Separatist Conflict Imminent in Northern Mali

Islamist fighters in northern Mali.

Islamist fighters in northern Mali.


“He reiterated that kinetic measures alone will not end the war and therefore advised that a political solution be implemented.”  


On 10 March, the Arabic-language website imangahdien.com, which covers northern Mali, published the excerpted interview with the spokesperson for the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA).  The CMA includes Tuareg and Arab militant and political movements that seek autonomy for northern Mali.  In 2015, the CMA concluded a peace agreement with the Malian government, known as the Algiers Accords.  CMA spokesperson Mohamed Ramadan Mouloud suggests that the CMA may take up arms again against the Malian state and renounce the Algiers Accords.  The CMA views that a return to war is likely because the current Malian military rulers are unwilling to grant autonomy in parts of northern Mali to the CMA.   The CMA’s views regarding the lack of implementation of the Algiers Accords are consistent with the findings of the International Crisis Group, which argued in 2020 that the decentralization and regionalization guaranteed by the Accords had indeed not been fully implemented and that the Malian government focused almost exclusively on the jihadist threat.

Mouloud notes that the CMA welcomed the coup that brought the Malian military to power last year and ousted the democratically elected President Ibrahima Boubacar Keïta.  According to Mouloud, Keïta did not implement the Algiers Accords.  However, the CMA believes that the military leaders have also not implemented them, despite their promises to do so.  Further, the CMA resents the military rulers because they allowed Russian forces, including from the Wagner Group, on Malian soil despite Russia’s record of human rights abuses in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, and elsewhere.  Moreover, the CMA claims that Russia will not be able to compensate for the withdrawal of French troops from Mali because the security and counter-terrorism demands of the country are too severe for either foreign power to resolve.  Rather, the CMA believes its own military forces should be granted increased authority to provide security in northern Mali.


Source:

“المتحدث باسم CMA: العودة إلى الكفاح المسلح ليست مستبعدة في ظل تنصل مالي من اتفاقية السلام (CMA Spokesperson: A return to armed struggle is not excluded because of Mali’s rejection of the peace agreement),” imangahdien.com (Arab language news website), 10 March 2022. https://imangahdien.com/en/2022/03/10/porte-parole-de-la-cma-un-retour-a-la-lutte-armee-nest-pas-exclu-a-la-lumiere-de-la-repudiation-par-le-mali-de-laccord-de-paix/

The spokesperson for the Coordination of Azawad Movements, which signed the peace agreement with the Malian government, stated that a return to armed struggle cannot be discounted because of the Malian government’s disavowal of the agreement concluded between the two parties.

Mohamed Ramadan Mouloud: In fact, we welcomed with anticipation the departure of the regime of former President Ibrahima Boubacar Keïta, who had no will to implement the agreement concluded between the Malian government and the Azawad movements, signed six years ago, all of which was scheduled to be implemented within two years of its signing…. The precedent that has been procrastinating and manipulating the Azawadi issue.

Our position on the Russian presence is very clear and specific. From the first day, we issued a statement rejecting the Russian presence on the territory of Mali, and we said that this presence would represent a danger to the region, and that Wagner’s history is linked to crimes and massacres in Syria, Libya and Central Africa…. Of course, they will not be able to fill the vacuum of the French and European forces, and in fact, the security vacuum in Mali can only be filled by the re-arranged national army, to include the national forces of the Azawad movement.

Source: “Mali’s Algiers Peace Agreement, Five Years On: An Uneasy Calm,” The International Crisis Group (international research organization), 24 June 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire

The agreement seeks to restore peace in Mali principally through a process of decentralisation or regionalisation, reconstituting a national army from the members of the former armed groups that were signatories, and boosting the economy (particularly in the north), based on dialogue, justice and national reconciliation…. So far, the measures have been temporary or too limited to make any real impact on the ground.


Image Information:

Image: Islamist fighters in northern Mali.
Source: Idrissa Fall
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Islamist_fighters_in_northern_Mali.PNG
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Indonesia Upgrades Naval Submarine Fleet

Submarine KRI Nagapasa, Indonesian Navy.

Submarine KRI Nagapasa, Indonesian Navy.


“Yudo explained that the plan to purchase Scorpene submarines had undergone a long evaluation in order to modernize the equipment of the Indonesian Navy’s weapons systems.”


