Nigerian Leadership Seeks Renewed Regional Cooperation Against Boko Haram

Trigger time at Flintlock 20.

Trigger time at Flintlock 20.


The operations conducted by MNJTF have seriously degraded the insurgents and there is, therefore, the need to bring all resources together to completely defeat the BHT/ISWAP.”


On 30 November, the business-oriented Lagos-based publication The Nation reported in the excerpted article on Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari’s speech to heads of state of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) countries, which include Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin.[i] Buhari argued for greater financial and political commitment to enable the MNJTF to defeat Boko Haram. Prior to Buhari’s speech, on 25 September, the southern Nigeria-based publication This Day, which often reports critically on northern Nigerian affairs, featured the second excerpted article that highlighted the importance the Nigerian army is placing on the MNJTF to combat Boko Haram. According to the article, Nigerian Brigadier General Abdulsallam Abubakar visited the MNJTF headquarters in Chad and, like Buhari, stated that the MNJTF was degrading Boko Haram but additional resources would be needed to finish the job. In particular, Abubakar pointed to the increasing operational tempo against Boko Haram, which comprises two factions around Lake Chad whose mobile bases were largely dismantled during a Chadian-led operation in 2019.[ii]

Although there are other security challenges facing Nigeria, such as banditry and cross-border trafficking, which were the MNJTF mandates when it formed in the 1990s, Buhari urged the MNJTF countries to continue to primarily focus on combatting Boko Haram. This has been the top priority for the MNJTF since Boko Haram launched its insurgency in 2010. The MNJTF was most effective in combating Boko Haram in 2015, but it has since suffered from a lack of coordination, if not also unity of purpose and sufficient resourcing. Ultimately, results will need to be seen on the battlefield in future MNJTF confrontations with Boko Haram along Lake Chad’s shorelines for Buhari’s and Abubakar’s statements to be validated. Their statements nevertheless demonstrate that Nigeria is not conducting a go-it-alone strategy against Boko Haram. Rather, the country considers the contributions of neighboring countries—and specifically the MNJTF—crucial to the military effort.[iii]


Sources:

“Boko Haram: Buhari urges MNJTF to exert final push to end terrorism,” thenationonline.ng (business-oriented Lagos-based daily newspaper), 30 November 2022. https://thenationonlineng.net/boko-haram-buhari-urges-mnjtf-to-exert-final-push-to-end-terrorism/

President Muhammadu Buhari yesterday urged the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin to exert the final push towards ending terrorism in the region. The President said this in his opening address at the 16th summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) at the Conference Hall of the Presidential Villa in Abuja. President Buhari, who ended his tenure as chairman of the commission at the end of the 16th summit, also charged his colleagues from the other five member-countries of to provide the requisite political and material support for the LCBC/MNJTF in order to motivate the formations to deliver on their mandates.

President Buhari noted that the fight against Boko Haram terrorists and other forms of threats in the region must remain the lead priority.

“MNJTF Seeks Joint Resource Pool to End Boko Haram, ISWAP Menace,” thisdailylive.com (independent Lagos-based daily newspaper), 25 September 2022. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/09/25/mnjtf-seeks-joint-resource-pool-to-end-boko-haram-iswap-menace/

The Force Commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Maj. Gen. Abdul Ibrahim, yesterday called on stakeholders to mobilise resources to bring to an end the menace posed by terror groups, Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. The Force Commander spoke as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen. Lucky Irabor, said joint training of the armed forces was crucial in dealing with security challenges afflicting the nation…. Speaking in Chad, the Force Commander, MNJTF stated that to effectively bring hostilities in the region to an end and  “completely wipe out Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorists in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region,” all stakeholders must pool resources to contain insurgency. He said so far the operations conducted by MNJTF had significantly degraded the insurgents….“The operations conducted by MNJTF and Operation Hadin Kai have seriously degraded the insurgents and there is, therefore, the need to bring all resources together to completely defeat the BHT/ISWAP,” he said.

Director of Army Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Mr. Sunday Attah, affirmed that “the objective of the competition, which is to reinforce the existing cordial working relationship between members of the Armed Forces, has been achieved.”


Notes:

[i] The MNJTF, which is based in N’Djamena, Chad, was originally based in Baga, Nigeria until Boko Haram overran the military base there in 2015. Considering that Boko Haram has gained strength since 2015, the MNJTF is generally not regarded as having succeeded despite winning several battles with the group. In particular, it has been hampered by distrust between the member states. See Albert, Isaac Olawale. “Security Regimes in Africa – Prospects and Challenges.” Africa Development, Vol. 42, No. 3. 2017, pp. 119-135.

