Somalia: Behind Al-Shabaab’s Success in Recruiting Children

Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.

Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.


“Over the past decade or so, Somali’s federal government has attempted to combat al-Shabaab’s child recruitment in a variety of, ultimately ineffective, ways.”


Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Somalia’s newly elected president, is facing many problems in his country, including a drought that threatens millions with famine, political divisions hampering unity, and a rise in attacks by al-Shabaab despite years of combatting the terrorist group.  As the accompanying excerpted article from the pan-African independent news platform African Arguments explains, much of al-Shabaab’s strength owes to its ability to recruit children.  The group uses boys as logistics operatives, combatants, and suicide bombers, while girls are used as cleaners, cooks, and “wives” of the fighters.  The group uses both boys and girls as spies, with their young age helping to lessen suspicion of their activities.

According to the article, al-Shabaab finds it easy to recruit youth due to a variety of factors.  Work in a country with a devastatingly high unemployment rate such as Somalia is a huge draw. Power, marriage, and for those seeking one, a religious education, albeit quite radical, are other reasons for joining al-Shabaab.  There is also widespread discontent with the government, which people perceive as being deeply corrupt.  Abuse at the hands of security forces drives young people to the terrorist organization.  Additionally, impoverished parents who receive money from the organization sometimes force their young children to join the group. 

There have been programs to persuade young recruits to leave al-Shabaab as well as dissuade those who have not yet joined from doing so.  However, as the article notes, these attempts usually have little impact because they focus on the evils of al-Shabaab as opposed to the actual needs of the children.  Meanwhile, Western powers, the African Union, and the Somali military are finding it quite difficult to eliminate al-Shabaab because even when they eliminate large numbers of its fighters, new ones soon appear.  Until the factors that draw young people into the terrorist group are significantly mitigated, the pipeline of recruits ready to take up arms will very likely remain quite full.


Source:

Liban Osiye and Liban A. Hussien, “To counter al-Shabaab, Somalia’s new govt must do something for the kids,”African Arguments (pan-African independent news platform), 24 May 2022. https://africanarguments.org/2022/05/to-counter-al-shabaab-somalias-new-govt-must-do-something-for-the-kids/

Tackling this war crime head on will be critical to saving thousands of children from myriad forms of abuse and, in some instances, death. But it will also be essential to combating the al-Shabaab threat as a whole. In almost all the groups’ acts of terrorism, young people are involved in some capacity.

Over the past decade or so, Somali’s federal government has attempted to combat al-Shabaab’s child recruitment in a variety of, ultimately ineffective, ways.

Unless President Mohamud’s administration honestly examines the reasons that many young people and their families see joining al-Shabaab as an attractive or necessary option, the Islamist militants will keep winning the radicalisation war. To truly tackle child recruitment, his new government will have to recognise that al-Shabaab’s greatest tools in turning Somalia’s future generations against its present leadership are issues such as endemic poverty, social exclusion, lack of basic public services, endemic corruption, paralysed politics, and poor governance. An effective military strategy is also essential to combatting al-Shabaab – insecurity allows militants to use brute force, torture and abductions to recruit many child soldiers – but not sufficient.

Most of al-Shabaab’s child recruits are from areas the group holds or has a significant presence in. But it is notable that its level of recruitment in big cities like the capital Mogadishu is reportedly increasing.

And it has been found to use girls as cooks, cleaners, and “wives” as well as to spy or move weaponry.


Image Information:

Image: Despite the efforts of Somali soldiers, such as those pictured here, and AMISOM/ATMIS, al-Shabaab remains a powerful force.
Source: AMISOM/Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/au_unistphotostream/7306922512/in/album-72157629979805598/
Attribution: Public Domain

Murder of Paraguayan Prosecutor in Colombia Suggests Transnational Criminal Cooperation

Brazilian Police have faced stiff resistance in the face of a sophisticated and expanding PCC.

Brazilian Police have faced stiff resistance in the face of a sophisticated and expanding PCC.


“The prosecutor was leading one of the largest anti-mafia operations in the history of Paraguay, a key country in the region’s drug trafficking network.”