Recently, Indonesia acquired two Scorpene submarines from France, modernizing its navy’s weapons systems.  The accompanying articles from local sources provide insight intotwo factors that prompted Indonesia to pursue new submarines.  First, China has repeatedly entered the waters of the North Natuna Sea, which Indonesia claims as its exclusive economic zone and China asserts is within its so-called nine-dash line.  The Natuna Sea is important for both countries’ economies due to its substantial oil and gas reserves.  Second, in April 2021, an Indonesian submarine sank off the coast of Bali, killing 53 crew members.  The 44-year old submarine’s sinking highlighted the age and vulnerability of Indonesia’s aging submarine fleet and the need for an upgrade.  The next step for Indonesia is to receive training on operating the Scorpene submarines and acquire the necessary spare parts and an air-independent propulsion system.


Source:

“Prabowo Bakal Beli 2 Kapal Selam Scorpene, KSAL: Kita Sudah Cek, Kita Setuju (Prabowo will Buy 2 Scorpene Submarines, KSAL: We Have Checked, We Agree),” kompas.com (historically pro-government and nationalist-leaning Indonesian-language news source), 5 March 2022.  https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/03/02/15351471/prabowo-bakal-beli-2-kapal-selam-scorpene-ksal-kita-sudah-cek-kita-setuju

The Chief of Naval Staff (KSAL) Admiral Yudo Margono agreed to the plan to purchase two Scorpene ships from France. According to Yudo, the Scorpene submarine is a submarine that meets the requirements to be able to operate within the confines of Indonesian waters…. In addition, Yudo explained that the plan to purchase Scorpene submarines had undergone a long evaluation in order to modernize the equipment of the Indonesian Navy’s weapons systems.”

Source: “Indonesia to ramp up submarine fleet in response to Chinese incursions,” aninews.com (news source covering Indian and Asian current affairs), 30 May 2021.  https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/indonesia-to-ramp-up-submarine-fleet-in-response-to-chinese-incursions20210530163032/

In response to repeated Chinese incursions into its waters, Indonesia aims to expand its submarine fleet by as much as triple its current line to 12 total vessels, according to multiple defense sources.

This comes after the Indonesian submarine that went missing off the coast of Bali with 53 crew members on board sunk last month, killing all crewman.


Image Information:

Image: Submarine KRI Nagapasa, Indonesian Navy.
Source: Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Submarine_KRI_Nagapasa,_Indonesian_Navy.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Philippines Pursues Helicopter Deals with Russia, Turkey, and Poland

Marawi crisis UH-1H helicopter.

Marawi crisis UH-1H helicopter.


“The Philippines will proceed with the acquisition of 17 helicopters from Russia despite the latter’s conflict with Ukraine…”


The accompanying article from the Philippines-based gmanetwork.com looks at the Philippine government’s decision to purchase 17 military transport helicopters from Russia.  The article notes that the deal was made before the Russian invasion of Ukraine and, for the Philippines, the invasion does not affect the status of the deal.  The article asserts that the fulfillment of the deal would ultimately depend on Russia, which has been subject to sanctions since its war in Ukraine began.  The president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, has only expressed concern about, but not condemned, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In addition, on 9 March, Turkey’s pro-government Daily Sabah reported that the Philippines received six attack helicopters from a Turkish company.  Like the Russian helicopters, the helicopters from Turkey are intended to enhance the Philippines’ surface strike system.  They are capable of being deployed in the South China Sea, where the Philippines has territorial disputes with China.

Besides Russia and Turkey, gmanetwork.com reported on 22 February that the Philippines acquired 16 Black Hawk helicopters from Poland and is under contract for the purchase of 32 more.  The Philippines Air Force (PAF) noted that the helicopters would be used in humanitarian emergencies, as occurred when Typhoon Odette caused the deaths of more than 400 civilians in Visayas and Mindanao in December 2021.  In addition, the PAF may use the helicopters for aerial surveillance, including of pirates and terrorist groups like Abu Sayyaf, which have been active in the south of the country, kidnapping both foreign tourists and Philippine citizens.


Source:

“Philippines keeps $12.7-billion chopper deal with Russia despite Ukraine conflict,” gmanetwork.com (largely centrist Philippine based media outlet), 10 March 2022. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/824565/philippines-keeps-12-7-billion-chopper-deal-with-russia-despite-ukraine-conflict/story/

The Philippines will proceed with the acquisition of 17 helicopters from Russia despite the latter’s conflict with Ukraine, the Department of National Defense (DND) said. In a statement, DND Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said the deal and initial payment for the project were made even before the start of the crisis in Ukraine.

Source: “Philippines receives 1st batch of Turkey-made attack helicopters,” dailysabah.com (Turkish pro-government news source), 9 March 2022. https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/philippines-receives-1st-batch-of-turkey-made-attack-helicopters

The Philippines has received the first batch of Turkey-made attack helicopters, the country’s air force announced. The country had ordered six helicopters designed and developed by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI). The Philippines – which is buying the six choppers worth approximately $280 million (TL 4.1 billion) – is the first country abroad to use the ATAK.