[ii] Chad launched Operation Bohoma Wrath against Boko Haram after the terrorist group, led by Abubakar Shekau, massacred roughly 90 Chadian soldiers in the town of Bohoma along the Lake Chad shoreline in a surprise raid in early 2020. For additional information see: United Nations S/2020/373 Security Council, “Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General,” May 8, 2020. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3861622?ln=fr

[iii] A book chapter on the MNJTF notes that the four MNJTF countries besides Nigeria are incentivized to participate in military operations against Boko Haram to build their own military capacities by receiving training and weapons from foreign armies. In this regard, these countries have tended to seek only limited engagements with Boko Haram on Nigerian territory, but still just enough to assure that the capacity-building of their armies continues. See Emmanuel, Nikolas. “External Incentives and the African Subregional Response to Boko Haram.” African Border Disorders, 1st ed., vol. 1, Routledge, 2018, pp. 136–50. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315166483-7


Image Information:

Image: Trigger time at Flintlock 20
Source: USAFRICOM from Stuttgart, Germany, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Trigger_time_at_Flintlock_20_(50111204252).jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Marawi Reflections Reveal Urban Warfare Challenges for Philippine Army

Boming on Marawi City.

Boming on Marawi City.


“Marawi showed all potential enemies the advantages of urban warfare [for insurgents].”


The Filipino publication mindanews.com recently published the excerpted article featuring portions from a book by Filipino author Gail Ilagan about the 2017 occupation of Marawi, Mindanao by up to 2,000 militants loyal to the Islamic State (IS) and the military’s recapture of the city. The article recounts details of the occupation, noting that the trigger of the occupation was the Philippine army’s attempt to capture the militants’ leader, Isnon Hapilon. Unbeknownst to the army, the militants had already established sleeper cells in Marawi that they activated once the operation to capture Hapilon began, including attacking a prison to release group members, bombing a church, and sending fighters to control university campuses.[i]

The article points to missteps by the army, including interpreting the militants to be local fighters when, in fact, they not only had inspiration from IS, but also had invited foreign IS supporters to Mindanao and employed IS tactics. In addition, Philippine security forces overlooked earlier bombings at night markets near universities and occupations of smaller towns in Mindanao, which had displaced residents and should have been seen as a harbinger of the future occupation of the much larger city of Marawi. Ultimately, the article claims the military’s unpreparedness resulted in more soldiers’ lives lost than necessary. Military equipment, such as tanks, were unsuitable for maneuvering Marawi’s narrow alleyways, while the insurgents’ hijacking of fire trucks and other public vehicles made it difficult for soldiers to identify their adversaries in the urban combat environment. However, the article concludes that hard lessons were learned from the siege of Marawi that make a similar insurgent takeover unlikely in the near term.[ii] The military has changed its organizational structure, acquired new equipment, and improved training methods to prepare for urban warfare.


Source:

“Local Frontlines of Globalized Islamic States Network: The Emerging War Arena for the Filipino Soldier,” mindanews.com (regional newspapers focusing on Mindanao), 16 October 2022. https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2022/10/local-frontlines-of-globalized-islamic-states-network-the-emerging-war-arena-for-the-filipino-soldier/

Violent extremists are rare among Muslim Filipinos. However, it does not take a lot of them to cause a scale of destruction such as was seen in the aftermath of the 2017 Marawi Siege.

Among its choices, the region of Mindanao seemed to be most appealing [to ISIS] because of its porous maritime boundaries and the safe haven that local extremist groups could provide. One such local extremist group was the Basilan-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) that had pledged allegiance to ISIS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in June 2014. In 2016, al-Baghdadi accepted the Abu Sayyaf’s pledge and appointed ASG commander Isnilon Hapilon as the ISIS’ emir in Southeast Asia. Hapilon and his soldiers traveled soon after to Marawi where they were embraced by the Maute Group, as well as other local terrorist groups that shared the ISIS’ aspiration.

The Marawi Crisis was ignited in the early afternoon of 23 May 2017 when security forces tried to arrest Hapilon in Barangay Basak Malutlut in Marawi City. It was two days before the Muslim holiday of Eid’l Fitr. Intelligence sources would later reveal that the ISIS-inspired groups intended to mark Eid’l Fitr by taking over the only Islamic city in the Philippines and declaring it ISIS territory. At the time when the security team was sent to Marawi with the warrant of arrest, they were unaware that Hapilon’s forces were positioned in the adjoining buildings, ready to defend their leader. The arresting team immediately came under heavy fire as soon as they entered the narrow street where Hapilon’s quarters were located.

It would take five long months for the government to neutralize the extremists and rid Marawi of them.


Notes:

[i] In mid-2014, the longtime Abu Sayyaf commander Isnon Hapilon and around a dozen other militants released a video pledging allegiance to IS leader Umar al-Baghdadi. Hapilon noted in the video that these militants and other factions had made pledges separately but were now coming together, which signaled the unification of Abu Sayyaf factions and set the stage for the group’s eventual attack on Marawi under the leadership of the Maute Brothers and Hapilon, all of whom were killed during the battle. See: Jacob Zenn, “The Islamic State’s Provinces on the Peripheries: Juxtaposing the Pledges from Boko Haram in Nigeria and Abu Sayyaf and Maute Group in the Philippines.” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 13, no. 1, 2019, pp. 87–104.

