Author Archives: Matthew Stein

India Begins Development of a Light Tank

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“India had considered acquiring the Russian light tank the Sprut SDM1 following the outbreak of the current Sino-Indian boundary in May 2020.”

On 3 March, the Indian government announced the development of a light tank that could better operate at high altitudes and mountainous terrain along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).  The project would also provide a boost to Indian firms as part of the Make in India initiative.  The accompanying excerpted article from the Indian independent think-tank Observer Research Foundation, provides some background to the decision to develop this indigenously and points out some issues that could come up in the process.

According to the article, the proposed tank will be developed under the “Make-I category of the 2020 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP).”  This means the government will fund the development, instead of the defense industry.  The article also points out that China has already developed its Type 15 light tank and deployed it in the high-altitude regions along the LAC.  The author notes that India considered purchasing Russia’s Sprut light tank just after the border clashes with China in May 2020, but officials ultimately decided to develop an indigenous light tank.  He also notes that while building it at home would be beneficial for the domestic defense industry, there “could potentially be a minimum five-year lag before the country witnesses the emergence of the initial variant of a homemade light tank.” 

The author cites the pained development of the Arjun main battle tank, including delays and a lukewarm reception, as an example of the issues that could come up during the development of a new tank.  He also notes the Arjun’s limited deployment only in certain geographic areas as a “reminder of how not to proceed with the development of an indigenous light tank.”  He believes that if India repeats these mistakes with a light tank, it could eventually need to import one at a time when sanctions against Russia make it a risky source of supply.

Source:

Kartik Bommakanti, “Light tanks: A shot in the arm for the Indian Army,” Observer Research Foundation (an independent think tank in India), 21 March 2022.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/light-tanks-a-shot-in-the-arm-for-the-indian-army/

The Modi government on 3 March 2022 announced the development of light tanks for the Indian Army (IA). This decision was taken under the Make-I category of the 2020 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP)…

…the Chinese have designed and developed a dedicated light tank called the Type-15 and deploy them due to their suitability for high altitude warfare against India. The Type-15 weighs 35 tonnes with a 105 mm gun making it significantly lighter than the IA’s T-90, T-72… It is one of the few light tanks built in the last three decades…

Against this backdrop, India had considered acquiring the Russian light tank the Sprut SDM1 following the outbreak of the current Sino-Indian boundary in May 2020. In April 2021, the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces issued a Request for Information (RFI) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for 350 light tanks in the weight class of 25 tonnes. Notwithstanding Russia’s offer, India has now turned to native development of a light tank rather than import them.

…Irrespective of the merits of native development of light tanks, India’s decision-makers have to recognise that there could potentially be a minimum five-year lag before the country witnesses the emergence of the initial variant of a homemade light tank.

…The light tank project cannot be hobbled by past native development of armoured platforms such as the nearly 70 tonne—Arjun MBT…it is an overweight tank and can only be deployed in “pockets” such as the desert areas along the India-Pakistan border…The delayed and lukewarm integration of both variants—Mk1 and Mk1A of the Arjun MBTs by the IA also serves as a reminder of how not to proceed with the development of an indigenous light tank, because it could compel the IA and the government importing light tanks at the cost of an indigenous capability. A heavily-sanctioned Russia in the coming months and years will be a highly risky source of supply…

Azerbaijan and Russia Seek Improved Relations

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Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks.

Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks.

“The parties, taking into account the high level of military-technical cooperation, interact on issues of equipping with modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest.”

Azerbaijan has had a strained relationship with Russia for a number of years, but as the accompanying excerpted article from Azerbaijani semi-independent news agency Trend reports, President Aliyev and President Putin signed an agreement on 22 February 2022 to improve relations.  Several points of the agreement are worth noting, particularly since Aliyev and Putin signed it two days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The article includes the text of the agreement, which has over 40 areas of cooperation.  The first and second points state that both sides will respect each other’s internal and foreign affairs, and refrain from interfering in them.  Point number nine states that both governments will continue to make efforts to implement the agreements they signed with Armenia as part of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.  Since then, Azerbaijan has provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine as the two sides have had a good bilateral relationship.  Still, Azerbaijan has so far held a neutral position on the war.

Points 12 through 16 pertain to increasing security cooperation in various capacities, particularly numbers 14 and 15, which deal with working together to develop new weapons and equipment.  While it is unknown how much this security cooperation will develop, Russia will likely continue to provide Armenia with new weapons and equipment.  This could be a continuation of previous policy where Russia provided both Armenia and Azerbaijan with equipment as part of an effort to maintain influence with each during their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lastly, point number 25 states that both sides “will refrain from carrying out any economic activity that causes direct or indirect damage to the interests of the other Party.”  The government of Azerbaijan has reportedly suspended flights of its national airline to Russia due to insurance issues, but it has so far not carried out any economic sanctions against Russia as part of its neutral position on the conflict.  Considering the history of Azerbaijan’s strained relations with Russia, it is difficult to determine how much this relationship will develop, but the agreement marks a step closer to better relations at a time when the Russian government faces sanctions and poor relations with a number of countries around the world.