Paraguayan prosecutor Marcelo Pecci was recently murdered on the Island of Barú while on honeymoon with his wife.  The young prosecutor, who specialized in organized crime, had a reputation for pursuing cases related to transnational criminal organizations and money laundering.  His brutal murder, far from Paraguay, shocked the nation and hinted at a highly organized and motivated set of criminal organizations operating in conjunction.  Five suspects, one Venezuelan and four Colombians, have been arrested and prosecuted for the crime, according to reporting in Spain’s top newspaper El País.  The BBC’s Spanish-language news service BBC Español further reports that the hit was likely organized by the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), Brazil’s largest and most sophisticated criminal organization.  The PCC uses Paraguay’s relatively ungoverned tri-border area as a hub for smuggling and money laundering.  Pecci was conducting one of the largest investigations into criminal organizations in Paraguay’s history.  The cross-continent operation displays a remarkable level of criminal coordination and sophistication.  It also shows the extent to which Paraguay risks becoming a state held hostage by criminal interests operating in its much larger neighbor.  Finally, Pecci’s assassination highlights the persistent inability of Latin America’s governments to protect prosecutors, police, and politicians pursuing anti-corruption agendas.


Source:

“Capturan a los presuntos asesinos del fiscal Marcelo Pecci (The capture of alleged murderers of prosecutor Marcelo Pecci),” El País (Spain’s top newspaper with comprehensive coverage of Latin America), 3 June 2022.  https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2022-06-03/capturan-a-los-presuntos-asesinos-del-fiscal-marcelo-pecci.html

Pecci was a specialized prosecutor against organized crime in Paraguay and was in charge of several of the most important drug trafficking and money laundering cases in that country…Without committing to a hypothesis, the director of the Colombian Police, General Jorge Vargas, said that ‘two of the main investigations carried out by prosecutor Pecci in Latin America were against the Primeiro Comanda da Capital—the most powerful group of organized crime in Brazil and South America—and the structure known as Point 50, in the south of the continent.’ 

Source:  “Marcelo Pecci: las nuevas evidencias sobre el asesinato del fiscal paraguayo (Marcelo Pecci: the new evidence on the murder of the Paraguayan prosecutor),” BBC Español (the Spanish-language version of the popular British outlet), 8 June 2022.  https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-61741012  

Pecci was enjoying his honeymoon with his wife in the tourist town of Barú, near Cartagena, when he dismounted a jet ski and a gunman shot him.  The prosecutor was leading one of the largest anti-mafia operations in the history of Paraguay, a key country in the region’s drug trafficking network.


Image Information:

Image:  Brazilian Police have faced stiff resistance in the face of a sophisticated and expanding PCC.
Source:  Wikimedia,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File :A_group_of_police_officers_at_2004_Brazilian_Grand_Prix.JPG
Attribution:  CC BY-SA 2.5

Iran Warns UAE Against Allowing Israel in the Persian Gulf

Admiral Tangsiri reviews Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces during a June 2022 visit to Greater Tonb Island.

Admiral Tangsiri reviews Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces during a June 2022 visit to Greater Tonb Island.


“Khomeini was satisfied, which is the best medal of honor for us.”


The excerpted article from Iran’s official diplomatic news website, IranDiplomacy, suggests that Iranian officials worry about the implication of Israeli ties to Gulf Cooperation Council states, which lay less than 200 miles across the Persian Gulf from Iran’s coast.  As Israel develops diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, Iranian officials grow increasingly concerned that these states could provide Israel with a military foothold less than a half hour flying time from Iran’s southern border.

It is within this context that the visit of the chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Navy (IRGC-N), Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, to Greater Tonb Island is important.  In 1970, two years after the British government announced its impending withdrawal from areas east of the Suez Canal, the Iranian Navy launched an assault on Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tonb Islands, each of which are internationally recognized as belonging to the UAE.  The islands are strategically important because they dominate the waters as ships move from the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf.  The IRGC has long fortified these islands.  During his visit, Tangsiri condemned rapprochement with Israel, essentially threatening Abu Dhabi that any cooperation with Jerusalem will risk Emirati security.  Bahrain hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet and will also understand the implied threat given previous Iranian efforts to incite Bahrain’s majority Shi’ite population against the Sunni monarchy.  The discussion of the IRGC-N and fortifications on Greater Tonb Islands more broadly can pose a threat to international shipping.  Indeed, Tangsiri speaks effusively about the IRGC-N’s seizure of Greek tankers in the Persian Gulf on 27 May. 


Source:

“Sardar Tangsiri dar Bazdid az Jazireh-e Tonb-e Bozorg: Emruz Amniyat-e Motalubi ba Hamkari Keshvarha-ye Hamsayeh dar Hawzeh-e Khaliji Fars Vujud Darad (Admiral Tangsiri visiting Greater Tonb Island: Today there is good security with the cooperation of neighboring Persian Gulf countries),” IranDiplomacy.ir (Iran’s official diplomatic news website), 11 June 2022. http://irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/2012448

Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- Navy [IRGC-N], visited units stationed on Greater Tonb Island to check the condition of fortifications and engineering structures, passive defense and to assess combat readiness…

Admiral Tangsiri, referring to the recent order of the Supreme Leader and his appreciation and satisfaction for the performance of the Marines, which raised national pride and fulfilled Iranian zeal, said: By seizing the offending Greek tankers, the deputy of the Mahdi, Grand Ayatollah Imam Khomeini was satisfied, which is the best medal of honor for us.