[ii] The restoration of critical infrastructure in Marawi and the return of the city’s inhabitants to their original homes, which were destroyed during the battle in 2017, has been slow. This has also raised concerns that grievances of the local population regarding their treatment in post-conflict Marawi could result in their supporting antigovernment militant groups in the future or their remaining alienated from the government, which was one of the reasons why Abu Sayyaf was initially able to gain some traction from among the youths in Marawi. See: Jacob Zenn, “Marawi Rehabilitation Progress Slows in the Philippines,” OE Watch, July 2018. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-singular-format/277112 


Image Information:

Image: Boming on Marawi City.
Source: Mark Jhomel https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bombing_on_Marawi_City.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russian-Led Military Alliance in Central Asia Weakening Amid Quagmire in Ukraine

Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.

Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.


“In particular, it directly hits the unity within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as a result of which the Indestructible Brotherhood exercises in Kyrgyzstan were canceled…”


The excerpted article from the Moscow-based, Russian-language newspaper Kommersant discusses deepening fissures within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance in Central Asia. First, the ongoing border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resulted in Kyrgyzstan withdrawing from the CSTO’s upcoming exercises in Tajikistan, which have a collective defense scenario.[i] Moreover, according to the article, Kyrgyzstan postponed the exercises that are scheduled to take place in Kyrgyzstan next year, arguing that not taking part is within its rights as a CSTO member-state. However, the article notes that Russia appreciated that Kyrgyzstan requested that Russia mediate its conflict with Tajikistan because it preserved Russia’s central role in the CSTO and Central Asian affairs generally. The article emphasizes how this role is especially important for Russia because the war in Ukraine has placed it in a difficult situation geopolitically and the CSTO remains Russia’s Central Asian security linchpin considering growing competition in the region over the past two decades from the United States, Turkey, and China.[ii]

Finally, the article asserts that countries like Tajikistan can now take advantage of Russia’s vulnerable position resulting from the war in Ukraine. For example, in a recent speech at the Russia-Central Asia Summit, Tajikistani President Emomali Rahmon placed subtle demands on Russia to support Tajikistan. Tajikistan could, like Kyrgyzstan, decrease engagement with the CSTO and seek closer ties with China or other countries.


Source:

“Киргизия и Таджикистан громко ссорятся (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Fight Loudly),” kommersant.ru (Moscow-based Russian-language daily focusing on business and politics), 17 October 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5619937

The conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which developed for many years, but previously concerned only the residents of the border regions of the two countries, became an important factor for the entire post-Soviet space. In particular, it directly effects the unity in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which resulted in the Indestructible Brotherhood exercises in Kyrgyzstan being canceled, and the Frontier-2022 maneuvers that began today in Tajikistan taking place without the Kyrgyz military. In this context, the statement of the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon that Moscow allegedly does not respect its partners in the region sounded as strong as possible.

The Kyrgyz side formally stated that it would not participate in the [exercises], which is completely within its rights. As for the exercises that were supposed to take place in Kyrgyzstan, it was requested in Bishkek for them to be postponed to the next year…. Moscow liked that Bishkek was ready to see it as a mediator in resolving the conflict, while Dushanbe strongly demanded on a bilateral format.

According to a Kyrgyz source of Kommersant, the President of Tajikistan made a somewhat harsh speech at the “Russia-Central Asia Summit….” He recalled that the Russian language is being studied in the republic “from kindergarten” and a Russian military base is located there.


Notes:

[i] Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have had several intermittent clashes related to each country’s territorial exclaves within the other’s borders, creating competition regarding issues such as boundary demarcation and water and electricity use. Although these clashes often begin with local villagers using improvised weapons, in recent years the national armies have become involved, raising the risk that one of these localized clashes will eventually spiral into a national-level conflict. For more, see Matthew Stein, “Resolution to Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Problems?,” OE Watch, Issue 3, March 2019. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/oe-watch-articles-2-singular-format/353586

[ii] Turkey’s assistance to Azerbaijan during its 2020 military victory against Armenia over disputed territories in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as its military performance in Syria and Libya in the years prior, has resulted in Central Asian states, such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, seeking Turkish support for their military modernization programs, especially related to unmanned aerial vehicles.



Image Information:

Image: Main Cathedral CSTO Summit 02.
Source: Mil.ru
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Main_Cathedral_CSTO_Summit_02.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

India Responds to Chinese and Pakistani Naval Activities in Sri Lanka

India Navy continuity drill.

India Navy continuity drill.


“India’s move to help Sri Lanka enhance its maritime surveillance capabilities appears to be a subtle move by it to reassert its role as a net security provider for the Indian Ocean…”


