Little Evidence That Algeria Is Shifting From Russian to Chinese Arms Imports Amid Ukraine Conflict

SR-5 Chinese 220mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL).

SR-5 Chinese 220mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL).


The Russian official’s visit coincided with media reports about Algeria allocating a huge budget for armaments in the coming years …”


The Algerian government recently announced a substantial increase to its 2023 defense budget, thanks largely to windfall profits from high global energy prices. The announcement has led to various rumors about the weapons systems that Algeria may seek to purchase from abroad. For years, the preponderance of Algerian advanced weaponry has been sourced from Russia. Russian weapons sales, however, are expected to decline as international sanctions and Ukraine-related domestic needs cut into export production. This had led to speculation that Chinese manufacturers will compete for market share in traditional Russian markets, including Algeria. 

Belying speculation of declines in Russian arms exports to Algeria, the English-language news website Africa Intelligence recently published an unverified claim that Algeria will soon ink a 10-year “mega-contract” for Russian equipment, worth more than $10 billion dollars.[i] The report, which is behind a paywall, was picked up and amplified by prominent Arabic-language news outlets. As reported in the first accompanying excerpt, from the Russian news website RT Arabic, the deal would likely include submarines, advanced Sukhoi aircraft, and long-range air defense systems. The rumored deal received some indirect support with the early November visit to Algiers by Dmitry Shugaev, director of Russia’s Federal Service of Military-Technical Cooperation.

As reported in the second accompanying excerpt, from the Arabic-language website of the Turkish Anadolu News Agency, Shugaev heads a Russian state institution that oversees arms deals and foreign military cooperation. Some days prior, an Algeria-focused military observer who goes by the Twitter handle @fares4302 circulated a photograph of an Algerian-Chinese meeting purportedly discussing the Chinese SY-400 [RG1] platform, which can be configured as a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) or Short-Range Ballistic Missile System (SRBM).[ii] The same user had earlier circulated a photograph that showed what appeared to be a model SY-400 in the headquarters of the Algerian Land Forces.[iii] The timing of the tweets suggested a link between Algerian interest in these systems and the current context, specifically the expected attrition of Russian SRBM exports due to the Ukraine conflict. However, the photograph of Chinese-Algerian SY-400 discussions turned out to be from Abu Dhabi’s biannual IDEX weapons expo, which last occurred in February 2021—a full year before the Ukraine invasion. The photo displaying a model SY-400 in the headquarters of the Algerian Land Forces, furthermore, was from 2020 and may well depict a visually similar system possessed by Algerian forces, such as the Chinese SR-5 [RG2] MLRS, which Algeria acquired in 2017. In sum, while China may indeed be moving to compete with Russia in certain market segments, there is of yet no hard evidence that it is doing so in response to a Ukraine-related decline in Russian exports, at least insofar as Algeria is concerned.

In mid-November, the Algerian president’s office issued a decree forbidding government officials from talking to the media about defense issues without permission from the Defense Ministry. As reported in the third accompanying excerpt, from the Qatar-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadeed, it is unclear whether the measure applies to media-friendly Army Chief of Staff Said Chengriha. The measure may well be related to the various rumors surrounding Algerian arms purchases, but it should also be considered in the context of an ongoing and highly opaque power struggle between competing factions in the Algerian military.


Sources:

“مصدر إعلامي: الجزائر تتجه لتوقيع صفقة أسلحة ضخمة مع روسيا

(Media source: Algeria plans to sign huge weapons deal with Russia),” RT Arabic (Russian Arabic-language media outlet), 31 October 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4s6f8c74

“Africa Intelligence” reported that negotiations are underway to conclude an agreement on Russian military supplies to Algeria over the next ten years. The deal will occur within the framework of Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s official visit to Moscow next December. The Algerian military leadership is particularly interested in acquiring submarines, aircraft including the Su-57[RG1] , Su-34 [RG2] and Su-30[RG3] , and new air defense systems such as the S-400[RG4] , Viking (Buk-M3[RG5] ) and Antey-4000.

“قائد الجيش الجزائري يبحث مع مسؤول روسي التعاون العسكري

(Algerian military leader discusses military cooperation with Russian official),” Anadolu News Agency, 10 November 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4tfdc5m5

“The Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation is a state institution that reports to the presidency in Moscow and oversees all arms deals and foreign military cooperation. The Russian official’s visit coincided with media reports about Algeria allocating a huge budget for armaments in the coming years, amounting to about $10 billion, though the Algerian authorities have not confirmed this information.”

“الرئيس الجزائري يقرر منع الحديث في مسائل الدفاع إلا بترخيص منه

(Algerian president forbids talking about defense matters without his permission),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 14 November 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8m36te

On Monday, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune issued a decree banning military and government officials from speaking to the press about information about military issues without permission from the Minister of Defense… It is not known whether this decision also includes the statements of the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Said Chengriha, who constantly appears in speeches on state television during army-related activities.


Notes:

[i] The paywalled article can be found at: https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa/2022/10/31/armaments-algiers-to-sign-new-dollars12bn-mega-contract-with-moscow,109839871-art.

[ii]The tweet reads: “An Algerian military delegation in China is probably receiving explanations about the Sy-400 missile system.” A comment below notes that the picture is from IDEX. https://twitter.com/fares4302/status/1588516913541705729

[iii]The tweet reads: “From the headquarters of the Algerian Land Forces a mock-up of a surface-to-surface missile system appears, apparently the Chinese system SY-400.” https://twitter.com/fares4302/status/1583753579399036928


Image Information:

Image: SR-5 Chinese 220mm Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL)
Source: TRADOC Worldwide Equipment Guide,  https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/mediawiki/images/1/1a/SR-5_Chines_Guided_%28D%29.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

Russia’s Ukraine Narratives Find Appeal in Arab Countries

RT Arabic Logo.

RT Arabic Logo.

Sputnik Arabic Logo.

Sputnik Arabic Logo.


The war saved everyone from the Corona virus, which was prepared in Ukrainian laboratories. President Putin struck those laboratories and ended the virus. If this had not happened, the virus would not have ended, because America wants to reduce the global population …”


The “Arab street” has largely supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine several polls indicating that Arabs are more likely to blame the conflict on Ukraine or the West than on Russia.[i] Russian influence campaigns have almost certainly played a role given ample evidence that Russia’s Arabic-language outlets have deliberately sought to shape perceptions vis-à-vis Ukraine. There is also data showing that Russian Arabic-language media outlets RT and Sputnik Arabic are more popular than their Western counterparts, such as BBC Arabic or the U.S.-funded al-Hurra.[ii]Several national news agencies in the Middle East have signed content sharing agreements with these Russian outlets. However, focusing primarily on Russian influence operations misses the important social contexts in which these pro-Russian opinions are being formed.