The commander of IRCG-Navy said, “Today, there is good security with the cooperation and synergy of neighboring countries in the geographical area of the Persian Gulf. If anyone opens the door to this region of the miserable regime, the child-killing regime and the number one enemy, that is Zionism, for any reason, he will cause insecurity, disorder and instability to the region.”


Image Information:

Image: Admiral Tangsiri reviews Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces during a June 2022 visit to Greater Tonb Island
Source: Sharvand Online
https://shahrvandonline.ir/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/تنگسیری.jpg
NO ATRIBUTION

Iran Opens New Drone Plant in Tajikistan

Tajik Minister of Defense Shir Ali Mirza with Mohammed Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces.

Tajik Minister of Defense Shir Ali Mirza with Mohammed Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces.


“God willing, in the future we will see more cooperation and interaction from all levels of military defense between Iran and Tajikistan.”


The excerpted article from one of Iran’s major economic newspapers, Eghtesad News, illustrates how Iran uses drones to secure diplomatic objectives.  The article discusses Iran’s Army Chief of Staff General Mohammed Bagheri’s recent visit to Tajikistan, where he attended the inauguration of the Ababil-2 [RG1] drone plant in Dushanbe.  In meetings with Tajik officials, Bagheri also discussed common defense of the border against the Taliban. Tehran appears not to have offered Tajikistan the rights to manufacture the Ababil-3 presumably to maintain its own qualitative military edge among regional states and because of Tajikistan’s continued warm relationship with the United States.  The Ababil-3 is larger, has a reported flight endurance of eight hours, and a maximum ceiling of 15,000 feet.

While some countries, such as Turkey, export drones to cement partnerships with countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, Iranian strategy differs as Iran authorizes the manufacture of its drones abroad.  In addition to providing drones to allies, this strategy also gives Iran plausible deniability in the case of nonstate actors like Lebanon’s Hezbollah or Yemen’s Houthis using Iranian-made drones.  It also creates international clients for ongoing military equipment and hardware sales.

Iran may have turned to drone diplomacy with Tajikistan for several reasons.  Iran has long considered Tajikistan within its own cultural circle because of the common language—Tajik is a dialect of Persian (Farsi), the official language of Iran.  However, Iran-Tajikistan relations have not always been smooth.  Emomali Rahmon, who has dominated Tajikistan since 1994, resented Iran’s backing of the Islamic opposition during the civil war that dominated the first decade of Tajik independence.  For its part, Tajikistan has buried its frustration with Iran and other regional states to make common cause against the Taliban in recent years.


Source:

“Eftetah-e Karkhaneh Tavalid-e Pehpad-e Irani Ababil-2 dar Tajikistan (Inauguration of the Iranian Ababil-2 UAV plant in Tajikistan), Eghtesad News (major Iranian economic newspaper), 17 May 2022. https://www.eghtesadnews.com/بخش-اخبار-سیاسی-57/495755-افتتاح-کارخانه-تولید-پهپاد-ایرانی-ابابیل-در-تاجیکستان

Inauguration of Ababil-2 UAV Plant in Tajikistan
In order to strengthen and develop joint defense and military cooperation between the two countries and with the efforts of defense industry experts of the Ministry of Defense and the support of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Ababil-2 UAV plant was inaugurated in Dushanbe in the presence of General Bagheri and Minister of Defense Shir Ali Mirza and a high-ranking group of commanders in the Tajikistan capital of Dushanbe.

General Bagheri pointed out that the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the efforts of its committed specialists and scientists and using its internal capabilities, has been able to have a significant growth in all military and defense dimensions, especially drones. “Today we are in a position where we can export military equipment to allied and friendly countries in addition to meeting domestic needs in order to increase security and lasting peace,” he said. The Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces described the opening of the Ababil-2 plant in Tajikistan as a turning point in military cooperation between the two countries, adding: “God willing, in the future we will see more cooperation and interaction from all levels of military defense between Iran and Tajikistan.”


Image Information:

Image: Tajik Minister of Defense Shir Ali Mirza with Mohammed Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces
Source: EghtesadNews; https://shorturl.at/hoFNW
NO ATTRIBUTION

Iran Unveils New Drone-Fired Cruise Missile

A Haider-1 missile mounted on an Iranian helicopter.

