Author Archives: Matthew Stein

India Cancels Plans To Purchase Russian Equipment

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SU-30MKI India.

SU-30MKI India.

“The ongoing conflict in Russia and Ukraine has also resulted in delays in the supply of spares for the fighter aircraft fleet.”

The Make in India initiative initially encouraged the Indian Armed Forces to gradually purchase domestic weapons or equipment whenever possible, before establishing import ban lists in the past year (see: “India Orders More Domestically Produced Self-Propelled Artillery System,” OE Watch, #3 2022).  However, as the accompanying excerpted articles report, Russia’s war in Ukraine is forcing the Indian government to reexamine certain acquisitions and upgrades for the armed forces that could further boost the Make in India initiative.  The article from the independent English-language newspaper The Hindu reports Minster of Defense Rajnath Singh’s comments in early May 2022 after the government cancelled plans to acquire and upgrade two systems from Russia.  He mentions that the government is drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine to become more self-sufficient and acknowledges that there will be short-term economic issues while becoming less dependent on imports.  The article from the English-language independent news magazine India Today reports that India’s Air Force cancelled a purchase of 48 Mi-17 V5 helicopters from Russia in support of the Make in India initiative.  Government officials claimed that “the decision to withdraw the tender for the 48 helicopters was taken long before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and that the Indian Air Force is now going to support an Indian effort for a helicopter. The article from the English-language daily Live Mint reports on the Indian government’s decision to cancel a plan to upgrade a number of its Su-30 fighters just days after cancelling the purchase of Mi-17s.  The article notes that the government made the decision because of the war in Ukraine and the Make in India initiative.  It also notes that the Indian Air Force had planned to upgrade 85 Su-30s with better radar and electronic warfare capabilities.  The article mentions that there are delays for spare parts for the fighters and that, while India has stocked up on enough for now, “it is expected that the supply of these spares and other equipment may become an issue in near future.”  Overall, India did not say that it would stop looking to Russia to acquire or upgrade systems, but the war in Ukraine is causing India to reassess how much it will depend on the Russian defense industry.

Sources:

“Self-reliance vital to protect nation’s sovereignty: Rajnath Singh,” The Hindu (independent English-language newspaper), 5 May 2022. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/self-reliance-vital-to-protect-nations-sovereignty-rajnath-singh/article65385058.ece

…Self-reliance in defence is essential not only for building domestic capacity but also safeguarding the sovereignty of the country, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said on Thursday…

…Talking of ‘Aatmanirbharta’ in defence, Mr. Singh said our past experiences had taught us that India could not depend on imports for its security. “Recent conflicts, especially the situation in Ukraine, have told us that not just defence supplies, but commercial contracts are also prone to be affected when it comes to national interests,” he stated.

In such a situation, self-reliance was necessary not only for building domestic capacity, but also for maintaining our independence, Mr. Singh said…“We may not even find it economical in the beginning. But we are very clear about this, that in the middle and long-term, it will help in building the foundation of a robust industrial base not only in the defence sector, but in every sphere of the industry,” he asserted…

Source: Manjeet Negi, “To boost Make in India, IAF cancels plans to buy 48 Mi-17 choppers from Russia,” India Today (English-language independent news magazine), 16 April 2022. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/make-in-india-iaf-mi-17-choppers-russia-1938341-2022-04-16

Aiming to support the Make in India initiative in the Defence programme of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Indian Air Force has decided to cancel plans to buy 48 more Mi-17 V5 helicopters from Russia.

Top government sources told India Today that the decision to withdraw the tender for the 48 helicopters that was taken much before the conflict between Russia and Ukraine broke out and has nothing to do with the global scenario.

“The tender for 48 Mi-17V5 helicopters has been withdrawn in view of the push for indigenisation. The IAF would now be supporting an indigenous programme for helicopters,” the sources said.

Source: “India shelves ₹35,000 cr plan to upgrade Su-30 fighter fleet amid Russia-Ukraine war,” Live Mint (online version of the financial English-language daily newspaper), 8 May 2022. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-shelves-rs-35-000-cr-plan-to-upgrade-su-30-fighter-fleet-amid-russia-ukraine-war-11652006926134.html

Several factors have shelved the Indian Air Force’s plan to upgrade its Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft fleet. The factors include the war between Russia and Ukraine and current policy of Make-in-India of the Indian government.

 IAF had planned to equip the Su-30 aircraft with more powerful radars and the latest electronic warfare capabilities to make it more powerful as per the latest standards.

IAF was planning to upgrade 85 of their planes up to the latest standards in collaboration with the Russians and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The plan has been put on the backburner for now in view of the present situation…

The ongoing conflict in Russia and Ukraine has also resulted in delays in the supply of spares for the fighter aircraft fleet…

Sources said even though the spares situation is manageable at the moment and expected to remain so in the near future as India had stocked them up in a considerable amount post the Uri surgical strikes and the ongoing China conflict. However, it is expected that the supply of these spares and other equipment may become an issue in near future…

Image Information:

Image: SU-30MKI India.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SU-30MKI_India.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Kazakhstan Cancels Soviet-Era Parade To Focus on Combat Readiness

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Kazakhstan Republican Guard.

Kazakhstan Republican Guard.