Source:

“Обнародован текст Декларации о союзническом взаимодействии между Россией и Азербайджаном (The published text of the Declaration on Allied Cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan),” Trend (semi-independent news agency in Azerbaijan), 22 February 2022.

https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3559098.html

…As Trend reports on Tuesday with reference to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, the Declaration says: “President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, having comprehensively considered the state and prospects for the development of Russian-Azerbaijani relations…Noting the importance of building a multipolar world based on international law and the central role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, declare the following:

1. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan build their relations on the basis of allied interaction, mutual respect for independence, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state borders of the two countries, as well as adherence to the principles of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force or threat of force.

2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan pursue an independent foreign policy aimed at protecting their national interests.

…

9. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan will continue to contribute in every possible way to efforts to implement the provisions of the statements of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation dated November 9/10, 2020, January 11, 2021 and November 26, 2021, which served as the basis for strengthening stability and security, unblocking all economic and transport ties in the region and for normalizing relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia.

…

12. The Parties shall develop bilateral military-political cooperation that meets national interests and is not directed against third countries.

13. The parties will deepen interaction between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat training activities, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.

14. The parties, taking into account the high level of military-technical cooperation, interact on issues of having modern weapons and military equipment, as well as in other areas in this area of ​​mutual interest.

15. The Parties will intensify efforts to create service centers for maintenance, repair, modernization of weapons and military equipment, as well as to organize joint production of various types of military products.

16. In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military assistance on the basis of the UN Charter, separate international treaties and taking into account the existing international legal obligations of each of the Parties.

…

25. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan will refrain from carrying out any economic activity that causes direct or indirect damage to the interests of the other Party.

Image Information:

Image: Vladimir Putin and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made statements for the press following Russian-Azerbaijani talks
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Putin-Aliyev_joint_statements_(2022-02-22)_02.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

CSTO Members Respond to Potential Involvement in Ukraine

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Maulen Ashimbayev.

Maulen Ashimbayev.

“The key change is the concept of a “coordinating state”: it must take over leadership of a peacekeeping operation if one is carried out.”

In early January 2022, member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) demonstrated their willingness to carry out a joint peacekeeping operation when the organization deployed units from the Collective Operational Reaction Force to Kazakhstan.  On 3 March 2022, President Vladimir Putin submitted a protocol to Russia’s State Duma to amend the CSTO’s agreement of peacekeeping activities, causing speculation that the CSTO would deploy peacekeepers to Ukraine.  The accompanying excerpted articles provide more context to the possibility of a CSTO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, suggesting that CSTO is not likely get involved.

The accompanying excerpted article from semi-independent Russian daily Kommersant reports on Putin’s submission of the protocol to amend the CSTO’s peacekeeping activities.  The article mentions that the change involves having a “coordinating state” to take “leadership of a peacekeeping operation if one is carried out.”  CSTO officials stated that the “change is not connected to the events in neighboring Ukraine,” but is meant to integrate a CSTO peacekeeping force into the UN and deploy it outside the organization’s area of responsibility.  In the past, the Russian government has tried and failed to obtain an official mandate from the UN to have its peacekeeping forces in the post-Soviet space.  The article from Kazakhstan government-run news agency Kazinform reports on a statement from Maulen Ashimbayev, the Chair of the Senate of Kazakhstan, in response to the possibility of Kazakh peacekeepers deploying to Ukraine.  Ashimbayev states, “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with other documents, Kazakhstan can send our peacekeepers outside the CSTO countries only in accordance with a UN mandate.”  This statement came out the day of Russia’s invasion and prior to any speculation that came with Putin’s proposed change to the amendment. 

The article from the Armenian state news agency Armen Press reports on a statement from Vahagn Aleksanyan, a member of Armenia’s National Assembly, in response to Armenia’s obligations to the CSTO.  He notes, “the CSTO mechanisms are triggered in the event of an attack on one of the CSTO member states.”  In addition, he does not believe the conflict will spread to Russia, which would initiate a response of the CSTO’s article on collective defense.  He does not bring up a peacekeeping operation, but his comments still represent how another CSTO member is responding to potentially getting involved in the war in Ukraine.  If the statements from Kazakh and Armenian officials are any indication, the CSTO is not likely get involved in Ukraine.