Mariano said the Turkish-made attack helicopters are expected to enhance the “surface strike system” of the Air Force.

Source: “Philippines, Poland firm sign deal for 32 Black Hawk helicopters,” gmanetwork.com (largely centrist Philippine based media outlet), 22 February 2022. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/822693/philippines-poland-firm-sign-deal-for-32-black-hawk-helicopters/story/

The PAF said the set of helicopters would boost the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ capability for various operations such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions. The defense chief added that the Black Hawk helicopters, as well as the country’s 15 Sikorsky 70i, were helpful during the onslaught of Typhoon Odette in parts of Visayas and Mindanao.


Image Information:

Image: Marawi crisis UH-1H helicopter.
Source: Philippines Information Agency
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marawi_crisis_UH-1H_helicopter.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 2.0

Nigerian Governor Assures Counterterrorism Success Against Boko Haram

7 Div NA - Camp Zairo, 2017.

7 Div NA – Camp Zairo, 2017.


“He reiterated that kinetic measures alone will not end the war and therefore advised that a political solution be applied.”  


Babaguna Zulum, the governor of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State, is assuring Nigerians that a multi-pronged counterterrorism approach is leading to success against Boko Haram.  According to the excerpted 18 February article from Nigerian current events-focused Vanguard News, Zulum met with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari and reported that 30,000 Boko Haram members had surrendered voluntarily to the Borno authorities.  He further underscored that defections from Boko Haram substantiate that dialogue with the insurgents, including guarantees of assistance for insurgents who lay down their arms, must accompany the army’s use of force.

Zulum noted that the heavy presence of Nigerian troops in southern Borno coincided with the defections and called for a similar deployment in northern Borno.  This indicates that military pressure on the insurgents led to demoralization and caused some of the insurgents to surrender.  Further, Zulum advised that once the government cleared insurgents from local areas, then it should immediately return displaced people to their homes with military protection.

Zulum distinguished between those Boko Haram members who the government captured and those who surrendered, with only the latter granted a chance for rehabilitation.  Given the success of such efforts, Zulum urged the Nigerian government to provide increased funding to repatriation, resettlement, and reconciliation programs.  More broadly, Zulum claims that Boko Haram will not be defeated completely on the battlefield and, therefore, the government must seek some form of political settlement through negotiations.


Source:

“Boko Haram insurgency’ll end by 2023 — Zulum,” vanguardngr.com (Nigerian news source), 18 February 2022. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/02/boko-haram-insurgencyll-end-by-2023-zulum//

The governor further said that the Borno state government does not offer any incentive to the fighters to come out of the forests; rather, they have done so voluntarily.

Zulum disclosed that he discussed the continuing surrender of the insurgents and the case of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with the president even as he said that the security situation in Borno state has improved considerably, hoping that things will continue in that direction. He reiterated that kinetic measures alone will not end the war and therefore advised that a political solution be applied.

“… I’m pleased to inform you that there was a very heavy military deployment into the southern Borno. And I hope such a deployment will also take place in northern Borno, with a view to clearing the ISWAP insurgents in the Lake Chad.”

Source: “More than 8,000 Boko Haram terrorists have surrendered,” premiumtimesng.com (Nigerian news source), 21 September 2021. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/486107-more-than-8000-boko-haram-terrorists-have-surrendered-goc.html

The Acting General Officer Commanding (GOC), 7 Division, Abdulwahab Eyitayo, says more than 8,000 Boko Haram terrorists have so far surrendered to troops.… He said the surrender by the repentant terrorists was a welcome development, adding that the overwhelming fire power of the troops was responsible.


Image Information:

Image: 7 Div NA – Camp Zairo, 2017
Source: Hussaina Muhammad, VOA
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:7_Div_NA_-_Camp_Zairo,_2017.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Senegal and Algeria Opposed to Their Citizens Fighting in Ukraine

Ukrainian aviation unit. DR Congo.

Ukrainian aviation unit. DR Congo.


“Like their Algerian counterparts, the Senegalese authorities requested the Ukrainian embassy to immediately withdraw the call to recruitment without delay.”


