Russia Positions Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Belarus

President Putin and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Eurasian Economic Forum, 24 May 2023


Belarus is now becoming Russia’s “nuclear queen” on the borders with NATO and Ukraine.”


The current Russian leadership appears to be taking concrete measures to reposition non-strategic nuclear weapons into Belarus to support its military operations in Ukraine, according to the pro-Kremlin site Century. A key element of the Kremlin’s propaganda over the past decade has been its focus on its huge nuclear weapon arsenal, which it interprets to symbolize Russia’s superpower status. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric escalated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened to use these weapons to achieve their objectives in Ukraine.,

The transfer of Russian nuclear weapons into Belarus was not altogether unexpected. President Lukashenko of Belarus has increasingly become dependent upon Kremlin support over the past several years.[i] Belarus’s economic, defense, and foreign policies largely follow those of Russia. Lukashenko has permitted the Russian military to use Belarus as a staging area while  managing to prevent his soldiers from directly participating in the Ukrainian conflict.. To maintain the fiction of Belarus’ agency and independence, the article declares that “Lukashenko has long asked to place Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of his country.” While these nuclear weapons will remain under Russian control, President Putin addressed the training of Belarusian crews to deliver these bombs via Su-24 [RG1] aircraft or the Iskander-M [RG2] operational-tactical missile systems which belong to Belarus.[ii] According to the article, Putin argues that Russia is merely answering the United States in a “mirror way,” since “America stores 200 tactical nuclear weapons, mostly atomic bombs…in six European countries.” The article concludes with a quotation  from former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who claims that “the horsemen of the apocalypse are already on their way,” and that if Ukraine tries to recapture Crimea, it “would be grounds for Russia to use any weapon.”


Sources:

Alexander Pronin, “Ядерный ферзь России; Растущая милитаризация Европы и наш комплексный ответ (Nuclear Queen of Russia; The Growing Militarization of Europe and Our Comprehensive Response),” Century (pro-Kremlin site), 10 May 2023. https://www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/jadernyj_ferz_rossii_537.htm

President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has repeatedly raised the issue of deploying Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in the republic with the Russian leadership. The last time – in March of this year. His request is finally granted….

According to Putin, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko has long asked to place Russian nuclear weapons on the territory of his country. He publicly announced this desire even before the start of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, in 2021…

…The next public discussion of the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus took place in June 2022 during the talks between Lukashenka and Putin.

The Russian leader noted that at that moment in six European countries – NATO members – the Americans stored 200 tactical nuclear weapons, mostly atomic bombs….

“On July 1, we are completing the construction of a special storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus,” Vladimir Putin said in March 2023 in Pavel Zarubin’s program.

…And he added that the training of Belarusian crews will begin on April 3. According to him, there are already carriers of (Russian) nuclear weapons in Belarus: these are the Su-24s, the Iskander-M operational-tactical missile systems, modified by agreement with Minsk, as well as our MiG-31s [RG1] ​​with Kinzhals, all this is covered modern air defense systems, including the transferred S-400 anti-aircraft missiles….

Thus, Belarus is now becoming Russia’s “nuclear queen” on the borders with NATO and Ukraine….

By the way, special ammunition will be stored and controlled by the Russian army…. The President of Russia made it clear that the decision of Moscow and Minsk is a response to the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, organized by the West.

“Each day of deliveries of foreign weapons to Ukraine ultimately brings this same nuclear apocalypse closer. This does not mean that it will definitely take place. But the horsemen of the apocalypse are already on their way and continue their movement, you can rest assured,” Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, commented on the decisions taken by NATO. In addition, Medvedev warned that Ukraine’s attempt to retake Crimea would be grounds to use any weapon, including those provided for by the “fundamentals of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.” He believes that an attempt to “split off part of the state” is equal to “an encroachment on the existence of the state itself.”


Notes:

[i] On paper, at least, Russia and Belarus have formed a “Union State.” The strength of this union improved after President Lukashenko appealed for Kremlin assistance in the summer of 2020. Lukashenko had falsified presidential election results, and when large protests broke out, Russia provided economic and security assistance to quell the demonstrations. Since then, Lukashenko’s room to maneuver has been limited.

[ii] Russia has repeatedly promised to move an airbase into western Belarus for the past several years. There has been some speculation that Russia will use this base as the storage site for its non-strategic nuclear weapons. For background, see: Ray Finch, “Russia Deploying Anti-NATO Air Assets in Belarus Under Guise of Training,” OE Watch, July 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/oe-watch-issues


Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Eurasian Economic Forum, 24 May 2023
Source: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71198/photos/71199
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl


Russia Concerned About Dependence on Chinese Technology

President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.

President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.


Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology…”


Over the past decade, as the Kremlin leadership has touted and celebrated its growing ties to China as it has sought to distance itself from the West. This turn toward Beijing accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Western governments imposed additional sanctions and many Western firms departed. As the first excerpt from Russian television channel ORT describes, during President Xi’s visit to Moscow in March, there was talk of a comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation. Having only just recently been labeled as a war criminal by the Hague, the Chinese leader’s decision to make his first foreign visit since the onset of COVID-19 speaks volumes regarding his support for Putin. While political relations today are cordial, some in Russia are beginning to question their country’s growing economic and technological dependence upon China.[i] The second excerpt from Russian-language Turkish news service TRT captures this concern, which attributes it to Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. Not only are there security concerns regarding Russia’s dependence on this technology, but “Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security.”[ii] The article concludes by quoting statistics regarding the growth of Russian firms using “Chinese cybersecurity solutions,” growing from 5 percent in 2022 to nearly 60 percent today. Should the current trend continue, China will gain considerable leverage over Russian information processing.


Sources:

Pavel Matveev, “Завершился государственный визит председателя КНР Си Цзиньпина в Россию (Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Russia ends),” ORT (Russian Main TV Channel), 22 March 2023. https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-03-22/449553-zavershilsya_gosudarstvennyy_vizit_predsedatelya_knr_si_tszinpina_v_rossiyu

The farewell ceremony took place at Vnukovo airport. State flags, anthems of the two countries, after which the Chinese leader followed the red carpet to his plane.