Source:

Vladimir Solovyev, “Украина ни при чем (Ukraine has nothing to do with it),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 4 March 2022.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5240328

…Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a protocol on amending the “Agreement on the CSTO peacekeeping activities” to the State Duma for ratification. The key change is the concept of a “coordinating state”: it must take over leadership of a peacekeeping operation if one is carried out…The CSTO said the adoption of the change is not connected to the events in neighboring Ukraine…

…Changes to the “Agreement on peacekeeping activities” were adopted on September 16, 2021 at the CSTO Collective Security Council session in Dushanbe. They are necessary in order for the organization to be able to integrate its peacekeeping potential into the UN peacekeeping mechanism, so that it would be possible to use CSTO peacekeeping outside the organization’s area of ​​responsibility…

Source: Serik Sabekov, “Маулен Ашимбаев ответил на вопрос о направлении миротворцев из Казахстана в зону конфликта между РФ и Украиной (Maulen Ashimbayev answered the question about the deployment of peacekeepers from Kazakhstan to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine),” Kazinform (government-run news agency in Kazakhstan), 24 February 2022.

https://www.inform.kz/ru/maulen-ashimbaev-otvetil-na-vopros-o-napravlenii-mirotvorcev-iz-kazahstana-v-zonu-konflikta-mezhdu-rf-i-ukrainoy_a3903655

The Chair of the Senate of the Republic of Kazakhstan Maulen Ashimbayev commented on the question of the possible deployment of Kazakh peacekeepers to take part in the conflict in Ukraine, Kazinform reports.

“In this situation, we must proceed from the following – Kazakhstan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization – the CSTO. In this regard, the question arises, is it possible to send Kazakh peacekeepers to the conflict?… . In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with other documents, Kazakhstan can send our peacekeepers outside the CSTO countries only in accordance with a UN mandate,” Maulen Ashimbayev said…

The speaker noted that, in accordance with the CSTO charter, peacekeeping forces and troops of the organization’s countries can only be used on the territory of the participating countries…

Source: “Депутаты коснулись вопроса возможности применения механизма ОДКБ в Украине (Deputies raised the issue of the possibility of using the mechanism of the CSTO in Ukraine),” Armen Press (Armenian state news agency), 7 March 2022.

https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1077269.html

The CSTO mechanisms work only in case of an attack on one of the CSTO member states. Vahagn Aleksanyan, a member of the “Civil Contract” faction of the National Assembly, said this, what would Armenia’s position be if Russia, the CSTO partner, offered to implement the CSTO mechanisms…

“It should be noted that the CSTO mechanisms are triggered in the event of an attack on one of the CSTO member states, the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Russia, at least for the moment, I do not consider likely,” Aleksanyan said…

Image Information:

Image: Maulen Ashimbayev.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maulen_Ashimbayev.jpg
Attribution: CC 1.0

India Orders More Domestically Produced Self-Propelled Artillery Systems

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Indian K9 SPH at Ladakh during Indo-China Clashes.

Indian K9 SPH at Ladakh during Indo-China Clashes.

“A large number of these guns will be specially modified with uprated engines to operate in the high altitude cold deserts of Ladakh and Sikkim.”

In August 2020, the Indian government introduced the first of several import ban lists for the armed forces.  These lists included various items that the armed forces must procure from Indian manufacturers as part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” initiative, which Modi introduced in 2014.  Indian officials had hoped the initiative would help the country’s defense industry develop, but it has had limited results in the years since as the Indian armed forces have often looked abroad to acquire various weapons and equipment.  The accompanying excerpted articles report on two recent developments aimed to improve the country’s defense industry and meet operational requirements.

The first article from English-language independent news magazine India Today reports that the Indian government cancelled multiple deals to acquire new systems and that “this decision is being viewed as a strong message to the domestic defence sector.”  The article notes that “many other deals are under review,” including one for a “Russian VSHORAD (very short-range air defence) missile system for the Army.”  The article also mentions that this decision came after a review meeting last year, during which officials believed additional measures needed to be taken to better fulfill the “Make in India” initiative.

The second article from India Today reports that India’s defense ministry is preparing to “place a repeat order of 200 more 155mm tracked self-propelled howitzers” and that it is the “largest order placed with an Indian private sector defence firm.”  The article notes that the defense ministry previously purchased 100 K-9 Vajras and put these into service “with the Indian army’s three strike corps ranged across the plains of the Punjab and the semi-deserts of Rajasthan.”  It also mentions that the Indian Army deployed a few K-9s into Ladakh last year as part of a trial and that the systems are designed to operate in mountainous terrain with a harsh climate. 

Overall, it is unclear what domestic substitutes Indian officials will look for in response to the cancelled deals.  The order for more K-9s is not mentioned as a replacement for a cancelled deal, though it will provide India’s defense industry with a boost and the systems can operate on the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.  The reports show how Indian officials are now pushing harder to improve the country’s defense industry.

Source:

Manjeet Negi, “Govt cancels chopper, missile import deals under ‘Make in India’ push,” India Today (English-language independent news magazine), 14 January 2022.