Ukrainian soldiers have taken part in peacekeeping operations in Africa in recent years, and now Ukraine is urging African nationals to travel to Ukraine to fight Russian.  The excerpted French-language article in tsa-algerie.dz, which covers affairs in Francophone countries from an Algerian perspective, discussed the Algerian and Senegalese governments’ negative reactions to the prospects of their citizens fighting in Ukraine.  According to the article, the Ukrainian Embassies in Algeria and Senegal issued statements on Facebook calling on these countries’ citizens to join the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces to resist Russian aggression.  In response, the Algerian government demanded that Ukraine remove the post on grounds that it violates the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.  Senegal relayed the same message to Ukraine, while acknowledging that 36 Senegalese citizens had registered to fight.  Senegal is wary of foreign fighters given the experience of its nationals as foreign fighters with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  France24.com, for example, reported in the excerpted passage from 2016 that Senegalese had become influential in ISIS in both Libya and Syria.  Although the circumstances and threats are different with the situation in Ukraine, Senegal, like Algeria, remains steadfastly against allowing the participation of its nationals in foreign conflicts.


Source:

“Le grave dérapage de l’ambassade ukrainienne en Algérie (The serious mistake of the Ukrainian embassy in Algeria),” tsa-algerie.dz, 4 March 2022. https://www.tsa-algerie.dz/le-grave-derapage-de-lambassade-ukrainienne-en-algerie/

To all foreigners “who wish to join the resistance to the Russian occupiers and protect world security,” Ukrainian leaders offer you “to come to our country and join the ranks of the Territorial Defense Forces…,” the appeal read. The message was taken down after the Algerian foreign ministry ordered the Ukrainian embassy to delete it.

This message was also relayed by the Ukrainian Embassy in Senegal. The Ukrainian ambassador in Dakar confirmed the existence of the call while confirming the registration of 36 volunteer candidates. Like their Algerian counterparts, the Senegalese authorities requested the Ukrainian embassy to immediately withdraw the call to recruitment without delay.

Source: “Who are the Senegalese men joining the Islamic State group?,” france24.com, 1 February 2016. https://observers.france24.com/en/20160201-senegal-jihadist-islamic-state

Senegal is on edge after jihadist attacks have swept West Africa in the past few months, striking Mali in December 2015 and previously quiet Burkina Faso in January 2015. Senegal is worried that it might be the jihadists’ next target. In a sweep aimed at cracking down on insecurity, Senegal arrested 900 people in the cities of Dakar and Thies last month. Although most of these arrests were not on terror-related suspicions, the police said that the raids were carried out because of the terrorist threat.


Image Information:

Image: Ukrainian aviation unit. DR Congo.
Source: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ukrainian_aviation_unit._DR_Congo_(26858301702).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Uganda and Rwanda Target Militants in Congo

Ugandan soldiers on parade.

Ugandan soldiers on parade.


“In order to fight them more effectively, our two countries [Uganda and DRC] have recently agreed to pool their efforts in order to carry out joint operations against this common enemy.”


The first accompanying excerpt from the Rwanda-centric media outlet taarifa.rw discusses the continued counterterrorism collaboration of Rwanda’s neighbors, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  The cooperation is meant to combat militants loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the insurgent Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), based in the DRC.  According to the article, the two countries’ forces have opened a second axis for launching an offensive against the ADF.  The article notes that originally Uganda entered the DRC with the DRC government’s permission because the ADF conducted two bombings in Kampala, but Uganda has increased coordination with the DRC to more effectively combat the ADF.

The second accompanying excerpt from the Ugandan publication pulse.ug also emphasizes a retaliatory objective for Uganda’s latest troop deployment to the DRC.  Besides the ADF’s bombings in Kampala, the group also began attacking markets located near Uganda’s northern border with the DRC.  After the ADF stole food and medicine and retreated, numerous displaced people crossed into Uganda, which created an additional humanitarian crisis for Uganda.  Further, the article notes the Ugandan army suspected that ADF members were operating in Uganda by disguising themselves as refugees.  This incentivized Uganda to enter the DRC to push the ADF back from the border.

As the final excerpt from the pro-government Rwandan daily newtimes.co.rw notes, there is a growing perception that the conflict in the DRC is now a regional affair.  According to the article, Rwandan President Paul Kagame is calling for collective regional military action to combat the ADF and the Rwandan government is opening lines of communication with Uganda to resolve their border issues as another means to address the ADF’s regional threat.  In addition, the article mentions Rwanda’s increasing collaboration with Burundi to target other militia groups besides the ADF, and with Mozambique to combat ISIS-loyal militants in that country.  This suggests that Rwanda is increasingly acquiring regional military influence.