The first accompanying excerpt, from the Arabic-language news website of the German media outlet Deutsche Welle, cites an Egyptian media expert who highlights the extent to which Arabs are registering “protest support” for Russia, based on opposition to Western policies that are seen as biased against Arabs and Muslims. Russian influence campaigns, he argues, need not be particularly strong, as “the audience is more susceptible and obedient to Russian counter-propaganda, without this meaning that the propaganda is good or effective.” The second accompanying excerpt, from the Arabic-language news website al-Bawaba, illustrates the extent to which Russian misinformation has spread to new segments of the Arab public. The excerpt is from an interview with an archbishop in Egypt’s Coptic Church. When asked about the impact of the Ukraine conflict on Egypt, he claims that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has ended COVID-19, which was purportedly created by the United States in Ukrainian laboratoriese to trim the global population to 2 billion people. 

According to the third accompanying excerpt, an opinion piece published in the Qatar-aligned English-language news website The New Arab, the current global environment has “opened a floodgate of misinformation tainted with apocalyptic thinking and metaphysical explanations.”  The author notes how the combined effects of COVID-19, extreme weather events, and war in Ukraine have led many in the region to seek answers in scripture. Arab skepticism toward the U.S. role in Ukraine is neither novel nor surprising, since narratives portraying the United States as a latent source of regional conflict and instability are pervasive. What is new, however, is that fanciful, apocalyptic-tinted anti-U.S. narratives—made popular last decade by Islamic State ideologues—may be pushing their way into the region’s Christian minority populations with a little help from Russian media outlets.


Sources:

“غزو أوكرانيا.. هل ربحت روسيا حرب المعلومات في الشرق الأوسط؟

(Ukraine invasion… did Russia win the information war in the Middle East?),” Deutsche Welle Arabic (German media outlet), 25 August 2022. https://tinyurl.com/49783hk2

Yasser Abdel Aziz, an international lecturer and Egyptian media expert… says: “I believe that this support is ‘protest support’ because there are large segments of the Arab public who feel that the Western media is biased and that the West in general is biased against Arab and Islamic issues. There is historical and other bitterness, and because of this the audience is more susceptible and obedient to Russian counter-propaganda, without this meaning that this propaganda is good or effective… Abdel Aziz added, “The West has the right to feel resentment in light of this situation, because its effective and successful communication tools and its prestigious and venerable media outlets are sometimes unconvincing, while the ‘miserable’ Russian media tools, or others that do not have the same luster or capabilities, find popularity at times.

“الأنبا بنيامين مطران المنوفية: الزواج استشهاد دون سفك دماء..

(Anba Benjamin, Bishop of Monofia: Marriage is martyrdom without blood…).” al-Bawaba (Arabic-language news website), 20 October 2022. https://www.albawabhnews.com/4674878

Q: The Ukrainian-Russian crisis. How do you see its impact on the world and Egypt in particular?

A: The war saved everyone from the Coronavirus, which was prepared in Ukrainian laboratories. President Putin struck those laboratories and ended the virus. If this had not happened, the virus would not have ended, because America wants to reduce the global population, there are 7.5 billion people and they want to reduce it to 2 billion.

Emad Mousa. “MENA’s misguided climate change schadenfreude towards Europe,” The New Arab (Qatari-aligned English-language news website), 19 October 2022. https://english.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/menas-misguided-climate-change-schadenfreude-towards-europeBecause the unusual weather conditions came shortly after a global pandemic and coincided with the Ukraine war and a global economic meltdown, it opened a floodgate of misinformation tainted with apocalyptic thinking and metaphysical explanations – similar to the height of the Covid-19 global emergency. During the pandemic, Egyptians reportedly ranked highest in Google searches


Notes:

[i] Per the May 2022 ArabNews/YouGov poll on who is responsible for the Ukraine conflict (https://www.arabnews.com/sites/default/files/anyg_rusukr_report_web_compressed.pdf), 24 percent of respondents hold NATO responsible; 13 percent hold the current U.S. President responsible; 16 percent hold Russia responsible; six percent hold Ukraine responsible; and 42 percent do not know or are unsure who is responsible. Per the September 2022 Arab Youth Survey on who is responsible for the Ukraine conflict (https://arabyouthsurvey.com/en/findings/#my-global-citizenship-10),

31 percent of respondents hold the United States/NATO responsible; 18 percent hold Russia responsible; 15 percent hold Ukraine responsible; and 37 percent do not know or cannot say who is responsible.

[ii] According to a 2015 Nielsen study, RT’s Arabic-language news channel had higher daily audiences than BBC Arabic, Sky News Arabia, al-Hurra and China’s CCTV in Arabic in Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE and Iraq. (https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rt-arabic-is-among-top-3-most-watched-news-channels-in-6-arabic-countries-300039119.html)

See also: Norman Cigar, “COVID-19 and the Arab World: Opportunity for Russian Anti-American Disinformation?” MES Insights, Volume 11, Issue 2, The Krulak Center at Marine Corps University, April 2020. https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MES/Insights/MES%20Insights%20Volume%2011%20Issue%202%20April%202020.pdf?ver=2020-05-01-133622-630


Image Information:

Image 1:  RT Arabic Logo
Source: Twitter, https://twitter.com/RTarabic/photo
Attribution: Fair Use

Image 2:  Sputnik Arabic Logo
Source: Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=293803939457940
Attribution: Fair Use

Morocco and Algeria Strengthen UAV Capabilities With Imports From China, Turkey, and Israel

TAI Aksungur at Teknofest 2019.

TAI Aksungur at Teknofest 2019.


“Morocco issued a warning to Iran, which is accused of militarily supporting separatist and terrorist groups


Over the past year, both Algeria and Morocco have bolstered their unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities by importing technology from China, Turkey and—in the case of Morocco—Israel.[i] As detailed in the first excerpted article, in October 2022, the Spanish news website OkDiario reported on a video showing a Chinese Wing Loong II UAV flying over Morocco, seemingly confirming that Morocco had acquired several of these platforms after expressing interest in them earlier this year. Also in October, as detailed in the second excerpted article, the independent Algeria-focused military news website Menadefense reported that Algeria, which has a Wing Loong II fleet of its own, had become the first export client for the Turkish TAI Aksungur long-range UAV, after signing a deal to acquire six units.