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/govt-cancels-chopper-missile-import-deals-under-make-in-india-push-1900263-2022-01-14

The central government has cancelled multiple deals for the purchase of short-range Surface-to-Air missiles and a tender for the purchase of 14 choppers for the Indian Coast Guard. This decision is being viewed as a strong message to the domestic defence sector.

A decision in this regard was taken during a meeting of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in New Delhi on Friday…Many other deals are under review, including the purchase of six more P-8I surveillance aircraft and Klub anti-ship cruise missiles for the Navy and Russian VSHORAD (very short-range air defence) missile system for the Army.

The initiative came after PM Modi chaired a review meeting with officials of the Ministry of Defence last year…Officials who attended the meeting last year felt that strong measures need to be taken to ensure that the country moves firmly towards Aatmanirbhar Bharat in the defence sector…

Source: Sandeep Unnithan, “What’s behind a massive order for Made-in-India howitzers,” India Today (English-language independent news magazine), 23 January 2022.

https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/what-s-behind-a-massive-order-for-made-in-india-howitzers-1903375-2022-01-23

The defence ministry has begun moving files to place a repeat order of 200 more 155mm tracked self-propelled howitzers worth over Rs 10,000 crore.

This significant order, to be placed with Larsen & Toubro (L&T) sometime this year, is the largest order placed with an Indian private sector defence firm and is a potential booster dose for the government’s plan to modernise the military, create an industrial defence base and reduce defence imports.

… L&T had delivered 100 K-9 Vajras for Rs 4,500 crore in partnership with South Korean defence firm Hanwha Defense. The contract was signed in May 2017 and the 100th gun delivered to the army on February 2021…

… A new order, which could be placed by this year, will see the guns start to roll out of Hazira by 2023 with all deliveries completed before 2028… The army’s five existing regiments of Vajras (each regiment has 18 guns, not counting the two in reserve) were acquired not for the mountains, but to operate with the Indian army’s three strike corps ranged across the plains of the Punjab and the semi-deserts of Rajasthan.

… Late last year, three K9s were moved up into eastern Ladakh on a trial basis. A senior artillery officer in the Udhampur-based Northern command was a key mover behind this unusual deployment. The guns drove up from Leh to the forward areas of eastern Ladakh on their own power (instead of a tank transporter-trailer), demonstrating their ability to operate independently…

What seemed to have been forgotten was that these guns had been originally designed to operate in South Korea, a rugged mountainous country with a hostile neighbor and with climatic conditions that could mimic those of eastern Ladakh…

Image Information:

Image: Indian K9 SPH at Ladakh during Indo-China Clashes.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Indian_K9_SPH_at_Ladakh_during_Indo-China_Clashes_.jpg 
Attribution: CC BY SA 4.0

Armenia Acquires Russian Helicopters as Part of Armed Forces Modernization

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Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.

Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.

“The air force received the four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in an assault configuration…”

A few months after the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, which resulted in significant Armenian losses, the Armenian government announced it would modernize the country’s armed forces.  At the August 2021 Russian-sponsored International Military-Technical Forum “Army-2021” in Moscow, Armenian Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan stated that he was looking to acquire modern weapons and equipment from Russia and noted a need for unmanned aerial systems (UAS).  While Karapetyan did not announce any acquisitions made during the forum, the accompanying excerpted article reports on the recent delivery of Russian helicopters to Armenia and provides a look at one area where Armenian officials are modernizing the country’s armed forces.

The article from independent Russian-language news website Eurasia Daily reports that the Armenian Air Force received four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in January.  The article notes this variant of the Mi-8 helicopter can conduct a variety of tasks and referenced Karapetyan’s statement from last year.  The Armenian Air Force reportedly has 11 Mi-8MTVs already in service, though they are older variants and less versatile than the Mi-8MTV-5.  Overall, the helicopters are not as significant as the Armenian acquisitions of the Iskander ballistic missile system or the Su-30SM multirole fighters before the 2020 war; however, the helicopters mark an acquisition that took place during the modernization of the Armenian Armed Forces and will play a role in this.  It also illustrates how Russia continues to be one of the main providers of military equipment for Armenia.

Source:

“Армянская армия пополнилась боевыми вертолëтами (The Armenian army is being reinforced with combat helicopters),” Eurasia Daily (independent Russian-language news website), 25 January 2022.

https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/01/25/armyanskaya-armiya-popolnilas-boevymi-vertoletami

The Armenian Air Force received new multipurpose helicopters on 25 January, reports the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia…

It is noted that the helicopters that entered service are designed to perform landing, fire support, transport, and medical tasks… The air force the received four Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters in an assault configuration…

Armenia will take practical steps to increase military-technical cooperation with Russia, then Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan said in an interview on 24 August 2021. Yerevan, as part of an ongoing modernization of the Armenian Army after the war in Karabakh, plans to purchase only modern weapons, Karapetyan said…

Image Information:

Image: Russian Air Force Mi-8MTV-5.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mil_Mi-17-V5_(Mi-8MTV-5),_Russia_-_Air_Force_AN1905918.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 3.0

Service Rifles and Fighter Jets: Pakistan’s Defense Acquisition Priorities

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A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.