…A full program, many meetings and negotiations, as a result of which important documents were signed and a joint statement was published on deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction…. In particular, Russia will support Chinese business, which is replacing Western companies. Settlements between the two countries have already mostly switched to rubles and yuan….


“Российские чиновники опасаются растущей зависимости от Huawei (Russian officials wary of growing reliance on Huawei),” TRT (Turkish News Service in Russian), 20 April 2023. https://www.trtrussian.com/novosti/rossijskie-chinovniki-opasayutsya-rastushej-zavisimosti-ot-huawei-12905704

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is making Moscow too dependent on Chinese technology, as US and EU sanctions have barred Russian firms from accessing Western technology. Instead, the Russian Federation is forced to reorient itself to Chinese developments, in particular, to deliveries from Huawei….

…The document cited by the publication says: some high-ranking Russian officials are concerned that Chinese companies such as Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. may take a dominant position in the Russian market, thereby posing a risk to the information security of the country. …In a report compiled by the Ministry of Digital Development of the Russian Federation in the summer of 2022, microcircuits, network devices and electronics are highlighted as areas of particular vulnerability.

…In addition to fears of growing dependence, Russian officials also fear that the growth of the presence of Chinese companies and developments in the Russian market could hinder the development of their own developments in the field of security…

…As TRT previously wrote in Russian, more than half of companies in Russia plan to switch to Chinese equipment in the field of cybersecurity after European and American manufacturers leave the Russian market.The Russian newspaper Kommersant, citing a survey by K2Tech integrator, notes that until 2022, only 5% of Russian companies used Chinese cybersecurity solutions. Now 60% of companies have switched to them or are planning to switch to them to replace the products of departed Western players – Cisco, Palo Alto, etc….


Notes:

[i] This concern has been growing for the past several years. For additional background, see: Ray Finch, “Russia-China: Potential Allies or Adversaries?,” OE Watch, November 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/340594

[ii] The Kremlin has been careful not to publicize information regarding unfair Chinese business practices and espionage to protect the warming relationship between the two countries.  For some relatively recent background, see: Ray Finch, “Russian Concerns over Chinese Espionage,” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/379981


Image Information:

Image: President Putin and Chinese President Xi, Kremlin, June 2019.
Source: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60669/photos
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Russian Domestic Support for Ukraine Invasion Weakens as Fighters Return Home

President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.

President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.


The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.”


According to the excerpted article from official Kremlin news outlet Parliamentskaya Gazeta, during the Victory Day celebration on 9 May, President Putin declared “all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine.” Despite some skepticism of such claims, indeed, most indicators suggest that Russian civil society support for the invasion has remained high over time.[i] Some of this robust domestic support stems from the Kremlin’s control over the country’s major media, which has over the past 15 months asserted that Russian soldiers are protecting their country against a quasi-Ukrainian/Nazi threat (supported by the US and NATO).[ii] Alongside the 24/7 propaganda, the Kremlin has also enacted legislation that severely punishes any attempt to protest Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[iii] Nevertheless, despite the Kremlin’s tight control over the narrative, there are growing indications that some Russians are beginning to question the costs behind this conflict, and possibly, their support.

The second excerpt from a regional source in Krasnodar, 93.RU, describes the brutal kidnapping and murder of two local residents by three ex-convicts. The victims’ car had broken down, and after offering to help, the criminals forced them to withdraw money from the bank and then murdered them. The source suggests that these ex-convicts may have recently gained their freedom from prison by volunteering to fight with the Wagner private military company in Ukraine. One of them had been sentenced to 16 years in prison in 2016 for a similar murder, and the article questions how he could have been released so soon. Since “discrediting” the military is now a serious offense in Russia, the author of the article couches the assertion that these ex-convicts had been released from prison by volunteering to fight in Ukraine in vague terms. However, anonymous reader comments to this article are more forthright, pointing out that once these convicts had spent six months fighting in Ukraine, they were now free to return to former criminal habits. Another reader warns that “now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.” These comments suggest that the blowback from using convicted criminals as soldiers could reduce Russian domestic support for fighting in Ukraine.


Sources:

Anton Grebennikov, “Президент: Вся страна сплотилась для поддержки участников спецоперации (President: The whole country rallied to support the participants of the special operation),” Parliamentskaya Gazeta (official Kremlin site), 9 May 2023. https://www.pnp.ru/politics/prezident-vsya-strana-splotilas-dlya-podderzhki-uchastnikov-specoperacii.html

Today, all of Russia has rallied to support the participants in the special military operation in Ukraine. The country is proud of its heroes, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during the Victory Day Parade on Red Square…. “There is no more important thing now than your combat work. Today, the security of the country rests on you, the future of our statehood and our people depends on you, you honorably fulfill your military duty – you fight for Russia. Your families, children, friends are behind you, they are waiting for you,” RIA Novosti quotes the president….


Valeria Dulskaya, “Верили до последнего. Кто и зачем убил аниматоров на кубанской трассе (They believed until the very end. Who and why killed the animators on the Kuban highway),” 93.RU (Krasnodar News Site), 4 May 2023. https://93.ru/text/incidents/2023/05/04/72274256/

On the evening of April 28, animators Kirill Chubko and Tatyana Mostyko disappeared on the highway near the village of Berezanskaya in the Krasnodar Territory, who were driving home from work. They broke the wheel, and after some time they stopped communicating. Two days after the disappearance, Kirill’s car was found burned in the forest. More than 180,000 rubles disappeared from the accounts of the animators – they were withdrawn at night from different ATMs. Officers later arrested three suspects….

Unfortunately, that evening it became known that the animators were dead. On the morning of May 3, police reported that they had detained three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatiana. They were 31-year-old Demyan Kevorkyan from Krasnodar, 30-year-old Anatoly Dvoinikov from the Tikhoretsky district and 45-year-old Aram Tatosyan from the Apsheron district.