While China and Turkey appear willing to sell technology and deepen security cooperation with both Morocco and Algeria, Israeli-Moroccan cooperation has likely geopolitical implications given fears of Iranian and Russian meddling in the region.[ii] As shown in the third excerpted article, in September the Moroccan English-language news website Morocco World News reported that Morocco had acquired at least 150 small vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) unmanned aircraft from the Israeli firm BlueBird Aero Systems. The deal includes both the small WanderB model and a larger ThunderB model, as well as an agreement to build two UAV manufacturing plants in Morocco, the first of their kind. In the fourth excerpted article, in early October, as reported by the Moroccan news website Le360, an official from the Polisario Front, the Western Sahara independence movement that is supported by Algeria and opposed by Morocco, claimed that Sahrawi fighters would soon begin employing armed UAVs against Moroccan forces. These remarks prompted Morocco’s Foreign Minister to equate Polisario with Yemen’s Houthi Movement, accusing Iran of arming Polisario with Algerian complicity. Indeed, Moroccan accusations of Iranian support for Polisario are not new, as explained in the fifth article from the Qatari-aligned al-Araby al-Jadeed. While the accusations may have seemed fanciful four years ago, they seem less so now, given Israel’s quickly growing security footprint in Morocco and the fact that Algeria’s key security partner—Russia—is itself relying on Iranian military support in Ukraine.


Sources:

Pelayo Barro. “Marruecos compra los drones militares chinos más modernos mientras España le regala 4×4 (Morocco buys the most advanced Chinese drones while Spain gifts it 4x4s),” OkDiario (Spanish news website), 2 October 2022. https://okdiario.com/espana/marruecos-compra-drones-militares-chinos-mas-modernos-mientras-espana-regala-4×4-9739842

The latest [Moroccan] acquisition has not been ignored by Spain’s military intelligence: new-generation strategic Chinese drones with air-ground attack capabilities and endurance of over 7,000 kilometers… Mohammed VI’s armed forces had previously eyed these drones – called Wing Loong II – and had even proposed acquiring them to replace a previous Chinese drone they had already employed in their war against the Polisario Front.

“L’Algérie achète des drones d’attaque Aksungur (Algeria purchases Aksungur attack drones),” Menadefense (independent Algeria-focused military news website), 7 October 2022. https://www.menadefense.net/algerie/lalgerie-achete-des-drones-dattaque-aksungur/

The Algerian Air Force has ordered six Turkish MALE drones from TAI. They are the Aksungur, a larger, more modern, and better performing version than its Anka-S counterpart.

Aya Benazizi. “Morocco Purchases 150 Israeli Military Drones,” Morocco World News (Moroccan English-language news website), 22 September 2022. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2022/09/351475/morocco-purchases-150-israeli-military-drones

Morocco has purchased 150 military drones of the WanderB and ThunderB types, manufactured by Israel’s BlueBird Aero Systems, a company specialized in designing and developing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) equipment…

The agreement concerned the construction of industrial units in Morocco for the manufacture of Israeli drones.

البوليساريو تعلن أن الجزائر ستمدها بطائرات “درون” إيرانية لمهاجمة المغرب

Mohammed Ould Boah. “Polisario announces that Algiera will provide it with Iranian drones to attack Morocco,” Le360 (Moroccan news website), 4 October 2022. https://ar.le360.ma/politique/197102

According to the so-called “interior minister” of the Polisario, the separatists have obtained military drones, which they will use in their attacks against Moroccan territory. In the face of this dangerous escalation, Morocco issued a warning to Iran, which is accused of militarily supporting separatist and terrorist groups.

إيران والمغرب: تشيّع وصواريخ ودرونز

Abdelhamid Ajmahiri. “Iran and Morocco: Shiization, missiles and drones,” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari-aligned daily), 11 October 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p83v8hm Almost four years after accusing Tehran of handing the separatist Polisario Front advanced weapons – especially Strela surface-to-air missiles – last week Rabat accused Tehran of providing Polisario with drones… It is clear that relations between Rabat and Tehran have entered a bleak zone, now that the [Western Sahara] conflict has been resolved in favor of Moroccan national unity.


Notes:

[i] See: Lucas Winter, “Morocco and Algeria Bolstering Their Drone Fleets as Bilateral Tensions Rise,” OE Watch, Issue 11, 2021; Lucas Winter, “Morocco Denys Conducting Drone Strike Against Algerian Targets in Western Sahara,” OE Watch, Issue 12, 2021; Lucas Winter, “China Arming Algeria To Fight Its ‘New Generation Wars’,” OE Watch, Issue 8, 2022. 

[ii] See: Lucas Winter, “Algeria Sees Threat from Morocco as Western Sahara Conflict Threatens To Reignite,” OE Watch, Issue 6, 2022; Lucas Winter, “Algeria Likely To Deepen Military Ties with Russia as Morocco–Israel Security Cooperation Expands,” OE Watch, Issue 9, 2022.


Image Information:

Image: TAI Aksungur at Teknofest 2019
Source: CeeGee (own work), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TAI_Aksungur_Teknofest2019_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Saudi Arabia Continues Buying Missiles and UAVs From China as Part of Broader Foreign Policy Rebalancing

A Chinese DF-21A transporter erector vehicle on display at the "Our troops towards the sky" exhibition at the Beijing Military Museum.

A Chinese DF-21A transporter erector vehicle on display at the “Our troops towards the sky” exhibition at the Beijing Military Museum.