“Units of the Air Assault Forces worked out tactical methods of combat operation in urban areas during the main stage of the complex, interdepartmental strategic command and staff exercise ‘Brave Resistance – 2022“

Like Russia, Kazakhstan commemorates the Soviet Union’s victory over Germany in World War II.  A few weeks before 9 May, the Kazakh government announced that it planned to cancel its Victory Day military parade for the third year in a row.  The government also cancelled the parade in 2020 and 2021 because of the global pandemic.  While some Russian media speculated that the Kazakh government’s decision was a sign that it wanted to move away from Russian influence because of the war in Ukraine, the accompanying excerpted articles provide insight into the real reasons behind the Kazakh government’s decision.

The article from the news website Tengri News reports that the government cancelled the parade “because of the budget as well as the need to resolve other issues,” which included “combat readiness” and “the execution of tasks to ensure security and defense of the state and military facilities.”  The article from Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense website Sarbaz reports on how Kazakhstan’s Armed Forces carried out the “Brave Resistance – 2022” exercise in the city of Almaty as part of its combat readiness effort.  The article notes that the exercise involved a battalion tactical group with multiple support units as well as other agencies in an urban operation.  The article from the semi-independent newspaper Vremya and the second article from Tengri News report that the exercise took place in multiple regions and involved similar circumstances.  While the government of Kazakhstan has stated that it would not recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, it has stayed neutral in the war in Ukraine.  As Kazakhstan faces a difficult economic outlook this year, it likely looked to cut costs where possible while not sacrificing the readiness of its armed forces.

Sources:

Meirim Smaiyl, “Почему не будет военного парада, ответили в Минобороны (The Ministry of Defense answered why there will not be a military parade),” Tengri News (news website in Kazakhstan), 13 April 2022. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/pochemu-ne-budet-voennogo-parada-otvetili-v-minoboronyi-466522/

…“There are no plans to hold a military parade in Kazakhstan in 2022 because of the budget as well as the need to resolve other issues. In particular, the priority to have the required level of combat readiness and mobility of the Armed Forces, and the execution of task to ensure security and defense of the state and military facilities,” said the ministry’s press service…

Last year, because of the epidemiological situation in the country, the military parade in honor of Defender of the Fatherland Day and Victory Day was also cancelled.

Source: “Активная фаза учения «Батыл Тойтарыс – 2022» прошла в Алматинской области (The active phase of the exercise “Brave Resistance – 2022” has started in the Almaty Oblast),” Sarbaz (news website of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense),” 15 April 2022.

https://sarbaz.kz/army/aktivnaya-faza-ucheniya-batyl-toytarys-%E2%80%93-2022-proshla-v-almatinskoy-oblasti-221041839/

Units of the Air Assault Forces worked out tactical methods of combat operation in urban areas during the main stage of the complex, interdepartmental strategic command and staff exercise “Brave Resistance – 2022”…

According to the exercise plan, a battalion tactical group made up of an air assault battalion, reinforced by reconnaissance, artillery, engineering and sapper units, and UAV crews, in coordination with personnel from Special Operations Forces and the National Guard, carried out the task of freeing an area captured by a group of bandits…

Source: Langa Chereshkayte, “Сложные условия (Difficult conditions),” Vremya (semi-independent Russian-language newspaper in Kazakhstan), 18 April 2022. https://time.kz/articles/reporter/2022/04/18/slozhnye-usloviya

The exercise “Brave Resistance – 2022” with live firing took place at the Oymash training facility of the Aqtau garrison. According to the plan of the exercise, naval infantry was tasked with freeing a settlement from an armed group…

Additionally, during the tactical portion of the exercise, units of the border guards and the armed forces carried out combat training to strengthen the state border in order to prevent reserves from penetrating…

Source: “Военные учения прошли в Жамбылской области (A military exercise took place in the Zhambyl Oblast),” Tengri News (news website in Kazakhstan), 15 April 2022. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/voennyie-ucheniya-proshli-v-jambyilskoy-oblasti-466547/

…It is noted that during the exercise of soldiers in the Matybulak training facility in the Zhambyl region, the situation was simulated to take in account the experience of modern armed conflicts, in which illegally armed groups deployed in mountainous border areas…

…motorized rifle and tank units eliminated the enemy, while National Guard personnel cleared out the area…

Image Information:

Image: Kazakhstan Republican Guard.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kazakhstan_Republican_Guard.JPEG
Attribution: Public Domain

Kyrgyzstan Conducts Exercise with Its New Bayraktars

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Bayraktar TB2 S-IHA of the Turkish Army in Teknofest2021at Istanbul Atatürk Airport, Turkey.

Bayraktar TB2 S-IHA of the Turkish Army in Teknofest2021at Istanbul Atatürk Airport, Turkey.

“The Bayraktars entered service with the Border Guards in mid-December last year…”

Kyrgyzstan rarely acquires new weapons and equipment, so when the Kyrgyz government recently announced it had received a set of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), it marked an upgrade in the capabilities of Kyrgyz forces.  The accompanying excerpted articles report on a recent field exercise with the new drones as well as additional new equipment.

The article from the independent news website Kloop reports on an exercise involving Kyrgyzstan’s new Bayraktars.  The article notes that the scenario of the exercise involved eliminating a group of criminals with fire support from the UAVs.  Kyrgyz units in the Ministry of Defense, not the Border Guards, typically carry out this type of exercise.  The article mentions that it is unknown how many Bayraktars Kyrgyzstan purchased, but the UAVs and new vehicles are a notable upgrade specifically for the Border Guards.  There have been a number of clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border over the past 10 years, including clashes in April-May 2021 that resulted in a few dozen people killed (border guards and civilians) and clashes on 12 April 2022.