According to investigators, near the village of Berezanskaya, the alleged criminals noticed Kirill and Tatiana standing on the road on the road. The men decided to kill them in order to steal money and other valuables. They attacked the animators, took away their cards, “gaining access to the possibility of conducting banking operations on them.” Then the suspects withdrew more than 180 thousand rubles from several ATMs. Taking the money, the men killed Cyril and Tatyana. To hide the crime, they burned their car and hid the bodies, the press service of the regional Investigative Committee reported….

On May 3, the Investigative Committee announced the arrest of three suspects in the murder of Kirill and Tatyana – Demyan Kevorkyan, Anatoly Dvoinikov and Aram Tatosyan. According to the Russian Investigative Committee, all three had previous convictions…. The media suggest that they participated in the SMO, but there is no official confirmation of this.

Reader Comments:

One convict, who in 2016 was sentenced to 18 years for a similar murder, teleported out of the colony in some completely unknown way and killed the victims.

The funny thing is that now there will be many such heroes all over the country, which is scary.I don’t understand either, they gave him 18 years and he is free. Everything goes according to plan…


Notes:

[i] Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi, “How Strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?,” Atlantic Council, 2 May 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-public-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine/#:~:text=The%20Levada%20Center%2C%20which%20is,public%20backing%20of%20over%2070%25

[ii] For additional background on how the Kremlin has used the media to generate support for its policies, see” Ray Finch, CHAPTER 6. THE MOBILIZATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY, THE RUSSIAN MILITARY IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 1 September 2019. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20098.10

[iii]Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian media space had become tightly controlled, especially on matters dealing with national security. For a brief snapshot on some of these restrictive measures, see: Ray Finch, “More Restrictions on Defense Information,” OE Watch, October 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/376377; “Russia Moves Forward with New Restrictions on Military Reporting,” OE Watch, November, 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/397980


Image Information:

Image: President Putin, Victory Day, Red Square, 9 May 2023.
Source: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/photos/big2x/EONAWWmXRIkYHMVEZf8vmNhVq99RsGK3.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 4.0 Intl

Russia Tries To Appeal to New Contract Soldiers in Moscow

Russian advertisement for contract military service.

Russian advertisement for contract military service.


“The general atmosphere in the Center is strikingly different from the environment of the draft board familiar to every male Russian.”


Over the past 15 months, polls in Russia have indicated significant public support (ranging from around 70 to 80 percent) for its invasion of Ukraine. Given the government’s control over the media (and most polling agencies), the genuine level of support could be considerably lower. The Kremlin’s ongoing challenge in attracting sufficient contract-military manpower may better reflect the actual public mood regarding this conflict. Few young Russian men appear willing to enlist as contract soldiers. As the accompanying excerpt from the popular Russian site Moskovskiy Komsomolets points out, Russian officials in Moscow are now pulling out all stops to attract sufficient contract military personnel for the so-called “special military operation” (SMO) in Ukraine.

Until recently, processing centers for Russian contract soldiers were bureaucratic, bare-boned operations with minimal staffing and infrastructure. As the article describes, this has all changed (at least in Moscow) with the recent inauguration of the new “five-story Unified Selection Point for military service under contract.” Instead of long lines amid grim surroundings, this new induction center boasts of “electronic queues, comfortable waiting rooms, with trained and competent specialists.” All the administrative and medical facilities are co-located, allowing potential contract soldiers to “comfortably and quickly go through a full cycle of events related to admission to the army.” The center is open all week and has the capacity to process 300 new contract soldiers daily. The article also describes some of the terms and benefits of becoming a contract soldier. Quoting a Moscow military commissar, “each candidate has the right to choose his specialty,” and the ages of admission for contractors is between 18 and 60. Candidates can come from anywhere in Russia, as well as from any other neighboring country. According to the article, the pay and benefits package for new contract soldiers is quite impressive. Besides their regular contract pay, soldiers from Moscow will receive a one-time payment of 195,000 rubles ($2,500) as well as similar monthly payments while participating in the SMO. There are also schooling benefits for eligible children and retired parents of contract soldiers. As the Kremlin continues to wrestle with manpower challenges, contract military service may become a more attractive option for Russians living in Moscow.[i]


Source:

Yury Sukhanov, “В столице открылся сверхсовременный Единый пункт отбора на контрактную службу (An ultra-modern unified selection point for contract service was opened in the capital),” Moskovskiy Komsomolets (popular Russian site), 3 April 2023.  https://www.mk.ru/moscow/2023/04/03/v-stolice-otkrylsya-sverkhsovremennyy-edinyy-punkt-otbora-na-kontraktnuyu-sluzhbu.html

In Moscow, the modernization of all contours of the urban environment and public services continues. Following health care, education, housing and communal services, transport, the sphere of manning the Armed Forces, which is vital for the country, is brought to the standards of the 21st century. Within the framework of this program, a five-story Unified Selection Point for military service under a contract was opened …where volunteers can comfortably and quickly go through a full cycle of events related to admission to the army….

“What I would like to note: with all candidates, events will be held for selection for a contract on the principle of one window, without leaving the territory of this building, – says the military commissar of the city of Moscow Maxim Loktev. – All logistics are thought out taking into account the wishes of those who have already been on the contract. All the services participating in the selection procedure are located in one building, and all the logistics of those wishing to enter the contract are organized along the lines of multifunctional centers that are well known to Muscovites. Electronic queues, comfortable waiting rooms, trained and competent specialists are just the tip of the iceberg: the basis is a competent division of the functionality of employees, verified routes and procedures….

… “Each candidate has the right to choose his specialty,” Loktev added. According to him, people from 18 to 60 years old can become contractors… After the interview and clarification of the capabilities and intentions of the applicant entering the Armed Forces, it is the turn of doctors…

…according to the military commissar of Moscow, candidates from all regions of the country are accepted. “We are faced with the fact that guys who want to serve under a contract work in Moscow and often represent different regions….  This option is also provided for those who are not citizens of the Russian Federation, from neighboring countries, we will also consider these candidates and offer them military service under the contract,” said Maxim Loktev.