“Saudi foreign policy has adapted to international multipolarity…”


Saudi Arabia’s continued unwillingness to act against Russia in global energy markets should understood in the context of a broader Saudi foreign policy recalibration, formulated prior to the Ukraine conflict and in response to a perceived geostrategic transformation in which it views China playing a key role. Early in the Ukraine conflict, Saudi leadership countered U.S. pressure to undermine Russian interests in global energy markets with demands that the U.S. bolster security assistance for the kingdom. Looming behind these demands was the prospect of turning to China as a complementary, if not alternative, security partner. As detailed in the first excerpted article, a columnist in the influential Saudi daily al-Riyadh recently noted: “Saudi foreign policy has adapted to international multipolarity,” leading the kingdom to strengthen political, economic and military relations with several countries, including China. Chinese-Saudi military cooperation, which is likely to come under increased scrutiny in coming months, primarily involves weapons and technology transfers, most notably involving ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

At the core, Chinese-Saudi defense cooperation is rooted in missiles, and has been a relationship shrouded in secrecy from the start. Such cooperation began with a 1986 deal for around 50 medium-range DF-3 (Dongfeng 3) missiles, conducted surreptitiously and before the establishment of official bilateral relations in 1990.[i] In 2007, following a landmark visit to China by King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia purchased the upgraded DF-21 ballistic missile system; however, neither country publicly admitted to the deal, which was reported on several years later. Today, the secret China-Saudi missile development program appears to continue evolving, with recent media reports and analyses claiming that Saudi Arabia, with Chinese assistance, has begun producing missiles domestically.

In contrast to the clandestine missile program, Saudi-Chinese cooperation on UAVs and counter-UAV systems is mostly in the open. In the past decade, Saudi Arabia has purchased the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group’s Wing Loong II and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s Rainbow CH-4 UCAVs, employing them in the Yemen conflict and signing cooperation agreements for CH-4s to be coproduced in Saudi territory. Saudi military industry has also contracted with the China Electronics Technology Group to jointly develop drones and counter-drone systems.[ii]  Last February, during the first edition of the Saudi World Defense Show, the Saudi government signed a deal with China’s Poly Technologies to purchase an anti-UAV laser system called “Silent Hunter”[iii] amid Saudi accusations that the United States was an unreliable security partner. As a prominent journalist wrote at the time in the regionally influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat: “When Houthi terrorism targets Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles and Iranian drones, Washington rushes to Vienna to complete the nuclear agreement,” in reference to negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear deal. A few weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the defense ministers of China and Saudi Arabia met virtually and, per the accompanying tweet by the Saudi Defense Minister, “explored ways to strengthen our military and defense cooperation.”  Similar discussions took place in June 2022, on the sidelines of the 2022 Shangri-La Asian Security Dialogue. There was much expectation that Chinese President Xi Jinping would visit Saudi Arabia last summer, but the visit never materialized. If such a visit takes place, defense and security cooperation will very likely be on the agenda.


Sources:

المملكة وسياسة الرصانة.. تنويع التحالفات وتعزيز التوازن الدولي

Fahim al-Hamed. “The Kingdom and its Sober Policy… Diversifying Alliances and Strengthening International Balance,” al-Riyadh (influential Saudi daily), 15 October 2022. https://www.alriyadh.com/1977312


The kingdom is governed by mutual strategic interests, but has always set limits to its flexibility and to being pressured. At this stage, the kingdom maintains its interests in light of a changing international system and major international conflicts, to ensure its leading role in the global scene. Saudi foreign policy has adapted to international multipolarity; thus, the kingdom has strengthened its political, economic and military relations with China, Russia and India, and has recently been restoring the relationship with Turkey.

حان وقت العقلانية السياسية

Tariq al-Hamid. “It is time for political rationality,” al-Sharq al-Awsat (regionally influential Saudi daily), 23 March 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4663yaye


It is unreasonable for the price of oil to rise, so Britain and the United States rush to contact Saudi Arabia, and when Houthi terrorism targets Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles and Iranian drones, Washington rushes to Vienna to complete the nuclear agreement…
Is there a serious stance from the US administration, which is now talking about “partnership” and “alliance” with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states? Where is the serious American position on the security of the Gulf, as the Americans demand the Saudis and the Gulf states now to reduce oil prices and support international stability?

@kbsalsaud (Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Minister of Defense), Twitter, 26 January 2022. https://twitter.com/kbsalsaud/status/1486308204455804932

Upon the direction of HRH the Crown Prince, I met with the Minister of National Defense in the people’s republic of China General Wei Fenghe. We reviewed the historic ties between our two countries and explored ways to strengthen our military and defense cooperation.

@defensearabia (Defense Arabia, Arabic-language military news and analysis website), Twitter, 11 June 2022. https://twitter.com/defensearabia/status/1535634061141725184Saudi Assistant Defense Minister meets Chinese Defense Minister in Singapore, to discuss defense and military cooperation relations.


Notes:

[i] The DF-3 missiles were expensive and inaccurate, to the point of allegedly making them unusable during the first Gulf War. Yet, according to the memoirs of former deputy defense minister Khalid bin Sultan—the key Saudi official involved—the deal marked a turning point in Saudi military development and in its relations with China.

[ii] See: Lucas Winter, “UAV Technologies Proliferating in Yemen and Saudi Arabia,” OE Watch, Issue 7, 2022.

[iii] See: Lucas Winter, “Saudi Arabia Turns to China for Low-Altitude Air Defense,” OE Watch, Issue 4, 2022.


Image Information:

Image: A Chinese DF-21A transporter erector vehicle on display at the “Our troops towards the sky” exhibition at the Beijing Military Museum.
Source: Max Smith, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:DF-21A_TEL_-_Chinese_Military_Museum_Beijing.jpg
Attribution: Public Domain

“Chronic Instability” Atop Algerian Military’s Foreign Intelligence and Security Directorate

President of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria Abdelmadjid Tebboune (2021).

President of the Democratic People’s Republic of Algeria Abdelmadjid Tebboune (2021).


…a politico-military regime… which cuts off heads instead of questioning the structural reasons for its inadequacy.


The Algerian military seems plagued by internal rifts that negatively affect leadership and cohesion.  Some evidence of this can be found in what the widely read Moroccan news website Le360 characterizes as”chronic instability” atop Algeria’s foreign intelligence and security agency, the General Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DGDSE).  The Le360 article considers the instability atop DGDSE leadership as proof of a political-military regime that “cuts off heads instead of questioning the structural reasons for its inadequacy,” in ways that “destabilize both the officers and the troops.” 