The excerpted article from the Kyrgyz semi-independent newspaper Vecherniy Bishkek reports on the delivery of “50 new KAMAZ vehicles and 55 Tigr armored personnel carriers to the Border Guards Service of the National Security Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic” and notes that it is “the largest acquisition of equipment for Kyrgyzstan since its independence.”  The article also mentions that the Kyrgyz government purchased the new military equipment with state funds, which one political scientist believed was possible partly because of the government’s takeover of the Kumtor gold mine last year.  In May 2021, the Kyrgyz government took steps to take ownership of Kumtor a Canadian company that had operated and held majority ownership of the mine.  As of April 2022, Kyrgyz authorities now have ownership and control operation of the mine, which makes up a significant percentage of the country’s GDP.

Source:

Munduzbek Kalykov, “Одним видео: «Байрактар», бронетехника и президент в полевой кухне (One video: “Bayraktar”, armored personnel carriers and the president in a field kitchen),” Kloop (independent Russian-language news website in Kyrgyzstan), 31 March 2022. https://kloop.kg/blog/2022/03/31/odnim-video-bajraktar-bronetehnika-i-prezident-v-polevoj-kuhne/

The special tactical exercise “Kalkan-2022” has started at the “Edelweiss” training center in the city of Balykchy…

According to the exercise scenario, an “international criminal group” infiltrated Kyrgyzstan from a neighboring state, having already seized weapons, mortars, a tank and other equipment.

During the exercise, special units of the Border Guards blocked off and eliminated the mock enemy. Their captured armored vehicles were destroyed with the use of the Bayraktar…

The Bayraktars entered service with the Border Guards in mid-December last year. They were bought within the budget, but it is unknown how much was spent on them. Also, the number of drones was not specified.

Source: Bakyt Basarbek, “Благодаря правильной экономической политике мы закупили военную технику (We purchased military equipment thanks to the right economic policies),” Vecherniy Bishkek (semi-independent, Russian-language newspaper in Kyrgyzstan), 25 March 2022. https://www.vb.kg/doc/416032_blagodaria_pravilnoy_ekonomicheskoy_politike_my_zakypili_voennyu_tehniky.html

Today, on 25 March, in Bishkek, a ceremony was held to present 55 modern fire engines to the Ministry of Emergency Situations and 50 new KAMAZ vehicles and 55 Tigr armored personnel carriers to the Border Guards Service of the National Security Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic…this is the largest acquisition of equipment for Kyrgyzstan since its independence.

…the KAMAZ trucks and the armored personnel carriers were purchased with funds from the state budget…

“Now we can buy equipment ourselves. The privatization of Kumtor and general economic policy played a role in this,” said political scientist Mars Sariev…he recalled that Kyrgyzstan previously purchased the strike-capable unmanned aerial vehicle Bayraktar from Turkey…

Image Information:

Image: Bayraktar TB2 S-IHA of the Turkish Army in Teknofest2021at Istanbul Atatürk Airport, Turkey
Source: CeeGee via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bayraktar_TB2_S-IHA_TurkishArmy_Teknofest2021_(3).jpg
Attribution: CC by 4.0

India Begins Development of a Light Tank

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“India had considered acquiring the Russian light tank the Sprut SDM1 following the outbreak of the current Sino-Indian boundary in May 2020.”

On 3 March, the Indian government announced the development of a light tank that could better operate at high altitudes and mountainous terrain along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).  The project would also provide a boost to Indian firms as part of the Make in India initiative.  The accompanying excerpted article from the Indian independent think-tank Observer Research Foundation, provides some background to the decision to develop this indigenously and points out some issues that could come up in the process.

According to the article, the proposed tank will be developed under the “Make-I category of the 2020 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP).”  This means the government will fund the development, instead of the defense industry.  The article also points out that China has already developed its Type 15 light tank and deployed it in the high-altitude regions along the LAC.  The author notes that India considered purchasing Russia’s Sprut light tank just after the border clashes with China in May 2020, but officials ultimately decided to develop an indigenous light tank.  He also notes that while building it at home would be beneficial for the domestic defense industry, there “could potentially be a minimum five-year lag before the country witnesses the emergence of the initial variant of a homemade light tank.” 

The author cites the pained development of the Arjun main battle tank, including delays and a lukewarm reception, as an example of the issues that could come up during the development of a new tank.  He also notes the Arjun’s limited deployment only in certain geographic areas as a “reminder of how not to proceed with the development of an indigenous light tank.”  He believes that if India repeats these mistakes with a light tank, it could eventually need to import one at a time when sanctions against Russia make it a risky source of supply.

Source:

Kartik Bommakanti, “Light tanks: A shot in the arm for the Indian Army,” Observer Research Foundation (an independent think tank in India), 21 March 2022.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/light-tanks-a-shot-in-the-arm-for-the-indian-army/

The Modi government on 3 March 2022 announced the development of light tanks for the Indian Army (IA). This decision was taken under the Make-I category of the 2020 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP)…

…the Chinese have designed and developed a dedicated light tank called the Type-15 and deploy them due to their suitability for high altitude warfare against India. The Type-15 weighs 35 tonnes with a 105 mm gun making it significantly lighter than the IA’s T-90, T-72… It is one of the few light tanks built in the last three decades…

Against this backdrop, India had considered acquiring the Russian light tank the Sprut SDM1 following the outbreak of the current Sino-Indian boundary in May 2020. In April 2021, the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces issued a Request for Information (RFI) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for 350 light tanks in the weight class of 25 tonnes. Notwithstanding Russia’s offer, India has now turned to native development of a light tank rather than import them.