A Haider-1 missile mounted on an Iranian helicopter.


“They collectively warn the enemy against any unwise action.”


The Iranian military recently invited Iranian journalists into the 313 Strategic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle base buried under the Zagros Mountains, which run along the majority of the Iran-Iraq border and reach heights of up to 14,000 feet.  While Western reporting tends to focus on the underground nature of the base, the majority of the Iranian press, including the official Holy Defense News Agency from which the accompanying translation is excerpted, focuses on the Haider-1 missile and the Haider-2 drone.

The Haider-1 missile has a reported range of around 120 miles and can strike targets at speeds of up to 600 miles per hour.  According to Iranian press reports, the country’s Fotros[RG1]  and Kaman-22 drones can launch the missile.  While the missile’s range itself may not be impressive, the Fotros drone reportedly has an operational range of approximately 1,250 miles, a flight endurance of approximately 30 hours, and a ceiling of 25,000 feet.  This would place the entirety of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman within its range.  The Iran Aviation Industries Organization designed and produced the Fotros drone as an air-to-surface missile platform.  The regular Army’s Air Force uses the Kaman-22, which is a multi-purpose platform with a 620-mile operating radius and a flight endurance of approximately 10 hours.  It can be fitted for offensive, surveillance, or electronic warfare missions.  Iran first unveiled the Haider-1 missile attached to some of its helicopters in 2019.  At the time Iranian military spokesman said it would be drone-launched as well, and so this current announcement seems to follow through on this claim.

The nature of the Haider-2 “cruise drone” is less clear, but it appears to be an upgraded kamikaze drone.  The line between cruise missiles and kamikaze drones is sometimes blurry.  Iran points and shoots cruise missiles to target shipping and stationary targets and seeks advantage from a cruise missile’s faster speed.  Kamikaze drones are also guided onto the target but are a multi-use platform as opposed to the single-use cruise missile.


Source:

“Vizhgiha-ye Moshak ‘Haider-1’ va Pehpad-e Kruz ‘Heider-2’ (Characteristics of Haider-1 Missile and Haider-2 Cruise Drone),” Holy Defense News Agency (Iran state run media outlet), 30 May 2022. https://defapress.ir/fa/news/525883

…Brigadier General Shahin Taghikhani, the army’s deputy minister for Public Relations, expressed his condolences over the death of a number of compatriots in the Abadan metropolitan area, and said, “The military has significantly upgraded its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities in both quantity and quality, and has for a long time launched the production line of some UAVs.” He called the design, production and equipping of UAVs a move based on knowledge and technology and added, “We presented some of these achievements at the 313 Strategic Drone Base, and apart from reconnaissance, combat and destruction drones, we revealed various types of new Iranian ammunition.

…The Army spokesman said: “The Army Ground Force’s Haidar-1 missile is carried by large drones and can strike from a distance of 120 miles.” Taghikhani continued, “The Haider-2 Drone, designed by the Army Ground Forces, is a ‘cruise’ drone with a range of several hundred miles…Emphasizing that Iran has a collection of bombs, missiles, rockets and other equipment installed on UAVs, he said, “These achievements are the product of the creative minds of the youth in the army, the Ministry of Defense and the hi-tech companies, and they collectively warn the enemy against any unwise action against the Islamic Republic.

Emphasizing that Iran has a collection of bombs, missiles, rockets and other equipment installed on UAVs, he said, “These achievements are the product of the creative minds of the youth in the army, the Ministry of Defense and the hi-tech companies, and they collectively warn the enemy against any unwise action against the Islamic Republic.


Image Information:

Image: A Haider-1 missile mounted on an Iranian helicopter
Source: Mashreghnews.ir https://cdn.mashreghnews.ir/d/2019/04/28/4/2504823.jpg
NO ATTRIBUTION

Russia Revising Marine Doctrine To Use Civilian Ships for Military Purposes

“The country’s revised Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.”


According to an article from Norway-based The Barents Observer, Russia is revising its marine doctrine to easily integrate civilian ships for military tasks when necessary.  Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov noted that the revisions are necessary in the current “geopolitical and military-strategical world situation.”  Borisov blames the “hybrid war of the Collective West” for unprecedented actions against Russia and considers the Russian navy and an update to the marine doctrine as essential for Russia’s survival.

