“Russia On The Nature Of Future Conflict: Is This An Opening Discussion Of Russia’s New Military Doctrine?” by Timothy Thomas and Harold Orenstein (May 2021)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

The 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Soviet Union stated that military doctrine “contains two closely interlinked and interdependent aspects—a socio-political aspect and a military-technical aspect.”1 The socio-political aspect contains the greatest stability while the military-technical aspect encompasses matters directly pertaining to military organizational development and technical equipment. It helps determine the forms and methods for conducting operations.2

Likewise, the dictionary states that the character/nature of war is composed of socio- political and military-technical components (the 2007 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow: Eksmo, did not define the term). The socio-political aspect includes economic and socio-political causes, conflicts which led to war’s occurrence, class thrusts and political aims of belligerents, and the degree to which these aims are in conformity with social progress. This character of the socio- political component may change during a war’s course. The military-technical component of war’s character includes conventional and nuclear military hardware, the forms and methods of the conduct of military operations, and the scope, scale, and duration of war.3 While dated, the definitions offer most of the basic elements of these concepts today. Even though the article that follows is about the nature of future conflict, it should be kept in mind that the analysis is also about how Russian military authors may be sizing up their next version of military doctrine.


“The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense” by Les Grau and Charles Bartles (May 2021)

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

In the practice and application of historical analysis, the Russian General Staff closely examines details of past conflicts – noting what they learned and even unlearned – to keep their military science and training forward-looking. Maneuver defense is one of those lessons. Russia’s strategic defense Russia and the Soviet Union fought successful major wars using strategic defense and withdrawal. Russia defeated Napoleon by initially conducting a strategic defense and multiple withdrawals, followed by decisive counterstrokes.1 Up to his invasion of Russia, Napoleon’s strategy proved superior to that of his enemies and his operations were primarily offensive. Napoleon was often successful in surrounding an enemy army or defeating it in one decisive battle and then occupying its capital city and taking charge of the country.2 Russia defeated Napoleon’s invasion by losing battles, yet maintaining and rebuilding its army throughout successive retreats. As the army retreated, the Russians set fire to their own crops and villages, leaving scorched earth behind. Napoleon seized Moscow, yet Russia still refused to surrender and soon flames consumed Moscow. Napoleon had reached his culminating point, and his supply lines stretched to breaking. Russia was fighting a strategy of “war of attrition,” whereas Napoleon was fighting a strategy of “destruction.”


“Russia’s Conduct of War: How and with What Assets” by Timothy Thomas (2021-04-13)

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In 2019, during a presentation at the Russian Academy of Military Science, General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov summarized his presentation on strategy with the following statement:

The main thing for military science today is the cutting-edge, continuous, goal-oriented research to determine the possible nature of military conflicts, develop a system of forms and methods of operation of both a military and nonmilitary nature, and determine trends for the development of weapons and military equipment systems.

2021-04-02 Russian Robotics: A Look At Definitions, Principles, Uses, And Other Trends (Timothy Thomas)

2021-04-02 Russian Robotics: A Look At Definitions, Principles, Uses, And Other Trends (Timothy Thomas)

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The following summary first offers several ways that Russian theorists have defined a robot, starting in 1991. Second, the analysis compares Russian and U.S. approaches to employing robotics (from a Russian perspective) as well as tasks and principles of their use. Third, some of the uses of robotics in Russia are detailed, focusing on descriptions in military periodicals—in urban environments, in conjunction with engineer support, in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use, with artillery, and their use in Syria. Fourth, legal and organizational issues of contention are examined that affect robotic use worldwide and regarding Russia. Fifth, the numerous problem areas are covered that Russia has encountered in its development of robotic capabilities, followed by a few conclusions. There are two appendixes. Appendix One lists some robotic employment principles and Appendix Two offers some photos of robots under development in Russia along with their operating parameters (and several not shown in the photographs).

“The Chekinov-Bogdanov Commentaries Of 2010-2017: What Did They Teach Us About Russia’s New Way Of War?” by Timothy Thomas (2021-03-18)

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From 2010 to 2017 Russian Colonel (reserves) S. G. Chekinov and Lieutenant-General (retired) S. A. Bogdanov wrote 13 interesting articles in the journal Military Thought (nine of them are summarized below) that had a major impact on how Western analysts understood Russian military affairs and way of war. Though the authors have not written publicly since 2017, their impact continues to be felt as the West grapples with how to confront Russian activities across all domains. Asymmetric and indirect actions, the initial period of war, deterrence, military art, forecasting, strategy, new generation warfare, and other topics were discussed, ending with an article in 2017 discussing war in the 21st century. Numerous aspects of these themes remain under discussion in Russia.

“Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity v8” by Matthew Stein (2021-01-20)

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Since Central Asian states gained independence in 1991, new regional military and security alliances have been created (some of which are Russian-led), new military partnerships with non-NATO countries have been established, a number of joint military exercises have been conducted, dozens of high-profile incidents of violence and civil unrest have taken place, and military installations have been used by foreign militaries. While this activity gained attention, it has not been collectively compiled. A compilation of this activity can serve as a guide for current and future military and security involvement in Central Asia.

The first section of the compendium is organized alphabetically and includes entries on Central Asian military facilities and installations (bases, air fields, etc.), and military and security organizations past and present. The second section is also organized alphabetically and includes joint exercises of regional militaries and security forces (Note: the exercises are organized alphabetically by the title of exercise and then chronologically if the exercise was part of a series or conducted annually; the names of some exercises are transliterated from Russian, ex. Tsentr, Grom, Poisk, etc., and these are also listed alphabetically with names of the exercises in English; the untitled joint exercises are listed last and are organized chronologically). The third section is a list of Central Asian military and security structures and other (non-joint exercises) security cooperation activity organized by country. The fourth section is a list of major incidents of violence and civil unrest in Central Asia organized by country and then chronologically.

Great Power Competition: The Changing Landscape of Global Geopolitics (edited by Dr. Mahir J. Ibrahimov)

Great Power Competition - The Changing Landscape of Global Geopolitics

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Great Power Competition continues the discussion begun with the 2017 Cultural Perspectives, Geopolitics, & Energy Security of Eurasia: Is the Next Global Conflict Imminent?  This second volume undertakes a deep analysis beyond the obvious military strategic nexus to identify new spaces for planners and policymakers alike to consider. Similar to Cultural Perspectives, distinguished nationally and internationally known scholars in their respective areas discuss how emerging global and regional powers are trying to expand their influences in Eurasia, the Americas, and Africa, among other regions. The scholars, who bring a combination of academic and first-hand practical expertise, examine how the actions of adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran in a greater Eurasia landscape and beyond have challenged the US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. These actions include continuous efforts to challenge US interests in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, the Western Hemisphere and Africa, especially in the changing homeland security landscape in light of COVID-19 and recent societal unrest.    Click Here for Publication Site


“People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in Transition” by Kevin McCauley (2020-09-01)

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This monograph examines current People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army campaign doctrine, with a discussion of PLA theorists’ vision of the evolutionary development of warfare to provide context for current doctrine as well as potential future direction. The PLA develops doctrinal joint and service campaign scenarios for possible offensive and defensive operations. PLA campaigns represent the operational level of war between strategic operations and tactical combat. The PLA’s current focus on specific campaigns provides insight into Beijing’s perception of potential conflict scenarios. The campaign scenarios provide commanders and staff data on command and control, coordination, combat actions, support, and other critical campaign elements for specific operational environments. The description of each campaign’s operational environment and combat actions provides valuable support to operational planning and a context for staff and unit training for their specific operational mission. The Army campaigns are executed as components of a joint campaign, or as a primarily independent Army campaign with support from other services.


Russian Military Art and Advanced Weaponry (Timothy Thomas)

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Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov has continually requested that the Academy of Military Science provide him with ideas about new forms and methods of warfare. One source defined “methods” as the use of weaponry and military art. Weaponry is now advanced and is characterized by new speeds, ranges, and agilities, which introduce new ways for Russian commanders to apply force. Military art takes into consideration advanced weaponry’s contributions to conflict along with a combination of both old and new combat experiences, the creativity and innovative capabilities of commanders, and new ways for considering or adding to the principles of military art (mass, surprise, etc.).

In its simplest form, Russian military art is the development of recommendations for the application of military and nonmilitary actions. Military art changes in accordance with contemporary developments. Proof of this statement lies in the various and unexpected ways that Russian forces can now disorganize an opponent’s command and control systems, are developing strategic aerospace axes for deep operations, are considering new forms of maneuver and geophysical weaponry, and are developing new applications of electronic warfare and military stratagems. In addition, Russian military art avoids stereotyping, which along with several other items have serious implications for commanders of multi-domain operations (MDO) to take into consideration.

This study expands discussion of all these issues.


The Chinese Way of War: How Has it Changed? (Timothy L. Thomas)

The Chinese Way of War: How Has it Changed? (Timothy L. Thomas)

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The Chinese way of war has changed dramatically from what it was 20 years ago, but that does not mean everything is new. Some components of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) historic thought (deception, stratagems, etc.) remain as important elements and are being integrated into technologies. However, China’s intelligentization of operations and focus on joint and all-domain capabilities (to include some domains not currently under consideration in the US) create new challenges. Artificial intelligence (AI) is now being used to help design warfare and provide control over conflicts, ensuring that the PLA has a future deterrent force to confront other nations. It appears that China will remain a formidable opponent for many years to come.