The independent Indian daily newspaper Deccan Herald recently published an article, the first excerpted below, regarding India’s response to Chinese and Pakistani naval operations at Sri Lankan ports. According to the article, India is concerned that it risks losing its preeminent position as the primary security provider for Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean region at large. The article also emphasizes the importance of the timing of India’s deal to supply Sri Lanka with Dornier 228 maritime aircraft as a means of reasserting its geopolitical standing in the region. The provision of the Dornier 228 to Sri Lanka occurred shortly after Sri Lanka granted permission to the Strategic Support Force of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, which tracks satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles, to visit Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. In addition, Sri Lanka allowed the Pakistani Navy frigate PNS Taimur to refuel at Colombo Port when returning home from naval exercises in Cambodia and Malaysia. In a recent statement published by the Chinese Communist Party People’s Daily, as shown in the second article, a China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson noted that Chinese support to port infrastructure in Sri Lanka and other developing nations is simply a sign of Chinese cooperation between nations, and therefore India’s concerns are unwarranted. In the third excerpted article, from the Indian publication The Hindu, the author argues that the Dornier 228 will revamp Sri Lanka’s capabilities to contribute more to the security of the Indian Ocean region, which, in turn, supports India’s regional interests. At the same time, the new capabilities will reaffirm Sri Lanka’s role as a member of the Colombo Security Conclave, whose other three members are India, the Maldives and Mauritius. The article nevertheless acknowledged that India’s increased maritime security interest in Sri Lanka is being driven by its apprehension over Sri Lanka’s cooperation with China in maritime naval affairs.


Sources:

“Sri Lanka allows Pakistani warship, Chinese recon vessel to dock in its ports, to get maritime patrol aircraft from India,” deccanherald.com (independent daily newspaper targeting youth readership), 14 August 2022. https://www.deccanherald.com/national/sri-lanka-allows-pakistani-warship-chinese-recon-vessel-to-dock-in-its-ports-to-get-maritime-patrol-aircraft-from-india-1135976.html

Even as China’s recon ship ‘Yuan Wang 5’ is back on course towards the Hambantota Port of Sri Lanka, India is set to gift the island nation a Dornier 228 maritime patrol aircraft soon, subtly reasserting its role as the net security provider to the island…. New Delhi will replace the used aircraft with a newly-built one two years later and will then discuss with Colombo the modalities for handing over another aircraft to the Sri Lankan Navy or the Coast Guard.

India’s move to help Sri Lanka enhance its maritime surveillance capabilities appears to be a subtle move by it to reassert its role as a net security provider for the Indian Ocean, notwithstanding increasing forays by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

Beijing had on August 8 dismissed New Delhi’s security concerns as “senseless” and tacitly asked it to desist from “disturbing normal exchanges and cooperation” between China and Sri Lanka…. India also pointed out that it was its sovereign right to express its security concerns over the arrival of China’s ship with military capabilities in Sri Lanka.

India’s move to help Sri Lanka enhance its maritime surveillance capabilities appears to be a subtle move by it to reassert its role as a net security provider for the Indian Ocean, notwithstanding increasing forays by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy and Pakistani Navy in the region.

“毛宁:中国将为发展中国家做更多实事、好事 (Mao Ning: China will do more practical and good deeds for developing countries),” people.com.cn (largest Chinese newspaper owned by the Chinese Communist Party), 8 October 2022. http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2022/1008/c1002-32541066.html

The infrastructure of these countries includes ports, bridges, and power stations, in addition to mosques, parliament buildings, stadiums, and libraries. They are all beautiful business items made in China, and they are also golden images of China’s cooperation with developing countries.

“India hands over Dornier maritime surveillance aircraft to Sri Lanka Navy,” thehindu.com (widely circulated Indian daily newspaper), 15 August 2022. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-to-hand-over-dornier-maritime-surveillance-aircraft-to-sri-lanka-navy/article65770998.ece

Sri Lanka Air Force announced that the Indian Air force was gifting it a Dornier 228 Maritime Patrol Aircraft, while noting another aircraft would be donated within two years…. Sri Lanka is a member of the ‘Colombo Security Conclave’ that began as a trilateral initiate involving India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and later included Mauritius, for maritime cooperation in the region.


Image Information:

Image: India Navy continuity drill
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India_Navy_continuity_drill_1.jpg
Attribution: www.indiannavy.nic, CC BY 2.0

Vietnam Trains Cambodian Navy Amid Chinese Competition

Vietnam People's Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting 2010-10-12.

Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting 2010-10-12.


“The cooperation program in education and training between Cambodian military schools and the [Vietnamese] Naval Academy will continue to expand and develop to improve its effectiveness…”


Vietnam’s Naval Academy has trained Cambodian naval officers for years.  Recently, the Vietnamese government-affiliated People’s Army Newspaper reported that the Cambodian navy sent senior officials to Vietnam to discuss how to improve the effectiveness of the program from which thousands of Cambodians have graduated.  The article notes the Cambodian cadets receive instruction in history, tradition and naval tasks and functions, while fostering friendship and solidarity between the two neighboring countries’ navies.  The continuation of the training program comes amid greater competition from China for influence on the Cambodian navy. 

A separate article posted on the Chinese Ministry of Defense website noted that U.S. media outlets and government officials have claimed that China’s development of the Cambodian Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville lacked transparency and was part of Chinese military strategy to create a global network of naval bases.  The Chinese Ministry of Defense, however, claims its naval cooperation with Cambodia is a normal function of international relations and consistent with international law.  The ministry also condemned any suggestion that Chinese naval activities in Cambodia pose a threat.  Rather, the Chinese claim that Ream Naval Base will improve Cambodia’s ability to protect its maritime territorial integrity and combat piracy and other maritime crimes.