Source:

“Uganda Sends More Troops To DRC,” taarifa.rw (Rwanda-centric media outlet), 3 February 2022. https://taarifa.rw/uganda-sends-more-troops-to-drc/

Uganda’s government says it has sent an extra number of troops into neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo to bolster its fight against the Allied Democratic Forces rebels. Last year in November, thousands of [Ugandan] troops crossed into DRC on invitation by President Félix Tshisekedi to “fight against armed groups, in particular the Ugandan rebels of the ADF”. Uganda gladly accepted the invitation and responded by conducting aerial and artillery bombardment of ADF bases deep in the jungles of DRC.

The attacks in October and November [2021] prompted the Ugandan military to deploy in eastern DRC in late November to take on the Islamist fighters.

Source: “Thousands of refugees flee into Uganda after an ADF attack,” pulse.ug (Ugandan publication covering Ugandan affairs for a global readership), 7 February 2022. https://www.pulse.ug/news/thousands-of-refugees-flee-into-uganda-after-an-adf-attack/522ex8c

Uganda’s Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, Esther Anyakun, said that the ADF reportedly broke into pharmacies and shops as residents fled at their approach. The rebels allegedly made off with food and medicine. The refugees that crossed into Uganda were registered by Uganda Red Cross with the help of the Office of the Prime Minister and The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR. Only days before this fresh influx of refugees, residents in Bundibugyo and Ntoroko districts were advised not to accommodate refugees fleeing battle in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These refugees, Ugandan authorities said, would have to be reported to the Refugees’ Reception Center and be registered.

Source: “Security problems in DR Congo affect the whole region,” newtimes.co.rw (pro-government Rwandan daily), 8 February 2022. https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/security-problems-dr-congo-affect-whole-region-kagame

President Paul Kagame has called for collective efforts by regional leaders towards the end of security challenges in the Democratic Republic of Congo, mainly associated to armed militia groups based in the country. He said that Rwanda was ready to play her part in resolving the security challenges stemming from the neighbouring country. The head of state also weighed in on Rwanda’s ties with neighboring countries, which he said were on a promising trajectory.


Image Information:

Image: Ugandan soldiers on parade.
Photographer: Master Sergeant Carlotta Holley
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ugandan_soldiers_on_parade.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Mozambique Struggles with Post-Conflict Recovery in War Torn Cabo Delgado

Praça dos Heróis na cidade de Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, VOA.

Praça dos Heróis na cidade de Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, VOA.


“With the onset of the rainy and cyclone seasons, the cumulative impact of years of conflict and the worsening humanitarian emergency, it is more important than ever that Medicines Sans Frontiers teams have unrestricted and safe access to the area…”


On 4 February, the international affairs focused Brazilian publication portalrbn.com published the excerpted article on northern Mozambique’s transition from active military conflict to post-conflict reconstruction.  According to the article, many civilians in Cabo Delgado remain displaced and lack medical care, while attacks by militants loyal to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria persist.  For example, the militants carried out 20 attacks in the last two weeks of January, torching 2,800 homes and forcing 14,000 people to flee their villages.  The article indicates the military has retaken almost all the territory that the militants captured in 2021 but have not been able to prevent continued attacks on civilians.

Based on interviews with Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) personnel in the area, the article suggests that in addition to providing security, the military needs to find ways to provide medical care and protection against cyclones to aid displaced people.  If the military fails to do so, MSF warns the humanitarian crisis will spiral out of control, which will then affect the broader post-conflict recovery. 

In fact, further military support to Mozambique is expected in coming months. A 3 February article from South Africa-based news24.com noted that South African president Cyril Ramaphosa promised to continue South Africa’s deployment of 1,500 troops to Mozambique and allow for new investment to assist Mozambique’s post-conflict recovery.  According to the article, this will be essential to restoring normalcy to Cabo Delgado and allow for the reconstruction of northern Mozambique and the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis.  The article notes that Tanzania and Rwanda are also deploying forces to secure northern Mozambqiue and revitalize its economy, signaling a regional effort in ending the insurgency.


Source:

“Ataques e violência em Cabo Delgado deslocam milhares de pessoas no início da temporada de ciclones (Attacks and violence in Cabo Delgado displace thousands of people at the start of cyclone season),” portalrbn.com (Portuguese language international affairs focused Brazilian publication), 4 February 2022. https://portalrbn.com.br/mocambique-ataques-e-violencia-em-cabo-delgado-deslocam-milhares-de-pessoas-no-inicio-da-temporada-de-ciclones/

A significant part of Cabo Delgado’s population is now extremely vulnerable to displacement and the lack of access to medical care. Local authorities have reported more than 20 attacks on four villages in the last two weeks with 2,800 homes damaged or destroyed by fire. This is the biggest wave of displacement in recent months. “Violent attacks and continued insecurity in several districts of central Cabo Delgado have led thousands of people to leave their homes with only what they could carry, just as the cyclone and rain season is starting,” says Raphael Veicht, chief of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) emergency unit.