In early September 2022, Major General M’henna Djebbar was appointed as director of the DGDSE, making him the fifth person to hold the position since current President Abdelmadjid Tebboune assumed office in December 2019.  The volatility is noteworthy, given that for approximately 25 years, from 1990 until 2015, Algerian intelligence services were controlled by a single man: Mohamed Mediene, also known as “Toufik.”  Since then, factional struggles within the military and between the military and intelligence services have led to sudden falls from grace within the DGDSE, as one-time powerbrokers have been dismissed, indicted, or imprisoned for being on the losing side of a factional battle.  Djebbar, who is a longtime associate of Mohamed Mediene, was briefly jailed in 2019-2020, during the purge led by then-chief of staff Ahmed Gaid Saleh, following the ouster of longtime president Abdelaziz Bouteflika.  According to the accompanying excerpt from the France-based online news and analysis website Maghreb Intelligence, Djebbar has become a close ally to President Tebboune but is distrusted by Said Chengriha, the army’s current chief of staff. 

Major security challenges, including Libya’s civil war, Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara, and lawlessness in the Sahel are also likely to affect Algeria’s military performance.  Indeed, some recent DGDSE directors seem to have been appointed expressly to deal with the various crises of the moment.  The first head of the DGDSE in the Tebboune era, Major General Mohamed Bouzit, was a Libya specialist appointed in April 2020 at a time of growing Turkish influence in Libya.  After nine months on the job, he was dismissed and subsequently arrested on espionage charges. A report published at the time in the Africa-focused political weekly magazine Jeune Afrique argued that failure to curb Turkish influence in Libya was behind his fall.  His replacement, nicknamed “Polisario” due to his strong ties with leaders in the Western Sahara independence movement, was likely appointed to deal with Algerian concerns over growing international support for Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara. Domestically, the military-controlled Algerian government seems to be in a position of relative strength, having largely neutralized the protest movement that overthrew Bouteflika in 2019.  Algeria’s natural gas reserves and relatively stable relations with both Russia and Europe have yielded newfound geopolitical leverage in the shadow of war in Ukraine.  The Algerian military is strong on paper, thanks to substantial purchases of advanced Russian and Chinese weaponry in the past decade. Still, the chronic instability atop the DGDSE may be symptomatic of internal leadership and cohesion issues which, while not visible on the surface, should be considered when assessing Algeria’s military capabilities.


Sources:

Mohammed Ould Boah. “Les non-dits des nouveaux changements  à la tête des services du renseignement algérien (What goes unsaid about new changes in the leadership of Algerian intelligence services),” Le360 (widely read Moroccan news website), 16 July 2022. https://fr.le360.ma/politique/les-non-dits-des-nouveaux-changements-a-la-tete-des-services-du-renseignement-algerien-263715

This chronic instability at the head of Algerian foreign intelligence is indicative of the improvisation, mistakes, even casting errors, of a politico-military regime visibly incapable of scoring points and which cuts off heads instead of questioning the structural reasons for its inadequacy. At this rate of purges, the Algerian army has become leaderless – in the sense of lacking a head. Decapitated, this army capsizes according to the news and thinks of reassuring the chain of command by changing commander each time. This destabilizes both the officers and the troops.

Ilyes Aribi. “Algérie: la cruelle désillusion des partisans du général M’henna Djebbar (Algeria: the cruel disillusion of General M’henna Djebbar’s supporters),” Maghreb Intelligence (French-based online news and analysis website), 20 July 2022. https://www.maghreb-intelligence.com/algerie-la-cruelle-desillusion-des-partisans-du-general-mhenna-djebbar/

In 2021, M’henna Djebbar convinces Tebboune to include him in his inner circle to consolidate his faltering presidential power… But since June 2022, M’henna Djebbar’s plans have been troubled by the strong comeback of his number one opponent: Said Chengriha, the head of the Algerian military institution, who has worked to slow down the rehabilitation of former generals from the 1990s, fearing their stranglehold on Algerian power.

“Algeria: Is the Russia-Turkey rivalry at the heart of the Bouzit affair?” Jeune Afrique (Africa-focused political weekly magazine), 24 September 2021. https://www.theafricareport.com/130371/algeria-is-the-russia-turkey-rivalry-at-the-heart-of-the-bouzit-affair/

Major General Mohamed Bouzit (aka Youcef ), the former head of Algerian foreign intelligence, was appointed in April 2020 and replaced in January 2021. He was placed in detention in the Blida military prison, 60km south of Algiers, following his arrest on 7 September 2021…

Bouzit… is accused of having left the field open for Turkey to extend its field of intervention in Libya by installing several military bases, among other things… [and] is suspected of having misled Algerian diplomacy and favouring Ankara’s Libyan interests…

Therefore, the Bouzit affair is just another episode in the clan struggle that dominates the Algerian political-military seraglio. This muted war is taking place between President Tebboune’s close advisors, Chengriha’s entourage and even generals from Ahmed Gaïd Salah’s former team, who are all prepared to ally themselves with one or another of the factions to avoid joining their comrades in prison.


Image Information:

Image:  President of the Democratic People’s Republic of Algeria Abdelmadjid Tebboune (2021)
Source: https://www.quirinale.it/elementi/60784 
Attribution: Quirinale.it

The Appeal of “Duginism” in the Middle East

Aleksandr Dugin, at the Civilizations of the Eurasian Area meeting on February 26, 2018 at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.

Aleksandr Dugin, at the Civilizations of the Eurasian Area meeting on February 26, 2018 at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.


A special role in the project is given to Sufism, not only in Turkey but also in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa.


Whatever one thinks of Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin’s esoteric cultural-geopolitical theories, his influence in Arabic-speaking countries is worthy of attention. Dugin, a Russian political philosopher who rose to prominence among Russian military and foreign policy elites with the 1997 publication of his book “Foundations of Geopolitics,” has long called for Russia to annex Ukraine to counter “Atlanticist” encroachment. Several of Dugin’s books are available in Arabic translation, most recently a tome published last July by prominent Qatari think tank The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Two elements of Dugin’s ruminations on culture and geopolitics are finding receptive audiences in the Middle East: one, his opposition to U.S. regional involvement; and two, his appeals to cultural conservatism and civilizational identity.

Dugin’s strident critique of U.S. presence in the Middle East has been attractive to members of the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis,” which includes Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon and opposes the “West,” Israel, and Saudi Arabia.  Following the assassination of Dugin’s daughter Daria in August 2022 in Russia, allegedly by the Ukrainian government, a top Lebanese Hezbollah official issued a condolence statement that praised Dugin’s support for “the Palestinian cause and the legitimate struggle against American hegemony, Zionist occupation and takfiri terrorism.” Indeed, Dugin’s strong critiques of Israel seemingly appeal to a broad spectrum of the Arab public, including leftists and liberals who may otherwise disagree with many of his far-right-leaning ideas.