…The center in its current configuration with specialists is designed to receive a hundred people per day, but it is possible to expand its capacity to 300 people daily…. The general atmosphere in the Center is strikingly different from the environment of the draft board familiar to every male Russian.

…Before leaving for the special operation zone, all contract soldiers… will undergo special professional training at the best training grounds in the Moscow region.

As for material support for military personnel and their families, in Moscow it includes regular monthly payments, as well as lump sum payments upon signing a contract and sending them to the SMO zone. When signing a contract for a year or more, a person entering the Armed Forces will receive a lump sum of 195,000 rubles from the city. Further, the system guarantees regular additional payments depending on rank and military position.Moscow currently has one of the most extensive packages of social support and benefits for military personnel, primarily for participants in the special operation. These benefits apply not only to the soldiers themselves, but also to their families. Thus, the children of combatants have the right to extraordinary admission to the kindergarten closest to their home, the school of their choice (regardless of the place of permanent registration). And social workers will help elderly relatives of Muscovite soldiers in everyday life.


Notes:

[i] For additional background on recent incentives to attract new soldiers, see: Ray Finch, “Added Incentives for Those who Fight in Ukraine,” OE Watch, 3-2023.


Image Information:

Image: Russian advertisement for contract military service.
Source: https://www.n-vartovsk.ru/news/citywide_news/bvk/381142.html
Attribution: CCA-SA 3.0 Public Domain

Russia Widens and Tightens Conscription Policies

Andrey Kartapolov (General-Ret), chairman of the Duma Defense Committee.

Andrey Kartapolov (General-Ret), chairman of the Duma Defense Committee.


“The information space is filled with aggressive advertising of the services of commercial structures to evade military duty…”


The Kremlin continues to struggle to attract adequate military manpower to participate in its so-called special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine. The partial mobilization of 300,000 soldiers announced in September 2022 helped to stabilize Russian lines but so far has been insufficient to launch a counteroffensive or consolidate control of the four recently annexed provinces.[i] Similarly, Russian private military companies (PMCs) like the Wagner Group and other local militias have also proven inadequate to consolidate gains. The Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) increasingly may be forced to rely upon conscript soldiers to fill Russia’s manpower needs.

Russia is considering a proposal to change the age for draft-eligible Russians. In December 2022, the MoD announced that the age for draft-eligible Russian men would be changed from 18-27 to 21-30 years of age, which would supposedly provide for more mature and experienced conscripts. However, according to the first excerpt from the pro-business site Vedomosti, “the transition to a new draft age in 2023 is unlikely.” There is simply insufficient time for local draft boards to prepare and carry out this change. However, the article quotes another expert who claims that the “law on raising the draft age could come into force in the fall of 2023.” At first, the draft will be of a mixed type, that is, men aged 18 to 30 will be subject to it.” Expanding the age limits from 18-30 for military manpower could help the MoD to fill the military’s ranks. The Kremlin is also cracking down on ways to evade military service. To avoid the draft, many young Russian men employ the services of various legal agencies to find legal or medical reasons to remain out of the military.[ii] Not surprisingly, as the second excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes, legislation has been proposed that would “ban advertising of legal and consulting companies that provide services to conscripts.” The article quotes a Russian legislator who asserts that “the information space is filled with aggressive advertising of the services of commercial structures to evade military duty.” According to the Kremlin’s narrative, military duty is a sacred honor, and as the SMO continues, more young Russian men will be forced to carry out this obligation if the conscript age eligibility is expanded and legal recourse for potential conscripts is curtailed.


Sources:

Anna Vergazova, “В Госдуме оценили сроки перехода к новому призывному возрасту (The State Duma estimated the timing of the transition to a new draft age),” Vedomosti (Russian pro-business news outlet), 3 March 2023. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/03/03/965182-perehoda-novomu-prizivnomu-vozrastu

The transition to a new draft age in 2023 is unlikely, Yury Shvytkin, deputy head of the State Duma Defense Committee, told Vedomosti…. Viktor Bondarev, Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Federation Council, said on March 3 that the draft law on raising the draft age could come into force in the fall of 2023. He added that the introduction of the document is planned in the spring, and suggested that in this case it would come into force by the beginning of the autumn draft…

…A proposal to gradually increase the draft age was made by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on December 21, 2022 at an expanded meeting of the collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense. According to his proposal, the draft age can be increased from 18 to 21 years, and the maximum – from 27 to 30 years. In addition, Shoigu called for an increase in the number of military personnel to 1.5 million people.

Earlier, Andrey Kartapolov, chairman of the Duma Defense Committee , told Parliamentary Gazeta that from April 1, conscription could take place according to the new rules. At first, the draft will be of a mixed type, that is, men aged 18 to 30 will be subject to it.


Bulat Bashirov, “Призывников оградят от юристов (Conscripts to be shielded from lawyers),” Kommersant (Russian pro-business news outlet), 7 February 2023. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5811945

…Deputies of the Parliament of Bashkiria took the initiative to ban advertising of legal and consulting companies that provide services to conscripts. The legislators propose to amend the federal legislation accordingly, since “aggressive advertising of services for evading military duty” provokes citizens to commit acts punishable in criminal and administrative order….“The information space is filled with aggressive advertising of the services of commercial structures to evade military duty,” the explanatory note to the document says…. “Advertising ways to avoid conscription is widespread: cars with similar banners are literally parked near recruiting stations,” Vladimir Nagorny, head of the Bashkirian Kurultai Committee on State Construction, told Kommersant. “Their services are to find, they believe, a legal way to avoid conscription. The first way can be characterized as abuse of the right. On the advice of such lawyers, the recruit will appeal the decision of the draft commission in court, and even if he loses, by that time the draft campaign will already be over. The second method is friendly independent medical commissions, which find a disease in the conscript that exempts him from service. Lawyers do not hesitate to talk about this method.”


