mq9b-purchase-the-indian-air-force-and-indian-navy-revive-tapas

Earlier this year, the Modi government’s announcement that India will purchase 31 MQ9-B Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs), also known as Predators, developed by the United States’ General Atomics, came as a shot in the arm for the Indian armed forces. The Indian Navy (IN) will get 15 naval variants of the MQ9 UAVs dubbed the Sea Guardians for maritime missions, whereas the Indian Army (IA) and the Indian Air Force (IAF) will get eight each…The Reapers are primarily geared for ISR missions, but they can also perform strike missions, and the ones being purchased by India are multirole…even if this purchase is not consistent with the government’s flagship Atma Nirbhar Bharat (ANB) initiative…

All the factors mentioned above outweighed whatever capabilities the Tactical Airborne Platform for Air Surveillance (TAPAS), India’s native Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone, could bring to the armed forces…[TAPAS] was consumed by excessive development time and cost overruns, after its initial launch was pegged at a price of INR 1,650 crores or roughly US$ 200 million. By early January of 2024, the revised costs surged to INR 1,786 crores or US$ 215 million…

A key technical deficiency of the TAPAS drone is its engine, which is a fundamental weakness plaguing other Indian aircraft development programmes…The TAPAS underwent tests before the armed services and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) proceeded to acquire the MQ9s…

Thanks to the IAF and IN, the TAPAS is being revived despite its technological deficiencies. The IAF sees the TAPAS, notwithstanding its lack of endurance, worth improving on progressively, which it seeks to deploy along the Line of Actual Control (LaC)…

More recently, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has warned against both private sector enterprises and government-run entities like the DRDO sourcing drone parts from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) for military UAVs. Nevertheless, private industry still relies on Chinese supplied spares…The TAPAS may have the support of the IAF and IN, but more broadly the domestic drone industry is heavily compromised by its dependence on spares and components from China. India confronts a trade-off—allow spares for military drones in particular to be sourced exclusively from non-Chinese sources, especially from native industry, thereby driving up costs and prolonging development time, or in a bid to keep procurement costs low for UAV components, allow the security of its drones to be compromised in key areas such as camera functions, communications, radio transmission and software security that are vital to military operations…

Although there is not a single Indian drone that can be considered militarily worthy…there is no reason to feel completely bleak about the future of military drone development in India, provided there is sustained effort by the government, the armed services, the DRDO and industry.

Notes:

[i] The Indian government set this requirement as part of Prime Minster Modi’s Atma Nirbhar Bharat initiative, or the “Make in India” initiative, beginning in 2014. The initiative mandates that the Ministry of Defense make acquisitions from the Indian defense industry to bolster growth and development of Indian companies. In recent years, India’s Ministry of Defense has gone outside of the Indian defense industry under government allowed exceptions to the initiative for what Indians have called “fast track” acquisitions, which fulfill urgent operational requirements for items such as new assault rifles. For a recent example of this, see: Snehesh Alex Philip, “Indian Army orders fresh batch of 73K SIG SAUER 716 rifles from US under emergency procurement,” The Print, 27 August 2024. https://theprint.in/defence/indian-army-orders-fresh-batch-of-73k-sig-sauer-716-rifles-from-us-under-emergency-procurement/2240975/

[ii] The Acceptance of Necessity differs from the “fast track” acquisitions to allow for more expensive acquisitions, like the MQ9-B UAVs. For other recent examples of Acceptance of Necessity acquisitions, see: Dinakar Peri, “Defence Acquisition Council clears heavy weight torpedoes, mid-air refuelling aircraft among major deals,” The Hindu, 16 February 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/defence-acquisition-council-clears-heavy-weight-torpedoes-mid-air-refuelling-aircraft-among-major-deals/article67854256.ece  

[iii] India’s Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO) is an organization within the Ministry of Defense that has a history of working with companies in the defense industry to develop and produce various weapon systems.

Image Information:

Image: India’s Rustom-II in Flight during a testing phase. Note: the Rustom UAV is now referred to as the TAPAS
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Rustom_flight_2_(cropped).jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0

German Opinion Divided on Increased Multi-Domain Task Force Capabilities

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It is proposed that the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) surface-to-surface hypersonic missile be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Opponents to the deployment of such weapons suggest it will antagonize Moscow and lead to a new arms race.

“Two thirds of those surveyed are against the plans to station long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons in western Germany in 2026. A large majority fear that the stationing could lead to a new arms race and make Germany a target for attack.”