Furthermore, Dugin’s cultural conservatism seemingly endears him to a spectrum of Middle Eastern religious movements and organizations, both Sunni and Shi’ite.  Perhaps most interesting in this regard are Dugin’s appeals to Sufism, a diverse and varied Sunni school of thought and practice.  Broadly speaking, Sufism is associated with a mystical, esoteric approach to Islam, in contrast to the strict textualism of fundamentalist Salafi or Wahhabi groups.  The accompanying excerpt from the leftist, pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, translates a 2020 piece written by Daria Dugin on Russia’s approach to the Middle East.  In it, she argues for establishing a Russian alliance with the “Islamic Civilization” via Iran and Turkey, with special emphasis on Turkey due to its historical links with Sufism. Dugin’s appeal among Arab intellectuals and pundits has its limits, however.  Arab liberals, in particular, are likely to be skeptical of Dugin’s “anti-imperialism” and distrust his appeals to cultural conservatism.  As a recent piece in the independent Lebanese news website al-Modon argues, Dugin supports the idea of self-determination yet also “theorizes conquests, profit-sharing, and access to the warm waters of oceans and seas,” and as such is little more than an ideologue seeking to justify Russia’s imperial ambitions.


Sources:

Source: The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (prominent Qatari think tank), July 2022. https://bookstore.dohainstitute.org/p-2276.aspx

As part of its “translation series,” The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies has published a book titled “Geopolitics of Postmodernity: The Age of New Empires, General Outlines of Political Geography in the Twenty-First Century,” by Alexander Dugin.

Source:

“الموسوي: جريمة اغتيال داريا دوغينا تشكل عملاً ارهابياً قذرا

(Al-Moussawi: The assasination of Daria Dugin is a dirty act of terrorism),” al-Manar (Lebanese Hezbollah media outlet), 24 August 2022. https://almanar.com.lb/9887506

Hezbollah’s official in charge of Arab and international relations, Ammar al-Moussawi, issued the following statement:

On the occasion of the tragic incident that claimed the life of Mrs. Daria Dugin, the daughter of the Russian thinker and philosopher Alexander Dugin, I would like to express my condemnation of this crime, which constitutes a filthy terrorist act. I also take this occasion to express my great appreciation for Mr. Dugin’s position and courageous stances in defense of his country and people, as well as of just and righteous causes, including the Palestinian cause and the legitimate struggle against American hegemony, Zionist occupation and takfiri terrorism.

Source:

“روسيا والشرق الأوسط: استراتيجيات آفاق وتوقعات

(Russia and the Middle East: Strategies, Prospects and Expectations),” al-Akhbar (leftist, pro-Hezbollah Lebanese daily), 22 August 2022. https://al-akhbar.com/World/343506

A special role in the project is given to Sufism, not only in Turkey but also in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, with the exception of countries where Wahhabism, Salafism and Takfirism predominate (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar)… Reviving the traditions of Rumi, Bektashi, and Yunus Emre may also change the role of Ankara, which has a chance to become a true leader of the Sunni world. Sufism, while remaining outside Middle Eastern operations, is at least as mobilizing as Salafism, and could play a role in uniting the Muslim world against Atlanticism and the Wahhabism it supports…

Thus, Moscow, Ankara and Tehran will return to their traditional roots and become centers of three spiritual civilizations (Orthodox, Sunni and Shiite). Together, they will oppose the West. It is interesting to note that these three nations, with imperial traditions, may have fought each other in the past, but today they have learned to overcome historical contradictions and realize the geopolitical inevitability of this tripartite partnership. 

Source:

“الدوغينيون العرب

(The Arab Dugins),” al-Modon (independent liberal Lebanese news website), 25 August 2022.

https://tinyurl.com/2p978ntr

Indeed, in some of his books, Dugin theorizes conquests, profit-sharing, and access to the warm waters of oceans and seas. In short, the Russian Dugin is nothing but the other side of the American ideologues who have exposed us to creative chaos and what resulted from creative chaos, and democracy and what resulted from democracy…


Image Information:

Image: Aleksandr Dugin, at the Civilizations of the Eurasian Area meeting on February 26, 2018 at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.
Source: https://www.farsnews.ir/photo/13981126000814/نشست-تمدن-های-حوزه-اوراسیا
Attribution: CCA 4.0 INT

Algerian Military Deepening Ties to Russia

“… [Israel Defense Forces’ Chief of Staff] Kochavi’s visit to Morocco resulted in a series of technical and strategic agreements between the two armies and the two governments.….”


Russian-Algerian security cooperation has not been dampened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  Last March, a high-level Russian military delegation visited Algiers, where the two sides agreed to hold join anti-terror military exercises in southern Algeria this November (see “Algeria Caught Between Neutrality and Strategic Relations with Russia,” OE Watch, Issue 5, 2022).  Following a visit to Algiers in May, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke of “a new strategic cooperation document” that was being drafted to replace the 2001 agreement that currently guides Russian-Algerian relations.  In early June, the new director of Algeria’s Advanced Warfighting School led a group of officers on a tour of General Staff colleges in Russia (see “Algeria Inches Closer to Russia Amid Frosty Relations with Morocco and Spain,” OE Watch, Issue 7, 2022).  Also in May, as reported in the influential Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, a high-level Russian delegation led by Viktor Bondarev, the former head of the Russian Aerospace Forces who is now Chair of the Russian Federation Council’s Committee on Defense and Security, visited Algiers to discuss military cooperation and developments in Ukraine.  In late June, the general director of the Russian defense export entity Rosoboronexport visited Algeria, where he met with top military leadership. 

Despite other Algerian sentiment, the Algerian military seems likely to deepen military ties with Russia.  Over the past decade, Algeria has invested a substantial percentage of its GDP in new weapons purchases, particularly from Russia.  In recent months, high oil prices and new demand for natural gas in Europe have provided Algeria with a revenue windfall, parts of which will likely be channeled toward importing advanced weaponry.  Morocco, in turn, is set to boost its own military expenditures and capabilities through a blossoming relationship with Israel.  The Algerian-Moroccan arms race of the past decade is poised to intensify in the coming years, in the shadow of growing geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West.