Vietnam is an historical ally of Cambodia and competitor of China with maritime territorial disputes with China over islands in the South China Sea.  Therefore, Chinese presence at the Ream Naval Base, near Vietnam’s own naval base in Phú Quốc, draws Vietnam’s attention.  Given Vietnamese perception of naval competition with China, continuing to train Cambodian naval cadets is important to Vietnam as it seeks to maintain military influence in Cambodia.


Source:

“Đoàn cán bộ cấp cao Hải quân Hoàng gia Campuchia trao đổi kinh nghiệm tại Học viện Hải quân (A senior official delegation from the Royal Cambodian Navy exchanged experiences at the Naval Academy),” People’s Army Newspaper (government-affiliated media source), 27 June 2022. https://www.qdnd.vn/quoc-phong-an-ninh/tin-tuc/doan-can-bo-cap-cao-hai-quan-hoang-gia-campuchia-trao-doi-kinh-nghiem-tai-hoc-vien-hai-quan-698277

On June 27, a high-ranking delegation of the Royal Cambodian Navy led by Vice Admiral Non Sophat visited and exchanged experiences at the Naval Academy. Dr. Nguyen Van Lam, Director of the Naval Academy, introduced briefly the history, traditions, functions, tasks, achievements and development trajectory of the Naval Academy.  Simultaneously, he discussed with the delegation the situation and results of training Cambodian military cadets at the academy.  Over the years, the Naval Academy has trained and cultivated thousands of Royal Cambodian Navy officers.  Recently, despite the complicated situation of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Academy still organizes trainings for Cambodian students.

The cooperation program in education and training between Cambodian military schools and the Naval Academy will continue to expand and develop to improve its effectiveness further and contribute to fostering more friendship and solidarity between the armies, navies, and peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia to ensure peace, stability, and development of each country in the region and in the world.

Source: “国防部回应美炒作中柬合作:戴着有色眼镜 看什么都“不透明 (The Ministry of Defense responded to the United States exaggeration about China-Cambodia cooperation: Like wearing colored glasses to makes everything “blurry”),” mod.gov.cn (Chinese Ministry of Defence website), 22 June 2022. http://www.mod.gov.cn/jzhzt/2022-06/30/content_4914396.htm

Some media continue to exaggerate the normal exchanges and cooperation between China and Cambodia, which is entirely devoid of ulterior motives.  On June 8, the upgrading and reconstruction project of the Yunyang Naval Base assisted by China officially commenced.  It conforms to the domestic laws of the two countries and relevant international laws and international practices and is not targeted at a third party.  The construction of the Yunyang base is aimed at strengthening the Cambodian Navy’s ability to maintain maritime territorial integrity and combat maritime crimes.


Image Information:

Image: Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at ASEAN defense ministers meeting 2010-10-12
Source: Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Force,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_People%27s_Navy_honor_guard_at_ASEAN_defense_ministers_meeting_2010-10-12_1.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Benin Park Rangers Take on Counterterrorism Tasks

“In Benin, there is a lot of communication between us [park rangers] and the Beninese armed forces, but our roles are very distinct.”  


The French-language Beninese investigative media website daabaaru.bj published an article discussing an attack that left two Beninese police officers and two militants dead along Benin’s northern border with Burkina Faso.  A separate excerpted article in the Paris-based pan-African website jeuneafrique.com discussed the incident in the context of Pendjari Park rangers, who work in the area.  Although no one has taken credit for the attack, it occurred in the area of operations of the al-Qaeda–affiliated Group for Support of Muslims and Islam (JNIM).  According to the jeuneafrique.com article, the rangers acknowledge that they now coordinate with security forces to monitor jihadists’ infiltration into bases in the national park.  Current protocol for the park rangers when confronting jihadists is to contact the Beninese military and withdraw to allow the soldiers to intervene.  The article suggests that if the rangers are to be trained by a third party, the contractors should be former soldiers because they already have some relevant skills for both conservation and encountering terrorist groups.  In addition, although the park rangers acknowledge that several of them have lost their lives to jihadists in the Sahel in recent years, they are determined to continue working.  The rangers also note that they are not capable of developing a strategy to prevent terrorism, but it is necessary for the governments in the Sahel to formulate a more comprehensive strategy for how park rangers should deal with not only poachers, but now also jihadists.


Source:

“Quatre morts dans une Attaque terroriste (Four dead in a terrorist attack),” daabaaru.bj (French-language Beninese website), 26 June 2022. https://daabaaru.bj/atacora-quatre-morts-dans-une-attaque-terroriste/

The Commissariat of Dassari, commune of Matéri, department of Atacora was attacked by an armed group on the night of Saturday June 25 to Sunday June 26, 2022. The result was four dead, including two on the Beninese side and significant material damages.