A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.

“For the first time, Pakistan Air Force will introduce J10 C fighter jets during the fly past in collaboration with China and these fighter airplanes are an answer to Rafale jets…”

In late 2015 Pakistan announced it would conduct trials to find a new infantry rifle as the country’s army sought to phase out the Heckler & Koch G3.  After a few years of testing, the government did not select a rifle from bids of several well-known companies and instead looked to the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) for a potential replacement (See: “A New Domestically Produced Service Rifle in Pakistan?” OE Watch, December 2019).  While Pakistan’s Army has yet to acquire a new service rifle, the accompanying excerpted articles report on a possible replacement for the G3 and other defense acquisition priorities.

The article from Pakistani defense focused news website Quwa.org reports on the POF’s introduction of the BW20 and BW21.  The article notes that the POF is “pitching the BW20” as the next-generation rifle and that the cost of it could be lower due to “existing production infrastructure” for the G3.  It also notes that BW20 “has some commonality with the G3,” though it is considered a new rifle and not an upgrade.  The article also mentions that Pakistan’s Army “did not select any of the 7.62×51 mm designs for local adoption” and that one reason for not selecting a new rifle was that “the added improvement they offered may not have justified the total cost of adopting and locally manufacturing a foreign design.”  While the cost of the BW20 and BW21 might be lower than purchasing a foreign rifle, it could still be some time until it is in a position to become the standard service rifle in Pakistan’s Army.

The article from independent Pakistani English-language newspaper Dawn reports on the country’s recent acquisition of J-10 multirole fighters from China.  The article mentions the new fighters, but only in reference to them appearing as part of a fly over during Pakistan Day ceremonies on 23 March 2021.  Pakistan did not make a widely publicized announcement of the acquisition of a reported two dozen J-10s, which are estimated to cost $28 million each.  Dawn quoted the country’s Interior Minister as saying that the J-10s are an answer to India’s 2021 purchase of Rafale jets from France.

Source:

“Pakistan Reveals New Rifles – POF BW20 and POF BW21,” Quwa.org (news website focusing on defense issues in Pakistan), 19 December 2021. https://quwa.org/2021/12/19/pakistan-reveals-new-rifles-pof-bw20-and-pof-bw21-2/

Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) took the shrouds off its new in-house, original rifle projects – the BW20 and BW21. The POF BW20 and BW21 are chambered for 7.62×51 mm rounds.

…It seems that POF is pitching the BW20 for the PA’s next-generation rifle requirements…the BW20 is a new rifle design that delivers cost savings by re-leveraging POF’s existing production infrastructure, which is geared for the HK G3.

Though the BW20 has some commonality with the G3 (around 30%), the BW20 is not an upgrade of the HK G3. It is a new rifle…

In 2015, the Pakistan Army issued a tender for a new-generation assault rifle. It had tested many designs from all over the world, including the FN SCAR, Beretta ARX-200, CZ BREN, AK-103 and others. In the end, however, the Army did not select any of the 7.62×51 mm designs for local adoption…

Ultimately, it seems that POF was given the greenlight to design an original rifle. Part of the reason seems to stem from a sense that none of the foreign designs substantially improved upon the G3 in terms of its accuracy and durability. This is not to say the other rifles were not good, but the added improvement they offered may not have justified the total cost of adopting and locally manufacturing a foreign design…

Source: Aamir Yasin, “Every party seeks patronage of establishment, says minister,” Dawn (independent English-language newspaper from Pakistan), 30 December 2021.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1666604

Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed on Wednesday said every party and politician wanted to be patronised by the establishment, terming the debate on the return of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) supremo Nawaz Sharif useless…

“It does not matter whether he comes or not; it will not make any difference to the government,” he said, adding it was strange that people who spent most of their lives in this country eventually left it instead of loving it…The minister reiterated his offer of a one-way ticket to Pakistan for Nawaz Sharif.

Talking about the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of opposition parties, the minister said he wanted the alliance to move the date of its protest from March 23 to the 30th as it coincided with Pakistan Day celebrations.

“For the first time, Pakistan Air Force will introduce J10 C fighter jets during the fly past in collaboration with China and these fighter airplanes are an answer to Rafale jets,” Mr Ahmed said…

Image Information:

Image: A J-10B carrying PL-10 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles landing at Zhuhai Jinwan airport ahead of Airshow China 2018.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chengdu_J-10#/media/File:J-10B_with_PL-10_and_PL-12.jpg
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

The Collective Security Treaty Organization Demonstrates Its “Peacekeeping” Capabilities

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CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.

CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.