…Irrespective of the merits of native development of light tanks, India’s decision-makers have to recognise that there could potentially be a minimum five-year lag before the country witnesses the emergence of the initial variant of a homemade light tank.

…The light tank project cannot be hobbled by past native development of armoured platforms such as the nearly 70 tonne—Arjun MBT…it is an overweight tank and can only be deployed in “pockets” such as the desert areas along the India-Pakistan border…The delayed and lukewarm integration of both variants—Mk1 and Mk1A of the Arjun MBTs by the IA also serves as a reminder of how not to proceed with the development of an indigenous light tank, because it could compel the IA and the government importing light tanks at the cost of an indigenous capability. A heavily-sanctioned Russia in the coming months and years will be a highly risky source of supply…

Azerbaijan and Russia Seek Improved Relations

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Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks.

Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks.

“The parties, taking into account the high level of military-technical cooperation, interact on issues of equipping with modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest.”

Azerbaijan has had a strained relationship with Russia for a number of years, but as the accompanying excerpted article from Azerbaijani semi-independent news agency Trend reports, President Aliyev and President Putin signed an agreement on 22 February 2022 to improve relations.  Several points of the agreement are worth noting, particularly since Aliyev and Putin signed it two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The article includes the text of the agreement, which has over 40 areas of cooperation.  The first and second points state that both sides will respect each other’s internal and foreign affairs, and refrain from interfering in them.  Point number nine states that both governments will continue to make efforts to implement the agreements they signed with Armenia as part of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.  Since then, Azerbaijan has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine as the two sides have had a good bilateral relationship.  Still, Azerbaijan has so far held a neutral position on the war.

Points 12 through 16 pertain to increasing security cooperation in various capacities, particularly numbers 14 and 15, which deal with working together to develop new weapons and equipment.  While it is unknown how much this security cooperation will develop, Russia will likely continue to provide Armenia with new weapons and equipment.  This could be a continuation of previous policy where Russia provided both Armenia and Azerbaijan with equipment as part of an effort to maintain influence with each during their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lastly, point number 25 states that both sides “will refrain from carrying out any economic activity that causes direct or indirect damage to the interests of the other Party.”  The government of Azerbaijan has reportedly suspended flights of its national airline to Russia due to insurance issues, but it has so far not carried out any economic sanctions against Russia as part of its neutral position on the conflict.  Considering the history of Azerbaijan’s strained relations with Russia, it is difficult to determine how much this relationship will develop, but the agreement marks a step closer to better relations at a time when the Russian government faces sanctions and poor relations with a number of countries around the world.

Source:

“Обнародован текст Декларации о союзническом взаимодействии между Россией и Азербайджаном (The published text of the Declaration on Allied Cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan),” Trend (semi-independent news agency in Azerbaijan), 22 February 2022.

https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3559098.html

…As Trend reports on Tuesday with reference to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, the Declaration says: “President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, having comprehensively considered the state and prospects for the development of Russian-Azerbaijani relations…Noting the importance of building a multipolar world based on international law and the central role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, declare the following:

1. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan build their relations on the basis of allied interaction, mutual respect for independence, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state borders of the two countries, as well as adherence to the principles of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force or threat of force.

2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan pursue an independent foreign policy aimed at protecting their national interests.

…

9. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan will continue to contribute in every possible way to efforts to implement the provisions of the statements of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation dated November 9/10, 2020, January 11, 2021 and November 26, 2021, which served as the basis for strengthening stability and security, unblocking all economic and transport ties in the region and for normalizing relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia.

…

12. The Parties shall develop bilateral military-political cooperation that meets national interests and is not directed against third countries.

13. The parties will deepen interaction between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat training activities, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.

14. The parties, taking into account the high level of military-technical cooperation, interact on issues of having modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest.

15. The Parties will intensify efforts to create service centers for maintenance, repair, modernization of weapons and military equipment, as well as to organize joint production of various types of military products.

16. In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military assistance on the basis of the UN Charter, separate international treaties and taking into account the existing international legal obligations of each of the Parties.

…

25. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan will refrain from carrying out any economic activity that causes direct or indirect damage to the interests of the other Party.

Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin-Aliyev_joint_statements_(2022-02-22)_02.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

CSTO Members Respond to Potential Involvement in Ukraine

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Maulen Ashimbayev.

Maulen Ashimbayev.

“The key change is the concept of a “coordinating state”: it must take over leadership of a peacekeeping operation if one is carried out.”

In early January 2022, member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) demonstrated their willingness to carry out a joint peacekeeping operation when the organization deployed units from the Collective Operational Reaction Force to Kazakhstan.  On 3 March 2022, President Vladimir Putin submitted a protocol to Russia’s State Duma to amend the CSTO’s agreement of peacekeeping activities, causing speculation that the CSTO would deploy peacekeepers to Ukraine.  The accompanying excerpted articles provide more context to the possibility of a CSTO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, suggesting that CSTO is not likely get involved.