Source: “African Parks: ‘Au Bénin, face aux jihadistes, nous ne définissons pas la stratégie militaire’ (African Parks: ‘In Benin, faced with the jihadists, we do not define the military strategy’),” jeuneafrique.com (Paris-based pan-African website), 25 June 2022. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1355173/politique/african-parks-au-benin-face-aux-jihadistes-nous-ne-definissons-pas-la-strategie-militaire/

The rangers are armed according to the park where they work for the needs of the missions entrusted to them.  Their training, on the other hand, is relatively standard: it includes modules on respect for human rights, on escalation during an engagement, on how to deal with different risks and on how to behave when arriving at a crime scene.We use external trainers, who work under the direction of our head instructor.  The outside supporters are often former soldiers, some of whom also have real expertise in the field of conservation.  Our role is not to carry out national security missions, but to preserve the integrity of the areas entrusted to us.  Our rangers are trained to fight against poaching, but are effectively confronted with all kinds of threats, including jihadists.  In Benin, there is a lot of communication between us and the Beninese armed forces, but our roles are very distinct.  And when it is established that jihadists are involved, we withdraw immediately and let the military intervene.

Indonesia Extends Counter-Drug Trafficking Cooperation to South America

National Narcotics Agency (BNN) logo.

National Narcotics Agency (BNN) logo.


“I have just carried out a working visit as Chair of the Indonesian Delegation to several countries in South America in order to anticipate the entry of cocaine and other trafficked narcotics into Indonesia…”


According to the excerpted article from centrist Indonesian-language website tvonenews.com, Indonesia’s National Narcotics Agency (BNN) is now cooperating with South American countries to prevent the entry of cocaine and other narcotics into Indonesia.  In the article, BNN head Petrus Golose discusses his recent working visit to South America.  Although he notes that narcotics trafficking in South America has not yet directly affected Indonesia, it is necessary to address because Indonesia has seen an increase in domestic drug use and could become a destination country for illicit South American drugs.

The Indonesian Foreign Ministry’s website, kemlu.co.id, discusses the BNN delegation’s visit to Panama in particular.  Indonesia is concerned about Panama’s role as a drug trafficking hub, albeit not a producer.  Indonesia intends to share best practices with Panama in terms of law enforcement strategies to counter drug trafficking.  A memorandum of understanding between the two countries was signed, marking the first time Panama has ever cooperated with an Asian country to combat drug trafficking.

Indonesian-language media outlet databoks.com reports that there had been a surge in narcotics arrests in Indonesia, peaking in 2018, and decreasing since then.  According to the data, North Sumatra is the most affected region.  Marijuana is the most seized drug followed by methamphetamine and ecstasy.  Given that cocaine dominates narcotics trafficking from South America, these facts indicate that Indonesian counter-narcotics initiatives with South American countries is a longer-term preventative measure.


Source:

“BNN Jalin Kerja Sama dengan Negara-Negara di Amerika Selatan Cegah Masuknya Kokain dan Peredaran Narkotika Lain (BNN Cooperates with Countries in South America to Prevent the Entry of Cocaine and Other Narcotics from Circulating),” tvonenews.com (considered neutral Indonesian language media source), 9 June 2022. https://www.tvonenews.com/berita/nasional/45935-bnn-jalin-kerja-sama-dengan-negara-negara-di-amerika-selatan-cegah-masuknya-kokain-dan-peredaran-narkotika-lain

Head of the National Narcotics Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BNN RI) Petrus Reinhard Golose said that his team was cooperating with a number of countries in South America to prevent the entry of cocaine and other trafficked narcotics into Indonesia. Golose explained that the cooperation that BNN has established with countries in South America targets areas around the Andes Mountains. The head of the NNA confirmed that although the circulation of cocaine took place in the Americas, it was possible for Indonesia to become one of the destination countries for the circulation.

Source: “Panama – Indonesia untuk Pertama Kalinya akan Melakukan Kerja Sama Penanggulangan Narkoba (Panama – Indonesia for the First Time to Conduct Drug Countermeasures Cooperation), kemlu.go.id (website of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 25 May 2022. https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/3631/berita/panama-indonesia-untuk-pertama-kalinya-akan-melakukan-kerja-sama-penanggulangan-narkoba

With the support of the Indonesian Embassy in Panama City, the Head of the National Narcotics Agency and his team held a meeting with ministerial-level officials…. Panama itself is not a drug-producing country, but is a hub area for drug dealers in Latin America who come from surrounding drug-producing countries…. In this case, Panama and Indonesia can share experiences both in handling and tackling the use and distribution of drugs, as well as proper law enforcement techniques for dealing with drug issues.

Source: “Jumlah Tersangka Narkoba Menurun dalam 3 Tahun Terakhir (Number of Drug Suspects Decreased in the Last 3 Years),” databoks.katadata.co.ide (web-based Indonesian language media outlet), 29 May 2022. https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/05/26/jumlah-tersangka-narkoba-menurun-dalam-3-tahun-terakhir

According to a report by the National Narcotics Agency (BNN), the number of suspects in narcotics and illegal drugs or narcotics cases in Indonesia has decreased over the past three years. However, if one looks at the trend, since 2009 the number of narcotics suspects has tended to increase, with a record high of 1,545 people in 2018.