Notes:

[i]Russia annexed the four Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia in 2022, although the Kremlin does not fully control them.

[ii] For additional information regarding how young Russian men avoid being conscripted see: Ray Finch, “Dodging the Draft” OE Watch, December 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/377105


Image Information:

Image: Andrey Kartapolov (General-Ret), chairman of the Duma Defense Committee
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Andrey_Kartapolov,_2018.jpg
Attribution: Mil.ru. CCA 4.0 Intl

Russia Losing to China in Central Asia

Map of Central Asia.

Map of Central Asia.


“China can successfully form the image of a guarantor of the security of the countries of the region, replacing Russia in this capacity.”


The ripple effects of the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022 continue to reverberate around the world, particularly among China and Russia’s other neighbors. As the excerpted article from the semi-independent Russia-based Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye[i] indicates, given the demands of fighting in Ukraine, “it is increasingly difficult for Russia to ensure the security of Central Asia.” Furthermore, after its poor military performance in Ukraine, regional leaders see that the Russian armed forces are not nearly as formidable as they were once believed to be. And yet, Russia’s unprovoked attack has led certain Central Asian countries to worry about being met with the same fate as Ukraine.

Given Russia’s growing absence from Central Asia, the author, military journalist Alexander Khramchikhin, asserts that “with all these circumstances, China can dominate the region almost automatically.”[ii] He continues to say that a Chinese military presence in Central Asia is steadily developing, since over the last several years, the People’s Liberation Army of China and the People’s Armed Police have already conducted numerous joint exercises with the armies, border police, and internal troops of various Central Asian countries. The author then concludes that “China can successfully form the image of a guarantor of the security of the countries of the region…replacing Russia in this capacity.” The author reviews Chinese involvement in all five Central Asian countries, reminding readers of the recently constructed Chinese base in Tajikistan, claiming that “the place of Moscow as a guarantor of the security of Dushanbe is confidently taken by Beijing.” To ensure that China’s economic interests are well protected, he maintains that it is only a matter of time before further Chinese bases materialize in other Central Asian countries. Khramchikhin concludes that “Beijing will act on the principle of ‘crossing the river, groping for stones,’” suggesting that this transformation of China’s growing military presence in Central Asia will be gradual.


Source:

Alexander Khramchikhin, “Пекин прибирает к рукам страны Центральной Азии (Beijing takes over the countries of Central Asia),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (semi-independent Russian news source focused on military topics), 26 January 2023. https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2023-01-26/5_1222_asia.html

…Central Asia is now in the deep shadow of the Ukrainian events. But this does not mean at all that the struggle for it has ceased. In addition to geographic proximity, Russia has powerful historical, linguistic, cultural, economic, political, and military ties with the countries of Central Asia. To a large extent, the labor markets of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are oriented towards Russia. This explains the very significant influence of Moscow in the region….

…However, these ties are also gradually beginning to blur and weaken. In particular, Ukrainian events contribute to this. Because of them, it is increasingly difficult for Russia to ensure the security of Central Asia: too large forces are deployed by Moscow in Ukraine. In addition, the countries of the region see that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are by no means as strong as previously thought. On the other hand, some of these countries are beginning to fear sharing the fate of Ukraine…. In connection with all these circumstances, China can dominate the region almost automatically. In fact, competitors themselves give him this dominance….

The growth of China’s economic influence in the countries of Central Asia automatically leads to an increase in political influence…. If the growth of China’s economic influence in Central Asia is automatically followed by the growth of its political influence, then, obviously, the growth of political influence will be followed by the growth of military influence, which is already happening. In addition, most of China’s economic projects in the countries of Central Asia are part of the global One Belt, One Road project. Accordingly, Beijing wants to ensure the safety of these projects.

…In the 21st century, the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) have already conducted dozens of joint exercises with the armies, border and internal troops of the Central Asian countries.… Accordingly, China can successfully form the image of a guarantor of the security of the countries of the region from the well-known “three evils” (terrorism, separatism, extremism), replacing Russia in this capacity.

…The highest form of military cooperation between China and the countries of Central Asia is the deployment of Chinese military bases in the region…. Quite expectedly, it began with Tajikistan – the weakest country in Central Asia militarily and economically, the most remote from Russia, while having the longest border with Afghanistan… Dushanbe is experiencing a serious security deficit and is not sure that Moscow is able to solve this problem (especially now, in the context of the Ukrainian campaign). Therefore, the place of Moscow as a guarantor of the security of Dushanbe is confidently taken by Beijing…. 

The deployment of Chinese military bases in other countries of the region is apparently a matter of time. The pace and order of deployment of Chinese military facilities in the countries of Central Asia will be determined both by the general geopolitical situation and the degree of economic dependence of each specific country on China. …Most likely Tajikistan will be followed by Kyrgyzstan, then Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The last one, apparently, will give consent to the deployment of PLA facilities in the country Kazakhstan…. Chinese military bases in Central Asia will ensure the smooth functioning of the Belt and Road Initiative and the stability of local regimes. At first, Chinese facilities in the countries of the region are unlikely to be too large, but gradually the presence of the PLA and the PAP in these states will expand. As in all other areas, Beijing will act on the principle of ‘crossing the river, groping for stones.’ Almost always, the implementation of this principle leads China to success.


Notes:

[i]Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (Independent Military Review).

[ii] Alexander Khramchikhin was one of the few Russian military analysts who warned against an invasion of Ukraine, arguing that such an attack could have catastrophic consequences for Russia. See: Alexander Khramchikhin, “Полураспад Украины (Half-life of Ukraine),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye, 11 March 2021. https://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2021-03-11/8_1132_ukraine.html


Image Information:

Image: Map of Central Asia
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Central_Asia_-_political_map_2008.svg
Attribution: CCA-SA 3.0

Russia Adds Incentives for Fighters in Ukraine

VDV (airborne) troopers on parade repetition.