According to the revisions, the navy will include civilian ships and crews and provide functionality of maritime infrastructure in times of war.  As the article points out, the use of civilian ships during war is not unusual or unique to Russia, although Russia has a long history of calling civilian ships into military service when necessary.  The current revisions will make it easier for Russia’s navy to appropriate Russia’s civilian nuclear powered icebreakers, likely giving the Russian navy an advantage in Arctic waters.


Source:

Atle Staalesen, “Russia outlines militarization of fishing fleet and icebreakers,” The Barents Observer (independent Norwegian internet news service in Russian and English currently blocked in Russia, 24 May 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/05/russia-militarizes-its-fishing-fleet-and-icebreakers

The country’s revised Marine Doctrine includes a high stress on use of civilian ships and infrastructure for military purposes.  “The revisions of the Marine Doctrine take into account changes in the geopolitical and military-strategical world situation,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov underlined in a meeting in the government Marine Board late May.  The update of the strategic planning document comes in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine and its unprecedented isolation in international affairs.

According to Borisov, the Navy is now becoming even more important for Russia.  “Considering the total hybrid war of the Collective West against our country, the unprecedented sanctions and the special operation in Ukraine, the strengthening of national security is relevant as never before,” the Deputy Prime Minister stated as he opened the meeting.  The body includes top government officials from several ministries and federal agencies, as well as military representatives.

According to the high-ranking government official with special responsibilities for the military-industrial complex, the new and updated document “to the full extent meets current challenges and threats.  It is aimed not on confrontation, but on enhanced national security in the area of maritime operations [and] a significantly reduced dependency on external influence and markets in all fields of maritime activities.”  Among the revisions highlighted in the updated doctrine is a higher level of engagement of civilian ships in military activities.  According to the government, several “principally new aspects of the doctrine concerns mobilization preparations and preparedness.  This will allow for the inclusion in the Navy of civilian ships and crews and provide functionality of maritime infrastructure in times of war.”

It is hardly a new phenomenon that civilian ships have a role in national security preparedness, as well as military conflicts, and Russia has a long experience in applying non-military ships for military purposes.  But the new federal document clearly prepares the ground for a more systematic approach.  Potentially, Russia can choose to apply a large number of trawlers and fishing vessels for military purposes.  Many of them are active in international waters, including along the Norwegian coast.  Russia can also choose to militarize its powerful nuclear-powered icebreakers, the vessels that autonomously are capably of breaking through the thickest sea-ice of the Arctic.  Ultimately, it could also designate a stronger military role to its research vessels. That could include also the brand new “Severny Polyus[RG1] ,” the ship that is designed for autonomous drifting in Arctic sea-ice for up to two years.

Russia’s current Marine Doctrine was adopted in 2017 and covers the period until 2030. The document highlights the need for a technological modernization of Russian ships and development of transport corridors like the Northern Sea Route.  According to Yuri Borisov, the Russian Navy will in the course of 2022 get a total of 20 new military ships, as well as five motorboats and 21 support vessels.


Russia Building Literal and Figurative Bridges to China

…The first road bridge was opened between Russia and China….”


Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western censure, the pro-Kremlin media has reassured its audience that Russia could not be isolated, and that the country would find other trading partners.  China is often cited as an example of an alternate, trustworthy trading partner with which Russia can expand commerce.  The first excerpt from the pro-business source Kommersant describes the recent construction of two bridges in the Far East that will link China and Russia and facilitate trade. 

According to the article this was “the first road bridge opened between Russia and China,” linking Blagoveshchensk (Russia) to Heihe (China) across the Amur River.  Construction began in 2016, and although it was completed two years ago, “the opening had to be postponed due to the pandemic.”  The article also points that back in April, “the first cross-border railway bridge across the Amur River from the Russian village of Nizhneleninskoye to China’s Tongjiang was opened.”  Citing a logistics’ expert, the article also reinforces the notion “that we [Russia] are experiencing a global drop in foreign trade volumes with the European Union, [so] we need any options for the delivery of goods from the Middle Kingdom in order to somehow compensate for the drop in import flows.”

The second article from the pro-Kremlin source National News Service describes additional economic measures intended to further strengthen Russia-China trade.  It cites a Russian economist who asserts that “China can increase the volume of trade and investment cooperation.  Secondly, it is necessary to develop cross-border cooperationelectronic commercescientific and technical cooperation.”  To increase trade opportunities, the expert recommends that it is necessary to move away from dollars in relations with China in the interbank sphere – to the ruble-yuan regime.”  The article concludes by quoting the Chinese Ambassador to Russia who recently said, “that the world is now at an important turning point, promising that the Russian-Chinese relationship will only get stronger regardless of changes in the international situation.”