The accompanying excerpted article from semi-independent Russian daily Kommersant reports on Putin’s submission of the protocol to amend the CSTO’s peacekeeping activities.  The article mentions that the change involves having a “coordinating state” to take “leadership of a peacekeeping operation if one is carried out.”  CSTO officials stated that the “change is not connected to the events in neighboring Ukraine,” but is meant to integrate a CSTO peacekeeping force into the UN and deploy it outside the organization’s area of responsibility.  In the past, the Russian government has tried and failed to obtain an official mandate from the UN to have its peacekeeping forces in the post-Soviet space.  The article from Kazakhstan government-run news agency Kazinform reports on a statement from Maulen Ashimbayev, the Chair of the Senate of Kazakhstan, in response to the possibility of Kazakh peacekeepers deploying to Ukraine.  Ashimbayev states, “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with other documents, Kazakhstan can send our peacekeepers outside the CSTO countries only in accordance with a UN mandate.”  This statement came out the day of Russia’s invasion and prior to any speculation that came with Putin’s proposed change to the amendment. 

The article from the Armenian state news agency Armen Press reports on a statement from Vahagn Aleksanyan, a member of Armenia’s National Assembly, in response to Armenia’s obligations to the CSTO.  He notes, “the CSTO mechanisms are triggered in the event of an attack on one of the CSTO member states.”  In addition, he does not believe the conflict will spread to Russia, which would initiate a response of the CSTO’s article on collective defense.  He does not bring up a peacekeeping operation, but his comments still represent how another CSTO member is responding to potentially getting involved in the war in Ukraine.  If the statements from Kazakh and Armenian officials are any indication, the CSTO is not likely get involved in Ukraine.

Source:

Vladimir Solovyev, “Украина ни при чем (Ukraine has nothing to do with it),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 4 March 2022.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5240328

…Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a protocol on amending the “Agreement on the CSTO peacekeeping activities” to the State Duma for ratification. The key change is the concept of a “coordinating state”: it must take over leadership of a peacekeeping operation if one is carried out…The CSTO said the adoption of the change is not connected to the events in neighboring Ukraine…

…Changes to the “Agreement on peacekeeping activities” were adopted on September 16, 2021 at the CSTO Collective Security Council session in Dushanbe. They are necessary in order for the organization to be able to integrate its peacekeeping potential into the UN peacekeeping mechanism, so that it would be possible to use CSTO peacekeeping outside the organization’s area of ​​responsibility…

Source: Serik Sabekov, “Маулен Ашимбаев ответил на вопрос о направлении миротворцев из Казахстана в зону конфликта между РФ и Украиной (Maulen Ashimbayev answered the question about the deployment of peacekeepers from Kazakhstan to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine),” Kazinform (government-run news agency in Kazakhstan), 24 February 2022.

https://www.inform.kz/ru/maulen-ashimbaev-otvetil-na-vopros-o-napravlenii-mirotvorcev-iz-kazahstana-v-zonu-konflikta-mezhdu-rf-i-ukrainoy_a3903655

The Chair of the Senate of the Republic of Kazakhstan Maulen Ashimbayev commented on the question of the possible deployment of Kazakh peacekeepers to take part in the conflict in Ukraine, Kazinform reports.

“In this situation, we must proceed from the following – Kazakhstan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization – the CSTO. In this regard, the question arises, is it possible to send Kazakh peacekeepers to the conflict?… . In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with other documents, Kazakhstan can send our peacekeepers outside the CSTO countries only in accordance with a UN mandate,” Maulen Ashimbayev said…

The speaker noted that, in accordance with the CSTO charter, peacekeeping forces and troops of the organization’s countries can only be used on the territory of the participating countries…

Source: “Депутаты коснулись вопроса возможности применения механизма ОДКБ в Украине (Deputies raised the issue of the possibility of using the mechanism of the CSTO in Ukraine),” Armen Press (Armenian state news agency), 7 March 2022.

https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1077269.html

The CSTO mechanisms work only in case of an attack on one of the CSTO member states. Vahagn Aleksanyan, a member of the “Civil Contract” faction of the National Assembly, said this, what would Armenia’s position be if Russia, the CSTO partner, offered to implement the CSTO mechanisms…

“It should be noted that the CSTO mechanisms are triggered in the event of an attack on one of the CSTO member states, the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Russia, at least for the moment, I do not consider likely,” Aleksanyan said…

Image Information:

Image: Maulen Ashimbayev.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maulen_Ashimbayev.jpg
Attribution: CC 1.0

India Orders More Domestically Produced Self-Propelled Artillery Systems

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Indian K9 SPH at Ladakh during Indo-China Clashes.

Indian K9 SPH at Ladakh during Indo-China Clashes.

“A large number of these guns will be specially modified with uprated engines to operate in the high altitude cold deserts of Ladakh and Sikkim.”

In August 2020, the Indian government introduced the first of several import ban lists for the armed forces.  These lists included various items that the armed forces must procure from Indian manufacturers as part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” initiative, which Modi introduced in 2014.  Indian officials had hoped the initiative would help the country’s defense industry develop, but it has had limited results in the years since as the Indian armed forces have often looked abroad to acquire various weapons and equipment.  The accompanying excerpted articles report on two recent developments aimed to improve the country’s defense industry and meet operational requirements.