VDV (airborne) troopers on parade repetition.


Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the rights of the Russian military and their families must be protected.”


Despite Russian propaganda efforts to promote military service, the Kremlin and the Defense Ministry have struggled to enlist adequate manpower to fight Ukraine. Even after mobilizing 300,000 new soldiers in the fall of 2022, the Defense Ministry continues to seek new and capable fighters, including immigrants and convicted felons. As the accompanying excerpts illustrate, additional incentives have been introduced to attract new recruits and to further motivate those already in uniform. The first article from the pro-Kremlin news outlet Izvestiya describes how Russian veterans of the Ukraine invasion can expect extensive benefits. The list includes incentives such as vouchers for sanatoriums, free prostheses, and various housing, tax, and health benefits. While the list is long, obtaining promised benefits is often another story. Recall that Russia has no equivalent to the U.S. Veterans Administration. As such, depending on the type of uniformed service and current place of residence, there is often a wide disparity of benefits and care provided to Russian military veterans.[i] The second excerpted article from the government site Rossiyskaya Gazeta describes additional payments Russian soldiers can receive “for destroyed or captured equipment of Ukrainian militants.” For example, soldiers can earn 300,000 rubles ($4,300) for a downed aircraft or 100,000 rubles ($1,450) for having “destroyed a large number of enemy manpower.” The article, however, does not spell out the procedures for receiving these payments. Finally, the third article, from the pro-Kremlin site RT, briefly describes a recent meeting between Putin and Russian judges, where they discussed “grounds for suspending legal proceedings, including if a citizen who is a party to the case participates in hostilities as part of the Russian Armed Forces or other military formations.” Behind this bureaucratic language, Putin is telling the judges that Russian military personnel should have criminal charges dismissed if they fight in Ukraine.[ii] The variety of additional benefits and incentives being introduced by Moscow suggest that Russian recruiting efforts have not proven sufficient, and that the Kremlin may soon have to rely more upon coercion to replenish its military ranks.


Sources:

“Какие выплаты положены ветеранам боевых действий в России (What payments are due to war veterans in Russia),” Izvestiya (pro-Kremlin source), 16 January 2023. https://iz.ru/1455408/2023-01-16/kakie-vyplaty-polozheny-veteranam-boevykh-deistvii-v-rossii-grafika

Veterans of military operations in Russia can count on financial and other support from the state. They are entitled to monthly payments and a number of benefits….

Combat veterans can apply for: cash supplement to the pension; partial compensation of expenses for housing and communal services; free vouchers for sanatoriums; free prostheses and rehabilitation aids; extraordinary service; a one-time payment for the construction of a house or the purchase of housing; tax and land benefits; other social preferences….

Ilya Maksimov, “Представлен список поощрений за уничтожение и захват техники ВСУ (A list of rewards for the destruction and capture of Ukrainian military equipment),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Government newspaper), 15 November 2023. https://rg.ru/2022/11/15/predstavlen-spisok-pooshchrenij-za-unichtozhennuiu-tehniku-vsu.html

A list of rewards for destroyed or captured equipment of Ukrainian militants is presented… The biggest bonus is for those who were able to destroy an enemy aircraft – 300,000 rubles will be paid for this. The helicopter was valued at 200 thousand rubles, the drone – at 50 thousand.

The award is also given for the destruction of ground equipment. The fighter who eliminated the tank can claim a bonus of 100 thousand rubles. For the destruction of infantry fighting vehicles, BMDs, armored personnel carriers, MTLBs, self-propelled guns, S-300 [GRLCUT(1] systems, Buk[GRLCUT(2] , Tor, Osa complexes or MLRS launchers, they will pay 50 thousand rubles.

Bonus payments are also possible to military personnel who have destroyed a large number of enemy manpower or who have completed other tasks assigned to them. This premium is up to 100 thousand rubles.

“Путин: права российских военных и их семей должны быть защищены (Putin: the rights of the Russian military and their families must be protected),” RT (pro-Kremlin news outlet), 14 February 2023. https://russian.rt.com/russia/news/1111177-putin-voennye-semi

Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the rights of the Russian military and their families must be protected. The President stated this during a meeting with the judges.  He recalled the recent adoption of a number of legislative decisions on social support for the military, mobilized citizens and their families.The new measures provide additional grounds for suspending legal proceedings, including if a citizen who is a party to the case participates in hostilities as part of the Russian Armed Forces or other military formations. According to him, the courts should carefully consider issues involving the military, taking into account not only legal aspects, but also specific life circumstances and situations….


Notes:

[i] For additional background on benefits for Russian veterans, see: Ray Finch, “Proposal to Restore Veterans’ Benefits,” OE Watch, July 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/277121;  Ray Finch, “Russian Military Experiencing Pay Problems,” OE Watch, 1-2023. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/433072; Ray Finch, “Lack of PTSD Treatment for Russian Soldiers,” OE Watch, 11-2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/429190.

[ii] Notably, a similar strategy has also been used by the Russian private military company Wagner, wherein convicts can have their records expunged and earn their freedom in exchange for a six-month tour in Ukraine.


Image Information:

Image: VDV (airborne) troopers on parade repetition
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Comp_41.jpg
Attribution: CCA-SA 3.0

Russia Compares Ukraine Conflict to WWII

Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945.

Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945.


Comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable.”


The Soviet victory in World War II (WWII), which it calls “The Great Patriotic War,”  is the central to the Kremlin’s current ideology, which recasts it to justify the so-called special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine.[i] According to Kremlin propaganda, just as the USSR fought against the evils of Nazi Germany, so too today, Russian soldiers are defending their country from a Ukrainian “Nazi” threat. By framing this conflict as a fight against Nazism, the Kremlin has been able to tap into narratives of pain, fear, and sacrifice experienced by the Russian people during WWII. However, the accompanying excerpt from the semi-independent Russian news source Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye argues that viewing the SMO in Ukraine through a WWII lens presents its own set of challenges.   