A U.S. and German pronouncement on 10 July 2024 that the United States will start deploying long-range fires units to Germany in 2026 sparked a sharp Russian rebuke. On 12 July, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, made a statement that involved some thinly veiled nuclear threats. [i] These events have spurred debate in Germany about whether increasing U.S./NATO capabilities will make Europe safer or will simply antagonize Russia and start a new arms race. 

The accompanying excerpted article from the German political think tank, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, specifically lays out the capabilities of the BGM-109 Tomahawk surface-to-surface missile, the SM-6 ballistic defense missile, and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon surface-to-surface hypersonic missile that are proposed to be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. The think tank, which also advises the German government, explains the advantages of deploying the weapon systems and argues against possible concerns. In contrast, the second accompanying excerpted article from the German media company Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, notes that the German civilian population is highly critical of the decision to deploy these weapons, with citizens expressing various concerns. Of particular note, the article mentions a recent poll that found that two-thirds of respondents opposed plans to station these weapons in Germany. The third accompanying article from the German business newspaper Handelsblatt, lays out some expert German opinions for and against this deployment. It also notes another German poll in which 50 percent of respondents feared that such a force structure increase would further escalate conflict with Russia. 

On 1 September 2024, state elections in the German states of Thuringia and Saxony saw significant gains for the right-leaning Alternative for Germany party and the left-leaning Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance party, which both oppose the deployment of these U.S. weapons and disapprove of German support for Ukraine in its current form. These results may be an indicator of the upcoming German federal elections in 2025 and could influence the German position on the stationing of additional U.S. weapon systems.

Sources:

“Große Mehrheit lehnt Stationierung von US-Raketen in Deutschland ab (Large majority rejects stationing of US missiles in Germany),” Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (German media company), 21 August 2024. https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/mdrfragt-umfrage-ergebnisse-waffen-raketen-stationieren-nato-100.html

Two thirds of those surveyed are against the plans to station long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons in western Germany in 2026. A large majority fear that the stationing could lead to a new arms race and make Germany a target for attack. These are two results of the current MDRfragt survey from Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia with almost 24,000 respondents…

Only one in three believes that the deployment of weapons provides Germany with protection and strengthens its own defense capabilities (31%). A quarter of respondents believe that the US weapons systems could serve as a deterrent (26%).

In recent weeks, several parties have called for parliament to be involved in such a far-reaching decision. More than three quarters of MDRfragt participants also believe that the deployment of the weapons systems announced by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz has not yet been sufficiently discussed in politics.

Source: “Gewichtig und richtig: weitreichende US-Mittelstreckenwaffen in Deutschland (Significant and Sound: US Medium-Range Missiles in Germany),“ Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (The German Institute for International and Security Affairs), 29 July 2024. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/gewichtig-und-richtig-weitreichende-us-mittelstreckenwaffen-in-deutschland

The German-American plan envisages the deployment of three types of land-based US medium-range weapons in 2026. The first is the Tomahawk cruise missile… Second, the Standard Missile (SM) 6… Third, the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also called Dark Eagle…The three missiles will be deployed in Germany as part of the US Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Its core mission is to counter Russia’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities with new technologies and concepts: In the event of war, Moscow hopes to keep the bulk of NATO forces away from the combat zone along its border by using ballistic and cruise missile strikes to prevent the alliance’s troops from deploying and resupplying, or by forcing NATO to back down with strikes against individual member states. The Alliance could not effectively defend itself against these Russian options with air and missile defense systems alone because Europe’s territory is vast, and comprehensive protection against Russia’s missile arsenal would be too expensive. Nevertheless, with its own medium-range precision weapons, NATO can thwart this Russian plan in two complementary ways….

…Opponents of the deployment plan argue that the US weapons would become targets for Moscow’s missiles, thereby exposing Germany to an increased threat. This narrative must be countered: Although the Kremlin is likely to consider future medium-range US weapons legitimate targets, Putin sees Berlin as an adversary anyway. As a NATO logistics hub with many US bases, Germany is already a priority target for precision strikes if Moscow wants to keep NATO at a distance in the event of war. New US missiles deployed there will not significantly exacerbate this situation.