With the onset of the rainy and cyclone seasons, the cumulative impact of years of conflict and the worsening humanitarian emergency, it is more important than ever that MSF teams have unrestricted and safe access to the area so they can provide people with the necessary care. It is absolutely crucial that medicines and medical supplies can be imported quickly without bureaucratic delays.

Source: “’We are fighting to bring peace’: Ramaphosa visits insurgency-hit Mozambique,” news24.com (South Africa based on-line news), 3 February 2022. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/we-are-fighting-to-bring-peace-ramaphosa-visits-insurgency-hit-mozambique-20220203

President Cyril Ramaphosa visited northern Mozambique, supporting the government’s latest effort to reassure neighbours and investors that an Islamist uprising is under control. Over the last week, Mozambique has tried to reassure neighbours and investors that their efforts are worthwhile. Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan visited last Friday and TotalEnergies boss Patrick Pouyanne met Nyusi in Maputo on Monday. Rwandan forces last week also allowed journalists a rare visit, to see how life is slowly returning to some of the hardest-hit areas.


Image Information:

Image: Praça dos Heróis na cidade de Pemba, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, VOA.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pra%C3%A7a_dos_Her%C3%B3is_na_cidade_de_Pemba,_Cabo_Delgado,_Mozambique,_VOA.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Indonesia Takes Measures Against Chinese Naval Incursions

Singaporean Navy RSS Tenacious and RSS Justice along with Indonesian Navy KRI Diponegoro and KRI Malahayati during 2021 Eagle Indopura Joint Exercise.

Singaporean Navy RSS Tenacious and RSS Justice along with Indonesian Navy KRI Diponegoro and KRI Malahayati during 2021 Eagle Indopura Joint Exercise.


“China is showing its strength. It not only objected to Indonesia’s drilling operations on [Indonesia’s] own territory, but also sent coast guard ships to the area to pressure Indonesia.”


On 15 January, the mainly centrist leaning Indonesian-language website of Republika Merdeka, dunia.rmol.id, published the excerpted article on Indonesia’s evolving strategy towards China in the South China Sea and adjacent waters.  According to the article, China forced Indonesia into conflict due to Chinese coast guard ships’ encroachment into the Natuna Sea, and Chinese demands that Indonesia not extract resources from that sea.  The article notes that Indonesia argues the sea is part of its internationally recognized exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and is unwilling to acknowledge in the international arena that any dispute exists over its own maritime territory.

The article examines Indonesia’s strategy of outreach to navies in Southeast Asia, which are also seeing China make competing assertions to their own South China Sea territorial claims.  For example, Indonesia invited maritime security officials from five other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, including Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Vietnam, to a meeting in early 2023 to discuss responses to China’s assertiveness in the sea.  However, the article also concludes that China may take retaliatory actions against those countries if they participate in the proposed meeting.

In particular, the article focuses on Indonesia’s relationship with Vietnam.  The Vietnamese Coast Guard and Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, Baklama, signed a memorandum of understanding in January to cooperate on mutual maritime security.  In addition, the article noted that Indonesia was discussing with Russia’s state oil company to connect a pipeline from the Natuna Sea to Vietnam’s offshore network.  Indonesia already completed the drilling for this project, which, according to the article, Indonesia considered a Baklama victory over China.  It is unclear, however, what effect Russia’s increasing reliance on China because of the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine might have on Indonesia’s pipeline project with Russia.

In anticipation of any Chinese naval actions to take control of the Natuna Sea, the article notes that Indonesia is strengthening its defenses.  This includes building an additional runway to improve aerial surveillance of the sea, as well as a new submarine base.  Further, the country is expanding defense cooperation with three countries outside of Southeast Asia, including Japan, India, and Australia, to deter Chinese naval operations in the Natuna Sea.