The first article from English-language independent news magazine India Today reports that the Indian government cancelled multiple deals to acquire new systems and that “this decision is being viewed as a strong message to the domestic defence sector.”  The article notes that “many other deals are under review,” including one for a “Russian VSHORAD (very short-range air defence) missile system for the Army.”  The article also mentions that this decision came after a review meeting last year, during which officials believed additional measures needed to be taken to better fulfill the “Make in India” initiative.

The second article from India Today reports that India’s defense ministry is preparing to “place a repeat order of 200 more 155mm tracked self-propelled howitzers” and that it is the “largest order placed with an Indian private sector defence firm.”  The article notes that the defense ministry previously purchased 100 K-9 Vajras and put these into service “with the Indian army’s three strike corps ranged across the plains of the Punjab and the semi-deserts of Rajasthan.”  It also mentions that the Indian Army deployed a few K-9s into Ladakh last year as part of a trial and that the systems are designed to operate in mountainous terrain with a harsh climate. 

Overall, it is unclear what domestic substitutes Indian officials will look for in response to the cancelled deals.  The order for more K-9s is not mentioned as a replacement for a cancelled deal, though it will provide India’s defense industry with a boost and the systems can operate on the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.  The reports show how Indian officials are now pushing harder to improve the country’s defense industry.

Source:

Manjeet Negi, “Govt cancels chopper, missile import deals under ‘Make in India’ push,” India Today (English-language independent news magazine), 14 January 2022.

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/govt-cancels-chopper-missile-import-deals-under-make-in-india-push-1900263-2022-01-14

The central government has cancelled multiple deals for the purchase of short-range Surface-to-Air missiles and a tender for the purchase of 14 choppers for the Indian Coast Guard. This decision is being viewed as a strong message to the domestic defence sector.

A decision in this regard was taken during a meeting of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in New Delhi on Friday…Many other deals are under review, including the purchase of six more P-8I surveillance aircraft and Klub anti-ship cruise missiles for the Navy and Russian VSHORAD (very short-range air defence) missile system for the Army.

The initiative came after PM Modi chaired a review meeting with officials of the Ministry of Defence last year…Officials who attended the meeting last year felt that strong measures need to be taken to ensure that the country moves firmly towards Aatmanirbhar Bharat in the defence sector…

Source: Sandeep Unnithan, “What’s behind a massive order for Made-in-India howitzers,” India Today (English-language independent news magazine), 23 January 2022.

https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/what-s-behind-a-massive-order-for-made-in-india-howitzers-1903375-2022-01-23

The defence ministry has begun moving files to place a repeat order of 200 more 155mm tracked self-propelled howitzers worth over Rs 10,000 crore.

This significant order, to be placed with Larsen & Toubro (L&T) sometime this year, is the largest order placed with an Indian private sector defence firm and is a potential booster dose for the government’s plan to modernise the military, create an industrial defence base and reduce defence imports.

… L&T had delivered 100 K-9 Vajras for Rs 4,500 crore in partnership with South Korean defence firm Hanwha Defense. The contract was signed in May 2017 and the 100th gun delivered to the army on February 2021…

… A new order, which could be placed by this year, will see the guns start to roll out of Hazira by 2023 with all deliveries completed before 2028… The army’s five existing regiments of Vajras (each regiment has 18 guns, not counting the two in reserve) were acquired not for the mountains, but to operate with the Indian army’s three strike corps ranged across the plains of the Punjab and the semi-deserts of Rajasthan.

… Late last year, three K9s were moved up into eastern Ladakh on a trial basis. A senior artillery officer in the Udhampur-based Northern command was a key mover behind this unusual deployment. The guns drove up from Leh to the forward areas of eastern Ladakh on their own power (instead of a tank transporter-trailer), demonstrating their ability to operate independently…

What seemed to have been forgotten was that these guns had been originally designed to operate in South Korea, a rugged mountainous country with a hostile neighbor and with climatic conditions that could mimic those of eastern Ladakh…

Image Information:

Image: Indian K9 SPH at Ladakh during Indo-China Clashes.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Indian_K9_SPH_at_Ladakh_during_Indo-China_Clashes_.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY SA 4.0

Armenia Acquires Russian Helicopters as Part of Armed Forces Modernization

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Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.

Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.

“The air force received the four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in an assault configuration…”

A few months after the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, which resulted in significant Armenian losses, the Armenian government announced it would modernize the country’s armed forces.  At the August 2021 Russian-sponsored International Military-Technical Forum “Army-2021” in Moscow, Armenian Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan stated that he was looking to acquire modern weapons and equipment from Russia and noted a need for unmanned aerial systems (UAS).  While Karapetyan did not announce any acquisitions made during the forum, the accompanying excerpted article reports on the recent delivery of Russian helicopters to Armenia and provides a look at one area where Armenian officials are modernizing the country’s armed forces.

The article from independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that the Armenian Air Force received four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in January.  The article notes this variant of the Mi-8 helicopter can conduct a variety of tasks and referenced Karapetyan’s statement from last year.  The Armenian Air Force reportedly has 11 Mi-8MTVs already in service, though they are older variants and less versatile than the Mi-8MTV-5.  Overall, the helicopters are not as significant as the Armenian acquisitions of the Iskander ballistic missile system or the Su-30SM multirole fighters before the 2020 war; however, the helicopters mark an acquisition that took place during the modernization of the Armenian Armed Forces and will play a role in this.  It also illustrates how Russia continues to be one of the main providers of military equipment for Armenia.