“The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…”

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an intergovernmental military alliance of select post-Soviet states, made history on 6 January 2022, when the organization’s leadership agreed to a request from the government of Kazakhstan to deploy peacekeepers to support Kazakh security forces after a few days of civil unrest across the country.  This marked the first time the CSTO sent units from its Collective Operational Reaction Force and demonstrated how the organization can respond to an incident on short notice.

According to the excerpted article in semi-independent Russian daily newspaper Kommersant, the CSTO Security Council agreed to Kazakhstan’s request for peacekeepers based on Article 4 of the organization’s treaty.  The article notes that this section of the treaty provides for a collective response in the event of a threat to the “security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty” of a member state.  It also points out “the authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, but did not say by who.”  The article mentions how previous requests to the CSTO for military support, in 2010 by Kyrgyzstan and in 2021 by Armenia, were not granted.  The CSTO did not respond to Kyrgyzstan with military support in 2010 because its articles at the time did not allow a response to an internal security issue.  After the 2010 unrest, CSTO member states changed the articles to allow the collective forces to be used to respond to an internal security threat of a member state.  The lack of a response to Armenia in 2021 is notable as it involved clashes with Azerbaijan, an external threat to Armenian security, but the CSTO had not previously provided the Armenian government support for its conflict with Azerbaijan and stated the 2021 clashes were a border incident, which essentially did not require an actionable response.

The article from Central Asia-focusedindependent news website Fergana Agency reports on the units deployed and breaks down contributions from member states.  The majority of these came from Russia, including companies of the 31st Airborne Brigade, 98th Airborne Division, and the 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade.  A company of the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade from Belarus, soldiers of the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade from Kyrgyzstan, as well as special forces units from Armenia and Tajikistan also deployed.  The units in this peacekeeping force closely match the units that conduct annual joint military exercises of the CSTO’s collective forces.  The article also notes that the peacekeeping force tasks included protecting key infrastructure and airfields and that “the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies.”  This included Russian forces at Almaty’s international airport.  While the CSTO peacekeeping forces reportedly began withdrawing on 13 January, the deployment demonstrated the capabilities of the CSTO to respond to an incident involving a member state.

Source:

Kiril Krivosheev, Yelena Chernenko, Yuri Barsukov, and Arshaluis Mgdesyan, “ОДКБ спешит на помощь (The CSTO is hurrying to help),” Kommersant (semi-independent Russian daily newspaper), 6 January 2022.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5156017

…Around midnight (on 5 January), President Tokayev held a meeting of the Security Council, at which he announced a “counter-terrorist operation.” “The groups are, in fact, international, which have taken part in serious training abroad and their attack on Kazakhstan should be regarded as an act of aggression,” President Tokayev explained. “In this regard, today, I turned to the CSTO heads of state to assist Kazakhstan in overcoming this terrorist threat.”…

A confirming response to this request was sent overnight. The statement was, ironically, made by a politician who himself unsuccessfully sent a similar request not long ago, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, who is the current head of the CSTO Collective Security Council…

the Council made a decision in accordance with Article 4 of the treaty…It involves collective assistance, including military, if “one of the participating states is subjected to aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty).”…The authorities of Kazakhstan said the attacks were coordinated from abroad, by did not say by who…

It is unknown how long the peacekeeping mission will last…It should be noted that the CSTO collective forces are being used for the first time. In 2010, authorities in Kyrgyzstan asked for a deployment of the organization’s forces (against the backdrop of interethnic conflict in the south) as well as in 2021, when authorities of Armenia requested it (against the backdrop of an armed confrontation with Azerbaijan). However, these requests were not granted…

Source: Alexander Rybin, “Охранники инфраструктуры с боевым опытом (The guards of infrastructure with combat experience),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 7 January 2022.

https://fergana.agency/articles/124563/

On the night of 6-7 January, the first units of the Russian Airborne Forces arrived in Almaty and took control of the airport of the largest city in Kazakhstan…The total number of the peacekeeping force in Kazakhstan should stand around 2500. This includes a company from Belarus (around 150-200), 200 from Tajikistan, 150 from Kyrgyzstan and another 100 from Armenia. The remainder are from the Russian Army.

All of the Russian units in Kazakhstan have previously been involved with military operations in the post-Soviet period.

The 31st Airborne Brigade, which is permanently garrisoned in Ulyanovsk, took part in the Second Chechen campaign and the war in South Ossetia in 2008…Since 2013, the 31st has been part of the Rapid Reaction Forces.