Another concern is that the deployment of US weapons will force Russia to produce even more missiles and station them in Europe. The result would be an “arms race”. Indeed, the Russian government announced vague military countermeasures during the NATO summit… Nevertheless, due to Russia’s current arms build-up and the sanctions imposed upon the country, Russia’s defense industrial sector is already reaching its limits. Production capacity, skilled labor and financial resources are limited.  Therefore, even Russian and US experts who share concerns about an arms race have serious doubts that the Kremlin could launch a missile arms race with new programs in the short or medium term….

Source: “Was für US-Raketen in Deutschland spricht – und was dagegen (What speaks for US missiles in Germany – and what speaks against it),” Handelsblatt (German business newspaper), 20 August 2024.  https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/verteidigung-was-fuer-us-raketen-in-deutschland-spricht-und-was-dagegen/100059925.html

From 2026, the USA wants to station long-range missiles and cruise missiles in Germany. Many fear that this could escalate the conflict with Russia. Military experts assess the situation.  The USA wants to station Tomahawk cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles and SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles in Germany from 2026. This was announced by the governments of both countries in July on the sidelines of the NATO summit. Many citizens view the plan with skepticism. According to a survey for the Funke media group, 50 percent of those polled feared that this could further escalate conflict with Russia…

When the planned stationing became public knowledge, former SPD party chairman Norbert Walter-Borjans was upset. The fact that “such a far-reaching decision is practically not debated, that it is more or less made and announced unilaterally” is problematic, he told Deutschlandfunk. Walter-Borjans was still in office as party leader when the US announced in March 2021 that it would locate the second of five planned Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF) in Germany and opened the headquarters in Wiesbaden in September 2021…

Sahra Wagenknecht, founder of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), described the missiles planned for deployment as “offensive weapons”. The SPD [Social Democratic Party] executive committee, however, sees things differently: The planned deployment is “not a confrontational build-up of arms, but a strengthening of our country’s defense,” it says in the three-page letter in which the executive committee recently backed Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s decision…

What is the rule now, an offensive or defensive weapon? Both. Military expert Carlo Masala from the Bundeswehr University recently said in an interview with Handelsblatt that the cruise missiles and the hypersonic missiles still under development are designed to destroy command centers, bases or supply lines far behind the front in the event of a Russian attack.  This is intended to make it impossible for the enemy to expand its attack over a large area. But if it realizes that it cannot win a major war, it will probably not attack at all, argues Masala. That is why the weapons serve as a deterrent and a defense.

FDP leader Christian Lindner recently told the newspapers of the Funke media group that Germany has been within range of Russia’s nuclear-capable missiles for years. “That is why it is of paramount importance for us to establish a balance of deterrence.”  For example, Russia has stationed Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave and in Belarus, which carry nuclear warheads and can reach Berlin. But the balance called for by Lindner is not to be achieved through nuclear weapons. The weapons planned for stationing would be “equipped with conventional warheads,” says the SPD presidium paper. “There are no plans to arm the systems with nuclear weapons.”

Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) is calling for a public debate “to make the seriousness of the situation clear…On one hand, we are experiencing a new threat situation in Europe due to Russia’s aggressive behavior, and on the other hand, we have a capability gap that we can only close in the short term with the help of our US allies until we have developed these weapons ourselves,” he emphasized…

Security expert Claudia Major from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) recently wrote in a guest commentary in the Handelsblatt that the Europeans lack their own land-based missiles with which they could reach Russian territory.  From Major’s point of view, the planned stationing of the missiles could even help to make a nuclear escalation less likely. In the event of an attack, they would give NATO additional options for action short of a nuclear counterattack, writes the SWP expert…

Notes:

[i] See: “Special op experience shows Russia needs clearer nuclear doctrine — diplomat,” TASS (Russian news agency), 12 July 2024. https://tass.com/politics/1816259

Image Information:

Image: It is proposed that the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) surface-to-surface hypersonic missile be deployed to Germany as part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force. Opponents to the deployment of such weapons suggest it will antagonize Moscow and lead to a new arms race.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c4/LRHWfirstThunderBoltStrike.jpg

Tuareg Separatist Militants Form an Alliance Against Junta-Led Governments in Mali and Niger

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Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.

“The Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to assist each other, but also to defend their interests together on the international level.”

Since 2021, West African security and political dynamics have deteriorated as a result of coups by military juntas in the region’s three central states—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In July 2024, these three juntas agreed to a new regional Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) after leaving the preexisting regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States. They replaced Western military support with that of the successor to Russia’s Wagner Group, known as the Africa Corps. Now, however, two of the Sahel’s ethnonationalist and mostly secular Tuareg rebel groups, the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) in Niger and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)[i] in Mali, have formed their own alliance.