Source:

Sabina Adleiba, “Россия и Китай навели мосты (Russia and China build bridges),” Kommersant (pro-business site), 10 June 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5405772

…The first road bridge was opened between Russia and China…. Russia and China signed an agreement on the construction of the bridge back in 2015, work on it began in 2016. For three years, it was erected in parallel from two banks. The facility was ready two and a half years ago, but the opening had to be postponed due to the pandemic.

…The new bridge is two-lane, its length is about a kilometer, plus access roads – 6 km in China, twice as much in Russia. It is expected that more than 600 trucks, about 160 buses and about 70 cars will be able to pass on the new road every day.

In addition, at the end of April, the first cross-border railway bridge from the village of Nizhneleninskoye to China’s Tongjiang was opened. It also passes over the Amur River.  The new route can significantly change this situation, Georgy Vlastopulo, director of Optimal Logistics, believes…. “Taking into account the fact that we are experiencing a global drop in foreign trade volumes with the European Union, we need any options for the delivery of goods from the Middle Kingdom in order to somehow compensate for the drop in import flows.”

Source: Evgenia Zheludkova, “Военные маневры и уход от доллара: Как Китай поддержит Россию в обход санкций (Military maneuvers and the withdrawal from the dollar: How China will support Russia bypassing sanctions),” National News Service (pro-Kremlin site), 3 June 2022. https://nsn.fm/policy/voennye-manevry-i-uhod-ot-dollara-kak-kitai-podderzhit-rossiu-v-obhod-sanktsii

…China will significantly help Russia in economic terms if it decides to switch to rubles and yuan, said Andrey Ostrovsky, head of the Center for Economic and Social Research of China at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences…

“It will be more difficult to provide proper economic support, but there are a number of areas in which cooperation can be further developed,” he added…. “Here, firstly, China can increase the volume of trade and investment cooperation. Secondly, it is necessary to develop cross-border cooperationelectronic commercescientific and technical cooperation, there are many points here…”

“The most important problem today is that it is necessary to move away from dollars in relations with China in the interbank sphere – to the ruble-yuan regime….”

…The day before, Chinese Ambassador to Moscow Zhang Hanhui said that “the world is now at an important turning point, promising that the Russian-Chinese relationship will only get stronger regardless of changes in the international situation.”

Russian Orthodox Church Strengthening Support for Ukraine Invasion

Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces.

Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces.


“…It is worth recalling that shortly before the start of the special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, Hilarion said: “I am personally afraid of war. And I think that we must do everything to ensure that there is no war, no big war, no small war, no world war, no local war.”


Given its close alignment with the Kremlin, it is not surprising that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has adopted a “you are either with us or against us” philosophy and has openly endorsed the so-called “special military operation” (SMO) in Ukraine.  (For additional background, see “Religious Blessing for the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine,” OE Watch, May 2022). The accompanying excerpt from the semi-independent Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta describes some recent changes in the ROC’s hierarchy and organization, which reflects its growing militancy.  The article begins by recounting the recent transfer of high-level ROC cleric Metropolitan Hilarion, who had spoken out against the conflict in Ukraine.  Drawing an analogy to the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, Hilarion reminded his flock about “Rasputin [who] was an ardent opponent of Russia’s entry into the war.  He warned the tsar that if Russia entered the war, it would threaten the whole country with catastrophic consequences.” 

The article also provides an update regarding Orthodox believers in Ukraine who, up until last month, pledged allegiance to the Russian patriarch.  They now have announced their intention to split from the ROC, which has caused consternation in Moscow.  In the past, the clerics of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy (UOC-MP) enjoyed some level of independence from the church leadership in Moscow, but they will now fall under the “direct canonical and administrative subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.”  The article also discusses the restoration “of protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy,” who will serve as the chief liaison between the ROC and the military.  In the past, “this chief military priest was equated with a general.” 

The growing proximity of the ROC and the military, according to the excerpt, “is not surprising.  After the start of the invasion of Ukraine, the patriarch visited the main military church in Kubinka several times and delivered sermons there on the importance of military service.”  These religious developments, whereby the ROC is losing influence in Ukraine, may provide additional incentives for the Kremlin to gain control over the entire country. 