Source:

“Indonesia Bersiap Menantang China di Laut China Selatan, Akankah Diikuti Negara ASEAN Lainnya? (Indonesia Prepares to Challenge China in the South China Sea, Will Other ASEAN Countries Follow?),” dunia.rmol.id (mainly centrist leaning Indonesian-language website of Republika Merdeka), 15 January 2022.  https://dunia.rmol.id/read/2022/01/15/519533/indonesia-bersiap-menantang-china-di-laut-china-selatan-akankah-diikuti-negara-asean-lainnya

China has officially opened another front in its hostilities in the South China Sea. China’s behavior ultimately pushed Jakarta to confront the defend its own territory because the disputed area by China was actually in the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Jakarta has gone its own way by seeking support from the Russian state oil company Zarubezhneft to construct a pipeline in the Natuna Sea to link up with Vietnam’s offshore network. Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) has claimed success in the endeavor, which some analysts have called “Indonesia’s great victory over China.” China had repeatedly reminded Indonesia to stop the project and stated it was a violation because it infringed on Chinese territory. China is showing its strength. It not only objected to Indonesia’s drilling operations on its own territory, but also sent coast guard ships to the area to pressure Indonesia

The latest initiative that Indonesia has taken is to invite officials in charge of maritime security from five other ASEAN countries to meet early next year to discuss how to respond to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Vietnam Coast Guard and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency last month also signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in strengthening maritime security and safety between the two powers. And the Indonesian military is extending the runway of an air base so that additional aircraft can be deployed, along with constructing a submarine base and developing defense cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.


Image Information:

Image: Singaporean Navy RSS Tenacious and RSS Justice along with Indonesian Navy KRI Diponegoro and KRI Malahayati during 2021 Eagle Indopura Joint Exercise.
Source: Dispen Koarmada II (II Fleet Command Information Service)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Singaporean_Navy_RSS_Tenacious_and_RSS_Justice_along_with_Indonesian_Navy_KRI_Diponegoro_and_KRI_Malahayati_during_2021_Eagle_Indopura_Joint_Exercise_(1).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Russia’s Increasingly Visible Military Presence in Mali

Map showing Russia and Mali.

Map showing Russia and Mali.


“‘You speak of mercenaries, it’s your business. For us, they are Russian instructors,’ said the Malian official.”  


Although Mali has longstanding military ties with France, Russia is filling the void left in the region following France’s withdrawal of forces from Mali.  According to a recent French-language article in tvmonde.com, Russian personnel have replaced French troops at a base in Timbuktu.  The article further suggests there may be up to 400 Russians in Mali operating as military instructors.

The article contends there is also growing confirmation of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali, implying that the Russians are, in fact, mercenaries rather than regular armed forces.  According to the article, a Malian official in Timbuktu noted mercenaries were what outsiders might call the Russian troops, but from the Malian perspective all that matters is that the Russians are instructing Malian soldiers.  Meanwhile, according to a 12 January report in Russian-language Interfax military news.com, Russia denies any government role in Wagner Group activities in Mali and considers the company as having the right to independently pursue business interests in Mali.

The tvmonde.com article also notes that France and UN forces in Mali remain suspicious of the Russian presence and have reportedly conducted flights over the Timbuktu base hosting the Russians.  The article states that this angered Russia and caused Mali to request that France discontinue flights over the base.


Source:

“Mali: les Russes présentés comme des instructeurs de plus en plus nombreux (Mali: Russians presented more and more as instructors),” information.tv5monde.com 7 January 2021. https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/mali-les-russes-presentes-comme-des-instructeurs-de-plus-en-plus-nombreux-439418#:~:text=Un%20des%20responsables%20maliens%20a,notre%20camp%20militaire%20de%20Sofara.&text=Mais%20un%20influent%20%C3%A9lu%20d,%C3%AAtre%20tu%C3%A9%20des%20mercenaires%20russes%22

Many Russian instructors have been deployed in Mali in recent weeks, especially on the Timbuktu base (north) recently left by French forces, said Malian military officials. One of these officials responded in the affirmative to the possibility that these instructors now number about 400 across the country.

The apparent strengthening of cooperation with Russia coincides with the reconfiguration of the French forces and the planned reduction of the Barkhane anti-jihadist force, which will drop from around 5,000 soldiers in the Sahel in the summer of 2021 to around 3,000 in the summer of 2022. Barkhane recently handed over three bases in the north to the Malians, the most recent in Timbuktu in mid-December. Russian instructors recently arrived in Timbuktu to accompany the delivery of Russian helicopters, a Malian official said. Another Malian official, also on condition of anonymity, confirmed the presence of “Russian military instructors in several parts of Mali. You speak of mercenaries, it’s your business. For us, they are Russian instructors,” said the chief official.

Source: “Москве неизвестно, сколько граждан РФ, сотрудников ЧВК “Вагнер”, находятся в Мали” (“Moscow does not know how many citizens of the Russian Federation and employees of Wagner PMC are in Mali),” Interfax militarynews.ru (Russian language news service), 12 January 2022. https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=564129&lang=RU

As a high-ranking diplomat stressed, “the officials of the Russian Federation have nothing to do with the activities of our private companies. This is capitalism. Everyone earns as they can,” he added. The interlocutor provided a negative answer to the question of whether, in principle, a register of Russian citizens in Mali is maintained.