According to the excerpted French-language article from French state-owned radio news website rfi.fr, both the FPL and CSP-DPA oppose the respective juntas that are now ruling their countries. The main function of their newly established alliance is for both rebel groups to promise to aid each other in the case of an attack by AES armies, forcing them to confront a more complex and even multi-national insurgency. The article also states that the FPL and CSP-DPA plan to defend each other’s interests on the international level, although whether that entails advocacy or operations or both is left ambiguous. However, by targeting Chinese-funded pipeline projects, the FPL insurgency has already achieved internationalized operations status. The FPL believes such projects fund the junta in Niamey at the expense of predominantly Tuareg and other minority regions of Niger.[ii] Such attacks serve as a form of leverage and pressure against the junta.

The article also highlights that the alliance-making meeting between FPL and CSP-DPA leaders occurred in the northern Malian town of Tinzaouatène. This town near the Algerian border is the CSP base, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), which is under the CSP umbrella,[iii] and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group of Supporters of Islam and Muslims massacred dozens of African Corps and Malian troops in separate attacks on 28 July. According to the article, the Tinzaouatène meeting sent a message that the new FPL and CSP-DPA alliance could launch similar massacres if their goals for independence or autonomy are not met. This would represent a new development in the Sahel, where Tuareg rebel groups have historically remained relatively independent of each other and have mostly focused on reacting only to their own nation’s political and military developments.

At a time when the AES military juntas have largely lost legitimacy internationally and when Africa Corps is reeling from the massacre it suffered at the hands of the CMA, the FPL and CSP-DPA are escalating their confrontation with the embattled juntas in the political, military, and international realm. Neither group is particularly antagonistic towards the United States or the West. However, even if democratic rule eventually returns, their strengthening insurgencies will make it more difficult to reunite Mali and Niger and restore sovereignty to both nations.

Sources:

“À Tinzaouatène, les rebellions du Niger et du Mali se réunissent pour renforcer leurs relations (In Tinzaouatène, rebellions from Niger and Mali meet to strengthen relations)),” Radio France Internationale (French state-owned radio news website reporting on international affairs), 28 August 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240901-%C3%A0-tinzaouat%C3%A8ne-les-rebellions-du-niger-et-du-mali-se-r%C3%A9unissent-pour-renforcer-leurs-relations

The delegation of the Niger rebels of the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) was led by Barak Taher Hamit, who holds the title of “commander-in-chief” of the armed movement opposed to the Niger junta. The delegation of the Malian rebels of the Strategic Framework for Defense (CSP) was headed by Alghabass Ag Intalla, who is the leader of the militant group and opponent of the Malian junta. To begin discussions with an aim towards strengthening relations between them, the site of the meeting was quite symbolic: Tinzaouatène in northern Mali, located on the Algerian border.

During the meeting, no document was signed, or at least not made public. But the Malian and Nigerien rebels have decided to aid each other, and also to defend their interests together on the international level. According to sources close to both parties, other meetings are being planned about “fighting hand in hand against the militaries in power in Mali and Niger”.

Notes:

[i] “Azawad” is the term that Tuareg ethnonationalists use to refer their homeland.

[ii] In June 2024, the FPL, for example, disabled a section of Niger’s PetroChina-funded crude oil pipeline with the intent to force China to cancel a deal between the junta and China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC). See: Emmanuel Addeh, “Tensions Escalate As Armed Group Attacks Niger’s PetroChina-Funded Pipeline, Threatens More Attacks,” Arise.TV, 19 June 2024. https://www.arise.tv/tensions-escalate-as-armed-group-attacks-nigers-petrochina-funded-pipeline-threatens-more-attacks/

[iii] See: “Northern Mali: A Conflict with No Victors,” ICG, 13 October 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/nord-du-mali-une-confrontation-dont-personne-ne-sortira-vainqueur

Image Information:

Image: Tuareg ethnonationalist militants who launched the most recent phase of their insurgency in Mali in 2012 are now linking with ideologically similar militants in neighboring Niger.
Source: Magharebia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Le_Mali_confront%C3%A9_aux_sanctions_et_%C3%A0_lavanc%C3%A9e_des_rebelles_islamistes_(6904946068).jpg