Image Information:

Image: National Narcotics Agency (BNN) logo
Source: Kampung Jawa, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Logo_BNN.svg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Al-Qaeda’s Sahel Affiliate Targets Togo

“For a little more than two years, Togo had been preparing for the expansion of Sahelian terrorist groups on its territory.”


On 11 May, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) attacked a Togolese military checkpoint.  The attack, which claimed eight Togolese soldiers, was JNIM’s first known attack in Togo and may indicate further attacks to come.  The excerpted article from the political affairs-oriented French-language journaldelafrique.com notes that the attack reflects JNIM’s longtime plans to expand into Togo.  It also claims that Togo’s military preparations to secure its borders with Burkina Faso made the Togolese soldiers a target for JNIM.  The article cites previous JNIM attacks in Côte d’Ivoire and Benin as examples of JNIM’s intention to strike Togo.

The journaldelafrique.com article also suggests that military pressure from Mali is pressing JNIM in the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, forcing JNIM to move southward.  The article notes that JNIM reconnaissance teams had previously been arrested in northern Togo but were released due to a legal loophole.  The article concludes that the attack in Togo had ample warnings.  However, the article does not blame the army but instead focuses its disdain on Togo’s intelligence apparatus, who it claims should have noticed the 60 JNIM fighters entering Togolese territory and alerted the military that JNIM or other terrorist groups had infiltrated the country.


Source:

“GSIM claims responsibility for the Kpékpakandi terrorist attack,” togobreakingnews.info (French language news website), 7 June 2022. https://togobreakingnews.info/togo-gsim-revendique-lattaque-terroriste/

The terrorist attack on May 11 against the checkpoint of Kpekpakandi (Togo-Burkina border) is the work of the Group of Support for Islam and Muslims. The toll of this murderous operation was 8 dead and 13 wounded on the side of the defense and security forces of Togo…. This attack is also the first deadly one that Togo has experienced since the terrorist threat has raged in the West African sub-region.

Source: “Is Togo up to this new terrorist challenge?” journaldelafrique.com (political affairs oriented French-language news source), 12 May 2022. https://lejournaldelafrique.com/le-togo-est-il-a-la-hauteur-de-ce-nouveau-terroriste//

An attack caused the deaths of eight Togolese soldiers. The attack took place in Kpinkankandi, where the Togolese army is conducting its Kondjouaré operation, which aims to secure the borders with Burkina Faso.

For a little more than two years, Togo had been preparing for the expansion of Sahelian terrorist groups on its territory…. The latter [JNIM] have seen their influence in the “Tri-Border” area dwindle under the offensive of the Malian army in recent months…. Meanwhile, Côte d’Ivoire had suffered several attacks targeting soldiers on the borders with Burkina Faso. More recently, Benin also had to deal with three deadly attacks at the end of 2021.

In Togo, the security authorities had to expect a terrorist attack. It remained to be seen when it would take place. Several members of armed group reconnaissance cells had previously been apprehended in northern Togo, and then were released after interrogation due to a legal loophole…. But the response seems to have been slow on the part of the intelligence services which will, it seems, have great difficulty in curbing the terrorist threat in the short term.

The Philippines Gaining Upper Hand Against Abu Sayyaf

2021-12-03 T4 Delivery 005.

2021-12-03 T4 Delivery 005.


“The terror groups may try to disrupt the peace and order during the election period but our preparedness will assure that they will not succeed…”


The Philippines government may be weakening Abu Sayyaf across the region.  According to Philippine daily sunstar.com, there was concern that Abu Sayyaf would seek to disrupt the elections after Philippine forces killed the group’s leader in Basilan only weeks earlier.  The military’s strategy to protect the elections from Abu Sayyaf involved closing off access points to the group’s main area of operations in Basilan and ordering troops to avoid political partisanship.  In addition, the army boosted its coordination with the Philippine National Police, the Commission on Elections, and other agencies to secure the elections.  Ultimately, the army deployed 69,000 soldiers to protect the elections, which were held successfully on 9 May.

A separate article in the Philippines’ largest English-language newspaper, Manila Bulletin, pointed to the surrender of an Abu Sayyaf bomb-maker as evidence that Abu Sayyaf’s ranks were being further depleted through the Philippines’ rehabilitation program for former Abu Sayyaf members.  The program, which allows local governments to work with surrendered repentant militants to reintegrate them into society, has seen some success since the Philippines stepped it up in recent years. Elsewhere, according to a recent Indonesian-language article in Hong Kong-based suara.com, a number of hostages escaped Abu Sayyaf in Indonesia in April.  Collectively, the articles imply that Abu Sayyaf’s military capabilities and negative impact appears to be waning in the face of determined government effort.


Source:

“Troops told to ready for poll worst-case scenario,” sunstar.com (Philippine daily), 20 April 2022. https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/1926909/zamboanga/local-news/troops-told-to-ready-for-poll-worst-case-scenario

Lieutenant General Alfredo Rosario Jr., commander of the Western Mindanao Command (Westmincom), has ordered the troops in Basilan province to prepare for the worst-case scenario on election day. “The terror groups may try to disrupt the peace and order during the election period but our preparedness will assure that they will not succeed,” Rosario said. On March 25, Radzmil Jannatul alias Abu Khubayb, the leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan province, was killed in a clash with government troops in Sitio Center, Baiwas village, Sumisip, Basilan.