The 98th Airborne Division is located in Ivanovo. This unit has experience in participating in peacekeeping missions – in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, in Georgia-Abhazia in 1998 and in Kosovo in 1999…The 45th Guards Special Forces Brigade of the Airborne Forces is one of the most elite units in the Russian Army…

A peacekeeping company from the 103rd Vitebsk Guards Airborne Brigade deployed from Belarus…Kyrgyzstan sent 150 soldiers from the 25th “Scorpion” Special Forces Brigade to Kazakhstan…It is still unknown which units Tajikistan and Armenia deployed, but, according to local media, they are special forces…

As stated by the ministries of the CSTO governments, which agreed to take part in the peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan, the military personnel will carry out task to protect key infrastructure and airfields. The Russian Ministry of Defense noted that the CSTO peacekeepers in Kazakhstan will not be involved in the active operational measures of local law enforcement and security agencies…

Image Information:

Image: CSTO collective peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan 2022-JAN-11, Kyrgyzstan soldier in Almaty Power Station-2.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CSTO_collective_peacekeeping_forces_in_Kazakhstan_2022-JAN-11,_Kyrgyzstan_soldier_in_Almaty_Power_Station-2.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Indian Forces Work on Airlift Capabilities in Ladakh

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Indian Air Force C-17.

Indian Air Force C-17.

“The effort was a real-time demonstration of the inherent heavy-lift capability of the Indian Air Force.”

Indian defense officials continue to make improvements to roads and other infrastructure in areas near the Indian-Chinese border to facilitate operations in the event of a war with China.  The accompanying excerpted articles provide a look at how Indian forces are training for additional scenarios outside of the improvements in the border areas.  

The article from independent news magazine India Today reports on a recent airlift exercise by the Indian Air Force and Army.  The exercise took place to assess India’s logistics supply chain as the “Indian armed forces are preparing for another winter of enhanced deployment of over 50,000 troops in Ladakh.”  According to the article, the exercise involved C-17, IL-76, and An-32 transport aircraft operating out of the country’s Western Air Command. 

The article from India-based independent English-language news website The Print reports on an exercise carried out by the “Shatrujeet (airborne) brigade” in early November.  The exercise took place in the north of the Union Territory of Ladakh and involved members of the brigade being “inserted to a drop zone at an altitude of more than 14,000 feet.”  The article notes that the soldiers had been acclimated to the change in elevation in Ladakh prior to the exercise and that the exercise took place in order to “validate rapid response capabilities and seamless integration.”  This is important because ground travel is relatively slow up to the Tibetan Plateau where the terrain is vulnerable to rock slides and other obstacles.  Future flashpoints or confrontations with China may require a rapid response capability that only airlift can provide until follow-on forces arrive.

Source:

Abhishek Bhalla, “Operation Hercules: Army, IAF prepare for winter deployment amid Ladakh standoff,” India Today (an independent news magazine), 17 November 2021.

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ladakh-standoff-china-indian-army-air-force-operation-hercules-1877909-2021-11-17

The Indian Army and Air Force carried out a joint exercise to assess their logistics supply chain. This exercise was held at a time when the Indian armed forces are preparing for another winter of enhanced deployment of over 50,000 troops in Ladakh amid continuing tensions with China…

Temperatures have begun to drop and will fall to minus 30-40 degrees during peak winter. The Indian forces are geared up for enhanced deployment in the harsh winter for a second successive year.

The exercise named ‘Operation Hercules’ was undertaken by the Indian Air Force and Indian Army on November 15 with transport aircraft of the IAF being pressed into action.

The platforms utilised for the airlift were C-17, IL-76 and An-32 aircraft, which took off from one of the forward bases of Western Air Command…

Source: “Army conducts airborne exercise in eastern Ladakh to check rapid response along LAC,” The Print (independent English-language news website from India), 1 November 2021. https://theprint.in/defence/army-conducts-airborne-exercise-in-eastern-ladakh-to-check-rapid-response-along-lac/760296/

The Indian Army’s Shatrujeet brigade is conducting an airborne exercise along the northern borders in eastern Ladakh to validate its rapid response capabilities, sources said on Monday…airborne troops of the Army’s Shatrujeet brigade were inserted to a drop zone at an altitude of more than 14,000 feet as part of the exercise, the sources mentioned.

These pre-acclimatised troops along with specialist vehicles and missile detachments were transported through C-130 and AN-32 aircraft from five different mounting bases to validate inter-theatre move, precision stand-off drops, rapid grouping and the capture of designated objectives with speed and surprise, they said.

…The exercise also involved combat free fall jumps and integrated battle drills by airborne forces, mechanised columns and attack helicopters, to validate rapid response capabilities and seamless integration…

Image Information:

Image: Indian Air Force C-17.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IAF-C-17.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Central Asian States Take the Initiative in Security Cooperation

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Map of Central Asia.

Map of Central Asia.

“Against the backdrop of countering challenges to security and stability in the region, primarily with the situation in neighboring Afghanistan, the two sides confirmed that the positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan completely coincide on this.”

Much of the security cooperation analysis that takes place with Central Asian states often focuses on Russian, Chinese, or U.S. efforts in the region.  While important, this particular scope overlooks how Central Asian states have been increasingly carrying out bilateral security cooperation with each other in recent years.  The accompanying excerpted articles report on recent security cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and provide insight on how governments in the region are cooperating with each other outside of the influence of other partners.