Source:

“مسؤول روسي رفيع يبحث بالجزائر التعاون العسكري 

(High-level Russian official discusses military cooperation in Algeria),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 17 May 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2s3jt5ms

Yesterday, a senior official in the Russian Federation Council discussed with local Algerian officials the ongoing war in Ukraine, the development of military cooperation between the two countries, and the previously announced joint military exercises scheduled in the Algerian desert in November.

“Lieutenant General Said Chanegriha, Chief of Staff of the People’s National Army receives in audience the General Director of the Russian company Rosoboronexport, Mr. Alexandre Mikhaeev,” People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria Ministry of National Defence (Algerian Defense Ministry), 28 June 2022. https://www.mdn.dz/site_principal/sommaire/actualites/an/2022/juin/cem28062022an.php

The Lieutenant General Saïd Chanegriha, Chief of Staff of the People’s National Army, received in audience, this Tuesday 28th June 2022, at the headquarters of the People’s National Army, the General Director of the Russian company Rosoboronexport, Mr. Alexandre Mikhaeev. 

China Sharpens Tone Against U.S. Policy, Deepening Ties in Syria

Wang Yi, China's Foreign Minister at the Supporting Syria conference (2016).

Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister at the Supporting Syria conference (2016).


“…The United States has not stopped looting Syrian local resources…”


Chinese rhetoric toward the U.S. presence in Syria has recently sharpened, signaling a further convergence of narratives with Russia criticizing U.S. involvement in Syria while possibly hinting at greater Chinese involvement in the Levant.  Until recently, China’s criticism had largely been muted and vaguely worded, in contrast to the more direct accusations made by Syrian and Russian government officials and media outlets.  The excerpted article from the Arabic-language version of the Chinese state-run publication The People’s Daily is illustrative, alluding to a U.S. policy of “frantic piracy and resource looting” in Syria and beyond.  The article reinforces statements made by Chinese diplomats and is one of several pieces published in Arabic-language Chinese media highlighting the U.S.-facilitated transfer of oil from Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria across the border into Iraq.  The Chinese emphasis on “looting” echoes a narrative that has been pursued by Russian and Syrian officials for several months, partially in response to the Western emphasis on Russia’s control over Ukrainian resources.  Thus, China’s new approach reflects a narrative convergence with Russia, one that may portend greater coordination between these countries in the Levant.  

Meanwhile, China is working on telecommunications development that would further enable its rhetoric and influence with Syria.  In early 2022, Syria officially signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative, potentially setting the stage for greater Chinese economic involvement in the country.  In late July, the two countries signed a letter of intent for China to furnish $30 million dollars of telecommunications equipment and software for Syria to rebuild its tattered network in war-torn areas of the country.  As portrayed in an article from the pro-regime Syrian daily al-Watan, the agreement is a further landmark of deepening bilateral ties.  An analyst cited by the Qatar-aligned daily al-Araby al-Jadeedascribes security significance to the deal, arguing that it is for “listening and jamming devices,” though no evidence is presented to back this claim.  The deal could indeed be the start of greater Chinese involvement in Syria’s technological sector, though the modest sums involved belie the idea that it is of great consequence.  Nonetheless, media coverage of the deal highlights a growing pattern of magnification of the significance of any Chinese aid or assistance.  A good example of this comes from a recent report by the Center for Operational Analysis and Research, a Syria-focused research consultancy group.  The report notes that even though Syria received more than triple the number of COVID-19 vaccines from the World Health Organization’s COVAX initiative than it did from China, Syria’s official news agency published at least 38 articles praising Chinese assistance, and only one reference to the COVAX aid.   


Source:

“تعليق: سرقة النفط والقمح من سوريا .. حقيقة سيناريو الديمقراطية وحقوق الانسان الامريكي في الشرق الأوسط 

(Theft of oil and wheat from Syria .. The reality of the American democracy and human rights scenario in the Middle East),” China People’s Daily – Arabic (Chinese daily), 8 August 2022. http://arabic.people.com.cn/n3/2022/0808/c31662-10132765.html

In recent years, the United States has engaged in frantic piracy and looting of resources in the Middle East…  The United States has not stopped looting Syrian local resources since it stationed itself by force in the name of “fighting terrorism” in 2015.

Source: 

“سورية والصين توقعان على مشروع لتوريد تجهيزات خاصة بالاتصالات والبرمجيات بقيمة 30 مليون دولار …  

(China and Syria agree on project to supply communications and software equipment worth $30 million…),” al-Watan (pro-regime Syrian daily), 21 July 2022. https://alwatan.sy/archives/311198 

The Chinese ambassador also revealed that China’s $30 million grant for the supply of telecommunications technology equipment — which was preceded about a month ago by the grant of 100 Chinese buses — will be followed in the coming days by the arrival of a new batch of Chinese food aid, including wheat and rice…  In turn, the head of the Planning and International Cooperation Authority, Fadi Salti Al-Khalil… referred to the memorandum of understanding that was signed with the Chinese side at the beginning of this year for Syria’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative… 

Source: 

“الصين تزود النظام السوري بمعدات وبرمجيات اتصالات 

 (China supplies Syrian regime with software and telecommunications equipment),” al-Araby al-Jadeed (Qatari aligned daily), 20 July 2022. https://tinyurl.com/utsk4cym  

Meanwhile, economic researcher Younes al-Karim said in an interview with al-Araby al-Jadeed that the Chinese communication equipment announced today is likely to be “military, not civilian.” Al-Karim said that “the agreement is not new, it was revealed a while ago, and it is related to bringing in military listening and jamming devices.

Source: “China in Syria: Aid and Trade Now, Influence and Industry Later?,” Center for Operational Analysis and Research – COAR (Syria-focused research consultancy), 11 July 2022. https://coar-global.org/2022/07/11/china-in-syria-aid-and-trade-now-influence-and-industry-later/  

As of February 2022, Syria has received more than 8.3 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines through the WHO-supported COVAX facility, while China has committed an estimated 2.6 million vaccine doses.  As of early May 2022, SANA had published no fewer than 38 articles referencing Chinese bilateral support for COVID-related measures, noting that it “has spared no effort” to support Syria throughout the pandemic.  By comparison, SANA had referenced the (largely Western) WHO-supported COVAX facility only once.


Image Information:

Image: Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister at the Supporting Syria conference (2016).
Source: DFID – UK Department for International Development, Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/dfid/24789378436  
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Algerian Media Dismissive of Morocco-Israel Security Cooperation

IAI Harop UAV at Paris Air Show 2013.