Source:

“Армянская армия пополнилась боевыми вертолëтами (The Armenian army is being reinforced with combat helicopters),” Eurasia Daily (independent Russian-language news website), 25 January 2022.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/01/25/armyanskaya-armiya-popolnilas-boevymi-vertoletami

The Armenian Air Force received new multipurpose helicopters on 25 January, reports the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia…

It is noted that the helicopters that entered service are designed to perform landing, fire support, transport, and medical tasks… The air force the received four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in an assault configuration…

Armenia will take practical steps to increase military-technical cooperation with Russia, then Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan said in an interview on 24 August 2021. Yerevan, as part of an ongoing modernization of the Armenian Army after the war in Karabakh, plans to purchase only modern weapons, Karapetyan said…

Image Information:

Image: Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mil_Mi-17-V5_(Mi-8MTV-5),_Russia_-_Air_Force_AN1905918.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 3.0

Service Rifles and Fighter Jets: Pakistan’s Defense Acquisition Priorities

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A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.

A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.

“For the first time, Pakistan Air Force will introduce J10 C fighter jets during the fly past in collaboration with China and these fighter airplanes are an answer to Rafale jets…”

In late 2015 Pakistan announced it would conduct trials to find a new infantry rifle as the country’s army sought to phase out the Heckler & Koch G3.  After a few years of testing, the government did not select a rifle from bids of several well-known companies and instead looked to the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) for a potential replacement (See: “A New Domestically Produced Service Rifle in Pakistan?” OE Watch, December 2019).  While Pakistan’s Army has yet to acquire a new service rifle, the accompanying excerpted articles report on a possible replacement for the G3 and other defense acquisition priorities.

The article from Pakistani defense focused news website Quwa.org reports on the POF’s introduction of the BW20 and BW21.  The article notes that the POF is “pitching the BW20” as the next-generation rifle and that the cost of it could be lower due to “existing production infrastructure” for the G3.  It also notes that BW20 “has some commonality with the G3,” though it is considered a new rifle and not an upgrade.  The article also mentions that Pakistan’s Army “did not select any of the 7.62×51 mm designs for local adoption” and that one reason for not selecting a new rifle was that “the added improvement they offered may not have justified the total cost of adopting and locally manufacturing a foreign design.”  While the cost of the BW20 and BW21 might be lower than purchasing a foreign rifle, it could still be some time until it is in a position to become the standard service rifle in Pakistan’s Army.

The article from independent Pakistani English-language newspaper Dawn reports on the country’s recent acquisition of J-10 multirole fighters from China.  The article mentions the new fighters, but only in reference to them appearing as part of a fly over during Pakistan Day ceremonies on 23 March 2021.  Pakistan did not make a widely publicized announcement of the acquisition of a reported two dozen J-10s, which are estimated to cost $28 million each.  Dawn quoted the country’s Interior Minister as saying that the J-10s are an answer to India’s 2021 purchase of Rafale jets from France.

Source:

“Pakistan Reveals New Rifles – POF BW20 and POF BW21,” Quwa.org (news website focusing on defense issues in Pakistan), 19 December 2021. https://quwa.org/2021/12/19/pakistan-reveals-new-rifles-pof-bw20-and-pof-bw21-2/

Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) took the shrouds off its new in-house, original rifle projects – the BW20 and BW21. The POF BW20 and BW21 are chambered for 7.62×51 mm rounds.

…It seems that POF is pitching the BW20 for the PA’s next-generation rifle requirements…the BW20 is a new rifle design that delivers cost savings by re-leveraging POF’s existing production infrastructure, which is geared for the HK G3.

Though the BW20 has some commonality with the G3 (around 30%), the BW20 is not an upgrade of the HK G3. It is a new rifle…

In 2015, the Pakistan Army issued a tender for a new-generation assault rifle. It had tested many designs from all over the world, including the FN SCAR, Beretta ARX-200, CZ BREN, AK-103 and others. In the end, however, the Army did not select any of the 7.62×51 mm designs for local adoption…

Ultimately, it seems that POF was given the greenlight to design an original rifle. Part of the reason seems to stem from a sense that none of the foreign designs substantially improved upon the G3 in terms of its accuracy and durability. This is not to say the other rifles were not good, but the added improvement they offered may not have justified the total cost of adopting and locally manufacturing a foreign design…

Source: Aamir Yasin, “Every party seeks patronage of establishment, says minister,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper from Pakistan), 30 December 2021.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1666604

Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed on Wednesday said every party and politician wanted to be patronised by the establishment, terming the debate on the return of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) supremo Nawaz Sharif useless…

“It does not matter whether he comes or not; it will not make any difference to the government,” he said, adding it was strange that people who spent most of their lives in this country eventually left it instead of loving it…The minister reiterated his offer of a one-way ticket to Pakistan for Nawaz Sharif.

Talking about the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of opposition parties, the minister said he wanted the alliance to move the date of its protest from March 23 to the 30th as it coincided with Pakistan Day celebrations.

“For the first time, Pakistan Air Force will introduce J10 C fighter jets during the fly past in collaboration with China and these fighter airplanes are an answer to Rafale jets,” Mr Ahmed said…

Image Information:

Image: A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chengdu_J-10#/media/File:J-10B_with_PL-10_and_PL-12.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

The Collective Security Treaty Organization Demonstrates Its “Peacekeeping” Capabilities

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CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.

CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.

“The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…”

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an intergovernmental military alliance of select post-Soviet states, made history on 6 January 2022, when the organization’s leadership agreed to a request from the government of Kazakhstan to deploy peacekeepers to support Kazakh security forces after a few days of civil unrest across the country.  This marked the first time the CSTO sent units from its Collective Operational Reaction Force and demonstrated how the organization can respond to an incident on short notice.

According to the excerpted article in semi-independent Russian daily newspaper Kommersant, the CSTO Security Council agreed to Kazakhstan’s request for peacekeepers based on Article 4 of the organization’s treaty.  The article notes that this section of the treaty provides for a collective response in the event of a threat to the “security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty” of a member state.  It also points out “the authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, but did not say by who.”  The article mentions how previous requests to the CSTO for military support, in 2010 by Kyrgyzstan and in 2021 by Armenia, were not granted.  The CSTO did not respond to Kyrgyzstan with military support in 2010 because its articles at the time did not allow a response to an internal security issue.  After the 2010 unrest, CSTO member states changed the articles to allow the collective forces to be used to respond to an internal security threat of a member state.  The lack of a response to Armenia in 2021 is notable as it involved clashes with Azerbaijan, an external threat to Armenian security, but the CSTO had not previously provided the Armenian government support for its conflict with Azerbaijan and stated the 2021 clashes were a border incident, which essentially did not require an actionable response.

The article from Central Asia-focusedindependent news website Fergana Agency reports on the units deployed and breaks down contributions from member states.  The majority of these came from Russia, including companies of the 31st Airborne Brigade, 98th Airborne Division, and the 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade.  A company of the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade from Belarus, soldiers of the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade from Kyrgyzstan, as well as special forces units from Armenia and Tajikistan also deployed.  The units in this peacekeeping force closely match the units that conduct annual joint military exercises of the CSTO’s collective forces.  The article also notes that the peacekeeping force tasks included protecting key infrastructure and airfields and that “the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies.”  This included Russian forces at Almaty’s international airport.  While the CSTO peacekeeping forces reportedly began withdrawing on 13 January, the deployment demonstrated the capabilities of the CSTO to respond to an incident involving a member state.

Source:

Kiril Krivosheev, Yelena Chernenko, Yuri Barsukov, and Arshaluis Mgdesyan, “ОДКБ спешит на помощь (The CSTO is hurrying to help),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 6 January 2022.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5156017

…Around midnight (on 5 January), President Tokayev held a meeting of the Security Council, at which he announced a “counter-terrorist operation.” “The groups are, in fact, international, which have taken part in serious training abroad and their attack on Kazakhstan should be regarded as an act of aggression,” President Tokayev explained. “In this regard, today, I turned to the CSTO heads of state to assist Kazakhstan in overcoming this terrorist threat.”…

A confirming response to this request was sent overnight. The statement was, ironically, made by a politician who himself unsuccessfully sent a similar request not long ago, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, who is the current head of the CSTO Collective Security Council…

the Council made a decision in accordance with Article 4 of the treaty…It involves collective assistance, including military, if “one of the participating states is subjected to aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty).”…The authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, by did not say by who…

It is unknown how long the peacekeeping mission will last…It should be noted that the CSTO collective forces are being used for the first time. In 2010, authorities in Kyrgyzstan asked for a deployment of the organization’s forces (against the backdrop of interethnic conflict in the south) as well as in 2021, when authorities of Armenia requested it (against the backdrop of an armed confrontation with Azerbaijan). However, these requests were not granted…

Source: Alexander Rybin, “Охранники инфраструктуры с боевым опытом (The guards of infrastructure with combat experience),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 7 January 2022.

https://fergana.agency/articles/124563/

On the night of 6-7 January, the first units of the Russian Airborne Forces arrived in Almaty and took control of the airport of the largest city in Kazakhstan…The total number of the peacekeeping force in Kazakhstan should stand around 2500. This includes a company from Belarus (around 150-200), 200 from Tajikistan, 150 from Kyrgyzstan and another 100 from Armenia. The remainder are from the Russian Army.

All of the Russian units in Kazakhstan have previously been involved with military operations in the post-Soviet period.

The 31st Airborne Brigade, which is permanently garrisoned in Ulyanovsk, took part in the Second Chechen campaign and the war in South Ossetia in 2008…Since 2013, the 31st has been part of the Rapid Reaction Forces.

The 98th Airborne Division is located in Ivanovo. This unit has experience in participating in peacekeeping missions – in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, in Georgia-Abhazia in 1998 and in Kosovo in 1999…The 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade of the Airborne Forces is one of the most elite units in the Russian Army…

A peacekeeping company from the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade deployed from Belarus…Kyrgyzstan sent 150 soldiers from the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade to Kazakhstan…It is still unknown which units Tajikistan and Armenia deployed, but, according to local media, they are special forces…

As stated by the ministries of the CSTO governments, which agreed to take part in the peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan, the military personnel will carry out task to protect key infrastructure and airfields. The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…

Image Information:

Image: CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CSTO_collective_peacekeeping_forces_in_Kazakhstan_2022-JAN-11,_Kyrgyzstan_soldier_in_Almaty_Power_Station-2.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0