Source:

Andrei Melnikov, “РПЦ переходит на военное положение (The Russian Orthodox Church moves into martial law),” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (semi-independent Russian media outlet), 7 June 2022.  https://www.ng.ru/faith/2022-06-07/1_8455_general.html

The synod of the Russian Orthodox Church at a meeting on Tuesday put an end to the ambiguous position of the church against the backdrop of a military special operation in Ukraine. No longer bound by obligations to its Ukrainian believers, the Moscow Patriarchate is bringing its own configuration into line with the limits of influence of the Russian state. The synodals made revolutionary decisions: they removed Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev), who was responsible for “pacifism” in the Russian Orthodox Church, from the post of chairman of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR), and at the same time strengthened the spiritual and patriotic component of church policy….

…It is worth recalling that shortly before the start of the special military operation of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, Hilarion said: “I am personally afraid of war. And I think that we must do everything to ensure that there is no war, no big war, no small war, no world war, no local war. There are a lot of forces that want to drag us into some kind of war, and they are not only outside our country, but also inside it. There are those who want to rattle weapons, who say: they say, we are invincible, invincible, we will repulse any enemy. In March, he suddenly began to justify Grigory Rasputin. “Rasputin was an ardent opponent of Russia’s entry into the war. And he warned the tsar that if Russia entered the war, it would threaten the whole country with catastrophic consequences….”

The rejection of soft church power was also reflected in other decisions of the Synod of June 7. The ROC responded in a peculiar way to the recent declaration of independence by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – mainly with the votes of those participants in the Council of the UOC on May 27, who are located on the territory of the country controlled by the Kyiv authorities. For a long time, starting from the Russian spring of 2014, the Moscow Patriarchate maintained demonstrative independence from the political situation and left the three eparchies of Crimea under the jurisdiction of the UOC.

In response to the appeals of His Grace Metropolitan Platon of Theodosius and Kerch, Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea, Bishop Alexy of Dzhankoy and Razdolnensky, proceeding from the need to maintain an effective canonical and administrative connection with the central church authorities for the successful flow of church life in the dioceses served by the aforementioned bishops, taking into account the practical the impossibility of regular communication of these dioceses with the Kievan Metropolia, to accept the Dzhankoy, Simferopol and Feodosiya eparchies into direct canonical and administrative subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, – says in synodal journals…. 

…Finally, the Synod, in a sense, turned history back: it restored the position of protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy, which had been abolished in 1918….  The chief military priest was equated with a general. ….

The attention of the Synod to the military theme is not surprising. After the start of the special operation in Ukraine, the patriarch visited the main military church in Kubinka several times and delivered sermons there on the importance of military service. It was these sermons that became the basis for calls for sanctions against the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, because he allegedly “blessed” the special operation in Ukraine. 


Image Information:

Image: Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Cathedral_of_the_Russian_Armed_Forces
Attribution: CCA 4.0 Intl

Russia’s “Terminator” System in Ukraine To Inform Tactics

Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT).

Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT).

Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT).

Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT).


“In terms of firepower, according to experts, one “Terminator”, armed with cannons, rockets and machine guns, surpasses two motorized rifle platoons.”


The accompanying excerpted article from Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta  describes the capabilities of Russia’s Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT[RG1] ) and how it has been employed during Russia’s 2022 invasion of the Ukraine.  Also known as the ‘Terminator’ for its intent to destroy infantryman wielding antitank weapons, the BMPT concept has been in development since Soviet times.  Despite Russia’s reportedly successful use of the system during the Syrian campaign and the fact that a few foreign militaries (Kazakhstan and Algeria) have adopted it, there is currently only one BMPT company in the Russian Ground Forces.  According to the article, there is a debate about possibly rebranding the system by changing the name from ‘Tank Support Combat Vehicle’ to ‘Fire Support Combat Vehicle’ because the system can also support mounted and dismounted infantry formations.  The perceived success or failure of the BMPT in the Donbas will likely cause Russia to more widely field the BMPT, or abandon the program entirely.  If successful, the heavy combat conditions that BMPT is encountering will allow Russian tacticians and planners to determine the best tactics and force structure for the BMPTs integration with the Russian Ground Forces.


Source:

Sergey Ptichkin, “ВС РФ впервые применили в ходе спецоперации БМПТ ‘Терминатор’ (The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation used the BMPT ‘Terminator’ for the first time during the special operation),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official Russian government newspaper), 18 May 2022. https://rg.ru/2022/05/18/vs-rf-vpervye-primenili-v-hode-specoperacii-bmpt-terminator.html

…BMPTs, together with tank platoons, are involved in the destruction of Ukrainian positions, armored vehicles, and crews of anti-tank missile systems. It is also said that the participation of the BMPT in the course of the special operation will make it possible to finally form the tactics for the use of these vehicles and determine their place in the armored groups…

In terms of firepower, according to experts, one “Terminator”, armed with cannons, rockets and machine guns, surpasses two motorized rifle platoons.  Based on the Afghan experience, the first BMPT was developed, which received the name “Terminator” at the beginning of the 21st century. It was actively promoted by the head of the Main Armored Directorate, Colonel General Sergei Maev. But even his authority was not enough for the accelerated delivery of a machine to the troops, which really has no analogues in the world.