The article from Central Asia-focused independent news website Fergana Agency reports that the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan recently signed a “Declaration of Allied Relations.”  The agreement allows for increased cooperation between the two sides in a number of areas, including defense.  Additionally, both governments confirmed they have the same position on “countering challenges to security and stability in the region” in relation to the situation in Afghanistan. 

The first article from Uzbek news website Kun.uz reports on a recent joint military exercise carried out by Kazakh and Uzbek units.  The exercise involved engaging “with an illegally armed group that had broken through the state border” and that Kazakh and Uzbek forces used multiple systems to eliminate the threat.  The exercise marks another example of Central Asian forces conducting bilateral exercises annually for the past several years focused on eliminating a terrorist group.  The majority of Russia-led or China-led joint military exercises in the region involve similar scenarios.

The second article from Kun.uz reports on a November meeting between the defense ministers of both countries.  The article notes that the ministers “discussed the current state and prospects of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and looked at strengthening it,” signing an agreement at the end of the meeting, which included “a number of measures for defense cooperation.”  While there has been no indication of the bilateral security cooperation between Central Asian governments replacing what takes place with Russia or other partners, it demonstrates growing partnerships where Central Asian states take the initiative.

Source:

“Государства-союзники (Government-allies),” Fergana Agency (independent news website focusing on Central Asia), 6 December 2021.

https://fergana.agency/articles/124124/

Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Qasym Jomart-Tokyaev signed a Declaration of Allied Relations between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Republic of Kazakhstan on 6 December…Within the framework of the visit, which took place 5-6 December, 22 documents were signed…including a plan of action to bring trade turnover between the two states to $10 billion in the next five years…

Against the backdrop of countering challenges to security and stability in the region, primarily with the situation in neighboring Afghanistan, the two sides confirmed that the positions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan completely coincide on this…

Among the signed documents are agreements in the customs sphere, in the prevention and elimination of emergency situations, the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes as well as documents on further cooperation in the fields of trade, investment, energy, communications and defense…

Source: “В Термезе завершились совместные узбекско-казахские учения (The joint Uzbek-Kazakh exercise has finished in Termez),” Kun.uz (Uzbek news website), 25 November 2021.

https://kun.uz/ru/news/2021/11/25/v-termeze-zavershilis-sovmestnyye-uzbeksko-kazaxskiye-ucheniya

The soldiers of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan carried out the main stage of the joint exercise “Hamkorlik-2021” in Termez this week…

According to the plan of the exercise, the combined units of the two countries engaged with an illegally armed group that had broken through the state border with the support of fifty vehicles and three hundred service members.

Fighters, attack helicopters, armored vehicles, artillery, motorized rifle units and unmanned aerial systems were used to eliminate the mock enemy group…

Source: “Главы Минобороны Узбекистана и Казахстана обсудили региональную безопасность (The head of the Ministries of Defense of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan discussed regional security),” Kun.uz (Uzbek news website), 23 November 2021.

https://kun.uz/ru/news/2021/11/23/glavy-minoborony-uzbekistana-i-kazaxstana-obsudili-regionalnuyu-bezopasnost

On 22 November, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Lieutenant General Bakhodir Kurbanov, met with a military delegation led by the Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan, Lieutenant General Murat Bektanov…the two sides discussed the current state and prospects of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and looked at strengthening it…

Following the meeting, the ministries of defense signed an agreement, which includes a number of measures for defense cooperation…

Image Information:

Image: Map of Central Asia.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Central_Asia.png
Attribution: CC BY-SA 4.0

“Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity v8” by Matthew Stein (2021-01-20)

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(Click image to download brief.)

Since Central Asian states gained independence in 1991, new regional military and security alliances have been created (some of which are Russian-led), new military partnerships with non-NATO countries have been established, a number of joint military exercises have been conducted, dozens of high-profile incidents of violence and civil unrest have taken place, and military installations have been used by foreign militaries. While this activity gained attention, it has not been collectively compiled. A compilation of this activity can serve as a guide for current and future military and security involvement in Central Asia.

The first section of the compendium is organized alphabetically and includes entries on Central Asian military facilities and installations (bases, air fields, etc.), and military and security organizations past and present. The second section is also organized alphabetically and includes joint exercises of regional militaries and security forces (Note: the exercises are organized alphabetically by the title of exercise and then chronologically if the exercise was part of a series or conducted annually; the names of some exercises are transliterated from Russian, ex. Tsentr, Grom, Poisk, etc., and these are also listed alphabetically with names of the exercises in English; the untitled joint exercises are listed last and are organized chronologically). The third section is a list of Central Asian military and security structures and other (non-joint exercises) security cooperation activity organized by country. The fourth section is a list of major incidents of violence and civil unrest in Central Asia organized by country and then chronologically.