“Let us also sustain our good coordination with our partners from the Philippine National Police, the Commission on Elections, and other agencies to ensure an honest, orderly, and peaceful elections,” Rosario added. He reminded the JTF-Basilan troops to remain non-partisan at all times.

Source: “Sayyaf bomber surrenders in Zamboanga,” mb.com.ph (Philippines largest English language newspaper), 23 March 2022. https://mb.com.ph/2022/03/23/sayyaf-bomber-surrenders-in-zamboanga/

A suspected Abu Sayyaf member linked to several bombing and kidnapping incidents in Zamboanga and Basilan surrendered to authorities on Tuesday. Mursidin Husin, 39, a resident of Sitio Buahayan, Dita, Zamboanga City, surrendered to the police at PNP Camp General Eduardo Batalla, RT Lim Boulevard. Husin also turned over his .38 caliber revolver with ammunition. Husin, a follower of Jamiul Nasalun, an Abu Sayyaf sub-leader based in Zamboanga City, was allegedly involved in the 2013 bombing of a passenger bus in Zamboanga City and two other explosions in a Sangali cafeteria and in Basilan.

Source: “Kisah WNI 427 Hari jadi Tahanan Abu Sayyaf: Jarang Makan dan Takut Kena Bom (Story of Indonesian Citizen 427 Anniversary of Abu Sayyaf Prisoner: Rarely Eat and Fear of Bombs), suara.com (Hong Kong based Indonesian language bi-monthly newspaper), 5 April 2022. https://www.suara.com/news/2021/04/05/132923/kisah-wni-427-hari-jadi-tahanan-abu-sayyaf-jarang-makan-dan-takut-kena-bom

Arizal Caste Miran, one of the four victims of the Abu Sayyaf group hostage-takers in the Philippines, is now able to reunite with his family. Before returning to his family’s arms, Arizal and three other people were desperate to escape. They heard from a member of the Abu Sayyaf group that the hostages would be transferred to Tawi Island. While on their way in the morning, the ship they were traveling on capsized because from the waves. Instantly the four Indonesian citizens went to save themselves.


Image Information:

Image: 2021-12-03 T4 Delivery 005.
Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2021-12-03_T4_Delivery_005.jpg
Attribution: CC x 2.0

Boko Haram Train Attack Raises Frustration with Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy

81 Division NA - Camp Zairo, 2017.

81 Division NA – Camp Zairo, 2017.


“We failed to learn from our Boko Haram experiences, thus validating the dictum that those who fail to learn from their experiences are doomed to repeat them.”


The Nigerian government has been unable to curb Boko Haram attacks.  The excerpted article from Nigeria based vanguardngr.com expresses frustration over the government’s incompetence following an attack on a train in Kaduna State in late April.  According to the article, this is only the latest of many failures in Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy dating back to the notorious Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping of 2014.  The train attack is particularly notable because it occurred outside of Boko Haram’s main area of operations in northeastern Nigeria and came just two years after another Boko Haram faction loyal to al-Qaeda shot and almost downed a military helicopter in 2020.Vangaurdngr.com has previously been critical of the federal government led by northerner Muslim President Muhammadu Buhari, suggesting that the dire economic situation in Nigeria and lack of a government mandate over certain rural areas in Kaduna have facilitated Boko Haram’s spread in the country.  The article asserts the government is mismanaging the security situation in the country and failing to learn from previous mistakes in countering Boko Haram.  Unless the negative security trend lines are reversed, the article indicates the Buhari administration will have a legacy of empty promises.  Ultimately, the article demands the government prioritize defending communities against Boko Haram and warns that unless this is done, the group will continue to expand its operations and conduct devastating attacks like this one that erode the government’s legitimacy.


Source:

“Failure to learn from our Boko Haram experience,” vanguardngr.com (Nigerian media outlet), 19 April 2022. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/04/failure-to-learn-from-our-boko-haram-experience/

The train attack was obviously staged to embarrass and blackmail the Federal Government. They downed a military jet and attacked the Kaduna Airport twice. The steady massacres and attacks of defenceless communities in Southern Kaduna as well as Plateau and Benue states by herdsmen terrorists have gone largely ignored by the Buhari government. The parlous economic situation and near anarchy due to the failure of the Federal Government to protect innocent and defenceless people have continued to put a question mark on the positive legacy this regime has recorded. We failed to learn from our Boko Haram experiences, thus validating the dictum that those who fail to learn from their experiences are doomed to repeat them. We hope the next regime will review the actions of major actors of this administration in mismanaging our security.


Image Information:

Image: 81 Division NA – Camp Zairo, 2017.
Source: Hussaina Muhammad (VOA)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:81_Division_NA_-_Camp_Zairo,_2017.png
Attribution: CC x 2.0