Image Information:

Image: Map showing Russia and Mali
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mali_Russia_Locator.svg
Attribution: [CC x 2.0]

Southeast Asia Sees Decrease in Terrorism

DSA 2016 - Close Quarters Battle.

DSA 2016 – Close Quarters Battle.


“The government-imposed lockdowns have forced people to spend more time online, raising the likelihood of vulnerable individuals being exposed to radical ideologies in the cyber domain.” 


On 10 January, Malaysian business news outlet malaymail.com covered a report from a Singaporean think tank, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.  According to the article, the report indicated that terrorism was decreasing in Southeast Asia due to factors associated with COVID-19.

The article noted lockdowns forced militants, like all citizens in Southeast Asia, to reduce their activities, but it also noted that the lockdowns may have produced longer-term security risks.  During the lockdowns youths spent more unsupervised time online and could have been exposed to radical ideas as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continued its online recruitment efforts.

In Peninsular Malaysia itself, the article noted that there were no terrorist arrests at all in 2021, which is consistent with the trend line of reduced terrorism in the region.  In Sabah of Malaysian Borneo there were 15 terrorist arrests in 2021, roughly one-fifth the number of arrests there in 2019.  As reported in Singapore’s Straits Times, the terrorist arrests in Sabah relate to Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf’s maritime activities, including piracy and kidnapping, that are carried out between the borders of the Philippines and Malaysia and also involve Indonesian militants.  The malaymail.com article attributed the reduction in terrorism in the Philippines to the army’s capturing of militant bases in southern Mindanao.

As for Indonesia, the malaymail.com article suggested Jamaah Ansharut Daulah’s stagnation since 2020 and Mujahidin Indonesia Timor’s decline was caused by increased cost of movement, a result COVID-19 travel restrictions.  The only country that saw similar numbers of violence in 2020 as 2021, according to the article, was Thailand, where an insurgency has festered for more than a decade in the country’s majority Muslim south.  In general, however, the article points to the combination of COVID-19 travel restrictions and successful counter-terrorism operations to arrest militants as key factors behind the downturn in militancy in Southeast Asia.


Source:

“Terrorist threats in South-east Asia decline in 2021, according to Singapore report,” malaymail.com (Malaysian business news outlet), 10 January 2021. https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2022/01/10/terrorist-threats-in-south-east-asia-decline-in-2021-according-to-singapore/2034142

Terrorist threats in South-east Asian countries declined in 2021, a Singapore think-tank said in its annual threat assessment. There were fewer terror-related incidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines as governments battled Covid-19. In Thailand in 2021, meanwhile, violent incidents connected to an insurgency in the far south were similar to those in the previous year, the researchers found.

The report specifically linked the Covid-19 pandemic to the drop in terror activities in Malaysia last year. Authorities made no terror-related arrests in Peninsular Malaysia last year, but made about 15 in Sabah between May and September. The government-imposed lockdowns have forced people to spend more time online, raising the likelihood of vulnerable individuals being exposed to radical ideologies in the cyber domain. Around the region, groups such as IS have increased their recruitment and radicalisation efforts through social media during the pandemic.

Elsewhere, the armed forces of the Philippines drew praise for retaking terror bases in the southern region of Mindanao.

Source: “Malaysia’s Sabah is South-east Asian terrorists’ preferred transit point: Experts,” straitstimes.com (Singapore based news outlet), 5 September 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysias-sabah-is-south-east-asian-terrorists-preferred-transit-point-experts

As security threats posed by extremists rise in South-east Asia, Malaysia’s Sabah state has emerged as a preferred route for Indonesian militants to enter the southern Philippines to carry out their terrorist activities, according to a regional intelligence source.

Sabah appeared to be a transit point for Indonesians who want to join terror groups or learn to make IEDs (improvised explosive devices) in the Philippines, according to the source.

Source: “Annual Threat Assessment,” rsis.edu.sg (Singapore based think tank), 1 January 2021. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/CTTA-January-2022.pdf

Whilst this reflects a continuous declining trend of attacks and plots compared to the years preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 terrorist landscape was particularly marked by aggressive counterterrorism (CT) operations that hauled in more than three hundred terrorist suspects – the largest figure since 2018 – including key militant group leaders.


Image Information:

Image: DSA 2016 – Close Quarters Battle.
Source: Rizuan
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DSA_2016_-_Close_Quarters_Battle.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0