The author asserts that “comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable,” proceeding then to remind readers of basic facts surrounding WWII and how they differ from those surrounding the SMO in Ukraine. For instance, in June 1941 “the Red Army had a very significant (several times) quantitative superiority in military equipment over the Wehrmacht.” This was not the case in February 2022, when the Russian military “did not have any quantitative superiority over the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine.” Comparing casualties during the two conflicts, the author points out that so far, Russian total losses in Ukraine are small, noting that “during the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army lost the same number of servicemen on average in one day!”

Responding to those who assert that there can be no negotiations with the current Ukrainian leadership, the author reminds readers that in the summer and autumn of 1941, the USSR tried to reach a negotiated settlement with Nazi Germany. To those who claim that the USSR was the sole victor in WWII, the author reviews the critical role which the Western lend-lease program played in the Allied victory. The author makes other cogent comparisons, suggesting that to measure progress in the SMO thought a warped WWII lens will only “multiply losses and delay victory.”[ii] It is noteworthy that this sober assessment of the SMO was published given Russian press restrictions and the pervasiveness of pro-Kremlin propaganda.


Source:

Alexander Khramchikhin, “Уязвленный патриотизм порождает истерику (Wounded patriotism breeds hysteria),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye (semi-independent Russian news source), 1 December 2022. https://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2022-12-01/4_1216_patriotism.html

Comparing the special operation in Ukraine with the Great Patriotic War is unreasonable. A large part of Russian society is experiencing difficult feelings about the course of the military campaign in Ukraine. Many do not understand why we have not yet won,and sometimes retreating – moreover, from the territories included in the Russian Federation.

Such a reaction to the Ukrainian events is quite understandable in itself, but not should not incite hysteria. Expressing dissatisfaction with what is happening, outside observers cite the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War as a positive example for today’s Russia….

As of June 22, 1941, on the Soviet-German border, the Red Army had a very significant (several times) quantitative superiority in military equipment over the Wehrmacht…. As of February 24, 2022, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the Russian-Ukrainian border did not have any quantitative superiority over the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine. And the qualitative superiority of the Russian side was and remains not so fundamental as to compensate for the quantitative superiority of the enemy.

At the same time, however, hostilities are taking place exclusively on the territory of Ukraine (meaning the territory at the beginning of the current campaign). Ukrainian strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation (taken at the same time) are of microscopic proportions. Irretrievable losses of the RF Armed Forces over the entire period of hostilities are small. During the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army lost the same number of servicemen on average in one day!

Regular statements by some Russian officials about “creating a favorable background” for negotiations with “respected Western partners” produce a painful impression on the Russian population, to put it mildly.… But in the summer and autumn of 1941, at the direction of Stalin and Beria, Soviet representatives… tried to transfer to Berlin proposals for a virtually complete repetition of the Brest Peace. That is, about the surrender to the Germans of the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and maybe also Karelia. …If the Anglo-Saxons had not fought against Hitler (for whom almost all of continental Europe worked), and if Lend-Lease had been supplied not to the Soviet Union, but to Germany, we would have had a very bad time.

…But criticism is different. It is absolutely unacceptable to question the legitimacy of the actions of the army, to talk about its non-existent losses and, moreover, about non-existent crimes. But to ignore failures in various types of support and obvious mistakes in the preparation of the campaign as a whole means to multiply losses and delay victory.


Notes:

[i] For additional background on the Kremlin’s attempt to create a new state ideology, see: Ray Finch, “Russian Culture Ministry Proposes Possible Framework for New State Ideology,” OE Watch, Issue #5 2022. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/417836

[ii] The author, Alexander Khramchikhin, was one of the few Russian military analysts who warned against an invasion of Ukraine, arguing that such an attack could have catastrophic consequences for Russia. See: Alexander Khramchikhin, “Полураспад Украины (Half-life of Ukraine),” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obezreniye, 11 March 2021. https://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2021-03-11/8_1132_ukraine.html


Image Information:

Image: Soviet Victory Parade, Red Square, Moscow, June 1945|
Source: https://tinyurl.com/bdnrfsex
Attribution: Russian Ministry of Defense (Mil.ru) CCA 4.0 Intl

Russia Taking Steps To Improve Mobilization Capabilities


“Currently, in the military enlistment offices, the personal files of those liable for military service are stored exclusively in paper form, and each military enlistment office creates databases of citizens to be mobilized independently without any centralization.”


In September 2022, Russia began mobilizing 300,000 soldiers for its so-called special military operation in Ukraine—its first mobilization since World War II—exposing weaknesses in its infrastructure to track, prepare, and equip personnel for military service had deteriorated. As the two accompanying excerpts indicate, the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) have recently enacted changes that they believe will improve the mobilization process.

The first excerpt from Russian pro-business news outlet Kommersant describes how President Vladimir Putin instructed the Ministry of Digital Development to create “a centralized database by 1 April 2024, which will contain information about all Russians liable for military service.” Currently, the article says military enlistment offices store the “personal files of those liable for military service…exclusively in paper form, and each military enlistment office forms databases of citizens to be mobilized independently without any centralization.” During the partial mobilization, this antiquated system resulted in considerable confusion, where draft notices were sent to “wheelchair users, IT specialists who received a deferment, those unfit for health reasons, and fathers of many children.” The plan now is to develop a centralized, digital database, which includes pertinent personal information “about all Russians liable for military service.”[i] The article concludes by asserting that creating this digitized “mobilization resource of 25 million people in Russia” will be a “colossal” undertaking.

There have also been problems providing newly mobilized soldiers with the required personal military kit (uniforms, boots, protective gear, etc.). The second excerpt from the pro-Kremlin news organization RIA Novosti describes the recent decision to appoint the “Kalashnikov Concern…the coordinator of the supply of combat equipment (bulletproof vests, helmets and other items of equipment) to the Russian army.” According to the article, this decision was based on the “unprecedented challenges [faced by the MoD] associated with a special military operation and providing all necessary supplies for the mobilized.”