IAI Harop UAV at Paris Air Show 2013.


“China controls 80 to 90 percent of global capacity. This is an extremely dominant position for a country at a time when everyone is trying to expand.”


Security cooperation between Morocco and Israel has expanded rapidly since the two countries formalized relations as part of the 2020 Abraham Accords.  As reported in the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, the two militaries will institutionalize regular joint training and education programs.  In addition, Morocco has agreed to purchase Israeli weapons systems, including the BARAK MX Integrated Air & Missile Defense System, Heron unmanned aerial vehicles, and Harop loitering munitions[RG1] .  Seeking to bolster its domestic defense industry with Israeli know-how, Morocco is set to eventually manufacture Harop munitions domestically. 

Against this backdrop, Algerian media outlets have been dismissive of the extent to which deepening Israeli-Moroccan security links will shift the balance of military power in North Africa.  A recent opinion article in the Algerian daily El Chorouk interprets Moroccan outreach to Israel as a sign of desperation and insecurity within Morocco’s ruling elite, due to both regional strategic challenges and uncertainty over royal succession.  In this view, Israel is the only party willing to “rescue Morocco from Algeria’s military power,” something that in the author’s view it will not accomplish.  Algerian pundits may be dismissive of Morocco’s growing power, but Algerian military leaders are undoubtedly paying attention to the challenge of the Israel-Morocco security partnership. 


Source:

“كيف يستفيد المغرب من التجربة الإسرائيلية؟ 

(How does Morocco benefit from the Israeli experience?),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 22 July 2022. https://tinyurl.com/n5ntt67x

Kochavi’s visit to Morocco resulted in a series of technical and strategic agreements between the two armies and the two governments. At the core of them is cooperation in various security fields, as well as an active and persistent exchange of experiences, including study exchanges and joint training of combat units throughout the year… Morocco also agreed to buy a set of [Harop kamikaze drones] and to start manufacturing them domestically…

Source:

“الصهاينة لنجدة المخزن ضدّ قوة الجزائر العسكرية

(Zionism to rescue the Makhzen from Algeria’s military force),” El Chorouk (Algerian daily), 9 August 2022. https://tinyurl.com/4k6ew5zb

As for its dispute with Algeria, it led Morocco to an accelerating arms race in which it was difficult to keep pace with its eastern neighbor, leaving it far behind due to the strength of the latter’s resources, in contrast to the scarcity of Moroccan resources… [Morocco] has found no refuge except in the Zionist entity, which cannot provide what Rabat is looking for.


Image Information:

Image: IAI Harop UAV at Paris Air Show 2013
Source: Julian Herzog, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IAI_Harop_PAS_2013_02.jpg
Attribution: CC 4.0

Yemen’s Houthi Movement Continues To Recruit and Indoctrinate Child Combatants

Houthi logo on a house in Yafaa-Dhamar, Yemen (2013).

Houthi logo on a house in Yafaa-Dhamar, Yemen (2013).


“…Observers attribute the Houthis’ frantic race to recruit children to a need to cover huge losses on the fighting fronts…”


Yemen’s Ansarallah, a.k.a. the Houthis, have been indoctrinating child combatants with a militant anti-Western ideology for years.  According to the accompanying excerpt from the Emirati daily al-Ittihad, the Houthis have recruited more than 30,000 children to fight in Yemen’s ongoing conflict.  Ansarallah began as summer camps where children and adolescents, who were known as “Believing Youth,” were steeped in Zaydi religious doctrine, a Shiite offshoot prevalent in Yemen. They also learned to oppose stridently external involvement in their society’s affairs, particularly from the United States.  As the Houthis morphed into an armed rebel movement in the early 2000s, their summer camps evolved into a recruitment pool for committed foot soldiers. 

Although Ansarallah is now the de facto government of former North Yemen, it remains faithful to its roots as a network of youth training and indoctrination centers.  Since April, in the context of a nation-wide truce, the group vowed to stop sending children to the battlefield.  However, according to an expert cited by the Saudi-funded daily Independent Arabia, the Houthis have ramped up their recruitment activities this summer to make up for losses sustained in a failed attempt to take the city of Marib over the past year.  A variety of methods are used to get parents to send their children to the camps, including extensive nation-wide media campaigns, material incentives, and various forms of pressure and blackmail.  Lagging recruitment this summer, as noted in the accompanying article from the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, has led Ansarallah to force government employees to send their children to the summer camps or risk losing their jobs.


Sources:

”الحوثي” يواصل سياسة تجنيد الأطفال

(‘Houthis’ continue child recruitment policies),” al-Ittihad (Emirati daily), 2 June 2022. https://tinyurl.com/3bdtwwmy

Majed Al-Fadael, Undersecretary of the Yemeni Ministry of Human Rights and a member of the Supervisory Committee for the Exchange of Prisoners and Abductees, told Al-Ittihad that although there are no accurate statistics on the number of child soldiers, estimates indicate that more than 30,000 children have been dragged into the fighting fronts by the Houthi militia.

Source:

”المراكز الصيفية” طعم حوثي لتجنيد الأطفال

(‘Summer Camps’: Houthi bait for recruiting children),” Independent Arabia (Saudi-funded daily), 18 June 2022. https://tinyurl.com/yckr8vyp 

Observers attribute the Houthis’ frantic race to recruit children to a need to cover huge losses on the fighting fronts, especially during a nearly two-year battle to control the strategic city of Marib.

Source:

”الحوثيون يلزمون موظفيهم إحضار أبنائهم إلى معسكرات التجنيد والتعبئة

(Houthis force employees to bring their children to the recruitment and mobilization camps),” al-Sharq al-Awsat (influential Saudi daily), 20 June 2022.  https://tinyurl.com/yj83zj7j

Despite intimidation, incentives, and media campaigns in which mosques and dozens of radio and television stations participated, the Houthi militias failed to convince the majority of students’ parents in the occupied Yemeni capital to enroll their children in their sectarian “summer camps.” For this reason, they have resorted to forcing employees in government institutions and departments to bring their children to the camps.


Image Information:

Image:  Houthi logo on a house in Yafaa-Dhamar, Yemen (2013)
Source: Abdullah Sarhan, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Huthi-Logo.JPG
Attribution: CC 4.0