Perhaps the situation will now change, and the BMPT will go into mass production. By the way, an idea to slightly change the name of the system was put forward, to designate the “Terminators” as fire support combat vehicles.  Because the “Terminator” is capable of supporting not only tanks, but also infantry, especially those fighting in cities.

Here are just the main features and benefits of this machine. Since the BMPT was created on the basis of the T-72[RG1] , it has a tank’s armored protection — it is difficult to knock it out. It has optical, television and thermal imaging sites for observation and aiming. It sees at night as well as during the day…The BMPT is armed with two quick-firing 30 mm 2A42 cannons and four Ataka missiles. The 45-degree elevation angle of the missile armament and cannons makes it possible to conduct effective combat operations in mountainous terrain and in urban areas…


Image Information:

Image: Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT)
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/Rehearsal-in-Alabino-17-April-2019/i-chgNPrQ/0/5070c462/X2/Rehearsal17April2019-0071-X2.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Image: Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT)
Source: Vitaly Kuzmin, https://photos.smugmug.com/Military/Rehearsal-in-Alabino-17-April-2019/i-MHbnq66/0/ce5af375/X2/Rehearsal17April2019-0072-X2.jpg
Attribution: CC BY 4.0

Russia Tests Palantin Electronic Warfare System in Ukraine

Palantin Electronic Warfare System.

Palantin Electronic Warfare System.


The accompanying excerpted article from Russia’s official government newspaper, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, describes some of the capabilities of the Palantin electronic warfare (EW) system and how it has been employed during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—the first reported use of the system in combat.  According to the article, its most important advantage “lies in the ability to combine the electronic warfare systems such as [of] the “Moskva”, “Zhitel,” and “Judoist” into a “single working network.”  The Russian military personnel featured in the article claim that the Palantin EW system “disables reconnaissance drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” and “jams cellular communication and Internet sources at Ukrainian command posts,” but other, more objective open sources have not confirmed how effective the system has proven on the Ukrainian battlefield.

The Russian Ground Forces have a three-tiered system for EW.  At the maneuver brigade and division level, each has an EW company that focuses on tactical tasks.  At the combined arms Army level, each has an EW battalion that focuses on operational-tactical tasks.  At the Military District level, each has an EW brigade that focuses on strategic-level tasks.  At the tactical level, the Borisoglebsk-2. EW system is the primary and latest EW system for maneuver brigade/division level EW companies, while the Palantin EW system is the primary and latest system for combined arms Army level EW battalions.


Source:

Yuri Gavrilov, “Видео: Как работает в боевой обстановке комплекс РЭБ “Палантин” (Video: How the Palantin electronic warfare system works in a combat situation),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official Russian government newspaper), 4 June 2022.  https://rb.gy/4fjl6

The Palantin electronic warfare system disables reconnaissance drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, jams cellular communication and Internet sources at Ukrainian command posts, without disturbing the civilian communications infrastructure…The electronic warfare system independently detects enemy drones, intercepts their control signal, and interferes with them. As a result, the UAV loses contact with the operator on the ground.

The commander of the jamming company, Sergei, says that the specialists of his unit have mastered modern radio-electronic equipment without any problems. “Palantin” is the newest system, it is extremely easy to operate and maintain. The electronic warfare system provides automatic detection and suppression of radio communication lines…

A few words about what the Palantin-K electronic warfare system consists of.  It is mounted on four-axle KamAZ vehicles, and is designed to suppress existing and future radio communication systems, as well as to conduct signals intelligence. The capabilities of the system make it possible to “dazzle” enemy electronic systems in the ultrashort-wave [very high frequency (VHF)] and short-wave [high frequency (HF)] bands.

In addition, the “Palantin” can interfere with navigation systems and disable an air defense radars or a command and control systems…this system can deprive the enemy of cellular and trunking communications. Its most important advantage lies in the ability to combine the electronic warfare systems such as the “Moskva”, “Zhitel” and “Judoist” into a single working network… Experts say that “Palantin” is 2-3 times superior to Russian EW systems of the previous generation and currently has no analogues in combat capabilities in any army of leading foreign states.


Image Information:

Image: Palantin Electronic Warfare System
Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, https://rb.gy/4fjl6
Attribution: CC BY 4.0