Sources:

Nikita Korolev, “Айтикоматы: Воинскому учету указана цифровизация (ITcomats: Military registration ordered to digitalize),” Kommersant (Russian pro-business site), 25 November 2022.  https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5692024

Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Ministry of Digital Development to create a centralized database by April 1, 2024, which will contain information about all Russians liable for military service. The Ministry of Digital Transformation will have to create an IT system that will include sets of all kinds of data about the life of citizens liable for military service: from their level of education and place of residence to current mobile phone numbers, email addresses and information about the available transport. 

The coordinator of the new information system, follows from the document, will be the Ministry of Defense…. After the start of partial mobilization in Russia on September 21, 2022, the media and human rights organizations reported numerous mistakes that the military commissariats made when sending out subpoenas and instructions. For example, summons were received by wheelchair users, IT specialists who received a deferment, unfit for health reasons, fathers of many children, etc….

…Currently, in the military enlistment offices, the personal files of those liable for military service are stored exclusively in paper form, and each military enlistment office creates databases of citizens to be mobilized independently without any centralization, says the interlocutor of Kommersant, who is engaged in the digitalization of one of the law enforcement agencies.

…Taking into account the fact that, according to the official statements of the Ministry of Defense, the mobilization resource of Russia is 25 million people and their data will need to be digitized in a month, “the work ahead is simply colossal,” a top manager of a Russian IT company engaged in developments in the field of artificial intelligence told Kommersant.

“Калашников назначили руководить поставками экипировки, сообщил источник (Kalashnikov was appointed to lead the supply of equipment, the source said),” RIA Novosti (pro-Kremlin news outlet), 13 November 2022. https://ria.ru/20221113/ekipirovka-1831120404.html

The Kalashnikov Concern has been appointed the main enterprise – the coordinator of the supply of combat equipment (bulletproof vests, helmets and other items of equipment) to the Russian army, this measure is needed, among other things, to provide the necessary equipment for the mass replenishment of the Russian Armed Forces – more than 300 thousand mobilized, an informed source told RIA Novosti….

…The interlocutor of the agency explained that this decision was made to unconditionally provide the Ministry of Defense with combat equipment in a situation where the military-industrial complex and the entire system of state defense orders are facing “unprecedented challenges associated with a special military operation and providing all the necessary mobilized.”


Notes:

[i] The plan to digitize data within the Military Commissariats has been discussed for quite some time. For more information see Ray Finch, “Russia Digitizing the Military Commissariat,” OE Watch, October 2021. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/397925

Russia Further Bolstering Iran Relations Following Ukraine Invasion

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.


“The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that ‘Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.’”


A major tenet of the Kremlin’s current ideology revolves around transforming what it perceives as a U.S.-led global security sphere into a multipolar world order where Russia occupies one of the key poles. The Kremlin promotes this ideology globally, especially to countries that have had a troubled relationship with the United States, and Russia has increased these efforts since its invasion of Ukraine began. The accompanying excerpt from the pro-business site Kommersant describes the recent visit of Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to Tehran on 9 November, where he claimed, “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order.” During Patrushev’s visit, the two sides “discussed all aspects of bilateral cooperation, from the economy to security,” in light of improving bilateral relations over the past decade.[i] The author suggests that the two countries traded notes regarding “the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.” The latter point was emphasized by Patrushev, who “noted the key role that Western intelligence services have played in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country.”

Since the Kremlin officially denies receiving military assistance from Iran, the article carefully cites foreign reports on “the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine.” For the Kremlin and the wider Russian audience, admitting the need for Iranian military technology would be regarded as humiliating. Not that long ago, it was Iran who requested Russian military assistance, and now the tables have turned.[ii] The article concludes by asserting that increased Western pressure on Iran will likely result in “closer cooperation between Russia and Iran.”


Source:

Marianna Belenkaya, “Совбезы РФ и Ирана поговорили на одном языке (Security Councils of Russia and Iran spoke the same language),” Kommersant (pro-business news outlet), 9 November 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/amp/5653639

Russia and Iran held interdepartmental consultations on security issues in Tehran on Wednesday (9 Nov). The Russian delegation was led by Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev. In the Iranian capital, he was received by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. According to official reports, the meeting discussed various issues of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of security, as well as a number of international problems….

The two countries have accumulated a lot of common themes, or rather, common problems. Among them are the survival of the economy under sanctions, cybersecurity, terrorism, as well as the interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Russia and Iran.

Iranian politicians do not need to explain anything to their Russian colleagues. They understand everything themselves, moreover, they speak the same language. Thus, at a meeting with an Iranian colleague, Nikolai Patrushev noted “the key role of Western intelligence services in organizing mass riots in Iran and the subsequent dissemination of disinformation about the situation in the country based on the Persian-language Western media controlled by them.” …The Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation also stressed that “Russia and Iran today are at the forefront of the struggle for the establishment of a multipolar world order” and this “is confirmed by the unprecedented pressure on our countries from Washington and its satellites.”

…From the very beginning of hostilities in Ukraine, Tehran stated that they understood Russian security concerns and believed that the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv was provoked by NATO… The atmosphere in Iranian-Ukrainian relations escalated after the media reported on the supply of Iranian drones to Russia for use in hostilities in Ukraine….

… Against this background, experts believe that the stronger the pressure of the West on Iran, including in the form of strengthening the sanctions regime, and the more elusive the chance to restore the “nuclear deal” becomes, the closer cooperation between Russia and Iran will become.


Notes:

[i] For additional background on Russian-Iran relations, see Ray Finch, “Russian Views of Iran,” Review of Persidskij bastion (Persian Bastion) in NATO Defense Review, edited by R. N. Pukhov and Yu. Yu. Lyamin, Moscow, CAST, 2019, 320pp. https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=668

[ii] For additional background on Russian arms sales to Iran, see Ray Finch, “Russian Arms Sales to Iran,” OE Watch, July 2020. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/365980


Image Information:

Image: Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Patrushev_NP.jpg
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl